Displaced During Crisis

Lessons Learned from High-Frequency Phone Surveys and How to Protect the Most Vulnerable

WORLD BANK GROUP

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List of Acronyms

CBPS	Cox's Bazar Panel Survey (Bangladesh)
CONASUR	Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation)
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (OECD)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DWRAP	Developing World Refugee and Asylum Policy
FDP	Forcibly Displaced Population
FIES	Food Insecurity Experience Score
GCFF	Global Concessional Financing Facility
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
HFPS	High-Frequency Phone Survey
IDA	International Development Assistance
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JDC	Joint Data Center (World Bank-UNHCR)
LIC	Low-Income Country
LMIC	Low- or Middle-Income Country
MIC	Middle-Income Country
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NPM	Needs and Population Monitoring (IOM)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PoC	Person of Concern
ProGres	Profile Global Registration System (UNHCR)
RDD	Random Digit Dialing
RRPS	Rapid Response Phone Survey
RSW	Regional Sub-Window
SES	Socioeconomic Survey
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VDA	Venezuelans Displaced Abroad
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

The world is emerging from a series of shocks that led to widespread turmoil in lives and livelihoods. The COVID-19 pandemic generated the worst economic downturn since the Second World War and had a disproportionate impact on the poor and vulnerable. Following the initial shock, the recovery was similarly uneven and was further hampered by a cost-of-living crisis that quickly unfolded as food and energy prices skyrocketed.

Although historically low global poverty figures before the pandemic reflect a steady decline over several decades, extreme poverty has been increasingly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and in fragile and conflict-affected countries. The latter set of countries host about 10 percent of the global population but nearly 40 percent of the global poor. Understanding the welfare of vulnerable populations, including during times of economic shocks, is therefore critical to addressing threats to the trajectory of global poverty and shared prosperity.

Amid the devastating impacts of the pandemic, the crisis created an opportunity for a large-scale data collection effort on forcibly displaced populations (FDPs)—a group on which there exist significant data gaps. This started out as a series of country-level efforts that served as the basis for a newly harmonized database of phone surveys from 14 countries during the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. This contemporaneous database of host and displaced populations offers unique insights into the welfare of FDPs relative to their hosts, while also allowing for comparisons between different populations of concern (internally displaced persons, refugees, hosts) and accommodation types (in camps, out of camps).

The newly harmonized database represents a rich source of information in a context where there has been little coordinated research on how systemic shocks differentially affect forcibly displaced and host populations.

The evidence from this new database shows that FDPs were deeply affected by the pandemic and that they often, though not always, fared worse than their hosts. FDPs typically experienced larger initial employment losses that were then followed by a slower recovery. In addition, there were significant job changes among those who remained employed, again with greater turnover among FDPs. Household income dynamics, where available, suggest that the welfare impact was much more widespread than indicated by outright employment losses alone. Although labor income losses were most common, in some countries, a high share of FDPs reported reductions in assistance, an important source of income. Food insecurity—not a new challenge for many countries that host displaced populations—reached alarming levels during the pandemic, with FDPs almost always reporting worse outcomes. Efforts to support those in need likely fell short, leaving much of the negative welfare shock unmitigated. On top of the economic setbacks, hard-earned gains in education were lost during long school closures.

In many ways, the pandemic exacerbated an already precarious situation at the same time that other preexisting and contemporaneous factors were contributing to a deteriorating welfare trend among FDPs. The pandemic worsened the welfare of displaced populations who are already among the poorest and most vulnerable groups. Refugees often do not have full legal rights to work in their host countries, and the absence of

such rights, unsurprisingly, is correlated with lower employment levels across the board. In addition to pandemic-related disruptions, there were often other contemporaneous factors that adversely affected both displaced and host populations. This was particularly the case with food security–related outcomes, where in addition to rapidly rising global food prices, some countries also faced local preexisting or concurrent challenges, including the arrival of cyclical lean periods, fuel price shocks, and the escalation of conflict and violence.

The recent welfare losses raise concerns that the effects of the pandemic could mean higher poverty and inequality for a generation—not only among FDPs but also their hosts. This would be particularly the case if the losses are not alleviated over time. Lost assets and savings take time to rebuild. Extensive learning losses during COVID could be compounded as pandemic-affected generations enter the labor market and their future earnings are further depressed.

Inclusive policies and support for the self-reliance of displaced populations can shape this into a very different trajectory. Displaced populations create significant social, economic, and political pressures on the host countries, which are predominantly made up of low- and middle-income countries, many of which are struggling with their own development challenges, including high debt and low growth. During the pandemic, host countries were often ill-equipped to extend support to displaced populations as they were constrained by tightened fiscal space to respond to COVID's devastating impacts on the general population. To make matters worse, external aid for FDPs declined in 2020 during the most acute phase of the pandemic, even as overall aid increased. Because repatriation is rare, commitment to the burden sharing outlined in the Global Compact for Refugees is critically needed. Similarly, external support can help countries working toward durable solutions for internally displaced populations.

Supporting policies that will aid FDPs in becoming more self-reliant will help build their productive capacity and resilience, which in turn will reduce the financial burden on host countries and their

reliance on humanitarian assistance. Greater economic opportunities for FDPs will reduce the burden of hosting, and granting them formal labor market access can be a positive first step—indeed, labor market participation tends to be higher in countries that allow work rights for refugees. Another key means of integration and the promotion of self-reliance is providing refugee children access to national education systems and relieving the many social and economic constraints to their learning. Although remedial support is needed by all, displaced children are in a more disadvantaged position due to their lack of financial stability and heightened vulnerability. Displacement status can be an easy indicator for identifying one group of particularly vulnerable children in need of targeted catch-up learning.

Sustainable financing solutions that allow for continued investments and longer-term planning will be critical to easing the burden on major hosting countries. Considering the record-high levels of displacement and its increasingly protracted nature, financing needs are not likely to diminish soon. Many host countries rely heavily on official development assistance for government spending and for supporting displacement situations in their countries. As learned the hard way during the pandemic, a key challenge of current displacement financing is that it may not be available when needed most. Financing arrangements need to be predictable and reliable for planning purposes beyond the short term. The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) Window for Host Communities and Refugees can help with FDPs crossing national borders, but similar financial support does not exist for the far more numerous internally displaced populations. Shifting the balance of support more toward development aid and adopting more inclusive policies for the displaced can help ease the overall burden of hosting.

Finally, the complex nature of the challenges presented by displacement situations underscores recent calls for statistical inclusion to provide more and better data that can be relied upon to design better policies. Despite technical and budgetary challenges, including

FDPs in data collection efforts is often best done in collaboration with national statistical offices. These results demonstrate the value of open, harmonized, longitudinal data on displaced populations to monitor periods of crisis and recovery. Harmonization would be greatly aided by using standardized survey instruments, particularly as they integrate the UN Statistical Commission's recommendations developed by the Expert Group on Refugee, IDP and Statelessness Statistics (EGRISS). Because data collection on FDPs requires reliable sampling frames, up-to-date and complete registration databases are invaluable. Formal data sharing agreements can facilitate institutional exchanges. The phone survey experience during the COVID-19 pandemic shows that it is feasible to collect data during crisis that is not only statistically robust but also time and cost efficient.

Introduction

A man towards the mass grave where his son is buried in Plain Savo site, Democratic Republic of the Congo.
© UNHCR/Hélène Caux, March 2022

The world is still emerging from compounding crises that have led to widespread turmoil in lives and livelihoods. The COVID-19 pandemic generated the worst global economic downturn, the largest setback in the fight against global poverty, and possibly the largest single-year increase in global inequality since the Second World War, as income losses of the world's poorest were twice as high as those of the world's richest (World Bank 2020c). The number of extreme poor rose by over 70 million in 2020 alone, increasing the global total to over 700 million. Economic activities gradually resumed around the world after the initial shock subsided and lockdowns were lifted, but the recovery was hampered by a cost-of-living crisis that quickly unfolded as food and energy prices skyrocketed. Three years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the recovery is still incomplete and has been very uneven across countries and population subgroups (World Bank 2022).

Understanding the welfare of vulnerable populations during times of economic shock is critical to addressing threats to shared prosperity. Forcibly displaced populations (FDPs) are some of the poorest and most marginalized people in the world. Although historically low global poverty figures before the pandemic reflect a steady decline over several decades, extreme poverty has been increasingly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and in fragile and conflict-affected countries. The latter set of countries host about 10 percent of the global population but nearly 40 percent of the global poor (World Bank 2022).

Just before the pandemic hit, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put the total stock of FDPs at roughly 79 million. This included 26 million refugees, 46 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 4 million asylum seekers, and 4 million other persons in need of international protection, including Venezuelans Displaced Abroad (VDAs). After remaining stable at around 40 million, the stock of FDPs exhibited a steep increase beginning in 2013, following a series of displacement spikes in Afghanistan, the Levant, Myanmar, the Sahel, and Venezuela. The major source of FDP growth over the past decade has been from IDPs, whose number rose sevenfold between 2005 and 2019. More recently, the war in Ukraine added over 8 million refugees to the total (Figure 1.1).[1]

Displacements rose further through 2022, exceeding a record-breaking 100 million, though largely due to factors unrelated to the pandemic. COVID had a temporary impact on the displacement trend, as pandemic-induced movement restrictions and border closures are estimated to have led to approximately 1.5 million fewer refugees and asylum seekers in 2020 than would have been expected without COVID (UNHCR 2021b). In the same year, the number of asylum applications fell by about a third in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries but rebounded quickly in 2021 (OECD 2021, 2022). The latest trend suggests that the growth in refugee populations during the pandemic was largely a continuation of a preexisting secular trend; for example, the crises that prompted large-scale displacement in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia were largely driven by causes not connected to COVID. As before the pandemic, fragility, conflict, and violence remain the leading causes of forced displacement (Corral et al. 2020).[2]

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1   See UNHCR, "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/.
2   This intersects with displacement due to disasters and adverse effects of climate change (UNHCR 2021b); indeed, before the pandemic there were 5.1 million internally displaced persons as a result of environmental disasters in the world (IDMC 2020).

Figure 1.1 Stock of Forcibly Displaced Populations 2000–22

Note: "Others INIP" denotes others in need of international protection (INIP), comprised mostly of Venezuelans Displaced Abroad (VDA). Source: Authors' calculation from UNHCR Data Finder for refugees, asylum seekers and Others INIP; and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) for IDPs. UNHCR collects IDP data only for individuals who receive assistance and/or protection from the organization, whereas the IDMC offers a broader overview of internal displacement on a global scale. See UNHCR, "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/; and IDMC (2020, 2021, 2022).

Protracted displacement situations have also become increasingly common. The number of protracted refugee situations—defined as populations that have been displaced abroad for more than five consecutive years—has been stable, following little growth during the pandemic. About 15.9 million people, or 74 percent of the global refugee population, found themselves in long-lasting situations by the end of 2021 (UNHCR 2022f).

Displaced populations are concentrated in countries with low levels of development. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, by the end of 2019, 43 percent of FDPs were hosted in low-income countries (LICs), and about half were in middle-income countries (MICs). Similarly, more than three in five IDPs were in LICs, and very few were in high-income countries. About 82 percent of refugees (including asylum seekers and VDAs) lived in low- or middle-income countries (LMICs). As of 2019, 10 countries accounted for just 0.7 percent of global GDP, but they hosted one-third of the global displaced population.[3] Nearly two in five FDPs are found in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR 2019a), the region with the highest poverty rate (World Bank 2022).

Many of these major hosting countries were struggling with low growth, high debt, and other development challenges, making them ill-prepared to extend support to displaced populations as they were buffeted by compounding global shocks. Growth in some countries was slowing or regressing even before the pandemic: GDP per capita increased in real terms between 2010 and 2019 in only about a quarter of the 30 largest hosting countries. In Chad, for example, GDP per capita in 2010 declined from US$728 in 2010 to US$653 in 2019 (constant 2015 US$). GDP growth cratered in 2020 in these and other countries, in line with global trends; for example, GDP contracted by 9 percent in Iraq and by around 8 percent in Ecuador and Mexico. Yet the growth rate in Ethiopia, for example, fell only slightly from 8.4 percent in 2019 to 6.1 percent in 2020.[4] Government debt stock as a share of GDP rose significantly between 2010 and 2019, rising by over 50 percent in countries, such as Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burkina Faso, and Chad. This was broadly in line with regional and global trends and was followed by a global debt increase of around 8.6 percentage points in 2020.[5] The fiscal balance for developing economies similarly deteriorated, declining by an average of 2.8 percent per year in the 2010–19 period and dropping further

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3   UNHCR, "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/; World Bank, "Macro Poverty Outlook," https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook.

4   World Bank, "World Development Indicators," https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators.

5   World Bank, "Macro Poverty Outlook," https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook.

by 8.1 percent in 2020. This strongly implies that countries had little buffer against negative shocks heading into the pandemic.

The devastating impacts of the pandemic precipitated the need for wide-spread collection of socioeconomic data on the displaced. Significant data gaps on this population remain, but taken together, these data collection efforts were unprecedented in their scale and so form the basis of this report. This endeavor started out as a series of country-level efforts, a large number of which were supported by the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center (JDC) on Forced Displacement. The newly harmonized database developed for this report consists of phone surveys fielded in 14 countries during the roughly two-year period of the COVID-19 pandemic, from March 2020 through December 2021. The resulting database of contemporaneous host and displaced populations offers unique insights into the welfare of a large number of FDPs relative to nondisplaced populations and complements other recent efforts to build representative, harmonized surveys from LMICs. For example, a series of briefs by the World Bank (2023a, 2023b, 2023c) presents findings from harmonized surveys fielded from 2015-20 and covers representative samples of displaced and host populations in 10 countries.

The new database is a rich source of information in a context where there has been little coordinated research on how systemic shocks differentially affect forcibly displaced and host populations. Analysis using this harmonized data allows for robust comparisons across countries that could help identify systemic challenges. Conversely, such data can also help illustrate where there is heterogeneity in experiences and identify outliers that can be probed to understand important deviations from observed trends. Because it affected most countries at roughly the same time and in broadly similar ways, the global economic shock associated with COVID—including local restrictions on movement and global hikes in food and commodity prices—provides an opportunity to better understand how FDPs and their hosts are affected by the complex dynamics of systemic shocks. Previous analysis of earlier rounds of unharmonized phone survey data from eight countries had illustrated how the socioeconomic well-being of many FDPs and host populations deteriorated during the first year of the pandemic (Tanner et al. 2021).

Figure 1.2 Share of FDPs by host country income group, 2019

Share of all FDPs in host countries by income classification, in 2019

Share of IDPs in host countries by income classification, in 2019

Share of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Venezuelans displaced abroad in host countries by income classification, in 2019

- ■ High income hosting 2019
- ■ Lower-middle income host countries 2019
- ■ Upper-middle income host countries 2019
- ■ Low-income host countries 2019

Source: Staff illustration using "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/.

This report makes several contributions to the literature on the welfare of FDPs and their hosts. On the data front, the harmonized database compiled for this report represents a large and unique source of information on the welfare of both hosts and FDPs during the period of an unprecedented pandemic. The data span 14 countries from different regions, populations of concern (IDPs, refugees, hosts), and accommodation types (in camps, out of camps).

Over a fifth of the global population displaced before the start of the pandemic is represented in this database, allowing for direct comparison and aggregation of results across countries and subgroups.

Compared to previous studies, the analysis has been deepened to provide a more holistic view of welfare among the displaced during the pandemic. The results from most country-level High-Frequency Phone Surveys (HFPS) were often intended to provide a quick snapshot of the pandemic's welfare impact in a single country. This report extends that existing analysis by providing a more comprehensive view of how welfare evolved during COVID for both hosts and displaced populations in countries across the globe, and thus contributes to a long literature on the general welfare impacts of the pandemic (see Brunckhorst, Cojocaru, and Kim, forthcoming, for a summary). It also serves as a complement to a recently published World Bank report that analyzes global welfare during the COVID-19 pandemic (Brunckhorst et al. 2023) by lending a displacement lens to the analysis. The labor market analysis, for example, has been deepened to consider outcomes beyond job losses, such as the extent of job changes (similar to Brunckhorst et al. 2023 for nondisplaced populations).

The report also brings a policy lens to the analysis. By examining the role of existing labor market and education policies in the hosting country using newly available information from a cross-country, up-to-date policy database, the data yield important insights. In addition, the report examines aid financing trends using disbursement-level data from OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and a labor-intensive keyword search approach to tease out disbursements that are intended for displaced populations.

The rest of the report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this exercise, including the samples, the harmonization process, and the resulting database. Section 3 presents the key results on the welfare impact of the forcibly displaced and their hosts during the pandemic and ensuing crises. Where relevant and possible, the results are linked to preexisting sectoral polices that were in place in hosting countries before the pandemic. Section 4 discusses the recent trend in official development assistance (ODA) intended for displaced populations. The report concludes with a discussion of the results and a set of forward-looking policy recommendations, focusing on inclusive social policies and sustainable financing aimed at promoting self-reliance among the displaced, and on lessons learned for data collection and harmonization following this unprecedented endeavor.

Microdata and Methodology

*Four-year-old poses with her parents in Plain
Savo, Democratic Republic of Congo.
© UNHCR/Hélène Caux, March 2022*

2.1 High-Frequency Phone Surveys during COVID-19

Data allowing for comparisons between host and displaced populations are scarce. Displaced people living outside of camps are rarely identified in questionnaires or picked up in sufficient numbers to generate reliable subgroup statistics. Camps for displaced populations are frequently overlooked in sampling strategies for national household surveys. Although humanitarian and development agencies have made great strides, the statistical inclusion agenda necessitates identifying vulnerabilities and addressing the humanitarian and development challenges of marginalized communities. Including displaced populations in data collection is essential to accurately understanding welfare; not doing so may lead to significant underestimation of population needs.[6] Even so, accurately estimating welfare for displaced populations comes with significant methodological challenges.

The extent and length of the pandemic increased need for regular and timely data to assess the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19, especially on vulnerable groups such as FDPs, who remain largely unaccounted for in household surveys. Indeed, despite the considerable number of forcefully displaced worldwide, the collection of good quality microdata on this particular population remained limited (Dang and Verme 2022). This prompted a call for action from the World Bank-UNHCR JDC in its working paper opportunely entitled, *Highly Vulnerable Yet Largely Invisible: Forcibly Displaced in the COVID-19-Induced Recession* (Vishwanath, Alik-Lagrange, and Aghabarari 2020).

During the COVID-19 crisis, HFPS approaches helped overcome the challenges of face-to-face surveys that were suspended by restrictions enforced to mitigate the spread of the virus. HFPS had a nascent but strong track record of being deployed in remote or risky areas, and with the rapid acceleration of digital adoption in developing countries, technological innovations in survey administration have emerged in the past decade that have facilitated these alternative techniques. In particular, "with the availability of inexpensive phone handsets and rapidly growing network coverage in many developing countries, the mobile phone has attracted much of the attention as a new tool for collecting high-frequency and, oftentimes, low-cost survey data" (Dabalen et al. 2016).

A series of HFPS initiatives were implemented beginning in April 2020 in several developing countries. These were mainly led by the World Bank, in collaboration with other key stakeholders, and aimed to capture the socioeconomic welfare of national populations during the pandemic. In some of these countries, the surveys were extended to include FDPs. These FDP-related efforts were mainly led by the World Bank and UNHCR, often with support of the JDC.

The team applied a series of selection criteria when considering datasets to include in this report. Eligible datasets included phone surveys[7] that were carried out by the World Bank or others during the pandemic from April 2020 through December 2021 and that included representative,[8] contemporaneous[9] data on host[10] and displaced populations (refugees[11] or IDPs) in LMICs. To mitigate sampling and selection biases, the data

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6   For example, current global poverty counts are often based on the assumption that the distribution of welfare among displaced people living in camps is equal to that of the rest of the country in which they reside in (Corral et al. 2020). Because FDPs are likely to have higher poverty rates, this assumption may underestimate poverty (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019). Studies conducted in Iraq, Peru, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda suggest that FDPs have roughly 25 percent lower welfare than the nondisplaced host population in the country (Sharma and Wai-Poi 2019; Pape and Parisotto 2019; Pape and Wollburg 2019; World Bank 2019b). Corral et al. (2020) estimate that the tendency of displaced people to be poorer than nondisplaced populations could raise the global poverty count by 33 million people.

7   Note that Jordan fielded both phone and face-to-face interviews simultaneously in select rounds of data collection to facilitate testing for modality effects.

8   The surveys used a robust probability sampling approach with a clear sample frame for the relevant population. Sample sizes must be sufficiently large to allow for statistical testing of differences between host and displaced populations at reasonable levels of discriminant validity.

9   Surveys needed to have at least one wave of a comparable phone survey of the host population and FDPs fielded in the same or adjacent months.

10   Reflecting the lack of international agreement on the definition of the term, "Host population" is used somewhat loosely here to mean the nondisplaced national population or the sub-populations that live within the administrative region of the country as the displaced group, as in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, for example. See Table 2.3 for details for each country.

11   When referring to the survey data or results derived therefrom, "refugees" refers collectively to the population of refugees, asylum seekers, and Venezuelans Displaced Abroad (VDA) appropriate to each country's context and sampling strategy.

were required to include sampling weights, or sufficient documentation to reconstruct sampling weights to make the data as representative as possible of the general host and the displaced populations. Finally, questionnaires were assessed to see which were sufficiently close to the World Bank's core HFPS questionnaire to allow the data to be harmonized.

The resulting survey catalogue represents a large source of information on the welfare of both host and displaced populations in developing countries during the pandemic. It harmonized data across different regions, populations of concern (IDPs, refugees, hosts), and their accommodation type (in camps, out of camps)[12] where available. These data still had shortcomings – often through incomplete frames wherein not all geographic areas were sampled, for example. But they were deemed sufficiently rigorous to be instructive on the contours of socioeconomic welfare to provide credible grounds for policy recommendations.

The 14 countries emerging from this process cover nearly all world regions and a large share of the global displaced population. Together, these 14 countries hosted more than 25 percent of the 79 million people that had been forcibly displaced before the start of the pandemic[13], and 13 are among the 30 LMICs with the largest counts or shares (or both) of FDPs in the world[14] (see Figures A2.1a and A2.1b in Annex 2).[15] These countries also run the full range of accommodation arrangements, from those that have no or very few UNHCR camps or settlements, as in Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ecuador, and Mexico, to Burkina Faso and Djibouti, where nearly half are in camps, to Bangladesh, Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda, where nearly all displaced persons are in camps or settlements (see Table 2.1).

Country Abbreviations	
BFA	Burkina Faso
BGD	Bangladesh
CRI	Costa Rica
DJI	Djibouti
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECU	Ecuador
ETH	Ethiopia
IRQ	Iraq
JOR	Jordan
KEN	Kenya
MEX	Mexico
SOM	Somalia
TCD	Chad
UGA	Uganda

The data cover most major displacement events from the decade preceding the pandemic. Fragility in the Sahel is represented by Burkina Faso and Chad. Displacement from conflict in the Levant is represented by Iraq and Jordan. The Rohingya crisis is covered by Bangladesh. Displacement from Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba is shown in surveys from Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Mexico. Violence in East Africa is reflected in data from IDPs in Somalia and refugees fleeing to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. And the simmering conflict in Central Africa is evident in data from the DRC on two displacement groups: refugees and IDPs. Together this collection of surveys covers refugees in 12 countries and IDPs in four and includes data on camp status in seven countries, as seen in Table 2.2.[16]

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12   "Camps" refers generally to formal or informal camps, settlements, or in the case of Djibouti, "refugee villages."
13   "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/ Because some surveys only measure IDPs or refugees even if a country has both, this set of surveys represents about 20% all FDP populations.
14   The exception is Mexico, which hosts the 32nd highest number of FDPs at 443,000 and is the 53rd highest as a share of the national population (0.4 percent).
15   "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/; and "Macro Poverty Outlook," https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/macro-poverty-outlook.
16   The last column in Table 2.2, labeled "Camp/Non-Camp Data," indicates only the countries where information on in-camp or out-of-camp status of displaced populations was collected in the HFPS data. A missing mark could indicate that there are no camps in the country (as is the case in Latin America, including Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico, see Table 2.1), information on accommodation type is not being collected, or the sample is being restricted to either only camped or non-camped populations. For example, nearly all refugees live in camps in Chad, whereas no camps exist for refugees in Uganda. In some analyses, the sample size of those in camps may not be large enough to generate reliable statistics (typically with a sample size <30).

Table 2.1 Accommodation in Camps

Country	Total IDPs or Refugees (2019)	Share Living in Camps and Settlements (2021)
BFA (IDPs)	560,000	52%
BGD (refugees)	854,813	100%
CRI (refugees)	114,186	0%
DJI (refugees)	30,792	50%
DRC (IDPs)	5,512,000	5%
DRC (refugees)	526,925	25%
ECU (refugees)	503,607	0%
ETH (refugees)	734,800	91%
IRQ (IDPs)	1,555,000	15%
IRQ (refugees)	286,924	36%
JOR (refugees)	744,951	17%
KEN (refugees)	489,728	84%
MEX (refugees)	150,950	0%
SOM (IDPs)	2,648,000	41%
TCD (refugees)	446,426	86%
UGA (refugees)	1,381,116	99%

Sources: Staff calculation based on CONASUR and UNHCR (2021); OCHA (2021); UNHCR and CNR (2021); CCCM Cluster Somalia (2021); Uganda (2021); UNHCR and Bangladesh (2021); UNHCR (2021a, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e, 2021f); CCCM, REACH, and UNHCR (2021); and "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/.

Table 2.2 Available Samples in the Harmonized Data

Country	Host	Refugees	IDPs	Camp/Non-Camp Data
Bangladesh	X	X		
Burkina Faso	X		X	X
Chad	X	X		X
Congo, Dem. Rep.	X	X	X	
Costa Rica	X	X		
Djibouti	X	X		X
Ecuador	X	X		
Ethiopia	X	X		X
Iraq	X	X	X	X
Jordan	X	X		X
Kenya	X	X		X
Mexico	X	X		
Somalia	X		X	
Uganda	X	X		

Source: Staff illustration based on the harmonized HFPS database.

2.2 Phone Survey Sampling Strategies among Displaced Populations

The representativeness of the HFPS data is determined by the availability of a comprehensive sampling frame. This list (or other device) can be linked to contact information for the universe of households from which a sample is to be drawn.

Sampling strategies are adapted to the context, population, and availability of a frame. Three primary approaches dominate the 22 different sampling strategies of the 30 population groups used in this report. Table 2.3 briefly describes the survey samples for the phone surveys of the 14 countries harmonized in this endeavor, and more detailed descriptions are available in the country tables in Annex 1. Sampling based on Random Digit Dialing (RDD) was used in six instances, sampling frames based on preexisting surveys were leveraged in nine cases, and registration and population administrative databases were employed in 13 others.[17] Some surveys employed multiple sampling frames or approaches, as described in the examples of Kenya and Bangladesh in Box 2.1.

UNHCR's Profile Global Registration System (ProGres) database can be a powerful resource in sampling displaced populations in contexts where it is current and complete. ProGres is UNHCR's main repository for storing data on individuals who are persons of concern (PoCs), including refugees and IDPs in UNHCR field operations. It is now a key instrument for the delivery and tracking of protection and assistance services to PoCs around the world. Coverage of FDP types in ProGres varies by context. Verification exercises are carried out periodically to update the information in each country-specific registration database—a necessary process for populations as dynamic as FDPs. Importantly, ProGres includes phone numbers and basic demographic characteristics that can be used to sample and contact displaced populations. The database was used in several contexts, either directly by UNHCR or through data-sharing agreements with the World Bank, depending on which institution led the HFPS data collection exercise on the displaced sample.

Preexisting samples can be useful in constructing high-frequency phone panels of displaced and host populations. Bangladesh, Chad, and Djibouti were the only countries where refugees had already been integrated into previous surveys, and only in Chad were refugees included in a national household survey. That lack of inclusion in standard national household surveys undermines the principles of statistical inclusion and severely limits the ability to do rapid, representative survey work when sudden needs arise or to perform longitudinal analyses in tracking representative cohorts over time (World Bank 2023d).

Box 2.1 Use of Multiple Sampling Frames in Kenya and Bangladesh

The rapid response phone survey (RRPS) sample in Kenya aimed to be representative of refugees and stateless people registered by UNHCR by leveraging the most recent data available for each of five strata—Kakuma refugee camp, Kalobeyei settlement, Dadaab refugee camp, urban refugees, and Shona stateless people. For refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, as well as for stateless people, recently conducted socioeconomic surveys (SES) were used as sampling frames. Because no recent survey existed for urban or Dadaab refugees, those sampling strata were based on ProGres records.

The HFPS in Bangladesh used phone numbers for Rohingya refugees and host populations living in the Cox's Bazar district collected in the 2019 Cox's Bazar Panel Survey (CBPS) baseline. However, that survey used multiple frames to generate the sample. The CBPS baseline used satellite imagery, combined with the 2011 Bangladesh census, to draw the host sample and used round 12 of the International Organization for Migration's Needs and Population Monitoring (NPM) site assessment implemented from August to October 2019 to sample Rohingya refugees.[19]

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17   Detailed discussion of these and other approaches can be found in Himelein et al. (2020).
18   "IOM Bangladesh – Needs and Population Monitoring NPM," https://data.world/iom/1b88bca6-2d7c-423e-97d7-17160d056e9a.

Table 2.3 HFPS Design for Displaced and Host Samples

Country	Lead Institution for Data Collection	Population	Geographical Coverage	Sample Size (First Round of Analysis)	Sampling Frame
Bangladesh	World Bank	Host	Cox's Bazar district & Bandarban district (partial)	1,816	Cox's Bazar Panel Survey baseline (2019)[b]
		Refugees	Camped refugees in Cox's Bazar	1,358	
Burkina Faso	NSO, World Bank	Host	National	1,998	2018/19 EHCVM[b]
		IDPs	9 of 12 regions	1,146	CONASUR database[a]
Chad	NSO, World Bank	Host	National	1,609	2018/19 ECOSIT4[b]
		Refugees	10 regions	919	2018/19 RHCH[b]
Costa Rica	World Bank	Host	National	802	phone list / RDD[c]
	UNHCR	Refugees	National	1,163	UNHCR ProGres[a]
Democratic Republic of Congo	World Bank	Host	Eastern DRC (Beni, Bunia, Goma, Lubero, and Komanda)	1,252	SPJ-FSRDC registry[a]
		Refugee		126	SPJ-FSRDC registry[a]
		IDP		1,087	SPJ-FSRDC registry[a]
Djibouti	NSO, World Bank	Host	Urban areas	1,375	2017 National social registry[a]
		Refugees	Djibouti-city and 3 refugee villages	564	2019 Refugee survey[b]
Ecuador	World Bank	Nationals	National	958	phone number range / RDD[c]
	World Bank	VDAs	National	269	phones with Venezuelan contact[d]
Ethiopia	NSO, World Bank	Host	National	2,753	2018/19 ESS[b]
		Refugees	Addis Ababa, Sub-office Jijiga, Sub-office Shire	1,676	ARRA/UNHCR registration database[a]
Iraq	World Bank	Host	National	1,623	2018 MICS[b]
	World Bank	IDPs	Kurdistan and Northern region (covering approx. 85% of IDPs in Iraq)	728	Phone numbers from MNOs[c,d]
	UNHCR	Refugee	National	1,602	UNHCR ProGres[a]
Jordan	World Bank	Host	National	732	National Unified registry[a]
	World Bank	Refugees	Syrians in Jordan registered with UNHCR	813	UNHCR ProGres[a]
Kenya	World Bank	Host	National	4,060	2015/16 KIHBS[a], RDD[c]
	UNHCR	Refugees	Urban refugees, Shona stateless and camps (Kakuma, Kalobeyei, Dadaab)	1,159	SES[b], UNHCR ProGres[a]
Mexico	UNHCR	Host	National; regions of settlement of 4 primary PoC groups	1,142	RDD[c]
	UNHCR	Refugees		1,220	UNHCR ProGres[a]
Somalia	World Bank	Host	National	2,063	RDD[c]
		IDPs	National	718	RDD[c]
Uganda	World Bank	Host	National	2,135	2019/20 UNPS[b]
	UNHCR	Refugees	Kampala, South-West and West-Nile	2,010	2018 UBOS survey[b] & UNHCR database[a]

Note: For all surveys, the observation unit is the household. "NSO" indicates involvement of the National Statistical Office. Sampling Frame types: a—registry, b—preexisting survey, c—random digit dial, and d—phone list from mobile network operator. ARRA: Ethiopia Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs; CONASUR: Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (database regularly updated); ECOSIT: Enquête sur la Consommation des Ménages et le Secteur Informel au Tchad; EHCVM: Enquete Harmonisée sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages; ESS: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey; IOM NPM12: International Organization for Migration, Needs and Population Monitoring Round 12 data; KIHBS: Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey; MICS: Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys; MNOs: Mobile Network Operators; RHCH: Refugees and Host Communities Household Survey in Chad; SES: Socio Economic Survey; UBOS: Uganda Bureau of Statistics; UNFPA PESS: United Nations Population Fund Population Estimation Survey of Somalia; and UNPS: Uganda National Panel Survey.

2.3 Biases

Despite best efforts, biases may affect any sample, as some parts of the true distribution are over or under-represented. As described in Tanner (2021), phone surveys among displaced populations can be particularly challenging. However, bias can be significantly reduced by being aware of its potential sources and acting to mitigate them through ex ante design and ex post reweighting strategies to bring the sampled data as close to a distribution of the true population distribution as possible.

Frame bias

All phone surveys are susceptible to some common elements of frame bias. Frames for phone surveys are only representative insofar as functional phone access is distributed uniquely and uniformly across the population and screening instruments can accurately identify targeted subpopulations.[19] Typically, households with no phones are more likely to be poorer and located in remote areas, which could severely affect the representativeness of HFPSs.[20] Insofar as displaced populations are more likely to be poorer or have less discretionary space in household budgets, they are less likely to have access to a mobile phone. Consequently, analysis of phone survey data could overestimate the welfare of displaced populations relative to nondisplaced populations such that the actual disparity between host and displaced populations may be larger than what is reported in these data.

Registration databases, previous surveys, censuses, and other list-based frames may be outdated or susceptible to self-selection. If they have not been recently refreshed or validated, these frames may miss households that have only recently entered the population, may lack accurate contact information, or may list outdated household characteristics that would be used to formulate sampling clusters or strata (e.g., dwelling location, household size, education levels, or marital status). Households may also have differential incentives to register themselves depending on the perceived purposes of the registration database and the perceived barriers to registration.

RDD approaches are not immune to bias. Even if all households do have phones, households with phone numbers that fall outside of the numerical range or lists used in RDD algorithms do not have a chance of being selected, creating a bias that may be difficult to sign. This can happen with a foreign country code or prefix of a displaced persons phone number, for example. Similarly, in RDD cases where phone lists are used, minority subgroups of the population may not be on the list. Though not necessarily a bias, it is also worth noting that RDDs can be inefficient if the size of a target subpopulation is small relative to the size of the full population in the frame. For this reason, RDD is often not applied unless the target subgroup is a sizable share of the overall population; for example, this is why RDD is feasible in Somalia, where 17.5 percent of the population is estimated to be internally displaced—one of the highest IDP rates in the world.

Modality bias

Conducting interviews through a phone modality offers the enumerator limited control over respondents' environment and level of focus during the surveys, which may affect data quality. However, studies of nondisplaced populations have shown that there is little difference between answers given through phone surveys and in-person interviews (Ballivian et al. 2013; Garlick, Orkin, and Quinn 2015). Emerging HFPS results from the data used in this report on refugees and hosts in Jordan, for example, suggest that phone surveys and face-to-face surveys generate similar responses for most topics, but that refugee respondents are less likely to acknowledge personally sensitive challenges, such as mental health and depression, when answering by phone than when answering in person (Rodriguez and Smith, forthcoming).

The volume and complexity of information that can be retrieved over the phone tend to be rather limited compared to the quantity and depths of

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19   Shared phone numbers, households or individuals with multiple phone numbers, uneven phone ownership, unequal network coverage or network, mobile throttling, unreliable electrification, phone time rationing, and so forth, can all contribute to violating the central assumption in the sampling frame that all respondents have a known and nonzero probability of being successfully contacted. The "coverage gap" remains significant in Africa, where, despite a 21 percent increase in 4G coverage since 2020, 18 percent of the population remains without any access to a mobile broadband network (ITU 2021). The continent is also lagging behind in terms of 4G network coverage, and 30 percent of the rural population has no access to the internet.
20   Face-to-Face approaches can help where possible. See Dabalen et al. (2016).

topics surveyed face to face because of time restrictions. Ten to 15 minutes is usually the upper bound of good practice for phone survey length. Even so, various approaches can be used to retain an appropriate balance between data richness (breadth and depth) and data quality. For example, questionnaires may rotate modules between waves such that topics that are subject to change over time (e.g., employment or school attendance) may be kept across waves of phone surveys, but topics unlikely to see frequent change (such as demographic characteristics of the respondent or household) may be rotated out (Tanner 2021).[21]

Non-response and attrition rates of HFPS

As with all data collection approaches, phone surveys encounter difficulties with non-contact, non-response, and attrition; these are particularly challenging among displaced populations. Households may not be successfully contacted because phone numbers may not work or respondents may not be in range or pick up because they do not recognize the caller or because they are rationing minutes. Similarly, households may not be successfully interviewed because of refusals, disconnections, or hang-ups mid-interview. Moreover, there are generally higher non-response and attrition rates among those experiencing displacement. This observed phenomenon could be due to several reasons: their frequent need to move, resulting in imperfect or outdated sampling frames; their limited access to cell phone ownership and rationed use associated with poverty; and their settlement in remote areas with limited network coverage (Tiberti et al. 2021; Malaeb et al. 2021; World Bank 2020b, 2020d, 2021a, 2021b`). To reduce non-contact and non-response, teams in several countries (e.g., Djibouti, Uganda) sent a text message to mobile phones to determine if the number was still functioning and to alert respondents that they would be receiving a call with a survey. In some instances, top-ups are used to offset time used in the survey and provide a (small) incentive to participate.

Surveys often employed oversampling strategies in the first round to ensure that the desirable size of the representative sample estimated through power calculation was reached. In expectation of non-response and attrition, surveys often drew larger samples than power calculations indicated would be needed, and then put in place recontact protocols to maximize the likelihood of retaining respondents. Expecting challenges when contacting displaced respondents, at least five (Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Uganda) out of the 14 country surveys oversampled in the initial survey round.

Ex post bias correction

After collection, data can be treated to mitigate some of the bias from incomplete frames, non-response or attrition to make the distribution of observed characteristics as similar as possible in the sample and true population. The post-survey weighting strategies used in the 14 countries to correct for bias include propensity score matching or inverse probability weighting and cell weighting. In Himelein's (2014) ex post weighting approach, a propensity score model is estimated using a logit regression of household characteristics on the respondent's likelihood of having completed the interview in the previous wave. Attrition adjustment factors are derived from the propensity scores and applied to the initial propensity score matching weights. A trimming and imputation procedure is then applied to the right tail of the distribution before proceeding to a final post-stratification adjustment to get the final balanced panel weights. Ambel, McGee, and Tsegay (2021) have shown that reweighting techniques can reduce overall sample bias in HFPS but do not fully eliminate them.[22]

2.4 Harmonization of the HFPS Data

Survey instruments and questionnaires

The first data policy recommendation in the *World Development Report 2023* for migrants and refugees is to harmonize data and data

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21   Though not used in the HFPS here, a random module assignment paired with imputation methods can also be considered.
22   For example, the scope for correction is more limited when RDD or list-based sampling frames are used because there are few (or no) known characteristics about households that were not part of those frames, or about households that were selected but did not respond (Himelein et al. 2020; Brubaker, Kilic, and Wollburg 2021)

collection methodologies from across contexts. The work in harmonizing data from across these 14 countries highlights the value of following that recommendation. The data collected in the HFPSs covered several topics. The core baseline questionnaire was designed by the World Bank's Poverty and Equity Global Practice to facilitate international comparison (see Table A2.1 in Annex 2 for the list of modules covered in the core questionnaire and brief descriptions).

Country teams often adapted the questionnaire to accommodate the needs and contextual differences in each country. Such modifications were made regarding the inclusion of modules and questions, the wording of questions, recall period, or changes to response options. The resulting heterogeneity in survey instruments created challenges in comparing data from one context to another, requiring that the data be harmonized to facilitate aggregation, where possible. Not all countries that included samples of displaced populations incorporated all modules or items from the core questionnaire that allowed harmonization. This report presents results from the harmonized database for select modules and items from these core modules—specifically examining employment, income, assistance and coping mechanisms, food security, and education.

Harmonization process

The harmonization of the datasets from these 14 countries was conducted according to a global dictionary developed by the World Bank.[23] The same harmonization procedure was applied to UNHCR surveys. For each topic of interest, relevant questions were screened for consistency with the Bank questionnaire, and responses were adjusted as needed to facilitate direct comparison. Some flexibility in the wording of the question was deemed acceptable. The number of rounds,

as well as the duration of and interval between rounds, varied from country to country as shown in Table 2.4 below. Most of the original datasets are available for public use on the microdata libraries of the World Bank and UNCHR.[24] Most results of this data harmonization exercise from displaced populations can be found on the World Bank's COVID-19 dashboard.[25]

Challenges addressed by harmonization and analysis

Most of the challenges encountered in harmonizing this large number of sample populations and periods are not new. First, not all country surveys harmonized in this exercise were explicitly based on the World Bank's core questionnaire or were originally designed as part of the Bank's COVID-19 monitoring effort. Even so, surveys administered by UNHCR to displaced populations in Mexico, Costa Rica, Uganda, and Kenya used the Bank's COVID-19 core questionnaire and were designed to be identical to the questionnaires administered by the Bank to the national samples in these countries. However, the surveys in Cox's Bazar Bangladesh, in the Eastern DRC, among Iraqi refugees, and in Somalia were developed as part of separate efforts and used distinct survey instruments. Nonetheless, some specific items from those questionnaires were sufficiently similar to the Bank's HFPS instruments that their data could be harmonized and included.

Second, customization led to variation in the list of modules and in the specific variables included in each module across countries and within countries over time. As a result, although there are 14 countries with surveys considered for this report, coverage of modules and outcomes varies substantially. Differences in survey item recall periods can create challenges. For example, in order to better balance coverage and comparability, and considering the importance of both, a decision was made to consider comparable food security—

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23   An overview of the global initiative, questionnaire template, and other documents is available at World Bank, "Household Monitoring Systems to Track the Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic," https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/high-frequency-monitoring-surveys.
The data dictionary and other resources for the Harmonized COVID-19 Household Monitoring Surveys can be found at https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/int/search/dataset/0037769/harmonized-covid-19-household-monitoring-surveys
24   World Bank, "High-Frequency Phone Surveys," https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/hfps/?page=1&ps=15&repo=hfps; and UNHCR, https://microdata.unhcr.org/index.php/home.
25   World Bank, "COVID-19 Household Monitoring Dashboard," https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2020/11/11/covid-19-high-frequency-monitoring-dashboard.

Table 2.4 Timing of Phone Surveys

	2020									2021											
	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bangladesh	▨							▨					▨								
Burkina Faso													▨		▨	▨					
Chad											▨	▨									
Congo, Dem. Rep.																			▨	▨	
Costa Rica												▨				▨					
Djibouti									▨										▨		
Ecuador		▨	▨	▨	▨									▨							
Ethiopia							▨	▨													
Iraq							▨	▨	▨	▨											
Jordan																			▨		
Kenya		▨		▨			▨			▨			▨			▨					
Mexico											▨						▨				
Somalia			▨																		
Uganda								▨				▨									

Note: The survey months represent the month(s) during which the majority of the data collection was conducted.

related variables, regardless of the reference period.[26] Additionally, the different types of sampling frames, geographic coverage areas, and weighting methods used needed to be understood in order to make correct interpretations of the data and the analytical results.

Third, the timing and frequency of the survey rounds varied greatly. The number of rounds, and the duration and interval between rounds, varied from country to country as shown in Table 2.4 below. In some cases a survey module was only done once, preventing analysis of changes over time; in others, the survey was conducted multiple times but in successive months (e.g., Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Chad), and in still others, they were more spaced apart (e.g., Bangladesh, Costa Rica). Overall, coverage was lower in 2020 compared to 2021, when the majority of countries in the sample had at least one survey round. The pattern of survey coverage over time has implications for the analytical approaches, as discussed in Section 3.1.

Harmonization can limit the richness of the analysis that is otherwise feasible within countries. The harmonized database allows for direct and more accurate comparisons across the populations included in the sample but can only do so insofar as sufficiently similar data are collected within each country. Consequently, harmonized databases can lack the depth of any of the country datasets. Improved ex ante standardization can significantly help to increase the richness of harmonized data. For example, a module on income loss might ask additional questions on the source or relative magnitude of different income sources to provide a more detailed picture of income dynamics, but while those details would have been used in country-level reporting they were not implemented across enough countries to include them in the harmonized analysis.

With few exceptions, the displaced respondents in these 14 countries were, on average, slightly younger, less educated, and more likely to be male than their host counterparts. However, there were no systematic differences in household size across countries. Of course, there are country-level exceptions to these trends. For example, education levels among adults tended to be higher

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26   The reference period for food security questions was typically either seven days or 30 days. The original harmonized database considers questions of different reference periods as strictly different variables. Surveys conducted in the same country used the same recall period for all waves and populations.

for host populations nearly everywhere except in Ecuador, where Venezuelans were on average better educated than their hosts.[27] Similarly, household sizes for IDPs are significantly larger than nondisplaced households in Burkina Faso, yet internally displaced and host populations in Somalia are virtually identical.

The study is still limited in several important ways. First, the data do not allow for a robust identification strategy to assert the causal link between the interaction of the pandemic with displacement status on observed outcomes. Second, although baseline data is available in some cases, comparison

of observed outcomes to the prepandemic or pre-displacement/pre-arrival periods limits socioeconomic interpretation of the results. Similarly, irregular timing of the frequency and number of survey rounds during the pandemic limits the use of more sophisticated econometric techniques. And third, data on some important aspects of welfare like nominal consumption, mental health, learning, and early childhood development were not collected (or were not collected in sufficient countries to allow for more robust interpretation). Even so, the data from these surveys usefully describe the contours of the relative welfare of displaced and nondisplaced populations during the pandemic.

Table 2.5 Descriptive Statistics for Harmonized Survey Data Respondents

Country	Sub-Population	Average Household Size	Male	Age	Age > 25	No Education	Primary Education	Secondary Education	Tertiary Education
Bangladesh	Refugee	5.42	0.47	37.03	0.81				
	National	5.27	0.50	35.73	0.80				
Burkina Faso	IDP	13.55	0.65	45.99	0.95	0.88	0.07	0.05	0.00
	National	7.06	0.80	45.95	0.96	0.73	0.12	0.11	0.04
Chad	Refugee	6.14	0.48	42.60	0.92				
	National	6.63	0.82	40.73	0.92				
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Refugee	7.18	0.43	32.99	0.77	0.12	0.25	0.56	0.07
	IDP	7.66	0.50	32.74	0.79	0.07	0.25	0.60	0.08
	Returnee	7.57	0.57	32.60	0.76	0.05	0.23	0.63	0.09
	National	7.28	0.53	31.91	0.76	0.03	0.13	0.64	0.21
Costa Rica	Refugee	5.79	0.49		0.88	0.18	0.28	0.54	0.00
	National	3.56	0.43	42.49	0.87	0.02	0.34	0.40	0.24
Djibouti	Refugee	4.32	0.49	37.64	0.90				
	National	6.22	0.48	42.95	0.88				
Ecuador	Refugee	4.45	0.60	39.88	0.96	0.00	0.02	0.52	0.46
	National	4.23	0.44	41.72	0.87	0.00	0.30	0.47	0.23
Ethiopia	Refugee	2.66	0.49	28.69	0.57	0.13	0.28	0.53	0.06
	National	5.14	0.73	38.77	0.89	0.50	0.19	0.20	0.11
Iraq	Refugee	3.90	0.35		0.85				
	IDP	6.50	0.82	36.40	0.84	0.25	0.51	0.11	0.13
	Returnee	6.81	0.88	39.55	0.94	0.21	0.60	0.10	0.09
	National	6.40	0.61	37.52	0.90	0.05	0.25	0.22	0.48

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27   See, for example, UNHCR Ecuador Monthly Update July—August 2022, which reports that about 23 percent of Venezuelans are estimated to have a higher education degree (UNHCR 2022d). World Bank (2020a) also reports that Venezuelan refugees are typically well educated, with secondary education or above.

Table 2.5 Descriptive Statistics for Harmonized Survey Data Respondents (continued)

Country	Sub-Population	Average Household Size	Male	Age	Age > 25	No Education	Primary Education	Secondary Education	Tertiary Education
Jordan	Refugee	5.71	0.43	38.56	0.88	0.08	0.74	0.00	0.17
	National	8.14	0.44	43.60	0.96				
Kenya	Refugee	5.60	0.52	33.63	0.75	0.25	0.34	0.31	0.09
	National	4.13	0.50	35.06	0.80	0.10	0.32	0.38	0.20
Mexico	Refugee	5.38	0.55		0.78	0.05	0.39	0.46	0.10
	National	6.97	0.44		0.85	0.01	0.11	0.52	0.35
Somalia	IDP	6.08	0.49	35.20	0.81	0.47	0.29	0.12	0.12
	National	5.46	0.45	35.15	0.80	0.42	0.29	0.14	0.15
Uganda	Refugee	5.43	0.47	37.53	0.87	0.22	0.35	0.34	0.09
	National	5.05	0.51	42.58	0.93	0.14	0.54	0.28	0.04

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.

The Welfare of Displaced and Host Populations during the Pandemic

3.1 Pandemic Context

The impacts of COVID-19 were quite widespread and severe, starting in the early months (Egger et al. 2021; Bundervoet, Davalos, and Garcia 2021). The social and economic impacts evolved significantly over the duration of the pandemic; in fact, the impacts during the first few months after the onset in 2020 looked very different from those in, say, mid-2021 (Brunckhorst et al. 2023).

The policy response to the pandemic was unprecedented and included a number of measures that restricted population mobility over an extended period of time. These included, in particular, non-pharmaceutical responses, such as lockdowns and contact tracing. The countries studied in this report followed patterns similar to many others around the world, as shown in an analysis of Google mobility trends and policy stringency indicators[28] in 2020 and 2021 (Figure A2.2 in Annex 2). The trends suggest three different stages of the pandemic: the first period from April to June 2020, coinciding with lockdowns in most countries and an initial shock that led to sharp increases in policy stringencies and corresponding decreases in mobility; the second period from July to December 2020, which was associated with a gradual lifting of lockdowns and other containment measures, along with a gradual increase in mobility; and the third in 2021, which broadly represented a further relaxation of stringency measures and a return to prepandemic mobility patterns.

The analysis in this report is anchored on these three periods, which each define different stages of the pandemic. The final data coverage in the phone surveys for displaced populations was not sufficiently comprehensive to describe how changes in welfare outcomes evolved over time for all relevant population groups. Thus, a more careful approach was needed to present a cross-country narrative without compromising country-level heterogeneities. The presentation of results in this section follows a few principles. When there is sufficient coverage with data available in about half or more countries, cross-country aggregated trends are generally presented first. Those are compared with country-level trends to ensure that they broadly reflect the trend for the majority of cases and are not driven by compositional changes in the sample over time. Results from individual countries, rather than cross-country averages, are presented when the outcome of interest is available for only a small number of countries. In every instance, the focus is on understanding how hosts and displaced groups or different types of displaced groups (refugees compared to IDPs, in camp compared to out of camp) fared differently before and during the pandemic.

3.2 Employment

As economic activities contracted around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic led to unprecedented levels of labor market losses. The harmonized phone surveys made it possible to understand some important aspects of the labor market impacts during the pandemic, primarily those related to job losses that represent changes to employment in the extensive margin. Changes in the intensive margin, such as changes to hours or wages, were often not captured and are therefore

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28   Policy stringency indicators are estimated using data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), https://github.com/OxCGRT/covid-policy-tracker.

Figure 3.1 Share of Employed by Host and FDP Type, before and during the Pandemic (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Prepandemic refers to recall questions asking about the period immediately before the pandemic. Household sample weights are used within countries and each country is weighted equally. Confidence intervals, shown as vertical lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The countries included in the sample for each period are Bangladesh, Ecuador, Kenya, Somalia (Apr-June 2020); Bangladesh, Djibouti, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Uganda (Jul-Dec 2020); Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Ecuador, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, Somalia, Uganda (2021).

not included in the global harmonized database. A large number of workers were likely temporarily absent, but the surveys typically did not collect sufficiently detailed information to classify them as either employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. Given that the surveys were administered after the onset of the pandemic, changes in employment were measured using a retrospective question about labor market engagement immediately prior to the pandemic or the start of lockdowns.

Aggregate labor market dynamics suggest that the initial employment losses were slightly greater and the recovery slower among refugees compared to hosts. Employment levels fell sharply in the first three months of the pandemic, after which a gradual recovery began; however, the initial decline was steeper among refugees and their recovery was slower and remained incomplete as of late 2021, where data were available. In contrast, employment levels among hosts had recovered significantly by the second half of 2020. IDPs' employment patterns appeared to follow more closely those of hosts in the initial period, although the recovery appeared to be slower. Figure 3.1 shows aggregate patterns based on data from 12 countries, while country-level figures are presented in Figure A2.3 (Annex 2). The cross-country patterns are generally reflective of country-level trends, with a few exceptions: in the three Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico) and Somalia, the difference in

employment trends between hosts and FDPs was relatively minimal.

FDPs experienced disproportionately larger losses in the majority of countries, but this is not unexpected given their employment profile. Refugees and IDPs are much more likely to be working in informal, low-skilled jobs, often as day laborers or other types of irregular work. This means that they frequently lack de jure or de facto protections and were more likely to lose their jobs (Dempster et al. 2020; Vishwanath, Alik-Lagrange, and Aghabarari 2020). Moreover, because of legal restrictions, shorter time horizons, lack of access to financial markets, and socioemotional trauma, general labor market participation (as well as wages and working conditions) is often lower among displaced populations (Schuettler and Caron, 2020). A simple way to examine the differential labor market impact is by looking at work stoppage rates among hosts and FDPs, as shown in Figure A2.4 (Annex 2). Work stoppages are estimated as the share of respondents who were working before the pandemic but not at the time of the survey. Of note, both current employment levels and work stoppages are relevant to consider, because the latter are only estimated among those who had held a job before the pandemic, whereas there may have been new labor market entrants after the pandemic started who would be captured in current employment estimates.[29]

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29   Labor market entry rates (calculated among those who were not working before the pandemic) were estimated to be on the order of 10–15 percent in Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, and Uganda, for example.

Multiple structural and pandemic-related factors may explain the difference in employment levels across countries and population groups. The probability of work is lower among refugees even after controlling for basic respondent characteristics, including gender, age group, and household size. Figure 3.2 shows that the marginal effect of FDP type on probability of work during the pandemic was negative and statistically significant across the majority of countries (regression results are in Table A3.1a of Annex 3). Where that is not the case, the estimated coefficient is small and not statistically different from zero. Differences in structural economic conditions and the level of policy stringencies during the pandemic likely influenced employment outcomes across countries. These factors are captured using GDP per capita, annual GDP growth, and the Oxford policy stringency index. As expected, more stringent policies and a larger negative GDP shock were correlated with a higher probability of having stopped work during the pandemic, while the coefficient on the level of GDP is not statistically significant (Figure 3.3 and Table A3.2).

In addition, differences in refugees' access to labor rights in host countries are expected to explain some of the variation in access to job opportunities. For this analysis, the Developing World Refugee and Asylum Policy (DWRAP) dataset was used, which provides information on national policies toward displaced populations for 92 developing countries between 1952 and 2021.[30] The database quantifies and codifies the differences in de jure policies consistently across countries. The extent of the restrictions on refugees' legal work rights is constructed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the subcomponents that constitute access to employment in the DWRAP database. Specifically, they measure whether law or policy (1) guarantees the right to work; (2) guarantees the right to self-employment or to start a business; (3) guarantees the right to work in professional fields; (4) obligates individuals to hold

a work permit; and (5) places additional restrictions in terms of work, such as specifying the industries or locations they may work in.[31]

As expected, the findings suggest that more restrictive work rights are associated with lower levels of employment among refugees.[32] This result is based on a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that controls for basic individual and household characteristics, in addition to economic conditions (proxied using GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth) as well as policy stringency during the pandemic (Figure 3.4 and Table A3.2). Although this may not be a surprising result, the relationship between labor market policies for refugees and their employment outcomes across countries has rarely been investigated in an empirical manner. This may be partly due to the lack of comprehensive information on the laws and legislation that are relevant to FDPs across countries, although several recent efforts have helped to advance the understanding of this issue.[33] World Bank (2023c) also recently found that refugees in countries with more liberal refugee policies had higher employment rates.

Significant job transitioning took place among both host populations and FDPs, but there was more churning among the latter group. In a few countries, the phone surveys collected additional information on the sector of activity and employment type for both current and prepandemic jobs, which was used to estimate the share of workers who changed jobs.[34] Transition probabilities are estimated by comparing the sector and employment type of the prepandemic job and the latest job on record in 2021. Estimates show that a significant number of transitions took place across sectors and different employment types. Across employment types, the proportion of wage earners saw a large relative decline, as only 69 percent of hosts and 56 percent of FDPs maintained wage employment during the pandemic, and the rest were pushed into self-employment or out of the labor force (Table 3.1).

30   The DRWAP database is particularly notable given its comprehensive geographic and temporal coverage as well as the broad set of policy dimensions that are recorded. See Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein (2021) for details.
31   A sixth subcomponent relates to taxes and quantifies whether the law or policy obligates individuals to pay taxes. Given the relevance for access to work itself, this particular aspect is not considered for the analysis in this report.
32   The DWRAP database measures de jure work rights, though in some countries, workers may have de facto access to the labor market.
33   In addition to the DWRAP database described in Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein (2021), see also Zetter and Ruaudel (2016) and Ginn et al. (2022).
34   Of note, however, is that job changes are likely still underestimated, considering that both sector and employment type are highly aggregated so that, for example, movements of wage workers within the broad services sector are not captured in these calculations.

Figure 3.2 Marginal effect of FDP type on probability of work during the pandemic

Marginal effect on probability of working during the pandemic, for working age population (18–64)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Figure shows the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a refugee or IDP, measuring the difference in the probability of work relative to the national population. Results are based on multivariate OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent is working or not. Regressions control for household size, gender, and age group (whether respondent is age 25 and above). Individual country regressions include survey month fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Confidence intervals, shown as horizontal lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, including probit.

Figure 3.3 Marginal effect on probability of stopping work

Marginal effect on probability of stopping work, if working prepandemic

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Figure shows the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a refugee or IDP, measuring the difference in the probability of work relative to the national population. Results are based on multivariate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent has stopped working during the pandemic. GDP data are from 2020. Regressions control for household size, gender, and age group (whether respondent is age 25 and above). Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Confidence intervals, shown as horizontal lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, including probit.

Figure 3.4 Marginal Effect on Probability of Working during the Pandemic for Refugees

Marginal effect on probability of working during the pandemic, for refugees

Table 3.1 Employment Type Transition Matrix, by Hosts and FDPs

Population	Prepandemic Employment Type	Share of Working-Age Population, Prepandemic (%)	Probability of Transition into... (%)			Share of Working-Age Population, 2021 (%)
			Self-employed	Wage Earner	Not working	
National (hosts)	Self-employed	38%	**79%**	3%	17%	36%
	Wage-earner	25%	8%	**69%**	22%	21%
	Not working	37%	8%	6%	**86%**	44%
FDPs	Self-employed	24%	**73%**	7%	20%	26%
	Wage-earner	34%	13%	**56%**	31%	24%
	Not working	41%	9%	6%	**85%**	51%

Among hosts, workers in the agriculture sector were much less likely to have moved, whereas among FDPs, the same was true for workers in the category of "other services." FDPs were more likely to have changed jobs compared to hosts across all sectors except other services (Table 3.2). For example, only 23 percent of hosts working in agriculture switched jobs during the pandemic compared to 53 percent among FDPs. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 present visual illustrations of the relative size of flows for hosts and FDPs across sectors and employment types, respectively.

It should be pointed out that this is against a context in which employment among FDPs was already of low quality. This is not obvious at first glance, as the overall distribution of employment types and sectors shows that FDPs were more likely to be in wage employment and less likely to be engaged in agriculture compared to hosts, both before and during the pandemic. This result is somewhat driven by the specific countries that are included in the sample; in particular, 70 percent of refugees in Ecuador, 30 percent in Jordan, and 35 percent in Bangladesh report being engaged in

wage-earning work (in Burkina Faso and Djibouti, the estimates are 23 and 14 percent, respectively). The reasons for the high share of wage earners are highly context-dependent but can be attributed to the availability of cash-for-work programs in camps provided by international or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (as in the case of Bangladesh, see Davis et al. 2022) or informal, temporary wage jobs in sectors such as construction where entry barriers are low (as in the case of Jordan, see Stave and Hillesund 2015). In Ecuador, refugees tend to be engaged in jobs of lower quality—that is, jobs that are highly informal and temporary and that provide lower returns, which is notable given that Venezuelans Displaced Abroad in Ecuador are highly educated (Olivieri et al. 2020). The shift toward self-employment and agriculture did not help in this regard, as both tend to be dominated by low-quality jobs associated with low productivity and thus less pay and less stability.

Table 3.2 Sector Transition Matrix, by Hosts and FDPs

Population	Prepandemic Sector	Share of Working-Age Population, Prepandemic (%)	Probability of Transition into... (%)					Share of Working-Age Population, 2021 (%)
			Agriculture	Mining / Manufacturing	Commerce	Other Services	Not Working	
National (hosts)	Agriculture	20%	**77%**	3%	4%	3%	13%	22%
	Mining/ Manufacturing	7%	7%	**61%**	4%	7%	21%	8%
	Commerce	4%	2%	3%	**55%**	12%	27%	8%
	Other services	19%	9%	3%	13%	**46%**	28%	15%
	Not working	50%	8%	5%	5%	10%	**72%**	46%
FDPs	Agriculture	8%	**47%**	1%	3%	5%	43%	8%
	Mining/ Manufacturing	11%	2%	**51%**	3%	4%	40%	8%
	Commerce	7%	6%	2%	**45%**	18%	29%	8%
	Other services	18%	1%	3%	3%	**67%**	26%	20%
	Not working	56%	5%	3%	7%	10%	**75%**	57%

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Each number represents the probability of a job transition between different sectors of activity, e.g., from commerce before the pandemic to agriculture in 2021. Diagonal entries represent the share of workers who maintained the same prepandemic sector of activity in 2021. Each row sums to 100 percent. In countries with multiple surveys in 2021, the latest data point was selected. Sample includes Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Somalia, and Uganda.

Figure 3.5 Employment Transitions across Employment Types, by Host and FDPs

Hosts

Self–employed

Wage–earner

Not working

February 2020   2021

All FDP groups

Self–employed

Wage–earner

Not working

February 2020   2021

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Sample includes Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ecuador, and Jordan.

Figure 3.6 Employment Transitions across Sector of Activity, by Host and FDPs

Hosts

Agriculture

Mining/Manuf.

Commerce

Other services

Not working

February 2020   2021

All FDP groups

Agriculture

Mining/Manuf.

Commerce

Other services

Not working

February 2020   2021

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Sample includes Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Jordan, Somalia, and Uganda.

3.3   Income

Income losses can be used as a proxy for broader welfare losses as they reflect the combined losses from a range of labor and nonlabor income sources and have direct implications for household consumption. While the harmonized HFPS database mostly captured employment changes in the extensive margin, high informality in these countries meant that many workers were likely forced to cut back on hours or accept lower wages (in the case of wage workers) or were suffering income losses even with the same hours due to decreased demand (in the case of self-employed). In the absence of detailed information on changes in hours or wages, income losses can be considered a next-best proxy for changes that would be inclusive of those in the intensive margin. In addition, the loss in overall income could have also come from losses in nonlabor income, such as assistance from the government or NGOs. It should be noted, however, that the information in the harmonized dataset indicates only whether households reported gains or losses in incomes and does not indicate how much incomes changed. This remains an important limitation to the interpretation of the below results.

Many more households lost income than lost employment during the pandemic. Figure 3.7 shows that the share of households that lost income during the pandemic was multiple times larger than the share that reported having stopped work—in the case of refugees in Latin America, between 20 and 25 percent lost their livelihoods whereas up to 70 percent lost at least part of their income in countries where data was available. Among hosts, the share was slightly lower though still staggeringly high, with around half of households reporting income losses. These results are reported for refugee and host populations in only three countries, all in Latin American—Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico—so the results are reported for each country separately.

Refugees living outside of camps in Chad and Ethiopia were more likely to experience income losses compared to camp refugees. This result may be somewhat expected, given how extensive labor market disruptions were, although this pattern was less clear in Burkina Faso, where IDPs living in camps appeared to have slightly higher income losses compared to IDPs outside of camps (Figure 3.8).[35]

Between labor and nonlabor income sources, labor income losses were more much more likely to occur among both FDPs and hosts, though a high share of FDPs also reported a decrease in assistance. For a handful of countries, there is additional information on how different components of income were affected, such as wage income, farm and nonfarm business incomes, and social assistance. This distinction is useful because FDPs rely heavily on assistance from government and nongovernment sources (for example, see World Bank (2021b) for evidence on Chad; World Bank (2021c) for Uganda; and UNHCR (2022c) for Costa Rica), while at the same time, access to income-earning opportunities is also typically lower for FDPs, as discussed in the previous section. Consistent with Figure 3.7, losses from wage and business incomes were widely reported, much more so than incomes from private or public transfers (Figure 3.9).

Results from the regression analysis are consistent with the above outcomes, in that displaced populations were more likely to have lost incomes even after controlling for demographic and other factors such as work stoppages. Figure 3.10 (and Table A3.1b in Annex 3) shows the results from a regression of household income losses, conditional on whether the respondent is a refugee as well as the respondent's age, gender, and household size, and experience with work stoppages since the pandemic. The coefficient on the binary refugee variable is positive and statistically significant for Costa Rica and Mexico. In the case of Ecuador, the coefficient on the refugee dummy was still positive but smaller and (barely) not statistically significant. The result that refugees were more likely to have experienced income losses after controlling for work stoppages may indicate that they were more likely to have been affected by losses from earned income (conditional on remaining employed) or losses in social assistance.

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35   There are no data points for Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Chad in Figure 3.7 because they lack information on total income loss for host populations in the harmonized database. Refugees in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico all reside out of camps as there are no encampment policies in those countries.

Figure 3.7 Share of Households with Work Stoppages and Income Losses, by Population Group (%)

CRI   ECU   MEX

■ Stopped work   ■ Total income decreased |—| 95% CI

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Confidence intervals, shown as vertical lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

Figure 3.8 Work Stoppages and Income Losses, by Camp Status

BFA   ETH   TCD

■ Stopped work   ■ Total income decreased |—| 95% CI

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Confidence intervals, shown as vertical lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

Figure 3.9 Share of Households Reporting Income Losses, by Source of Income (%)

■ Agricultural income decreased since pandemic
■ Non-farm business income decreased since pandemic
■ Wage income decreased since pandemic
■ Govt. assistance decreased since pandemic
■ NGO assistance decreased since pandemic
■ Remittances decreased since pandemic

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: In Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda, this information is only available for refugees in the harmonized database. Data on remittances are not available in these two countries.

Figure 3.10 Marginal Effect of Being a Refugee on the Probability of Income Loss during the Pandemic

Marginal effect on probability of losing income during the pandemic, controlling for work stoppage

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Figure shows the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a refugee, measuring the difference in the probability of income loss relative to the national population. Results are based on multivariate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent's household lost income during the pandemic. Regressions control for household size, gender, and age group (whether respondent is age 25 and above). Individual country regressions include survey month fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Confidence intervals, shown as horizontal lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, including probit.

3.4 Assistance and Coping

FDPs were more likely to have received assistance during the pandemic compared to hosts in nearly all countries. The main variable in the harmonized database related to social assistance coverage is defined as whether households "received any social assistance since the beginning of the pandemic."[36] The sources of assistance varied by country but generally included cash or in-kind assistance from the government, NGOs, or other nongovernment sources. FDPs were about 20 percentage points more likely to have received assistance than hosts, among whom the share receiving assistance gradually increased from around 18 percent in the first few months of the pandemic to about 36 percent in 2021 (Figure 3.11). This pattern is replicated in nearly all countries for which data are available. Where the estimates are similar between FDPs and hosts (such as in Ecuador), the difference is not statistically significant. Jordan is an exception in that hosts were more likely to have received assistance—specifically, 43 percent of refugees and 78 percent of hosts reported having received support by October 2021, with coverage among hosts likely helped by several emergency cash assistance programs. Data on the share of IDP

households that received assistance are reported for Iraq and Somalia, where there is little difference between IDPs and hosts (Figure A2.5 in Annex 2). Because of insufficient coverage, an aggregated trend for IDPs is not shown in Figure 3.11.

There was significant heterogeneity in the share of FDPs receiving assistance across countries. In Somalia, the share was low at around 18 percent, whereas in Bangladesh, assistance reached almost all displaced households—a necessity as the Rohingya are restricted from living or working outside of camps and the incentive pay received through camp-based volunteer programs is very low (Davis et al. 2022). FDPs in camps generally had a similar or higher likelihood of having received assistance than non-camp FDPs, except in Chad (Figure A2.6 in Annex 2).

Although assistance coverage may appear high in certain cases, it should not be taken as evidence that FDPs were adequately supported during the pandemic. The question in the HFPS often did not differentiate between regular assistance that was being provided before the pandemic and additional relief extended during the pandemic. Another limitation is that the harmonized database primarily

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36   Typically, in the first wave, households were asked whether households had received any support since the beginning of the pandemic. After that, the question was usually rephrased to ask whether households had received any assistance since the last survey. For the purpose of this report, these measures were combined so that a "cumulative" measure could be consistently created across countries.

reports whether any support was provided at all without further details on the duration of assistance or the benefit amounts.

In reality, the level of support likely fell short of needs. As seen in Figure 3.9, many households reported that their income from assistance had declined. For example, about half of refugees in Costa Rica and Chad, a third of IDPs in Somalia, and over 80 percent of refugees in Uganda received less assistance during the pandemic than they did before it started. Further, although about half of FDPs received some kind of social assistance over the first two years of the pandemic in the sample countries, this is much less than the share of households reporting income losses—a result confirmed in every country for which there are data. The high share of households that reported income losses (as shown in the previous section) could indicate the extent to which welfare losses went unmitigated by any support provided during the crisis.

Funding shortfalls were widely and frequently reported by agencies such as UNHCR at the frontline of delivering assistance to the displaced. UNHCR (2021g) notes that the largest area of unmet needs during the COVID response was the shortfall in cash assistance, followed by access to primary health care and education. Other agencies such as World Food Programme (WFP) similarly reported funding gaps amid rising food prices (WFP 2021). The poor and vulnerable groups among the host population did not fare better—despite its historic scale, support to the poor was often delayed and inadequate (World Bank 2022). This is consistent with the findings in Section 4 that show a decline in external aid financing for displaced populations, combined with a weak government fiscal response in these countries.

The reliance on various coping strategies further suggests that mitigation measures were insufficient in the face of widespread income losses during the pandemic. Figure 3.12 shows the share of households that reported having reduced consumption, drawn down their emergency savings, or sold their assets since the beginning of the pandemic. The results vary but are overall concerning: in the most extreme case, households in the DRC reported very high probabilities of reducing consumption and selling off assets, around 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively. The estimate was similarly high for Ecuador, while in the rest of the countries, up to 20 percent of households were affected—still a high number. Interestingly, compared to the wide variation across countries, the difference between hosts and FDPs within countries tended to be rather small most of the time. Although these measures are meaningful, they may represent lower bounds in terms of the need to cope during the crisis, not least because the poorest households likely do not have many assets or savings to begin with. In other words, less engagement in coping strategies does not necessarily imply better welfare.

Figure 3.11 Share of Households Receiving Assistance during the Pandemic, by Host and FDPs (%)

Figure 3.12 Share of Households that Relied on Various Coping Measures, by Host and FDPs (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.

3.5 Food Security

Going without food is a coping mechanism of last resort. Food security could be considered a reduced form metric of whether households can meet minimal welfare needs. Food security during the pandemic was not a new challenge for countries that host displaced populations. In 2019, just before the pandemic shocks hit world food markets, more than 80 percent of displaced people were sheltering in countries with high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition. Indeed, of the 10 countries hosting the most displaced people, nine had suffered through a recent major food crisis (WFP and IOM 2020). During the COVID-19 recession, the situation deteriorated; a joint report by the WFP and International Organization for Migration (IOM) noted that "no country had been spared" increased hunger during the pandemic (WFP and IOM 2020).

In many countries the pandemic disruptions were in addition to other, perhaps even more salient shocks affecting food security. Pandemic-period complications bled into the food price crisis resulting from Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Some nations faced a host of local preexisting, cyclical, or contemporaneously erupting challenges. Yemen, for example, simultaneously experienced currency crises and food and fuel price shocks (see Favari et al. 2021; D'Souza et al. 2022). Other countries, including Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, faced lean periods depending on agricultural workers' crops, political upheaval, or conflict—all affecting food security during the pandemic (see Rudin-Rush et al. 2022, for example).

High prices of food and other commodities contributed to levels of food insecurity not seen in a decade. Indeed, price indices for basic agricultural products of oils, meals, and grains rose from just under 2010 levels right before the pandemic to more than 125 percent higher a year later, and they have stayed high and even increased since that time (Figure 3.13). Following years of declining levels of food insecurity, the risk of hunger and malnutrition shot up during the pandemic and in the years since due to compounding crises, including the recent food shortages caused by the Ukraine war (see Figure 3.14). For example, areas in Burkina Faso faced catastrophic levels of food insecurity in 2020 and 2021 (FSIN, 2022).

Food security was an even larger threat for those who had been forcibly displaced. Food price inflation is likely to be particularly regressive; that is, because food forms a larger share of their expenses, higher food prices means that poor households' food budgets shrink in real terms. Even those families that receive some portion of their food through in-kind transfers from government or humanitarian organizations are affected by food price inflation. Early in the pandemic, the WFP and UNHCR reported significant increases in food prices and supply chain challenges (UNHCR and WFP 2020), making it difficult to bring humanitarian aid to the displaced. As illustrated in Section 4, foreign aid was often cut precisely when it was most needed; for example, amidst pandemic-induced spikes in food prices, the WFP was forced to cut food assistance by 40 percent to the largest refugee population in Africa, the 1.3 million refugees in Uganda.

Figure 3.13 Agricultural Price Indices

Source: World Bank, "Commodity Markets," https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets#1.

Displaced households were more likely to run low on food. In each period of analysis, displaced households were more likely than hosts to run out of food. This validates concerns voiced by WFP in November 2020 that dwindling resources could result in household-level food shortages (UN 2020). Early in the pandemic, host, refugee, and IDP populations in the sample were similarly likely to run out of food, but perhaps because of the successive shocks to food markets, the share of displaced households that ran out of food appears to have increased as the pandemic crisis bled into the food price crisis induced by the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Toward the end of 2021, nearly 70 percent of forcibly displaced households in the sample reported running out of food because they lacked resources. In fact, in nearly every country (except for Ecuador) and in nearly every period in every country measured (except for June 2020 in Somalia), displaced populations were statistically significantly more likely to run out of food than hosts (Figure A2.7 in Annex 2). Running out of food because the household lacked resources was particularly common for displaced populations and hosts in DRC and Chad, but the gap between displaced and host was largest in Uganda.

The correlation between being displaced and running out of food is robust, controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, including previous and current employment, food prices, engagement in the agriculture sector, and time

and country fixed effects. Although there is considerable variation in regressions pooling countries with the necessary data, point estimates suggest that refugee and IDP populations are much more likely to run out of food relative to host populations. This analysis also indicates that although household size and age of the respondent (usually the household head) do not seem to be correlated with the likelihood of running out of food, the finance-related covariates—current work status, national GDP per capita, and national GDP growth—are all negatively correlated with running out of food due to finances, as expected (Figure 3.15 and Table A3.2).

Figure 3.14 Number of People Facing Crisis-Levels of Acute Food Insecurity

Source: FSIN, "2023 Global Report on Food Crises" (Rome: Food Security Information Network, 2023), https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC2023-brief-EN.pdf.

Figure 3.15 Estimates from the Linear Probability Model on the Likelihood of Running out of Food

Source: Staff estimates using HFPS
Note: Within-country samples are weighted using household sample weights. Countries are weighted equally. Results from multivariate OLS (linear probability model) regression, with confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by country. Sample includes Chad, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uganda. Confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, including probit.

As households run low on food, ration reductions result in displaced household members— sometimes even children—being more likely to skip a meal entirely. Indeed, in each pandemic period, displaced households were 50–100 percent more likely to have had an adult skip a meal because of a lack of resources (see Figure 3.16). Childhood malnutrition has been linked to compromised cognition, impaired behaviors, and underperformance at school (see, for example, Martins et al. 2011; Kirolos et al. 2022). The set of surveys in this report typically did not collect this data, but it was collected in Djibouti, Jordan, and Kenya. In Djibouti at the end of 2020, children from urban refugee families were 18 percentage points less likely to have had three meals per day, and they were more likely to have gone to bed hungry. Similarly, surveys in Jordan that generated Food Consumption Scores indicated that refugee children were nearly 10 percentage points more likely to have been food insecure during the pandemic than Jordanian children—though the latter were more likely to have gone to bed hungry or skipped a meal (Rodriguez and Smith, forthcoming). Although this unfortunate gap decreased in Kenya over the course of the pandemic, it was still more common among refugees than hosts.

Most concerning, households facing more acute food insecurity may have to go an entire day (or longer) without eating. Country-level dynamics show that displaced groups were more likely to have gone a day without food in at least one period for all 10 countries for which there are data. Moreover, in only three—Djibouti, Ecuador and Somalia—did host and displaced population levels converge in the last survey period (see Figure A2.8 in Annexes 2).

As shown in Figure 3.17, on average adults in displaced households were far more likely in every pandemic period to go hungry.[37] Even after controlling for household-level socioeconomic status, all countries for which data exist, except Djibouti and Ecuador, showed a statistically significant higher likelihood of displaced households going a day without food relative to host households. This has near and longer-term effects on labor market income by reducing productivity and may also have even longer-term effects on household consumption by shortening working life and potentially increasing health care costs. Again, in pooled regression the finance-related covariates—current work, national GDP, and national economic growth— are seen to be negatively correlated with going a day or more without food, one of the most severe forms of coping (see Figure 3.18 and Table A3.1c).

37   The dip in the share of host populations not having eaten for a day during the middle of the pandemic is likely because Somalia, which has a relatively high share of all populations going full days without a meal, was absent from that period because data were only collected right at the shoulder of the other two periods in June 2020 and January 2021.

Figure 3.16 Share of Households with Adults Having Skipped a Meal Because of Lack of Resources (%)

Figure 3.17 Share of Households with Members Not Having Eaten for a Day Because of Lack of Resources (%)

Aggregate measures, such as the Food Insecurity Experience Score (FIES), accentuate the severity of hunger challenges among the displaced during the pandemic. Between January and April 2021, 77 percent of Chadians experienced moderate or severe food insecurity. As alarming as that number is, over the same period, fully 96 percent of refugees in Chad were moderately or severely food insecure. Similarly, in Burkina Faso between May and July of 2021, internally displaced Burkinabe were nearly 2.5 times more likely to have experienced moderate or severe food insecurity: 74 percent of IDPs experienced moderate or severe food insecurity compared to 33 percent of their nondisplaced compatriots.[38] Aggregating across all pandemic waves, these countries, with the other

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38   For further analysis on this data in Burkina Faso and Chad, see Joint Data Center, "JDC Support to Integrating Forcibly Displaced Populations into COVID-19 High Frequency Phone Surveys,"
https://www.jointdatacenter.org/jdc-covid-19-hfps/; and Baradine et al. (2021).

Figure 3.18 Marginal Probability of Displaced Households with Members Not Having Eaten for a Day Because of Lack of Resources, Relative to Host Households

Marginal effect on probability of household members not eating for a day because of lack of resources

Source: Staff estimates using HFPS.
Note: Within-country samples are weighted using household sample weights. Results from multivariate OLS regression, with confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by country. Confidence intervals, shown as horizontal lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Results are robust to alternative estimation techniques, including probit.

two nations in the dataset for which FIES scores can be calculated,[39] reveal that in the Sahel, refugees in Chad and Uganda appear far more likely than IDPs in Burkina Faso and Somalia to have been moderately and severely food insecure, and both FDP groups were much more likely than host populations to have experienced food insecurity (see Figure 3.19).

Figure 3.19 Food Insecurity Experience Scores

Source: Staff estimates using HFPS.
Note: In this figure moderate food insecurity refers to households that experience three or four of the scenarios described in the eight FIES questions, and severe food insecurity refers to households experiencing five or more. Vertical brackets are 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Somalia, and Uganda.

The higher levels of food insecurity experienced by displaced populations is remarkably consistent, though there are some important exceptions. Although only four countries' surveys included all eight questions that allow for calculation of the FIES, another eight countries asked questions on at least two of the eight FIES subcomponents. Averaging all waves within a country, it can be seen that in almost every instance, displaced populations fared worse than hosts (Table 3.3). The data that are available also reflect the severe vulnerability of some populations, like refugees in Uganda, or some regions for both displaced and host populations, like Chad and Eastern DRC. It is also apparent that even though households in Ecuador were relatively more food secure, the higher education level of Venezuelans was insufficient to insulate them from dimensions of food insecurity relative to Ecuadorian hosts.

Somalia is the single exception to the trend that the displaced were at least as likely as nondisplaced hosts to encounter every dimension of food insecurity (Table 3.3). In Somalia, the internally displaced and nondisplaced populations were virtually identical in the average number of FIES subcomponents that respondents affirmed they had

39 FIES scores can be calculated only when a survey includes all eight FIES component questions.

Table 3.3 Food Insecurity Components

Country	Population	Hungry but could not eat	Hungry adults went w/o eating for a day	HH ran out of food	Worried about not having enough food	Unable to eat healthy/ preferred food	Ate only a few kinds of foods	Skipped a meal	Ate less than you thought you should	Average number of affirmative subcomponents (1 to 8)
Bangladesh	Refugee					75%	45%	31%		
	Hosts					73%	44%	32%		
Burkina Faso	IDP	25%	15%	27%	86%	74%	78%	38%	58%	4,00
	Hosts	6%	2%	4%	51%	35%	49%	12%	23%	1,83
Chad	Refugee	80%	52%	81%	94%	94%	93%	91%	92%	6,77
	Hosts	57%	35%	60%	90%	87%	72%	69%	77%	5,47
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Refugee	88%	84%	92%		90%				
	IDP	85%	79%	91%		91%				
	Hosts	75%	69%	83%		82%				
Costa Rica	Refugee		33%	68%						
	Hosts		6%	23%						
Djibouti	Refugee		8%					19%		
	Hosts		6%					8%		
Ecuador	Refugee	48%	15%	47%		42%		56%		
	Hosts	27%	11%	39%		42%		33%		
Iraq	IDP					64%			33%	
	Hosts					28%			18%	
Kenya	Refugee	32%	15%		55%			33%		
	Hosts	40%	5%		55%			31%		
Mexico	Refugee	55%	36%	60%				58%		
	Hosts	17%	7%	22%				20%		
Somalia	IDP	45%	32%	79%	60%	63%	65%	54%	63%	4,61
	Hosts	48%	36%	66%	59%	64%	65%	61%	64%	4,62
Uganda	Refugee	84%	43%	72%	92%	93%	93%	87%	84%	6,50
	Hosts	10%	3%	9%	28%	37%	38%	14%	21%	1,59

Source: Staff estimates using HFPS.

experienced.[40] Of the eight countries globally with more than 10 percent of the population internally displaced, only two collected phone survey data during the pandemic: Somalia, in which 17.5 percent is internally displaced, and Yemen which suffers an internal displacement rate of 13 percent. Reports using the Yemen phone survey data indicate that, as with Somalia, declines in food security were nearly identical between displaced and nondisplaced Yemenis (Favari et al. 2020).

Households living in camps were not necessarily less food insecure than those living out of camps. Over three rounds of data in Burkina Faso, IDPs in camps consistently had a slightly higher FIES than those that are not in camps (though both were far higher than the food insecurity scores of nondisplaced households) (Tiberti et al. 2021). This is in line with the observation noted earlier for Kenya, wherein nearly every survey period showed that children in camped households were more likely to have skipped a meal than refugee children in households living outside camps.

3.6 Education and Learning

The disruption to education during the pandemic was historic. By some estimates, over 1.5 billion students around the world were affected by school closures that were still in place in many countries even in late 2021, nearly two years into the pandemic.[41] However, the education response differed widely across regions, as seen in the UNESCO database on COVID school closures, which tracked partial or full school shutdowns between February 2020 and March 2022. South Asian countries had the longest closures on average, with schools being closed for nearly 70 weeks over the 95 weeks of this report period. Europe and Central Asia had the shortest closures, but still averaged nearly 30 weeks (Figure 3.20). For children residing in the 14 countries examined in this report, the learning experience during the

pandemic mostly reflected regional trends but was overall characterized by widespread school closures (Figure 3.21). Schools in Ecuador were closed, partially or fully, for the longest period of time, reaching 91 weeks over nearly two years; Uganda, Bangladesh, and the other two Latin American countries in the sample were not far behind.

Following widespread school closures, many governments responded by shifting education online, but the modality and implementation details varied widely. LICs were less likely to offer any distance learning than MICs, and when it was offered, online learning was available in less than half of LICs. Instead, education was typically delivered using TV and radio in those countries (Figure 3.22).

Differences in the provision and uptake of learning modalities likely reflect the reality in those countries where limited access to the internet, electricity, and digital devices made it particularly challenging to participate in distance learning. For example, 89 percent of children did not have a computer and 82 percent did not have internet access in 2020 in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank and UNHCR 2021). In Jordan, only about 2 percent of refugee households owned a computer before the pandemic (Wagner and Hine 2021), and even the simplest technologies such as radios are often not available to displaced populations (UNHCR 2020). The displaced are often not connected to power or it may not be affordable; over 80 percent of refugee camps are estimated to have minimal access to energy, and where it is available, it can be very expensive.[42] These barriers further exacerbated the many challenges that refugee children faced with regard to accessing education even before the pandemic, including documentation requirements to enter the host country's education system and the lack of access to properly trained teachers.

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40   Of the eight FIES subcomponents, internally displaced and nondisplaced populations were statistically significantly different for only two: IDP households were more likely to have run out of food, and host households were more likely to have skipped a meal.

41   UNESCO, "Education: From School Closure to Recovery," https://www.unesco.org/en/covid-19/education-response.

42   In Dadaab camp in Kenya, refugees spent nearly a quarter of their income on energy before the pandemic (Lahn and Grafham 2015). Still, there are also exceptions: in Jordan's Azraq camp, electricity generated from a solar plant is being provided free of charge. See C. Dunmore, "Jordan's Azraq Becomes World's First Clean Energy Refugee Camp," UNHCR Stories, May 17, 2017, https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/jordans-azraq-becomes-worlds-first-clean-energy-refugee-camp.

Figure 3.20 Length of Full or Partial School Closure, Average Number of Weeks by Region

Source: Staff calculation using UNESCO, "Dashboards on the Global Monitoring of School Closures Caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic, https://covid19.uis.unesco.org/global-monitoring-school-closures-covid19/.

Figure 3.21 Length of Full or Partial School Closure between February 2020 and March 2022 by Country

Source: Staff calculation using "Dashboards on the Global Monitoring of School Closures," https://covid19.uis.unesco.org/global-monitoring-school-closures-covid19/.

Figure 3.22 Distance Learning Modalities Adopted, by Country Income Group

Source: "Dashboards on the Global Monitoring of School Closures," https://covid19.uis.unesco.org/global-monitoring-school-closures-covid19/.
Note: UMIC = upper-middle-income countries.

These challenges are reflected in HFPS data that reveal large differences in the extent to which children's learning was interrupted during the pandemic. Figure 3.23 presents the share of households with children who stopped learning during the pandemic by country. The question is directed to respondents with school-age children, asking whether they were in school before the pandemic and whether they had stopped learning once the pandemic began.[43] Households in Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, and Chad (especially when asked in the first round) reported very high levels of learning interruptions, at around 80 percent or higher. Hosts and displaced populations were affected in similar ways, which is perhaps unsurprising, given that school closure policies in camps reportedly followed national policies during the pandemic (UNHCR 2022e).[44] The impact was much lower in other countries, such as Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Mexico, where less than 10 percent of households reported that their children had stopped learning entirely (Figure 3.23), which may be due to the fact that despite long school closures overall, schools were partially open for a good number of weeks, allowing for relatively fewer interruptions to learning. Learning disruptions were also relatively moderate in Burkina Faso and Jordan, although this may have as much to do with the later timing of the survey—mid to late 2021 in both countries, when policy stringency was trending toward much lower levels (Figure A2.2, Annex 2).

Refugee children's access to education was a large challenge even before the pandemic.[45] The latest, most comprehensive enrollment data come from UNHCR (2022a), which compiled education statistics for more than 40 countries. Average gross enrollment rates at the primary and secondary levels were estimated at 68 percent and 37 percent, respectively, while tertiary enrollment was only 6 percent. These estimates are all well below the enrollment rates for nondisplaced populations, estimated at 91, 84, and 37 percent at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, (World Bank and UNHCR 2021).

Lower prepandemic enrollment rates among displaced children compared to host children were also observed in the HFPS in most countries. This can be seen in Figure 3.24 which is useful to understanding the average enrollment gap between children from displaced and nondisplaced households. The aggregate figure, however, conceals wide variation across countries in displaced children's access to schooling (presented in Figure A2.9, Annex 2).[46] There were significant differences in displaced children's prepandemic enrollment rates across the countries in the HFPS sample, ranging from less than 10 percent in Ethiopia to 93 percent in Ecuador (closely followed by Jordan, where enrollment was 86 percent). Prepandemic enrollment rates in the remaining countries were between 60 and 80 percent among children from refugee households in Costa Rica, Kenya, Mexico, Chad, and Uganda. Ecuador is a notable exception in that refugee children were reported to have been in school before the pandemic or to have continued learning during the crisis at rates comparable to those of host children.

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43   Since phone surveys are typically designed to be short, in most cases they did not collect schooling information on each individual child separately, which may contribute to some differences in official enrollment statistics. Household-level results are likely to miss some variations by schooling level (primary, secondary, etc.) and the gender of the child, which limits the understanding of whether boys or girls were more likely to have lost out on learning, for example. In fact, multiple sources raised concerns over girls dropping out of school in higher proportions compared to boys to take on care responsibilities and support income generation, in some cases leading to early marriage (Wagner and Hine 2021), though this appears to also have been true for adolescent boys from disadvantaged families (UNHCR 2022a).

44   This was also verified independently with UNHCR operations for the countries in the sample.

45   Accurate and comprehensive enrollment statistics are difficult to collect. Age-specific enrollment data by international protection status are particularly difficult to collect in many countries (UNHCR 2020). Estimates tend to be more reliable for refugee children in camps where it is easier to collect data, though missing information on their protection status makes it challenging to determine the education status of refugee children who are integrated into national systems and attending public schools (UNHCR 2016, 2022a).

46   The question on access to education before the pandemic was measured quite consistently across countries, asking mainly whether children in the household were enrolled in school or attending school. The question on learning after the pandemic was broader and varied somewhat across countries, as the surveys attempted to capture the new modalities and forms of learning initiated during the pandemic. For example, some surveys asked about continued learning activities, whereas others asked about school attendance (the differences may be related to the presence of lockdowns at the time of the survey). In some countries, this question was asked only when children were in school before the pandemic. In such cases, it is assumed that those who were not in school before the pandemic were not participating in pandemic learning after it got underway.

Figure 3.23 Share of Households with Children Who Stopped Learning during the Pandemic, by Country (%)

Figure 3.24 Share of Households with Children Accessing Education before and during the Pandemic, by FDP Type (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Prepandemic refers to recall questions asking about the period immediately before the pandemic. Household sample weights are used within countries, and each country is weighted equally. Confidence intervals, shown as vertical lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The countries included in the sample for each period are Ecuador and Somalia (April–June 2020); Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, and Uganda (July–December 2020); and Burkina Faso, Chad, DRC, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, Somalia, and Uganda (2021). The data point for refugees in April–June 2020 is omitted due to low coverage.

IDPs have their own challenges, even though they technically reside in their own country. Children from IDP households displayed enrollment rates of around 65 percent in Burkina Faso and Somalia and 77 percent in Iraq, which was lower than that of hosts. Among the challenges for IDPs are the formal registration requirements: for example, in Iraq, children can only register for schooling during the first 50 days of the school year and can be refused registration if they are without identity and schooling documentation (IOM 2020), which families may inadvertently leave behind in the chaos of being displaced.

Children in households that live in camps tend to have better education access than those who live out of camps. In a handful of countries, the information on access to schooling in the HFPS can be disaggregated for displaced households living in and out of camps. Children living in camps had higher enrollment rates compared to children living out of camps in five out of six countries where prepandemic school enrollment rates could be disaggregated by camp status (Figure A2.10 in Annex 2). These trends may reflect generally higher levels of service provision for displaced populations living in camps.

The impact of school closures on learning access during the pandemic was very heterogeneous. This was also true when prepandemic enrollment rates were relatively high. Some countries, such as Jordan, Ecuador, and Burkina Faso, experienced relatively few disruptions, whereas in Iraq, Chad, and Kenya, learning was interrupted for the vast majority of children (Figure 3.25). In Chad and Iraq, the return to school appears to have been swift following the reopening of schools (Figure A2.9, Annex 2). In Ethiopia, where the baseline enrollment rate was low, nearly 80 percent of host and displaced children stopped learning once schools closed. For refugee children, access to learning fell further from an already low schooling rate before the pandemic. Schools reopened in October 2020 but the return to school was slow, possibly because many schools did not have the resources to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (Wagner and Hine 2021).

The heterogeneity in learning is a function of a variety of factors. Policy support for refugee education, the effectiveness of educational responses to COVID, and households' ability to access alternative forms of learning offered during the pandemic likely all contribute to a child's

Figure 3.25 Prepandemic Schooling vs Stopped Learning during the Pandemic, by Country (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: Share of children who stopped learning is based on the earliest available estimate for each country. Countries below the 45-degree line had lower school enrollment after the pandemic started, whereas the opposite is true in countries above the same line.

ability to enroll before the pandemic and learn during it.[47] The inclusiveness of education policies is measured by ranking the formal policy stance toward refugee children's education as written in national laws or legislation. Drawing on the DWRAP database, the outcomes in the HFPS data are compared against an aggregate sum of two components of education policies, namely, whether the law or policy guarantee access to primary and secondary education. Each component takes on a score of zero, one, or two. For simplicity, the scores from the two components are added up to vary between zero and four.[48] Higher scores represent more open, inclusive policies toward displaced populations. The resulting education policy scores range from zero (Ecuador, Jordan) to one (Mexico), and four (Chad, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda); none of the countries in this report had a score of two or three.

The inclusiveness of formal education policies does not correlate strongly with access to schooling before and during the pandemic. For example, Jordan and Ecuador have a policy score of zero across all policy areas, but both provided high levels of access to schooling in practice. There have also been recent efforts by the Jordanian government to include refugees in national education systems (UNHCR 2022b). Chad which recorded a de jure education policy score of four and relatively high levels of education access has been in the process of integrating refugees into their national education system by implementing the 2030 Strategy for Refugee Education that the government signed in 2020. Meanwhile, Ethiopia scores well on the formulation of formal education policies, but de facto access to schooling remained quite low among refugees (Figure 3.26).

Access to quality education for refugees is determined by not only education policies but a number of other policies as well, making it a complex challenge to tackle. In many hosting countries where there is ongoing conflict and violence, damage to school infrastructure, a chronic shortage of teachers, and continued security issues make accessing schooling even more challenging (UNESCO 2019; IOM 2020). Refugees also tend to settle in poorer areas of the country where education services are of even lower quality (World Bank and UNHCR 2021) and financial constraints often make it challenging to keep children in school. Improving education outcomes requires investments in infrastructure, teachers, outreach efforts, and more, which can be difficult in capacity- and resource-constrained countries that are already struggling to improve enrollment among host children.

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47   In some countries, the question on learning after the pandemic is asked to all households with school-age children, and in other countries it is asked only to households that were sending their children to school before it began. In order to generate comparable estimates across countries, it is assumed in the latter set of countries that if the household was not sending their children to school before the pandemic, they did not do so during it either. The assumption appears to be quite reasonable based on the small number of countries where this information is complete.

48   The component on primary education is coded zero if the answer is no, one if the answer is yes but only for recognized individuals, and two if yes for all individuals. The component on secondary education is coded zero if the answer is no, one if access to secondary education is guaranteed, and two if access to secondary and post-secondary education is guaranteed.

Figure 3.26 Schooling before the Pandemic vs Learning during the Pandemic among Refugees, by Country (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS. Education policy scores use data from the DWRAP database for 2017.
Note: Yellow and red marks denote the country's scoring on refugee education policies. The policy score is an aggregate sum of two components: access to primary education and access to secondary education. Each component can take on a value of zero, one, or two, depending on the level of access provided. The score ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of four, with higher scores indicating better access. Countries with a score of 4 are marked in yellow and those with a score of 0 or 1 are marked in red. The 45-degree line indicates where educational engagement would be if all students enrolled before the pandemic continued learning during the pandemic.

Financing For Displaced Populations

An 18 year-old from Daraa, Tawjihi (end of high school) students in Zaatari Camp, Jordan. © UNHCR/Shawkat Alharfoush, August 2023

Displaced populations create significant social, economic, and political pressures on the host countries. However, not only are the obligations of hosting displaced populations very unequally shared across countries (as shown in Section 1), but hosting countries also respond in different ways as seen in the wide heterogeneity in forced displacement policies adopted (Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2021). This section turns attention to the importance of sustainable financing to support crisis response and integration[49] for FDPs. As seen below, there was a decline in aid intended for displaced populations especially in the first year of the pandemic, which is consistent with the unmitigated welfare impact observed in Section 3.

The role of fiscal policies received considerable attention during the pandemic. The widespread socioeconomic impact of the pandemic prompted an expansionary fiscal policy in many countries, especially in 2020 (IMF 2020). However, it has also been widely documented that the fiscal response was uneven across countries (World Bank 2022). In the many lower-income countries that had been dealing with low growth and high levels of debt distress even before the crisis, the pandemic-induced shock to economic growth and falling revenues further constrained their fiscal space. For developing countries bearing a large share of the hosting burden, these structural challenges and consequent vulnerabilities significantly undermined their ability to support displaced households.

The size of fiscal spending in response to the pandemic was very low among both the HFPS countries studied in this report as well as the broader set of countries that bear a large hosting burden. Except for Chad, COVID-related spending as a share of GDP in the 14 HFPS countries was even lower than the LIC average, which was already lower than that in MICs. Iraq recorded the lowest spending of all HFPS countries at just 0.2 percent of GDP, while Chad recorded the highest spending at 5.3 percent. More spending was allocated for non-health purposes, although the health response to the pandemic often commanded a significant budget share (Figure 4.1).

Access to external financing was an important determinant of fiscal spending during the pandemic, most of which came from multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks, and other UN agencies in the form of concessional loans and grants (World Bank 2022). ODA accounted for a large share of government expenditure in many of these countries (Figure 4.2). It is challenging to identify how forced displacement situations are funded between domestic and external sources of financing, but it is very likely that the dependence on external aid is high for most hosting countries.[50]

Analyzing ODA data from the OECD's CRS reveals that aid for displaced populations fell in 2020—at the peak of the pandemic when needs

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49   Recognizing the importance of the other two channels of durable solutions, safe repatriation and third-country resettlement, this report focuses on integration, as that is the channel most of the displaced encountered during the crisis.

50   These public expenditures are often not well documented. Information systems rarely record any costs incurred as displaced people cycle through the asylum/refugee system (see, for example, Uganda in UNDP 2017). Some benefits are difficult to assign a monetary value, such as land allocated to promote self-reliance. However, available data suggest that LICs spend little on refugees; for example, Kenya allocated 0.01 percent of GDP in its fiscal year 2021/2021 budget (see Kenya 2022). In comparison, Ecuador, as an upper-middle-income country, has spent 0.3 percent of GDP per year on integrating Venezuelan migrants in recent years (see Arena et al. 2022).

Figure 4.1 The Fiscal Response during COVID-19, by Country and Country Groups (% GDP)

Figure 4.2 Net ODA Received in 2021 (%)

were high. Aid to displaced populations is derived using annual CRS disbursement-level data and identifying development aid flows intended for displaced populations. The primary strategy entails keyword extraction based on project identifiers consisting of project titles and descriptions (see Annex 4 for details).[51] For comparison, the indicators that are being tracked under the UNHRC Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) rely on different data sources or methods to proxy refugee financing.[52] Estimates using this strategy suggest that between 2019 and 2020, aid flows allocated to displaced populations took a downturn, falling from US$9.26 billion to US$9.12 billion globally, and from US$2.91

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51   Any disbursements are counted that include certain keywords, such as refugee, displaced, FDP, returnee, migration, conflict, or UNHCR, and are therefore most likely intended for displaced populations. Estimates counting disbursements tagged to specific CRS sectors are employed as a secondary measure, although the key results are largely the same.

52   A dedicated OECD survey on financing refugee situations among members is used to monitor a subset of GCR indicators, such as "Total ODA disbursements from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors for the benefit of refugees (and host communities) in developing countries." For the survey, member countries used their own methods to approximate ODA going to refugee situations; "Total ODA disbursements from DAC donors for the benefit of refugees in developed countries" is estimated with a separate sector code in the CRS, and the "Number of donors providing official development assistance (ODA) to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities in refugee-hosting countries" uses OECD DAC Statistics on Resource Flows to Developing Countries. For details, see UNHCR (2019b) and Hesemann. Desai, and Rockenfeller (2021).

billion to US$2.75 billion in IDA-18/19 and Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) countries combined. The most notable downturn was experienced by major hosting countries—those that host more than half a million FDPs—where real disbursements fell from US$6.6 billion to US$6.0 billion.[53] There is a marked gap between the actual aid flows for displaced populations and the expected amounts extrapolated from linear trends based on the years leading up to the pandemic. Figure 4.3 presents these trends globally (panel A), among World Bank IDA-18 and GCFF countries (panel B), major hosting countries (panel C), and the 14 HFPS countries (panel D). The list of the top ten recipient countries between 2016 and 2021 is shown in Table A4.4.

This drop in aid to displaced populations occurred even as overall aid to developing countries increased globally by over 20 percent.[54] Figure 4.4 shows that overall aid flows had been on an upward trend between 2016 and 2019 and then received a significant boost in 2020. Global real aid disbursements rose from US$219 billion in 2019 to more than US$270 billion in 2020, an increase of about 22 percent. The increase in the IDA-18 Regional Sub-Window (RSW) and GCFF countries and in major hosting countries was of similar magnitude, where real disbursements increased from US$43 billion to about US$53 billion, and from US$92 billion to US$111 billion, respectively. Consequently, the aid effort in 2020 and 2021 was noticeably above the linear time trend from years leading up to the pandemic. This increase in total aid is consistent with trends during previous crises when aid would first rise to finance urgent needs and then fall two–three years after the crisis. ODA had thus long been a dependable and much-needed source of financing during crisis times (Ahmad and Carey 2021).

Figure 4.3 Trend in Aid for Displaced Situations in Recent Years (constant 2020 US$ million)

Source: Staff calculations using OECD CRS disbursement data.

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53   The IDA-18 Regional Sub-Window (RSW) represents the IDA's additional dedicated funding to help 14 LICs that host a large number of refugees. The countries included are Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Uganda. Countries included in the IDA-18 RSW are also eligible for the IDA-19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) (see World Bank, "IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities," https://ida.worldbank.org/en/replenishments/ida18-replenishment/ida18-regional-sub-window-for-refugees-host-communities).   The GCFF is a World Bank fund to support programs targeting displaced populations in Colombia, Ecuador, Jordan, Lebanon, and Moldova (GCFF 2021). In 2020, IDA-18 RSW and GCFF countries combined hosted 38.5 percent of all refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/IDA hosts refer to IBRD/IDA member states that were home to more than half a million FDPs as of 2022 (based on UNHCR refugee population statistics).

54   Aid is estimated from OECD microdata by totaling disbursements made by 30 OECD DAC member countries, 65 multilateral organizations, and 25 non-DAC countries (see OECD, "Development Assistance Committee (DAC)," https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee/). Further, disbursements made by 39 large private donors are included to better represent the total aid dependance of recipient countries.

Figure 4.4 Trend in Total Aid Flows in Recent Years (constant 2020 US$ million)

Source: Staff calculations using OECD CRS disbursement data.

Figure 4.5 Aid to displaced populations, as proportion of total aid, by region (%)

Source: Staff calculations using OECD CRS disbursement data.
Note: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SAR), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Aid to displacement situations measured as a proportion of total aid also fell across all regions from 2019 to 2020 (Figure 4.5). Average real aid per displaced person declined in 2020, globally by about 9 percent from US$129.3 to US$118.0, and in all regions except Latin America and the Caribbean (Figure 4.6). These trends reversed in some regions in 2021, but not in all.

These trends point to a key challenges fomented by ad hoc and unpredictable financial arrangements.

Unpredictability of the source, amount, or timing of financing undermines the ability to plan any longer-term, sustainable solutions for this highly vulnerable group. Although there was some year-to-year variation in total aid, the amount received in 2020, which includes some of the most acute phases of the pandemic, fell significantly below expected levels extrapolated from prepandemic trends. Strikingly, even as overall aid efforts increased, FDPs were disproportionately neglected as disbursements fell for the first time since 2016,

even though they were highly affected by the pandemic. The World Bank's IDA-18/19 windows for host and refugees and the GCFF can be used to partially mitigate gaps in development spending for refugee situations; however, there is no similar instrument to help establish reliable financing for situations of internal displacement—despite there being roughly three times more displaced people who have not (yet) crossed an international border as those who have.

Figure 4.6. Aid to displaced populations, per displaced person, by region (constant 2020 US$)

Source: Staff calculations using OECD CRS disbursement data.
Note: East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SAR), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Discussion and Conclusion

This report uses newly harmonized contemporaneous HFPS data on host and displaced populations from 14 countries to provide insights into the differential welfare impact on these groups during the recent COVID crisis. Although the COVID-19 pandemic prompted a global crisis of historical scale, it also created an opportunity for a large-scale data collection effort on displaced populations that are often excluded from such efforts and for whom little systematic data exist. The harmonized cross-country database used in this report combines a number of data collection efforts at the country level, making them more comparable. The database covers 14 countries from different regions, populations of concern (IDPs, refugees, hosts), and accommodation types (in camps, out of camps), allowing for a more comprehensive analysis across countries and subgroups. The 14 countries in this study collectively host roughly a quarter of the global displaced population.

Although FDPs were deeply affected by the shocks that rippled through the global economy, they often started out from a worse baseline and were impacted by other contextual factors that contributed to the worsening of their welfare during the pandemic. Compared to a number of earlier studies that documented the pandemic's impact on displaced populations, the analysis in this report has been deepened on several fronts to provide a more holistic view of how welfare evolved during that time, for both hosts and displaced populations. The key findings show that FDPs typically experienced larger initial employment losses that were followed by a slower recovery. In addition, there were significant job changes among those who remained employed, again with greater turnover among FDPs. Household income dynamics, where available, further corroborate that the welfare impact was

much more widespread than indicated by outright employment losses alone.

Welfare losses went largely unmitigated as external support fell short of needs. FDPs were often more likely than hosts to receive social assistance during the pandemic. However, the data do not specify the magnitude of that social assistance or whether it was from existing programs or new initiatives specifically designed to mitigate the impacts of the compounding crises. The reliance on negative coping strategies suggests that mitigation was not sufficient; although estimates varied across countries, there were significant numbers of households that were forced to reduce consumption, draw down emergency savings, or sell their assets during the pandemic. An increase in food insecurity and malnutrition was reported globally as key agricultural commodity prices more than doubled between 2020 and 2022. These trends are underscored in the HFPS data, which show that well over half of displaced households ran out of food in 2020 and 2021, and in the most disturbing outcome, about a third of households reported members that went a full day or more without eating because of a lack of resources.

The lack of support during the pandemic—and the challenges with supporting FDPs in general—is related to the fact that the vast majority of FDPs are hosted by LIMCs, many of which struggle with their own development challenges. Displaced populations create significant social, economic, and political pressures on the host countries, many of which were grappling with their own structural economic challenges even before the pandemic, including fragility, low economic growth, and high levels of poverty. These countries also tend to have a high reliance on external financing for government expenditure, including on displacement financing.

Figure 5.1 Poverty Trends by Country Groups, 2015–30 (%)

World Bank, "Poverty and Inequality Platform," https://pip.worldbank.org/home; Mahler, Yonzan, and Lakner ⓡ al., (2022); and staff estimates.
Note: FCS = fragile and conflict-affected situations. All country classifications are as of FY2023.

The estimated amount of aid intended for displaced populations declined in 2020, at the height of the pandemic, even as overall ODA financing increased, which may explain why needs went largely unmet. Novel analysis using disbursement-level data from the OECD's CRS shows that aid flows attributable to displaced populations took a downturn in 2020 during the most acute phases of the pandemic. This coincides with funding shortfalls that were widely and frequently reported by agencies such as UNHCR at the frontline of delivering assistance to the displaced. Although overall aid levels, including those intended for displaced populations, increased in 2021, the results from this exercise highlight a key challenge of displacement financing, which is that it is highly unpredictable and may not be available when needed the most—as was the case during the early stages of the pandemic. Most of the countries analyzed in this report spent less than the average LIC to deal with the epidemiological and economic consequences of the pandemic.

These compounding crises had significant and potentially long-lasting impacts on the displaced and their hosts, which could lead to higher poverty and inequality for a generation. The latest trends suggest that poverty has been stagnant or on the rise in countries officially classified as fragile and conflict-affected situations, putting their extreme poverty levels at around 30 percent. Projections suggest limited improvements in poverty rates through 2030 (Figure 5.1), which are likely underestimated given the exclusion of FDPs in most household surveys in major hosting countries. Recent work by Corral et al. (2020) suggests that accounting for displaced populations missing from surveys could add 30 million more people to the global count of extreme poor.

But it does not have to be this way. Better policies to integrate displaced populations into host societies and to share the hosting burden more equally can reorient these trends to a very different trajectory. This is also consistent with the messages in the latest *World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Societies*.

Access to economic opportunities will allow the displaced to become more self-reliant, which should also reduce the burden of hosting. Analysis in this report suggests that countries with policies that allowed access to labor markets tended to have higher employment levels among the displaced. Indeed, a review of existing research suggests that displacement can benefit host communities, with relatively little evidence of negative labor market impacts on hosts due to the influx of FDPs.[55] Improving their legal status and providing access to economic opportunities are critical elements in

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55   See B. Gillsäter, "People Feeling Conflict Don't Want Aid—They Want Work," Joint Center on Forced Displacement, January 19, 2023, https://www.jointdatacenter.org/people-fleeing-conflict-dont-want-aid-they-want-work/.

their recovery from the recent crises and in their long-term well-being.[56] Integration can also help improve widespread negative perceptions about refugees (Alan et al. 2021). As repatriation is looking increasingly less likely, burden sharing through resettlement or integration is critically needed.

Another key aspect to the integration and promotion of self-reliance is allowing refugee children access to national education systems and relieving the many social and economic constraints to their learning. This is an important policy area because displaced populations are disproportionately children: less than a third of the global population are children but among refugees, the share exceeds 40 percent. Similarly, about 20 out of a total of 55 million IDPs are children under the age of 15 (IDMC 2021). While remedial support is needed by all following the crisis, displaced children are in an even more disadvantaged position due to the lack of financial stability and their heightened vulnerability (IOM 2020).

Permanent losses in human capital among this generation could diminish future earnings potential and reduce economic mobility. Where data do exist, there are signs that the pandemic may have led to longer-term erosions in human capital. The return to school was slow in some countries such as Ethiopia, where multiple rounds of data were collected. Data from Jordan showed that pandemic-related school closures led to deteriorations in early grade literacy and numeracy among vulnerable children, including refugees (UNICEF 2022). However, not much is known about the learning recovery more generally. Although studies specifically on displaced populations have not yet been carried out, a few global studies on the potential implications of the education crisis have led to dire predictions. The sudden and massive education shock during the pandemic could lead students in LIMCs to lose up to 10 percent of their future earnings if the widened gaps are not addressed (Schady et al. 2023). The rise in food insecurity during the pandemic may have profound long-term impacts, as the physiological and cognitive effects of acute malnutrition, including impaired neurodevelopment and academic achievement, can last decades.[57] However, children who benefit from timely catch-up growth may be insulated from negative outcomes, underscoring the importance of monitoring efforts and prompt interventions (see, for example, Martins et al. 2011).

Sustainable financing solutions that allow for continued investments and longer-term planning will be critical to easing the burden on major hosting communities. Many hosting countries rely on ODA for government spending, and though detailed data are difficult to come by, it is very likely that it is also a major source of funding for displacement situations. It is therefore particularly problematic that funding to support some of the poorest and most vulnerable populations decreased during a crisis that was unprecedented in recent decades. Financing arrangements need to be predictable and reliable for planning purposes beyond the short term (Schady et al. 2023). Financing gaps are not likely to diminish in the near future, given record-high displacement levels and the increasingly protracted nature of displacement. Shifting the balance of support more toward development aid and adopting more inclusive refugee policies could help ease the overall burden.

Finally, the complex nature of the challenges faced by displacement situations requires more and better data that can be relied upon to design better policies. This injunction is echoed in recent global agreements and instructions including the Global Compact on Refugees, the establishment of the World Bank – UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement,[58] a recent report on Informing Durable Solutions for Internal Displacement by the World Bank (World Bank 2019a), and the World Development Report 2023 on Migrants, Refugees and Societies (World Bank 2023d). Statistical inclusion of displaced people is a critical element of the broader inclusion agenda, despite the technical and budgetary challenges of including FDPs in data

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56   The most recent *World Development Report* recognizes the tension between gaining legal status and accessing economic opportunities as the root cause of the challenges in resolving refugee situations. Legal status is usually acquired through resettlement or return to country of origin, and therefore it is typically difficult to achieve both. The report offers examples of innovative solutions that include regional freedom of movement or a shift to labor migrant status (see World Bank 2023d). For an overview of labor market policies on displaced and host populations, see Ginn (2023).

57   See, for example, Grantham-MacGregor (1995), Tanner et al. (2015), Adebisi et al. (2019), and Kirolos et al. (2022)

58   See www.jointdatacenter.org

collection efforts. Robust data is critical to identifying vulnerabilities and addressing the humanitarian and development challenges and helping host countries and humanitarian and development institutions quantify the burden that is to be shared—as agreed under the GCR, for example.

The experience of collecting and harmonizing data on displaced populations during the pandemic provides valuable lessons for future efforts. Chiefly, high frequency phone surveys can provide rigorous, representative data. Although phone survey instruments are necessarily shorter than face to face surveys and cannot control the interview environment, they are useful in settings in which in-person interviews are not possible due to safety concerns or are prohibitively expensive.

The reliability of phone survey data is predicated upon minimizing sample bias. This can be achieved by a) using a sampling frame of the complete universe of the population under study, b) drawing a probability sample from that frame, and c) applying reweighting techniques to compensate for any sample bias observed in the data. The availability of complete sampling frames has historically been a challenge when working with displaced populations, but UNHCR's ProGres database can be a powerful resource in contexts where it is current and complete. Institutional data-sharing agreements between agencies, such as the recently concluded Global Data Sharing Framework Agreement between the World Bank and UNHCR, can facilitate access to such databases.[59]

Working in conjunction with National Statistical Offices to collect data on displaced populations can yield important benefits. By collaborating with them, NSOs—and by extension national and local governments—are more likely to accept results. The experience of unsuccessful attempts to work with countries to collect this FDP data highlighted that even when there was political will to collect such data, in some instances the NSO simply lacked the

resources or capacity (or both) to include displaced populations in data collection efforts. As with working with NSOs on general data collection, FDP efforts can be a way to increase NSO capacity by mentoring staff in a "learning by doing" approach; capacity building ideally begins early in the process to develop frames, skills, and relationships that allow for rapid data response. Integration of FDPs in data systems can help fill important data and analytical gaps and can form ready-made sampling frames for phone surveys used for monitoring.

Collecting comparable, contemporaneous data on host and displaced populations is perhaps most easily done as a part of standard national surveys. Such surveys should employ a sampling strategy that includes an FDP sub-sample of sufficient size to give statistical power. Questionnaires for surveys covering host and FDP populations should include the short module of refugee or IDP identification questions recommended by the UN Statistical Commission's Expert Group on Refugee, IDP and Statelessness Statistics (EGRISS) to accurately identify or verify displacement status of persons in the samples (EGRISS 2023b). [60] When such national face to face surveys are later combined with subsequent phone surveys, the data can tell compelling stories of changes over time, as has been done with host and refugee populations in Chad.[61]

Data collection should be designed to allow comparisons between populations, over time, and across contexts. The contemporaneous data collection on host and displaced populations in these COVID-era HFPS exercises afforded the rare opportunity to compare these groups and benchmark them with each other.[62]

The timing and frequency of data collection significantly affect the utility of the data. For analysis over periods of crisis or recovery, metrics are critical. Ideally, baseline data would have been collected on all sizable displaced populations before

59   See https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/world-bank-unhcr-data-sharing-agreement-improve-assistance-forcibly-displaced
60   See https://egrisstats.org/ for more.
61   https://www.jointdatacenter.org/refugees-in-chad/
62   For example, harmonized, contemporaneous host/FDP data collection can be used to inform the 12 policy priority indicators recommended by the UN Statistical Commission to be disaggregated by displacement status are 1.2.1, 1.4.2, 2.1.1, 3.1.2, 4.1.1, 6.1.1, 7.1.1, 8.3.1, 8.5.2, 11.1.1, 16.1.4 and 16.9.1, covering topics of poverty; property rights; access to health care, sanitation, and electricity; employment; adequate housing; and identity. See https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/ and https://unstats.un.org/wiki/display/sdgGoodPractices/Agencies+and+other+groups%3A+data+disaggregation#Agenciesandothergroups:datadisaggregation-e.RefugeesandInternallyDisplacedPeople(IDPs)

the pandemic to allow for pre-crisis comparisons; without pre-crisis baselines, interpretation of contemporary outcomes and recovery trajectories can be limited. Developing rigorous (often face-to-face) baselines also affords an early opportunity for NSO capacity building. Additionally, collecting data at regular intervals on indicators that have high variation or measurement error can help uncover important trends in welfare dynamics. In practice, this calls for more frequent microdata collection that in turn should also facilitate regular welfare monitoring.

Finally, the insights gained from these data are compounded because results can be compared across contexts. The surveys were based on a loosely standardized common questionnaire, and the data were then harmonized across countries after it was collected. Yet, harmonization was a long and resource intensive process, suggesting that country customization may need to be carefully balanced against standardization in cases where cross-country comparisons are important. Use of a standardized questionnaire can help improve comparability across contexts with more indicators, improve timeliness of cross-country results (by saving on harmonization) and allowing for more automation in data cleaning. Applying the standards developed in the EGRISS Compiler's Manual can help (EGRISS 2023a).

Considerably more research is needed on this vulnerable and growing population. The 2023 WDR calls for data on refugees that is harmonized, longitudinal, open, and innovative in developing new types of surveys to inform policies. The phone survey experience during the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that such data collection efforts can be done in a way that is not only statistically rigorous but also time and cost efficient—and can provide actionable insights on some of the most marginalized communities.

Annexes

‘Aleppo’, the furniture workshop founded by
Venezuelan whose grandparents fled Syria. Ecuador.
© UNHCR/Jaime Giménez, September 2022

Annex 1. Country Surveys

N.B. An * indicates rounds that were included in the analysis in this report. Dates listed are the approximate start dates of survey rounds.

BANGLADESH

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 1-3	Rounds	Hosts & FDPs		Refugees	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1*	Apr-20	1,816	Apr-20	1,358
	2*	Oct-20	2,180	Oct-20	1,662
	3*	Apr-21	2,194	Apr-21	1,458
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO				
	Host	The Cox's Bazar monitoring surveys use the Cox's Bazar Panel Survey (CBPS) baseline as the sampling frame. The CBPS was a face-to-face survey fielded in 2019 that used the 2011 population census and GIS data as a sampling frame for hosts and the IOM NPM12 (International Organization for Migration, Needs and Population Monitoring) Round 12 data for Rohingya refugees.			
	FDPs				
Coverage	Host	Host population within Cox's Bazar and Bandarban district			
	FDPs	Rohingya population living in camps within Cox's Bazar and Bandarban district			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The CBPS study was divided among three strata covering Rohingya refugees in camps and host communities in Cox's Bazar district and some adjacent regions of Bandarban district. The CBPS High-Frequency Tracking attempted to follow the full baseline sample of 5,020 household in each round, with no alterations or additions made to the sampling design. For hosts, a two-stage sampling strategy was followed. The first stage of selection was done at the mauza level by strata. A random sample of 66 mauzas was drawn from a frame of 286 mauzas using probability proportional to size. Based on census population size, each mauza was divided into segments of roughly 100-150 households. The second stage selected three segments from each chosen mauza with equal probability of selection. Within each selected power supply unit in camps (blocks) and hosts (mauza-segments), all households (100–150 on average) were listed. Of listed households, 13 households were selected at random for an interview, with an additional replacement list of 5 households.			
	FDPs	Stages of sample selection: For camps, NPM12 divided all camps into 1,954 majhee blocks. 1,200 blocks were randomly selected using a probability proportional to the size of the camp. A full listing was carried out in each selected camp block.			
Modules	Access to Basic Needs, Labor, Education				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4528				

BURKINA FASO

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		IDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Jun-20	1,968		
	2	Jul-20	2,037		
	3	Sep-20	2,013		
	4	Nov-20	2,011		
	5	Dec-20	1,944		
	6	Jan-21	1,985		
	7	Feb-21	1,979		
	8	Mar-21	1,967		
	9	Apr-21	1,971		
	10*	May-21	1,998	May-21	1,146
	11*	Jun-21	1,986	May-21	1,107
	12*	Apr-22	1,971	Jun-21	1,043
	13	Jun-22	1,735		
	14	Aug-22	1,708		
	15	Oct-22	1,700		
	16	Dec-22	1,688		
	17	Mar-23	1,642		
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? YES				
	Host	2018/19 EHCVM Enquete Harmonisée sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages			
	FDPs	CONASUR Database The CONASUR database (developed and supported by the government of Burkina Faso with the technical and financial support of development partners, including UNHCR, IOM and OCHA) is updated regularly and has an exhaustive list of refugees and IDPs, along with a few socio-demographic characteristics, as well as information on the phone numbers of households.			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	IDPs (in 9 regions out of 13)			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	Households from the 2018/19 EHCVM with at least one valid phone number established the sampling frame for the high-frequency survey (HFS). To obtain representative strata at the national, capital (Ouagadougou), urban, and rural levels, the target sample size for the HFS was 1,800 households (assuming a 50% non-response rate, the minimum required sample is 1,479). To account for non-response and attrition, 2,500 households were called in the baseline round of the HFS. 1,968 households were fully interviewed during the first round of interviews.			
	FDPs	The BFA HFPS-IDPs was representative of households that have access to phones. Taking that into consideration, a key concern was the bias introduced by sampling households with at least a phone number, as phone penetration in some regions/areas might be limited. However, according to data from the CONASUR database, the percentage of households with at least one phone number was very high, accounting for above the 74% in all the sampled regions. To account for non-response and attrition, 1,500 households were selected in the baseline round of the HFS. 1,166 households were fully interviewed during the first round of interviews.			
Modules	Household Roster, Knowledge Regarding the Spread of COVID-19, Behavior and Social Distancing, Access to Basic Needs, Education, Credit, COVID Testing and Vaccination, Employment and Income, Food Security, Shocks, Fragility, Conflict and Violence, Other revenues, Social protection, Personal Health Questionnaire, Displacement, Early Child Development - Parental Support, Concerns, Economic Sentiment, Price of Items, Climate Change				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3768 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4481				

CHAD

Rounds included in the analysis in this report: 3-4	Rounds	Hosts		Refugees	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	May 202	1,748		
	2	Jul-20	1,708		
	3*	Jan-21	1,609	Jan-21	919
	4*	Mar-21	1,482	Mar-21	852
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? YES (for N and R)				
	Host	2018/2019 ECOSIT 4 Enquête sur la Consommation des Ménages et le Secteur Informel au Tchad			
	FDPs	2018/2019 RHCH Refugees and Host Communities Household Survey in Chad (subsample of ECOSIT 4)			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	Refugees			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The sampling of the high-frequency survey aimed at having representative estimates nationally and by area of residence: Ndjamena (capital city), other urban and rural areas. The minimum sample size was 2,000, out of which 1,748 households (87.5%) were successfully interviewed at the national level.			
	FDPs	ECOSIT 4 contained a subsample of Chadians and refugee households from which the refugee sample of this high frequency survey was drawn. Sampling weights were adjusted to ensure that the two samples were representative of all Chadian households and all refugee households, respectively.			
Modules	Household Roster, Knowledge of COVID-19, Behavior and Social Distancing, Employment and Income, Access to Basic Services, Income Loss, Subjective Poverty, Prices and Food Security, Shocks/Coping, Impacts of COVID-19, Social Safety Nets and Assistance, Perception, Impacts of COVID-1, Fragility and Security, Vaccine; Gender-Based Violence				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3792				

COSTA RICA

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	Phase 1				
	1	May-20	801	-	-
	2	Jul-20	636	-	-
	3	Jul-20	658	-	-
	Phase 2			-	-
	4*	May-21	802	Mar-21	1,163
	5‡	Oct-21	905	Jul-21	761
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO				
	Host	RDD Random Digit Dialing protocol			
	FDPs	UNHCR ProGres Database			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	National with stratified random sampling			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The sample was based on a dual frame of cellphone and landline numbers generated through a Random Digit Dialing (RDD) process. The RDD methodology produces all possible phone numbers in the country under the national phone numbering plan and draws a random sample of numbers. This method ensures coverage of all landline and cellphone numbers active at the time of the survey.			
	FDPs	National representation of PoCs registered in UNHCR ProGres database, with additional stratified sampling for Nicaraguan PoCs in the Greater Metropolitan Area (GAM), Venezuelans in the GAM, Cubans in the GAM, and Nicaraguan PoCs in the North.			
Modules	Hosts: Basic Information, Knowledge Regarding the Spread of COVID-19, Behavior and Social Distancing, Access to Basic Services, Employment, Income Loss, Food Security, Concerns, Coping Strategies, Social Safety Nets, Trust FDPs: Knowledge, Behavior, Access, Employment, Income, Food Security, Concerns, Resilience, Networks, Demographics				
URLs	Phase 1 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4052 Phase 2 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4562 Phase 2 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4755 Report LAC https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35902 UNHCR https://microdata.unhcr.org/index.php/catalog/636				

Note: ‡ The Oct-21 host data were not published in time to be harmonized in this effort and so are not used in the analysis in this report.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		Refugees		IDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Jun-2020	1,453	-			-
	2	Jul-2020	1,438	-			-
	3	Aug-2020	1,437	-			-
	4	Sep-2020	1,440	-			-
	5	Nov-2020	1,438	-			-
	6	Feb-2021	1,443	-			-
	7*	Oct-2021	1,252	Oct-2021	126	Oct-2021	1,087
	8*	Nov-2021	1,261	Nov-2021	163	Oct-2021	1,057
	9	Jan-2022	1,260	Jan-2022	139	Jan-2022	1,086
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO						
	Host	Social registry in Eastern DRC Built up by the Social Protection and Jobs (SPJ) program and managed by Fonds Social de la RDC (FSRDC) across different sites in Eastern DRC. The social registry includes both hosts and self-declared FDPs.					
	FDPs						
Coverage	Host	Eastern DRC					
	FDPs	Refugees, IDPs (and returnees; not used in this report) in Eastern DRC					
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The social registry was comprised of individuals showing up to the public lotteries of the program, with those selected through the public lottery becoming beneficiaries of the SPJ-FSRDC project. The program remunerated beneficiaries U$3 per day for their participation in community works, which was announced prior to the public lottery. As a result, the selection mechanism ensured that only individuals from poor and vulnerable populations participated in the lotteries – those who were willing and able to carry out work for the established daily wage. The SPJ-FSRDC program collected phone numbers during public lotteries. Hence, the current panel survey by the DRC Crisis Observatory was able to select from a pool of vulnerable and poor populations residing in Eastern DRC who showed up to the public lottery and provided a phone number to Monitoring Automated for Real Time Analysis (MARTA). MARTA recorded a total of 68,558 respondents across Beni (including Kalunguta), Bunia, Goma, Lubero, and Komanda, 51,007 of whom provided a phone number.					
	FDPs	Displacement status was self-reported in the SPJ-FSRDC registry used as the sampling frame. The interpretation is that this sample is representative of all refugees/ IDPs/returnees who self-selected into participation of the SPJ project and thus were sufficiently poor to qualify as vulnerable FDPs (showing up for daily US$3 per day wage).					
Modules	Access to Food and Medical Supplies; Schooling; Employment; Income; Coping Strategies; Food Security; Social Assistance; COVID-19 Welfare Perceptions; Early Childhood Development; Mental Health						
URLs	https://crisisobservatory.org/welfare-monitoring						

DJIBOUTI

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Jul-20	1,486		
	2	Sep-20	1,457		
	3*	Dec-20	1,375	Dec-20	564
	4*	Mar-21	1,561	Oct -21	435
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO				
	Host	2017 National social registry Collected by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MASS), it is an official database of households in Djibouti that may benefit from public transfers and be particular targets of poverty alleviation efforts.			
	FDPs	2019 Refugee survey Collected in 2019 by Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie (INSD) jointly with MASS, WFP, and UNHCR. The original sample of the Refugee Survey in 2019 was drawn from the refugee registration data.			
Coverage	Host	Urban			
	FDPs	Djibouti-city and 3 refugee villages			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The sample design was a one-stage probability sample selected from the sampling frame and stratified along two dimensions: the survey domain (three categories) and the poverty status (binary). This yielded six independent strata. Within each stratum, households were selected with the same ex ante probability, but this differed across strata. Initially 1,590 households were drawn. Given a non-response rate averaging 30 percent, a replacement sample of 750 households was selected.			
	FDPs	Among the Refugees Survey Sample, the refugee sample of the COVID-19 survey was not drawn randomly but by selecting the households that had a phone number.			
Modules	Household Roster, Employment, Household Income Sources, Access to Basic Goods, Access to Health Care and Education, Food Insecurity, Vaccine Attitudes, Gender				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4216 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4070				

ECUADOR

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	Phase 1				
	1*	May-20	958	May-20	269
	2*	Jun-20	785	Jun-20	240
	3*	Jul-20	646	Jul-20	207
	4*	Aug-20	740	Aug-20	231
	Phase 2				
	5*	May-21	951	May-21	401
	6‡	Oct-21	1,032	Oct-21	583
	7	Feb-22	1,072	Feb-22	445
	8	Jun-22	1,106	Jun-22	356
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO				
	Host	RDD Random Digit Dialing protocol			
	FDPs	List of cell phone numbers Phone numbers that had contact with Venezuela (incoming or outbound) that were confirmed to be from Venezuela			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	Venezuelan households living in Ecuador			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The sample was based on a dual frame of cellphone and landline numbers generated through an RDD process. The RDD methodology produces all possible phone numbers in the country under the national phone numbering plan and draws a random sample of numbers. This method ensures coverage of all landline and cellphone numbers active at the time of the survey.			
	FDPs	Considering Venezuelans are a small part of the population in Ecuador, the strategy to identify and sample Venezuelan migrants was different from that used for the overall population. To create a sampling frame, a list of all cell phone numbers of customers who registered regular incoming or outgoing calls from Venezuela was generated. A first-phase simple random sample was selected from this frame and contacted to confirm that the owners were indeed Venezuelan and determine if they were willing to participate in the survey. From those who agreed to participate in the study and were confirmed as Venezuelan adults, a second-phase sample was selected to complete the survey.			
Modules	Cover Page, Basic Information, Knowledge Regarding the Spread of COVID-19, Behavior and Social Distancing, Access to Basic Services, Employment, Income Loss, Food Security, Concerns, Coping Strategies, Social Safety Nets, Trust				
URLs	Phase 1 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4060 Phase 2 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4564 Phase 2 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4757 Phase 2 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/5406 FDPs https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/5665 Report LAC https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35902				

Note: ‡The Oct-21 rounds of data were not published in time to be harmonized in this effort and so are not used in the analysis in this report

ETHIOPIA

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPs	
		Date	**Sample size (HH)**	**Date**	**Sample size (HH)**
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Apr-20	3,249		
	2	May-20	3,107		
	3	Jun-20	3,058		
	4	Jul-20	2,878		
	5	Aug-20	2,770		
	6*	Oct-20	2,753	Sep-20	1,676
	7*	Nov-20	2,536	Oct-20	1,429
	8	Dec-20	2,222		
	9	Dec-20	2,077		
	10	Feb-21	2,178		
	11	Apr-21	1,982		
	12	Jun-21	888		
	13	Oct-22	2,876		
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? YES (for nationals)				
	Host	2018/19 ESS Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS)			
	FDPs	ARRA/UNHCR registration database Ethiopia Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	Refugees in Addis Ababa, Sub-office Jijiga, Sub-office Shire			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	To obtain representative strata at the national, urban, and rural levels, the target sample size for the HFPS-HH was 3,300 households: 1,300 in rural and 2,000 in urban areas. In rural areas, the survey team attempted to call all phone numbers included in the ESS, as only 1,413 households owned phones and another 771 households provided reference phone numbers. In urban areas, 3,213 households owned a phone and 224 households provided reference phone numbers. To account for non-response and attrition, all the 5,374 households were called in round 1 of the HFPS-HH.			
	FDPs	The geographic division of the UNHCR sub-office, combined with the phone penetration rate, was used to inform which stratification was best placed to yield robust representative results of refugee populations. The team considered only strata with a phone penetration higher than 30 percent in order to (i) have enough phone numbers and (ii) not introduce too high a sampling bias. The sample was drawn using a simple random sample without replacement. Expecting a high non-response rate based on experience from the HFPS-HH, the team drew a stratified sample of 3,300 refugee households for the first round.			
Modules	Household Roster, Knowledge Regarding the Spread of COVID-19, Behavior and Social Distancing, Access to Basic Services, Employment, Income Loss and Coping, Food Security, Aid and Support/ Social Safety Nets, Agriculture, Locusts, WASH, Education and Childcaring, Credit, Migration, Return Migration, SWIFT, Youth Aspirations and Employment, Access to Health Services, Food Prices				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3716 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4543				

IRAQ

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		IDPs		FDPs Refugees	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Aug-20	1,621				
	2	Sep-20	1,621				
	3*	Oct-20	1,623	Oct-20	728	Oct-20	1,602
	4*	Nov-20	1,629	Nov-20	746	Nov-20	1,406
	5*	Dec-20	1,614	Dec-20	717		
	6*	Jan-21	1,651	Jan-21	720		
	7	Jun-21	1,627				
	8	Jul-21	1,635				
	9	Aug-21	1,628				
Sampling Frame		The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO					
	Host	2018 MICS					
	FDPs	IDP – Data from all major Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), Refugees – UNHCR ProGres					
Coverage	Host	National					
	FDPs	IDPs and returnees in Kurdistan and Northern region Refugees: national coverage					
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The data collection methodology consisted of a countrywide survey covering the 18 governorates in Iraq. The sample size was disaggregated by 18 governorates, and the survey firm applied a random sampling approach to reach participants from different governorates in order to reach the given geographical quotas. All major MNOs active in the country were included within the sampling frame to ensure a representative sample. The sample size was designed to detect changes in the prevalence of food insecurity (mainly people with inadequate food consumption) at governorate level as reported in the 2016 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) survey in Iraq.					
	FDPs	IDP Sample: Almost all the IDPs in Iraq are located in the three governorates of Kurdistan region and five governorates of the Northern region. Therefore, the coverage of the mobile phone survey for the IDP sample was limited to those two regions to create 4 strata: Duhok (stratum 1), Erbil and Sulaimaniya (stratum 2), Nineveh (stratum 3), and the rest of the northern region, i.e., Kirkuk, Diyala, Anber, and Salah Al-deen (stratum 4). Refugee Sample: The sample covered all governorates in Iraq and included households from Syria as well as households of different nationalities. The sample size and demographics were derived through a stratification process, which involved dividing the population into homogeneous subgroups before sampling. Hence, random sampling was employed for the study, using three levels of stratification: (1) governorate, (2) country of origin, and (3) camp and out-of-camp status (specifically for Syrian refugees).					
Modules		Demographic Section, Employment, Entrepreneurial/Business activities, Agricultural Activities, Food Consumption, Reduced Coping Strategy, Access to Food and Market, Transfers, Health Status and Access to Health Services, Education/Distance Learning, COVID-19 Test and Vaccine, Household Expenses					
URLs		https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4023 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4076 https://microdata.unhcr.org/index.php/catalog/774/related-materials					

JORDAN

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPS	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Mar-21	1,004^		
	2*	Nov-21	732	Nov-21	813
	3	Apr-22	923	Apr-22	1,516^
	4			Jun-22	800
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO				
	Host	National Unified Registry (NUR) bread subsidy applicants The NUR is an administrative registry of potential beneficiaries for social assistance.			
	FDPs	UNHCR database			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	Syrian refugees living in the country			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The NUR is an administrative registry of potential beneficiaries for social assistance. The bread subsidy was estimated to cover around 80 percent of the Jordanian population up until 2021 when it was discontinued. The sample for the survey was drawn in 2020. Since the sampling frame tends to over-represent the poor, an ex post weight adjustment was applied to better reflect population demographics in terms of gender, age of the household head, and socioeconomic status.			
	FDPs	The sample was stratified by rural/urban location and camp/non-camp location in four bins: Amman, other governorates-urban, other governorates-rural, and camps. An ex post weight adjustment was also applied to the refugee population to better reflect this population's demographics using the UNHCR database.			
Modules	Including: Employment, Food Security, Coping Strategies Used by Households, Mental Health				
URLs	Forthcoming				

Note: ^ Interview modes: Phone and face-to-face; otherwise, phone only.

KENYA

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPs	
		Date	**Sample size (HH)**	**Date**	**Sample size (HH)**
Rounds and Sample Size	1*	May-20	4,060	May-20	1,159
	2*	Jul-20	4,489	Jul-20	1,540
	3*	Sep-20	4,979	Sep-20	1,336
	4*	Jan-21	4,890	Jan-21	1,245
	5*	Mar-21	5,857	Mar-21	1,405
	6*	Jul-21	5,764	Jul-21	1,258
	7*	Nov-21	5,633	Nov-21	1,137
	8	May-22	4,550	May-22	1,355
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? YES, partly (for nationals and FDPs)				
	Host	2015/16 KIHBS and RDD Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey			
	FDPs	SES, UNHCR database Socio Economic survey			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	Refugees and stateless: Urban refugees, Shona stateless and camps (Kakuma, Kalobeyei, Dadaab)			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The COVID-19 RRPS with Kenyan households had two samples. The first sample consisted of households that were part of the 2015/16 KIHBS CAPI pilot and provided a phone number. The 2015/16 KIHBS CAPI pilot was representative at the national level, stratified by county and place of residence (urban and rural areas). At least one valid phone number was obtained for 9,007 households and all of them were included in the COVID-19 RRPS sample. The second sample consisted of households selected using the RDD method. A list of random mobile phone numbers was created using a random number generator from the 2020 Numbering Frame produced by the Kenya Communications Authority. The initial sampling frame therefore consisted of 92,999,970 randomly ordered phone numbers assigned to three networks: Safaricom, Airtel, and Telkom. An introductory text message was sent to 5,000 randomly selected numbers to determine if numbers were in operation. Out of these, 4,075 were found to be active and formed the final sampling frame.			
	FDPs	The third RRPS sample consisted of urban and camp-based refugees as well as stateless people registered by the UNHCR. The sample aimed to be representative of the refugee and stateless populations in Kenya. It comprised five strata: Kakuma refugee camp, Kalobeyei settlement, Dadaab refugee camp, urban refugees, and Shona stateless, where sampling approaches differ across strata. For refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, as well as for stateless people, recently conducted socioeconomic surveys (SES)were used as sampling frames. For the refugee population living in urban areas and the Dadaab camp, no such household survey data existed, and sampling frames were based on UNHCR's registration records (ProGres), which include phone numbers. For Kakuma, Kalobeyei, Dadaab, and urban refugees, a two-step sampling process was used. First, 1,000 individuals from each stratum were selected from the corresponding sampling frames. Each of these individuals received a text message to confirm that the registered phone was still active. In the second stage, implicitly stratifying by sex and age, the verified phone number lists were used to select the sample. For the stateless population, all the participants of the Shona SES (n=400) were included in the RRPS, because of limited sample size. The sampling frames for the refugee and Shona stateless communities are thus representative of households with active phone numbers registered with UNHCR.			
Modules	Household Roster Background and Information, Travel Patterns and Interactions, Employment, Food Security, Income Loss, Transfers, Subjective Welfare, Health, COVID Knowledge, Household and Social Relations				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3774 https://microdata.unhcr.org/index.php/catalog/296/				

MEXICO

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1*	Feb-21	1,142	Feb-21	1,220
	2*	Aug-21	517	Aug-21	701
Sampling Frame		The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO			
	Host	RDD Random Digit Dialing protocol			
	FDPs	UNHCR ProGres registry, stratified			
Coverage	Host	Comparable subsample of the national population in the same locations where PoCs were sampled (see below).			
	FDPs	Four strata comprising areas where PoCs are most likely to settle: 1. Southern Mexico – Honduran and El Salvadoran PoC population 2. Mexico City – Honduran, El Salvadoran, and Cuban PoC population 3. Northern and Central Industrial Corridor – Hondurans and El Salvadoran PoC population 4. Venezuelan population – Mexico City, Monterey (Nuevo Leon), and Cancun (Quintana Roo).			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The sample was based on a dual frame of cellphone and landline numbers generated through an RDD process. The RDD methodology produces all possible phone numbers in the country under the national phone numbering plan and draws a random sample of numbers. This method ensures coverage of all landline and cellphone numbers active at the time of the survey. RDD was used to generate a comparable subsample of the national population in the same locations where PoC were sampled.			
	FDPs	ProGres database with representative samples of the four strata of PoCs described above. The population of the four groups represents 67% of the active registered refugees in Mexico.			
Modules		Cover Page, Basic Information, Knowledge Regarding the Spread of COVID-19, Behavior and Social Distancing, Access to Basic Services, Employment, Income Loss, Food Security, Concerns, Coping Strategies, Social Safety Nets, Trust			
URLs		Phase 1 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4056 Phase 2 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4568 Phase 2 https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4761 Report LAC https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35902			

SOMALIA

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts & FDPs		FDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Jun-20	2,063	Jun-20	718
	2	Jan-21	1,344	Jan-21	350
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? NO				
	Host	RDD Random Digit Dialing protocol			
	FDPs				
Coverage	Host	National coverage, including nomads and IDPs			
	FDPs				
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	The SHFPS sampled 2,811 households across Somalia using phone numbers selected through an RDD protocol. A sample allocation for the COVID-19 SHFPS was developed to provide representative and reliable estimates nationally, at the level of Jubaland, South West, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Puntland, Somaliland, and Banadir Regional Administration, and by population type (i.e., urban, rural, nomads, and IDP populations).			
	FDPs	Reaching rural and nomadic lifestyle respondents proved to be challenging and additional measures were employed to sample within that population stratum (see microdata library webpage).			
Modules	Household Roster, Knowledge Regarding the Spread of COVID-19, Behavior and Social Distancing, Concerns Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Access to Basic Goods and Services, Employment, Income Loss, Remittances, Shocks and Coping Mechanisms, Food Insecurity, Social Assistance and Safety Nets, COVID-19 Vaccine, Mortality, Interaction with Internally Displaced Persons				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4077				

UGANDA

Rounds included in analysis in this report: 10-12	Rounds	Hosts		FDPs	
		Date	Sample size (HH)	Date	Sample size (HH)
Rounds and Sample Size	1	Jun-20	2,227		
	2	Jul-20	2,199		
	3	Sep-20	2,179		
	4*	Oct-20	2,135	Oct-20	2,010
	5*	Feb-21	2,122	Dec-20	1,852
	6	Mar-21	2,100	Feb-21	1,985
	7	Sep-21	1,950		
	8	Jun-22	1,881		
	9	Aug-22	1,871		
	10	Oct-22	1,668		
	11	Dec-22	1,666		
Sampling Frame	The sampling frame is a longitudinal, integrated, nationally representative household survey? YES (for nationals)				
	Host	2019/20 UNPS Uganda National Panel Survey			
	FDPs	2018 UBOS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics) survey & UNHCR database			
Coverage	Host	National			
	FDPs	Refugees in Kampala, South-West, and West-Nile			
Sampling Strategy and Representativeness	Host	To obtain a nationally representative sample for the COVID-19 Impact Survey, a sample size of approximately 1,800 successfully interviewed households was targeted. However, to reach that target, a larger pool of households needed to be selected from the frame due to non-contact and non-response common for telephone surveys. Thus, all the households in the 2019/20 round of the UNPS that had phone numbers for at least one household member, or a reference individual, were included in the initial sample. This consisted of 2,227 households, that is, 72% of the UNPS 2019/20 sample.			
	FDPs	The Profile Global Registration System (ProGres) served as a sample frame for the URHFPS. It was complemented by the data collected for the refugee household survey carried out by UBOS and the World Bank in 2018. The sample was selected from the pool of refugees with phone numbers. The targeted sample included 2,100 observations: 300 observations in each stratum. Four countries of origin were targeted in the survey: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, and South Sudan. The combination of country of origin and region were used to create seven strata: Kampala-Somalia, Kampala-other (Burundi, DRC, South Sudan), South West-Burundi, South West-DRC, South West-South Sudan, South West-Somalia, and West Nile-South Sudan.			
Modules	Access to Basic Goods and Services, Access to Education, Access to Health Services, Access to Medicine and Treatment, Access to Soap and Water, Agriculture, Anti-COVID-19 Behavior and Social Distancing, Assets - Climate Change Impact, Concerns Re: COVID-19 Impacts, Consumption Price of Staple Food, COVID-19 Symptoms, Credit, Early Childhood Development, Economic Sentiment, Employment, Food Security, Household Composition, Income Losses, Knowledge and False Beliefs Re: COVID-19, Mental Health, Non-Farm Enterprises, Perceptions Re: Efficacy of Government Actions, Safety Nets, Shocks and Coping Strategies, Survey of Well-Being via Instant and Frequent Tracking, Vaccination and Willing to Test				
URLs	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3765 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35819				

Annex 2. Supplemental Figures and Tables

**Figure A2.1a Thirty LMICs Hosting the Most FDPs in 2019**

Legend: Refugees | Asylum-seekers | IDPs | VDAs | Countries with data included in this report

Y-axis: Millions (0–8)

Countries (left to right): Colombia, Syrian Arab Rep., Congo, Dem. Rep., Türkiye, Yemen, Sudan, Afghanistan, Jordan, Somalia, Nigeria, West Bank and Gaza, Ethiopia, Iraq, South Sudan, Pakistan, Uganda, Lebanon, Cameroon, Bangladesh, Iran, Peru, Ukraine, India, Kenya, Chad, Central African Rep., Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Libya, Myanmar

Figure A2.1b Thirty LMICs Hosting the Most FDPs as a Share of National Population in 2019

Legend: FDPs (Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, IDPs, VDAs) | Countries with data included in this report

Y-axis: FDPs as share of national population (%) (0–100)

Countries (left to right): West Bank and Gaza, Syrian Arab Rep., Jordan, Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Colombia, Yemen, Central African Rep., Georgia, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, Congo, Dem. Rep., Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Cameroon, Iraq, Chad, Uganda, Congo, Rep., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ecuador, Djibouti, Peru, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Honduras, Costa Rica, Mauritania

Source: Staff illustration using UNHCR, "Refugee Data Finder," https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/.

Table A2.1 Core Modules for the COVID-19 HFPS

Section/Module	Description
Household Roster	Roster of individuals living in the household; age; sex; and relationship to the household head.
Access to Basic Needs and Services	This section includes questions on: (i) Respondent household's ability to buy medicines and selected staple items that were needed in the week preceding the survey, and if not able, why they could not be purchased; (ii) School attendance status for households with school-age children; availability and use of learning activities during the school closures; (iii) access and utilization of health care services; and (iv) access to financial services.
Knowledge (COVID-19)	Respondent's knowledge about the pandemic, including questions on knowledge of ways to reduce the risk of contracting coronavirus and knowledge of steps that the government has taken to reduce spread of corona virus.
Behavior (COVID-19)	Selected questions on the respondent's practices, including frequent hand washing and avoiding handshake/physical greetings, avoiding gatherings.
Aid and Assistance	Assistance that anyone in the household received from institutions by type of assistance, amount received, and types of institutions providing the assistance.
Employment	Respondent's work status in the week preceding the survey; job loss and its reasons; employers and their sectors; changes in work arrangements; profile of household-owned business and changes.
Food Security	Household-level questions on food insecurity experience by an adult household member for the 30 days preceding the survey. In several cases, the module adapted from the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Food Insecurity Experience Scale was supplemented or substituted with WFP's Food Consumption Score.
Income Loss	Types of household income sources: farming, personal income from wage employment or pension, own non-farm business; remittances from within the country and abroad; income from properties, investments and savings; support from government and NGOs and other charitable organizations; and changes in income sources after the outbreak.
Shocks and Coping Mechanisms	Shocks that affected households and their coping strategies.

Figure A2.2 Mobility Trends and Policy Stringency in Countries with Phone Surveys

Source: Google, "COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports," https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/ and University of Oxford, "COVID-19 Government Response Tracker," https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/covid-19-government-response-tracker.

Note: No Google mobility data for Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

Figure A2.3 Share of Employed by Host and FDP Type, by Country (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: The figure shows estimates from each survey round, by country. Prepandemic refers to recall questions asking about the period immediately before the pandemic. The periods corresponding to different pandemic stages are shaded in different colors: the prepandemic period is green, April–June 2020 is red, July–December 2020 is blue, and 2021 is gray. January 2020 estimates are based on recall from the earliest available survey wave for each country. Within country estimates use household sample weights. Confidence intervals are shown as vertical lines and are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

Figure A2.4 Share of Households with Respondent Who Stopped Working during the Pandemic, by Host and FDP Type, by Country (%)

Figure A2.5 Share of Households that Received Any Social Assistance Since Pandemic Started, by Host and FDP Type, by Country (%)

Figure A2.6 Share of Households Receiving Assistance during the Pandemic, by Camp Status (%)

Source: Staff estimates using HFPS.
Note: Confidence intervals, shown as vertical lines, are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

Figure A2.7 Share of Households that Ran out of Food Because of a Lack of Money or Other Resources in the Past 30 Days (%)

Figure A2.8 Share of Households with Household Members Not Eating for a Day due to Lack of Resources (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: The figure shows estimates from each survey round, by country. The periods corresponding to different pandemic stages are shaded in different colors: the prepandemic period is green, April–June 2020 is red, July–December 2020 is blue, and 2021 is gray. Within country estimates use household sample weights. Confidence intervals are shown as vertical lines and are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

Figure A2.9 Share of Households with Children Accessing Education before and during the Pandemic, by Country and FDP Type

Figure A2.10 Share of Households with Children Accessing Education before and during the Pandemic, by Country and Camp Status (%)

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: The figure shows estimates from each survey round, by country. The periods corresponding to different pandemic stages are shaded in different colors: the prepandemic period is green, April–June 2020 is red, July–December 2020 is blue, and 2021 is gray. Coverage is insufficient for Chad wave 2 (March 2021) and is thus omitted from this figure. Prepandemic refers to recall questions asking about the period immediately before the pandemic. Within country estimates use household sample weights. Confidence intervals are shown as vertical lines and are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.

# Annex 3. Regression Tables

Table A3.1a Probability of Working

Variable	Bangladesh	Burkina Faso	Chad	Costa Rica	Djibouti	Ecuador
Refugee	-0.209*** (0.009)		-0.145*** (0.023)	0.018 (0.04)	-0.325*** (0.021)	-0.106 (0.066)
IDP		-0.276*** (0.015)				
HH size	-0.003 (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.008)
Male	0.276*** (0.01)	0.025 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.028)	0.282*** (0.04)	0.023 (0.017)	0.353*** (0.033)
Age above 25	0.043*** (0.012)	0.206*** (0.06)	0.037 (0.051)	0.032 (0.059)	-0.046* (0.027)	0 (0.049)
Constant	0.188*** (0.016)	0.611*** (0.061)	0.846*** (0.055)	0.46*** (0.077)	0.882*** (0.033)	0.291*** (0.064)
Observations	8162	8497	2327	1592	3864	3088
R-squared	.19	.04	.01	.09	.1	.14

Table A3.1a Probability of Working (continued)

Variable	Ethiopia	Iraq	Jordan	Kenya	Mexico	Somalia	Uganda
Refugee	-0.609*** (0.017)		0.037 (0.033)	-0.509*** (0.025)	-0.06** (0.03)		-0.503*** (0.023)
IDP		-0.163*** (0.012)				0.039 (0.038)	
HH size	0.013 (0.003)	-0.021*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.004 (0.002)
Male	0.175*** (0.018)	0.478*** (0.013)	0.069 (0.04)	0.096*** (0.014)	0.212*** (0.031)	0.152*** (0.036)	0.087*** (0.014)
Age above 25	0.044 (0.027)	0.171*** (0.018)	-0.113 (0.095)	0.096*** (0.018)	0.171** (0.068)	0.08 (0.044)	0.012 (0.034)
Constant	0.642*** (0.032)	0.379*** (0.023)	0.45 (0.107)	0.586*** (0.021)	0.418*** (0.083)	0.329*** (0.054)	0.815*** (0.035)
Observations	8255	8359	1545	41991	2171	4359	7629
R-squared	.1	.24	.01	.11	.06	.04	.08

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: This table reports results based on multivariate OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent is working or not. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a refugee or IDP measures the difference in the probability of work relative to the national population. Regressions control for household size, gender, and age group (whether respondent is age 25 and above). Within-country samples are weighted using household sample weights. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.

Table A3.1b Probability of Income Loss

Variable	Costa Rica	Ecuador	Mexico
Refugee	0.149*** (0.041)	0.058* (0.03)	0.164*** (0.031)
HH size	0.03** (0.012)	0.011 (0.008)	0.024*** (0.007)
Male	0.072* (0.042)	0.013 (0.035)	-0.066** (0.033)
Constant	0.35*** (0.055)	0.575*** (0.046)	0.335*** (0.046)
Observations	1569	1348	2151
R-squared	.02	.02	.1

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: This table reports results based on multivariate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent's household lost income during the pandemic. The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a refugee measures the difference in the probability of income loss relative to the national population. Regressions control for household size, gender, and age group (whether respondent is age 25 and above). Within-country samples are weighted using household sample weights. Individual country regressions include survey month fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.

Table A3.1c Probability of Not Eating for a Day

Variable	Burkina Faso	Chad	Costa Rica	Djibouti	Ecuador	Kenya	Mexico	Somalia	Uganda
Refugee		0.364*** (0.084)	0.254*** (0.027)	0.014 (0.048)	0.059 (0.054)	0.155*** (0.014)	0.35*** (0.032)		0.402*** (0.033)
IDP	0.122*** (0.008)							0.105*** (0.036)	
HH size	0 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	0 (0.006)	0.01** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)
Male	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.099 (0.098)	-0.023 (0.02)	-0.007 (0.04)	-0.033 (0.028)	0.011 (0.014)	0.018 (0.022)	-0.06* (0.035)	0.039* (0.024)
Age above 25	0.003 (0.024)	0.113 (0.071)	-0.012 (0.033)	0.04 (0.073)	0.08*** (0.018)	-0.01 (0.018)	0.074*** (0.027)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.007 (0.032)
Constant	0.029 (0.025)	0.414*** (0.121)	0.079** (0.039)	0.112 (0.085)	0.038 (0.039)	0.016 (0.018)	-0.11** (0.044)	0.337*** (0.057)	0.083 (0.053)
Observations	7572	313	1588	473	2921	8444	1722	3640	3663
R-squared	.03	.36	.02	.03	.05	.05	.03	.04	.2

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: This table reports results from multivariate OLS regression where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the household members had not eaten for a day. The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a refugee or IDP measures the difference in the probability of not eating for a day relative to the national population. Regressions control for household size, gender, and age group (whether respondent is age 25 and above). Within-country samples are weighted using household sample weights. Individual country regressions include survey month fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.

Table A3.2 Country-pooled Linear Probability Models on Select Outcomes

Variable	Stopped working		Currently working (refugees)	Ran out of food	
Refugee	0.049** (0.02)	0.048* (0.025)		0.441*** (0.14)	0.353*** (0.105)
IDP	-0.019 (0.02)	0.05 (0.037)		0.076** (0.03)	0.245*** (0.028)
HH size	0 (0.001)	0 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.005)	0.007 (0.008)
Male	0.012 (0.023)	0.002 (0.022)	0.143*** (0.035)	-0.088** (0.039)	-0.081 (0.057)
Age above 25	0.013 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.037 (0.063)	-0.064 (0.075)
Prepandemic work				0.035* (0.019)	0.012 (0.017)
Current work				-0.068* (0.042)	-0.022 (0.059)
Agriculture sector				0.041 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.037)
Policy Stringency		0.032** (0.014)	-0.081*** (0.013)		-0.575*** (0.14)
Log of GDP per capita		0.025 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.068)		-0.04 (0.029)
GDP per capita growth rate		-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.009 (0.008)		-0.084*** (0.009)
Food price inflation (%)					0.036 (0.024)
Restrictiveness of work rights for refugees			-0.118*** (0.012)		
Constant	0.132*** (0.019)	-0.067 (0.15)	0.501 (0.54)	0.385*** (0.105)	-0.023 (0.439)
Country fixed effects	x			x	
Month fixed effects	x			x	
Obs	66455	66455	24374	21424	13563
R-squared	.06	.04	.2	.22	.25
Included countries	Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda		Bangladesh, Chad, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Mexico, Uganda	Chad, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Uganda	

Source: Staff calculation using HFPS.
Note: This table reports results from multivariate OLS regression where the dependent variable is (i) respondent stopped working; (ii) respondent is currently working; and (iii) household ran out of food. The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a refugee or IDP measures the difference in the probability of stopping work or running out of food relative to the national population. Regressions control for household size, gender, and age group (whether respondent is age 25 and above). Prepandemic work and current work are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent was working before the pandemic or at the time of survey. The variable agriculture sector is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was engaged in the agriculture sector. Policy stringency is measured using data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT). Data on refugee's work rights comes from the DWRAP database. Within-country samples are weighted using household sample weights and all countries are equally weighted. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.

Annex 4. Estimating Aid for Displaced Populations Using OECD CRS Data

Official Development Assistance (ODA) refers to official government financing flows (i.e., aids, loans, and grants) to aid development. The overall aid data come from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database, which outlines all aid flows made by OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries,[63] non-DAC countries, multilateral organizations, and large private donors.[64] Aid flows from OECD donors provide a very close approximation of official ODA figures, representing on average about 95 percent of total ODA (see below). The database is updated annually and is currently available through 2021.

Aid to displaced populations is derived using annual CRS disbursement-level data by disaggregating development aid flows intended for displaced populations. Although disbursements are tagged to specific CRS sectors, there are no sector codes dedicated to aiding displacement situations but rather, they are intended to classify various types of humanitarian aid in emergency situations, which includes forced displacement but also natural disaster situations, among others.[65] Therefore, the primary strategy here entails keyword extraction based on project identifiers consisting of project titles and descriptions. Any disbursements are counted that include certain keywords, such as refugee, displaced, FDP, returnee, migration, conflict, or UNHCR, and are therefore most likely intended for displaced populations. Estimates counting disbursements tagged to specific CRS sectors are employed as a secondary measure, although the key messages are largely the same. For reference, the indicators tracked under the UNHRC Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) rely on different data sources or methods to proxy refugee financing.[66]

1. Coverage of OECD CRS data

a. Database includes aid flows by OECD's DAC member countries, non-DAC countries, multilateral organizations, and large private donors. China is notably excluded.

b. ODA numbers from OECD are a reasonably good approximation of the official ODA figures (average 95 percent coverage):

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63   OECD, "Development Assistant Committee," https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee/.
64   OECD, "Creditor Reporting System," https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/data/creditor-reporting-system_dev-cred-data-en.
65   Relevant sector codes include "Material Relief Assistance and Services (72010)," "Basic Health Care Services in Emergencies (72011)," "Education in Emergencies (72012)," "Emergency Food Assistance (72040)," and "Relief Co-ordination and Support Services (72050)."
66   A dedicated OECD survey on financing refugee situations among members is used to monitor a subset of GCR indicators, such as "Total ODA disbursements from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors for the benefit of refugees (and host communities) in developing countries." For the survey, member countries used their own methods to approximate ODA going to refugee situations. "Total ODA disbursements from DAC donors for the benefit of refugees in developed countries" is estimated with a separate sector code in CRS, and "Number of donors providing official development assistance (ODA) to, or for the benefit of, refugees and host communities in refugee-hosting countries" uses OECD DAC Statistics on Resource Flows to Developing Countries. For details, see UNHCR (2019b) and Hesemann, Desai, and Rockenfeller (2021).

Table A4.1 Coverage of OECD CRS Database, Select Countries, 2019

Country	(1) Official ODA 2019, USD millions in 2019	(2) Estimated ODA from OECD CRS, USD millions in 2019	Proportion (=(2)/(1))
Bangladesh	4,483	4,381	98%
Burkina Faso	1,149	1,108	96%
Chad	707	642	91%
Costa Rica	60	56	93%
Dem. Rep. of Congo	3,026	2,810	93%
Djibouti	272	262	96%
Ecuador	525	507	97%
Ethiopia	4,810	4,677	97%
Iraq	2,212	2,091	95%
Jordan	2,797	2,689	96%
Kenya	3,251	3,172	98%
Mexico	536	525	98%
Somalia	1,866	1,720	92%
Uganda	2,100	2,028	97%

2. Estimating aid to displaced populations

a. Using keyword analysis

The primary strategy aims to parse out aid flows intended for displaced populations by iteratively extracting keywords from descriptive variables about each aid flow. This includes project titles, short descriptions, and long descriptions. The main keywords are highlighted in the table below:

Table A4.2 Keywords Used to Estimate Aid for Displaced Populations and Examples

Keyword	Examples and notes
MIGRANT or MIGRATION	Example 1: "ADVANCING THE RIGHTS AND PROTECTION OF CONFLICT-AFFECTED OLDER SOUTH SUDANESE MIGRANTS IN ETHIOPIA, UGANDA, AND SOUTH SUDAN" Example 2: "COMMUNITY-LED OUTREACH ON SAFE MIGRATION (COSM)"
UNHCR	Example: "SUPPORT TO UNHCR TO PROVIDE INTERVENTIONS IN NUTRITION, HEALTH, WATER, AND SANITATION FOR KENYAN REFUGEES AND SUPPORT VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION TO SOMALIA"[68]
CONFLICT	Example: "BUILDING RESILIENCE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ"[69]
DISPLACED	Example: "ENSURE THE DIGNITY AND QUALITY OF LIFE FOR CONFLICT-AFFECTED INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO" Note: The acronym "FDP" was commonly used to refer to "fertilizer deep placement" technologies. To address this, the use of this acronym was not considered. Instead, the word "displaced" covers nearly all cases used to refer to forcibly displaced persons, including those with the intended use of the acronym.
IDP	Example: "DOCUMENTATION, SHELTER, AND SOCIAL COHESION FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDP) AND EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES IN BURKINA FASO"
REFUGEE	Example: "PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSISTANCE, LIVELIHOODS and DURABLE SOLUTIONS PROGRAM FOR COLOMBIAN REFUGEES IN ECUADOR"
RETURNEE	Example: "IMPROVING REINTEGRATION OF RETURNEES IN BANGLADESH"

67   All aid flows that were channeled through UNHCR regardless of project descriptions were also included.
68   The term "conflict" is commonly used to refer to governance projects involving institutional conflict and therefore the term is used only when used in conjunction with the terms "violent," "victim," or "affected."

b. Using sector codes

Each ODA transaction is tagged to a standardized set of sector codes specified in the CRS. To assess the robustness of the primary strategy using keyword extraction, a secondary indicator of aid for displaced populations was also considered: the emergency response sector. This exploits subcategories of the three-digit sector code 720 in the CRS codebook whose description most closely matches projects intended for displaced populations and are listed in Table A4.3.[69] Emergency response mainly includes assistance in times of crises and subsequent rehabilitation. Compared to the primary approach of key word analysis, this secondary measure is qualitatively less precise in identifying aid targeting displaced groups. Although there is reasonable correlation for most country groups between the estimates based on the two different methods, the secondary method tends to produce more volatile estimates over time.

Similar to estimates derived using the keyword search method, total disbursements intended for displaced populations fell from their 2019 peak, globally as well as in the IDA-18 RSW and GCFF countries and in major hosting countries (Figure A3.1). There is a strong correlation in the estimated annual aid totals for the sample of HFPS countries and the IDA-18 RSW and GCFF countries through 2020.

Table A4.3 Detailed Sector Codes in the OECD CRS Emergency Response Sector

Material Relief Assistance and Services (72010)	Shelter, water, sanitation, education, health services, including supply of medicines, and malnutrition management, including medical nutrition management; supply of other nonfood relief items (including cash and voucher delivery modalities) for the benefit of crisis-affected people, including refugees and IDPs in developing countries. Includes assistance delivered or coordinated by international civil protection units in the immediate aftermath of a disaster (in-kind assistance, deployment of specially equipped teams, logistics and transportation, or assessment and coordination by experts sent to the field). Also includes measures to promote and protect the safety, well-being, dignity, and integrity of crisis-affected people, including refugees and IDPs in developing countries.
Basic Health Care Services in Emergencies (72011)	Provision of health services (basic health services, mental health, sexual and reproductive health), medical nutritional intervention (therapeutic feeding and medical interventions for treating malnutrition), and supply of medicines for the benefit of affected people. Excludes supplemental feeding (72040)
Education in Emergencies (72012)	Support for education facilities (including restoring preexisting essential infrastructure and school facilities), teaching, training and learning materials (including digital technologies, as appropriate), and immediate access to quality basic and primary education (including formal and non-formal education), and secondary education (including vocational training and secondary level technical education) in emergencies for the benefit of affected children and youth, particularly targeting girls and women and refugees, life skills for youth and adults, and vocational training for youth and adults
Emergency Food Assistance (72040)	Provision and distribution of food; cash and vouchers for the purchase of food; non-medical nutritional interventions for the benefit of crisis-affected people, including refugees and IDPs in developing countries in emergency situations. Includes logistical costs. Excludes non-emergency food assistance (52010), food security policy and administrative management (43071), household food programs (43072), and medical nutrition interventions (therapeutic feeding) (72010 and 72011).

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69   In 2020, material relief assistance and services accounted for 56 percent of emergency response disbursements, while emergency food assistance and relief coordination accounted for 25.3 percent and 18.6 percent, respectively. During the sample period 2016–20, there was no disbursement made for purposes 72011 (Basic Health Care Services in Emergencies) and 72012 (Education in Emergencies).

Relief Co-ordination and Support Services (72050)	Measures to coordinate the assessment and safe delivery of humanitarian aid, including logistic, transport, and communication systems; direct financial or technical support to national governments of affected countries to manage a disaster situation; activities to build an evidence base for humanitarian financing and operations, sharing this information and developing standards and guidelines for more effective response; and funding for identifying and sharing innovative and scalable solutions to deliver effective humanitarian assistance

Source: OECD, "DAC and CRS Code Lists," https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/dacandcrscodelists.htm.

Table A4.4 Top ten recipient countries in terms of aid for displaced populations, 2016-2021 (in 2020 million $US)

Year	Country	Aid for displaced populations
2016	Syrian Arab Republic	1,130
2016	Türkiye	765
2016	Jordan	683
2016	Iraq	616
2016	Lebanon	568
2016	West Bank and Gaza	543
2016	Burundi	349
2016	South Sudan	185
2016	Nigeria	172
2016	Yemen, Rep.	148
2017	Syrian Arab Republic	982
2017	Türkiye	972
2017	Iraq	577
2017	Lebanon	560
2017	Jordan	529
2017	South Sudan	443
2017	Uganda	236
2017	Libya	213
2017	Bangladesh	198
2017	Somalia	192
2018	Syrian Arab Republic	802
2018	Iraq	773
2018	Türkiye	762
2018	Jordan	682
2018	Lebanon	596
2018	Bangladesh	410
2018	Ethiopia	289
2018	Yemen, Rep.	222
2018	Uganda	191
2018	Somalia	190
2019	Türkiye	1,060
2019	Syrian Arab Republic	692
2019	Jordan	607
2019	Lebanon	566

2019	Iraq	525
2019	Bangladesh	505
2019	Ethiopia	253
2019	Yemen, Rep.	251
2019	Uganda	243
2019	South Sudan	240
2020	Türkiye	858
2020	Syrian Arab Republic	648
2020	Lebanon	509
2020	Jordan	499
2020	Bangladesh	449
2020	Iraq	424
2020	South Sudan	236
2020	Ethiopia	229
2020	Uganda	224
2020	Colombia	207
2021	Türkiye	1,285
2021	Colombia	1,224
2021	Jordan	570
2021	Lebanon	460
2021	Bangladesh	425
2021	Iraq	404
2021	Syrian Arab Republic	354
2021	Ethiopia	309
2021	West Bank and Gaza	278
2021	South Sudan	271

Source: Staff calculations using OECD CRS disbursement data.

Figure A4.1 Aid to Displaced Populations, Globally and by Country Groupings (in 2020 million US$)

Source: Staff calculations using "DAC and CRS Code Lists," https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/dacandcrscodelists.htm.
Note: Global aid flows correspond to the secondary axis on the right.

Figure A4.2. Total Aid by country (in 2020 million US$)

Note: Total disbursements correspond to the secondary axis on the right.

Figure A4.3. Aid per displaced person by country (in 2020 US$)


Source: Staff calculations using "DAC and CRS Code Lists," https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/dacandcrscodelists.htm.

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