



1. Project Data

Project ID P156900	Project Name CI-Transport sector reform project	
Country Cote d'Ivoire	Practice Area(Lead) Transport	
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-58700	Closing Date (Original) 30-Jun-2021	Total Project Cost (USD) 12,099,331.87
Bank Approval Date 05-Jul-2016	Closing Date (Actual) 31-Dec-2021	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	30,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	11,860,248.95	0.00
Actual	12,099,331.87	0.00

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1, page 5) and in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 6) was "**to improve the efficiency and safety of transport services on the Ivorian section of the Abidjan, Ivory Coast - Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso road transport corridor**".

The PDO is unpacked for this review as follows:



PDO 1. To improve the efficiency of transport services on the Ivorian section of the road transport corridor.

PDO 2. To improve the safety of transport services on the Ivorian section of the road transport corridor.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

There were five components (PAD, pages 6 - 8).

1. Institutional strengthening and capacity building support for public and private sector participants in the transport sector (estimated cost at appraisal was US\$5.8 million; actual cost was US\$3.8 million). This component aimed to strengthen the public sector participants in the sector and support private operators in the road services industry. Activities in this component included: (i) strengthening the institutional capacities of the Directorate General of Land Transport and Traffic Management (TDMT) and other agencies (such as the Traffic Fluidity Observatory (OFT) and the Road Racket Fighting Unit (ULCR) (also described in the ICR (page 6) as the Racket Control Unit); (ii) capacity building of transport sector associations and operators; (iii) support for establishing a market-based freight allocation mechanism; (iv) supporting communication and coordination activities for facilitating trade on the Ivorian section of the corridor; and (v) supporting regional dialogue with Burkina Faso on transport and transit facilitation issues on the corridor.

2. Development of a heavy cargo truck renewal scheme (estimated cost at appraisal was US\$30.7 million, actual cost was US\$1.6 million). This component planned to provide financing for developing a long haul heavy truck renewal scheme and institutional strengthening of the Road Transport Development Fund (FDTR). There were three subcomponents: (i) support for designing the institutional and implementation arrangements for stakeholders (commercial banks, FDTR, the Project Coordination Unit (PCU), and commercial operators applying for truck renewal; (ii) support for selecting a contractor for scrapping old trucks under the scheme; and (iii) capacity building and technical assistance (TA) to the FDTR for managing the scheme on Government's behalf.

This activity was dropped one month before the closing date due to the obstacles encountered in developing a vehicle scrapyard (discussed in section 2e).

3. Support to customs modernization and trade facilitation on the Ivorian section of the corridor (estimated cost at appraisal was US\$3.4 million, actual cost was US\$2.3 million). This component aimed to increase the efficiency of trade and transit procedures on the corridor. There were four subcomponents: (i) supporting interconnection of the corridor's customs' management system and implementing new Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems for facilitating regional trade through aligning customs procedures; (ii) support for modernizing the customs clearance procedures and promoting coordination between customs departments to reduce congestion at the gateway port (Abidjan) and at the



border posts; (iii) training customs officials, external customs systems users and capacity building of the clearing and forwarding industry; and (iv) financing communication campaigns.

4. Road safety on the Ivorian section of the corridor (estimated cost at appraisal was US\$3.2 million, actual cost was US\$1.3 million). This component aimed at improving road safety on this section of the corridor and institutional strengthening of the Road Safety Agency. There were four subcomponents: (i) capacity building of the Road Safety Agency (OSER) and support for monitoring road safety; (ii) financing sensitization campaigns; (iii) support for identifying accident black spots; and (iv) financing training equipment and other materials for the OSER training center.

5. Project management, monitoring and evaluation (estimated cost at appraisal was US\$1.7 million, actual cost was US\$3.1 million). Activities included: (i) financing the operating cost for the already established Emergency Infrastructure Renewal Project Coordination Unit (PCU); (ii) project management support including support for monitoring and evaluation; (iii) supporting citizen engagement; (iv) financing studies and technical assistance (TA); and (v) HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns including monitoring HIV/AIDS along this section of the corridor.

e. **Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

Project cost. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$45.0 million. The actual cost was US\$12.1 million as the activity of developing a heavy truck renewal scheme was dropped from the project scope.

Financing. At appraisal, the project was financed by an IDA credit of US\$30.0 million. The amount disbursed was US\$12.09 million. US\$15.78 million of the credit was cancelled.

Recipient contribution. At appraisal, the recipient contribution was US\$15.0 million. There was no recipient contribution during implementation.

Dates. The project was approved on July 5, 2016, became effective on December 14, 2016, and was scheduled to close on June 30, 2021. However, the project closed six months behind schedule on December 31, 2021.

Other changes. There were two Level 2 restructurings.

The Bank supported the following changes through the **first restructuring on May 17, 2021**.

- extending the closing date by six months from June 30, 2021, to December 31, 2021, due to the severe delays encountered in the development of the heavy cargo truck renewal scheme (component two activity); and
- changing the disbursement and implementation arrangements to align with the new closing date.

The following changes were made through the **second restructuring on November 25, 2021**.

- The activities related to commissioning 300 modern heavy-cargo trucks and operationalizing the truck renewal scheme were cancelled. Although a site was selected for vehicle scrapping, the environmental and social studies (a prerequisite for operationalizing the vehicle dismantling



process), were subject to delays and not completed when the project closed. Therefore, this activity was dropped from the project.

- Cancellation of US\$15.78 million of the undisbursed IDA credit.
- A proposal to replace the truck renewal scheme with a risk sharing facility for fleet renewal, which involved the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to give strategic and operational support was not supported.

Split rating. There was no split rating of objectives, because the project restructuring did not modify the project's original development objectives/outcomes which remained unchanged throughout implementation.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country and sector context. The Abidjan - Ouagadougou corridor is a 1,189 kilometer (km) long road and rail corridor, of which 55% is in Cote d'Ivoire. In 2013, the corridor had a market share of 35% of the overall transit trade for Burkina Faso (PAD, paragraph 6). This share was expected to increase as Cote d'Ivoire regained its role as the dominant transit corridor for Burkina Faso and to a lesser extent for Mali and Niger. Factors such as deficient infrastructure, inadequate regulations and market distortions had created a large gap between prices and costs in providing transport services and created an environment not conducive for sectoral investments in the corridor. Other issues affecting the efficient use of the truck fleet on the corridor were: (i) slow truck rotation times; (ii) delays in customs clearance at the port; (iii) non-tariff and other informal barriers; and (iv) difficulties of finding backhaul cargo. These factors made it difficult for most transporters to cover their capital costs and renew truck fleets. Following the end of the civil war in 2007, the corridor had regained its position as one of West Africa's main corridors and Abidjan port had regained the market share of regional transit trade despite setbacks in early 2010, improving the efficiency and safety of transport services on the corridor was important to the Government strategy.

Alignment with the Government strategy. Two years before appraisal (2014 - 2016), the Government launched an ambitious program of reforms to modernize the transport and transit environment. A key objective of the reform was to *"improve the efficiency of transport services on key intra -and inter-regional corridors such as the Abidjan - Ouagadougou transport corridor, to better serve the tradable part of the Ivorian economy and to further enhance Cote d'Ivoire's position as a key transport and trade hub for the West Africa sub-region"*. The PDO was consistent with Cote d'Ivoire's National Development Plan (NDP) for 2016 - 2020 and the updated NDP for 2021-2025. The plans broadly articulated the need for structural transformation of the economy through industrialization. The plan for 2021- 2025 reiterated the role of the transport sector as an enabler for growth in all sectors of the economy for increased competitiveness.

Alignment with the Bank strategy. The PDO is well-aligned with the Bank Strategy for Cote d'Ivoire. At appraisal, the PDO was aligned with the Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for 2015, and the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2016- 2019 (which was extended to 2021), which remained relevant at closure. The SCD identified poor trade and transport logistics as one of the main constraints for developing agri-business and manufacturing industries. The first pillar of the CPF articulated the need for sustaining strong private sector-led growth through reducing transport and logistics bottlenecks and removing trade barriers. The CPF also made the case that improving regional economic infrastructure was key to



increasing competitiveness, expanding markets, and making available affordable goods and services to the poor. The ICR (paragraph 20) notes that an update of the SCD was ongoing when this project closed.

Previous Bank experience. The Bank has financed previous transport infrastructure projects in Cote d'Ivoire such as the Emergency Infrastructure Renewal Project and the Abidjan - Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation project. When this project was under preparation, the Bank was supporting both Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso through the Regional Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness Credit (RTFCC) Development Policy Operations (DPOs). Specifically, the DPO's directly supported joint efforts by the two countries to reduce trade, transport and transit costs on the Abidjan - Ouagadougou corridor.

This project supported technical assistance activities aimed to facilitate transit trade on the corridor through establishing support mechanisms to help private operators adapt to the new regulatory environment for expediting customs clearance at the Abidjan port and border posts, and enhancing road safety on the Ivorian section of the corridor. This project which supported institutional strengthening activities, improving road safety on the Ivorian section of the corridor and developing a truck renewal scheme for replacing old trucks with new trucks was appropriate. These activities were likely to improve the efficiency and road safety along the Ivorian section of the corridor. Alongside this project, the Bank financed a parallel project in Burkina Faso for addressing similar issues along the Burkina Faso section of the corridor. The level of ambition of this project was appropriate and the outcomes of this project in Cote d'Ivoire, along with the intended outcomes of the Burkina Faso were likely to aid in the long-term development objective of improving the efficiency and safety for long-haul movement of freight on the corridor. As such, the relevance of the PDO is high.

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

PDO 1. To improve the efficiency of transport services on the Ivorian section of the road transport corridor.

Rationale

Theory of change. This project supported technical assistance (TA) activities aimed at reducing the trade-related transactions costs of moving freight on the Ivorian section of the corridor. The outputs of activities such as strengthening institutional capacities of state agencies, establishing a market-based freight allocation mechanism, developing trade facilitation initiatives and a truck fleet renewal scheme, were aimed at reducing trade-related transaction costs on the corridor. The outputs such as interconnecting customs management systems and installing new ICT systems at the Abidjan port and at border posts, modernizing customs clearance procedures, promoting coordination between customs departments and training customs officials, were aimed at expediting customs clearance. Provided these activities were effective in inducing behavior change, the outputs were likely to help in contributing to the efficiency of transport services (with efficiency



measured in terms of the costs and time for moving freight), and to the long-term development outcome of improving the competitiveness of the tradeable sectors of the economy in Cote d'Ivoire. The outcomes were predicated on the following assumptions: (i) the capacity building programs were to be implemented effectively; and (ii) the truck fleet renewal scheme would become operational. The causal links between the project activities, outputs and outcomes were logical and the intended outcomes were monitorable.

Outputs. (ICR. pages 12- 16 and 42- 43).

The following activities were completed as targeted.

- The National Training Program for professional driving was updated. This program enabled implementing a nationally standardized program, automating driver license examinations and monitoring driving schools. The project provided equipment for 21 examination centers and two driving license units.
- The project provided DRIVER software and training manuals for instructors. 355 instructors were trained. 950 students were sensitized on road safety. The project provided Information and Communication Technology (ICT) equipment and tools to the Transport Fluidity Observatory (OFT) and the Racket Control Unit (ULCR). The project aided in developing the institutional framework for freight exchange.
- 3,602 truck drivers and 1,541 road transport managers were trained in transport and logistics aspects. Information and awareness campaigns were held. There were no targets for these indicators.
- The operational manual for the heavy cargo fleet renewal scheme was completed. Feasibility studies and environmental and social impact assessment and a commercial viability assessment for implementing a scrapyards at a selected site was completed. Advisory services were provided for a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) arrangement for the scheme. Communications and awareness campaigns were held for 3,574 road transport actors on the relevance of the scheme.
- The project aided in interconnecting the customs information systems of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso and providing equipment for interconnection procedures. This enabled electronic transmission of transit documents collected by Ivorian customs to Burkina Faso customs in real time, Customs technical teams were trained on the procedures.
- The percentage of overloaded trucks on the Ivorian section of the corridor decreased from 60% at the baseline to 45.7%, short of the target of 30%.
- HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns were conducted among 3,608 heavy-vehicle cargo vehicle drivers along the corridors.

The activity associated with developing a heavy truck renewal scheme was dropped from the project scope during the latter stages of implementation.

Outcomes.

The outputs discussed above were aimed to improve efficiency of transport services on the Ivorian section of the corridor. Efficiency was measured through the following dimensions: (i) reduction in the average cost of transporting a 40- foot container from Abidjan to Ouagadougou; (ii) reduction in the average transit time after the freight exits the Abidjan port to the Burkina Faso border; and (iii) annual reduction in carbon dioxide emissions due to the scrapping of old trucks and replacing them with 300 new ones.



- The average cost of transporting a 40 - foot container from Abidjan to Ouagadougou decreased from US\$3,500 at the baseline to US\$3,000 when the project closed, exceeding the target of US\$3,350.
- The average transit time after exiting the Abidjan port to the border with Burkina Faso decreased from 96 hours to 48 hours, as compared to the target of 50 hours.
- 3,770,000 people directly benefitted from project activities, short of the target of 4,150,000. 49.7% of the beneficiaries were women.
- The outcome pertaining to annual reduction in carbon dioxide emissions could not be monitored, as the activity associated with developing the fleet renewal scheme was dropped during implementation.

Of the three indicators, two were realized. However, the outcomes of these two indicators were not wholly attributable to project activities, as the project activities coincided with the rollout of activities under a parallel project (enforcement of Authorized Economic Operators conceived under the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Trade Facilitation Project) (ICR, paragraph 25). The heavy truck renewal scheme, which would have reduced carbon dioxide emissions was dropped. As such, efficacy of this objective is rated as **modest**.

Rating
Modest

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

PDO 2. To improve the safety of transport services on the Ivorian section of the road transport corridor.

Rationale

Theory of change. The TA activities aimed to improve the safety of road transport services on the Ivorian section of the corridor. The outputs of activities such as capacity building activities for the Road Safety Agency (OSER) for monitoring road safety, training their staff and sensitization campaigns were aimed at improving road safety. These activities are likely to reduce the incidence of road-related crashes and casualties on the corridor provided that the road safety activities are enforced effectively and that the activities are effective in inducing behavioral change. The intended outcome was measurable.

Outputs (ICR, pages 12 - 16 and 42 - 43).

The outputs of some activities described above such as, updating the National Training Program for professional driving, were also pertinent for this objective. In addition to those activities, the following activities were relevant for this objective.

- Driving simulators and podium trucks, headlamps, exhaust gas analyzers and associated accessories were provided as targeted.
- Road safety audits were completed. Training manuals were developed for traffic and road safety instruction as targeted.
- An awareness campaign on road safety was conducted for students and two and three wheelers' users along the Abidjan-Ouagadougou corridor as targeted. Under this campaign, 950 students and 3,800 two and three wheelers' users were sensitized on using helmets between October 26 and November 6, 2021. There were no targets for these indicators.



- The training of 400 teachers along the corridor was not completed as planned due to procurement delays.

Outcomes.

The outputs discussed above were aimed at improving road safety by reducing the number of casualties on the Ivorian section of the corridor.

- The number of casualties on this section of the corridor did not decrease. Rather, it went up from 110 at the baseline to 207 when the project closed. The ICR (paragraph 28) notes that this outcome was not realized as the nature of project activities focused mainly on communications and awareness campaigns, with no clear supporting linkages on the enforcement side of reforms to the existing regulatory frameworks.

In sum, efficacy of this objective is rated as **modest**.

Rating
Modest

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

Overall efficacy is modest in view of the modest achievement.

Overall Efficacy Rating
Modest

Primary Reason
Low achievement

5. Efficiency

Economic analysis. A cost-benefit analysis was conducted using standard econometric techniques for project activities that accounted for 93% of the appraisal estimate but 74% of the actual cost respectively. The economic benefits were assumed to come from: (i) an increase in customs revenue; (ii) a reduction in the transport and logistics costs; and (iii) reduced fatalities due to road accidents on the corridor (which did not materialize). The Net Present Value (NPV) at the standard 12% discount rate at completion was US\$35.6 million, as compared to the NPV of US\$200.4 million at appraisal. The reason for the higher NPV at appraisal than at completion was that unlike the NPV at appraisal which included all project benefits, the NPV at closure considered only the road safety costs and benefits associated with expedited customs clearance. The ex post Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) was, nevertheless 32% as compared to the ex-ante EIRR of 40%.

Administrative and operational shortcomings. Project implementation encountered significant delays, with most activities starting execution more than a year after project effectiveness. The long delays in implementing



the fleet renewal activity eventually led to dropping this activity through the second project restructuring a month before the project closing date. Only about US\$1.28 million of the funds allocated for this activity were utilized, and US\$15.78 million of the undisbursed IDA credit was cancelled. The actual project management cost (component five activity) at US\$3.1 million, was almost double the appraisal estimate of US\$1.7 million.

In sum, despite administrative and operational shortcomings, efficiency is rated as substantial because the EIRR at 32% was still high even though some benefits were not included in the economic analysis.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	40.00	93.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	32.00	74.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of the PDO to the Bank strategy is rated as high. Overall efficacy is rated as modest, in view of the low achievement. Efficiency is rated as substantial, mainly in view of the economic justification for the project. Overall outcome is hence rated as moderately unsatisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Government commitment:

(a) This project aided in providing systems and equipment for interconnection of customs of Cote d'Ivoire with Burkina Faso and capacity building of the respective state agencies. Given that systems and equipment can be rendered obsolete without maintenance and updated protocols in place, and that training the state agencies is fundamental for sustainability of investments financed under this project, there is a moderate risk that there may not be enough budgetary funds allocated for these activities.



(b) An important project activity - the fleet renewal scheme - was dropped from the project activity. There is risk that completion of this activity could be undermined as there was uncertainty on the roadmap to be followed post-project closing (ICR, paragraph 79). This risk to development outcome is at least moderate pending agreement between the Client and the Bank to determine an implementation framework going forward.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The Bank prepared this project based on the experience from previous Bank-financed transport infrastructure projects in Cote d'Ivoire (the Emergency Infrastructure Renewal Project and the Abidjan - Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Project). Alongside this project, the Bank was also financing a project aimed to support similar activities on the Burkina Faso side of the Abidjan - Ouagadougou corridor.

The implementation arrangements included: (i) a Project Steering Committee responsible for overall project coordination; (ii) a Project Technical Committee for technical oversight for implementing project components; and (iii) a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) that was already established under the Emergency Infrastructure Renewal Project and had extensive experience in implementing Bank-funded project responsible for fiduciary, M&E and audits management (ICR, page 31). The arrangements made at appraisal for safeguards and fiduciary compliance were appropriate (discussed in section 10).

There were significant shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry. First, this project, which was prepared in just five and half months from concept to approval and not ready for implementation. Additional time and effort were required to complete key guiding principles, roadmaps and plans steering the implementation of important activities. These factors undermined the project's overall readiness for implementation. This was particularly so for the activity associated with developing the fleet renewal activity, for which important aspects of its general procedural guidance were not developed to the level of detail required for implementing this activity. This contributed to the delays in implementing this activity and eventually led the dropping of this activity from the project scope and cancellation of the Bank financing for this activity. Second, the preparation team's assessment of the Road Transport Development Fund's (FDTR) capacity to implement the fleet renewal activity at appraisal was inadequate. Likewise, the project overestimated the capacity of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to coordinate activities across four independent government agencies. Three, there were M&E shortcomings (discussed in section 9)

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank conducted supervision missions on average twice a year. The supervision missions scheduled for 2020 were cancelled and converted to virtual sessions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The



field presence of the Task Team Leaders (TTLs) helped in facilitating dialogue with the government counterparts. The continuity of leadership was more or less maintained with Bank specialists serving as TTLs for the project. The last TTL was involved in implementation from beginning to project closure. The supervision team was proactive in responding to the challenges on the ground and responded to the operational and procedural challenges encountered during implementation. The support provided by the supervision team aided in fiduciary compliance (discussed in section 10). The supervision team was not particularly effective in correcting the shortcomings in M&E framework.

There were shortcomings in supervision. Major amendments to the fleet renewal scheme were considered after protracted discussions internally with the World Bank Group (WBG) and with the Client. It was proposed to actively involve the IFC as a strategic partner to facilitate access to credit lines by private transport freight operators participating in the fleet renewal program. This arrangement, according to the October 2018 Mid-Term Review, would have enabled sharing the project's financial risk for the fleet renewal activity. However, this shift was considered too ambitious in the context of Cote d'Ivoire, even though this approach had been successfully implemented by IFC in other projects in the region. The proposed approach highlighted conflicting operational policies within the WBG, with the Bank considering the proposed restructuring for using this approach as too complex, as it would have necessitated ten new indicators. Given the long delays in implementation accruing to almost two years, the proposed restructuring was not approved, and this activity was dropped from the project scope, just a month before the closing date.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The key outcome indicators for monitoring the PDO of improving the efficiency of transport services were: (i) the average cost of transporting a 40 - foot container truck by road from Abidjan to Ouagadougou, (ii) the average transit time taken for moving freight after the good exits the Abidjan port to the border post of Burkina Faso, and (iii) the annual reduction in carbon dioxide emissions due to scrapping 300 old trucks with new ones. These indicators were appropriate, although at the macro level. The indicator measuring the number of casualties on the Ivorian section of the corridor was appropriate for monitoring the PDO of improving road safety on the Ivorian section of the corridor.

However, there were shortcomings in the M&E framework design, which reduced the ability to fully capture and measure the project activities. The indicators that were selected failed to fully reflect the sustainability of efforts put in place by the project. For instance, the main initiative of the project (by component amount) focused on the modernization goal with the rollout of a fleet renewal system. However, this activity was indirectly accounted for in the results framework, with most indicators measuring the impact of other activities. The indicators pertaining to average cost of transporting a 40 - foot container and transit time,



were not fully attributable to project activities, given that there was a parallel operation external to this project (discussed in section 4). The indicator pertaining to annual reduction in carbon dioxide emissions was rendered moot, with the dropping of this activity. The methodology for monitoring the number of fatalities on the Ivorian section of the corridor was not clear, as the M&E framework did not clearly specify project boundaries where the monitoring had to be pursued. Measuring fatalities along the Ivorian section of the corridor (653 km) represented a major challenge in light of the capacity weaknesses of the implementing agencies and inadequate monitoring tools. The yearly target project projections for both the PDO and intermediate level indicators undermined monitoring in relation to changes observed on the ground, particularly for indicators on casualties and carbon dioxide emissions.

b. M&E Implementation

The ICR (paragraph 60) notes that although the frequency of data collection was appropriate, the quarterly reports were not produced or shared in a consistent manner. The ICR also notes that during implementation, the presence of a Task Team Leader in Cote d'Ivoire aided in facilitating dialogue with the government counterparts in implementing M&E.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR (paragraph 63) noted that the results framework was used as a checklist to monitor progress. It also noted that most indicators were only assessed at project design, once during implementation and at closing (although at appraisal the PAD stated that they were to be assessed on a yearly basis). As such, indicators were unavailable to regularly inform and assess project performance during implementation.

In sum, overall M&E is rated as modest, given the shortcomings in M&E framework and M&E implementation.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as Environmental Category B under the World Bank safeguard policies. One safeguard policy was triggered at appraisal: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) (PAD, page iv).

Environmental Assessment. As the project supported only TA activities, long term adverse environmental impacts were not expected. However, as the project had a truck fleet renewal component under which 30 old trucks were to be scrapped, the implementing agency conducted an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) at appraisal. The agency also prepared an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) that was publicly disclosed (PAD, paragraph 74). In addition, the agency established a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) for addressing project-level complaints by communities and individuals.



The ICR (paragraph 67) noted that the project complied with the environmental safeguards. It also noted that the ESIA was submitted to the National Environment Agency (ANDE) for inter-ministerial validation on August 16, 2021, and that the implementation of the fleet renewal scheme was to be transferred to a parallel operation in Cote D'Ivoire's transport portfolio.

The project's **social safeguard compliance** was moderately unsatisfactory (ICR, paragraph 68). The ICR observed that completing the required social studies was a prerequisite for starting construction of the vehicle scrapyards subcomponent. Although the preparation of a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was launched as planned, it was not completed at project closure. Hence, the activities related to the fleet renewal scheme were transferred to a parallel operation in Cote D'Ivoire's transport portfolio. The ICR does not report any issues with the GRM.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management. The Bank conducted the financial management arrangements of the PCU at appraisal. The PCU had extensive experience in implementing previous Bank-funded projects. The assessment concluded that PCU's financial arrangements were satisfactory. The overall financial risk was rated as moderate at appraisal (PAD, page 32). The project's financial management was satisfactory (ICR, paragraph 69). The PCU submitted unqualified audits in a timely fashion.

Procurement management. The Bank conducted a procurement assessment of the PCU at appraisal. The assessment concluded that the arrangements were satisfactory and procurement risk was rated as average (PAD, page 38). The ICR (paragraph 69) notes that the project's procurement performance was satisfactory and that two contracts were terminated due to the inadequate performance of two consulting firms.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

The ICR does not report of any unintended impacts.

d. Other

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	There were significant shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry and delays during supervision.



Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial

12. Lessons

The ICR draws the following two main lessons from the experience of implementing this project, with some adaptation of language.

1. Having a solid and comprehensive roadmap with adequate time for preparation at appraisal can help to minimize implementation delays. The preparation of this project was expedited, and it was prepared in only five months. Additional time and effort were then required to complete key guiding principles, roadmaps and plans steering the implementation of important activities. These factors contributed to the delays in the initial years. This indicates that the project would have benefitted from an extended preparatory period.

2. A careful assessment is necessary of further endeavors, such as developing a fleet renewal initiative in this project. The sustainability of efforts deployed in pursuing such fleet renewal scheme depends on complementary efforts by both Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to resolve the matter based on the experiences to date. The sustainability of such reforms needs to be ensured through appropriate budgets and continued training programs.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provides a detailed overview of the project. The theory of change articulated in the text clearly shows the logical links between the project activities, outputs and intended outcomes. The ICR candidly acknowledges the challenges associated with developing the heavy truck renewal scheme. The quality of evidence and analysis is aligned to the messages outlined in the ICR and the evidence provided in the ICR is adequate to assess project performance, though sometimes it is not easy to follow. The ICR's lessons are clear and based on evidence outlined in the ICR.

A shortcoming of the ICR is it could have been more concise. The main body of the text at 30 pages is twice the recommended length of 15 pages.

- a. Quality of ICR Rating**
Substantial

