



1. Project Data

Project ID P160931	Project Name Myanmar SEA DRM Project	
Country Myanmar	Practice Area(Lead) Urban, Resilience and Land	
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-60800,TF-A5031	Closing Date (Original) 31-Oct-2023	Total Project Cost (USD) 2,171,617.15
Bank Approval Date 15-Jun-2017	Closing Date (Actual) 31-Oct-2023	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	117,000,000.00	1,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	4,570,357.86	60,274.46
Actual	2,171,617.15	60,274.46

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

This project in Myanmar, was part of the Southeast Asia regional program on Disaster Risk Management (DRM) financed by the World Bank (WB). The program involved a series of projects (SOPs) in Myanmar, Cambodia and Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao, PDR).

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1, page 5) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 15):



" To improve drainage services, and the structural performance of selected public facilities in Yangon, and enhance the capacity of the Government to facilitate disaster response ".

For the purpose of this Implementation Completion and Results Report Review (ICRR), the PDOs are unpacked as shown below:

PDO 1. To improve drainage services in Yangon.

PDO 2. To improve the structural performance of selected public facilities in Yangon.

PDO 3. To enhance the capacity of the Government to facilitate disaster response.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

There were five components (PAD, pages 16- 19).

1. Strengthening financial planning for disaster resilience. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$20.00 million from the International Development Association (IDA) credit and US\$1.00 million a trust fund (TF) grant. The actual cost was US\$60, 274 from the TF grant. There were two sub-components:

a. Support for Strengthening Disaster Resilience. This sub-component planned to provide technical assistance (TA) to strengthen the financial planning capacity of the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF) for disaster resilience by: (i) mainstreaming disaster and climate resilience into investment planning and development processes; (ii) preparing a national disaster and climate risk financing strategy; and (iii) facilitating Myanmar's participation in the regional disaster risk pooling mechanism; and (iv) support for day-to-day implementation.

b. Payment of Disaster Risk Insurance Premium. This sub-component planned to facilitate sovereign risk coverage (including, without limitation risk coverage) through the financing of premia for the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Financing Facility (SEADRIF).

2. Urban Flood Risk Management. The estimated cost at appraisal US\$71.00 million (IDA credit). The actual cost was US\$1.63 million. There were two sub-components:

a. Drainage Improvements. Activities in this sub-component aimed to improve and increase the capacity of drainage infrastructure in selected locations in Yangon.

b. Flood Risk Management Planning and Maintenance. Activities in this sub-component aimed at providing TA and maintenance equipment to build capacity for integrated flood risk management through; (i) developing and operationalizing an improved asset management system and improving drain maintenance;



(ii) revising planning regulations and building codes for sustainable drainage systems; and (iii) identifying and preparing climate-resilient designs for drainage equipment and expansion.

3. Safer Public Facilities and Critical Infrastructure. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$22.00 million (IDA credit). The actual cost was US\$0.25 million. There were two sub-components:

a. Risk Reduction for Public Facilities and Infrastructure. Activities in this sub-component aimed at improving the structural performance of critical public facilities and infrastructure.

b. Risk Assessment of Critical Infrastructure and Institutional Capacity Building. Activities in this sub-component aimed at institutional capacity building for: (i) carrying out multi-hazard of lifeline/critical infrastructure; and (ii) developing a digital database of building information.

4. Project Management. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$3.00 million (IDA credit). The actual cost was US\$0.21 million. This component planned to provide assistance for project implementation, including on coordination, technical matters, fiduciary management, social and environmental safeguards, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting.

5. Contingent Emergency Response Component. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$0.00 million. The actual cost was US\$0.00 million. This component aimed to provide immediate response to an eligible crisis or emergency, as needed. This component was not activated.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$117.00 million. The actual cost was US\$2.17 million. The significant difference between the appraisal estimate and actual cost was due to the non-completion of many project activities, when the Bank paused all disbursements in accordance with OP/BP 7.30 on February 1, 2021, following the military takeover in Myanmar.

