## 1. Project Data

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
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<td>P126773</td>
<td>WARFP AF Guinea, Sierra Leone &amp; Liberia</td>
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<td>Environment, Natural Resources &amp; the Blue Economy</td>
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IEGSD (Unit 4)
2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (p. 1) and the Financing Agreement of April 17, 2015 (p. 6), the Project Development Objective (PDO) was “to strengthen governance and management of targeted fisheries and improve handling of landed catch at selected sites.” The Global Environmental Objective (GEO) of the West African Region Fisheries Program Series of Projects was the same as the PDO.

For the ICR Review, the PDO was unpacked as follows:

i. Strengthen governance of targeted fisheries;
ii. Strengthen the management of targeted fisheries; and
iii. Improve the handling of landed catch at selected sites.

In January 2017, the project received Additional Financing (AF) for US$10 million. The validation does not require a split rating since revisions to the PDO indicators generally expand the project's scope (i.e., expanding an indicator’s coverage to include new participating countries or increasing ambition). At the same time, changes to component activities adjusted the implementation to the client’s needs and priorities. Some revisions to the PDO indicators were made to make them more realistic and feasible to measure without narrowing the project scope.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

Yes

Date of Board Approval

05-Jan-2017

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No
d. Components

Component 1: Strengthening Good Governance and Sustainable Management of the Fisheries (appraisal estimate US$10.4 million; AF US$3.30 million, actual US$11.29 million): This component included four subcomponents:

Subcomponent 1.1: Developing the legal and operational policy and strengthening the institutional capacity to enable sustainable management of fisheries resources (long-term agenda);

Subcomponent 1.2: Strengthening the vessel registration systems for accurate assessment and effective control of fishing capacity (short-term agenda);

Sub-component 1.3: Introducing new fisheries management schemes in target fisheries, segments, or communities to align fishing capacity and effort to sustainable catch levels, which is pursued in parallel with development and implementation of fisheries management plans (medium-term agenda); and

Subcomponent 1.4: Strengthening the system of fisheries-related data collection, compilation and management, and dissemination and communication in a transparent manner (long-term agenda).

Component 2: Reducing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (appraisal estimate US$3.02 million, AF US$1.62 million, actual US$3.23 million): This component financed strengthening fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems by reducing Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities that threatened the sustainable management of fish resources. The component was also to provide legal assistance aimed at strengthening the alignment of the national fisheries legislation with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), particularly Article 73, whereby any foreign vessels and crews detained in the Exclusive Economic Zone was to be immediately released upon posting a reasonable bond, and the flag state of the vessel is immediately notified. Mauritania did not have this component as the fisheries surveillance program was already funded.

Component 3: Increasing Contribution of the Fish Resources to the Local Economy (appraisal estimate US$9.18 million; AF US$4.03 million, actual US$14.01 million): This component was to increase the benefits derived from fish caught in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the countries in particular by investing in infrastructure and institutional capacity that enable improved handling of landed fish and reduction of postharvest losses.

Component 4: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Regional Coordination (appraisal estimate US$6.40 million, AF US$1.05 million, actual US$7.40 million): This component was to finance project implementation and regional coordination within the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP), ensuring that regular monitoring and evaluation was conducted, and the results were fed back into decision making and project management.

When the project received AF on January 5, 2017, the following activities were added to the project:

- **Guinea:** Financing of US$5 million was added to deepen institutional and regal reforms (on the national, regional, and communal level), build the physical and human capacity of local fishing communities to manage and monitor assigned fisheries areas and local businesses as well as further invest in surveillance capacities.
Liberia: Financing of US$1 million was added to advance existing management efforts for targeted fisheries, further build up the Community Management Associations (CMA) model and strengthen local monitoring and surveillance.

Sierra Leone: Financing of US$4 million was added to support community-led fisheries management, regulatory and institutional reform, and improve fisheries monitoring.

Regional level: AF was to enhance the coordination between the WARFP countries and support the utilization of IW-LEARN as a platform for sharing results and knowledge.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The project was estimated to cost US$40.05 million. Actual cost was US$36.62 million.

Financing: The project was financed by two grants for US$12.0 million (of which US$10.9 million was disbursed) and US$10.0 million (US$9.8 million disbursed), and four grants by the Global Environment Facility (GEF): i) TF-19089 (US$7.0 million of which US$5.87 million disbursed); ii) TF-A3532 (US$1.0 million, which fully disbursed); iii) TF-A3533 (US$4.0 million of which US$3.9 million disbursed); and iv) TF-A3530 (US$5.0 million of which US$4.9 million disbursed).

Borrower Contribution: The Borrowers were to contribute US$1.05 million. According to the Bank team (April 20, 2023), all expected funding in Guinea materialized (US$0.5 million) and 60 percent of planned funding in Mauritania (US$600,000). Mauritania’s planned in-kind contribution of US$1 million did not materialize due to resource constraints at the Implementing Agency.

