1. Project Data

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Prepared by  
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Financing Agreement (FA, p. 6) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, paragraph 18) the Project Development Objective (PDO) of the Somalia Urban Resilience Project Phase I (SURP) was "to strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level and support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas."

This Phase 1 project is part of the Somalia Urban Resilience Program, to strengthen urban resilience of key cities in Somalia. Three projects – Somali Urban Investment Planning Project (SUIPP, P150374), this project
Somalia Urban Resilience Project Phase I (SURP, P163857), and Somalia Urban Resilience Project Phase II (SURP-II, P170922) – constituted this program. A Series of Project (SOP) program is a World Bank instrument that assembles successor projects over a well-defined period as a holistic approach to achieve a long-term goal.

This review will assess the performance of the Somalia Urban Resilience Project against the following objectives:

- To support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas; and
- To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
No

d. Components

1. Mogadishu Municipality: (US$6.5 million at appraisal, US$6.5 million actual). This component was to finance 4 sub-components - infrastructure, capacity building, operations and maintenance (O&M), and project management. The infrastructure sub-component was to finance the use of labor-intensive methods to construct secondary roads with side drains, pedestrian walkways, and solar streetlights across 7 districts (allocated 1 km per district for equity purposes). Since Somalia did not have standard construction codes (ICR, footnote 13) the infrastructure work specifications were to be followed to ensure quality. Labor-intensive construction methods meant the use of precast interlocking concrete paving blocks with compacted sub-base and base materials (ICR, footnote14) to create short-term income-generating opportunities for the vulnerable population such as women, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the poor. (ICR, footnote 15). The capacity building sub-component was to finance training in the areas of financial management (FM), procurement, environmental and social safeguards, and engineering to build the capacity of the municipal government Project Implementation Unit (PIU). The operations and maintenance (O&M) sub-component was to finance the development of O&M plans for the road and drainage investments, guidelines to help municipalities establish and coordinate maintenance committees, and conduct training of district-level maintenance committees and other staff on routine maintenance, community mobilization, and monitoring and reporting. The project management sub-component was to finance project management costs of the PIU, including staffing, grievance redress and feedback mechanisms, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

2. Garowe Municipality: (US$2.5 million at appraisal, US$2.5 million actual) This component was to finance four sub-components, similar to the activities funded for the Mogadishu component above - infrastructure, capacity building, O&M, and project management. The infrastructure sub-component was to finance four secondary roads with side drains, pedestrian walkways, and solar streetlights across seven districts using labor-intensive construction methods. The use of Otta seal surfacing with compacted materials was intended to support the traffic load to generate employment opportunities for the poor in the area. The capacity building sub-component was to finance training and technical assistance to build the capacity of the Project Implementation Unit in the areas of financial management (FM), procurement, environmental and social safeguards, and engineering. The O&M sub-component was to
finance the development of O&M plans for the road and drainage investments, guidelines to establish and coordinate maintenance committees, and training of district-level maintenance committees on maintenance, community mobilization, and monitoring and reporting. The project management sub-component was to finance the project management costs of the PIU, including staffing, grievance redress and feedback mechanisms, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The PIU was also to contract the engineering supervision of the civil works by an independent engineering supervision firm and another firm to conduct a project baseline survey.

3. Contingent Emergency Response (US$0 million at appraisal, US$0 million actual) This component was to allow for rapid reallocation of uncommitted project funds in the event of a natural or manmade crisis during the implementation. This component was to finance eligible emergency needs under the conditions established in an operations manual. This component had no initial funding allocation initially and would draw resources from the other expenditure categories at the time of activation.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The total project cost was US$9.0 million. The grant was fully disbursed.

Financing: This project was financed by the 2014 Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (SMPF) under the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Facility (SRDF) administered by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The SRDF pooled US$447 million from 11 international donors to provide grants for government-led state building and service delivery. The German Government provided US$6 million to Mogadishu and the World Bank financed US$2.5 million to Garowe through the SMPF (ICR, footnote 24). The task team clarified the World Bank financing to be US$3.0 million.

Borrower Contribution: None.

Dates: The project was approved on August 2, 2018 and became effective on October 18, 2018. The Mid Term Review (MTR) was conducted on May 18, 2020. The project closed as originally planned, on September 30, 2021. There were no project restructurings.

Split Rating: No split rating was applied to derive the outcome of the project. The PDOs or the outcome indicators were not revised

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country Context: The September 2013 Brussels Conference created the Somali Compact. This compact included peacebuilding and state-building goals. The compact created a Somaliland Special Arrangement because the country had no access to International Development Association (IDA) funds. Somalia had been in non-accrual status since 1991. Access to IDA was restored in 2020 after the government cleared its arrears to international financial institutions. The country was categorized a Decision Point under the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. The August 2012 provisional constitution led to the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).

Since 1991, the country has undergone armed conflict. Natural disasters have displaced people and damaged much of the infrastructure. Forced migration brought by conflict, insecurity, and natural disasters has accelerated the rate of urban migration in Somalia. This urbanization contributed to an increase in poverty rate and food insecurity. The 2017 drought weakened the economy and further increased the country's vulnerability. Services in urban areas were unable to match the pace of rapid urbanization. A holistic approach to create resilient cities appealed to the government because of its limited capacity and resources to address these challenges. The approach adopted five dimensions - spatial, physical, economic, social, and institutional aspects - that constituted a series of projects comprising an urban resilience program for Somalia.

**Country Programs:** The PDOs were relevant to the National Development Plan of the Federal Government of Somalia for 2017-2019. In particular, the PDOs supported activities under the infrastructure and the resilience pillars. The infrastructure pillar aimed "to lay out the foundations of resilient infrastructure systems that contribute to the country's stability and provide services for all." The resilience pillar aimed "to create opportunities for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee returnees to participate in local and urban development processes," and "to enhance their absorptive capacity" to services delivered.