Financing. The project was financed by an IDA Credit of US\$116.00 million and a South East Disaster Risk Insurance Facility Program Multi-Donor Trust Fund (TF) Grant of US\$1.00 million. US\$2.11 million of the IDA credit and US\$60,724 of the TF Grant was disbursed.

Dates. The project approved on June 15, 2017, became effective on December 14, 2017 and closed as scheduled on October 31, 2023.

Changes. The project was restructured on March 12, 2020, as part of the Myanmar Active Portfolio bulk restructuring. This restructuring extended the timeline for submission of audit reports from six to nine months.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale



Country context. Myanmar ranked 2nd out of 187 countries in the 2016 Global Climate Risk Index and 9th out of 192 countries in the Index for Risk Management (INFORM). Over the past 25 years, Myanmar had 24 disaster events (severe floods and landslides). These events affected 4 million people and caused US\$4.7 billion in damages (estimated at 0.9% of GDP) and disproportionately affected the vulnerable segments of the population.

Sector context. Myanmar is rapidly urbanizing, with concomitant demand for urban infrastructure and public services. Much of this urban development was unplanned and inconsistent with the required standards and regulations. Integrating risk management solutions in public investment planning was especially needed in the growing Yangon City (a vital economic hub and the most populous city in Myanmar) to reduce the costs of natural disasters and improve service delivery (such as urban drainage and safer public facilities). Moreover, the Government was lacking disaster response financing instruments to finance social protection activities in post-disaster situations. A comprehensive approach with pre and post-disaster measures was important to the Government strategy.

Government and Yangon priorities. The project activities were well-aligned with the Government and Yangon city priorities. The Government's "2016 Myanmar Economic Policy" articulated the need for "establishing towns that are compatible with environmental conservation, enhancing public services, creating more public places and protecting cultural heritage". The "2013 Strategic Urban Development Plan for Greater Yangon" aimed to make the city more livable by conserving heritage and green spaces. The project aimed at aiding Myanmar in fulfilling its international obligations under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on Disaster Management and Risk Reduction.

The PDO was well-aligned with the current Government strategy articulated in the *Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018- 2030)*. The PDO was directly related to Strategy 3.6 "building a priority infrastructure base that facilitated sustainable growth and economic diversification" and strategy 5.2 "increasing resilience to climate change, reducing exposure to disasters and shocks while protecting livelihoods and facilitating a shift to a low-carbon growth pathway".

WB strategy. The project was well-aligned with the WB's 2014 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) and the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2015 - 2017. The project activities were consistent with the CPF pillars of : (i) capacity building of national and provincial agencies in governance and institutional development; (ii) infrastructure and urbanization through critical infrastructure investments; and (iii) climate change and disaster risk management through resilient investments and disaster risk financing and insurance (DRFI).

The PDOs are relevant to the WB's CPF for 2020-2023. The project supported the CPF focus area of "enhancing climate and disaster resilience and sustainable natural resource and environmental management" and objective 3.1 "Strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities against climate and natural disaster risk". The CPF noted that the current patterns of urbanization in Myanmar (combined with environmental degradation and climate change) were likely to heighten the risks of shocks and their consequences.

The project was aligned with the WB's 2020 - 2025 Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) countries. The fourth pillar of this strategy articulated the need for mitigating the spillovers of FCV (such as forced displacement and shocks from climate and environmental change).



Bank experience. This was the first WB project in the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC). The project's financing was made possible by a subsidiary agreement between the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF) and the YCDC to utilize the IDA credit by the Yangon regional government, an innovative and untested financing tool. The project activities included disaster risk financing and sectoral reforms aimed at increasing Myanmar's resiliency against adverse disasters. The project activities were articulated to provide upstream regulatory planning tools to disaster risk finance and analytics and downstream resilient investments in public infrastructure in Yangon City. Given the fragile country context, the scope of work was relatively ambitious. The relevance of PDO is rated as substantial.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

PDO 1. To improve drainage services in Yangon.

Rationale

Theory of change. The causal links between activities (inputs), outputs and outcomes were logical. The intended outcomes were monitorable. The outputs of activities such as drainage improvements (through improving culverts, main and interceptor drains and major outlet structures) and TA aimed at operationalizing the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) asset management system and preparing climate-resilient designs for drainage equipment, were likely to help in realizing the outcome of improving drainage services in Yangon. The outcomes were likely to aid in realizing the long-term outcome objective of enhancing the resiliency of the Government and the population of Yangon from natural disasters. The theory of change explicitly assumes that the improved drainage services are maintained by the government.

Outputs.

- TA to mitigate flood risks work was completed before the military takeover. TA related to the promotion of sustainable urban drainage systems (SUDS), originally conceived under the project, was completed by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID).
- The activities were expected to improve drainage services through increasing the length of culverts and main interceptor drains. These activities were not completed as targeted.
- The project aimed at constructing five major outlet structures incorporating storm pumps. None were constructed.
- The SCADA system was not operationalized.

Outcomes.



The envisioned activities were expected to: (i) increase the number of people benefitting from flood protection: and (ii) increase in area provided with improved drainage services.

- The number of poor people benefitting from improved drainage did not increase and remained at the baseline.
- There was no increase in area with improved drainage services.

Efficacy of this PDO is rated as negligible.

Rating

Negligible

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

PDO 2. To improve the structural performance of selected public facilities in Yangon.

Rationale

Theory of change. The causal links between activities, outputs and outcomes were logical. The intended outcomes were monitorable. The outputs of activities such as seismic retrofitting of identified public buildings and facilities and establishing building information database were likely to help in realizing the desired outcome of improving selected public facilities in Yangon. The theory of change explicitly assumes that the building information database is regularly utilized and maintained by the government.

Outputs.

- A multi-Hazard Risk assessment of the Water Supply Network was completed in November 2018. This allowed the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) to identify the most vulnerable water supply system elements.
- None of the eight identified public buildings and facilities were retrofitted to withstand earthquakes at a "Life Safety" performance level (reference standards in Myanmar).
- The building information database was not established as targeted.
- There was no increase in the percentage of beneficiaries who were satisfied with the improved drainage services.

Outcomes.

The envisioned outputs were expected to increase the number of occupants benefitting from public facilities strengthened to "Life Safety" performance level.

- The number of occupants benefitting from public facilities did not increase and remained as at the baseline.

Efficacy of this PDO is rated as negligible.



Rating
Negligible

OBJECTIVE 3

Objective

PDO 3. To enhance the capacity of the Government to facilitate disaster response.

Rationale

Theory of change. The causal links between activities, outputs and outcomes were logical. The intended outcomes were monitorable. The outputs of activities such as capacity building for strengthening financial planning for disaster resilience and payment of disaster risk insurance premium for the Southeast Asia Disaster Resilience Insurance Facility (SEADRIF), were likely help the Government with the capacity to access sovereign disaster risk insurance and the long-term development outcome of enhancing the resiliency of Myanmar to natural disasters. The theory of change assumes that the Government regularly paid the premium for disaster risk insurance.

Outputs.

- A real-time flood risk monitoring platform was completed in July 2018. This platform provided the Government with rapid and reliable information on impacts of floods for informed decisions during and following flood events.
- Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for establishing the SEADRIF in December 2018, with Lao PDR, Cambodia, Japan, Singapore and the SEADRIF Insurance Company and signed the insurance policy with the SEADRIF Insurance Company on February 1, 2021.
- The Ministry of Planning and Finance did not develop and adopt a strategy for building financial resilience to disasters.

Outcomes.

The outputs described above were expected to ensure that Myanmar had the information and capacity to access sovereign disaster risk insurance.

- Myanmar's policy purchase agreement with SEADRIF was cancelled on March 24, 2021 due to the nonpayment of the premium following the military takeover.

