Dire Strait: The Far-Reaching Impact of the Red Sea Shipping Crisis MENA FCV ECONOMIC SERIES BRIEF Issue #1 | April 2024 This is the first of a new series of notes ana- impacts, and maintain sound monetary-exchange and lyzing recent economic and social develop- fiscal policy frameworks to limit economic vulnerabilities ments and special issues in Fragile, Conflict, to new shocks. Depending on the severity of impacts, and and Violence (FCV) situations in the Middle the presence of fiscal space, they could consider coun- East and North Africa (MENA).1 termeasures, including countercyclical interventions. Also, the ongoing global re-shoring, near-shoring, and friend- The Red Sea, a vital maritime artery channeling 30 shoring, while contributing to increased trade costs, offers percent of global container traffic, is in the middle of a silver lining for countries that are geographically close an escalating shipping crisis with far-reaching conse- to major economic blocs like the European Union and the quences—and the impact is intensifying. The conflict in Gulf states. Nations in North Africa, for example, that can the Middle East that led to attacks on commercial vessels offer a conducive investment climate and sound policy in recent months has precipitated a dramatic slump frameworks may stand to attract foreign direct investment in maritime activity. As of March 2024, traffic through from these regions, potentially boosting local investment the strategic Suez Canal and Bab El-Mandeb Strait has and jobs, raising incomes, and facilitating technology halved while the Cape of Good Hope route has seen a transfer—all of which can contribute to the resilience and twofold increase in navigation. The detours necessitated growth of local economies. by the crisis have not only inflated the journey distances for cargo and tankers by up to 53 percent, but also the Harnessing the power of latest geospatial and economic environmental toll, with a surge in CO2 emissions from data, this briefing offers a snapshot of the cascading the additional fuel consumed by ships rerouting around effects of the Red Sea shipping crisis as of the close the Horn of Africa. Financial repercussions are acute: of March 2024. It charts the shifting patterns in mari- freight rates have risen and the cost of shipping insurance time traffic, voyage lengths, emission outputs, and the has reached unprecedented heights, delivering a blow increased costs of freight. The analysis then narrows its to both regional and international shipping economies; it focus, dissecting the repercussions at the granular level of would also increase cost pressures on inflation. The Red individual ports and the broader economic shockwaves Sea ports and associated economies are enduring the rippling through nations in the vicinity and further afield. most of this upheaval, with most grappling with diminished volumes and only a select few benefiting from the diverted traffic. The ripple effects of the Yemeni port disruptions are   Conflict Location and Trends palpable, particularly in Saudi Arabia, though they wane with distance from the epicenter. This brief delves into the The tapestry of conflict in the Red Sea region, particu- multifaceted dimensions of a crisis that is reshaping the larly around Yemen, has become increasingly complex landscape of global shipping and trade and its associ- since October 2023. From the commencement of the Red ated environmental and economic impacts. Faced with Sea Crisis on November 17, 2023, to April 11, 2024, these challenges, what should policymakers do? They the area has been the stage for 86 conflict incidents, must remain vigilant, constantly evaluating the evolving culminating in 11 tragic losses of life. The frequency of 1 The Brief is prepared under the guidance of Eric Le Borgne (Practice Manager, EMNMT) by a team comprising Željko Bogetić (Lead Economist, EMNMT), Luan Zhao (Senior Economist, EMNMT), Holly Krambeck (Project Manager, Data Lab), Andres Chamorro (Geographer), Sahiti Sarva (Consultant), Joanne Matossian (Consultant), and Yahui Zhao (Consultant). 2 Dire Strait: The Far-Reaching Impact of the Red Sea Shipping Crisis Figure 1    Reported attacks in the Red Sea region have significantly increased since October 2023 A. Reported conflict events in the Red Sea region B. Reported conflict events and fatalities in the MENA region involving involving Houthi forces Houthi forces 5 (from October 1, 2023 to April 11, 2024) 4 Red Sea Crisis 3 2 1 0 11/2023 12/2023 01/2024 02/2024 03/2024 04/2024 Houthi claimed attacks Missiles intercepted by other countries Source: ACLED, https://acleddata.com; World Bank staff estimates. Note: The conflict events outside the Red Sea Region were predominantly in Yemen (99%) followed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. these incidents has surged, with March 2024 witnessing has plummeted by half relative to historical norms, while a peak of 27 conflict events—the most intense month to the volume of ships braving the longer journey around the date, as depicted in Figure 1A. These incidents encom- Cape of Good Hope has surged, doubling in frequency pass a range of hostile engagements against shipping (Figure 2A and 2B). This strategic dislocation has not targets from Ansar Allah (the Houthis) to countermeasures only reshaped the map of global shipping lanes but also by a coalition of US, UK, German, French, and Italian signaled a new era of uncertainty for maritime commerce. naval forces. In a broader context, these actions have been implicated in 986 conflict events, leading to 956 conflict-related fatalities across the MENA (Middle East Travel Time and Emissions   and North Africa) region since the conflict's inception, as Implications illustrated in Figure 1B. In response to the escalating crisis in the Red Sea, ships have been forced to seek alternative pathways,   Trade Diversion notably the extended route around the Cape of Good Hope. This strategic detour has led to a significant elon- Since November 2023, the Red Sea—a critical conduit gation of travel distances and times, as well as increased for nearly a third of global container traffic—has been fuel consumption, including from ships traveling at higher thrust into chaos by attacks on commercial vessels. speeds to maintain schedules. The impact on regional These assaults have jolted the backbone of international supply chains has been profound, with the trade diversion maritime trade, compelling a shift in transit routes that have causing a sharp uptick in the monthly distance traveled by long been taken for granted. In the wake of these disrup- vessels that once frequented the Red Sea. The data paint tions, the once-thriving maritime passage, prized for its a stark picture: starting from January 2024 and peaking role as the most expedient link between Europe and Asia, in March 2024, the monthly distance traveled for cargo has witnessed a precipitous drop in vessel traffic.2 Ship- ping companies, in a bid to circumvent the turmoil, have 2 International Monetary Fund. 2024. Middle East and North been rerouting en masse, a trend that took hold just weeks Africa: Conflict Compounding Economic Challenges. January following the initial barrage of Houthi offensives. The 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/ repercussions have been stark: by March 2024, the flow Issues/2024/01/31/regional-economic-outlook-update- of trade through the Suez Canal and Bab El-Mandeb Strait mena-january-2024. MENA FCV Economic Series Brief 3 Figure 2    Attacks targeting ships in the Red Sea have disrupted commercial shipping operations since December 2023 A. AIS transit calls relative to historical average B. AIS transit calls in key areas (number of vessels, change from historical average) (% change from historical average) Bab el-Mandeb Strait Bab el-Mandeb Strait 80 100% 60 50% 0% 40 –50% Cape of Good Hope Cape of Good Hope 80 100% 60 50% 0% 40 –50% Suez Canal Suez Canal 80 100% 60 50% 0% 40 –50% 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-08 2023-09 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 2024-04 Source: IMF’s PortWatch platform, https://portwatch.imf.org; World Bank staff estimates. Note: Figure 2A separates transit calls for each area and includes a black line to indicate the historical average for each respective area. and tanker vessels has ballooned by up to 53  percent a significant recalibration in global maritime logistics and 28 percent respectively, compared to the pre-conflict (Figures 3 and 4). baseline of January to September 2023. This has resulted in corresponding increases in travel times of up to 51 The Red Sea crisis has precipitated a dramatic percent for cargo and 39 percent for tankers, signaling reshaping of maritime logistics, with vessels embarking Figure 3    The trade diversion has led to a sharp increase in monthly distance traveled by Red Sea vessels A. Total distance traveled by Red Sea vessels B. Total distance traveled by Red Sea vessels C. Total distance traveled by Red Sea vessels (nautical miles) crossing Cape of Good Hope (nautical miles) crossing Bab El-Mandeb Strait (nautical miles) 6,000,000 3,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000 0 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Vessel type Vessel type Vessel type Cargo Tanker Cargo Tanker Cargo Tanker Source: UN Global Platform, https://unstats.un.org/wiki/display/AIS/AIS+Handbook+Outline. 4 Dire Strait: The Far-Reaching Impact of the Red Sea Shipping Crisis Figure 4    Travel distances and times for Red Sea vessels spiked in March 2024 compared to their pre-conflict baselines A. Distance traveled by Red Sea vessels B. Time traveled by Red Sea vessels (% change from Jan–Sep 2023 baseline) (% change from Jan–Sep 2023 baseline) 60% 60% 40% 40% 20% 20% 0% 0% 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 2023-10 2023-11 2023-12 2024-01 2024-02 2024-03 Vessel type Vessel type Cargo Tanker Cargo Tanker Source: UN Global Platform, https://unstats.un.org/wiki/display/AIS/AIS+Handbook+Outline; World Bank staff estimates. on lengthier voyages, guzzling more fuel, and conse- sions by a staggering 260 percent to 354 percent for routes quently, emitting more CO2 along these routes. Theoreti- to Northern Europe and the Mediterranean3—global mari- cally, this should have led to a spike in global greenhouse gas emissions from shipping. Yet, intriguingly, the latest data reveals a paradox: despite the anticipated surge in 3 World Economic Forum. 2024. What is ‘slow steaming’ and emissions along the Red Sea route due to increased fuel why is the Red Sea crisis affecting shipping emissions? March consumption, higher speeds, and potentially the deploy- 19, 2024. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/03/ ment of less efficient vessels—projected to amplify emis- slow-steaming-emissions-red-sea-trade/. Figure 5    Despite increased distances traveled, global maritime transport CO2 emissions have remained stable Maritime transport CO2 emissions (experimental) Tonnes 60,000,000 40,000,000 20,000,000 0 2022-01 2022-03 2022-05 2022-07 2022-09 2022-11 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Source: OECD, OECD Data Explorer website; World Bank staff estimates. Note: Allocation to countries is determined by the companies operating the ships’ residency. Vessel-level emissions estimates are associated with operator information and then aggregated for all countries or territories represented in the estimates. MENA FCV Economic Series Brief 5 Figure 6    Global maritime activity has experienced a gradual decline since the start of the Red Sea shipping crisis Port visits, worldwide Maritime trade volume, worldwide (#) (million metric tons) 6,000 20 Middle East conflict Red Sea shipping crisis Middle East conflict Red Sea shipping crisis 5,500 18 16 5,000 14 4,500 12 4,000 10 3,500 8 3,000 6 Apr-23 May-23 Jun-23 Jul-23 Aug-23 Sep-23 Oct-23 Nov-23 Dec-23 Jan-24 Feb-24 Mar-24 Apr-23 May-23 Jun-23 Jul-23 Aug-23 Sep-23 Oct-23 Nov-23 Dec-23 Jan-24 Feb-24 Mar-24 Source: IMF’s PortWatch platform, https://portwatch.imf.org; World Bank staff estimates. time CO2 emissions have defied expectations, remaining (Figure 7A). The tempest was fiercest along the Red Sea stable through March 2024 (Figure 5). routes, where prices soared to four to four-and-a-half times their pre-crisis rates in January. Although they have This unexpected steadiness in global emissions can since receded, they remain at an elevated two-and-a-half be attributed to a simultaneous downturn in ship- times higher in April 2024 (Figure 7B).6 The Freightos ping activity—which caused a countervailing decline Baltic Index (FBX), which tracks freight rates from China in associated emissions. This is linked to the deterrent to the United States, mirrors this trend, painting a picture of rising shipping costs or to other global disruptions, of a shipping industry navigating through a difficult such as the congestion at the Panama Canal caused by storm.7 Moreover, a recent analysis by the IMF indicates fluctuating water levels. Likely affected by the Red Sea shipping crisis, both worldwide port visits and maritime trade volume have depicted a consistent decrease from 4 World Bank. 2024. “MENA Economic Update – Conflict December 2023 through April 2024 (Figures 6A and and Debt in the Middle East and North Africa”. April 2024. 6B). This complex interplay of factors underscores the https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/ multifaceted nature of the crisis and its wide-ranging, yet middle-east-and-north-africa-economic-update. 5 Drewry World Container Index. https://www.drewry.co.uk/ balanced, global environmental impact. supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container- index-assessed-by-drewry. 6 In January 2024, shipping costs from Shanghai to Rotterdam Increased Shipping and   and Genoa surged by 306 and 339 percent, respectively, Insurance Costs compared to pre-crisis levels. In April 2024, these rates remain elevated, still up by 150 percent. Similarly, costs to Los Angeles The Red Sea crisis has unleashed a wave of economic and New York rose by 116 and 139 percent in early February disruption, catapulting shipping rates to new heights.4 2024, with April 2024 still seeing increases of 65 and The Drewry World Container Index, a critical gauge of 80 percent, respectively. 7 FBX increased threefold from mid-October 2023 to mid- global shipping costs, recorded a staggering 170 percent February 2024 and then started to drop. At the beginning surge from the calm before the storm in November 2023 of April 2024, the prices are still twice the price before the to a peak in January 2024, with the cost to ship a 40-foot conflict in Gaza. The decline in freight rates since February container nearing an US$4,000.5 While rates have could be partially due to reduced demand for China’s manu- since retreated from their zenith, they continue to hover factured goods in North America, leading the world’s largest at a 90 percent above pre-crisis levels as of April 2024 shipper, MSC, to cancel some routes from China to the US and 6 Dire Strait: The Far-Reaching Impact of the Red Sea Shipping Crisis Figure 7    Travel distances and times for Red Sea vessels spiked in March 2024 compared to their pre-conflict baselines Drewry world container index Freight rates from Asia to Europe 4,500 Red Sea shipping 7,000 Red Sea shipping Middle East conflict Middle East conflict 4,000 crisis crisis 6,000 3,500 5,000 3,000 2,500 4,000 2,000 3,000 1,500 2,000 1,000 500 1,000 0 0 Jan-23 Feb-23 Mar-23 Apr-23 May-23 Jun-23 Jul-23 Aug-23 Sep-23 Oct-23 Nov-23 Dec-23 Jan-24 Feb-24 Mar-24 Apr-24 Jan-23 Feb-23 Mar-23 Apr-23 May-23 Jun-23 Jul-23 Aug-23 Sep-23 Oct-23 Nov-23 Dec-23 Jan-24 Feb-24 Mar-24 Apr-24 Shanghai – Rotterdam Shanghai – Genoa Source: Drewry World Container Index, https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index- assessed-by-drewry. Note: Drewry tracks the freight costs of 40-foot containers via eight major routes, including spot rates and short-term contract rates. that doubling of freight costs have been shown to influ- King Fahd, as well as Egypt’s El Sokhna, have all with- ence inflation around the world, on average by about stood the worst of this downturn. (Figures 8C, 8D, and 0.7 percentage points, with the impact more pronounced Annex 1). Yet, amidst this bleak landscape, a glimmer of in island and low-income countries.8 resilience shines through at Egypt’s Safaga and Suways ports, Saudi Arabia’s Duba, and Yemen’s Al Hudaydah, The conflict in the Middle East and the ensuing Red where a surge in imports signals a defiant pivot in trade Sea crisis have resulted in soaring insurance costs for patterns, as these smaller harbors become unlikely havens shipping. Insurers, grappling with the heightened risk, for diverted traffic (Figures 8A and 8B). have significantly raised premiums for vessels crossing the Yemeni waters, with war risk premiums in January 2024 soaring to 1 percent of a ship’s value—a 3,200 percent Canada. LaRocco, Lori Ann. 2024. “Despite Red Sea crisis leap from the early days of December.9 By February, the inflation shock, ocean freight rates are headed down on key premiums doubled yet again, reaching a 2 percent.10 China-U.S. trade route”. January 13, 2024. https://www. This surge has not only burdened carriers with heavier cnbc.com/2024/01/12/shippers-cut-cargo-rates-despite-red- costs for navigating the Suez Canal but also threatens to sea-crisis-chinas-the-reason.html. 8 https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/03/28/ ripple through the global economy, as soaring freight and how-soaring-shipping-costs-raise-prices-around-the-world. insurance expenses add to global inflationary pressures, 9 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. also casting long shadows over the oil market.11 2024. “Potential Impacts of Red Sea Crisis Escalation on Food Insecurity in Yemen”. February 28, 2024. https://reliefweb. int/report/yemen/special-technical-paper-potential-impacts-   Port Disruption red-sea-crisis-escalation-food-insecurity-yemen-issued-28th-feb- ruary-2024. 10 Townsend, Sarah. 2024. “Cost of Red Sea shipping insur- The Red Sea crisis has cast a long shadow over the ports of the region. From December 1, 2023, to March ance rises 2,700%.” AGBI, February 1, 2024. https://www. agbi.com/logistics/2024/02/cost-of-red-sea-shipping-insur- 31, 2024, ports activity contracted sharply in trade ance-rises-20-fold/. volume, a stark contrast to the bustling activity of the 11 Alfares Cargo. 2024. “Where Will The Effects Of The Red previous year. While a handful of ports have eked out Sea Crisis Reach In Shipping And Supply Chains In The Arab marginal gains, the majority witnessed significant drops in Region And The World?” April 16, 2024. https://www.alfar- both imports and exports. Jordan’s Al Aqabah, Yemen’s Al escargo.com/where-will-the-effects-of-the-red-sea-crisis-reach-in- Mukalla and Aden, Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah, Rabigh, and shipping-and-supply-chains. MENA FCV Economic Series Brief 7 Figure 8    Most Red Sea ports saw a reduction in trade activity since October 2023 (December 1, 2023 through March 31, 2024 compared to January 1, 2022 to October 6, 2023) A. Difference in import volume during Red Sea crisis B. Difference in export volume during Red Sea crisis (absolute difference from baseline) (absolute difference from baseline) 100,000 0 0 Metric tons Metric tons –100,000 –100,000 –200,000 –200,000 –300,000 –300,000 Rabigh Al Aqabah Jeddah King Fahd Port El Sokhna Aden Al-hudaydah Jeddah oil Safaga Al Adabiyah Duba Bulk Plant Tanker Terminal Duba Al Mukalla Djibouti Yanbu As Suways King Fahd Port Rabigh Al Aqabah Jeddah Djibouti Yanbu Safaga El Sokhna Aden Al-hudaydah As Suways Jeddah oil Duba Bulk Plant Tanker Terminal Al Mukalla Al Adabiyah Duba C. Percent change in import volume during Red Sea crisis from baseline D. Percent change in export volume during Red Sea crisis from baseline 100% 100% 50% 50% % change % change 0% 0% –50% –50% Duba Rabigh Safaga Al Aqabah Al-hudaydah King Fahd Port As Suways Aden Al Mukalla Duba Bulk Plant Tanker Terminal Al Adabiyah El Sokhna Jeddah Jeddah oil Yanbu Djibouti Djibouti Jeddah oil Al Mukalla As Suways Aden Duba Bulk Plant Tanker Terminal Yanbu Rabigh Al Aqabah Al-hudaydah Jeddah Safaga Duba King Fahd Port El Sokhna Al Adabiyah Source: IMF’s PortWatch platform, https://portwatch.imf.org; World Bank staff estimates. Spillover Impacts of Port   their vast economies is but a minor disturbance (Figure Disruptions 9A, 9B, and 9C). The 90-day paralysis of a key Yemeni port has unleashed a cascade of economic tremors, with   Implications for Policymaking Saudi Arabia at the epicenter, shouldering a poten- tial loss of over 1.1 million metric tons in export The crisis in Red Sea shipping has created new diffi- capacity.12 This spillover from Yemen’s port disruption culties for regional policymakers, who are now facing has most heavily impacted Saudi Arabia, with US$125 the dual challenge of navigating trade disruptions and million in export value affected. Djibouti, too, faces leveraging potential opportunities. The crisis has sent significant impact,1.0 million metric tons of exports on ripples through the global economy, with cost-push infla- the line. While China, despite its distance, faces a tion extending to region’s and European markets due looming threat to US$96 million worth of exports, the relative impact on other nations’ total export values is 12 Spillover, in this context, denotes the indirect effects of marginal, barely registering at less than one percent. disruptions in maritime transport networks on global trade Oman and Kuwait also feel the ripples, albeit with less flows, supply chains, and economic activities, including force, and even distant South Asian countries, are not port closures and conflicts impacting multiple countries and entirely immune to the disturbance, though the effect on industries. 8 Dire Strait: The Far-Reaching Impact of the Red Sea Shipping Crisis Figure 9    The 90-day paralysis of a key Yemeni port has unleashed a cascade of economic tremors, particularly hitting Saudi Arabia with major export losses Estimated Capacity at Risk in Top Countries Top Countries by At-Risk Export Value with Top Countries by At-Risk Export Value with Most Impacted by 90-Day Disruption in Yemen 90-Day Port Disruption in Yemenb a Port Disruption in Yemen, as Percentage of Portsa (metric tons) (US$ million) Total Export Value At-Risk Export Value with a Port Disruption in 1,200,000 Yemen (as percentage of total export value) Disruption at all Yemen Ports (metric tons) Simulated Capacity at Risk from 90 Days 120 At-Risk Export Value with 90-Day Port 1.000% Disruption in Yemen (US$ million) 1,000,000 100 0.800% 800,000 80 0.600% 600,000 60 400,000 0.400% 40 200,000 20 0.200% 0 0 0.000% Saudi Arabia Djibouti United Arab Emirates Turkiye Saudi Arabia China Yemen Singapore Malaysia Oman India United Arab Emirates Kuwait Thailand Yemen Saudi Arabia Oman Kuwait Source: IMF’s PortWatch platform, https://portwatch.imf.org; World Bank staff estimates. a The paper, “Ports’ Criticality in International Trade and Global Supply Chains” introduces a methodology to assess the impact of disruption at one port on the export capacity (in metric tons) and value (in USD) of other ports or countries. For this analysis, by analyzing global export data to all Yemen ports, we identified the top ten countries with the highest at-risk daily capacity if any Yemen port experiences disruptions. Following the paper’s guidance on the linear relationship between daily at-risk capacity and the number of days of disruption, we multiplied the at-risk capacity by 90 days. b For this analysis, we replicated the steps used for assessing at-risk daily capacity, but instead focused on at-risk daily export value. to the soaring freight and insurance costs and strain on temporary countercyclical measures to cushion the ports and their surrounding economies. This has affected impact on the vulnerable population. foreign exchange revenues and both import and export capacities in the region, which in turn threatens to slow Moreover, this situation unfolds against the backdrop down economic activity. To minimize the impact of such of a global shift towards reshoring and near-shoring shocks, sound monetary-exchange and fiscal policy strategies, which aim to bring production closer to frameworks are critical. end-consumer markets. This shift, while contributing to increased trade costs, offers a silver lining for countries Policymakers, therefore, must remain vigilant, that are geographically close to major economic blocs like constantly evaluating the evolving impacts and main- the European Union and the Gulf states. Nations in North taining sound macroeconomic policy frameworks. Africa that can offer a conducive investment climate and Policies for low inflation and sustainable public finances sound policy frameworks may stand to attract foreign direct are key to limiting macroeconomic vulnerabilities and investment from these regions, potentially boosting local the impact of new shocks such as the Red Sea crisis. investment and jobs, raising incomes, and facilitating tech- Where economic downturn is particularly severe, and if nology transfer—all of which can contribute to the resilience budgetary conditions allow, governments may consider and growth of local economies. MENA FCV Economic Series Brief 9 Annex: The Red Sea crisis has had a significant   impact on trade across most ports in the region Figure 10    Monthly trade volumes via the Red Sea ports (metric tons) Monthly trade volume – Djibouti, Djibouti Monthly trade volume – Al Aqabah, Jordan Metric tons Metric tons 1,000,000 800,000 750,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 250,000 200,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Monthly trade volume – Al Adabiyah, Egypt Monthly trade volume – Safaga, Egypt Metric tons Metric tons 200,000 150,000 150,000 100,000 100,000 50,000 50,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Monthly trade volume – El Sokhna, Egypt Monthly trade volume – As Suways, Egypt Metric tons Metric tons 30,000 1,000,000 20,000 500,000 10,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Monthly trade volume – Al Mukalla, Yemen Monthly trade volume – Al-hudaydah, Yemen Metric tons Metric tons 300,000 40,000 30,000 200,000 20,000 100,000 10,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Trade flow Export Import (continued on next page) 10 Dire Strait: The Far-Reaching Impact of the Red Sea Shipping Crisis Figure 10    Monthly trade volumes via the Red Sea ports (metric tons) (continued) Monthly trade volume – Aden, Yemen Monthly trade volume – Duba Bulk Plant Tanker Terminal Metric tons Metric tons 300,000 75,000 200,000 50,000 100,000 25,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Monthly trade volume – Jeddah Oil, Saudi Arabia Monthly trade volume – Rabigh, Saudi Arabia Metric tons Metric tons 600,000 750,000 400,000 500,000 200,000 250,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Monthly trade volume – King Fahd Port, Saudi Arabia Monthly trade volume – Duba, Saudi Arabia Metric tons Metric tons 2,500,000 30,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 20,000 1,000,000 10,000 500,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Monthly trade volume – Yanbu, Saudi Arabia Monthly trade volume – Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Metric tons Metric tons 250,000 1,500,000 200,000 150,000 1,000,000 100,000 500,000 50,000 0 0 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 2023-01 2023-03 2023-05 2023-07 2023-09 2023-11 2024-01 2024-03 Trade flow Export Import Source: IMF’s PortWatch platform, https://portwatch.imf.org; World Bank staff estimates. 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