**World Bank Partnership:** This project was part of the World Bank's reengagement with Somalia after the 2012 constitution created its Federal Government. The PDOs were relevant to the focus area 1 of the World Bank Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Somalia for FY 2019-2022. This Focus area aimed to strengthen institutions and expand access to services while addressing cross-cutting considerations of building resilience to fragility and shocks.

**World Bank experience in the sector and in the country:** The World Bank has provided a Special Financing Facility for Local Development (P156257) to finance the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the federal government, its public financial management (PFM), and recurrent costs. This facility developed procurement and supervision functions at the federal Ministry of Finance and financed small-scale investments in small secondary and tertiary cities. The facility expanded the use of the public financial management system for a capital investments in Federal Member States. Another World Bank-financed Somalia Capacity Injection Project (CIP, P149971) focused on the strengthening of the basic PFM capacity of Somalia. This first phase project served to build upon those early interventions. This project was both an urban resilience and a local governance project.

Overall, the relevance of objectives is rated Substantial. The PDOs directly supported both government plans and the World Bank reengagement strategy for the country.

**Rating**
Substantial

**4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)**
**OBJECTIVE 1**

**Objective**
To support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas.

**Rationale**

**Theory of Change:** At appraisal, a Results Chain framed a Theory of Change (ToC) (PAD, Section D, following paragraph 37). This ToC was replicated at closing (ICR, Figure 1) providing a logical causal sequence from the project activities and inputs to intermediate/final outcomes. However, the ToC was simply stated and provided the link between outputs and intermediate outcomes, and not necessarily the final outcomes of the project activities.

**Inputs** were to include physical investments to rehabilitate secondary urban roads, improve drainage, establish pedestrian walkways, and install street lighting in the target cities of Mogadishu and Garowe. By using labor-intensive construction methods, such as using precast, interlocking concrete paving blocks, and seal surfacing with compacted base materials to support anticipated traffic load, the works were expected to generate short-term employment for the vulnerable population such as women, internally displaced people (IDP), and the poor in the target cities. An assessment of the road connectivity and drainage network in Mogadishu was also to be prepared.

**Outputs** were to include the length of rehabilitated roads and improved drainage, the number of income-generating opportunities for the urban poor, expressed in person-days, and an assessment report on road connectivity and drainage network in Mogadishu. The feasibility studies and preliminary designs of the infrastructure investments were completed under the preceding Somalia Urban Investment Planning Project (SUIPP).

**Outcomes** targeted the beneficiary residents including the urban poor, IDPs, and returnees, who were to benefit from improvements in connectivity, provision of access to markets and services, improvements in conditions of safety and security from pedestrian walkways and streetlights, and increases in incomes from employment. Outcomes were represented by the number of beneficiaries and respondents who expressed that the interventions satisfactorily met their needs, without distinguishing which aspects were being addressed (e.g., access, safety, security, income improvements). The ToC did not include any critical assumptions that needed to be in place for the objective to have a greater likelihood of being achieved. The achievement of the above objective would contribute to the long term institutional, physical, spatial and economic resilience of the urban areas and demonstrate visible and tangible improvements in the lives of its citizens, strengthen legitimacy of the government, and lead to social and political stability in the country. However, the number of beneficiaries was not sufficient to indicate that this outcome was achieved (see Section 9 M&E below).

**OUTPUTS:**

- The following non-rural roads were rehabilitated:
  - In Mogadishu - 11 roads with 7.4 km were rehabilitated in six districts of Bodhere, Hamar Jaja, Hamar Weyne, Howlwadag, Shangani, and Warta Nabada Districts (the target of 19 roads, in seven districts with 7.5 km, was almost achieved). The PAD noted that the specific number of roads to be rehabilitated were subject to change due to budgetary, security, and political economy considerations (PAD, paragraph 21). The 12th road Agoonta in Abdiaziz district was
partially built for 753 m but construction work was stopped due to noncompliance with safeguards (see Section 10 Other Issues below).

- In Garowe - 4 roads with 4.93 km were rehabilitated (the target of 4 roads, 4.4 km, was achieved). These prioritized roads connected the urban poor communities and IDP settlements to key socio-economic facilities.

- Person days of employment were created consisting of unskilled and skilled workers. “Unskilled” are workers who lack technical training, industry experience, and are often trained on the job site, e.g., flag man, security, manual hold digger, etc. The average daily rates for unskilled workers was $12. “Skilled” are workers who attended a vocational school, university, college, or any other technical school, e.g., site engineer, foreman, welder, mechanic, excavator operator, distributor operator, hot-oiler, laboratory technician, survey technician, etc. The average daily rates for skilled workers was $20.

- In Mogadishu, the road construction created 63,324 person-days of temporary employment (the target of 22,000 was exceeded). The labor created involved over 1,088 workers - 20.0% female, 9% IDPs, 37% from host communities, 4% returnees, and 50% from other communities (no targets). In addition, the newly established businesses along the new roads increased employment and livelihood opportunities for those residing in the target settlements but these were not monitored or reported. Unskilled workers were recruited based on certain criteria (vulnerability, female-headed households, households with more than 6 persons, households with elderly parents, persons with disabilities, orphans) and displacement status to ensure that IDPs and returnees were targeted. The employment generated exceeded the conservative target because manual labor was favored over machines to maximize the impact on the community.

- In Garowe, the road construction created 42,512 person days of temporary employment (the target of 18,000 was exceeded). This involved over 600 workers from the host communities (67.6%) and IDPs (32.4%). 89.8% were males, 10.2% were females. In addition, newly established businesses along the new roads increased employment and livelihood opportunities for those residing in the target areas but this was not monitored or reported.

- The Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR) financed a drainage master plan and road connectivity assessment for Mogadishu.