Efficacy of this PDO is rated as negligible.

Rating
Negligible



OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

Overall efficacy is rated as negligible due to the significantly low achievement of targets. This is also largely due to the Bank pausing of all disbursements in accordance with OP/BP 7.30 on February 1, 2021, following the military takeover in Myanmar.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Negligible

Primary Reason

External shock

5. Efficiency

Economic analysis. A cost-benefit analysis was conducted at appraisal for component one to three project activities. These activities accounted for 80% of the appraisal estimate. For component one activities, a preliminary analysis of the portfolio of flood risk for Myanmar, Cambodia and Lao PDR showed savings in excess of 27% for the countries. The savings were to come from catastrophe risk pooling and economies of scale in operational costs, as compared to if the countries were to access the international reinsurance market individually. When disaster risk insurance was provided through the regional pool, the Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) was estimated at 30%. With a 10% discount rate, the Net Present Value (NPV) was US\$2.30 million on average. The benefits of drainage activities were assumed to come from benefits to road users due to improved drainage infrastructure. The EIRR for this activity was 32.6%. With a 10% discount rate, the NPV was US\$86.88 million. The economic benefits of retrofitting public facilities were assumed to come from reduced damages and avoiding disruption of economic activities. The EIRR was estimated at 18.2%. With a 10% discount rate, the NPV was US\$13.25. A simple average of the combined EIRR for the three activities was 26.6%.

Economic analysis was not conducted at closure, since key outputs such as civil works or insurance premium payments, were not completed. The project supported only TA activities. This coupled with limited data constrained quantifying the economic impact of project activities at project closure.

Administrative and Operational Issues during Implementation: Project disbursements were significantly delayed, with only 1.8% of the loan disbursed when disbursements paused. The delays were on account of several factors, such as: (i) continued setbacks in the SEADRIF premium payment due to the longer-than-anticipated deliberations on operationalizing the SEADRIF insurance company; and (ii) procurement delays and delays in preparing safeguards and impact assessment activities. The delays were exacerbated by factors over which the project had no control, such as the military takeover on February 1, 2021 and the setbacks in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.

Overall efficiency is negligible. The project generated few benefits as most project activities were not completed.

Efficiency Rating

Negligible



a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	26.60	80.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The relevance of the PDO to the Government strategy and Bank strategy is substantial. Both efficiency and overall efficacy are negligible. Taking these ratings into account, the outcome is Highly Unsatisfactory, reflecting severe shortcomings in the project's achievement of its objectives and in its efficiency.

a. Outcome Rating

Highly Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Political risk. Following the military takeover in February 2021, the WB paused disbursements in accordance with OP/BP 7.30. The ICR (para 74) notes that based on available information, violence and crackdowns continue in Yangon. The ICR acknowledges that meaningful infrastructure is unlikely to restart in the short term, and that WB was unable to verify the compliance with the Bank's environmental and social safeguards.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The Bank prepared this project based on the lessons learnt from previous Bank-financed projects in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. Lessons incorporated at design included: (i) assigning a vital role to the MOPF for promoting investments in risk reduction in planning and development; (ii) arranging for training and awareness raising by specialists, given the fragile country context; and (iii) combining physical investments with installing SCADA system to enable the key drainage infrastructure to be controlled and monitored remotely. The PAD utilized the pilot Agile program, a 2016 -2020 Bank initiative which aimed to reduce the project preparation time.



As part of the regional SEADRM initiative, the project coordinated with the SEADRM projects in Cambodia and Lao PDR, which were also under preparation. The Bank prepared this project in close collaboration with other donor agencies who were financing complementary activities in Myanmar (including the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan International Coordination Agency (JICA) and the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation) to avoid duplication of activities.

The preparation team identified several risks at appraisal including High risks relating to the political situation and governance, low institutional capacity and fiduciary risks. Even with mitigation measures, the project risk was rated as High at appraisal, given the fragile country context (PAD, para 48).

The implementation arrangements made at appraisal were appropriate. The Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF) was in charge of implementing upstream national-level activities (components 1 and 5). The Project Management Unit (PMC) established by the Yangon City Development Committee (YCDC) was in charge of implementing activities in Yangon City (components two to four). The arrangements made at appraisal for safeguards and fiduciary compliance were appropriate (discussed in section 10).

There were moderate shortcomings at the Quality-at-Entry. One, the project activities, which included upstream regulatory activities at the national level and downstream activities at the Yangon City, were relatively ambitious, given the weak implementation capacity in the fragile country context, and two, there were shortcomings in M&E design (discussed in section nine).

Quality-at-Entry Rating Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank fielded ten implementation support missions and three technical missions focused on cultural heritage. Between missions, the Bank scheduled regular meetings with the implementing agencies and other development partners to provide appropriate technical guidance. In the wake of the restrictions occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bank adapted by utilizing virtual check-ins for procurement and financial management. The continuity of leadership was maintained, with only one change in Task Team Leader (TTL) during implementation. During implementation, the Bank coordinated with DFID, which co-financed TA activities pertaining to capacity building for the YCDC. Following the military takeover, the Bank paused all disbursements in accordance with OP/BP 7.30 on February 1, 2021.

There were shortcomings in supervision. There could have been more candor in reporting progress on the ground. All Implementation Status Results Reports (ISRs) before the Bank paused disbursements in 2021, rated PDO as Satisfactory and implementation progress as either moderately satisfactory or above, even though only 1.8% of the loan was disbursed when disbursements paused. The ICR notes that this reflected the expectation that procurement of the large works contracts would commence imminently. However, with less than three years remaining till the closing date, it was unlikely that these major contracts would have been implemented and completed in time to achieve the PDO even in stable country situation. Second, the deficiencies in M&E were not rectified during implementation although the indicators and targets were envisaged to be reviewed during the Mid-Term Review (MTR) to better capture all the project



activities. Overall Bank performance is rated as moderately unsatisfactory for the deficiencies in supervision.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The results framework was logical, and the four outcome indicators (discussed in section four) were, for the most part, adequate for monitoring project performance. The indicators were specific, time-bound, with baselines and targets. The Ministry of Planning and Finance's (MOPF) Treasury Department was responsible for monitoring component one activities, the Project Management Unit (PMU) at the Yangon City Development Committee (YMDC) developed and maintained the M&E system for the project activities in Yangon.

There were shortcomings in the M&E framework. Although the M&E design appropriately envisioned measuring the key outcome indicators (improved flood protection and occupants for public facilities) to be disaggregated by poverty level and gender, targets were not set for these sub-indicators. The key outcome indicators for component one activity were not measured sufficiently to capture the intended outcome, and component two activities (flood risk management planning and maintenance) were not tracked by any indicator.

b. M&E Implementation

The methodology for data collection was straightforward and clearly specified, and values for almost all the indicators could be collated from existing departmental records or consultants' progress reports.

The ICR (para 60) noted that although the M&E implementation was carried out as planned, albeit with significant delays. The regular reporting was often delayed and semiannual progress reports were submitted only three times, starting in August 2019 (that is, almost two years after the credit became effective), before the military takeover in February 2021. The survey for the baseline of project beneficiaries was significantly delayed and not implemented due to the COVID-19 pandemic. No adjustments were made to the Results Framework, although the indicators and targets were envisaged to be reviewed during the Mid-Term Review (MTR) to better capture all the project activities.

c. M&E Utilization



The ICR (para 61) observed that the YCDC worked with the Bank to deliver updates on project implementation progress, highlighting issues affecting implementation to identify and resolve challenges. These reports helped to facilitate and inform discussions between the Bank and the implementing agencies on ongoing issues. The ICR acknowledges that there was little evidence to show that whether the M&E was utilized adequately to improve implementation progress.

In sum, overall M&E is rated as Negligible. Although the M&E system as designed was generally sufficient to assess the achievement of the objectives, there were shortcomings with M&E implementation and little opportunity to utilize the M&E reports/system given the termination of the project.

M&E Quality Rating

Negligible

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category B (partial assessment) project under the World Bank safeguard policies. Four safeguard policies were triggered at appraisal (PAD, page 4): Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04); Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11); and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12).

Environmental Assessment, Natural Habitats and Physical Cultural Resources. The PAD (para 74) noted that the negative environmental impacts were expected to be temporary and site-specific. The safeguards on natural habitats was triggered, as there were three threatened species of animals in Greater Yangon. The safeguards on physical cultural resources was triggered due to the possibility that such cultural resources could be found during construction. An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared and publicly disclosed to address these issues. The ratings for environmental safeguards were rated as Satisfactory before the military takeover and the subsequent pause in communications. However, most activities had not yet started when the Bank paused all project disbursements in Myanmar.

Involuntary Resettlement. The PAD (para 71) noted that land acquisition impacts were expected to be minimal, as investments mainly focused on underground drainage systems. The retrofitting of existing public facilities was not expected to result in land acquisition, as they were located on public land free of encroachment. As detailed locations of investment were not known at appraisal, a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was prepared and publicly disclosed to address issues pertaining to land acquisition and resettlement. The performance rating for social safeguards was moderately satisfactory in October 2022 due to the delay in completing key social inputs into the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and the resettlement planning process. The ICR does not provide details on whether there was land acquisition or resettlement.



b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management (FM). The Bank conducted a financial assessment of the MOPF at appraisal. The assessment concluded that most departments had adequate staff to manage the FM. The overall financial risk was, however, rated as Substantial, given the fragile country context (PAD, para 63). The ICR (para 66) noted that following the military takeover, the Bank performed monthly desk reviews of the materials sent by the PMU. FM did not reveal any irregularities during implementation. The interim financial reports (IFRs) of acceptable quality were submitted up to March, 31, 2023. The final audited financial statement was due by June 30, 2024. The remaining funds for the project's designated accounts were refunded to the Bank in November 2023 and all expenditures incurred were documented in January 2024.

Procurement management. The Bank conducted a procurement assessment of the MOPF at appraisal. The MOPF had experience with implementing Bank-financed projects. The assessment identified the risks associated with lack of an adequate legal framework and procedures, limited experience in international competitive procurement, language proficiency, delays in approval process and lack of a system for procurement complaints. Mitigation measures were incorporated at design. Even with the these measures, procurement risk was rated as substantial, given the fragile country context. The ICR (para 66) noted that procurement performance during implementation was rated as Satisfactory despite the delays but was downgraded to moderately satisfactory in 2021 after the military takeover when project procurement was suspended.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

There were no unintended impacts.

d. Other

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Highly Unsatisfactory	Highly Unsatisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Shortcomings in supervision.
Quality of M&E	Modest	Negligible	Shortcomings in M&E implementation and utilization.
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons



The ICR draws the following two main lessons from the experience of implementing this project, with some adaptation of language.

1. Careful management of the procurement process may be particularly needed in fragile country contexts with weak implementation capacities. The procurement delays experienced in this project demonstrated the need for simplifying the approval processes through avoiding large contracts and instead organizing the civil works in smaller and more manageable contracts.

2. Effective coordination of development partners may raise the potential for targeted interventions without duplication of effort. This project was prepared alongside complementary activities financed by other development partners including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and DFID. The Bank's efforts to collaborate helped the project avoid duplication and achieve synergies.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is clear and well-written. The theory of change expounded in the text shows the clear logical links between project activities (inputs), outputs, and desired outcomes. The text explicitly states the assumptions underlying the theory of change. The ICR clearly acknowledges the issue with reporting progress in the Implementation Status Results Reports. The ICR draws reasonably good lessons from the experience of implementing this project.

Overall, the ICR quality is rated as Substantial.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial