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**The World Bank**

Report No: ICR00006188

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT  
(BIRF 8479-DO)  
ON A  
LOAN  
IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$75 MILLION  
TO THE  
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
FOR THE  
INTEGRATED SOCIAL PROTECTION AND PROMOTION PROJECT  
March 17, 2023

Social Protection & Jobs Global Practice  
Latin America And Caribbean Region

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective September 20, 2022)

Currency Unit = Dominican Pesos (DOP)

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53.53 DOP= US\$1

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FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADESS	Social Subsidies Administration Unit ( <i>Administradora de Subsidios Sociales</i> )
BEEP	<i>Bono Estudiantil Estudiando Progreso</i>
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfers
CEP	Eating is First Program ( <i>Comer es Primero</i> )
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CRC	Community Report Card ( <i>Reportes Comunitarios</i> )
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CRM	Customer Relation Management System
DR	Dominican Republic
ESH	SIUBEN Socio Economic Study
GCPS	Social Cabinet ( <i>Gabinete de Coordinación de Políticas Sociales</i> )
HH	Households
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
ICV	Quality of Life Index ( <i>Índice de Calidad de Vida</i> )
ILAE	<i>Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar</i>
INFOTEP	National Institute for Professional Technical Training ( <i>Instituto Nacional de Formación Técnica Profesional</i> )
IRI	Intermediate Results Indicators
ISR	Implementation Status Report
LCR	Latin America and Caribbean Region
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEPyD	Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development ( <i>Ministerio de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo</i> )
NPV	Net Present Value
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDI	Project Development Indicator
PDO	Project Development Objective
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PROSOLI	National Social Protection Program ( <i>Progresando con Solidaridad</i> )
PU	<i>Progresando Unidos</i>
PV	Present Value
SENASA	Subsidized Health Insurance Program ( <i>Seguro Nacional de Salud</i> )
SIME	Integrated System of Monitoring and Evaluation of the Social Cabinet ( <i>Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo y Evaluación</i> )
SIUBEN	Single Beneficiary Selection System ( <i>Sistema Único de Beneficiarios</i> )
SUPERATE	Anti-poverty Strategy and Cash Transfer Program, Former PROSOLI Program
TOC	Theory of Change
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfer
WBG	World Bank Group

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**DATA SHEET**

**BASIC INFORMATION**

**Product Information**

Project ID	Project Name
P147213	INTEGRATED SOCIAL PROTECTION AND PROMOTION PROJECT
Country	Financing Instrument
Dominican Republic	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Not Required (C)	Not Required (C)

**Organizations**

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Dominican Republic	Social Cabinet

**Project Development Objective (PDO)**

Original PDO

The Project Development Objective is to improve access of the Borrower's poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities, including in particular human capital, enhanced employability, and housing improvements in selected provinces.



**FINANCING**

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
<b>World Bank Financing</b>			
IBRD-84790	75,000,000	74,389,354	74,389,354
<b>Total</b>	<b>75,000,000</b>	<b>74,389,354</b>	<b>74,389,354</b>
<b>Non-World Bank Financing</b>			
Borrower/Recipient	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	<b>75,000,000</b>	<b>74,389,354</b>	<b>74,389,354</b>

**KEY DATES**

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
12-Mar-2015	28-Oct-2015	05-Mar-2018	30-Mar-2019	20-Sep-2022

**RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING**

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
30-Aug-2018	20.92	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Implementation Schedule
12-Aug-2020	55.56	Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Implementation Schedule
15-Mar-2022	68.45	Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Implementation Schedule

**KEY RATINGS**

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Substantial



**RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs**

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	09-Jun-2015	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0
02	22-Dec-2015	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0
03	07-Jun-2016	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	.50
04	28-Nov-2016	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	.81
05	31-May-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	3.50
06	07-Dec-2017	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	6.15
07	24-Jun-2018	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	16.71
08	18-Dec-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	28.37
09	25-Jun-2019	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	39.72
10	23-Dec-2019	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	46.07
11	25-Jun-2020	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	54.66
12	16-Dec-2020	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	58.92
13	17-Jun-2021	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	59.64
14	11-Nov-2021	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	62.02
15	14-Jun-2022	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	72.99

**SECTORS AND THEMES**

**Sectors**

Major Sector/Sector	(%)
<b>Social Protection</b>	<b>100</b>
Social Protection	89
Public Administration - Social Protection	11

**Themes**

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3)	(%)
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<b>Private Sector Development</b>	<b>100</b>
Jobs	100
<b>Social Development and Protection</b>	<b>38</b>
Social Inclusion	2
Participation and Civic Engagement	2
Social Protection	36
Social Safety Nets	31
Social protection delivery systems	5
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## I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

### A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

#### Context

1. **In late 2014, at the time of the appraisal of the Integrated Social Protection and Promotion Project (P147213), the Dominican Republic (DR) had experienced high growth –5.8 percent per year between 1991 and 2012– and yet, growth failed to reach the most vulnerable in the country.** The poverty rate of 40 percent (2011) in the DR exceeded the Latin America and Caribbean Region (LCR) average of 30 percent and was also high considering its upper middle-income status. Likewise, extreme poverty was 9.5 percent in 2011, compared to the LCR average of 4.3 percent. In addition, there were strong disparities on poverty levels and unmet basic needs, both between and within provinces, as well as important income and gender disparities in terms of human capital and employment. For instance, 46 percent of the population in the Elias Piña province is considered extremely poor, as opposed to 3.5 percent in Monseñor Nouel. In 2011, only 48 percent of the poorest adolescents attended secondary school, as opposed to 62 percent of the wealthiest quintile. Women in the DR had exceptionally high maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates by LCR and upper middle-income country standards. Furthermore, female-headed households were more likely to be poor.<sup>1</sup>

2. **The DR had made significant advances in the gradual establishment of a social protection system in the previous decade, especially in the area of social assistance.** First, in 2008 the Government through its Social Cabinet (*Gabinete de Coordinación de Políticas Sociales, GCPS*)<sup>2</sup>, had reformed the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program (now known as *Progresando con Solidaridad, PROSOLI*) making it truly conditional by linking transfers with the fulfillment and adequate verification of education and health responsibilities thus promoting human capital accumulation for the poorest and poverty reduction. An impact evaluation of the program carried out between 2016 and 2019 showed its positive results across a range of health and education indicators<sup>3</sup>. Second, the DR had institutionalized a transparent targeting system, the Single Beneficiary Selection System (*Sistema Unico de Beneficiarios, SIUBEN*)<sup>4</sup>, which classified households into poverty levels based on geographic and household data and was used to target the CCT Program and subsidized health insurance (*Seguro Nacional de Salud, SENASA*). The initial SIUBEN (SIUBEN 1) was based on a survey carried out in 2004. An update (SIUBEN 2) was based on a survey launched in September 2013 covering 1.8 million households (55 percent of the population). In this context, and in response to the Government's request for World Bank support to further improve the social protection system, the **Integrated Social Protection and Promotion Project (P147213)** was appraised late in 2014.

3. **Persistent challenges in the DR's safety net, however, needed to be addressed in order to make progress to reduce both extreme and overall poverty.** Priorities that the Government had already started

<sup>1</sup> Data sources are cited in the Project Appraisal Document (P147213).

<sup>2</sup> The Social Cabinet is the entity that coordinates, manages, administers, and executes social protection programs in the DR. It includes, among others, the Executive Technical Department (ETD), the PROSOLI, SIUBEN, and the Administrator for Social Subsidies – ADESS-departments. The Vice-President provides oversight.

<sup>3</sup> Gertler et al. (2019). Evaluación de impacto al programa con solidaridad (PROSOLI): evidencia para la innovación en la protección social. Nota de Política. Vicepresidencia de la Republica Dominicana.

<sup>4</sup> Created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1073-04 dated August 31, 2004.



to address at the time of appraisal included:

- *PROSOLI coverage of extremely poor households needed to be improved.* A comparison of the SIUBEN 2 database and the PROSOLI database carried out by the Government suggested that approximately 53,000 extremely poor households living in the 14 poorest provinces of the country were eligible for the main PROSOLI CCT (*Comer es Primero*, CEP), but were yet to be included in the Program for various reasons including lack of documentation, financing gaps, and insufficient outreach.
- *PROSOLI needed to tailor service provision to different levels of poverty – moderate and extreme.* While moderately poor CCT users might have improved their basic living conditions, they remained vulnerable to poverty and required a package of opportunities that could allow them to exit poverty on a sustainable basis. Extremely poor CCT users faced challenges in terms of access and use of health and education services, while having needs for basic service provision. Unmet housing needs required particular attention. All beneficiaries needed to be connected to skills-enhancing and income-generation opportunities.
- *PROSOLI needed to respond more effectively to regional disparities.* Through its integrated area-based service delivery approach, PROSOLI planned to focus on provinces with the highest levels of poverty and deficient basic service provision. In turn, to be effective this strategy required a strengthening of operational processes and the capacity of regional CCT structures.
- *Further advances in targeting were needed to promote the efficiency of pro-poor social spending.* The targeting accuracy of the SIUBEN instrument needed to be improved including through an update of the Life Quality Index (*Índice de Calidad de Vida*, ICV).<sup>5</sup>

4. **The Project was aligned with the broader objectives of the Government and the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS).** The Project would contribute to the Government's extreme-poverty reduction strategy *Progresando Unidos*, an area-based service provision initiative in 14 out of 32 provinces selected either because of high relative or high absolute numbers of poor. The idea was to connect poor CCT users to a package of productive activities and housing improvements. In addition, the operation was also aligned with higher country-level objectives, such as the 2030 National Development Strategy (*Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo*, END) approved by Law 01-12 in 2012. The END establishes the following as key objectives and lines of action: to build an effective and efficient social protection system (specific objective 2.3.3); to adapt the vocational training system to the poor, with a view to facilitate their labor market insertion and income generation capacity (line of action 2.3.2.3); and reduce regional disparities on access to services and opportunities (specific objective 2.4.2). The Project responded to the World Bank Group's (WBG) mandate to eradicate extreme poverty and increase shared prosperity, and was fully consistent with the CPS for 2015-2018 (Report 89551-DR), especially through the Pillar of Strengthening Social Service Delivery.

5. **The Project capitalized on the WBG's long-term engagement in social assistance and youth employment in the DR.** The Bank's engagement with the DR started in 2009 through a suite of financial and advisory services, which supported the Government in developing and reforming its CCT program. The Programmatic Development Policy Financing (DPL) series Performance and Accountability of Social

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<sup>5</sup> The ICV categorizes households into four groups of structural poverty: extreme poor (ICV1); moderately poor (ICV2); vulnerable (ICV3); and non-poor (ICV4). Thresholds are calculated so that each group is proportionally equivalent to poverty groups as defined by the official monetary poverty calculations.




Sectors (PASS) (P116972, P121778, and P125806) supported the overhaul of the CCT program *Solidaridad* to become a robust CCT with institutional capacity at the local level. The Social Protection Investment Project (P090010) also broke ground on the provision of documentation for extremely poor Dominican citizens using an innovative output-based approach, updated the Second SIUBEN census in 2011-12, and piloted the CCT Community Report Cards (CRCs). On the labor front, the Bank promoted good practices for youth training through the Youth Development Project (P096605).

#### Theory of Change (Results Chain)<sup>6</sup>

6. **The components of the Project were intended to address gaps in basic needs (housing) and regional disparities in extreme poverty and generate the conditions for a sustainable exit of moderately poor households from the CCT Program.** There were strong disparities in terms of poverty levels and unmet basic needs among provinces in the DR. Building on the Government's PROSOLI *Progresando Unidos* initiative, the aim of the Project was to improve the access of poor citizens living in provinces with either relatively high poverty rates or with the largest absolute number of poor to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities. To ensure the success of the integrated area-based strategy (Component 1), the activities under Component 2 (Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program and support to targeted households), would improve PROSOLI's operational processes and local structures and specifically its capacity to effectively link targeted households to newly available opportunities and services in selected provinces. Component 3 would continue to support improvements in the national level social protection system required for PROSOLI's area-based integrated service provision approach such as enhanced targeting and results-based orientation (see Figure below).

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<sup>6</sup> The PAD did not explicitly describe a Theory of Change (ToC). As per Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS), including the TOC became mandatory for PADs as of May 2018, after this operation was prepared. For the ICR, the TOC was constructed ex-post using information from the PAD, the Results Framework and its detailed description.





### Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

7. The PDO was to improve access of the Borrower's poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities including, in particular, human capital, enhanced employability, and housing improvements in selected provinces.

### Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

8. The Project had six key outcome indicators to be used to measure progress towards achieving the development objective.

- Percentage of extremely poor households who are incorporated in CCT PROSOLI in selected provinces.
- Percentage of eligible extremely poor PROSOLI users in selected provinces with dirt floors replaced by reinforced cement floors.
- Relative difference in employment rate of PROSOLI users (men and women) 18-29 years of age in selected provinces who receive vocational training, versus that of the control group.
- Percentage of eligible households whose socio-economic situation is updated by SIUBEN based on the SIUBEN 3 socio-economic categorization.
- Number of Direct project beneficiaries (individuals).
- Percentage of Female beneficiaries - Supplemental.

### Components

9. **Component 1. Integrated Area-Based Social Protection and Pro-poor Service Delivery (original US\$47.7 million<sup>7</sup>, restructured US\$ 42.7 million). This component aimed to improve access of the poor in selected provinces to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities.**

- Sub-component 1.1. Bridging CCT coverage gaps for eligible extremely poor PROSOLI households (original US\$2.0 million, restructured US\$3.4 million). Using an output-based disbursement approach, the sub-component incentivized processes to increase PROSOLI's coverage of eligible extremely poor households and the incorporation of eligible extremely poor households under PROSOLI into the SENASA.
- Sub-component 1.2. Increase access to extremely poor CCT users to housing improvements (original US\$19.2 million, restructured US\$15.8 million). This sub-component financed minor housing improvements (replacement of dirt floors by reinforced cement floors and painting of walls) for extremely poor CCT users.
- Sub-component 1.3. Increase access of eligible CCT users to productive opportunities (original US\$26.5 million, restructured US\$23.5 million). This sub-component aimed to increase the employability of young women and men (18-29 years of age) in extremely poor and moderately poor PROSOLI households through: (a) technical, vocational and life skills training courses and two month apprenticeships; (ii) periodic diagnostics of employers' training needs and training for eligible training providers; and (iii) technical assistance and capacity-building to enhance the knowledge and capacity of PROSOLI to link beneficiary households to income-generating

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<sup>7</sup> Original figures do not include the unallocated amount.



opportunities through self-employment.

10. **Component 2. Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program and Support to Targeted Households (original US\$8.9 million, restructured US\$9.8 million).** This component was to strengthen PROSOLI's operational processes and its capacity to effectively link targeted households to opportunities and services in selected provinces.

- Sub-component 2.1. Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program's Field-Based Coordination, Operational Processes, and Assistance to Households (original US\$4.2 million, restructured US\$3.7 million). The sub-component would strengthen the capacity of Municipal Coordination Committees and the CCT Regional Inter-institutional Technical Committees, as well as strengthen direct assistance, coaching, and follow up with households.
- Sub-component 2.2. Improving Users' Orientation and Feedback Mechanisms (original US\$2.70 million, restructured US\$4.0 million). This sub-component would expand the number and strengthen the role of one-stop service points (*Puntos Solidarios*) and improve the timeliness of responses to users' claims and complaints. CRCs would be extended to the 14 prioritized provinces and the corresponding processes made automatic. Synergies between *Puntos Solidarios* and the CRCs would be enhanced.
- Sub-component 2.3. Strengthening Inter-connectivity of Information Management Systems (original US\$2.1 million, restructured US\$2.1 million). This sub-component would strengthen inter-connectivity between the information management systems of the major providers in the Project (PROSOLI, Social Subsidies Administration Unit (*Administradora de Subsidios Sociales*, ADESS), SIUBEN, SENASA, and National Institute for Professional Technical Training (*Instituto Nacional de Formación Técnica Profesional*, INFOTEP)) through technical assistance and technological infrastructure.

11. **Component 3. Enhancing Equity and Results-orientation (original US\$18.4 million, restructured US\$22.5 million).** This component included institutional strengthening at the national policy level on the building blocks of the social protection system.

- Sub-component 3.1. Strengthening SIUBEN's Targeting Instrument (original US\$10.2 million, restructured US\$13.3 million). This sub-component would contribute to the consolidation of SIUBEN by (i) updating of the SIUBEN database through a Third Socio-economic Survey and (ii) strengthening SIUBEN to provide information.
- Sub-component 3.2. Enhancing Result Orientation (original US\$1.9 million, restructured US\$1.9 million). This sub-component would support: design of a process evaluation and an impact evaluation for the integrated strategy and other interventions; and activities to strengthen evidence-based policymaking and results-oriented social spending.
- Sub-component 3.3. Promoting Innovation and Policy Development (original US\$1.9 million, restructured US\$3.0 million). This sub-component would support a flexible set of technical assistance and capacity-building activities to inform social protection debates and reform in the DR.
- Sub-component 3.4. Support to Project Coordination and Implementation (original US\$4.5



million, restructured US\$4.3 million<sup>8</sup>). This sub-component would strengthen the technical-administrative areas of the Project's implementation unit and finance activities such as the financial audit, information technology equipment, training, and operating expenses.

## B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

### Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

12. **The PDO was not revised during project implementation.**

### Revised PDO Indicators

13. **The first restructuring (August 2018) included a revision in a PDO indicator as well as several related intermediate results indicators.** The first Project restructuring revised one PDO indicator to broaden the aim of closing the coverage gap for the main CCT (CEP) in the 14 selected provinces to include the incorporation of moderate poor (ICV2) in addition to the extreme poor (ICV1), the original focus. The same change was made in two related intermediate results indicators referring to the education components of the CCT PROSOLI<sup>9</sup>, as well as in the indicator referring to PROSOLI incorporations into SENASA. To reflect the change in definition, baseline values for the four indicators were revised. While the target for closing the coverage gap remained virtually the same for the PDO indicator (99.9 vs 100 percent), the target was raised for the three intermediate results indicators. While the target for the PDO indicator related to the employment outcome for PROSOLI users who received vocational training was not revised, the target for the related intermediate indicator –number of beneficiaries of the vocational training package– was reduced from 40,000 to 30,000 given substantial implementation delays.

### Revised Components

14. **Activities were revised in several components over the life of the Project.** Both the first and third restructuring revised several sub-components. The first restructuring (August 2018) revised the sub-components under all three components, but primarily under Component 1. The second restructuring (March 2020) extended the closing date with no other changes. The third restructuring (March 2022) revised only sub-components under Components 2 and 3 (minor reallocation of resources).

15. **Key changes are summarized below:**

- Component 1 Integrated Area-based Social Protection and Pro-Poor Service Delivery (August 2018).
  - Sub-component 1.1 (Bridging CCT Coverage Gaps). The strategy was expanded to include moderate poor (ICV2) in addition to extreme poor (ICV1). This was done to reflect the efforts of the Social Cabinet to close gaps for the moderate poor given their high vulnerability to shocks. (August 2018)
  - Sub-component 1.3 (Increase access of eligible CCT users to productive opportunities). The original Project design only considered a model comprising technical and vocational, and life skills training courses and apprenticeships for PROSOLI youth. Entrepreneurship courses were introduced to reflect the need to respond to the conditions and labor market needs of the

<sup>8</sup> For the original amount, it includes the costs for component 3.4, the front end fee, and the unallocated amount. For the restructured amount it includes the component 3.4 costs and the front end fee.

<sup>9</sup> The two education components included: the ILAE for promoting enrollment and assistance to Primary Education, and the BEEP for promoting enrollment and assistance to Secondary Education.



- localities (scarcity of wage employment in some areas) and beneficiaries (interest in self-employment) supported by the Project. At the same time, two additional training modalities were incorporated (company-provided training with a hiring commitment and community youth entrepreneurship). All courses were consistent with the original model. (August 2018)
- Component 2 Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program and Support to targeted Households
    - Sub-component 2.1 (Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program’s Field-Based Coordination, Operational Processes, and Assistance to Households). Activities were added to cover updates of PROSOLI beneficiary information and to transform the CCT program, an initiative of the authorities that took office in 2020. A higher resource allocation was proposed. (March 2022)
    - Sub-component 2.2 (Improving Users’ Orientation and Feedback Mechanisms). The strategy for *Puntos Solidarios* was updated to focus more on virtual one - stop service offices, including a strengthening of its platform and the linkages with the payment platform. The revised approach was more modern and cost efficient, utilizing technology instead of only physical offices. (August 2018)
  - Component 3 Enhancing Equity and Results - orientation
    - Sub-component 3.1 (Strengthening SIUBEN’s Targeting Instrument). Activities were added to incorporate the data of COVID - 19 response program beneficiaries and to support the development and validation of a strategy to transform SIUBEN into a national social registry, including instruments to collect data more frequently. The expansion of activities related to the SIUBEN recognized the important role of the targeting mechanism in the social protection system and the initiative of the new authorities which took office in August 2020 to expand it to a national social registry systematically updating information on beneficiary households. (March 2022)
    - Sub-component 3.3. (Promoting Innovation and Policy Development) Pilots were added to generate evidence on strategic issues for social protection policy development, including the prevention of gender - based violence (August 2018).

### Other Changes

16. **The Project closing date was extended and reallocations were made among sub-components.** Cumulatively, through the three restructuring processes, the Project closing date was extended by three and a half years, from March 30, 2019 to September 20, 2022. There were several reallocations of loan resources between sub-components. The most important were the following additions: (i) US\$1.4 million to sub-component 1.1 (Bridging CCT Coverage Gaps) and the related output - based disbursement category, and (ii) US\$3 million to sub-component 3.1 (Strengthening SIUBEN’s targeting instrument). On the other hand, fewer resources than expected were used for sub-components 1.2 (Housing opportunities) and 1.3 (Productive opportunities), roughly US\$3 million less for each.

### Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

17. **The changes made responded to emerging country priorities and did not affect the underlying Theory of Change (TOC) or ambition of the Project.** While the changes to the Project broadened its focus from the emphasis on the extreme poor, the moderate poor population was included in the framework





(and the Legal Agreement) from the beginning, particularly for youth training (sub-component 1.3). In addition, the target for incorporation of the extreme poor into the main CCT (CEP), part of the revised PDO indicator, was lowered only marginally. The moderate poor were still vulnerable to poverty due to shocks (including climate and health-related) and the children stood to gain from participation in the education components of the CCT. For the latter, an additional consideration was the difficulty in reaching the targeted increase in coverage focusing solely on the extreme poor. Beneficiaries for the replacement of dirt by cement floors continued to be the extreme poor. The net effect of the changes included in the first restructuring was an increase of slightly over 200,000 household members in the estimated number of Project beneficiaries of the Integrated Area-based Social Protection and Pro - Poor Service Delivery Component meaning that, overall, the Project became more ambitious (Table 1). The changes to Components 2 (Strengthen CCT Program and Support to Households) and 3 (Enhance Equity and Results Orientation) strengthened their contribution to bringing about the intended results of the integrated area-based social protection and pro-poor service delivery (Component 1) as well as improving PROSOLI CCT processes.

**Table 1. Number of Project Beneficiaries under Component 1**

Component	Unit	Total Beneficiaries	Total Beneficiaries	Total Beneficiaries
		Original End Target	Restructuring End Target	Final
COMP 1.1 CEP	Households (HH)	60,669 ICV1	124,231 • 59,731 ICV1 • 64,500 ICV2	140,660 • 66,480 ICV1 • 74,180 ICV2
COMP 1.1 <i>Incentivo a la Asistencia Escolar</i> (ILAE) - Primary Education	HH members	71,909 ICV1	129,671 • 47,214 ICV1 • 82,457 ICV2	144,651 • 63,304 ICV1 • 81,347 ICV2
COMP 1.1 <i>Bono Estudiantil Estudiando Progreso</i> (BEEP) - Secondary Education	HH members	33,623 ICV1	63,917 • 17,434 ICV1 • 46,483 ICV2	128,018 • 27,614 ICV1 • 100,404 ICV2
COMP 1.1 SENASA	HH members	229,900 ICV1	150,000 • 97,768 ICV1 • 52,232 ICV2	151,533 • 53,145 ICV1 • 98,388 ICV2
COMP 1.2 Housing	HH	7,500 ICV1	7,500 ICV1	9,072 ICV1
COMP 1.3 Youth Training	HH members	40,000 ICV1 and 2	30,000 ICV1 and 2	30,756 ICV1 and 2
Sub-total	HH	68,169 ICV1	131,731 • 67,231 ICV1 • 64,500 ICV2	149,732 • 75,552 ICV1 • 74,180 ICV2
Sub-total	HH members	375,432	373,588	454,676



## II. OUTCOME

### A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Relevance of PDO: High

#### Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

18. **The relevance of the PDO is rated as high.** The Project is well aligned with the current Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the DR for the Period FY22-FY26, discussed by the Board of Executive Directors on March 29, 2022 (Report No. 167896-DO). The FY22-FY26 CPF recognizes that the poverty gap between the poorest and richest regions had dropped from 22 to 18 percentage points during 2019-20, but notes that structural factors need to be addressed for the improvement to be sustained. The Project contributed to High Level Objective 1: “Improved access to quality public service delivery” and its objective 1.3 “Enhanced coverage and quality of health and safety nets”, by supporting planned reforms to improve fiscal space, and by helping to reform electricity, safety nets, and health care services. The FY22-FY26 CPF also highlights the creation of SUPERATE in June 2021, a revamped PROSOLI which embodies the third generation of reforms, including linking beneficiaries to economic inclusion opportunities. The role of stronger safety nets is recognized as a requirement for the success of the energy and water sector reforms that the country is pursuing and are being supported by the Bank through the Electricity Reform for Sustainable Growth Development Policy Loan (P175874) and the DR Water Sector Modernization Program (P177823), the latter under preparation. Finally, the CPF includes specific results indicators related to increased coverage of SIUBEN and the maintenance of the share of SUPERATE participants that graduate from formative actions for economic inclusion – both areas of focus of the Project.

### B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Rating: Substantial

19. **This evaluation does not include a split rating.** While the targets of the PDIs were changed through formal restructuring, this was done when only US\$20.92 million of the US\$75 million operation had been disbursed and the targets were generally made more ambitious, thus a split rating evaluation would not change the final efficacy rating.

20. **According to the PDO, the project had three objectives:** 1. Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities that improve human capital; 2. Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities that enhance employability; and 3. Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities that improve housing, all in selected provinces. The achievement of each of these three objectives is evaluated below. In addition to the indicators related to each objective as discussed in the sections that follow, the Project also included two Project Development Objective Indicators (PDIs) that were not mapped to any objective: the number of direct project beneficiaries (individuals) and the percentage of female beneficiaries (PDI3). The target (revised higher) for the first indicator was surpassed, while the second showed only a slight shortfall (51 vs. 52 percent). Inclusion of these PDO indicators was standard practice at the time the Project was prepared, although properly they should have been intermediate results indicators.

#### Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

21. **Objective 1: Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and**



**promotion opportunities that improve human capital was fully achieved.** There were two PDIs to measure the achievement of this objective – one fully outcome oriented and one more intermediate. Both were surpassed:

PDI1	Percentage of extreme and moderate poor households who are incorporated in CCT PROSOLI in selected provinces.	Formally Revised Baseline: 90.0% Formally Revised Target: 99.9% Actual: 101.5 <sup>10</sup> (June 2022)
PDI 2	Percentage of eligible households whose socio - economic situation is updated by SIUBEN based on the SIUBEN3 socio economic categorization.	Baseline: 0% Target: 60% Actual: 100 (June 2022)

22. There were also three intermediate results indicators (IRIs) that measured this objective and all were surpassed as well:

IRI1	Percentage of household members, categorized as ICV1 and ICV2 and who meet eligibility criteria, identified and incorporated by PROSOLI into the ILAE program in selected provinces.	Formally Revised Baseline: 88% Formally Revised Target: 98.0% Actual: 99.59 (June 2022)
IRI2	Percentage of households categorized as ICV1 and ICV2 who meet eligibility criteria, identified and incorporated into BEEP in selected provinces.	Formally Revised Baseline: 90% Formally Revised Target: 95% Actual: 100.42 (June 2022)
IRI3	Percentage of eligible PROSOLI ICV1 and ICV2 household members newly incorporated by the National Health Insurance Program SENASA.	Formally Revised Baseline: 0% Formally Revised Target: 100% Actual: 101 (June 2022)

23. **The programs that aim to increase human capital included the CCT PROSOLI and SENASA health insurance.** The CCT PROSOLI includes a food security component tied to compliance with health conditions (CEP) and components tied to education conditions covering basic education students (ILAE) and middle and secondary education students (BEEP). Progress on PROSOLI coverage was measured by PDI1; IRI1 and IRI2 measured progress on the education components; and IRI3 measured progress on SENASA coverage. PDI2 was an intermediate outcome towards improving coverage of the poor in PROSOLI and was also surpassed. All five are considered for the assessment as all contribute to coverage of programs that improve human capital referred to in the PDO statement. The percentage targets set were based on numerical goals calculated after an analysis of the 2014 SIUBEN database and the databases of the three CCT components and SENASA. As mentioned earlier, these numerical goals were adjusted during the first project restructuring. For the CCT components, the previous goals for uncovered extreme poor (ICV1) were lowered, while the addition of moderate poor (ICV2) resulted in higher combined targets for increased coverage, compared to the original ones. On the other hand, the combined goal (ICV1 and 2) for expanded coverage of SENASA health insurance is about a third less than the original target (Table 1). In order to clarify Project performance, the revised numerical targets and achievements are summarized below:

- **PDI1 (CCT PROSOLI – CEP).** The revised target was to enroll 124,231 households (59,731 ICV1 and 64,500 ICV2). 140,660 households were enrolled (66,480 ICV1 and 74,180 ICV2).

<sup>10</sup> Coverage is calculated by adding the newly enrolled (144,651) to the baseline (1,132,494) and dividing the sum by total eligible (1,257,663). Coverage for IRI1-3 is calculated in a similar manner.



- **IRI1 (ILAE).** The revised target was to enroll 129,671 children (47,214 ICV1 and 82,457 ICV2). 144,651 children were enrolled (63,304 ICV1 and 81,347 ICV2).
- **IRI2 (BEEP).** The revised target was to enroll 63,917 children (17,434 ICV1 and 46,483 ICV2). 128,018 children were enrolled (27,614 ICV1 and 100,404 ICV2).
- **IRI3 (SENASA).** The revised target was to enroll 150,000 household members (97,768 ICV1 and 52,232 ICV2). 151,533 household members were enrolled (53,145 ICV1 and 98,388 ICV2).

24. **By Project closing, all revised targets had been achieved (SENASA) or overachieved (CCT components).** Performance specifically on incorporation of the extreme poor (ICV1) for all CCT components exceeded the revised (reduced) targets, and in the case of CEP was also above the original target (Table 1). It is important to note that a factor in the achievement of IRI1 and IRI2 were changes in the education system in 2019: the age for basic education was lowered from six to five years and two grade levels moved from being classified as basic education to being considered part of middle/secondary education. While the changes for basic education left the pool of potential children roughly the same for ILAE, the pool of potential children in middle and secondary school increased for BEEP. The target for SENASA was reached given that the shortfall in registering extreme poor household members was more than compensated for by enrollments of the moderate poor. Challenges in registering ICV1 household members included somewhat cumbersome enrollment procedures and limited pro-active outreach to these CCT beneficiaries.

25. **The target related to the SIUBEN updating while somewhat ambiguous, is judged to be achieved.** SIUBEN is the targeting mechanism used for PROSOLI as well as other social programs. The database for SIUBEN 2 contained 1.8 million households. The target was to update information for at least 60 percent of “eligible” households. SIUBEN 3 registered 2.1 million households, on the surface leading to a conclusion that information had been updated for 100 percent. More precise “matching” by specific households’ identification between the databases of the two studies indicates that 1.1 million households in SIUBEN 2 can be matched in SIUBEN 3, a share of 61 percent. Another reference is that 86 percent of current SUPERATE beneficiaries are in the SIUBEN 3 database. In sum, although the definition of the indicator is open to interpretation, the target was met in all three scenarios.

26. **Objective 2: Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities that enhance employability was partially achieved.** There was one PDI and a related IRI to measure the achievement of this objective. While the PDI target was not met, as explained below, the IRI happened to be a better measure of the progress towards the achievement of the PDO. The IRI target (lower revised in the first Project restructuring in August 2018) was slightly exceeded. In addition, there is supplementary evidence of positive outcomes.

PDI4	Employment rate of PROSOLI users (men and women) 18 - 29 years in selected provinces who receive vocational training versus that of the control group	Baseline: N/A Target: 10% Actual: 0 (June 2022)
IRI7	Number of Beneficiaries of vocational training package	Baseline: 0 Formally Revised Target: 30,000 Actual: 30,756 (June 2022)

27. **The programs to enhance employability included a package of vocational training (including internships) and entrepreneurship courses.** The objective of the PDO is to “improve access” to an integrated package of services to enhance employability. Although the target for the PDO indicator was not met, it is important to highlight that the PDO never intended to increase employment (measured in



PDI4) but rather increase access to services that increase employability (measured in IRI7). As explained earlier, the target for the number of CCT users provided with a training package was reduced from 40,000 to 30,000 because of implementation delays. The Project slightly exceeded the revised target. Moreover, although according to the results of the impact evaluation<sup>11</sup> the employment rate of the treatment group (those receiving vocational training) was not statistically different from the employment rate of the control group (those who did receive training). Additional findings from the impact evaluation suggest other positive employment-related impacts. The treatment group on average received higher salaries, expected to stay in their current jobs for longer periods, scored higher on tests on hard skills, sought work with greater intensity, and expected to be employed sooner. These findings suggest that the trained youth were more selective in accepting employment (affecting the employment rate) but once working earned a higher salary. Moreover, the results persisted and, in some cases, even improved over time, suggesting that the youth who had participated in the program, particularly those who received both technical training and the short workshop on curriculum and interview preparation, would in the future have more formal and better remunerated jobs.

28. **Objective 3: Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities that improve housing in selected provinces was fully achieved.** There was one PDI and one IRI to measure the achievement of this objective. The target for the PDI was surpassed and the target for the IRI was achieved:

PDI5	Percentage of eligible extremely poor PROSOLI users in selected provinces with dirt floors replaced by reinforced cement floors.	Baseline: 0 Target: 70% Actual: 84.7% <sup>12</sup> (June 2022)
IRI4	Percentage of beneficiaries whose dirt floors were replaced reporting an improvement in living conditions.	Baseline: N/A Target: 80% Actual: 80% (June 2022)

29. **The program to improve housing was the replacement of dirt for cement floors.** The 70 percent target meant that 7,500 extremely poor CCT users would benefit, based on the initial estimate that a total of 10,714 households met the eligibility criteria to benefit from this activity. By June 2022, floors had been replaced for 9,072 households, equivalent to a share of 84.7 percent, amply exceeding the target. A related IRI indicator tries to get at outcomes at the household level from the investment: 80 percent of households who benefited report an improvement in living conditions, meeting the target. “Living conditions” included several dimensions, all of which registered increases in satisfaction: health (gastrointestinal); and the quality of flooring and housing in general.<sup>13</sup>

### Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

30. **Overall efficacy is rated as substantial.** All three objectives (1. Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities that improve human capital; 2. Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities that enhance employability; and 3. Improve access of poor citizens to an integrated package of social

<sup>11</sup> Impact Evaluation Report. Evaluación de Impacto al Proyecto de Capacitación Progresando Unidos (sub-componente 1.3). Government Report. 2022.

<sup>12</sup> In comments to the ICR, the Government provided an updated slightly higher figure of 9667, but without full documentation. Using that figure, the overachievement would be even greater (90 percent).

<sup>13</sup> Impact Evaluation Report. Evaluación de Impacto al Proyecto de Mejoramiento de Viviendas de Progresando Unidos (sub-componente 1.2).



protection and promotion opportunities that improve housing, all in selected provinces) were fully achieved and when looking at the indicators, some surpassed what they were originally intended to achieve, thus, overall efficacy is substantial. While the ICR guidance may suggest a rating of *high*, *substantial* is found as more appropriate given the misalignment of objective 2 with the PDIs and the underachievement of PDI4.

### C. EFFICIENCY

Rating: Substantial

#### Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

31. **A standard ex-post economic analysis conducted for the ICR suggests that the Project's Net Present Value (NPV) is likely to be higher than what is reported.** The analysis (see Annex 4) was carried out taking into consideration the costs associated with the Project and anticipated economic benefits based on the actual number of beneficiaries and expected gains relative to counterfactual peers. Potential positive externalities and spillovers from the Project on the country's economic and productivity growth, human capital accumulation, and social cohesion are not taken into account. In addition, the benefits of Components 2 and 3 are not quantified. It is therefore more than likely that the Project's Net Present Value (NPV) is higher than what is reported. The main conclusions of the economic analysis are robust to several sensitivity tests.

32. **Overall Project benefits are positive and substantial.** The economic analysis in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) described the general benefits expected from several activities based on international and DR-specific evidence. Citing the difficulties to quantify some aspects, the NPV was estimated only for the increased earnings due to additional years of schooling (sub-component 1.1 – CCT Coverage). The economic rate of return for the Project calculated at appraisal was 22 percent, with a NPV of US\$16 million, using a 12 percent discount rate. The economic analysis carried out for this report updates that estimate plus is extended to calculate the benefits from other Project activities given the availability of additional evidence, including from impact evaluations supported under the Project (sub-component 1.2 – housing improvements and Sub-component 1.3 – youth training). The economic analysis for the ICR assesses the combined benefits of the three sub-components of Component 1 accounting for the majority of Project resources. Since the benefits of Components 2 and 3 are hard to quantify, the detailed analysis discusses anticipated gains without precisely estimating them. Assuming a 12 percent discount rate (the assumption used in the PAD), the NPV amounts to US\$53.17. The main results are summarized below.

33. **The economic analysis conducted for the ICR shows positive results for two of the three sub-components under Component 1.** The sub-component 1.1 (the closure of CCT coverage gaps) shows a NPV at completion of US\$3.38 million<sup>14</sup>. The CCT program with the largest NPV is the CEP due to the positive impact on female labor force participation expected in the short term. For sub-component 1.3 (youth training), the results of the impact evaluation suggest that, although there was no increase in the employment rate among youth participants in the trainings and workshops with respect to youth in the control group, the trained youth were more likely to have a more complete curriculum, to look for work

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<sup>14</sup> The PAD and ICR differ with respect to assumptions on the CCT impact on education outcomes. The PAD economic analysis assumed that beneficiaries obtain an increase in the total years of completed schooling of one year due to the project. It then calculates the wage gains coming from that one extra year. The ICR assumes that primary and secondary school completion rates increase among CCT beneficiaries. It then calculates the wage gains stemming from higher completion rates.



with greater intensity and to increase their expectations of finding work in the medium-term. In addition, the trained youth who worked after participating in the Project, worked in better paying jobs, in part because during training they acquired greater technical skills. The economic analysis indicates that sub-component 1.3 is expected to yield substantial positive economic benefits, with a NPV of US\$58.14 million at completion. The main results based on a 5-year impact duration indicate that, on average, the Program's NPV per participant is expected to be equal to US\$2,745. Even if benefits last only two years, the training intervention provided under this sub-component is estimated to generate important gains for participants.

34. **Estimates of the economic returns for sub-component 1.2 are not positive.** For the economic analysis of 1.2 (replacement of floors) monetary gains are estimated based on the number of beneficiaries and the average house rental value increase resulting from the housing improvements. On that basis, sub-component 1.2 is expected to yield a negative NPV of US\$8.35 million. Results also indicate that, on average, the Program's NPV per household participant is expected to be US\$920.59. The size of the benefits depends partly on the duration of the housing improvements. Increasing the duration of the investments from 10 years to 15 years leads to an increase of 20.5 percent of benefits per household in PV terms. Although there is evidence of positive intervention effects on health and satisfaction with dwellings, the increase in rental value is not sufficient to result in positive returns in the absence of valuing the health benefits for children. The analysis of benefits is conservative in the sense that it does not take into account any reductions in medical expenses from improved adult health or reduced school and work absenteeism. It is also possible that in the medium-term households will put a higher rental value on their improved dwellings: a rental value increase of US\$31 would be sufficient to turn the NPV of the component positive. While these estimates suggest that Component 1.2 was not a highly cost-effective intervention, it is highly likely that in the medium term the component will yield positive net benefits once health and related improvements materialize. On the positive side, for this sub-component costs were lower than estimated at appraisal even though the target was exceeded.

35. **While some Project design and implementation features had a negative impact on efficiency this was compensated by higher than targeted results in some areas and some cost savings.** On the negative side, the Project had substantial initial delays and implementation required 3.5 years longer than planned (see Annex 4 for details on the impact on economic returns). A variety of factors contributed to these delays, including insufficiently defined activities and investments, government administration transitions, staff turnover in the project implementation units (PIU), and the time spent to complete procurement. In addition, targets were lowered for both SENASA coverage (under sub-component 1.1) and youth training (sub-component 1.3). Nevertheless, the negative impact was compensated in part by over-achievement (floor replacement), in some cases of more ambitious targets (CCT coverage). There were other positive factors as well. The share of trainees completing training was 88 percent, and generally improved during the duration of the Project, substantially higher than the target of 60 percent set at appraisal for the related intermediate results indicator. Also, as mentioned above, there were cost savings on Component 1.2 (floor replacement).

#### **Justification of Overall Efficiency Rating**

36. **Overall efficiency is rated as substantial.** The rating of substantial is based on the estimated positive NPV of the Project even without considering potential positive externalities and spillovers from the Project and the quantification of any benefits of Components 2 and 3. While some design and implementation features had a negative impact on efficiency, these were counter-balanced by positive impacts related to higher achievements on several targets and some cost savings.



#### D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

37. **The rating for the overall outcome of the Project is Satisfactory.** Based on the high relevance of PDOs, and ratings of substantial for both efficacy and efficiency, the overall outcome rating is assessed as satisfactory.

#### E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

##### Gender

38. **The Project had several positive gender outcomes including a share of 50.85 percent of female direct beneficiaries.** First, performance on the gender targets in the results framework of the Project was positive. The target for the share of female direct project beneficiaries was virtually met (50.85 percent vs. 52 percent). The share of female training participants was amply exceeded, reaching 70 percent compared to a target of 50 percent. Overachievement of this target was supported by payment of an additional stipend for female trainees with children under the age of five. About 15 percent of female participants received the extra amount. Second, impact evaluation results for the PROSOLI CCT show positive outcomes for women, including a decline in gender-based violence and a 3-4 percentage points greater likelihood that female heads of household have worked for a salary in the last 30 days, suggesting that these individuals were able to substitute informal jobs for formal jobs.<sup>15</sup> Third, under the policy innovation sub-component of Component 3, the 2018 Project restructuring incorporated support for the design and implementation of a communications strategy aimed to reduce gender-based violence, *Cultura Ciudadana*. The strategy aimed to promote a cultural change through a high-quality package of actions delivered through diverse channels including workshops, social media, and personalized attention via hotlines and counseling.

##### Institutional Strengthening

39. **The Project supported institutional strengthening for policy-making in the social sectors.** The Project supported institutional strengthening in several areas. One area was to establish the legal foundation for the exchange of information between the Social Cabinet and other institutions involved in project activities (ADESS, INFOTEP, the Ministry of Labor, among others). Related training focused on improving staff capacity to support the exchange of information and its use to manage social policies. A second area was the strengthening of institutional networks at the local level through training on the implementation of the new integrated social protection model, certified via the collaboration with universities, and linked to the new design of SUPERATE in the final years of the Project. A third area was attention to beneficiaries where services were strengthened, including the system to respond to grievances and complaints, again at the local level, and absorbed at the end of the Project into the SUPERATE program. Processes for social accountability (CRCs) were also strengthened, including through the use of technology. Finally, the activities of the Project related to economic inclusion resulted in stronger ties between PROSOLI and now SUPERATE and agencies such as the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Ministry for Small and Medium Enterprises, the Ministry of Labor, and agricultural programs, for referrals of SUPERATE beneficiaries to benefit from their services.

##### Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

40. **The Project contributed to reduce monetary poverty and income inequality in the DR.** A public

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<sup>15</sup> Impact Evaluation of PROSOLI: Policy Note (Impact Evaluation of the Progressing with Solidarity (PROSOLI): Evidence for Innovation in Social Protection by Gertler, P. Garz, S., Rodriguez, L., and Polanco, L. 2019.





expenditure review conducted by the Bank (Report No. 160637) found that social assistance programs have been effective in reducing both monetary poverty and income inequality, while avoiding an increase in the poverty gap. Analysis based on 2018 data shows that the global PROSOLI (including all components) reduced monetary poverty by 1.4 percentage points and income inequality by slightly over 1 percent. Likewise, a comparison of the benefit-cost ratio of the country's main social protection programs showed that one of the programs with the highest benefit-cost ratio is the ILAE, the incentive for the primary school attendance component of PROSOLI with a RD\$0.38 reduction in the poverty gap for each peso invested. The benefit-cost ratio of the Global PROSOLI was roughly RD\$0.26. In addition, a comparison between the first (2009) and the third (2017-18) SIUBEN study shows that almost 80 percent of the extremely poor PROSOLI households (ICV1) improved their living conditions. In total, between the two studies, almost half of all PROSOLI beneficiaries improved their living conditions.<sup>16</sup>

### Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

41. **Components supported under the Project contributed significantly to the Government's ability to respond to COVID-19 and provided inputs to the ongoing reform of the electricity sector.** The crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic contracted gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by 6.7 percent in 2020. As part of the Government's response to COVID-19, there was both a horizontal and a vertical expansion of PROSOLI, the former enabled by the identification of new households through the updated and strengthened SIUBEN 3 (under Component 3). This support helped attenuate the impact of the pandemic on the poor – without SP mitigation measures, monetary poverty would have been six percentage<sup>17</sup> points higher (approximately 600,000 additional individuals).<sup>18</sup> In addition, the monitoring and redress mechanisms used in PROSOLI field operations were adapted to the emergency response.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, as part of the reform of the electricity sector, a key action is to move towards full cost recovery by reducing end-user subsidies. Recognizing the need to protect poor and vulnerable households, the Government is reforming a program that provides transfers to pay for electricity services (*BonoLuz*) by both improving its targeting (currently based on a customer's level of electricity consumption) and increasing coverage of poor and extreme poor households using SIUBEN data.<sup>20</sup> More broadly, a large share of the Bank's portfolio in the DR has incorporated a social protection angle, in particular, measures to protect the poor during shocks and sector reforms, among other situations, employing tools (targeting, information, redress mechanisms, etc.) supported under the Project.

## III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

### A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

42. **The Project design was very ambitious even considering that some activities and implementation arrangements built on the Bank's previous engagement with the DR.** Unavoidably, the design of the Project was complex given its focus on area-based interventions to address the multi-dimensionality of poverty. As a result, the Social Cabinet, as the fiduciary unit in charge of the Project,

<sup>16</sup> World Bank Calculations based on the National Continuous Labor Force Survey or ECNFT as abbreviated in Spanish (2020). WBG LRC Poverty Team.

<sup>17</sup> World Bank Calculations based on the National Continuous Labor Force Survey or ECNFT as abbreviated in Spanish (2020). WBG LCR Poverty Team.

<sup>18</sup> According to national estimates, monetary poverty increased from 21 percent in 2019 to 23.4 percent in 2020.

<sup>19</sup> ICR for Loan 9144-DO, DR COVID-19 Crisis Response Support, May 31, 2022, Report o. ACR00005918.

<sup>20</sup> Program Document for a Proposed Loan for Electricity Reform for Sustainable Growth Development Policy Loan (March 4, 2022) (P175874).



needed to undertake new activities involving a range of actors including private contractors, Non-Governmental Organizations, and training providers. In addition, the Project correctly included activities to continue efforts to strengthen the instruments of the social protection system, such as social accountability measures, the targeting system, and supporting information systems. The relatively short initial duration of the Project (4 years) and the expectation that some activities (training provision) would start at scale in the first year did not take into account adequately the learning curve for these new activities and the standard delays prior to effectiveness in the DR related to congressional approval. On the positive side, several activities of the Project built on the Bank's previous engagement, for example, support for reform and strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT and youth training, as well as piloting of social accountability measures. The output-based disbursement mechanism had been used successfully in the previous Social Protection Investment Project.

43. **While the focus on the poor living in the poorest provinces was appropriate, the Project design suffered from inadequate preparation and anticipation of likely challenges to serve this population<sup>21</sup>.** The selection of beneficiary groups –households classified in the bottom two levels according to the SIUBEN living in the poorest provinces was appropriate, but implied additional challenges in terms of identifying qualified local providers and pertinent interventions. Risks of insufficient capacity to implement the housing improvements and training activities were correctly identified, but risk mitigation measures were not sufficient to prevent substantial delays in the completion of bidding processes for both. Although the PIU (Social Cabinet's Projects Technical Implementation Unit) was in place, it was not ready for immediate implementation of the main activities of training and housing improvements at the pace implied by the targets set. The Project's training model was based on the expectation of wage employment even in poor rural areas. The institutional capacity to monitor the Project was to be gradually installed and developed under Component 3. However, the extensive results framework included five PDO indicators and 14 intermediate indicators with some inconsistencies and complexities (see section IV.A below). Finally, the number and diversity of activities in Components 2 and 3 presented challenges for implementation, and even more so for coordination. Many activities ended up operating as independent actions rather than contributing to an integrated approach and better operational processes for the CCT program. Without a process evaluation (see section on Monitoring and Evaluation) there was no review of the implementation of the integrated approach or recommendations for improvements. The objectives of interoperability both among the agencies involved in the implementation of PROSOLI and in the context of the Integrated System of Monitoring and Evaluation of the Social Cabinet (*Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo y Evaluación, SIME*) focused narrowly on information technology rather than the fundamental institutional issues involved.

## B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

### Factors subject to Government/Implementing Agency control

44. **Although political transitions and staffing gaps at times led to delays, Project staff took into account lessons learned and there were capacity gains early in implementation.** Project activities did not begin until 18 months after Board approval mainly because of delays in congressional approval and the transition of the new administration that took office in August 2016. After the first restructuring (August 2018), project disbursements took off more strongly. The PIU had developed sufficient capacity to implement the complex design and multiple activities. In addition, the required preparatory work had

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<sup>21</sup> This section draws on the report *Sistematización de cuatro componentes del 8470-DO, Proyecto Integrado de Promoción y Protección Social*. September 2022, Gomez, R.



been completed (diagnostic labor market studies, preparation of bidding documents, training for Non-Governmental Organizations bidding on floor replacements, contracting for SIUBEN 3, etc.) thereby enabling the launch of Project activities. At various points during the life of the Project, the PIU was not fully staffed due to changes in Government (in part reflecting the long duration of Project implementation), which delayed some administrative and procurement processes. In particular, the 2020 change in administration brought about substantial changes in fiduciary staff and institutional arrangements. The Project also had challenges to make timely payments of stipends for youth training. That said, by the end of the Project, payments were being made on a timelier basis through bank accounts. The SIUBEN 3 survey presented complex, logistical demands related to PIU payments to fieldworkers. There were improvements during the updating in 2020-21 with more efficient and timely flows, as the PIU applied lessons learned from the previous round. The PIU contracted extra staff to ensure payments related to SIUBEN and the CRCs.

45. **The Project received support from high levels of Government.** The Social Cabinet and PROSOLI made strong coordination efforts to execute for the first-time economic inclusion activities. During the transition to a new Government in 2020, coordination took place from the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Development (*Ministerio de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo*, MEPyD) and the Presidency to make SUPERATE more independent, and transform it into an integral strategy for poverty reduction. During implementation, the Project consistently received the support of the highest levels of Government – the MEPyD, Ministry of Finance, the Vice-President as well as the Social Cabinet, reflecting the role of PROSOLI (SUPERATE) as the main social assistance program in the country. In fact, the Government used it as the main vehicle to respond to both COVID-19 and the recent increase in food prices.

#### Factors subject to World Bank control

46. **Supervision effectively supported the follow-up and resolution of implementation issues and adaptation to changing conditions.** During most years, the Bank team supported the Project through two implementation support visits. Reporting through the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) was regular and covered in detail project progress and implementation issues and the actions needed for their resolution. In particular, the first restructuring included adjustments in the activities of some components, mainly under Component 1, to ensure faster implementation and incorporate lessons learned so far, such as the organization of bidding processes considering geography and the presence of local providers to respond to labor market demands. Responding to the constraints for wage employment that became evident given the low levels of salaried jobs, for instance in rural areas and in some provinces, the Project introduced support to self-employment. One weakness was the fact that although entrepreneurship support was incorporated into the Project, it covered only training, excluding other components of a complete package (coaching and access to financing). Towards the end of the Project, the Bank team facilitated the use of the Project to respond to the needs of a sector reform that began in 2020, including through the third restructuring. Examples of appropriate adaptation of Project activities to changing conditions were the expansion of support for the SIUBEN; modifications in the training offer and modalities; and incorporation of support for documentation acquisition. Reporting was candid, albeit sometimes overly optimistic about the expected speed of disbursements. Transition arrangements are being addressed in the context of the follow-on project under preparation (Integrated Social Protection Inclusion and Resilience Project, P179440). While the task team leader for the Project changed, the handover was smooth as the new task team leader had been a team member.

47. **Showing proactivity, the Bank team mobilized additional resources to expand work on adaptive social protection.** The Bank team was proactive in mobilizing resources aimed to strengthen the social



protection system's shock adaptiveness. The grant (US\$430,000) financed an assessment of the social protection system for disaster preparedness and response, and the development of an operational strategy for launching an adaptive social protection component, among other activities. Notes were prepared to assist the authorities to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Bank team also provided appropriate advice and help on M&E, providing technical support for the two impact evaluations carried out under the Project. Collaboration within practices was a key factor supporting the Project particularly as it led to new operations for COVID response, hurricane response, and electricity reforms.

#### Factors outside the control of Government and/or Implementing Agencies

48. **The COVID-19 pandemic affected Project implementation.** The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the related restrictions on mobility and in-person group activities (training, for example) in the DR temporarily halted some Project activities (floor replacements, training, impact evaluation surveys) and prompted the redesign of youth training to accommodate the requirements for virtual provision to complete the courses.

### IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

#### A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

##### M&E Design

49. **While the Project laid out a clear TOC, the M&E Design had moderate shortcomings mainly related to the classification and formulation of several indicators.** The TOC is articulated in the underpinning vision of the Project explained together with the PDO in the PAD. Reflecting the PDO's focus on "improving access" most of the indicators in the results framework measured outputs, rather than outcomes. There was a balance across indicators between those focusing on better access of the poor to services (four PDO and six intermediate results<sup>22</sup>) and those focusing on progress in the strengthening of the supporting activities needed to effectively implement the integrated area-based strategy (one PDO and seven intermediate results). Two IRIs were yes/no indicators (Customer Relation Management System, CRM) developed and functioning, technological platform for information exchange developed and implemented) and thus of limited use for monitoring progress. Identifying indicators for institutional development (particularly related to SIUBEN and the SIME) was challenging and ended up focused on information system benchmarks instead of evidence of information exchange and utilization by key stakeholders. There are two outcome indicators: the extent to which employment results are better for youth trainees and the improvement in living conditions reported by beneficiaries of cement floors. These indicators are not aligned with the PDO, which committed only to increasing access to the services, and in fact are more ambitious. Their classification compared to the related IRIs is also inconsistent. In the case of floor replacement, increased access is the PDO indicator and the improvement in living conditions (outcome) is considered an intermediate result. This outcome was also not reflected in the PDO. In the case of training, the improvement in employment (outcome) is the PDO Indicator, while the related output indicators (number of participants and completers of training) are considered an intermediate result, but again the PDO measured the output rather than the outcome. Another shortcoming was the fact that several indicators (related to sub-component 1.1 Bridging CCT Coverage Gaps) were formulated as percentages, making it difficult to gauge the level of effort and understand the baseline. In addition, several of these indicator definitions referred to eligibility status, adding some ambiguity, and an explicit

<sup>22</sup> Not considering the gender disaggregation.



clear definition of the denominator was missing in some cases. Since with one exception, these activities were financed through an output-based financing mechanism based on nominal figures, it would have been simpler and more straightforward to use nominal figures instead. The M&E design was comprehensive as it provided for impact evaluations of training and floor replacement, as well as the “integrated nature” of the activities supported by the Project (process and impact).

50. **M&E arrangements were satisfactory with minor shortcomings.** The PIU was responsible for consolidating the information needed for monitoring. The fact that the PIU was under the leadership of the Social Cabinet facilitated monitoring with the main institutions executing the Project, several of which were outside of the Cabinet, as did the fact that the coordinator did not change during the life of the Project. Even though the PIU prepared implementation reports every semester, monitoring was a challenge as the indicators were not automatically generated by the information systems so were reported independently by various line units, subject to staff turn-overs, and different interpretations of results and data collection methods. A range of monitoring instruments was included: impact evaluations; semi-annual progress reports; tracer and satisfaction surveys for youth training; and systematization of some Project activities including training, the CRCs, and the *Puntos Solidarios*.

#### M&E Implementation

51. **M&E Implementation was satisfactory with minor shortcomings.** The semi-annual progress reports were of good quality, delivered on time and helped to monitor Project indicators and achievements against the targets. The principal agencies implementing the Project regularly sent the information required for the progress reports. At times, there were differences in the CCT coverage data that came from the PROSOLI Program and from the Independent Verification Agent. The latter followed a methodologically sound approach with quality control involving the processing of several different databases, and was more reliable, even if available with some delay. For several of the yes-no indicators, the Bank team provided supplementary information to provide details on progress. There were some inconsistencies and corrections needed in the data reported for indicators in the ISRs due to the aforementioned ambiguities on the definition of the denominator used in some indicators. Baseline and follow-up data for the two impact evaluations was collected and analyzed in a methodologically sound manner. However, results were not available until near the Project closing date because they were not designed until the Mid-term Review and data collection was restricted during the pandemic. While the impact evaluation of housing improvements was unable to generate evidence on the potential benefits cited in the PAD (health and cognitive improvements for children under five years old) due to issues with sample size and composition, it provided evidence of other impacts. A shortcoming in M&E implementation was the failure to carry out any evaluation of the “integrated” approach to service delivery, although envisaged in the M&E design described in the PAD. The Project sub-component related to the SIME helped to raise the capacity of the staff of the Social Cabinet and 14 other agencies through training and information technology (interoperability), although the activity was not completed until nearly the end of the Project and with some limitations in terms of institutionalization. These investments should lay the base for the further needed improvement in M&E functions and processes after Project closing.

#### M&E Utilization

52. **M&E data on performance and results progress was used to inform project management and decision-making.** Monitoring information on the slow progress to incorporate the extremely poor into the CCT components and SENASA, as well as on the contracting of youth training, led to a reduction of the



related targets in the first Project restructuring (August 2018). Monitoring of training activities also led to the addition of entrepreneurship training to the originally planned technical training. The fact that the monitoring indicators in the Results Framework provided evidence mostly of inputs and outputs, rather than outcomes reflected the focus in the PDO on access to integrated services. The two impact evaluations carried out under the Project provided some evidence on outcomes. M&E findings were communicated to stakeholders. Examples of specific activities include: bi-annual discussions with the different stakeholders in order to prepare the progress reports; project results and lessons learned were reviewed during the annual meetings to prepare sector plans; and events were held to present both the intermediate and final results of the two impact evaluations. Finally, the Project supported the development of the Observatory of Social Policies, through which bulletins were published three times a year containing new research and reports on results. The Observatory also sponsored discussion fora and research on many of the social policies supported under the Project, including energy subsidies, social housing, documentation of the vulnerable population, economic inclusion, adolescent pregnancy, family coaching, and prevention of violence. The M&E findings have informed the preparation of the proposed follow-on projects to be financed by the Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

#### **Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E**

53. **The Quality of M&E is rated as Substantial based on the ratings for the three dimensions.** Based on the moderate shortcomings in M&E Design, minor shortcomings on implementation and good utilization of M&E data, the overall rating is substantial. Progress reports consolidating the monitoring data submitted by various implementing units were delivered on time and informed decisions on the Project. Two impact evaluations were completed.

#### **B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE**

54. **There were no significant environmental, social, or fiduciary issues during Project implementation.** No environmental or social safeguard policies were triggered/applicable to the Project. Ratings for both financial management and procurement were satisfactory over the life of the Project. The June 2018 ISR rated procurement as moderately satisfactory because of delays in the launching of bidding processes, mainly related to youth training (sub-component 1.3). The December 2018 ISR included an upgraded procurement rating (satisfactory) in light of progress on training bidding processes. Project audit reports were submitted on time and were favorable and unqualified.

#### **C. BANK PERFORMANCE**

##### **Quality at Entry**

55. **Quality at entry is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.** While the Project was strategically relevant, supported by adequate economic analysis, and incorporated gender aspects, there were moderate shortcomings primarily related to: (i) underestimation of risks and the identified mitigation measures; (ii) low implementation readiness; and (iii) gaps in the technical design of two major sub-components (productive inclusion and SIUBEN). The risk of delays linked to the 2016 election was underestimated at the design stage. The mitigation measures—that the social protection approach appealed to different sides of the political spectrum and the strong involvement of grass-root stakeholders—did not address potential delays (which materialized) in decisions on Project activities. Although the PAD rated the risks on the capacity of the Social Cabinet Projects Technical Unit and design as substantial because of the incorporation of housing improvements and training, the only mitigation measure identified for both was the strengthening of the PIU under the Project. PROSOLI Implementation capacity was overestimated,



leading to substantial delays in the envisaged timetable for launching, evaluation, and awarding of bidding processes, and Project disbursements. In particular, the time it took PROSOLI to design and put in place a new operational platform to deliver training services to youth was not anticipated. Gaps in the technical design for training included insufficient attention to the challenges of delivering the model of technical courses and internships for poor PROSOLI youth, particularly in extremely poor localities (with few private sector opportunities), and the need for agile procedures given the scale of the intervention. The identified mitigation measures that trainers' curricula will adapt to the potentially low level of skills in this low-income target group suggests that additional upfront analysis should have been undertaken during project preparation. Equally, the extended discussions after Project approval on SIUBEN strategy, instruments, and systems improvement (including interoperability) suggest that these components may have been under-designed. The Project had to be adapted to respond to needs that were not originally envisioned, such as the needs to revise the ICV and pilot the data collection mechanism and the recurrent updates that were needed after the third SIUBEN census. Bank inputs and processes were satisfactory: the Decision Review Meeting noted the importance of improving the accuracy of SIUBEN; supported the use of the CCT as a platform for delivering interventions to address multi-dimensional poverty; and recognized that the Project did not expect to influence the CCT payment mechanism (near cash). The questions posed on the capacity of both SENASA and INFOTEP were well founded. As already discussed under the quality of M&E, there were moderate shortcomings in M&E design.

### Quality of Supervision

56. **Supervision is rated Satisfactory.** Bank teams focused on development impact during supervision, for example, identifying and attempting to address issues relating to documentation that were preventing progress towards closing CCT and SENASA coverage gaps and problems in identifying private sector internships in rural areas. Supervision missions were organized regularly. In most years, there were two implementation support visits to the DR and the team benefited from the consistent participation of team members with the required experience in a range of specialized areas (housing, training, targeting, information system interoperability, and fiduciary). Performance reporting was candid with sufficient substantive details. Transition arrangements are being supported under the new Project currently under preparation (P179440). Minor shortcomings included some instances of over optimism: "no delays expected during the transition of the new Government" (June 2016 ISR); the expectation that a bidding process to be launched in end-2017 would cover 20,000 youth trainees (December 2017 ISR); and that a one-year extension would be sufficient (June 2018 ISR). In addition, the Mid-term Review was postponed several times. It did not take place until March 2018, only a year before the original closing date although it was apparent by end-2016 that Project targets and disbursements were seriously off track.

### Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

57. **The overall rating of Bank Performance is Moderately Satisfactory.** Based on the rating of Moderately Satisfactory for quality at entry and Satisfactory for the quality of supervision, the overall rating for Bank performance is Moderately Satisfactory.

### D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

58. **The risk to development outcome is considered low for several reasons.** First, in 2021, the newly elected administration carried out an institutional reform of the social protection system to reduce fragmentation and improve coordination between social programs. The reforms involved the reformulation of PROSOLI into SUPERATE, as the umbrella social protection program and main cash transfer scheme, and the strengthening of its delivery systems. The SUPERATE program is the new



administration's comprehensive poverty reduction strategy. SUPERATE expands the scope of PROSOLI by including a larger set of cash transfers, comprising: (i) CCT paid based on the compliance of co-responsibilities in education and health, (ii) newly created components such as unconditional cash transfers (UCT) for emergency response, (iii) economic inclusion services, and (iv) support services for households and individuals (providing identity cards to individuals, energy and fuel subsidies, and housing improvements). Second, efforts to close coverage gaps continue. In 2021, SUPERATE increased the coverage of *Alimentate* (previously CEP), the largest CCT. A further expansion is planned for 2023, prioritizing the closing of the coverage gap of extreme poor and poor households specifically to respond to the food inflation shock. Another goal is to increase the provision of economic inclusion support. Third, building on improvements implemented under the Project, the Government is transforming SIUBEN from a social registry to an 'Integrated Social Protection Information System' (SIUBEN+), and expanding its coverage. The Project financed the design and validation of the strategy to support this initiative. Finally, a follow-on Project (P179440) is under preparation comprising support for cash transfers, the promotion of economic inclusion for SUPERATE households, the transformation of SIUBEN into an integrated social protection information system and continued strengthening of local service centers and users' orientation and feedback mechanisms.

## V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<sup>23</sup>

59. **The design of projects which prioritize the extreme poor needs to take into account their particular circumstances.** The focus of the Project was closing coverage gaps for the extreme poor as well as providing them with an integrated package of services, later expanded to include the moderate poor. However, the challenges of reaching and serving the extreme poor were not fully considered in the Project design. For example, lack of documentation was a barrier to incorporating the extreme poor, but related activities were incorporated only after difficulties were discovered. Also, the scarcity of salaried employment in some rural localities with a high concentration of extreme poor was not initially considered in the youth training intervention. Moreover, the territorial focus (14 provinces) was in practice quite broad since it included two-thirds of the population in the DR.

60. **Improving pro-poor targeting performance requires, in addition to updated household data, the implementation of explicit strategies at the program level to use the data for new enrollments and exits.** In spite of substantial investments under the Project in the SIUBEN, the targeting performance of PROSOLI (now SUPERATE) in reaching the poor continues to rank well below other countries in LCR<sup>24</sup>. One reason is that the updated information from SIUBEN 3 was not used by the CCT. Households continued to be incorporated to close the coverage gap based on information from SIUBEN 2 up until 2020. The information was not used to identify beneficiary families who exceeded the eligibility threshold and should have been exited from the program, or to enroll new households. Improvements in pro-poor targeting rely not just on the availability of updated data, but also on the implementation of explicit strategies to use the data for new enrollments and program exit. In some countries, the requirement for social programs to use the most recent data is embedded in the normative and institutional framework of the targeting mechanism, but that was not the case for SIUBEN, nor was it a focus of the Project.

<sup>23</sup> This section draws on *Sistematización de cuatro componentes del 8479-DO, Proyecto Integrado de Promoción y Protección Social. 2022*. Gomez, R. and *Informe final de evaluación independiente Proyecto Integrado de Protección y Promoción Social. 2022*, Gomez, R.

<sup>24</sup> See *Stronger Social Protection and Labor Systems in Central America for a Resilient and Inclusive Recovery* (2002, World Bank), p. 25-26.





Furthermore, most of the data for SIUBEN 3 was collected during 2018, meaning it is now out of date. Programs may find it easier to incorporate new targeting data if updating happens more continuously (dynamic social registries) instead of all at once every 4-5 years.

61. **Micro-entrepreneurship support in Bank projects should incorporate best practices by including the activities required to maximize the chances of success for participants, including coaching and access to financing.** International evidence suggests that the most effective support for micro-entrepreneurship includes training, coaching during implementation of the activities (including on how to connect to value chains), and facilitation and/or access to financing. In the case of this Project, since micro-entrepreneurship support was not included from the beginning, the adjustments made during implementation only covered the first part of this package (training), partly because the Program lacked partners for the entrepreneurship track. Although it was envisaged that successful completers of entrepreneurship training would be able to submit their business plans to credit agencies linked to the Program or the Government, it did not happen. Nor were arrangements made for mentoring during implementation of the activity.

62. **The design and monitoring of interoperability efforts needs to consider the fact that each institution has its own norms and laws governing the procedures related to information and focus on the objective of interoperability.** Achieving interoperability requires efforts on many fronts in addition to information technology. Each institution has its own norms and laws governing the procedures related to information. The goal of the Project in Component 2 was to link information from many participating agencies. While Project targets were met, the process of interoperability is not finished, particularly since so many agencies were involved. Indicators that focus only on the informatics side of interoperability miss both the process of harmonizing regulations as well as other aspects of data sharing and the actual use of the resulting integrated information.

63. **Results Frameworks should draw to the extent possible from existing data sources.** The Project results framework includes several indicators related to the narrowing of gaps in CCT and SENASA coverage that were expressed as percentages. The approach had disadvantages: it was hard to understand the level of effort and the baseline, particularly when the “base” for expanding coverage changed from “extreme poor” to “extreme and moderate poor” in the first restructuring. Because the increases in coverage were included in the output-based disbursement mechanism and subject to confirmation by an independent verification agent, it would have been more straightforward to use the same source and methodology for reporting these results.

64. **A Project objective of “integration” is intrinsically a management and coordination challenge and needs to be supported through specific mechanisms and arrangements.** There is a risk that “integration” becomes a slogan instead of a guiding principle for the organization of activities. The latter will not happen by chance, but requires specific management tools. For example, since the goal of integration is better outcomes for households and individuals, how activities are combined in practice at the household level should be tracked and tailored to their characteristics. Institutional structures are needed at the local level to support coordination and monitor results. Finally, achieving integration is a long-term process, which needs to be informed by periodic reviews of how arrangements are working on the ground, including through process evaluations.



ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: Improve access to an integrated package of SP and promotion opportunities that improve human capital

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of extremely and moderate poor households who are incorporated in CCT PROSOLI in selected provinces	Percentage	90.00	100.00	99.90	101.50
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022

Comments (achievements against targets):

The original coverage target translated into 60,669 ICV1 households enrolled in CEP. The formally revised target was to enroll 124,231 households (59,731 ICV1 and 64,500 ICV2). 140,660 households were enrolled (66,480 ICV1 and 74,180 ICV2), exceeding the higher revised target by 13 percent due to better-than-expected performance for ICV2 households.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of eligible	Percentage	0.00	60.00	60.00	100.00



households whose socio-economic situation is updated by SIUBEN based on the SIUBEN III socio economic categorization.		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022
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**Comments (achievements against targets):**

SIUBEN 2 contained 1.8 million households. The achievement of this indicator can be measured in three ways. First, SIUBEN 3 registered 2.1 million households, leading to a conclusion that information had been updated for 100 percent when compared to SIUBEN 2. Second, more precise “matching” between databases of these two studies indicates that 1.1 million households in SIUBEN 2 can be matched to SIUBEN 3, a share of 61 percent. Finally, 86 percent of current SUPERATE beneficiaries are certified in the SIUBEN 3 database. In sum, although the definition of the indicator is open to interpretation, the target was met in all three scenarios.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries	Number	1,130,391.00	1,342,713.00	1,925,518.00	1,969,871.00
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	52.00	52.00	52.00	50.85

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

The formally revised (higher) target was amply exceeded. The share of female beneficiaries of 50.85 percent fell slightly short of the original target (and the baseline) of 52 percent.



**Objective/Outcome:** Improve access to an integrated package of SP and promotion opportunities that enhance employability

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Employment rate of PROSOLI users (men and women) 18-29 years in selected provinces who receive vocational training, versus that of the control group.	Percentage	0.00 07-Jul-2014	10.00 12-Mar-2015	10.00 30-Aug-2018	0.00 06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

According to impact evaluation results, the employment rate of PROSOLI users who received vocational education was not statistically different from the employment rate of the control group. Although the target was not met, additional findings from the impact evaluation suggest other positive employment impacts: higher salaries and scores on hard skills tests, and more intensive job search and job readiness as preparing CVs and using job search platforms, among the treatment group.

**Objective/Outcome:** Improve access to an integrated package of SP and promotion opportunities that improve housing

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of eligible extremely poor PROSOLI users in selected provinces with dirt floors replaced by reinforced cement floors.	Percentage	0.00 07-Jul-2014	70.00 12-Mar-2015	70.00 30-Aug-2018	84.67 06-Jun-2022



**Comments (achievements against targets):**

The coverage target translated to replacing floors for 7,500 ICV1 households. Floors were replaced for 9,072 ICV1 households, equivalent to a share of 84.7 percent, amply exceeding the target.

**A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators**

**Component:** Integrated Area-Based Social Protection and Pro-Poor Service Delivery

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of household members, categorized as ICV1 and ICV2 who meet eligibility criteria, identified and incorporated by PROSOLI into the ILAE program in selected provinces.	Percentage	88.00 07-Jul-2014	83.00 12-Mar-2015	98.00 30-Aug-2018	99.59 06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

The original coverage target translated into 71,909 children in ICV1 households enrolled in ILAE. The formally revised target was to enroll 129,671 children (47,214 ICV1 and 82,457 ICV2). 144,651 children were enrolled (63,304 ICV1 and 81,347 ICV2), exceeding the higher revised target by 12 percent.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
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Percentage of household members, categorized as ICV 1 and ICV 2 who meet eligibility criteria, identified and incorporated into Bono Escolar Estudiando Progreso in selected provinces.	Percentage	90.00 14-Jul-2014	86.00 12-Mar-2015	95.00 30-Aug-2018	100.42 06-Jun-2022
<p><b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>            The original coverage target translated into 33,623 children in ICV1 households enrolled in BEEP. The formally revised target was to enroll 63,917 children (17,434 ICV1 and 46,483 ICV2). 128,018 children were enrolled (27,614 ICV1 and 100,404 ICV2), double the higher revised target. Overachievement is explained mainly by the fact that in a restructuring of the education system in 2019, 2 grade levels were moved from basic to middle and secondary education, thereby increasing the pool of children eligible for BEEP.</p>					
<b>Indicator Name</b>	<b>Unit of Measure</b>	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Original Target</b>	<b>Formally Revised Target</b>	<b>Actual Achieved at Completion</b>
Percentage of eligible PROSOLI ICV-I and ICV 2 household members newly incorporated by the National health Insurance Program SENASA.	Percentage	0.00 07-Jul-2014	60.00 12-Mar-2015	100.00 30-Aug-2018	101.00 06-Jun-2022
<p><b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b></p>					



The original coverage target translated into 229,900 ICV1 household members enrolled in SENASA. The formally revised target was to enroll 150,000 household members (97,768 ICV1 and 52,232 ICV2). 151, 533 household members were enrolled, meeting the target. Performance for ICV1 household members was less than targeted, but the gap was made up by better performance for ICV2 household members.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of beneficiary households whose dirt floors were replaced reporting an improvement in living conditions.	Percentage	0.00	80.00	80.00	80.00
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

According to results of the impact evaluation, 80 percent of households benefiting from floor replacement report an improvement in living conditions, meeting the target.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of participants from PROSOLI households categorized as ICV1 and ICV2 that finish vocational training	Percentage	0.00	60.00	60.00	101.58
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**



Considering youth who participated in at least one part of the training cycle (34,942), 30,756 finished the cycle, a share of 88 percent, above the target of 60 percent and high by international standards, especially for the poor. The share of 101.58 represents the number of youth who finished the training, relative to the revised target of 30,000.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of vocational training participants who are women	Percentage	0.00	50.00	50.00	71.00
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

The share of vocational training participants who are women was about 70 percent, amply exceeding the target of 50 percent, with a similar share for those who finished training.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of Beneficiaries of vocational training package	Number	0.00	40,000.00	30,000.00	30,756.00
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

The number of beneficiaries who participated in at least one part of the training cycle was 34,942, among which 30,756 finished the cycle. Both figures exceed the target of 30,000.





**Component:** Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program and Support to Targeted Households

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of PROSOLI field staff trained on new integrated territorial intervention strategy in selected provinces	Percentage	0.00	85.00	85.00	86.29
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

1,294 PROSOLI field staff were trained under the Project, representing 86 percent of staff, meeting the target.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of “Puntos Solidarios” equipped and functioning in the 14 provinces	Number	0.00	70.00	39.00	39.00
		07-Jul-2014	12-Mar-2015	30-Aug-2018	06-Jun-2022

**Comments (achievements against targets):**

The target for the number of “Puntos Solidarios” equipped and functioning met the target. The figure rises to 39 if other modalities (mobile and platforms) are also considered.



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of community report card cycles implemented and supervision initiated in the 14 provinces	Number	0.00 07-Jul-2014	4.00 12-Mar-2015	4.00 30-Aug-2018	4.00 06-Jun-2022
<p><b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b> The number of community report card cycles (4) met the target.</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Customer Relation Management System (CRM) developed and functioning	Text	NO 07-Jul-2014	YES 12-Mar-2015	YES 30-Aug-2018	YES 06-Jun-2022
<p><b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b> The Customer Relation Management System (CRM) was developed and is functioning.</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at
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				Target	Completion
Technological platform for information exchange between SIUBEN and other public institutions is developed and implemented	Text	NO 07-Jul-2014	YES 12-Mar-2015	YES 30-Aug-2018	YES 06-Jun-2022
<p><b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b> The technological platform for information exchange was developed and implemented.</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of modules of the Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (SIME) developed and functioning	Number	0.00 07-Jul-2014	4.00 12-Mar-2015	4.00 30-Aug-2018	4.00 06-Jun-2022
<p><b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b> The four modules of the SIME were developed and functioned to prepare sectoral reports and the annual sector planning documents. The new administration has decided to revamp SIME using the platform developed by this Project.</p>					

**Component:** Enhancing Equity and Results-orientation

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at
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				Target	Completion
Number of entities associated with the GCPS trained and applying instruments to assess performance of priority social protection programs	Number	0.00 07-Jul-2014	9.00 12-Mar-2015	9.00 30-Aug-2018	9.00 06-Jun-2022
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b> Nine entities associated with the GCPS were trained and applied instruments to assess performance of priority social protection programs during the lifetime of the project despite frequent staff turn-overs. The new administration benefitted from these reporting to inform the sector reform.					



**B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT**

**Objective:** Improve access of the Borrower’s poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities, including in particular human capital, enhanced employability, and housing improvements in selected provinces.

Outcome Indicators

**Objective 1. Improve access to an integrated package of SP and promotion opportunities that improve human capital.**

PDI1. Percentage of extremely and moderate poor households who are incorporated in CCT PROSOLI in selected provinces.

*At 101.50 percent, the share exceeded the formally revised (higher) target of 99.9 percent.*

PDI2. Percentage of eligible households whose socio-economic situation is updated by SIUBEN based on the SIUBEN 3 socio-economic categorization.

*The target of 60 percent was reached.*

PDI3. Direct project beneficiaries<sup>25</sup> (Individuals): At 1,969,871, the number of direct project beneficiaries exceeded the formally revised target of 1,925,518.

- Direct project female beneficiaries: The share of 50.85 percent fell slightly short of the target of 52 percent.

**Objective 2. Improve access to an integrated package of SP and promotion opportunities that enhance employability**

PDI4. Relative difference in employment rate of PROSOLI users (men and women) 18-29 years in selected provinces who receive vocational training, versus that of the control group. (percentage).

*There was no difference, but there is evidence of other positive employability impacts.*

**Objective 3. Improve access to an integrated package of SP and**

<sup>25</sup> In the Results Framework, the indicator Direct Project Beneficiaries is mapped to Objective 1 of the PDO although it includes beneficiaries of all Components.



	<p><b>promotion opportunities that improve housing</b></p> <p>PDI5 Percentage of eligible extremely poor PROSOLI users in selected provinces with dirt floors replaced by reinforced cement floors. <i>Dirt floors were replaced for 84.7<sup>26</sup> percent of extremely poor PROSOLI users, exceeding the target of 70 percent.</i></p>
Intermediate Results Indicators	<p>IRI1. Percentage of household members, categorized as ICV1 and ICV2 and who meet eligibility criteria, identified and incorporated by PROSOLI into the ILAE program in selected provinces. <i>At 99.59 percent, the share exceeded the formally revised (higher) target of 98 percent.</i></p> <p>IRI2. Percentage of household members, categorized as ICV1 and ICV2 who meet eligibility criteria, identified and incorporated into BEEP in selected provinces. <i>At 100.42 percent, the share exceeded the formally revised target of 95 percent.</i></p> <p>IRI3. Percentage of eligible PROSOLI ICV1 and ICV2 household members newly incorporated by the SENASA. <i>At 101 percent, the share matched the formally revised target of 100 percent.</i></p> <p>IRI4. Percentage of beneficiary households whose dirt floors were replaced reporting an improvement in living conditions. <i>80 percent of beneficiary households reported an improvement in living conditions, meeting the target.</i></p> <p>IRI5. Percentage of participants from PROSOLI households categorized as ICV1 and ICV2 that finish vocational training. <i>88 percent of youth who participated in at least one part of the training</i></p>

<sup>26</sup> In comments to the ICR, the Government provided an updated figure but it lacked full documentation. Using the updated figure, the share would be higher ( 90 percent).



*cycle finished the cycle.*

IRI6. Percentage of vocational training participants who are women.  
*The share of 70 percent amply exceeded the target (50 percent).*

IRI7. Number of beneficiaries of vocational training package.  
*30,756 youth completed the training cycle, slightly above the revised (lower) target of 30,000.*

IRI8. Percentage of PROSOLI field staff trained in new integrated territorial intervention strategy.  
*86.29 percent of PROSOLI field staff were trained, above the target of 85 percent.*

IRI9. Number of *Puntos Solidarios* equipped and functioning in the 14 provinces.  
*39 Puntos Solidarios were equipped and functioning, meeting the revised (lower) target.*

IRI10. Number of CRCs cycles implemented and supervision initiated in the 14 provinces.  
*At four cycles, the target was met.*

IRI11. CRM developed and functioning.  
*The CRM was developed and is functioning.*

IRI12. Technological platform for information exchange between SIUBEN and public institutions is developed and implemented.  
*The platform was developed and implemented.*

IRI13. Number of modules of the SIME developed and functioning.  
*The four modules are developed and functioning, meeting the target.*

IRI14. Number of entities associated with the GCPS trained and applying instruments to assess performance of priority social protection programs.  
*The nine entities met the target.*



Key Outputs by Component<sup>27</sup>

**Component 1**

1. New beneficiary households incorporated into CCT PROSOLI and receiving payment.

*140,660 households were enrolled, exceeding the revised (higher) target by 13 percent.*

2. New beneficiary children incorporated into ILAE program and receiving payment.

*144,651 children were enrolled, exceeding the higher revised target by 12 percent.*

3. New beneficiary youth incorporated into BEEP.

*128,108 children were enrolled, double the higher revised target.*

4. New CCT PROSOLI beneficiary households incorporated into SENASA.

*151,533 households were enrolled, meeting the target.*

5. Replacement of dirt floors by cement floors for extremely poor.

*Floors were replaced for 9072<sup>28</sup> households, amply exceeding the target.*

6. 1,652 youth training courses delivered: 1,172 with internship and 479 entrepreneurship.

*Youth stipends delivered to 30,756 participants.*

**Component 2**

1. Field Staff Training modules developed.

2. Field Staff Trainings delivered.

3. Digital platform for *Reportes Comunitarios* (CRC) designed.

4. 14,215 problems detected, of which 8,021 were resolved through RC.

<sup>27</sup> Some information for Components 2 and 3 is drawn from *Sistematización de cuatro componentes del 8479-DO, Proyecto Integrado de Promoción y Protección Social*.2022, Gomez, R. and *Informe final de evaluación independiente, Proyecto Integrado de Protección y Promoción Social*, 2022, Gomz, R.

<sup>28</sup> In comments to the ICR, the Government provided an updated figure of 9,677 but not fully documented.





5. 38,882 household participated in RC.
6. 3,643 social service providers participated in RC.
7. Management platform for *Puntos Solidarios* designed.
8. IT equipment installed in *Puntos Solidarios*.
9. 39 *Puntos Solidarios* physical offices, plus 2 mobile units and 3 “virtual” sites functioning.
10. 741,272 requests received through *Puntos Solidarios*.

**Component 3**

1. Households registered in SIUBEN 3.
2. IT equipment for SIUBEN.
3. Internal and external audit of the SIUBEN database.
4. Update of ICV methodology.
5. Agreements and protocols for information exchange.
6. Impact evaluation of floor replacement.
7. Impact evaluation of training activities.
8. Development of software for SIME.
9. Training delivered for SIME.
10. 10,722 people concluded processes to obtain documentation, including 2,325 PROSOLI individuals.
11. *Cultura Cuidadana* (gender-based violence) strategy, communication campaigns, workshops, fora, cultural events, messages and programs, hotline, and consultations.
12. Social Policy Observatory: 43 information bulletins, 46 infographs, 1 National Competition for Social Research, expert roundtables, and web portal.



**The World Bank**

INTEGRATED SOCIAL PROTECTION AND PROMOTION PROJECT (P147213)

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**ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION**

**A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
<b>Preparation</b>	
Carine Clert	Task Team Leader(s)
Zoila Catherine Abreu Rojas	Procurement Specialist(s)
Maritza A. Rodriguez De Pichardo	Financial Management Specialist
Robert Hale Montgomery	Social Specialist
Lucia Solbes Castro	Team Member
Ramiro Ignacio Jauregui-Zabalaga	Counsel
Andrea Gallina	Team Member
Maria Concepcion Steta Gandara	Team Member
Miriam Matilde Montenegro Lazo	Team Member
Juan Martin Moreno	Team Member
Tatiana Cristina O. de Abreu Souza	Team Member
Victor Manuel Ordonez Conde	Team Member
Patricia M. Bernedo	Team Member
Patricia O. Orna	Team Member
Sylvie Debomy	Team Member
Karla J. McEvoy	Team Member
Lerick S. Kebeck	Team Member
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>	
Miriam Matilde Montenegro Lazo	Task Team Leader(s)
Maria Alejandra Scheker Lora	Procurement Specialist(s)



Lucas Carrer	Financial Management Specialist
Alexandra Soto Ortiz	Procurement Team
Federico Antonio Beckley Gonzalez	Procurement Team
Robert Hale Montgomery	Environmental Specialist
Maria Pia Cravero	Counsel
Maria Concepcion Steta Gandara	Team Member
Brenda Mendieta-Arroyo	Procurement Team
Tatiana Cristina O. de Abreu Souza	Team Member
Patricia Rodrigues de Melo	Team Member
Rahmoune Essalhi	Team Member
John Morton	Team Member
Patricia O. Orna	Procurement Team
Sylvie Debomy	Social Specialist

**B. STAFF TIME AND COST**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Preparation</b>		
FY14	19.673	131,424.55
FY15	31.299	186,645.85
FY16	3.250	12,408.67
FY17	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>54.22</b>	<b>330,479.07</b>
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
FY14	0	170.98
FY15	2.500	17,911.61
FY16	44.983	179,260.18
FY17	57.361	196,766.09



FY18	40.602	165,500.80
FY19	29.523	229,092.14
FY20	34.842	223,557.89
FY21	41.908	258,463.93
FY22	35.266	267,200.81
FY23	11.773	63,808.10
<b>Total</b>	<b>298.76</b>	<b>1,601,732.53</b>

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**ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT**

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
Component 1. Integrated Area-Based Social Protection and Pro-poor Service Delivery	47.70	42.70	89.5
Component 2. Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program and Support to Targeted Households	8.90	9.82	110.3
Component 3. Enhancing Equity and Results-orientation	16.95	22.30	131.6
Unallocated funds (1.2625)	1.2625	0	0
Front End Fee (0.1875)	0.1875	.18	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>75.00</b>	<b>75.00</b>	<b>100.0</b>



ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Introduction

1. This annex presents the economic analysis of the Integrated Social Protection and Promotion Project (P147213) implemented in the DR between 2015 and 2022. It was conceived with the objective to improve access of the Borrower’s poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities, including in particular human capital, enhanced employability, and housing improvements in selected provinces. To achieve this goal, the Project focused on reducing eligible household coverage gaps in the national CCT program PROSOLI and on strengthening PROSOLI’s operational processes. It also supported reforms and expansion of the national social protection system.

2. The results from the economic analysis indicate that project benefits are positive and substantial, with a NPV of US\$53.17 million. The economic analysis compares the NPV of the project at completion with its value at approval using the information and targets available at different time periods of the project life cycle. The economic analysis uses survey and administrative data from the DR and the literature on the impacts of similar programs to assess the costs and benefits of the interventions implemented. While the Project was structured around three components, the economic analysis only assesses the combined benefits of the three sub-components of Component 1 accounting for the majority of project resources. The benefits of project activities implemented under Components 2 and 3 are hard to quantify so the analysis discusses anticipated gains without precisely estimating them. The estimate of the total NPV of the Project is therefore a conservative one. Further, the main conclusions from the economic analysis are robust to a range of assumption and sensitivity checks.

3. The rest of the document is structured in three sections. Estimates of benefits by components and sub-components are discussed in Section 2. The total NPV of the Project is calculated in Section 3. The last section concludes.

Project benefit estimates

4. The present value of total project costs for the components assessed in this analysis is estimated at US\$44.96 million. Assuming a 12 percent discount rate, the PV of project costs amounted to US\$58.07 million at appraisal. At completion, the PV changed to US\$44.96 million due to the longer lifespan of the project and funds reallocation across components. Table 4.3 below displays discounted PV projects costs at different stages of the project life cycle.

Table 4.3: Discounted project costs

	Total PV Costs
Disbursement plan - Appraisal	US\$58.07
Disbursement plan - Restructuring #1	US\$47.74
<b>Disbursements - Completion</b>	<b>US\$44.96</b>

Source: WB staff estimates. Annual discount rate of 12 percent used.

5. This section discusses the benefits generated by the different activities executed under the Project. An explanation of the underlying assumptions and methods used to estimate the benefits associated with the activities undertaken under Component 1 follows. A reference annual discount rate of 12 percent is used throughout the analysis. A rate of 12 percent is used because it is the rate that was used in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Social Protection Investment Project



(P090010) completed in the DR in 2016. Further, a rate of 12 percent is also used in the examples given by the Dominican Ministry of Finance in its methodological guide for project evaluation.<sup>29</sup> The benefits arising from implementation of Components 2 and 3 are also discussed but not quantified given the multifaceted nature of the activities involved and the difficulty it would entail.

*Component 1.1: Bridging CCT coverage gaps for eligible extremely poor PROSOLI households*

6. **Component 1.1's objective was to increase CCT PROSOLI's coverage of extremely poor households in order to support consumption and human capital investments.** The Project worked towards increasing the inclusion of eligible households in the following PROSOLI components: i) CEP, addressing food security; ii) ILAE, encouraging primary education attendance; iii) BEEP, encouraging secondary schooling attendance; and iv) the subsidized health insurance regime. At appraisal, this sub-component was expected to support 60,669 households. By completion, the project had more than doubled its initial objectives with 140,660 beneficiary households reached. To measure the total PV monetary gains generated by sub-component 1.1, the economic analysis estimates separately the gains expected from children and households accessing the ILAE, BEEP, and CEP programs.

7. **Impact evaluation results show that the PROSOLI program had positive effects on several socioeconomic outcomes.** The impact evaluation<sup>30</sup> of the PROSOLI program was carried out between January 2016 and August 2019 with the objective of measuring the impacts of the CCT programs on the economic and social wellbeing of program participants. Impacts attributable to PROSOLI were observed in terms of improvements in household food security, increases in the reported well-being of participants, reduction in the use of biomass for cooking, increased enrollment in the subsidized National Health Insurance, and a decrease in the proportion of households without a birth certificate. Regarding access to health and education services, impacts were observed in relation to school attendance at the basic and intermediate levels, as well as in increases in preventive visits to health centers for children under five years of age and health exams for women. The PROSOLI program had a large and important impact on school attendance with impacts ranging from an estimated increase of 4.0 percentage points for elementary school and 6.0 percentage points for secondary school. The results of the analysis also suggest that female household head participants were between 3.3 percentage points and 4.1 percentage points more likely to have worked for pay in the last 30 days compared to non-participant female household heads. Access to cash transfers gave more time to women to work while children were in school and allowed for higher possession of assets and better mental health. Finally, the study found evidence of a decrease in acts of emotional abuse and sexual violence by male partners.

8. **For the economic analysis, monetary gains from inclusion in the ILAE CCT program are estimated based on the number of beneficiary children, the expected impact on primary school completion, and subsequent anticipated income gains obtained in adulthood.** Gertler et al.'s (2019) impact evaluation of the PROSOLI ILAE program finds that children enrolled in ILAE increase primary school attendance by 4.0 percentage points compared to control children. Molina Millan et al.'s (2019) review of the international evidence on the long-term impacts of CCTs finds that most studies report positive effects on schooling and human capital accumulation<sup>31</sup>. In line with estimates found by Gertler et al. (2019) in the DR and in

<sup>29</sup> Ministerio de Economía, Planificación y Desarrollo (2017). Guía Metodológica General para la Formulación y Evaluación de Proyectos de Inversión Pública.

<sup>30</sup> Gertler et al. (2019). Evaluación de impacto al programa con solidaridad (PROSOLI): evidencia para la innovación en la protección social. Nota de Política. Vicepresidencia de la Republica Dominicana.

<sup>31</sup> Millan, T. M., Barham, T., Macours, K., Maluccio, J.A., and Stampini, M. (2019). Long-term impacts of conditional cash transfers: review of the evidence. The World Bank Research Observer, 34(1), 119-159





the developing world by Molina Millan et al. (2019), the economic analysis assumes that access to the ILAE program increases primary education completion rates by 4.0 percentage points compared to counterfactual children<sup>32</sup>. It is also assumed that the ILAE beneficiary is eight years old on average and that income benefits are obtained once the beneficiary turns 18. The size of the income gain is calculated by comparing the average annual earnings of working adults without any education to those with primary education completed across the bottom four deciles of the income distribution. The income gains are assumed to accrue to beneficiaries every year from age 18 and for 40 years after which individuals exit the labor force. The employment rate is assumed to be equal to 64.2 percent and the labor market returns to one additional year of work experience to be equal to 3 percent. Parameters and assumptions are summarized in Table 4.4 (see Panels A and B).

9. **Monetary gains from inclusion in the BEEP CCT secondary schooling benefit are estimated following a similar approach. Based on Gertler et al.'s (2019) impact evaluation of the BEEP program and Molina Millan et al.'s (2019) literature review, the economic analysis assumes that access to BEEP increases secondary education completion rates by six percentage points compared to the counterfactual.** It is also assumed that the BEEP beneficiary is 14 years old on average and that income benefits are obtained at 18 years old. The size of the income gain is calculated by comparing the average annual earnings of working adults with secondary education to those with primary education completed in the bottom four deciles of the income distribution. The income benefits are assumed to accrue every year from age 18 and for 40 years after which individuals exit the labor force. The employment rate is assumed to be equal to 64.2 percent and the labor market returns to one additional year of work experience to be equal to 3 percent. Parameters and assumptions are summarized in Table 4.4 (see Panel C).

10. **Finally, monetary gains from enrollment in the CEP program are estimated based on the number of beneficiary households with a female head, CEP's positive impact on female labor force participation and its associated labor earnings. Based on Gertler et al.'s (2019) results, it is assumed that female heads who are CEP program participants have a 4.1 percentage points higher probability of having worked for a salary in the last 30 days.** The impact evaluation results from that study suggest that household heads are substituting household chores and informal labor for more formal employment. The size of the monetary gains is assumed to be equal to the earnings of individuals working for their own account in the first decile of the income distribution. These income gains are modeled to last for ten years. Parameters and assumptions are summarized in Table 4.4 (see Panel D).

11. **On the costs side, the economic analysis considers WB project expenditures and CCT operational costs.** As the cash transfers benefit directly recipient households (see discussion above), only the administrative cost of delivering the transfers is factored in on the government side. It is estimated that the administrative costs are equal to eight percent, that is to say for every one US dollar sent to PROSOLI households, eight cents are spent by the Government on operational costs (overhead, information systems, communication, transaction fees, etc.).

**Table 4.4: Assumptions for calculating the PV gains of component 1.1**

<sup>32</sup> The PAD and ICR differ with respect to assumptions on the CCT impact on education outcomes. The PAD economic analysis assumes that beneficiaries obtain an increase in the total years of completed schooling of 1 year due to the project. It then calculates the wage gains coming from that one extra year. The ICR assumes that primary and secondary school completion rates increase among CCT beneficiaries. It then calculates the wage gains stemming from higher completion rates.



Variable	Value	Source
<i>Panel A: General assumptions and parameters</i>		
Age at which beneficiaries start working (years)	18	WB assumption
Exchange rate, LCU per US\$ (2021)	57.2	WB MPO (October 2022)
Years of future active employment for ILAE and BEEP children	40	WB assumption
Annual earnings in RD\$ - no education	107,197.79	ENCFT survey 2021 Q4 <sup>33</sup>
Annual earnings in RD\$ - primary education	113,371.27	ENCFT survey 2021 Q4
Annual earnings in RD\$ - secondary education	120,217.20	ENCFT survey 2021 Q4
Employment rate (labor market participation rate)	0.642	ENCFT survey 2021 Q4
Labor market return to one year of work experience	0.03	WB assumption
Administrative/operational cost for delivering cash transfers (%)	8.0	WB assumption
<i>Panel B: ILAE benefit assumptions</i>		
Number of ILAE beneficiaries at approval	71,909	WB project documents
Number of ILAE beneficiaries at first restructuring	129,671	WB project documents
Number of ILAE beneficiaries at completion	144,651	WB project documents
ILAE benefit impact on primary education completion rate	0.04	Gertler et al. (2019)
Annual income increase in RD\$ per beneficiary	6,173.47	WB estimate
Annual income increase in US\$ per beneficiary	107.93	WB estimate
Average age of ILAE beneficiaries at project completion	8	WB assumption
Total ILAE annual gains in US\$ - at appraisal	199,302.00	WB estimate
Total ILAE annual gains in US\$ - at first restructuring	359,394.38	WB estimate
Total ILAE annual gains in US\$ - at completion	400,912.74	WB estimate
<i>Panel C: BEEP benefit assumptions</i>		
Number of BEEP beneficiaries at approval	33,623	WB project documents
Number of BEEP beneficiaries at first restructuring	63,917	WB project documents
Number of BEEP beneficiaries at completion	128,018	WB project documents
BEEP benefit impact on secondary education completion rate	0.06	Gertler et al. (2019)
Annual income increase in RD\$ per beneficiary	6,845.94	WB estimate
Annual income increase in US\$ per beneficiary	119.68	WB estimate
Average age of BEEP beneficiaries	14	WB assumption
Total BEEP annual gains in US\$ - at appraisal	155,010.01	WB estimate
Total BEEP annual gains in US\$ - at first restructuring	294,672.54	WB estimate
Total BEEP annual gains in US\$ - at completion	590,193.36	WB estimate
<i>Panel D: CEP benefit assumptions</i>		

<sup>33</sup> Banco Central de la República Dominicana (2022). Encuesta Nacional Continua de Fuerza de Trabajo (ENCFT). Labor market statistics from the fourth quarter of 2021 are used.



Variable	Value	Source
Number of beneficiary households at appraisal	60,669	WB project documents
Number of beneficiary households at first restructuring	124,231	WB project documents
Number of beneficiary households at completion	140,660	WB project documents
Percentage of female headed households	0.623	WB project documents
CEP effect on female employment rate	0.041	Gertler et al. (2019)
Annual earnings working on own account in RD\$	56,540.60	ENCFT survey 2021 Q4
Annual earnings working on own account in US\$	988.45	WB estimate
Total CEP annual gains in US\$ - at appraisal	1,531,776.64	WB estimate
Total CEP annual gains in US\$ - at first restructuring	3,136,596.02	WB estimate
Total CEP annual gains in US\$ - at completion	3,551,396.97	WB estimate

12. **The economic analysis indicates that sub-component 1.1 is expected to yield positive economic benefits, with a NPV of US\$3.38 million at completion.** Results indicate that, on average, the PV of the sub-component at completion was almost twice as high than at approval (Table 4.5). The CCT program with the largest PV benefits is the CEP due to the positive impact on female labor force participation realized in the short term. The positive benefits households are expected to enjoy through participation in the PROSOLI cash transfer program outweigh the costs of the intervention. Every CCT program (ILAE, BEEP and CEP) generates gains that are higher than their costs.

**Table 4.5: NPV of sub-component 1.1 benefits**

	Total PV benefits	ILAE PV benefits	BEEP PV benefits	CEP PV benefits
PV benefits at approval (US\$ million)	<b>8.11</b>	0.49	0.75	6.87
PV benefits at restructuring #1 (US\$ million)	<b>14.63</b>	0.79	1.28	12.56
PV benefits at completion (US\$ million)	<b>14.08</b>	0.70	2.04	11.34
PV Costs of Cash Transfers (US\$ million)	<b>8.23</b>	0.68	1.21	6.34
Net PV at completion (US\$ million)	<b>5.85</b>	0.023	0.82	5.00
PV Costs Component 1.1 (WB project, US\$ million)	<b>2.47</b>			
<b>Total Net PV at completion (US\$ million)</b>	<b>3.38</b>			

Source: World Bank staff estimates. Discount rate of 12 percent used.

*Component 1.2: Increase access of extremely poor CCT users to housing improvements*

13. **This sub-component financed minor housing improvements for extremely poor CCT users.** Emphasis was placed on the replacement of dirt floors by reinforced cement floors and painting of house walls given demonstrated positive effects on health and project resource constraints. At approval, the Project planned to replace dirt floors in approximately 7,500 houses. The end target was surpassed at



completion with 9,072<sup>34</sup> households having benefited from housing improvements.

14. **Impact evaluation results show that the program increased the life quality of beneficiary households, their satisfaction with their dwellings, and their health.** The results of the impact evaluation of Component 1.2<sup>35</sup> conducted under the Project suggest that for all measures of home satisfaction, except for general life satisfaction, the treatment groups reported higher satisfaction than the control group. The value of the monthly rent that households would ask for their houses, estimated by the head of the household, increased on average by US\$4.00 compared to the control group. Contrary to the expectations of the program, the intervention had no effect on the gastrointestinal health of children under six years of age. However, a positive effect on the general health of household members was observed. Treatment households had fewer sick members of any virus or disease. Although the impact evaluation did not cover these aspects, international evidence also suggests that better housing conditions are associated with higher life quality, better physical and mental health outcomes, reduced school and work absenteeism. In an impact evaluation study of a slum housing improvement program run in El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay, researchers found that life satisfaction increased by 15 percentage points in families that received housing upgrades (Galiani et al. 2017). In addition, beneficiary households in El Salvador reported substantial improvements in their feeling of security (18 percentage points compared to control group). Moreover, in El Salvador and Mexico child health improved as a result of the program<sup>36</sup>.

15. **For the economic analysis, monetary gains for this component are estimated based on the number of beneficiaries and the average house rental value increase brought by housing improvements.** Impact evaluation results of the sub-component indicate that the monthly rental value of treated houses increased by US\$4.00 according to household heads' own valuations. The welfare improvements and monetary gains equivalent captured by the higher rental value are assumed to accrue once housing upgrades are completed and every following year for ten years after which the housing investment is completely depreciated. A discount rate of 12 percent is used. Parameters and assumptions are summarized in Table 4.6 below.

16. **The economic analysis indicates that sub-component 1.2 is expected to yield negative net economic benefits, with a NPV of US\$ -8.35 million at completion.** Results also indicate that, on average, the Program's NPV per household participant is expected to be negative at US\$ -920.59 (Table 4.7). The size of the benefits depends partly on the duration of the housing improvements. Increasing the duration of the investment from 10 years to 15 years leads to an increase of 20.5 percent of benefits per household in PV terms. Although there is evidence of positive intervention effects of health and satisfaction with dwellings, the increase in rental value is not sufficient to result in positive returns in the absence of valuing the health benefits for children. The analysis of benefits is conservative in the sense that it does not take into account any reductions in medical expenses from improved adult health either or reduced school and work absenteeism. As households were surveyed relatively shortly after having received improved housing materials, it is possible that they had not fully factored in the improvements in their living conditions and their associated consequences on several outcomes, including health. It is likely that in the

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<sup>34</sup> In comments to the ICR, the Government provided an updated figure of 9,667 but without full documentation.

<sup>35</sup> Banco Mundial y Presidencia de la República Dominicana. (2022). Evaluación de Impacto al Proyecto de Mejoramiento de Viviendas de Progresando Unidos (sub-componente 1.2). Gabinete de la Política Social, Dirección Técnica. Unidad de Monitoreo y Evaluación. Junio 2022

<sup>36</sup> Galliani, Sebastian, Paul J. Gertler, Raimundo Undurraga, Ryan Cooper, Sebastian Martinez and Adam Ross (2017). Shelter from the Storm: Upgrading Housing Infrastructure in Latin American Slums. *Journal of Urban Economics* (98): 187-213



medium-term households will put a higher monthly rental value on their dwellings. Households only need to put a higher rental value of US\$ 31 on their dwellings to turn the NPV of the component positive. While these estimates suggest that Component 1.2 was not a highly cost-effective intervention, it is highly likely that in the medium term the component will yield positive net benefits once health and labor outcome improvements materialize.

**Table 4.6: Assumptions for calculating the PV gains of the housing improvements**

Variable	Value	Source
Number of beneficiary households at appraisal	7,500	World Bank project documents
Number of beneficiary households at first restructuring	7,500	World Bank project documents
Number of beneficiary households at completion	9,072	World Bank project documents
Monthly house rent value increase (US\$)	4.00	Gabinete de la Política Social and World Bank
Annual monetary gains per household (rent impact x 12 months – US\$)	48.00	World Bank estimate
Total annual monetary gains - at appraisal	360,000.00	World Bank estimate
Total annual monetary gains - at restructuring #1	360,000.00	World Bank estimate
Total annual monetary gains - at completion	435,456.00	World Bank estimate

**Table 4.7: PV of sub-component 1.2 benefits**

Duration of intervention impact on beneficiaries:	Total Benefits PV		
	5 Years	10 Years	15 Years
PV benefits at approval (US\$ million)	0.92	1.45	1.75
PV benefits at restructuring #1 (US\$ million)	0.82	1.29	1.56
PV benefits at completion (US\$ million)	0.80	1.25	1.50
PV benefits at completion per beneficiary household (US\$)	87.66	137.40	165.63
PV Costs sub-component 1.2 (US\$ million)	9.60	9.60	9.60
Net PV benefits at completion (US\$ million)	-8.80	-8.35	-8.10
<b>Net PV benefits at completion per beneficiary household (US\$)</b>	<b>-970.33</b>	<b>-920.59</b>	<b>-892.36</b>

Source: WB staff estimates. Discount rate of 12 percent used.

#### *Component 1.3: Increase access of eligible CCT users to productive opportunities*

17. **This sub-component aimed at increasing the employability of young women and men (ages 18-29 years) in extremely poor and moderately poor PROSOLI households.** It provided an employability package of technical, vocational and life skills training courses followed by apprenticeships/internships in private firms for two months. An entrepreneurship-training track was added a couple of years after project start. Periodic diagnostics of employers' training needs and training for eligible training providers were also conducted. At appraisal, the target for this first set of activities was to enroll approximately 40,000 young people. The number of targeted beneficiaries was lowered to 30,000 after the first restructuring. In total, 30,756 young women and men ended up participating in the training package, of which 21,181 youth took the vocational training and apprenticeship employability package.



18. **Impact evaluation results show that the employability package had positive effects on labor outcomes.** The results of the impact evaluation of Component 1.3<sup>37</sup> conducted under the Project suggest that, although there was no increase in the employment rate among youth participants in the trainings and workshops group with respect to control group youth, the trained youth were more likely to have a more complete CV, to look for work with greater intensity and to increase their expectations of finding work in the medium term. In addition, the trained youth who did work were in better paying jobs, in part because during training they acquired greater technical skills (especially in mathematics and job-specific tests). These results indicate that the trained youth became more selective in accepting a job. While a higher employment rate was not observed among participants, those who were working reported higher wages in midline and endline surveys. These results persisted over time and suggest that over the course of their working careers the youth who have gone through the program, especially those who have done the full vocational and CV/interview trainings, will have more formal and better paying jobs. The entrepreneurship package was not the subject of an impact evaluation. Therefore, the economic analysis focuses only on the employability package for which rigorous evidence is available on its impacts.

19. **For the economic analysis, employment gains are estimated based on the number of beneficiaries, experimental evidence on the impact of the employability-training package on earnings, and the expected duration of the training impact.** The intervention is anticipated to generate a stream of economic benefits arising from increased productivity and employment among participants relative to their peers. Econometric results based on the endline survey indicate that participants in the full training program earn around RD\$ 8,342 more than youth in the pure control group per month. In terms of benefit duration, it is assumed in the main scenario that after completing the program, benefits accrue to the youth for five years and uninterrupted by any unemployment or informal employment spell. Parameters and assumptions are summarized in Table 4.8 below.

**Table 4.8: Assumptions for calculating the PV gains of the employment program**

Variable	Value	Source
Number of beneficiaries at appraisal	40,000	World Bank project documents
Number of beneficiaries at first restructuring	30,000	World Bank project documents
Number of beneficiaries at completion	30,756	World Bank project documents
Number of employability package beneficiaries at completion	21,181	World Bank project documents
Number of years of future active employment (main scenario)	5	World Bank assumption
Experimental impact of intervention on monthly salary (RD\$)	8,342 <sup>38</sup>	Gabinete de la Política Social and World Bank
Exchange rate RD\$ per US\$ (2021)	57.2	WB MPO (October 2022)
Experimental impact of intervention on monthly salary (US\$)	145.84	Gabinete de la Política Social and World Bank
Annual training benefit per trainee (salary impact x 12 months – US\$)	1,750.07	Gabinete de la Política Social and World Bank

<sup>37</sup> Banco Mundial y Presidencia de la República Dominicana. (2022). Evaluación de Impacto al Proyecto de Capacitación de Progresando Unidos (sub-componente 1.3). Gabinete de la Política Social, Dirección Técnica. Unidad de Monitoreo y Evaluación. Junio 2022.

<sup>38</sup> Even if the impact on the monthly salary drops as low as RD\$1182 (16 percent increase from the baseline), the NPV would still be positive.



Total program annual training benefit in US\$ - at approval	70,002,797.20	World Bank estimate
Total program annual training benefit in US\$ - at restructuring #1	52,502,097.90	World Bank estimate
Total program annual training benefit in US\$ - at completion	37,068,231.19	World Bank estimate

20. **The economic analysis indicates that sub-component 1.3 is expected to yield substantial positive economic benefits, with an NPV of US\$58.14 million at completion.** The main results based on a five-year impact duration indicate that, on average, the Program's NPV per participant is expected to be equal to US\$2,745 (Table 4.9). Even if benefits last only two years, the training intervention provided under this sub-component is expected to generate important gains for participants. These estimates imply that Component 1.3 was a highly cost-effective intervention.

**Table 4.9: PV of sub-component 1.3 benefits**

<i>Duration of training impact:</i>	<b>Total Benefits PV</b>			
	2 years	5 years	10 years	15 years
PV benefits at approval (US\$ million)	84.21	179.61	281.53	339.36
PV benefits at restructuring #1 (US\$ million)	56.39	120.28	188.53	227.25
PV benefits at completion (US\$ million)	31.74	67.70	106.11	127.91
PV benefits at completion per participant (US\$)	1,498.47	3,196.14	5,009.71	6,038.78
PV Costs sub-component 1.3 (US\$ million)	9.56	9.56	9.56	9.56
Net PV benefits at completion (US\$ million)	22.18	58.14	96.55	118.35
<b>Net PV benefits at completion per participant (US\$)</b>	<b>1,047.16</b>	<b>2,744.83</b>	<b>4,558.40</b>	<b>5,587.47</b>

Source: World Bank staff estimates. Discount rate of 12 percent used.

*Components 2 and 3: Improving PROSOLI's processes and institutional strengthening at the national policy level*

21. **Activities executed under Components 2 and 3 are anticipated to produce important gains in terms of program cost-effectiveness and service quality.** Social registry updating and modernization and improved connectivity of information management systems will improve targeting going forward, i.e., reduce inclusion and exclusion errors. It will also increase the administrative capacity of the PROSOLI program. Combined with enhanced PROSOLI operational capacity and coordination at the local level, these outputs will lead to more efficient expenditures and higher cost-effectiveness in the short to medium term. The introduction of better citizen feedback mechanisms will strengthen accountability, service quality and performance in public service delivery. Lastly, the set of technical assistance and capacity-building activities supported by the Project should promote innovations in social protection policy and the design of new interventions providing tailored benefits to population in need.

**Total Net present value**

**NPV calculations**

22. The total NPV of the project is estimated at US\$53.17 million. Having calculated the PV of costs



and benefits of the different components above, it is possible to estimate the total NPV of the Project. The figures in Table 4.10 are computed by adding together the PV estimates of benefits discussed above and subtracting project costs for each sub-component. With a discount rate of 12 percent, the NPV of the project amounts to US\$ 91.58 million.

**Table 4.10: Total Project NPV**

<i>Discount rate:</i>	3%	7%	12%	15%
PV Benefits (US\$ million)	200.92	130.58	83.02	64.76
PV Costs (US\$ million)	43.30	36.48	29.85	26.65
<b>Net PV (US\$ million)</b>	<b>157.62</b>	<b>94.10</b>	<b>53.17</b>	<b>38.11</b>

Source: World Bank staff estimates. Discount rate of 12 percent used.

### Sensitivity analysis to the discount rate chosen

23. The Project is expected to generate large net gains in the long-term independently of the discount rate chosen. Table 4.10 also displays NPV estimates with different annual discount rates. As expected, lower discount rates of three percent and seven percent are associated with larger NPV benefits. Even using a high discount rate of 15 percent, the Project is still expected to generate positive and substantial net gains of US\$ 38.11 million.

### Conclusion

24. The Project is expected to yield substantial positive economic benefits with an NPV ranging between US\$38.11 million and US\$157.62 million depending on the discount rate chosen. The ex-post economic analysis was carried out taking into consideration the costs associated with the Project and anticipated economic benefits based on the actual number of beneficiaries and expected gains relative to counterfactual peers. Potential positive externalities and spillovers from the Project on the country's economic and productivity growth, human capital accumulation, and social cohesion are not taken into account. In addition, the benefits of Components 2 and 3 are not quantified. It is therefore more than likely that the Project's NPV is higher than what is reported. Despite conservative benefit estimates, the main conclusions of the economic analysis are robust to several sensitivity tests.





## ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

### Borrower Final Implementation Report- (extracted from executive summary and conclusions and recommendations sections)

#### The Project

1. The Integrated Social Protection and Promotion Project (P147213) was implemented in the DR between 2015 and 2022. It was conceived with the objective to “To improve access of the Borrower’s poor citizens to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities, including in particular human capital, enhanced employability, and housing improvements in selected provinces”. All these with the objective to increase household consumption and human capital investments. To achieve this goal, the Project focused on reducing eligible household coverage gaps in the national CCT program PROSOLI and on strengthening PROSOLI’s operational processes. It also supported reforms and expansion of the national social protection system.

2. The GCPS was the fiduciary unit responsible for project implementation and coordinated project activities with the CCT Program, SIUBEN and MEPYD. Through its components and activities financed with a total budget of US\$75 million, the Project was expecting at effectiveness in 2015 to benefit about 383,638 poor households, 67 percent of which headed by women. The total estimated number of direct and indirect individual beneficiaries at the time was about 1.3 million, 52 percent of which being females. At closure, the Project had reached more than 1.9 million direct beneficiaries.

3. The Project was structured around three complementary components. Component 1 focused on improving access of poor citizens to cash transfers, human capital, housing, and enhanced employability benefits. Component 2 concentrated on strengthening the PROSOLI CCT program’s operational processes and its capacity to effectively link targeted households to newly available services in the provinces selected for implementation. Component 3 worked on institutional strengthening at the national level to sustain progress on the building blocks of the social protection system.

4. The life span of the Project expanded over seven years with three project restructurings. The investment loan was approved on March 12, 2015, and declared effective on October 28, 2015. The Original Closing Date was March 30, 2019, and was extended first to September 30, 2020, then to March 20, 2022, and finally to September 20, 2022, after three restructurings were approved. All restructurings were largely due to circumstances outside the control of the Project team, namely two presidential elections and the COVID-19 pandemic. The first restructuring involved no modifications of the PDO or total budget, an 18-month extension, and non-substantial changes to project activities and funding across components. The second restructuring involved only an 18-month extension of the loan closing date. The third and last restructuring involved minor reallocation of loan resources from Component 3 to Component 2 and a 6-month extension.

#### Description of project components and costs

5. Component 1: Integrated Area-Based Social Protection and Pro-poor Service Delivery. This Component aimed to improve the access of poor citizens of selected provinces to an integrated package of social protection and promotion opportunities by: (i) bridging CCT coverage gaps for eligible extremely poor households; (ii) increasing access of extremely poor CCT users to housing improvements; and (iii) increasing access of extremely and moderately poor CCT users to productive opportunities, with a priority



on enhancing the employability of young women and men. The whole Component 1 was costed in nominal terms at US\$47.70 million at appraisal and was lowered to US\$42.70 million at the first restructuring. The allocation for the Component remained constant thereafter.

6. Component 2: Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program and Support to Targeted Households. This Component focused on strengthening PROSOLI’s operational processes and its capacity to effectively link targeted households to newly available services in the provinces where the project took place. This involved improving field-based processes, access to information and feedback mechanisms, and information systems. Component 2 was costed in nominal terms at US\$8.90 million at appraisal. The last restructuring involved a minor reallocation of loan resources from Component 3 to Component 2 and brought the total costs of the Component to US\$9.82 million.

7. Component 3: Enhancing Equity and Results-orientation. The third Component complemented targeted interventions at the territorial level with institutional strengthening at the national policy level in order to sustain progress in building blocks of the social protection system. To this end, the Component financed activities to strengthen the national social registry SIUBEN and to improve evidence-based policy making as well as citizen oversight. The budget allocated to Component 3 initially amounted to US\$16.95 million at approval. It reached US\$22.30 million by the time of the third restructuring.

8. Total project costs remained constant throughout project preparation and execution. The total costs of the project and breakdown by project component are shown in Table 5.1 below. While the total envelope for the project remained constant, the envelope for the three components changed during the lifespan of the project.

**Table 5.1: Project costs**

Components / Project stage	Costs (US\$ m)		
	Appraisal stage (2015)	First Restructuring (2019)	Last Restructuring (2022)
<b>Component 1.</b> Integrated Area-Based Social Protection and Pro-poor Service Delivery	47.70	42.70	42.70
- Component 1.1. Bridging CCT coverage gaps for eligible extremely poor PROSOLI households	2.04	3.40	3.40
- Component 1.2. Increase access of extremely poor CCT users to housing improvements	19.15	15.75	15.75
- Component 1.3. Increase access of eligible CCT users to productive opportunities	26.50	23.50	23.50
<b>Component 2.</b> Strengthening of the PROSOLI CCT Program and Support to Targeted Households	8.90	8.90	9.82
<b>Component 3.</b> Enhancing Equity and Results-orientation	16.95	23.22	22.30
<b>Other</b> (unallocated + fee)	1.46	0.18	0.18
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>75.00</b>	<b>75.00</b>	<b>75.00</b>

Source: World Bank project PAD, project papers, Government reports, and ISRs.

9. The Project disbursed US\$74.67 million over the course of implementation with peak disbursements reached in FY2019. After a slow start, project activities and disbursements rapidly picked up from 2018 onwards. On average the project disbursed US\$9.3 million per year.



### Achievement of Targets and Results

10. A Final Independent Evaluation Report (the “Report”) was prepared for the Project and found that the Project implementation achievements were in line with its PDO and outcome indicators. The results are presented here.

11. The implementation of the Project exceeded or satisfactorily accomplished 19 of the 20 targets established in the Results Framework. Out of the 19 targets successfully achieved, at least 7 were substantially exceeded (ILAE coverage, BEEP coverage, CEP coverage, perceived housing improvements, percentage of vocational training youth who finished training, female share of vocational training participants who finished training, and one-stop service points – *Puntos Solidarios* equipped and functioning).

12. The target that had not been achieved by when this Independent Report was written, refers to the impact of the difference in employment rate of users who receive vocational training versus that of the control group, which was a desirable estimate in the absence of the post-pandemic labor market conditions. The impact evaluation did not detect differences according to its experimental design hypothesis. However, it is evident that the training sub-component did have positive results and achieved its targets. The World Bank Project had as an end target a higher employment rate among participants by ten percent. While this target has not been met, the results suggest that the intervention did increase the quality of employment among youth with a job. This is evidenced by higher wages; follow-up demonstrates it is over 100 percent higher on average for the treatment group. Additionally, relative to the control group youth, the trained youth were more likely to have a more complete CV, to look for work with greater intensity, and to increase their expectations of finding work in the medium term. In addition, the trained youth worked in better-paying jobs, in part because during training they acquired greater technical skills (especially in mathematics and job-specific tests). These outcomes indicate that trained youth became more selective when accepting a job, so this is why we observe no increase in the employment rate, although better wages are noticeable among those who are now working. In the long term, these results persist over time and suggest that during their professional careers, youth who finished the training program, especially those who have completed both the vocational training and the CV/interview workshop, will have more formal and better-paying jobs.

13. The indicators that were satisfactorily achieved or even exceeded are the “backbone” of the Project, including the service delivery components and sub-components. The key Project’s achievements are related to service delivery, which is the core of the project and its budget.

14. The first outcome indicator directly linked to the PDO refers to the expanded strategy for bridging CCT coverage gaps to enroll households. During implementation, 140,660 additional households enrolled in the basic CCT program *Alimentate* (previously CEP), exceeding the target (113 percent). In addition, 144,651 children were incorporated into the basic education CCT program *Aprende* (previously ILAE), exceeding the target (113 percent). Also, 128,018 children were enrolled in the middle-and-secondary education CCT component *Avanza* (previously BEEP), which double the target. Finally, 151,577 households were incorporated into the SENASA, slightly exceeding the target (101 percent).

15. The targets for the housing improvement and youth training service sub-components were also successfully achieved: floors for 9,667 households were improved, which represents a 20-percentage-point increase over the original target. And 30,756 youth completed their training cycle, overachieving the target (103 percent).



16. The Project achieved most of its activities and outputs. It also met the restructured implementation timeframe, although this implied three restructurings that extended the closing date. Implementation was impacted by substantial initial delays for nearly two years, the COVID-19 pandemic and its related lockdown, and the transition between two government administrations. The audit reports on compliance with funds use procedures and contractual commitments were favorable and unqualified.

17. Although the indicators were achieved, the Project faced limitations on institutional strengthening in social policy stewardship aimed at enhancing equity and results orientation, the core purpose of Component 3.

18. Successful certification of the total number of active program households surveyed by the third SIUBEN socio-economic study (ESH 3). SIUBEN II contained 1.8 million households. The achievement of this indicator can be measured in three ways. First, SIUBEN III registered 2.1 million households, leading to a conclusion that information had been updated for 100 percent when compared to SIUBEN II. Second, more precise “matching” between databases of these two studies indicates that 1.1 million households in SIUBEN II can be matched to SIUBEN III, a share of 61 percent. Finally, 86 percent of current SUPERATE beneficiaries are certified in the SIUBEN III database. In sum, although the definition of the indicator is open to interpretation, the target was met in all three scenarios. However, it is recommended to adopt the practice of consolidating the information and applying it to the active beneficiary registry and to potential new incorporations to ensure that the value of the indicator is maintained or increased over time.

19. One of the targets that, although completed, must be institutionalized, refers to the development and deployment of the SIME, formulated as a software and service module development. Although the modules were developed independently and made operational at some point during the project implementation, the pandemic, the change in administration, and the shift in the program's approach from system interoperability, functionality, and use to the project's closing stage poses challenges for ongoing system upgrades.

20. And finally, there is significant progress in implementing performance measurement tools for enhancing results orientation in nine entities associated with the GCPS, but they still require institutionalization, while training processes for the new entities should be resumed to apply these instruments to assess sectoral planning in upcoming years.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

21. In this section, the first part outlines the overall conclusions on the achievement of the Project's objectives and targets. The second part proposes some lessons based on the Project design and international experience to identify areas of improvement. Finally, it makes recommendations for future operations, for the Program, and for the GCPS.

### **Overall Conclusions**

22. The Project met satisfactorily most of the outcome indicators, particularly those related to service delivery. Many of them exceeded their targets substantially. The Project implementation meets most of the activities and outputs. Considering that its implementation confronted challenges arising from the COVID-19 activity lockdown and all pandemic complications, as well as the transition between government administrations, which resulted in the arrival of new civil servants to the GCPS, the Program, and SIUBEN, the Project was concluded within the timeframe agreed on in the restructurings, achieving satisfactory results in most of the outcome indicators, as well as in objectives and activities.



23. The key Project achievements are related to service delivery, which is the core of the project and its budget. The Project exceeds the expanded education CCT coverage target while achieving the expanded "basic" food and health insurance CCT coverage targets. The housing improvement coverage target (actions) was also exceeded, and so was the employability target with over 30,000 youth participating in job training programs.

24. The Project has limitations in three institutional strengthening indicators on social policy stewardship, aimed at enhancing equity and results orientation, as the core purpose of Component 3. Challenges remain in terms of institutionalization and update of the SIUBEN III surveys and their relationship with SUPERATE's active beneficiary registry, the extensive and functional use of the GCPS Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System, and the consolidated use by entities associated with the GCPS of "instruments" to assess the performance of priority social protection programs homogeneously and systematically. However, subcomponent 3 also reports significant progress. For example, gathering socio-economic information on more than 2 million households to update the SIUBEN database ("SIUBEN III") has been underway since 2018. The inclusion of two more services into the Project using the innovation and policy development funds is an important step forward: accompaniment to access identification documents and promoting a "new civic culture" to reduce gender-based violence. Other valuable actions such as the Observatory of Social Policies are also under implementation.

25. The Project PDO is completely relevant and pertinent, aligned with the Government of DR strategy, with the evolution of CCT Programs in LCR, and with the current World Bank CPS. The project components were fully relevant, particularly the first two. Component 3 was relevant to advance the institutionalization, regulatory, and stewardship capacity-building process of GCPS, including SIUBEN as the entity responsible for the "Household Registry", to target interventions based on their socio-economic characteristics and vulnerability condition. This strengthening envisaged in Component 3 has not yet been fully achieved, particularly due to the transition between government administrations.

26. The new Government of DR decided to scale up nationally some of the *Progresando Unidos* (PU) services and actions, supported by the Project under the SUPERATE Program (revamping PROSOLI and PU). In addition to the original SUPERATE CCTs, it incorporates and scales up nationally the youth training sub-component, and the accompaniment to access identification documents while maintaining the actions of the citizen culture sub-component.

### **Lessons Learned**

27. The Project is a World Bank-financed operation that contributes directly and strategically to the Government of DR's decision to advance the PU strategy. PU is an evolution and a complement to the Program (now SUPERATE, formerly PROSOLI), focused especially on extremely poor households across territories with a high incidence and numbers of households in poverty. This alignment is highly positive for both the Government and the World Bank. For the Government, besides having a dedicated source of financing, it is also a source of technical assistance and external accompaniment for the achievement of targets shared by the Project and PU. For the World Bank, it represents a timely and relevant response to support the Government's social protection policy. This is a powerful lesson that can and should be replicated for fostering the relationship between foreign assistance, multilateral organizations, banks, and the Government of DR.

28. The PU strategy and the Project, hence are part of and concur in many positive aspects with the evolution of CCT programs in LCR. In particular, PU and the Project are in line with similar endeavors in the region, aiming at ending extreme poverty and exploring "exit" actions, linking the access of youth to



economic inclusion opportunities through job training. The Project and PU also include innovative actions to improve services for the population through citizen participation and empowerment tools for the improvement of government services (participatory monitoring using CRCs) and expansion of the number of "one-stop service points" with territorial proximity and resolution capacity ("*Puntos Solidarios*").

29. The Project also sought to encompass the institutional dimension of social policy. In addition to service delivery and improved territorial operations, it also included resources and a broad array of actions to strengthen the regulatory, knowledge, operational and technological capacities of the GCPS and SIUBEN (under Component 3). The Project design identified a relevant area of improvement to advance the Government's institutional capacity. The need and urgency are still valid, as the purpose has not been fulfilled. The purpose was to strengthen the GCPS capacity to formulate, monitor and evaluate social policy. It also sought to turn the SIUBEN into an entity with legal powers and technical and technological capacities for targeting services, programs, and actions encompassing a broad set of social institutions and programs. The purpose was to create and operate regularly a "Unified Beneficiary Registry" and also, a "Household Social Information System (nominal)" falling under the responsibility of SIUBEN. These two purposes are still under construction and have been conceptualized by the SIUBEN+ Strategy, including the IV Socio-Economic Household Survey and the creation of the Unified Social Registry.

30. The Project considered a wide array of activities; since its inception, it expanded the number of sub-components and also added ten "sub-components", with budgetary implications and intricate operational processes. Sub-components include complex long-term or cyclical processes such as "participatory monitoring" (sub-component 2.2.1), and the SIUBEN update to create a new household registry based on the "SIUBEN III" database (sub-component 3.1.1), just to mention a few. All activities are relevant, pertinent, and with a clear strategic sense; the challenge lies in their extent, diversity, and articulation, as each entity (GCPS, SIUBEN, and the Program) and each internal area within these entities assumed responsibility for some of the activities, but the Project did not have a full-time manager or responsible party exclusively dedicated to the project management and monitoring, to ensure coherence and various forms of coordination among this broad set of activities. The vast majority of the actions were done "separately" accomplishing in most cases the established target, but without the tools to develop an "integrated" strategy as indicated by its title, an "Integrated Project". The project did not consider integrated operational planning and monitoring tools. The two main strategies included in the Project intended to "integrate" the interventions failed to deploy this integrated functionality: Updating SIUBEN to target households in line with their specific conditions and the M&E System to review progress on changes in households' status.

31. A major weakness and limitation of the Project was the inability to implement an "integrated" M&E. The difficulties in operationalizing the SIME triggered a results information gap that seriously hindered the Project implementation. In addition, the impact evaluation and the evaluation of operational processes of the "integrated" approach were canceled, which prevents us from having solid information from rigorous project evaluation studies. This report retrieves scattered documentation, varying in quality and content, mostly from administrative sources that were also used to prepare the semiannual reports to the World Bank. Without the SIME, a source for recording, collecting, and processing information that could "feed" the Project indicator framework was missing. From the onset of the project until its closing, the reports were integrated by aggregating reports prepared by different areas of the three agencies involved in the Project implementation, without sharing common criteria. The GCPS M&E area did not assume responsibility for following up on the Project but undertook only the activities directly outlined by the project under "M&E" (sub-component 3.2). In addition, SIME inception was confused with the need



to develop an IT tool ("Software"), without having first created the data recording, collection, and processing system, which, without being exclusively or primarily dedicated to the project, would be an indispensable information tool for most of the indicators in the Project Results Framework.

32. The targeting strategy needs to be thoroughly reviewed. There is a great lesson to be learned from the lack of regulations regarding the mandatory and timely ("immediate") use of updated information in SIUBEN. In 2022, the new Project-financed database created, "SIUBEN III" (ESH 3) remains "unused", although it was mostly built in 2018. The GCPS already had a history of multiple challenges after gathering the "SIUBEN 2" survey, which made it challenging to apply the information and recertify the households then active, particularly to remove ineligible households and add new households found eligible. The Project had as a first step (sub-component 1.1) added eligible households that had not been included (originally, ICV1 households, then extended to households categorized as ICV2). In the original design, this gap-closing coverage expansion was planned using information from "SIUBEN 2" and was planned to be completed in the first two years. This was not the case. The Program continued incorporating households based on SIUBEN 2, even up until 2020. This is incomprehensible and inadequate because the Project also included sub-component 3.1 to again update household information and create a new targeting database ("SIUBEN III") starting in 2018. The update is a highly complex and costly task as it requires census-type data collection and sweeps covering very large geographic areas. However, again the information has not been used to assess whether active households that no longer meet the eligibility criteria should stay in the Program or to include new households that would be eligible due to their vulnerability condition. And the information appears to be incomplete for defining the continuity or exclusion of active program households.

33. The Project contracted an external expert to conduct a systematization of all four components of PU which also provides lessons to be considered and that are further developed in the final systematization report. Here, listed for reference, the lessons on PU design are as follows:

- PU is a relevant strategy.
- Most of the interventions analyzed by the systematization had good design consistency.
- The project approved by the World Bank was instrumental in designing and achieving the PU outcomes.
- The PU design did not consider upgrading the CCT scheme that forms the backbone of the Program's operation. This is a serious limitation because PU is considered a strategy focused primarily on ending extreme poverty. Addressing the areas of improvement in the current CCT scheme of the Program, since its inception, would have contributed to poverty reduction.

34. The systematization-based lessons on targeting and territorial approach, are summarized as follows:

- The four components analyzed (by the systematization) covered extremely poor households, but also moderately poor households in an equal or greater proportion.
- PU lacked mechanisms to prioritize or pay greater proportional attention to households and people living in extreme poverty.
- PU incorporates the territorial approach to articulate services and interventions in extreme-poverty-stricken areas and communities, but the territorial approach is too extensive as it covers more than half of the country's territorial area and 2/3 of the total population.



- The PU territorial approach did not consider the difference in geographic contexts, which are instrumental to the territorial approach. The most evident limitation was that it did not have interventions or adjustments in operations or services for densely populated urban areas (such as the National District, with a population density of 14,216 inhabitants per square kilometer), vs. rural areas with a high population dispersion (e.g., Independencia and Pedernales with a population density of 27 and 19 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, respectively).

35. Lessons on synergy and articulation with partner institutions, supported by the systematization, are summarized as follows:

- The interventions under PU and overall, under the Program depend on inter-institutional collaboration, so institutional coordination arrangements are indispensable, but many of the PU interventions rely on the consensus-building skills of the Program's central and territorial teams rather than on clearly defined and binding norms for all stakeholders.
- Inter-institutional collaboration and coordination entail a range of modalities, scopes, and rules. The distinction among the different modalities is relevant for the Program's management capacity and also requires the adaptation of coordination instruments and arrangements tailored to each modality.
- The GCPS and the Program require technical capacities and normative authority to establish articulation arrangements to influence policies, plans, and actions with strategic partner institutions. Coordination cannot be limited to operational needs.

36. Lessons on operational and organizational consistency, derived from the systematization, are summarized as follows:

- The central teams and largely the territorial teams have experience and demonstrated capacity, but during Project implementation, they were recruited as "consultants", so they may not be able to work as "consultants", so they might not continue in the operational structures of the GCPS and the Program.
- A good practice that should remain in place is that the operational processes have been evolving and improving, and implementation was preceded by appropriate training.
- Most of the operating actions have a sound level of operational standardization across different territories, although the use of computer systems in operational management is still incipient and has not replaced still heavily bureaucratic "paper" based administrative procedures (such as "notarization" or the youth training stipend payment cycles).
- The operation lacks robust record-keeping tools for operational monitoring and construction of performance indicators derived from operations.

## **Recommendations**

### *Enhanced Equity*

37. Having in place an appropriate extreme poverty household-specific intervention strategy may yield very good results, under the SUPERATE Program. To design this new strategy, it is essential to consider the lessons learned from PU and the Project. The extreme poverty strategy should consider a differentiated CCT scheme (larger amounts for ICV1 households), as well as effective actions with a life-cycle approach: nutrition and early childhood development for children under three years old, school enrollment for children and adolescents, and vocational training for youth, at least. Documentation





actions are also essential, but they also require advocacy in procedures, norms, and laws.

38. Incorporate households not yet included in the SUPERATE program, based on the information available in SIUBEN III (ESH 3). First, it is urgent to close the coverage gaps to include ICV1 households. This action should be an urgent priority, to be completed no later than 12 months. In case of an inadequate budget, an inclusion phasing plan should follow. SIUBEN III data should also be applied to exclude those households categorized as ICV3 or ICV4 under SIUBEN III.

39. Define immediate and urgent mandatory regulations governing the use of SIUBEN's updated information by the Program, including other institutions carrying out targeting actions, such as SENASA or adult education. Prevent information from becoming obsolete and non-eligible households from being kept active in the Program while eligible households remain excluded (starting with ICV1 households, followed by ICV2 households). The problem now is that much of the "SIUBEN III" information was collected before the pandemic, so the information is likely outdated not only due to time lapsing (three or four years in most cases) but also due to its failure to mirror the economic and social "shocks" arising from the pandemic, with impacts at least on household income and the school retention rate among children, adolescents, and youth. A new survey to create "SIUBEN IV" or whatever decision is taken to "update" the information and the classification of households according to their ICV requires a much more stringent normative approach to apply the information "immediately", including a realistic and most likely gradual timetable to avoid that this complex task is again rendered pointless by delays and coverage failures.

40. Test and define more flexible methods to update SIUBEN and incorporate it into government regulations. For example, consider the possibility of cross-referencing information with other databases (government payroll, land property register, vehicle registration). Conduct tests to arrive at normative definitions that will help correct inclusion errors in a more streamlined and expeditious fashion.

41. The regulations should also facilitate registering changes of address in the SIUBEN-run "Unified Beneficiary Registry", accessible to multiple government agencies, without modifying the household ICV status. The absence of updated household addresses explains in part the issue of unidentified active households in SIUBEN III. The Program in SIPPS has more updated household location information (also ADESS can locate where the card is used when shopping), this information should be part of the "Padrón" (registry) and avoid "losing" households. The algorithm should exclude or not consider the address updates to recalculate the ICV until a full new household socio-economic characteristics questionnaire is "collected".

42. The SIUBEN database should have key information to target ad hoc household interventions, similar to a social information system.

#### *Enhanced Results-Based Orientation*

43. Develop a results-based monitoring system gradually and progressively. Gradualness should consider a first set of accessible indicators, generated by the Program and ADESS, to evolve towards the incorporation of more indicators, other information sourcing institutions (Ministry of Education, SENASA, and INFOTEP would be a priority), and new conceptual approaches. This task first requires conceptualization and trials before moving on to the software development phase, for which it is advisable to review several "social information systems" with information on results and actions in various countries of the region.

44. Create an M&E team with adequate knowledge and expertise. This requires adequate recruitment, hiring, and remuneration conditions to draw the most talented scientists in the country and



even people from other countries. Scientific M&E personnel must have the conditions and abilities to participate in the dialogue with national policy and strategy decision-makers.

45. Avoid impact evaluations to test interventions irrelevant to social policy. Given the cost of impact evaluations, they should be used for real alternatives and substantive social policy dilemmas.

46. Generate immediate and intermediate results monitoring indicators that are understandable and manageable by the entire operational structure. Encourage the use of data and evidence as part of the management process. Align indicators to strategic objectives without depending on projects or agreements with banks or other international organizations.

*Enhanced GCPS Stewardship*

47. Strengthen GCPS' internal capacity to enhance policies and simplify procedures and requirements resulting in social exclusion.

48. Assume a leadership role that promotes the articulation of social policies to create opportunities and promote social inclusion.

49. Strengthen the learning and M&E area, so that it has sound evidence of the impacts, outcomes, and outputs of the main interventions.

*Enhanced Operations*

50. It is also recommended to review the recommendations from the SUPERATE Program Systematization and the four "components" or actions included in the report: "Training", "Documentation", "Participatory Monitoring" and "Citizen Culture".

51. The proper operations of "Puntos Solidarios" as nearby convenient "one-stop service points" require, in addition to the interoperable information consultation system, the definition of resolution capacity and regulatory review to respond to the population's applications. For example, as long as there is no capacity for "on-demand information gathering" to review or define the household ICV, as well as to facilitate the inclusion of eligible households within a reasonable time frame, it is not advisable to implement this type of request. This type of "unresolvable" request is detrimental to the actions that can be settled and undermine the effectiveness of "Puntos Solidarios."

Santo Domingo, 20-02-2023

Ms. Miriam Montenegro

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*Reference: 8479-DO P147213, Comments on the Integrated Social Protection, and Promotion Project  
ICR Report*

Your Excellence Ms. Montenegro:

We have read the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) of the Integrated Social



Protection and Promotion Project (ISPP), Loan No. 8479-DO P147213. The most noteworthy report results, in our opinion, are discussed as follows:

The PDO relevance is considered satisfactory since 19 of the 20 proposed targets were met or exceeded by over 100 percent. This demonstrates that the Project's objective and strategy fully support extreme and moderate poverty reduction. It stressed the importance of synergy and collaboration among partner institutions to achieve this goal (GCPS, SUPERATE, SIUBEN, INFOTEP, SENASA, Ministry of Labor) despite the setbacks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Sub-component 1.2 had a remarkable performance, as it satisfactorily achieved its objective and surpassed the proposed target of improving 7,500 eligible homes to replace dirt floors with reinforced cement floors, reporting an improvement in living conditions of extremely poor households, replacing 9,667 floors.

Sub-component 1.3: Increase Access of Eligible CCT Users to Productive Opportunities for Training and Enhanced Employability aimed at generating labor market and economic insertion opportunities for youth in poor PROSOLI households through their participation in on-the-job training programs. Following the project's restructuring, the target was set at 30,000 youth trained; out of these, 30,756 youth participants of the Program in the 14 selected provinces completed successfully their training.

Sub-component 2.1, aimed at improving and supporting the Program's integrated territorial operation through training, strengthened the operational structure among field supervisors and household liaison supervisors, and trained field staff working directly with beneficiary families.

From the GCPS perspective, the ISPP implementation has also contributed to other institutional strengthening initiatives, such as the social auditing scheme through the "Community Report Cards" (or *Reportes Comunitarios*), as well as the creation of one-stop direct service points (*Puntos Solidarios*), and "Provision of Documentation", to mention a few:

Sub-component 2.2.2 *Puntos Solidarios* satisfactorily achieved its objective and exceeded the targets of equipping 39 offices and setting up 44 *Puntos Solidarios* offices, surpassing the original target by 113 percent in the 14 selected provinces, plus a mobile unit for this purpose.

Sub-component 2.2.1. Participatory Monitoring for service improvement through the CRCs satisfactorily achieved its objective and met its target throughout the four cycles as planned.

Providing Legal Identity Documentation had not been considered initially, but after the restructuring, it became a necessity to include it since the documentation issue in this population segment persists in the Dominican Republic; the socio-economic situation of extremely poor households is even worse as they lack access to the different government aid programs. SUPERATE has implemented this program to accompany "possible and/or future" beneficiaries to the services offered to help this group of people exit extreme poverty.

Also, note the lessons learned in terms of the inter-institutional synergies fostered by the Project during the Life Quality Index and the Targeting Instrument revisions, including the "mandatory" use of SIUBEN's updated information through interoperability platforms; it is necessary to design and



implement the exit strategy of households who would no longer be eligible because they have already overcome their poverty status, making room for new eligible poor households.

It is worth emphasizing the Bank's support in other valuable interventions to ensure the achievement of objectives as planned, through semi-annual "Supervision Missions" with well-defined objectives, decisively contributed to the accomplishment of objectives, results indicators, and targets.

It is our opinion and experience that the length of projects goes beyond public government administrations and work teams. Therefore, from the project design, it is necessary to take into account the preservation of existing work groups. On the other hand, it should also consider keeping in place a minimum structure of the Implementing Unit throughout the final closing with the final external audit, given that institutions usually have no budget to take on and cover such staff. Hence, we suggest considering this risk.



**ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)**

Project Appraisal Document (PAD). Report No. PAD1070. *World Bank, February 10, 2015.*

Project's Aide-Memoires. *June 2015-June 2022.*

Project's ISRs. *June 2015-January 2022.*

*Sistematización de cuatro componentes del 8490-DO, Proyecto Integrado de Promoción y Protección Social 2022, Gomez, R.*

*Informe final de evaluación independiente. Proyecto Integrado de Protección y Promoción Social, 2022. Gomez, R.*