Dates: The project received AF and was restructured five times:

- On January 5, 2017, the project received AF from the GEF for US$10.0 million to add Liberia and Sierra Leone to the project, acting as a bridge to Phase II for these two countries since they had been participating in WARFP Phase I Series of Projects (SOP)-A1 and were preparing their participation in SOP-A2. Also, interventions in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were scaled up.
- On February 28, 2018, the project was restructured to extend the closing date for TF0A3532 for Liberia by 12 months from March 1, 2018, to March 1, 2019, due to a significant delay in implementation caused by elections and a government transition.
- On April 30, 2019, the project was restructured to i) change in components and cost, ii) change in Results Framework to modify the wording of several PDO and intermediate outcome indicators, iii) reallocate between disbursement categories and iv) change in disbursement estimates.
- On July 11, 2020, the project was restructured to i) extend the closing date by nine months from March 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Sierra Leone; ii) realign activities and the Results Framework with actual progress in collaboration and CMAs capacity.
- On August 28, 2020, the project was restructured to extend the closing date by 12 months for Guinea and Mauritania from December 31, 2020, to December 31, 2021, to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on project implementation.
- On December 6, 2021, the project was restructured to extend the closing date for Sierra Leone and Mauritania by two months from December 31, 2021, to February 28, 2022, to ensure the completion of civil works, which had been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Regional/Sector Context: Ocean waters off the coast of West Africa offer some of the world's richest fishing grounds, but most commercially important fish stocks were already fully exploited or overexploited. At appraisal, more than 1.6 million tons of fish were legally captured in West African waters yearly, with an estimated wholesale value of US$2.5 billion. As in many other developing coastal and island nations, weak fisheries governance and management contributed to overcapacity, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, dissipation of resource rent, and depletion of fish resources.

Previous Bank experience: A healthy ocean and sustainable fisheries sector were key for achieving the Bank’s strategic goals of ending extreme poverty within a generation and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner in coastal and island client countries. Ocean waters off West Africa offered some of the richest fishing grounds in the world. In 2009, to ensure the productivity of this resource, the Bank approved a nine-country, multi-phase series of projects (SOPs), the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP). The development objective of the multi-phase WARFP, collectively, was to sustainably increase the overall wealth generated and captured by West African countries through better management of coastal fisheries. Implementation began in 2010 with Cabo Verde, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone as the first group of countries in the Program. Subsequently, Guinea-Bissau and Ghana joined the Program in 2011 and 2012. Mauritania and Guinea were the 7th and 8th countries, respectively, joining this program. Given the absence of physical borders in the ocean scape, improved governance and management in one country’s waters could potentially result in undesired practices and outcomes in the less-regulated waters of neighboring countries. Therefore, complete regional coverage was needed to achieve the full benefit of the interventions at the regional level. The Bank had a deep ongoing engagement in the region, which allowed the Bank to bring locally-adapted best practices to the project and replicate the results achieved under the earlier investments.

Alignment with the Bank's Strategy: The objectives of the project were in line with the Bank’s most recent Country Partnership Framework (CPF) (FY18-23) for Guinea, which focused on boosting agricultural productivity and economic growth, including fisheries through climate-smart practices, improving access to markets and the business environment of markets towns, and promoting economic diversification. The project’s objectives also aligned with the Bank’s most recent CPF for Liberia (FY19-24), which aims to enhance fishery value chains to increase productivity and output in the fishery sector. Furthermore, the project's objectives aligned with the Bank’s most recent CPF for Mauritania (FY18-23), which aims to increase the local share of production value in the fishery sector. Finally, the project's objectives were also in line with the Bank’s most recent CPF for Sierra Leone (FY21-26), which aims to increase revenue from fish resources and boost productivity in the fishery sector to diversify the economy.

The project's objectives also supported the Bank's engagement in the region as stated in the “Western & Central Africa Region Priorities 2021-2025,” which aims to create opportunities for growth and poverty reduction by boosting agricultural productivity and value chains. Also, the Bank’s Blue Economy Development Framework recognizes the significant potential of the marine and freshwater ecosystem’s contribution to achieving the SDGs and delivering smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth globally. The
project also supported the updated (2020) Africa Regional Integration and Cooperation Strategy for the FY2023 period, which noted the need for the management of shared natural resources.

Taking everything together, the relevance of the objective was High.

**Rating**

High

### 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

**OBJECTIVE 1**

**Objective**

Strengthen governance of targeted fisheries

**Rationale**

**Theory of Change:** The project’s theory of change assumed that project activities such as introducing new fisheries management schemes, including community-based schemes, strengthening the vessel registration system, and data collection, compilation, and dissemination, as well as developing the legal and operational policy foundation and introducing rules of resource use were to result in outputs such as new fisheries management schemes being introduced, vessel registration system strengthening as well as data collection, compilation and dissemination and a legal and operational policy foundation being developed. These outputs were to result in the outcome of strengthened governance of targeted fisheries. The project assumed that introducing rules of resource use and management were to result in reduced pressure on fish resources. The theory of change and how project activities were to lead to outputs and outcomes was adequate and logical.

The project made the following assumptions for all three objectives: i) allocation of secure fishing rights will incentivize responsible fishing practices; ii) regional harmonization of fisheries data and regulation will reduce IUU fishing and support conservation of stocks; and iii) interventions in the post-harvest sector potentially influence behavior in the harvest sector.

According to the Bank team (May 30, 2023), even though all three objectives were relevant across the four countries, not all PDO and intermediate indicators applied to all countries since countries were at different stages in terms of readiness and joined different activities for different periods.

**Fisheries Policy and Strategic Framework**

- In Guinea, even though there was no indicator to measure the strengthened policy aspects, the ICR notes that the project supported the new Fisheries Strategy and Investment Plan (along with PROBLUE funding), which was validated in July 2022, complemented by institutional reform of the Ministry of Fisheries, Aquaculture, and Maritime Economy (MPAEM). The MPAEM now supports developing and evaluating annual fisheries management plans based on scientific advice and supervision by equipped MPAEM departments at both central and decentralized levels.
• **In Mauritania**, the Project supported the finalization and evaluation of the implementation of the previous sector strategy (2015-19) and the preparation of the new strategy for managing and sustainable and integrated development of maritime fisheries for 2020-2024. The 2015-19 Strategy introduced ambitious reforms in fisheries management, moving from the previous capacity-centered approach to a focus on sustainable catch limits (fishing quotas), with the 2020-24 Strategy being in continuation of 2015-19. The project achieved the target of the Ministry of Fisheries submitting a proposal for institutional and functional reform to the cabinet, which was then implemented in law in July 2015 (IR1.3). The target of revised regulations integrating i) access management and ii) securing fishing rights was also achieved (IR1.4).

• **In Liberia**, targeted support has improved key elements of the institutional arrangements governing fisheries. Amendments to the legal text of the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Act enabled an institutional reform process, which established the National Fishery and Aquaculture Authority as an autonomous agency with a dedicated budget and authority to design the fisheries management framework.

• **In Sierra Leone**, the target of appropriate regulations integrating i) access management and ii) securing fishing rights being submitted was achieved. The project supported the preparation and submission of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Act of 2018, Fisheries and Aquaculture Regulations of 2019, FAO Ports States measures, and the National Plan of Action for IUU fishing.

• **At the regional level**, a new Strategic Plan 2019-23 for Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (CSRP) activities was developed. The CSRP supported countries in their effort to reform national fisheries policies and regulatory and institutional frameworks by mobilizing high-level expertise and facilitating knowledge exchange through the organization of study tours, etc.

### Fisheries Management Plans

• **In Guinea**, a fishery management plan was developed, achieving the target of one plan being developed. However, the plan could not be validated during the last quarter of 2021 due to the political situation.

• **In Liberia**, the target of one fishery management plan being developed was not achieved. The project delivered a draft national shrimp fishery management plan based on a shrimp fishery stock assessment. The draft management plan had been shared but not approved at project closing.

• **In Mauritania**, two fishery management plans (octopus and meagre) were developed, not achieving the original target of three plans but exceeding the revised target of one plan. The indicator was revised in April 2019 as the focus changed to octopus fisheries. The target value was reduced from 3 to 1, focusing only on a revised octopus plan. The ICR notes that not all implementation measures of these two plans have been enforced yet by regulatory instruments; the level of implementation of the management plans is still limited.

• **In Sierra Leone**, two fishery management plans were developed, achieving the target of two plans being developed. Also, a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) operational plan was developed, achieving the target of developing such a plan.

### Strengthen vehicle registration system:

• **In Guinea**, 84 percent of fishing vessels were registered, not achieving the target of 100 percent. The outcome was assessed by the number of registered vessels divided by the number of vessels surveyed.
In Mauritania, 66 percent of fishing vessels were registered, not achieving the target of 100 percent. The indicator was defined as a measure of the country's preparedness for controlling fishing efforts in each segment; it was assessed by the number of registered vessels divided by the number of vessels identified in the census.

Strengthen Fisheries Management Schemes (PDO#2)

- In Guinea, seven secure fishing rights in the small-scale segment in a participatory, transparent, and scientific manner were allocated, exceeding the target of three fishing rights (PDO#2). A target value of 3 was established based on a point system: one point for the legal establishment of a community association, one point for the adoption of a co-management plan, and one point for the implementation of key measures of the plan relating to the management of fishing efforts such as the number of vessels, area closure, biological rest, and fishing gear.
- In Liberia, the target of allocating one secure fishing right in the small-scale segment in a participatory, transparent, and scientific manner was not achieved.
- In Mauritania, the target of three individual quotas being distributed to all segments in a participatory, transparent, and scientific manner was not achieved. The publication of the criteria and data based on which quotas are being allocated is still lacking. In the artisanal segment, secure fishing rights through specialized individual licenses could not be accomplished due to the incomplete registration of all canoes in the small-scale segment.
- In Sierra Leone, the target for allocation of secure fishing rights was dropped due to limited capacity at the community level, and the artisanal segment remains open access.

Strengthened data collection, analysis, and dissemination (PDO#1)

- In Guinea, 83 percent of fisheries data was published regularly and made publicly accessible, achieving the target of 83 percent. The indicator was designed as a measure of governance improvement with respect to transparency. It was based on six locally adapted variables: i) a list of valid vessel licenses in the industrial segment (monthly); ii) a list of artisanal fishing boats (annually); iii) a list of infractions in the industrial segment (monthly); iv) fees from the licenses (every trimester); v) fees collected under fishing agreements (annually), and vi) fees from infractions (annually). Only variable (v) on fees collected on fishing agreements is not fulfilled because no fisheries agreement has entered into force.
- In Liberia, despite no explicit indicator, the project supported information recording, digitalization, and management, particularly of the industrial trawlers’ observer reports.
- In Mauritania, 100 percent of fisheries data was published regularly and made publicly accessible, exceeding the target of 83 percent.
- In Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone has cumulatively disclosed 75 percent of data on key variables and made it publicly accessible, not achieving the target of 100 percent. The ICR notes (page 43), however, that the data on the key variables are not regularly published.

All the countries made substantial progress in strengthening the policy framework and planning for fisheries management and improved data collection, analysis, and dissemination. There were moderate shortcomings in achieving the targets for vessel registrations and the allocation of secure fishing rights.
Overall, the achievement of the objective of 'strengthened governance of targeted fisheries' is Substantial, with moderate shortcomings.

Rating
Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
Strengthen management of targeted fisheries

Rationale
Theory of Change: The project’s theory of change assumed that project activities such as developing and implementing strategies for monitoring, controlling, and surveilling for IUUs as well as activities already stated under the first objective to create an enabling environment for reducing IUU fishing, were to result in outputs such as strategies for monitoring, controlling and surveilling for IUUs being developed, and an enabling environment for reducing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing being created. These outputs were to result in the outcome of strengthened management of targeted fisheries. The project assumed that enforcing resource use and management rules would reduce pressure on fish resources. The theory of change and how project activities were to lead to outputs and outcomes was adequate and logical.

Surveillance (PDO#4):

- **In Guinea**, the number of hours that the satellite-based surveillance system for industrial fishing vessels by the national fisheries surveillance agency was functional increased from eight hours in 2015 to 24 hours per day in 2021, achieving the target of being functional 24 hours. The days per year where surveillance patrol was carried out increased from 80 days in 2015 to 122 days in 2021, not achieving the target of 200 days. 184 days per year, surveillance of patrol of artisanal fishing boats was carried out, exceeding the target of 96 days. Also, the percentage of fishing vessels inspected by the national fisheries surveillance agency for compliance with national regulations increased from 25 percent in 2015 to 85 percent in 2021, exceeding the target of 80 percent.

- **In Sierra Leone**, all licensed industrial fishing vessels were installed with functional VMS and observers on board, achieving the target of 100 percent. The number of days per year where surveillance patrol was carried out decreased from 80 days in 2017 to 14 days in 2022 due to damage to the vessel propellers and partly due to a failure to appoint vessel officers and crew. As a result, the target of 240 days was not achieved. Also, the percentage of fishing vessels inspected by the national fisheries surveillance agency for compliance with national regulations increased from 35 percent in 2017 to 40 percent in 2022, not achieving the target of 70 percent.

Oversight (PDO#3):

- **In Guinea**, the number of fishing vessels operating in the exclusive economic zones did not exceed the ceiling established for each segment, thus achieving the target of not doing so. Each country's target ceiling was set individually based on the estimated capacity at appraisal. In Guinea, the ceiling values established were: i) 10,000 canoes in the artisanal segment and ii) 85 vessels in the industrial
segment (equal to the number of licenses). A target for the coastal segment was added in April 2019 to account for the growing number of advanced artisanal canoes equipped with an engine (Pêche Artisanale Avancée, PAA). The ceiling for the PAA segment was set at 150 boats. The outcome in the artisanal segment was assessed based on the number of registered vessels in year 5. At closing, 8,862 artisanal canoes were operating in the EEZ, of which 7,011 were registered and 1,851 were non-registerable dugout canoes. The number of registered advanced artisanal canoes (PAA) was 70. The outcome in the industrial segment was inferred from the number of fishing licenses in annual equivalence.

- **In Mauritania**, the number of fishing vessels operating in the exclusive economic zones exceeds the ceiling established for each segment. In Mauritania, the ceiling values established were: i) 7,661 canoes in the artisanal segment, ii) 261 boats in the coastal segment, and iii) 245 vessels in the industrial segment (equal to the number of licenses). The artisanal and coastal segment outcome was assessed based on the number of registered boats and the unknown dormant capacity (canoes and boats inactive for 30 days or more). According to the December 2019 IMROP (Mauritanian Institute for Oceanographic Research and Fisheries) survey, the canoe fleet consisted of 4,014 active and 3,430 inactive canoes for 7,444 canoes. Meanwhile, the Framework Survey Report of July 2020 counted 5,253 active canoes and 2,317 inactive for 7,570 canoes. In either case, the number of canoes operating in the EEZ was under the ceiling established. However, there were 257 active and 130 inactive boats in the coastal segment, according to the December 2019 IMROP survey, while the Framework Survey Report of July 2020 counted 233 active canoes and 200 inactive. In either case, the number of canoes operating in the EEZ was under the established ceiling. The outcome in the industrial segment was inferred from the number of fishing licenses in annual equivalence, i.e., 245 licenses issued in 2020 and equal to the ceiling established. Overall, the number of vessels operating in the EEZ did not exceed the ceiling in two out of three segments.

- **In Sierra Leone**, the target of fishing vessels operating in the exclusive economic zones not exceeding the ceiling established for each segment was achieved. In Sierra Leone, the baseline in 2017 was 114 fishing vessels in the industrial segment. According to the latest list of licensed vessels from September 2021 published on the Ministry's website, a total of 92 vessels were operating in the EEZ of which 78 were fishing vessels, 11 supply vessels, and three carriers. According to the ICR (p. 71), no official target for Sierra Leone was added to project documents, but the PMU tracked the indicator.

The targets for enhancing surveillance were met in Guinea, but there were shortcomings in Sierra Leone. There were no indicators for Mauritania and Liberia. Due to the technological equipment and operational support for surveillance activities, several fishing vessels operating in the EEZs did not exceed the ceiling established based on sustainable levels of harvest and associated fishing capacity in Guinea, Mauritania (except for the coastal segment), and Sierra Leone, thereby achieving the targets. In the artisanal segment, while certain management aspects were improved, fisheries as a whole remain open to access throughout the region. The ICR did not provide any information on Liberia on this PDO aspect.

Overall, the achievement of the objective of 'strengthened management of targeted fisheries' was Substantial with moderate shortcomings.

**Rating**
Substantial
OBJECTIVE 3

Objective
Improve handling of landed catch at selected sites

Rationale
Theory of Change: The project’s theory of change assumed that project activities such as investing in physical infrastructure to facilitate proper fish handling related to the landing platform, fencing, sanitation, storage, and market access were to result in outputs such as physical infrastructure to facilitate proper fish handling being invested in. This output was to result in the outcome of strengthened handling of landed catch at selected sites. The project assumed that investments in the post-harvest subsector in the fisheries industries would influence the behavior in the harvest sector. The theory of change and how project activities were to lead to outputs and outcomes was adequate and logical.

Outputs:

- In Guinea and Liberia, one integrated fish handling site was operational, achieving the target of one site being operational in each country. In Guinea, “operational” was defined as i) ice is available and accessible; ii) water and electricity are available; iii) waste is properly managed; iv) user fees are collected in a transparent manner; and v) a landing dock is functional. In Liberia, “operational” was defined as ice being available and accessible.
- In Mauritania, the target of one integrated fish handling site being operational was not achieved.
- In Sierra Leone, the target of 15 smoke overs being installed was not achieved.

Improved handling of landed catch (PDO#5):

- In Guinea, 58 metric tons of all landed fish were processed according to improved hygiene conditions, achieving the revised target of 30 metric tons. The indicator was revised in April 2019 to track changes in marketable volumes as measured by the total actual volume of processing capacity in accordance with improved hygiene conditions. The revised target with a value of 30 metric tons was not clearly defined. However, the ICR (p. 50) defined it as a daily value of 30 tons of smoking capacity, the primary type of processing at Koukoudé. Also, the original target was measured in “percentage,” making an assessment of the achievement of the original target (70 percent) impossible.
- In Liberia, the ICR notes that the capacity at the Robertsport landing cluster has been strengthened. Equipped with a proper ice machine, cold storage, weighing scales, and energy-efficient smoking ovens, the Robertsport landing cluster became fully functional under this project, and operational budget support ensured daily site management. However, a CMA site management plan could not be completed as planned, partly due to weak support from the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Authority (NaFAA), without which operational and financial management of the site lacks sustainability.
- In Mauritania, 30 metric tons of all landed fish were processed according to improved hygiene conditions, achieving the revised target. The target of this indicator was also revised in April 2019, and the target of 30 metric tons was not clearly defined, as stated above for Guinea. According to the Bank team (May 30, 2023), increased processing capacity was achieved through infrastructure improvements at the existing fish landing site (1st tranche of rehabilitation work). However, the output of one integrated site with a wastewater treatment plant built adjacent to the existing site (2nd tranche of rehabilitation work) could not be completed before the project closing.
In Sierra Leone, the ICR notes that the progress towards finalizing the cluster of landing sites at Konakriedee stalled. Still, post-project implementation arrangements have been made with a partner donor agency to finalize the physical investments needed, including cool chain facilities, smoking ovens, water supply, and sanitary facilities. The ICR notes that at the time of the ICR, construction is nearly complete, and it is expected that the activities will contribute to post-harvest loss reduction and enable fishers to sell their products at higher prices.

Beneficiaries (PDO#6) - (for the whole project)

In Guinea, 52,304 people benefitted from the project, not achieving the original target of 190,000 beneficiaries and exceeding the revised target of 32,000 beneficiaries. 30 percent of the beneficiaries were female, not achieving the original target of 66 percent and exceeding the revised target of nine percent. The indicator was revised in April 2019 to include only the direct beneficiaries that the PIU could trace and verify, and the target was adjusted to 32,000 beneficiaries, of which 9 percent would be women. The revised target included beneficiaries at the administration level, co-management sites (fishermen, processors, wholesalers, etc.), and registered boats (owners and fishermen).

In Mauritania, 54,904 people benefitted from the project, not achieving the original target of 255,000 beneficiaries and exceeding the revised target of 50,000. Six percent of the beneficiaries were female, not achieving the target of 30 percent.

Based on the evidence provided, the project made progress towards improved handling of landed catch in Guinea and Mauritania, even though the ICR notes that the revised targets were not clearly defined. There is partial evidence of increased processing capacity from infrastructure investments in Liberia and Sierra Leone. There is also a lack of comprehensive data on beneficiaries, including in the post-harvest sector for these countries. Overall, the achievement of the objective of 'improved handling of landed catch in selected sites' is assessed to be Modest.

Rating
Modest

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale
While the project made progress on all aspects of the PDO, there were some shortcomings as detailed above. Also, there was partial evidence on certain indicators for some countries even if the PDO aspects was applicable e.g. improved handling of landed catch, project beneficiaries, etc. The achievement of the first two objectives was Substantial while achievement of the third objective was Modest. The overall efficacy is rated as Substantial with moderate shortcomings.

Overall Efficacy Rating
5. Efficiency

Economic efficiency:

The PAD (p. 23) conducted an Economic analysis to evaluate the expected benefits mainly resulting from the activities in Component 1 in Mauritania and Guinea. The analysis developed quantitative bioeconomic models. Also, in both countries, different scenarios of fishing efforts were developed based on expected situations with and without project interventions, where it was assumed that the project was to reduce the fishing effort relative to the levels without the project. The bioeconomic models were used to relate the assumed fishing effort levels to the expected fish population and catch levels. At the same time, expected lower fishing effort levels due to project interventions implied lower fishing costs. Cost reduction was also estimated based on available information. The simulated catch levels were used to calculate expected fishing revenue, from which, combined with estimated fishing cost, obtained the expected net revenue from fishing.

The assessment was applied to the octopus fishery in Mauritania and the aggregate fishery (of all species) in Guinea. Using a discount rate of 20 percent, the analysis calculated cumulative net revenue of US$201 million in Mauritania and US$23.3 million in Guinea during the initial five years. The PAD (p. 23) stated that the analysis results for Mauritania were potentially overestimated due to restrictive model assumptions and a lack of reliable cost data. However, the analysis did not include potential benefits from other fisheries or other project components, which was likely to result in an underestimation of the analysis. Also, the benefits for Guinea were likely to be underestimated since potential benefits from other project components were not included in the analysis. Taking everything together, these analyses indicate that the project was a worthwhile investment. When the project received AF in 2017, the Bank team did not update the economic analysis conducted at appraisal.

The ICR (p. 27) reviewed the assumptions the analysis in the PAD made and found that the basic premises of the analysis were not sufficiently met to allow for a meaningful ex-post analysis. The ICR stated that without careful analysis of the causal direction in the dynamic interaction between fishing effort, harvest, and stock size, it would be premature to conduct an economic analysis to assess how project activities impacted catch and revenue levels without first assessing that those improved as a result of abundance rather than overexploitation.

According to the ICR (p. 26), the activities under components 1 and 2 through an increase in public revenues due to: i) fishing licenses, ii) fines levied for illegal fishing activities, and iii) revenues associated with the successful reduction of illegal fishing such as through partnership agreements. In Guinea, fees for fishing increased from US$5 million in 2016 to US$10 million in 2018. Almost 75 percent of these fees are related to fishing licenses and permits alone. This increase is compared favorably with an overall project investment in this area of US$5 million.

Also, in Sierra Leone, activities under component 2 increased revenues collected by 25 percent from US$8 million in 2017 to US$11 million in 2019. Finally, Mauritania was able to secure the continuation of the EU Sustainable Partnership Agreement due to project activities.

Operational efficiency:
The project experienced several implementation delays as a result of procurement and financial management issues as well as a high staff turnover within the Bank (eight different Task Team Leaders throughout implementation) and locally (as a result of elections and government transition in Liberia) as well as lack of engagement by different PIUs. The project was extended by a total of 26 months.

Given the lack of robust economic analysis and implementation delays, the overall Efficiency is rated as Modest.

**Efficiency Rating**

Modest

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**6. Outcome**

Relevance of the objective was High given the alignment of the PDO with the Bank’s CPFs for Mauritania, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, as well as "Western and Central African Regional Priorities 2021-2025". The project also built on the ongoing engagement in the Region. The efficacy of two objectives was rated as Substantial and one as Modest. The overall Efficacy was Substantial with moderate shortcomings. The Efficiency rating was Modest. Taking everything together, the project’s overall outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory.

a. **Outcome Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

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**7. Risk to Development Outcome**

The risks to development outcomes can be classified into the following categories:

**Political stability and government commitment**: Countries in the region are politically fragile and vulnerable to unrest. Frequently changing governments and priorities as well as power vacuums, can negatively impact the outcomes achieved under the project. Also, there is a co-dependence among coastal countries in this sector, with the success of one country greatly depending on the commitment of neighboring
countries. According to the ICR (p. 39) states need to make continued efforts to empower communities to manage well-defined areas and fisheries. As a result, political stability and government commitment is critical for ensuring the sustainability of project outcomes.

**Financing:** The project’s outcomes most at risk are those requiring the highest levels of financing. For example, according to the ICR (p. 39) ongoing data collection and annual research campaigns require large investments. Also, to improve vessel registration and licensing systems, sufficient resources for updating and enforcing them will be needed. Finally, while certain regional activities such as the regional dashboard are currently being funded by the EU there will be a need to identify more long-term funding. However, given the tight fiscal space all the countries in the region are facing, this will be challenging.

**Technical capacity:** The project was able to strengthen the governments’ capacity for fisheries management and governance as a result of various project activities such as adopting new or revised legal and regulatory instruments, as well as developing and implementing new management plans. However, frequent replacement of staff and the need for continuous training of staff at fisheries monitoring centers and surveillance operations will pose a risk to capacity built if there is lack of financing of training activities.

### 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

#### a. Quality-at-Entry

According to the ICR (p. 34) the project was based on a diagnostic of the development challenges and priorities of the region. Also, according to the PAD (p. 14) the project was built on lessons learned from several national and regional projects. Some of the key lessons considered included the following: i) need for an effective management system of access to fisheries resources; ii) need for sequencing of project activities to achieve desired results is important in case of complex design; iii) need to mobilize the appropriate level of expertise to adequately support fisheries governance reform processes; and iv) need to set up a well-functioning M&E system. The project design built on prior analytical work such as the 2014 study on "Transitioning towards Inclusive Green Growth in Mauritania" and the 2008 World Bank report, "The Main Results and Recommendations for the Fisheries Sector".

According to the PAD (p. 22) the Bank team identified relevant risks and rated “institutional capacity for implementation and sustainability” and “fiduciary” risks High. When the project was approved, project readiness was advanced and operational risks to safeguards, procurement, and Financial Management were all adequately mitigated. All legal covenants and requirements for effectiveness were met, and effectiveness was declared three months after Board approval.

The Bank team did not identify the risk of cancelling the next phase of the WARFP. According to the ICR (p. 33) this decision resulted in a large disappointment especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone which affected collaboration between the PCUs and the Bank team and also had a negative impact on the regional momentum and the role of the RCU in steering regional dialogue and harmonization.

The Results Framework had some shortcomings (see section 9a for more details). Also, the implementation arrangements for the performance-based management approach were too complex hampering its effectiveness. Also, according to the ICR (p. 32) capacity control of the small-scale segment was too ambitious and none of the countries were able to implement segment-wide capacity
control of the artisanal fleet as a result of a lack of local engagement due to misaligned incentives (Mauritania), incomplete registration of canoes (Guinea and Mauritania) and a lack of political will (Sierra Leone). As a result, the segment remained open access and is in many cases the main culprit in terms of overfishing.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

According to the ICR (p. 33) the Bank team conducted proactive supervision adapted to the needs of each country. Up to the Mid-Term Review (MTR) in 2018 candid Bank reporting showed that the project experienced slow implementation progress, low disbursement levels, poor project coordination, weak financial management, and lengthy procurement procedures. The Bank addressed these issues by refocusing the scope of activities. For example, in Mauritania the project started to only focus on octopus and in Guinea to focus on the artisanal sector. These measures resulted in higher project efficiency. The ICR (p. 33) stated that the project could have benefitted from more realistic ratings for development objective and implementation progress, especially for Sierra Leone.

According to the ICR (p. 33) the project experienced a high turnover of Task Team Leaders (TTLs) with a total of eight TTLs throughout implementation.

The Bank team restructured the project five times and obtained AF to add Liberia and Sierra Leone to the project as well as increase the scope of project interventions.

The ICR (p. 33) stated that transition arrangements were adequate for infrastructure investments, but project activities related to budget and operational support such as for surveillance patrols in Sierra Leone lacked transition arrangements to local and financial resources to ensure continuity. In Guinea, the Bank team was able to obtain PROBLUE funding in 2020 to follow-up with key activities and sustain project outcomes. In Liberia, the Bank is preparing a follow-on project to build on the outcomes achieved under this project. However, according to the ICR (p. 38) the countries were disappointed by the Bank’s decision to abandon the programmatic approach, which in some cases undercut planned activities. Especially, in Sierra Leone the decision deteriorated the relationship between the Bank and the government and impacted Bank supervision.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization
a. M&E Design

The objective of the project was specified. Also, the theory of change and how key activities and outputs were to lead to the intended outcomes was sound and reflected in the Results Framework. PDO indicator #5, relating to post-harvest loss, was revised due to a lack of baseline data and capacity to practically implement weighting of landed catch and sales. The intermediate outcome indicators were inadequate to measure the implementation progress of certain activities including alternative livelihoods activities in Guinea (and later in Sierra Leone), stocks assessment, and some regional activities conducted by the CSRP.

According to the ICR (p. 30), a modality with disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) was designed to motivate performance and management of results. Due to the DLI constraints in the Financing Agreements, which required third-party audit reports accompanied by a detailed review of expenditures incurred under the Eligible Expenditure Program, the DLI modality needed early restructuring. This resulted in a long delay for the first-year disbursement and led to replacing the DLI modality with a more straightforward Performance Based Contract.

An assessment of M&E capacity in Guinea and Mauritania was conducted during project preparation. The assessment showed weak capacity for conducting monitoring activities due to a lack of experience and administrative infrastructure. Three key challenges were identified: i) lack of validation of field-level data; ii) incomplete datasets and inconsistent reporting; iii) under-utilization of data in decision-making and policy formulation. The project addressed this by providing capacity-strengthening activities.

According to the PAD (p. 19), M&E at the regional level was to be performed by the CSRP, which was also responsible for coordinating M&E activities in the two countries with the respective fisheries ministries and assisted by the PIUs. The CSRP was also to provide technical backstopping to the countries on M&E, apply the data quality assurance mechanism already in place for other WARFP countries, conduct data collection, and foster cross-country learning. The RCU was responsible for coordinating in-country M&E activities with respective fisheries ministries.

b. M&E Implementation

The project’s Results Framework was revised four times during project restructuring to modify the wording of several PDO and intermediate outcome indicators, to add a few outcome targets for Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In April 2019, the Results Framework was revised to measure the direct beneficiaries that could be directly tracked and verified, as the original indicator included co-beneficiary livelihoods throughout the value chain. The revised target included beneficiaries at the administration level, co-management sites (fishermen, processors, wholesalers, etc.), and registered boats (owners and fishermen). However, when the project received AF in 2018, outcome targets were limited to specific indicators. However, even if not all indicators were applicable for all countries, given that countries were at different stages of readiness, there was still a lack of context-specific indicators to measure all the PDO aspects. The beneficiaries data was reported only for two out of the four countries.

According to the ICR (p. 35), countries submitted semi-annual and annual reports consolidated into project-level progress reports. Performance-Based Contracts data collected by countries was reviewed
by a third-party verifier, which offered an additional layer of transparency and validation of the M&E data collected.

According to the Bank team (April 21, 2023), national fisheries agencies produced much of the M&E data needed to report on project indicators and recorded them as official statistics for each participating country. Annual third-party verification reports for Performance-Based Contracts added an additional layer of validation of the M&E data collected to track implementation progress.

c. M&E Utilization

According to the ICR (p. 35), M&E data was routinely used to inform project management and decision-making. Also, the Results Framework identified key implementation challenges, such as reaching the artisanal fleet segment in connection with vessel registration or completing investments at landing sites. In addition, the project’s M&E activities strengthened the national capacity for M&E and informed national decision-making. Also, the project introduced new transparency standards. According to the ICR (p. 36), vessel registries and sector revenues were published in the press and online in Guinea and Mauritania, data that was never published before.

The Bank team also stated that M&E sustainability is likely post-project closing for two main reasons. First, the indicators were official government statistics collected, compiled, and published by the ministries/agencies overseeing fisheries. To that extent, the project did rely on national systems, with the PIUs accessing and reporting (subsets of) official data. Second, the project sought to support increased access and transparency on information, culminating with Mauritania joining the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) during project time and Guinea being in the process of joining.

Given shortcomings in M&E in terms of lack of context-specific outcome and intermediate outcome indicators for adequate reporting on all aspects of the PDO for all countries and lack of adequate integration of country-level indicators/targets during implementation/AF, the overall M&E quality rating is Modest.

M&E Quality Rating
Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as category B and triggered the Bank’s safeguard policies OP/BP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP/BP 4.04 (Natural Habitats), OP/BP 4.11 (Physical Cultural Resources), OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement), and OP10.00, paragraph 12 related to the project in situations of urgent need of assistance or capacity constraints (which was applied to Guinea).

The ICR (p. 36) stated that the project prepared Environmental and Social Management Frameworks (ESMFs) to assess the Environmental and Social (E&S) risks and identify measures to address these risks. Also, the project developed Resettlement Policy Frameworks (RPFs) and Resettlement Action Plans.
(RAPs), which complied with the Bank’s policies and the respective countries’ regulations. Even though the project did not include any activities that affected critical natural habitats, the project conducted E&S assessments and measures to protect, maintain, and rehabilitate natural habitats. Also, even though project activities did not affect critical physical and cultural resources, the project conducted E&S assessments and measures to protect, maintain, and rehabilitate these resources. In each project country, there was at least one E&S safeguard specialist.

According to the ICR (p. 36), the project complied with the triggered safeguard policies throughout implementation and was consistently rated Satisfactory. However, the operations portal showed that the consistent Safeguard rating was Moderately Satisfactory.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management and Procurement:

Overall, the project remained in compliance with fiduciary requirements throughout implementation. Over the lifetime of the project, both financial management and procurement were rated Moderately Satisfactory. The safeguards and fiduciary compliance by country are discussed below.

Guinea:

- Financial Management was Satisfactory, and no significant shortcomings were noted.
- Procurement performance was Satisfactory, and the project's contracting processes were conducted in an overall satisfactory manner. The Procurement Plan (PPM) and STEP system were regularly updated and detailed planning for the implementation of the latest activities exists.

Mauritania:

- Financial Management was Satisfactory throughout implementation. However, the project experienced an issue with some works delivered after the closing date of February 28, 2022, and the withdrawal application related to these expenses (US$ 466,135.25) which were considered ineligible for payment under the financing was deleted. As a result, there was no ineligible expenses at the project’s closing date.
- Procurement was Moderately Satisfactory. The project faced several procurement related challenges including awarding of some contracts was subject to significant delays in relation to the deadlines planned in the project's procurement plan. Also, difficulties were encountered in the application of archiving procurement documents and the dual procedure of the World Bank and the Public Procurement Code, which new reforms resulted in confusion and conflicts in the roles of the different actors in the procurement cycle. The Bank team addressed these issues by putting in
place a rigorous monitoring system for the execution of contracts, and a system of archiving procurement documents.

Sierra Leone:

- Financial Management was Satisfactory throughout implementation.
- Procurement was Moderately Satisfactory. Sierra Leone portfolio had five procurement activities planned during the entire project life, only two activity contracts were signed, and one activity was completed. Two were still under implementation based on the information available in STEP at the time the ICR was written. The project experienced some significant issues in the purchase of patrol boats including determination of technical specifications, market approach, delays in procurement process and delivery of the boats. Also, there was also a problem of coordination between the procurement agent, which was project fiduciary management housed in the ministry of finance and the PIU in the ministry of fisheries that contributed to delays in decision making and approval processes.

Liberia:

- Financial Management was Moderately Satisfactory. There were some challenges in the execution of the budgets. Also, the PMU did not have sufficient staff to perform the internal audits as there was initially only one internal auditor. Eventually, the PMU recruited more staff.
- Procurement was Moderately Satisfactory. During implementation, the procurement of the majority of contracts was delayed due to low level of both technical and procurement capacity on the project. There were significant delays on preparation of TORs, evaluation of CVs, and proposals, and award of contracts.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)
NA

d. Other
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11. Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings</th>
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<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of M&amp;E</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Shortcomings in adequacy of country level indicators/targets to measure the outcomes and</td>
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12. Lessons

The ICR (p. 40-41) included several lessons learned:

- **Fisheries management reforms require a medium to long-term horizon given the need to engage with multiple stakeholders and address behaviors that are deeply rooted in tradition and often related to the poorest segment of the population.** The design of this project was too ambitious in some areas such as in controlling capacity and access in the small-scale segment resulting in not being able to build a broad consensus on effective fisheries management, demonstrate results, and develop viable models. Since there will not be a follow-on project, there is a high risk of putting the project outcomes at risk.

- **Community Management Associations (CMAs) are an effective mechanism for introducing new harvesting rules, local surveillance, enhancement measures and local site monitoring to recover fish stocks and sustain fisheries productivity in managed fishing areas.** This project was able to establish or strengthen CMAs. The next step will require defining access modalities for artisanal fishermen outside the community and improving coordination among various CMAs sharing resources.

- **Performance based management linked to disbursements can be a critical tool to provide incentives for a swift implementation, but it is important to allow for a smooth application.** In this project, the effectiveness of the tool was impacted by the complexity of implementation arrangements due to issues such as i) complicated processes related to indicator definition, measurement, success metrics, and allocation of proceeds making implementation and monitoring difficult for PIUs; ii) contracting independent verifiers made coordination between the RCU and the two PIUs challenging; iii) backloading of technical audits towards the later years for cost reasons left limited time and space for recipients to use the funds and apply corrective measures to improve performance; iv) pre-defined program of eligible activities left little possibility for adjustments; and v) requirement of a specific RCU-contracted financial audit which was deemed not necessary in retrospect given the regular annual audit of financial statement.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provided an adequate overview of project preparation and implementation of a complex multi-country operation. The ICR was sufficiently outcome-driven and candid about implementation issues. The ICR provided useful annexes on the activities and results achieved by each country. In a few instances, the evidence
provided was inadequate to assess all four countries on all PDO aspects. There was an inconsistency between the safeguards rating reported in the ICR and the actual safeguards rating.

Taking everything together, the ICR’s quality rating is Substantial.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
   Substantial