1. Project Data

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<tr>
<td>Reviewed by</td>
<td>Salim J. Habayeb</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR Review Coordinator</td>
<td>Eduardo Fernandez Maldonado</td>
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<td>Group</td>
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives
According to the Financing Agreement (p. 5), the project’s objectives were "to strengthen the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) system and to improve the employability of youth in selected priority sectors of the economy."

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
   No

d. Components
   The project contained three components:

1. **Improvement in the quality and relevance of training** (appraisal: US$ 61 million, of which IDA US$ 28 million; actual IDA: US$ 28.13 million). This component was to improve the quality and relevance of training in Lycées Techniques (LTs), establish clusters of training centers for skills development in priority sectors, and create and implement a system for certification of skills.

   - For the LTs (which prepare students for continuing education for the University Institute of Technology, Diploma of Higher Technician (BTS) degree, or engineering school), the project was to upgrade selected LTs to centers of excellence through improvements in infrastructure and performance-based contracts to improve the quality of service delivery.
   
   - For the new clusters of training centers, the project was to respond to the needs of the private sector by upgrading existing centers and establishing new ones in horticulture, poultry farming, and tourism. These three sectors were chosen based on the readiness of the private sector to contribute to the training system and the potential for jobs creation. The clustering was to work across sites to ensure appropriate training for a range of activities across the value chain, covering all levels from the lowest (Certificate of Vocational Aptitude, CAP) to the highest (BTS), with training taking place both in the centers and in enterprises. A Board of Directors with private sector representation was to be established for each cluster. The project was to finance construction, rehabilitation, and equipping of infrastructure for the centers, consultant services for program reform and new program design, training of teachers and administrators, and development and implementation of management tools. A Unique Fund (see Component 2) was to be established to finance specific subprojects undertaken by the clusters.

   - For skills certification, the project was to provide short-duration training to youth who were not eligible for the first degree of vocational training because they did not meet the minimum admission requirements (primary or middle school graduate) or were unable to attend longer-duration programs. The courses were to be provided through existing training centers in the areas of agriculture, services, industrial manufacturing, information and communication technology, tourism and hospitality, construction, power, or fashion. At the completion of the training, each student was to be awarded a Certificate of Specialization. The project was to finance the development of training standards, vouchers for students to support part of the training fees, consultancies to support the development and implementation of the training program, and renovation or small-scale construction and equipment of training centers.

2. **Reform of the TVET sector's financial system** (appraisal: US$ 6.5 million of which IDA US$ 4.5 million; actual IDA: US$ 1.41 million). This component was to streamline and strengthen the funding instruments of the government's TVET policy. It was to support: (a) administrative and managerial reforms of the Directorate of General Administration and Equipment, which manages most TVET institutions' budgets at the central level, and (b) consolidation of existing mechanisms for financing TVET for individuals and businesses into a new Unique Fund (Fonds Unique, now known as Fonds de Financement de la Formation Professionnelle et Technique, or 3FPT) with a mandate to finance on-the-job training of workers at the request of existing businesses that need to upgrade their employees' skills; finance training centers and...
institutions on the basis of performance criteria; finance individual training for youth who are seeking qualifications to enter the labor market; and provide quality assurance to include standard setting, program accreditation of both public and private providers, quality audits, and the publication of reports.

3. Support for system management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and project management (appraisal: US$ 9 million, of which IDA US$ 2.5 million; actual IDA: US$ 3.49 million). This component was to strengthen the capacity of the Directorate of Technical and Vocational Education and key subunits, and to support the establishment of an M&E system, fiduciary management, and coordination of project activities. It was to finance external evaluations of each performance-based contract under the first component, to be used to decision making for financing of subsequent contracts. It was also to develop and implement a communication program on sector reforms undertaken by the government.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

The project was to be financed by an International Development Association (IDA) credit of $35 million, to be supplemented by a government contribution of US$ 25 million and US$ 16.5 million from the French Development Agency (AFD), for a total program cost of US$ 76.5 million. The AFD and IDA shared the same Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and conducted joint support missions, though AFD and IDA funds used a parallel financing mechanism and separate bank accounts. Actual IDA costs were US$ 33.03 million. The ICR reported that there were approximately US$ 1.71 million equivalent in exchange rate losses and US$ 0.26 million in undisbursed funds. The ICR did not provide the actual total program costs or the actual contributions for the government or AFD; the project team later clarified that, as the AFD financing was parallel rather than co-financing, the project did not track costs other than for the IDA credit.

The project was approved on December 8, 2014 and became effective on July 14, 2015. A mid-term review was conducted in March 2018. A December 19, 2019 restructuring reallocated funds across categories and extended the closing date by one year, from January 25, 2020 to January 25, 2021, to allow time for completion of activities. A second restructuring, on January 25, 2021, extended the project's closing date for another four months to allow for disbursement of remaining funds. The project closed on May 25, 2021.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The project's objectives were highly relevant to government strategy, country conditions, and Bank strategy. The government's strategic plan, Plan Senegal Emergent (Plan for an Emerging Senegal, 2012-2019, renewed 2019-2024), aimed to reverse low economic growth by focusing on improvements in the business climate and the development of clusters of services and skills to raise the productivity and capacity of businesses and the labor force. Under the Plan, efforts were focused on key sectors that have high potential for adding value, creating employment, and boosting exports: agriculture, mining, fisheries, clothing, information and communication technology, education and health care services, and tourism. The highest-priority metric to reduce poverty within this framework was the creation of 300,000 jobs by 2020, in part by ensuring better linkages between training programs and economic needs. Toward this goal, the government established an official TVET certification system that provides diplomas by skill level from lowest to highest, entry qualifications, and normal length of time to complete a given level of qualification,
as well as certifications of course completion for students who have undergone training but not completed formal certification exams. The Ministry of Vocational and Technical Training, Apprenticeship and Arts and Crafts (MFPAA), established in 2005 as a separate entity from the Ministry of Education, provides pre-employment TVET through public and private training institutions offering certificate or diploma programs as well as traditional apprenticeship programs. Despite this structure of training opportunities, a remarkably large share of the working-age population (36%) was neither working nor attending school at the time of project appraisal. This was observed at a similar rate among both youth and adults, many of whom were relatively well educated, and both urban and rural populations. Multiple weaknesses in the TVET sector were identified as contributing to this lack of uptake and effectiveness: weak linkages between TVET, economic sectors, and the development agenda; limited diversity of TVET specializations being offered; low-quality TVET courses, equipment, and instruction; gender and geographic inequities in training opportunities; and inadequate and inefficient financing of the TVET system. The government's strategic plans for the education sector (2001-2011, and 2012-2022) responded to these needs by placing TVET second in priority only to primary education, with goals to diversify training opportunities, update training programs, establish public-private partnerships in the development and delivery of training programs, expand work-study and apprenticeship programs, introduce competency-based approaches to training, and provide additional training opportunities and incentives for women. Prior to the project, the Bank had been the main development partner supporting Senegal's education sector, but there had been no interventions in TVET. This project meant that the Bank was involved across all levels of education in the country. This approach aligned the project with the Bank's Country Partnership Strategy at appraisal (2013-2017), which contained a pillar on ensuring the availability of skills necessary for accelerating growth and creating employment. The Bank's 2018 Systematic Country Diagnostic noted that, in the medium to long term, sustained economic growth and rising living standards can only be achieved through increases in productivity gained through strong human capital and innovation. The project's objectives remain highly relevant to the current Country Partnership Framework (2020-2024), which has a focus area on building human capital to enhance productivity and ignite the demographic dividend.

Rating
High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1
Objective
Strengthen the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) system

Rationale
The theory of change for this objective held that creating new TVET funding and governance mechanisms, improving training institutions through renovation of physical facilities, increasing the quality of training through performance-based contracts (PBCs) in selected LTs, establishing clusters of training centers, reforming TVET curricula, improving the expertise of trainers and creating new competencies in three targeted sectors (horticulture, poultry farming, and tourism), and supporting development of new short-term skills certification programs would lead to increased TVET outputs: more training clusters in the targeted sectors, more upgrading of LTs to centers of excellence through the use of PBCs, and more private sector involvement in TVET institutional governance. Taken together, these improvements would amount to strengthening of the TVET system.

**Outcomes**

The 3FPT was established and is functional for the financing and quality assurance of training centers as of November 2021, as planned. 682 institutions benefitted from its funding, far exceeding the target of nine institutions. The 3FPT created four funding windows that provided financing for individuals (a total of 48,805 men and women), training institutions (98 institutions in total, for development of strategic/institutional development plans), companies and professional organizations that requested training (42,156 employees/workers in 455 companies, and 28,126 young people from small enterprises), and quality assurance (a process that accredited 120 training organizations). 91% of financing through the 3FPT was provided by employer contributions, which led to a significant overachievement of targets for numbers of beneficiaries and programs supported under the project (see also Outcomes under Objective 2).

From a baseline of zero in 2013, 268 TVET institutions had functioning Boards of Directors in November 2021, far exceeding the target of 15 institutions. All TVET institutions targeted by the project now have a
Board of Directors. Nine of these institutions have a Board chair from the private sector, exceeding the target of six. According to the ICR (p. 22), private sector representation on the Boards has been essential in ensuring strong public-private partnerships for the TVET system as a whole, as well as supporting labor market-responsive program development within TVET institutions.

Rating
High

**OBJECTIVE 2**

**Objective**
Improve the employability of youth in selected priority sectors of the economy

**Rationale**
The theory of change for this objective held that, in addition to the interventions described under the first objective, streamlining and reinforcing the TVET funding mechanism by operationalizing the 3FPT would lead to an increase in the number of TVET institutions benefiting from that Fund, leading to more youth accessing TVET programming with skills leading to employment.

**Outputs**

75 short-term programs were offered, almost quadrupling the target of 20 programs. 14,883 trainees were enrolled in these programs, exceeding the target of 10,000 trainees.

8,846 students were enrolled in renovated science and technical programs in LTs, exceeding the target of 7,000 students. 40% of programs were delivered by a professional trainer in the private sector in targeted institutions, meeting the target of 40%.

**Outcomes**

From a baseline of zero in 2013, 6,746 youth graduated from short-term skills development training as of November 2021, not meeting the target of 7,500. The ICR (p. 23) noted that the shortfall was due to certifications being suspended in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, that an additional 1,000 students graduated from training centers after the centers re-opened following pandemic-related shutdowns and were awaiting their certificates of specialization at the time the ICR was prepared, and that 2,000 other students are currently enrolled, with 29,500 others on waitlists.

From a baseline of zero in 2013, the percentage of youth who graduated from short-term skills development training and were employed one year after completion of the training reached 36.44% as of November 2021, falling significantly short of the target of 70%. The percentage of females who graduated and were employed one year after completion reached 26.89%, not reaching the target of 40%. The results cover only the first cohort of graduates, and the ICR (p. 24) noted that this cohort did not benefit from the full curriculum
revisions that were supported by the project. A survey of the second cohort of graduates was not possible prior to project closing due to COVID-19. The government is currently conducting additional tracer studies. The project team later confirmed that the funding and terms of reference for a second tracer study have been secured, and the results are expected in 2022.

From a baseline of zero, 2,140 youth graduated from training clusters in horticulture (1,375), poultry (460), and tourism (305) as of November 2021, not meeting the overall target of 2,740 graduates, and not meeting the cluster targets of 1,500 for horticulture, 585 for poultry, or 655 for tourism. The ICR did not provide information on the percentage of these graduates who were female, per the indicator. The ICR noted that the results were affected by the pandemic, by slower-than-expected construction of training facilities in the poultry and horticulture sectors, and by a decision (prior to the pandemic) by the MFPAA to limit training in tourism to private training providers.

The ICR stated that there were 89,870 direct beneficiaries of the project as of November 2021, of whom 40% were female, exceeding the target of 14,105 beneficiaries, of whom 35% were to be female. The project team later explained that these direct beneficiaries included all trainees enrolled in project-financed programs.

**Rating**

Modest

**OVERALL EFFICACY**

**Rationale**

Through its integration of the private sector into TVET governance and functions, the consolidation of TVET financing mechanisms into the 3FPT, and strengthening of training institutions, the project highly achieved its objective to strengthen the TVET system. However, the objective to improve the employability of youth was only modestly achieved. Although many more training programs were created and students enrolled than planned, due to higher-than-envisioned financial contributions from the private sector, employment targets were not reached. This shortfall was partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and it appears likely that the resumption of activities following pandemic-related shutdowns will lead to prompt achievement of some targets, but there were other shortcomings related to slow construction of training facilities and government changes in the parameters of training programs.

The PAD (p. 15) cites several other donors active in the area of skills development: Canada (vocational training through apprenticeships, entrepreneurship training, and business plan development); Luxembourg, the International Labour Office, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and the United Nations Development Program (governance of the TVET system, curriculum reform, and employment for trainees); International Organization of Francophone Countries (pilot programs in mechanical engineering, electronics, and management); AFD (sectoral centers in motorized mechanics and energy management); Islamic Development Bank (youth apprenticeships); *Communauté Française de Belgique* (coordination and training of trainers at the National Technical and Vocational Education School); and African Development...
Given High achievement of one objective and Modest achievement of the other, overall efficacy is rated Substantial.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**

Substantial

### 5. Efficiency

At appraisal, a cost-benefit analysis was conducted for the project's first component (80% of planned Bank costs), representing investments in the development and delivery of training programs (PAD, pp. 79-88). Because cost and benefit streams differed by the targeted diploma level, separate calculations were done for the CAP and BTS levels. Benefits were considered for three cohorts who were to complete training by the end of the project, with an assumed program completion and employment rate of 90% and reasonable estimates of earning differentials compared with youth who did not complete any additional education and those who received a general education of similar duration to the supported TVET programs. For the BTS programs, the estimated net present value (NPV) was US$50,000 over ten years and US$91,000 over 20 years, with an internal rate of return (IRR) of 22% and 25%, respectively. For the CAP programs, the NPV was US$25,800 and US$47,000 over 10 and 20 years, with an IRR of 10% and 15%, respectively. The results remained positive even under lower assumptions of completion and employment. All results exceeded the opportunity cost of capital (4%).

The analysis at completion (ICR, pp. 56-68) also covered the first component only (85.2% of actual Bank costs), noting that the benefits of the second and third components were non-quantifiable. It employed similar assumptions to those used at appraisal: that LT beneficiaries experienced no foregone opportunity costs, as they were already enrolled in courses; that opportunity costs for other beneficiaries were equivalent to the average earnings of individuals who had completed previous levels of education; a 4% discount rate; a 3% inflation adjustment rate; wage rates based on levels of education and age, drawn from 2018 government statistics; a retirement age of 60, with project participants remaining in the labor market for up to 35 years following training; and a 90% graduation and insertion rate. These assumptions were reasonable, though they overestimated insertion rates. The analysis found an overall cost-benefit ratio (for the entire project) of 5.7 and IRR of 19.3%, with the highest return (31.3%) under the first component, and an overall NPV of US$174 million. This result supports the viability of project investments, robust under a sensitivity analysis that varied employability (to 75% rather than 90% of graduates finding a job), graduation rates (also adjusted from 90% to 75%), opportunity costs (included for LT beneficiaries), and the discount rate (adjusted to 5%).

Implementation arrangements were embedded within the formal structure of the MFPAA, with the Minister chairing the project's Steering Committee and the Unit for Studies and Planning (CEP) serving as Steering Committee Secretariat and holding responsibility for day-to-day project coordination and management. According to the ICR (p. 31), these arrangements functioned smoothly. According to the ICR (p. 37), joint
implementation support missions with AFD allowed the government to save time and costs, and ensured that donors were working together to achieve common goals. There were, however, minor inefficiencies: some delays in signing of procurement contracts related to the issuance of certificates of existence of funds from the Ministry of Finance, resolved through the establishment of a coordination unit for procurement and financial management; some initial delays in civil works for the LTs and satellite centers, addressed through technical support; and delays in signing of financing agreements with LTs and satellite centers due to quality assurance requirements of the 3FPT, which took more time than expected due to capacity constraints in the MFPAA, resolved through creation of an ad hoc committee within the Ministry. The ICR (p. 32) also noted that there were delays in some civil works and equipment procurement related to the provision of counterpart funds, which was a challenge across the Bank's portfolio in Senegal because commitments exceeded available resources. The COVID-19 pandemic also led to closure of training programs in March 2020, requiring a four-month project extension. Training activities resumed in November 2020.

### Efficiency Rating

**Substantial**

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

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* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

### 6. Outcome

The project's objectives were highly relevant to country context, government strategy, and Bank strategy at appraisal and closing. Project-supported institutional development, including the integration of the private sector into TVET programming and the development of a new TVET funding mechanism, led to high achievement of the objective to strengthen the TVET system. Shortcomings related to the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors led to underachievement of targets for employment of graduates of project-supported TVET institutions, indicating modest achievement of the objective to improve the employability of youth in targeted sectors. Quantified project benefits exceeded costs, and there was evidence of only minor implementation efficiencies. These ratings indicate that there were minor shortcomings in the project's preparation, implementation, and achievement, leading to an Outcome rating of Satisfactory.
a. **Outcome Rating**

Satisfactory

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### 7. Risk to Development Outcome

Project activities and innovations have largely been institutionalized. The government has agreed to allocate the full amount of lump-sum contributions for TVET provided by employers to the 3FPT moving forward, with private sector representation at the core of 3FPT management. According to the ICR (p. 21), this is the first fund of its kind in West Africa with such a high level of commitment from the government and business. The 3FPT’s governance structure, with 50% private sector representation, solidifies the role of the business community and ensures that training will remain relevant to labor market needs. There was significant institutional development throughout the project period that is likely to be sustained, including improved capacity of the MFPAA to govern the sector, use of PBCs, the role of Boards of Directors at training institutions, capacity for the CEP to manage training programs, and skills in procurement, budget analysis, and budget allocation at the Directorate of General Administration and Equipment (DAGE) of the MFPAA. The ICR (p. 36) noted, however, that challenges with unemployment and underemployment remain, requiring continued attention to improving the linkages between training and the private sector through robust internship and/or apprentice programs.

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### 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. **Quality-at-Entry**

The project’s design was based on a comprehensive analysis of the TVET sector conducted in 2013. Lessons learned from this study included: the TVET system was serving only a small proportion of the eligible cohort; demand for TVET skills was high; the diversity of specializations offered was limited; traditional apprenticeships were the most widespread mode of training; the share of resources allocated to TVET was inadequate, even though it had grown steadily from 2008-2011; quality assurance was missing; and the MFPAA was relatively isolated, with few strong, active connections to other important players in training and employment. The project directly addressed the main challenges identified in the study, including the limited capacity of the TVET system to absorb eligible youth, the relevance and diversity of training offered, the weak governance and financing systems in place, and the need to engage the private sector. Project design also learned lessons from prior experience in the education sector, including the need to resolve political conflicts on potentially controversial issues (such as textbook selection) before implementation; all major texts were adopted before negotiations.

Financial management arrangements were adequate and included additional strengthening actions agreed with the Bank (PAD, p. 35). Risk assessment at appraisal was thorough, with mitigation measures clearly specified (PAD, pp. 72-75). Overall implementation risk was rated Substantial, with particular focus on implementing agency capacity, delivery monitoring and sustainability, and political economy factors. Planned mitigation included institutional strengthening plans, selectivity in choosing reforms, and involvement of stakeholders in design of the reform program.
The project was designed using a participative and collaborative process involving public and private sector representatives. Working groups to design the tourism, poultry, and horticulture clusters were led by business people to ensure alignment with private sector needs. The Bank had played a leading role among other donors supporting primary and secondary education in the country, and its leadership in education sector policy dialogue and advice continued through preparation of this project. Project preparation benefited from close partnership with AFD, taking advantage of AFD's experience in supporting policies for training and youth employment through public-private partnerships.

The project's objectives were straightforward and monitorable. M&E arrangements were well established at appraisal, including clearly specified outcome indicators with baselines and targets. Prior Bank-financed projects in the education sector used regular directorates and units to implement project activities, rather than establishing a separate Project Implementation Unit. This project did the same, with an eye toward improving sustainability, ownership, and long-term institutional capacity building.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
Supervision missions were regular and included staff with appropriate expertise. The Bank team was consistent across the project's lifetime, facilitating regular interaction with counterparts and smooth implementation. When implementation challenges arose, the Bank team worked collaboratively with the government to find solutions "that would not compromise the integrity of project design" (ICR, p. 35). Supervision teams reported thoroughly and consistently on financial management, procurement, and safeguards processes and worked with the Ministry and other agencies to build capacity where necessary. The ICR (p. 35) noted that the project's success was largely due to the support and technical expertise of the in-country Bank team.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design
The project's objectives were clearly specified, and their achievement was measured by a logical results chain that included six outcome indicators and eleven intermediate outcome indicators. A clear M&E framework was in place at the start of project implementation. CEP was responsible for preparing an annual general progress report, quarterly implementation reports, and tracer surveys. Each training center
cluster and LT was to report data through an information system managed and coordinated by CEP. A TVET statistical yearbook was to be produced annually.

b. M&E Implementation

Reporting of data was done regularly throughout the project's lifetime. Performance indicators were tracked as planned, and one tracer study was carried out to collect data on student satisfaction and post-graduation employment experiences. A planned second tracer study was not completed due to the COVID-19 pandemic; it is expected in calendar year 2022. The project signed an agreement with the National Statistics and Demography Agency to strengthen the M&E function and data collection. The MFPAA also began to pilot the use of the Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS) Kobo tool to collect data on project interventions and beneficiaries, and the project supported the implementation of a geographic information system for TVET that became operational in February 2021. DAGE and CEP capacity was improved through the addition of staff.

c. M&E Utilization

M&E findings were used to adjust project implementation, produce reports for the MFPAA, and inform a report on progress of the TVET Sustainable Development Goals. GEMS data have also been used to prepare TVET statistical yearbooks, and to lower costs associated with in-person data gathering missions.

M&E Quality Rating
Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was rated Environmental Assessment category "B" and triggered three safeguard policies: OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment, OP/BP 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources, and OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. Primary responsibility for monitoring safeguards compliance sat with the Office National de la Formation Professionelle, an autonomous institution under the MFPAA that was in charge of managing the construction, rehabilitation, and equipping of facilities. The expected direct negative impacts of the project were minor and manageable (temporary nuisances during civil works, safety at work, risk of involuntary destruction of covered cultural artifacts). An Environmental and Social Management Framework and Resettlement Policy Framework were prepared and disclosed. In 2018, a Grievance Redress Mechanism was developed. One complaint, related to the construction of a poultry center, was filed and was resolved in February 2018. According to the ICR (p. 34), safeguards were monitored consistently during project implementation and reported on in Implementation Status Reports, and there was full compliance with safeguard policies.
b. Fiduciary Compliance

DAGE had overall procurement and financial management responsibility. The Bank held capacity development workshops to help DAGE staff with implementation of financial management requirements. Unaudited interim financial reports were regularly submitted on time and were of acceptable quality. Required audits were also submitted regularly and on time, and opinions were unqualified. Procurement was rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory throughout implementation, with one exception, in September 2020, when the Procurement Risk Assessment and Management System assigned a moderately unsatisfactory rating due to delays with infrastructure contracts and resignation of the procurement specialist. These issues were resolved by project closing. Procurement plans were updated during Bank supervision missions to accommodate construction delays at the LTs and satellite centers.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None reported.

d. Other

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11. Ratings

<table>
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<th>ICR</th>
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12. Lessons

The ICR (pp. 36-37) provided several key lessons, some of which are elaborated here:

**Strong public-private collaboration lies at the core of development and maintenance of relevant skills training programs.** In this project, the involvement of the private sector in Boards of Directors, delivery of skills training, and financing the 3FPT contributed to design and implementation of interventions that were responsive to the needs of the economy for skilled manpower.

**Performance-based contracts can be an important mechanism to improve dialogue, transparency, and monitoring of TVET institutions.** The use of PBCs in this project facilitated
negotiation of annual budgets of TVET institutions based on targets and results, shifting the management culture of these institutions from an input-based orientation to one focusing on outcomes.

**Tracer studies are essential for understanding the effectiveness of activities and policies.**
This project's design included tracer studies that produced valuable information on student activities following completion of short-term skills training. The data revealed challenges with insertion rates that helped inform areas for improvement moving forward.

IEG adds one additional lesson:

**Confronting sensitive political economy issues up front can avert potentially costly issues and delays during implementation.** In this case, identification and resolution of possible stumbling blocks such as textbook selection, as well as deliberate consultation with multiple stakeholders during project preparation, allowed the project to escape some risks that were identified at appraisal.

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR was concise, candid, and results oriented, with a thorough narrative covering the project's storyline. It harnessed available data, from the project's M&E system and elsewhere in its analysis of achievement of objectives. The ICR provided important detail on the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic affected achievement of outcomes. Its lessons were comprehensive and insightful, though some of the lessons added new information that was not referenced earlier in the document. Given the presence, documented in the PAD, of multiple development partners in the TVET sector, the ICR could have provided an analysis of the Bank's specific contribution to observed outcomes.

a. **Quality of ICR Rating**

Substantial