OUTCOMES:

- People with access to all season roads within a 500-meter range was improved.
  - In Mogadishu, 148,800 people benefited from the 11 rehabilitated roads (the target of 2,000 was exceeded). 1,600 households, with an average household size of eight, were estimated to benefit from each rehabilitated road. Beneficiaries included 50% female, 19% IDPs, and 81% from the host communities. The original target of beneficiaries was acknowledged to be overly conservative.
  - In Garowe, 8,000 people benefited from the four rehabilitated roads (the target of 2,000 was exceeded). The beneficiaries were 50% female, 25% IDP, 75% coming from the host communities. 250 households with an average household size of eight, were estimated to benefit from each rehabilitated road. The Garowe roads created a by-pass for motorists to have an alternate route through the city and decongested the main Garowe road (no data on reduced volume or impact on road safety).

- 91.5 percent of beneficiaries were satisfied that the rehabilitated infrastructure met their needs (the target of 90 percent was exceeded). According to the surveys at closing, the roads improved
accessibility, economic activity, security, and the general environment. However, there was no data to support these outcomes. The vast majority of respondents from both municipalities also agreed that the road project was relevant, addressed a pressing need, and positively changed the fortunes of the settlements served by the four upgraded roads in Garowe.

- In Mogadishu - using a sample size of 536 respondents, 89.4 percent overall (89% female, and 91% IDPs) confirmed that the rehabilitated roads met their needs.
- In Garowe - with a sample size of 386 respondents, 94.3% overall (93% female, and 93% IDPs) confirmed that the rehabilitated roads met their needs.

- The GFDRR-financed plans for Mogadishu informed the roads to be financed under the follow-on project SURP-II (ICR, paragraph 40).

The following additional outcomes of improved access to services by reducing travel time and travel costs to health facilities and schools were reported at closing. Not all the indicators were supported by data. These were not part of the results framework or the TOC and were not monitored during implementation. No study was undertaken to quantify economic gains from the project (ICR, paragraph 35). The Bank Team clarified that outcomes were limited to general observations on quality.

- Travel times were reduced:
  - in Mogadishu, the average travel time decreased by four minutes (no baseline)
  - In Garowe, the average travel time decreased by 10 minutes (from 30 at baseline) and travel costs reduced to an average of US$1.5 per trip (from US$2.1).

- No data was provided to support the claim that diverse and larger businesses were opened, minimal changes to rental and property values but noted increase in business rentals, access to goods and services, such as extending electrical services to IDP camps in Jilab Road, and increased municipal revenues. Anecdotally and with no quantifiable evidence to support the claim, the improved roads reduced flooding and stagnant water, and contributed to improved health conditions of residents. The new pedestrian walkways, speed bumps, traffic signage, and streetlighting improved road safety and security.

- Extended working hours in the markets were reported,
  - In Mogadishu 38 percent opening at 6:00 a.m. and 23 percent closing at 10:00 p.m. (29 percent and 8 percent at baseline, respectively). The average number of daily customers in Mogadishu increased to 25 (from 19 at baseline)
  - In Garowe, more businesses operate for longer hours, with 51 percent opening at 6:00 a.m. and 44 percent closing at 10:00 p.m. (14 percent and 27 percent at baseline, respectively). The average number of daily customers in Garowe to 36 (from 28).

Overall, the efficacy of the project to achieve this objective is rated substantial with moderate shortcomings. The outputs were achieved or exceeded. The outcomes were that the beneficiaries gained access to markets through temporary employment and improved connectivity presumably to the transport network although these were qualitatively described but not quantified. The outcomes were measured as nearly achieved or exceeded based on the favorable response by the sampled population. The FCV context of the country limited the quantifiable evidence of final outcomes. The FCV environment did not allow for additional surveys to capture higher level development outcomes such as increase in trade of goods and services. There is a reasonable expectation that the series of projects under this program, would incrementally lead to improvements in the lives and livelihoods of the beneficiaries of target cities in the long run.
OBJECTIVE 2

Objective
To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level.

This objective supports the overarching PDO of the long term Somalia Urban Resilience Program, which states "To strengthen the capacity of municipal governments to perform core functions and strengthen urban resilience in cities across Somalia (PAD, paragraph 41).

Rationale
The results framework at appraisal reflected the ToC. This same ToC was presented at closing (ICR, Figure 1). The ToC in both cases was logical and provided a causal link between the inputs and outputs and outcome. However, the outcome indicators were pitched at the level of processes and intermediate outputs rather than the final outcomes of the project activities.

Inputs were budgets to finance training and capacity building for the staff of the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) and Garowe Municipality to build their respective capacity in subnational level government systems, including the establishment of committees to oversee the maintenance of secondary roads. Inputs in Mogadishu were to include budgets for financing road connectivity and drainage network assessment.

Outputs were the number of persons trained from the PIU and other civil servants in public administration skills such as in the areas of financial management (FM), procurement, safeguards, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), participatory planning, and operating and maintenance (O&M). Another output was the number of maintenance committees formed.

The outcome was to be the strengthened performance of the municipal governments to deliver public services and improved accountability to its constituents. This improved performance was to be measured by the establishment of community engagement/O&M plans for the rehabilitated roads (an output or intermediate outcome at best) and the results of end line surveys expressing satisfaction with government performance in delivering the rehabilitated roads. The outcome of the training received was that the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) to which Mogadishu belongs and Garowe would adopt participatory planning, stakeholder engagement, and grievance redress to reflect better accountability to its constituents. This is more a process outcome. The achievement of the above objective was limited to having established community engagement/O&M plans to demonstrate strengthened local government capacity to improve the lives of its citizens. The ICR did not include critical assumptions.

OUTPUTS:

- Project and Government staff formally trained:
  - in Mogadishu 159 project and government staff were trained (target of 30 was exceeded). A total of 207 individuals (39% women) received formal training; 159 were project and government staff. Training included public financial management (20 participants);
procurement (45 participants); human resources management in local government (10 participants); M&E (57); operations and maintenance (O&M), environmental and social safeguards and grievance redress (75). Training was provided to representatives from BRA / Mogadishu (159) the Project Implementation Unit (PIU, 6), the contractor (4), the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS, 4), and community members (40).

- in Garowe, 72 government and project staff were trained (target of 20 was exceeded). A total of 79 individuals (19% women) received formal training in public financial management (27 participants), procurement (10 participants), human resource management in local government (5 participants), M&E (12 participants), contract management (1 participant), project management (4 participants), environmental and social safeguards and grievance redress (5 participants), and technical aspects and maintenance (15 participants). Training was provided to government staff (54), PIU staff (18), UNOPS (2), the contractor (2), the O&M committee (2), and the Grievance Redress Committee (1).

- Maintenance Committees established and functioning:
  - in Mogadishu, 6 committees were established for each district (target of 7 was almost achieved). Each committee had 7 members (5 male, 2 female), 2 representatives from the administration and 5 from the communities including IDPs. The initial list of prioritized roads covered seven districts, but the final set of roads covered six districts. Some of the committees were operational, others covered recently finalized roads. More time is needed to assess whether the committees are functioning as planned to maintain the most recently finished roads.
  - in Garowe one O&M committee was organized and conducted its first clean-up campaign in the 2nd quarter of 2021 (target of 1 was achieved). The committee consisted of 7 members (3 female). Of these, 4 were district commissioners, 2 were representatives from the host communities and one an IDP representative from the Jilab Road. The Committee covered all four roads. Three roads run through two adjacent neighborhoods (Koowda Agoosto and Hantiwadaag). The district recommended that one committee would handle the O&M of those roads.

OUTCOMES:

- All 16 completed sub-projects were accompanied by post-construction community engagement/O&M plans. The original target of 23 was not achieved because the number of roads was reduced, although the overall length of rehabilitated roads exceeded original targets.
  - In Mogadishu, the original plan was to finance the construction of 19 roads in 7 districts but variation orders during construction reduced the number of roads to 11 roads in 6 districts, covering an estimated total distance of 7.5 km. Variations were due to compliance issues with Environmental and Social Safeguards. Some roads were to pass through areas with underground septic tanks and lacked space for proper drainage. Others were dropped due to budgetary constraints.
  - In Garowe, four roads were constructed with 4.93 km exceeding the target of 4.4 km. The roads created a bypass that served as an alternative route through the city and decongested the main Garowe Road. The Jilab Road connected the city’s largest IDP settlements to the urban center, leading to better access to jobs and services by IDPs. The roads included drainage on one side and pedestrian walkways on both sides of the road. In both municipalities, these roads were prioritized based on their strategic importance that provided connectivity of urban poor communities and IDP settlements to key socioeconomic facilities.
• People surveyed were satisfied with the municipal government's performance on road rehabilitation.
  o In Mogadishu, the baseline survey showed 25.0 percent of respondents held a positive view (either satisfied or very satisfied). The end line survey showed 88.3 percent were satisfied. (88.2 percent of men, 88.4 percent of women, 97 percent of IDPs, and 86.7 percent of the respondents from the host community)
  o In Garowe, the baseline survey showed that 0 percent said they were very satisfied. The end line survey said that 47.4 percent were satisfied and 37.4 percent were very satisfied.

Overall, the efficacy of the project to achieve this objective is rated Modest. There were shortcomings in the outcomes. The project achieved the narrowly defined outcomes associated with the delivery of the rehabilitated roads by having established community engagement/O&M plans. However, the ICR acknowledged that more time is needed to assess the effectiveness of these plans to maintain the road investments (ICR, Annex 1). In addition, outcomes associated with establishing accountability to its constituents, e.g., the publication of periodic report cards on service standards to deliver public services would have been useful to support assertions that the municipal governments capacities have been strengthened.

Rating
Modest

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale
Overall, the efficacy of the project to achieve the first objective is rated substantial with moderate shortcomings. The roads were indeed completed as planned in both Mogadishu and Garowe, accompanied by O&M plan and short term income generating opportunities. However, there was a shortcoming in terms of the limited evidence provided related to the achievement of service and safety standards, such as the volume of traffic facilitated, or reduced incidence of accidents involving motorists and pedestrians.

The efficacy of the project to achieve the second objective is rated Modest because the outcomes reflected the strengthening of public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level only in a very limited sense and with moderate shortcomings. Moreover, the accountability features of the strengthened capacity is inadequately reflected by the level of satisfaction expressed at the end line surveys. Other outcome indicators would have been useful in terms of how the built capacity translated to effective accountability, such as the adoption of a regular score card reporting on how access has improved businesses or service standards associated with improving access to services. Social benefits from training and capacity-building activities (for example, local investments based on better planning, better transparency and accountability, reduced incidence of waterborne diseases due to improved drainage on roads, better O&M provisions, increased economic activity, and access to public services) were noted under Other Impacts but were not included in the ToC and thus were not part of the results framework or regularly monitored.

Nevertheless, the overall efficacy of the project -- taking into account the narrow focus only on the services associated with the rehabilitated roads in Mogadishu and Garowe, and the difficult implementation
environment in an FCV context – is rated substantial with moderate shortcomings due to this limited evidence.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**
Substantial

### 5. Efficiency

**Economic Efficiency:** At appraisal, no economic and financial analysis was undertaken due to the lack of economic data, the ongoing conflict in Somalia, and the uncertainty in determining costs and benefits. Comparative traffic flow analyses for before and after the project were also not possible due to data limitations. However, a framework for economic analysis was to be developed during project implementation to collect data on economic impact (PAD, paragraph 64). Benefits were to be derived from improved access to markets and services, short term income generating opportunities, and improved safety for all residents, both pedestrians and motorists in Mogadishu and Garowe.

At closing, an economic and financial analysis was conducted based on the US$9 million project cost of the road infrastructure investments in Mogadishu and Garowe. Economic benefits included travel time and cost savings for commuters, the worth of improved skills of new labor force entrants as well as those returning. Costs included all project disbursements along with O&M costs. A 12 percent discount rate was used. The net present value (NPV) was estimated at US$8.4 million. An economic rate of return (ERR) was estimated to be 34 percent. Using a 5 percent discount rate to represent the cost of capital to the Government of Somalia, the estimated NPV was at US$12.2 million. Using a 12 and 15 percent discount rate, which represented risk-adjusted discount rates, the estimated NPV was US$4 million at 12 percent and US$2.3 million at 15 percent (ICR, footnote 20).

**Administrative and Operational Efficiency:** This project was the second of a planned time-series projects to support Somalia's long term urban resilience program. The project closed as planned. There were no restructurings or extensions. The project was not complex, but several factors affected appraisal and implementation without extending the implementation period. **First,** appraisal was delayed by almost a year as other donor partners did not support the original project design that called for US$86 million investment to cover Hargeisa, Mogadishu, and Garowe (ICR, paragraph 41). This resulted in reducing the scope and ambition of the project, loss of momentum and loss of institutional memory. **Second,** design features of the roads investment delayed implementation. For Mogadishu, equity considerations (approximately 1 km road per district) led to disjointed sections of prioritized roads, not connected to existing, or proposed trade routes or commercial hubs, socioeconomic facilities, or other road networks. In addition, the UNOPS completed designs were not road-specific and did not take into account specific sites or locations of existing utility lines, whether above or underground. Physical plans that detailed the urban environment, showing the location of its unregulated public utilities, or its underground lines were absent, thus hampering implementation (see Section 10 Other Issues, Procurement). This led to redesigns during construction, hence, change orders and extensions, exposing the limited procurement and contract management capacity of the PIUs. **Third,** Mogadishu was led by five mayors over the course of the project. The president appoints Mogadishu’s mayors, who tend to be more accountable to top political leaders rather than their constituents. The high turnover constrained implementation because of the need to reestablish relations, aware that each new executive would call for their own quick wins.
and high visibility roads. In addition, achieving political consensus was difficult when mayors did not appoint their own deputies or secretaries. **Fourth,** replacing the BRA PIU Project Coordinator almost a year later after he resigned in December 2020 affected the implementation of resettling project affected persons (PAPs).

Overall, the efficiency of the project is rated Substantial based on the economic returns of the project investments at closing. The administrative and operational efficiency of the project, while noting reductions in the project's ambition and implementation delays did almost use up all of the resources on time.

**Efficiency Rating**

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

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* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

**6. Outcome**

The relevance of the project's objectives is substantial because the PDOs were relevant to both the country's plans and the Bank's reengagement strategy embodied in its partnership framework. The efficacy of the project to achieve its objectives is overall rated substantial with moderate shortcomings. The outcomes achieved for both capacity and investments were limited to the roads rehabilitated and did not include the institutionalization of the accountability built by the project interventions. Efficiency is rated Substantial. The overall outcome of the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory because of the moderate shortcomings in evidence on higher level outcomes.

a. **Outcome Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

**7. Risk to Development Outcome**

The following pose risks to the outcomes achieved by the project:

- **Political and economic risks.** This is a high risk. Somalia continues to experience armed conflict. The institutions remain weak and vulnerable, and this had affected project implementation. There is a
provisional 2011 Constitution in place. The federal government was established in 2012. Five new Federal Member States were formed subsequently. Somalia’s new federal map created a new, albeit incomplete political development space. Somalia continues to rebuild economic institutions but the incomplete political process jeopardize the recovery from fragility. These risks are to be mitigated by the Bank’s reengagement strategy focusing in two areas to address the structural drivers of fragility: (i) building institutions to deliver services, and (ii) restoring economic resilience and opportunities.

- **Risks from environmental and natural hazards, including the pandemic.** This remains a high risk. In this project, implementation delays and increase in construction costs were attributed to COVID-19, which restricted mobility and caused supply chain disruptions. Works in Garowe were completed by March 2021 (ICR, footnote 29). Heavy rains in 2019 and 2020 damaged completed works, hampered access to material, and delayed the works. The country’s high exposure to repeated climate change-related shocks poses risks to development outcomes. To mitigate this risk, the government committed to building resilience in its national plans and mirrored in the World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework for Somalia (FY19–FY22).

- **Risk from the adequacy of the financing modality.** This project was part of a set of projects with the next phase dependent on completing the preceding phase. The minimal funding envelope (US$9 million) of this phase tested the studies that were prepared, and all the funds channeled through the government system down to the municipal government level for the first time to show the strengthened capacity of the nascent national public financial management (PFM) system. This is a moderate risk since there is a commitment to follow through with this series of project approach by undertaking the next phase, the expansion of the interventions to cover two other cities.

- **Security remains a significant risk, particularly for Mogadishu.** This is a high risk. In this project, police officers were deployed to protect sites and workers. Increased security risks led to dropping initially prioritized districts. A PIU vehicle was attacked in July 2020. This was among several near misses experienced during implementation. Expanding the works to less secure districts led to an increase in cases where security barricades hindered transportation of construction materials. Access to sites by UNOPS supervision was hampered by security-related travel restrictions. The task team initiated monthly check-ins and weekly consultations toward the end of the project. To mitigate this risk, additional police officers were engaged for the protection of the project office and personnel. However, there is limited availability and timeliness of UN security support.

- **Risk from maintaining investments.** There is a high risk that the investments made will not be maintained after the project closes. In this project, there was a sense of ownership, some capacity built at the PIUs and municipalities. To mitigate this risk, subsequent projects need to provide incentives and recruit civil servants into the PIU. This would facilitate integration and build capacity for the municipality to lead implementation. The financial ability of the municipality to maintain assets is at risk without commitments and investments in municipal urban plans and budgets. To mitigate this risk, the Garowe Municipality has secured an initial O&M budget. Both cities, however, need to evaluate and routinely update infrastructure needs and formulate a budget and mobilize the political will and resources.

- **Risk from externalities.** This is a moderate risk. In this project, the small-scale investments did not increase land value to displace residents. The municipal governments need to monitor the impact of urban investments as the project expands to other cities. For Garowe, there is the risk that increased access to IDP camps may provide incentives to increase inflow and overwhelm the capacity to deliver limited services. To mitigate this risk, the government must remain vigilant and prepare for these scenarios.
8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The Bank team designed this project as the first phase to implement the Series of Project (SOP) approach of the Somalia Urban Resilience Program. The US$84 million, 7-year program reflected the World Bank's commitment to building institutions and urban resilience in states with Fragile, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) conditions like Somalia. The Somalia program would build urban resilience of key cities by improving their urban governance, planning, and social cohesion (PAD, paragraph 41). The preparatory phase laid the groundwork for establishing an implementation capacity and financed studies of road infrastructure investments. Phase 1 implementation was to cover the cities of Mogadishu and Garowe. Phase 2 was to expand to the cities of Kismayo and Baidoa. Phase 3 was to return to investments in Mogadishu and Garowe and waste management facilities in Hargeisa, subject to available funds from the multi donor trust fund for Somalia (PAD, paragraph 42).

The project was strategically relevant to the country's development plans and the World Bank's reengagement strategy (see Section 3 Relevance of Objectives above). The technical, financial, and economic aspects were adequately assessed, as well as the environmental and social safeguards. Of particular importance was engaging the different vulnerable groups and establishing consultative means for their participation in identifying investment priorities and benefiting from temporary employment. The implementation arrangement focused on an area-specific PIU - one for Garowe, one for Mogadishu through the Barowe Regional Administration (BRA), which administers Mogadishu. The BRA was to manage the engineering supervision consultant for both Mogadishu and Garowe (see Section 10 Other Issues, (b) Fiduciary Compliance below). Risk assessments were adequate. Mitigating measures included supplementing the expected low capacity with training support, hiring a third-party monitor to assist in monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The Bank team contracted UNOPS, who sub-contracted Apex for the feasibility, designs, and prioritization of Mogadishu roads; and IPE Global for the Garowe roads (ICR, footnote 26). The scope of the investments (the roads) was area wide to mitigate social tensions from different vulnerable groups - refugees, returnees, IDPs, and the poor in the host beneficiary communities to distinguish the chronic needs of the urban poor in the host communities and the acute needs of those forcibly displaced (returnees, refugees, internally displaced persons or IDPs).

Several lessons informed project design such as (i) use of government systems to strengthen local government institutions by building local capacity; (ii) use of a programmatic approach for flexibility; and an area-based approach to address the host communities' perception that IDPs and returnees, often from minority clans, were being favored for assistance; (iii) complementing development efforts by other development partners working in various sectors to maximize impact and leverage limited resources in countries with FCV conditions; and (iv) use of participatory decision-making to strengthen ownership (PAD, paragraphs 45-52).

At entry, the Bank team sought to complement other partners in Somalia. The project originally planned to link with ongoing district-level Operations and Maintenance (O&M) committees that were financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS+) and the United Nations Joint Program for Local Governance. However, partner programming had closed by the time the Bank team completed its project appraisal. New committees
were to be created to support the project. Actual maintenance costs were to be funded by the participating municipalities, although this financing was not secured at project start.

Overall, the Bank performance at entry is rated Satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
The Bank team conducted seven supervision missions over the course of the 3-year implementation period. The Task Team Leader (TTL) was based in Nairobi with local technical support including engineering and procurement consultants. The co-TTL transitioned as Team Leader providing smooth transition. The team developed close working relationships with each PIU, implementation partners, and development partners throughout the life of the project (ICR, paragraph 67). This was evident in short, intensive missions the Bank team conducted to each PIU accompanied by truncated, achievable action plans with specific goals and deadlines to address implementation challenges. The corrective measures were framed in a learning-by-doing’ approach to build PIU capacity. The Bank team also provided additional training in the Bank safeguards, fiduciary, and procurement policies. The Bank team supplemented the lack of implementation experience by hiring a Third Party Monitor (TPM) to assist the PIUs to help with M&E. The TPM recommended corrective measures at the midterm and toward the end of the project. In an effort to establish synergy with work done by other development partners, project start was delayed by almost a year. Nascent local capacity was also supplemented by UNOPS’s technical supervision. UNOPS performance met with several implementation challenges. These included the lack of formal transition from the two UNOPS teams (different staff were employed), limited on-the-ground presence in Mogadishu due to security risks, including limited availability and timeliness of UN security support. Coordination across UNOPS and counterparts improved over time.

Overall, the Bank team’s performance at supervision was Satisfactory. Efforts were made to address security risks, lack of local capacity, shortcomings in compliance with Bank policies and procedures. The Bank team did not address the modest M&E system that was designed, including the need for appropriate indicators to reflect capacity to deliver urban services (see Section 9, M&E below).

The overall Bank team’s performance at entry is rated Satisfactory with moderate shortcomings. The Bank performance at supervision is rated Satisfactory with efforts to adequately address the shortcomings at design, except for the weak M&E system. The overall Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Satisfactory
9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

At appraisal, the PIUs were to establish a project monitoring system to assess progress against indicators in the results framework. The PIUs were to prepare regular monthly and quarterly reports using inputs from the supervision agent and the Project Engineer. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was to be participatory, engaging community beneficiaries of the districts – including women, youth and the displaced - accompanied by targets (PAD, paragraph 58). A baseline and end-line beneficiary surveys were planned. Case studies were to document the gender dimension, impact on vulnerable or marginalized groups, intercommunity dynamics between the IDPs and the host communities, and how these groups contributed to urban resilience. Quantitative assessments were to identify lessons to be used in designing similar projects in the future (PAD, paragraph 59).

The theory of change was simply stated and limited to road investments. Indicators were adequate to monitor progress toward achieving the first objective and could reasonably test the links of the results chain. However, the ToC of objective 1 was stated simply and provided the link mainly between outputs and intermediate outcomes, and not necessarily the final outcomes of the project activities. The outcome indicators of the second objective were pitched at the level of processes and intermediate outputs (kilometers of road rehabilitated, number of O&M committees formed). These could have included, for example, impact on the social compact/state-society relations, such as those noted at closing ICR, paragraph 37). Some outcome indicators could have focused on tracking the effectiveness of training or the functionality of committees established, instead of outputs (the number of people trained or the number of committees formed). Results were disaggregated by location but not all targets were location-specific causing some confusion among the PIUs on expected outcomes for each municipality. M&E design did not include a Management Information System (MIS) or a GeoEnabling initiative for Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS) to include contract management as part of a streamlined M&E reporting.

b. M&E Implementation

M&E was implemented by the PIUs of the local governments assisted by a Third Party Monitor (TPM, Abyrint). Data was regularly collected by the PIUs in Mogadishu and Garowe. The TPM triangulated progress and issues from difficult-to-reach areas (ICR, paragraph 20) and (i) verified activities, (ii) tracked implementation, (iii) measured results achieved, and (iv) monitored social and environmental sustainability of the interventions following the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP, ICR, footnote 30, Section 10 Other Issues below). Both the contractor and UNOPS submitted monthly M&E reporting to the PIUs and the TPM confirmed its quality and reliability. Baseline and end line surveys were conducted as planned. The PIU initiated the adoption of the GEMS but without a project MIS or geo-referenced data. One firm conducted the baseline and end line surveys in both municipalities to reduce the risk of divergent approaches on qualitative indicators. Several outcome targets were exceeded because the initial targets were conservatively set (see Section 12 Lessons below). Beneficiaries were involved in defining target indicators, particularly in prioritizing the road investments. However, there was no report that beneficiaries were involved in assessing their achievement. Engaging females in stakeholder consultation processes provided job opportunities in civil works. Fair working conditions were promoted, such as sufficient and suitable toilet and washing facilities, separate for men and women workers (ICR, paragraph 37). The quality of the evidence would have
benefited from a more evaluative tracking of the results over time, not simply updating tables. Weaknesses in outcome indicators, particularly with regard to Objective 1, remained unaddressed.

c. M&E Utilization

M&E data informed project management and decision-making. The following TPM findings led to improvements by the time of the midterm review: (i) poor quality of works due to inadequate adherence to technical designs and workmanship standards; (ii) inadequate contract management; (iii) insufficient reporting on social, environmental, health and safety, and GBV/SEA risks; and (iv) deficiencies in community engagement, particularly with the integrity of grievance redress approaches. M&E data and extensive community consultations were reported to have informed the reallocation of resources (ICR, paragraph 33). M&E data was also used to report on achievements of targets. Noted shortcomings (e.g., MIS and GEMS, were not used) were to be considered for the subsequent phases of the program.

Overall, the M&E is rated Substantial. There were moderate shortcomings in the M&E system’s design and implementation. The outcome indicators were not revised during implementation to better test the links in the results chain of the theory of change for the second objective to strengthen public service delivery. Utilization of M&E data was substantial. The M&E system as designed and implemented was generally sufficient to assess the achievement of the objectives but was cognizant of the difficulty in reporting outcomes in an FCV context. At closing, the end line survey added qualitative aspects to support M&E use.

M&E Quality Rating
Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

Environmental Safeguards: The project was classified as a category “B” and triggered the following safeguards policies: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 4.04 (Natural Habitat), and OP 4.11 (Physical Cultural Heritage). An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was cleared by the World Bank and disclosed in-country and on the World Bank website. The relatively moderate scale of the civil works in the urban areas meant that the anticipated adverse environmental impacts were minor, temporary, and confined to the construction site.

Social safeguards: The project triggered OP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. The PIUs prepared a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) with subproject-specific Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs), and Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs). The limited size and nature of the individual physical works meant moderate resettlement impacts. No physical displacement occurred in the project. The economic displacement was related to temporary livelihood impact on mobile vendors or roadside businesses during the construction (approximately for one month at a given project road section under the
All project-affected stakeholders were compensated (105 in Mogadishu and 14 in Garowe). The project was not ‘gender-tagged’.

Compliance with the safeguards was rated Satisfactory (S) or Moderately Satisfactory (MS) from project start but was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) in January 2021 because of the delay in implementing Gender-Based Violence (GBV) risk mitigation measures in Mogadishu and the findings of the TPM after site visits. The following GBV-related corrective measures were implemented: a GBV action plan was adopted, training and awareness-raising activities were conducted for the PIU, community members, and contracted workers; GBV service providers were identified; and a code of conduct for project workers was enforced. The TPM findings on labor and working conditions, occupational safety and health measures, grievance redress mechanism (GRM), and reporting were also addressed. Compliance with safeguards was rated Moderately Satisfactory by July 2021, and until the project closed (ICR, paragraph 58).

GRMs were established at the district, contractor, and PIU levels. High illiteracy rates and the oral culture of the target communities resulted in almost all grievances being made orally, either in person or by telephone. Grievances were addressed in a transparent and inclusive manner. In Mogadishu, 130 grievances were recorded revolving around water drainage/flooding problems, damage to septic tanks, and access to households. Grievances were attributed to deficient road design. No civil works were conducted in roads with land disputes. All grievances were resolved by the time the project closed, except for two pre-existing land disputes between the municipality and landowners. In Garowe, 185 grievances were recorded during construction around traffic safety, air pollution, disruption to utilities (water supply and electricity), access to households, and engineering design. All were resolved by the time the project closed.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management: The quarterly interim financial reports (IFRs) were submitted on time. Audited annual financial statements were also submitted on time except for FY2019 and FY2020. Delays in hiring the firm to support the Auditor General caused the late submission. No significant audit findings were noted. However, the external audit report for the year ending December 31, 2020 reported the following (i) in FY2020, the Federal Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (FIMSC) meetings were held twice - February 29, 2020 and September 9, 2020 - instead of quarterly; and (ii) instances of weak payment verification process - one on works completion certificates and another for Puntland, where sourcing for an internet provider did not obtain at least three quotations or no justification for single source. Despite these findings, the project received an overall unqualified (clean) audit opinion (ICR, paragraph 61). The 2021 project audit was due for submission to the World Bank on or before June 30, 2022.

Procurement: Procurement complied with the World Bank’s ‘Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers’ 2018 edition. The National Procurement Law was not yet fully operational, so World Bank Standard Procurement Documents were used. Weak contract management was observed. The PIUs were unfamiliar with World Bank procurement regulations. The PIUs had insufficient understanding of safeguards planning or monitoring requirements and lacked contract management capacity. The PIUs had limited knowledge of local contractors. For example, the PIUs hired local contractors who lacked safeguards management, reporting capacity, or experience working with design specifications. Disputes arose because of late completion of contracts; incomplete documentation or lack of budgets for changes in scope. The Bank team contracted UNOPS (who sub-contracted Apex for the Mogadishu roads) to prepare preliminary road designs but these designs did not specify drainage and utilities for each road, or the link to the overall city.
drainage system. Adjustments were made during implementation to accommodate community requests and accommodate existing drainage and utilities. Rainwater flooded neighboring houses or other roads because these were now lower than the rehabilitated roads. In Mogadishu, poor adherence to technical designs, poor workmanship, and insufficient supervision by both the UNOPS and the PIU led to problems with the quality of some of the works. All procurement-related transactions required prior review. Procurement improved over time except when COVID19 emerged. Mitigation measures included allowing the electronic submission and subsequent opening of bids/proposals.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)
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d. Other
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11. Ratings

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<th>ICR</th>
<th>IEG</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreements/Comment</th>
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<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Limited evidence on higher-level development outcomes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of M&amp;E</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
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<td>Quality of ICR</td>
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12. Lessons

The operation resulted in 7 lessons (ICR, paragraphs 74-80). Five of the more important ones are reported below with slight modifications.

- **A simplified design using a decentralized implementation arrangement may also enhance federal capacity to build its strategic oversight.** In this project, simplified components (infrastructure investments) and interrelated activities (capacity building, O&M, project management) implemented at the municipal level provided flexibility in implementation. Design included adaptive specifications to overcome implementation challenges. The municipal governments were empowered to play a central role in project implementation. This reduced political interference because of clear division of labor across different tiers of government. However, the arrangement missed an opportunity for a central agency, like the State Ministry of Public Works, to use the project's local design specifications to lay the groundwork for building road standards. Future decentralized implementation arrangements may find it useful to take advantage of fostering local capacity by also facilitating strategic oversight or establishing standards at the federal line ministry level.
• **Using an international firm to design and supervise engineering works could supplement nascent local capacity.** In this project, Somalian implementation capacity was still limited. Partnering with an international engineering firm supported timely project implementation. Building local capacity may benefit from delegating specialized functions to third parties while the government maintains its leadership. All stakeholders are enjoined to closely monitor functions assigned to third parties, how these are engaged, how well they deliver their services, adjusting the collaboration as needed, to ensure successful partnership.

• **Infrastructure investments require multiyear budgeting and substantial allocations.** In this project, the allocation was small (US$9 million). The municipal governments focused on small, single sector investments. The smaller, and more cohesive city of Garowe, focused on small investments within the city. In Mogadishu, prioritized investments were influenced by equity considerations. Smaller, disjointed investments were made in 17 relatively autonomous districts of 1 km of community road each. The investments were considered peace dividends with limited impact. It also created a path of addressing dependency in that SURP-II funding in Mogadishu continues to be allocated for the construction of outstanding community roads, making it difficult to embark on a more holistic urban development.

• **A communications strategy may guide the use of consultations to inform project planning and management in an FCV context.** In this project, early, inclusive, and ongoing consultations provided an understanding of needs by the government and the community. The consultations managed stakeholder expectations and helped identify project risks; identified complementary investments to build impact; and devised timelines to monitor implementation targets. The benefits of community consultations need to be informed by good practices so that it is not excessive or its resources are spread thinly. The project could also partner with existing non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other community-based organizations (CBOs), and the private sector to take advantage of their relevant expertise. For example, the project could develop contracts with utility firms on how to address obtrusive utilities, or explore partnerships with CBOs/NGOs to foster effective participatory planning. A project communication strategy may be useful to outline the flexible approaches to guide and document transparent engagement.

• **Promoting structured and transparent approaches for the recruitment of unskilled labor is useful in FCV contexts.** In this project, no formal procedures guided the recruitment of vulnerable groups as unskilled labor. Contractors approached districts to recruit unskilled labor based on broad typologies of vulnerability, rather than a participatory, criteria-based approach that targets both vulnerable and marginalized groups. For Mogadishu, district administrations recruited using quotas from pre-existing community groups (religious leaders and elders, youth, and women), which are mostly made up of lower-income groups. Recruitment was less organized in Garowe and relied more on informal recruitment through relatives or neighbors who knew that the contractor was looking for workers. According to female beneficiaries, woman would like more job opportunities, not only as cooks, sweepers, and flag person but also in laying PICB (light manual labor) in some sites. Additional strategies are required for promoting female employment, such as improving awareness of job opportunities, setting minimum quotas for women employment, and offering childcare services through women’s groups.
13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR was well prepared, generally followed the guidelines, and provided a detailed overview of the project. The narrative supported the ratings. The justification for supporting the rating of supervision was well presented. The evidence and analysis were aligned with the theory of change to help the reader better understand project performance. It was accurate, internally consistent, and generally aligned to the PDOs. The detailed explanations in Annex 1 were helpful as well as the supporting information found in the footnotes. The report was candid, offering the shortcomings of the M&E system as designed and implemented as well as the drawbacks resulting from the low expectation associated with the lack of local implementation capacity and familiarity with Bank policies. Lessons and recommendations were derived from the operations. The annexes, particularly Annexes 8 and 9, helped the reader understand how the project progressed. Annex 10 detailed recommendations that is expected to strengthen the design of the subsequent operation of this Series of Projects operation. Other impacts from the project were useful in providing additional insights into the benefits from the project, particularly the results of the consultative processes, and its impact on engaging vulnerable groups. A minor shortcoming was the insufficient treatment of the outcome associated with strengthening the intergovernmental transfer system and the absence of CERC in the theory of change.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial