GENDER LANDSCAPE: POLAND Ewa Cukrowska-Torzewska (University of Warsaw) Reena Badiani-Magnusson (World Bank) MAY 2025 Poland has made important strides in strengthening gender equality, particu- larly in education where women now outperform men in many areas of human capital development. However, untapped opportunities remain to better trans- late these strengths into the labor market and society. While Polish women are highly educated, they participate less in the labor force, with differences most pronounced by age, education level, and family situation. Improving access to flexible work arrangements and expanding quality childcare could help more women balance work and family responsibilities – an area where cultural norms still place disproportionate caregiving expectations on women. Strengthening men’s engagement in family life and promoting shared responsibilities would support broader social progress. Addressing persistent gaps in wages, pensions, and leadership roles would also ensure that women’s educational achievements translate into equal economic outcomes over the life course. At the same time, greater focus on men’s well-being – including supporting those in vocational tracks and tackling health disparities – can contribute to more inclusive and bal- anced outcomes for all. This note draws on data and research to highlight both the challenges and opportunities ahead, and to identify key priorities for advanc- ing gender equality in Poland. 2 LIST OF CONTENT 1. Overview������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������4 2. Human Capital����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5 3. Labor Market�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������10 4. Power����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������20 5. Violence����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22 6. Institutions: norms and family policies�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24 7. Conclusion and recommendations���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27 References���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29 3 1. OVERVIEW Poland continues to lag behind the EU average on holistic measures of gender equality, with slow and uneven progress. According to the Gender Equality Index (GEI) developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality, Poland scored 63.4 points out of 100 in 2024 – ranking 18th in the EU and 7.6 points below the EU average. The GEI measures gender equality across six core domains: work, money, knowledge, time, power, and health, with 100 reflecting full equality be- tween women and men. While Poland has made gains over time in the GEI – most notably after 2020, due to improvements in how time is shared between genders on care, domestic work and social activities – its overall pace of progress (7.9 points since 2013) has been slower than the EU average. As a result, the gap between Poland and the EU average has widened over time. Poland has made important strides towards gender equality, with notable im- provements in areas such as work participation. A number of gaps however re- main visible, including in the domains of political representation and decision-making roles. Despite gains over time (Figure 1), Poland still lags behind EU averages in most areas included in the index, highlighting the need for tar- geted policies and initiatives to promote gender equality. Poland faces particu- lar challenges in the domain of power, which includes political representation and decision-making roles (Figure 2), with a score of 39.6 compared to the EU av- erage of 61.4. Furthermore, progress also varies within domains: while in work participation Poland’s score has converged to EU average between 2013 and 2024, reflecting rising female labor force participation, Poland scores second from the bottom in terms of segregation and quality of work in 2024, pulling down the average score in the work domain. Figure 1. Gender Equality Index in Poland and EU countries, 2024 and 2013 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 SE DK NL ES BE FR LU FI IE DE AT EU27 SI MT IT PT LT BG PL LV CY EE SK CZ HR EL HU RO Gender Equality Index 2024 (data 2022) Source: European Insitute for Gender Equality, [date of access: 26.05.2025] 4 Figure 2. Components of the Gender Equality Index in Poland and EU27, 2024 63 Index 71 72 Time 69 85 Health 89 80 Money 83 70 Work 74 60 Knowledge 64 Power 39 61 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 PL EU27 Source: European Insitute for Gender Equality, [date of access: 26.05.2025] 2. HUMAN CAPITAL Gender inequality in human capital in Poland presents a complex picture, with persistent barriers limiting women’s economic outcomes and an emerging re- verse gender gap disadvantaging men in education and health. According to the Human Capital Index (HCI) from 2020, Poland ranked 12th among EU27 countries, with a score of 0.75 – above the EU average of 0.73. This means that a child born in Poland in 2020 could achieve 75% of their potential lifetime pro- ductivity - what it could have been with complete education (defined as 14 years of high-quality school by age 18) and full health (defined as survival up to at least age 60). When broken down by gender, the picture gets more complex - girls in Poland have a significantly higher HCI score (0.79) than boys (0.72), a 9 percent- age point gap - larger than the average gap for the EU of 6 percent (Table 1 and Figure 3). The reverse gender gap on the Human Capital Index is driven by two main fac- tors: boys performance on harmonized test scores and male health outcomes. First, while boys and girls in Poland have comparable expected years of school- ing up to age 18, boys perform worse on harmonized test scores, indicating weak- er learning outcomes (Table 1). Second, and more strikingly, male health 5 outcomes are substantially worse, reflected in lower adult survival rates. As of 2020, Polish men had a life expectancy of 74.1 years, nearly eight years shorter than women (81.8 years)—a gap among the widest in the EU. This disparity is linked to higher rates of preventable mortality, including from cardiovascular disease, alcohol-related conditions, and risky behaviors, all of which undermine men’s long-term health and earning potential. Moreover, the HCI does not cap- ture the full extent of gender divergence in post-secondary education; as such, the HCI gender difference in expected years of schooling is negligible since it does not reflect the sizeable reverse gender gap in tertiary education in Poland. Women in Poland are now far more likely to enter and complete tertiary educa- tion, reinforcing a longer-term shift in human capital accumulation patterns. In sum, while girls currently have stronger outcomes in both education and health, these advantages have not fully translated into equal labor market returns due to persistent structural constraints. Meanwhile, boys’ growing disadvantage in foundational human capital—compounded by poorer health and lower life ex- pectancy. Figure 3. Human Capital Index, 2020 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 FI SE IE NL EE SI PT FR BE CY DK PL CZ DE AT EU27 ES IT HR MT LV LT EL LU HU SK BG RO HCI female-male ratio HCI Poland 2020 Human Capital Index and its components by gender Table 1.  Component Boys Girls Overall HCI 0.72 0.79 0.75 Survival to Age 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 Expected Years of School 13.4 13.5 13.4 Harmonized Test Score 525 535 530 Learning-adjusted Years of School 11.2 11.5 11.4 Adult Survival Rate 0.85 0.94 0.89 Source: Human Capital Index 2020, [date of access: 5.06.2024] 6 Women in Poland are better educated than men on average, but gendered pat- terns in study choices continue to shape divergent pathways. The higher aver- age education of women in Poland (Figure 4), is a consequence of different education choices at young ages driven by gender differences in test scores, as well as men being more likely to drop out of tertiary education and less likely to continue at master’s and higher levels (Gulczyński, 2023a). In 2023, nearly 51 per- cent of Polish women aged 30 to 54 held a tertiary degree, well above both the Polish male rate of 35.6 and the EU average for women of 42 percent (Figure 2). Among university graduates, women represented 66 percent of degree holders, resulting in the number of women obtaining a degree in Poland being twice as large as the number of men (Gulczyński, 2023b). However, gender segregation in the fields of study remains a persistent challenge, influencing labor market out- comes and reinforcing/continuing occupational divides. Women are still signifi- cantly more likely to choose degrees related to education, health and welfare, humanities and arts (39 percent of all female students compared to 19 percent of all male students)1, despite the increased representation of women in STEM fields observed in the last decades (Gulczyński, 2023b). These patterns are often rooted in intergenerational influences: research shows that young women and young men tend to follow the educational paths modeled by their parents, with parental educational background playing a significant role in field selection (Cukrowska-Torzewska, 2017). Figure 4. Population aged 30-54 by gender and education level, 2023 34.3 42 35.6 50.8 36.6 30.7 49.2 34.1 9 10.4 20.1 16.9 9.6 11 5.6 4.1 Men Women Men Women EU 27 Poland Tertiary (levels 5-8) Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary (levels 3 nad 4) – vocational Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary (levels 3 nad 4) – general Less primary, primary and lower secondary (levels 0-2) Source: Eurostat: Population by educational attainment level, sex and age (%) [edat_lfs_9903], [date of access: 6.06.2024] 1 Source: Gender Equality Index based on Eurostat, Education statistics, 2020. educ_uoe_enrt03. https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2022/domain/knowledge/PL 7 Figure 5. Share of women among upper secondary graduates, 2019 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 IT SI PL CZ AT SK FI EE BE EU ES PT DK FR DE LU LV NL LT SE EL HU IE Vocational General Source: Education at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators, [date of access: 6.06.2024] The overrepresentation of women in tertiary education in Poland is closely linked to educational pathways in secondary school. Girls are significantly more likely than boys to enroll in the general secondary education track, which allows con- tinuing education at the tertiary level (Figure 5). In contrast, boys are more likely to pursue vocational secondary education (Figure 6), a pathway that has long been perceived as a choice of less talented and less ambitious students (Mazik- Gorzelańczyk, 2016), which contributed to its lower attractiveness. Recognizing the need to revitalize and revalue vocational training, Poland has undertaken several reforms and initiatives in recent years to promote this pathway and re- duce its stigma. These efforts include strengthening cooperation with employ- ers, adapting the offer and content of vocational education following employer’s needs, introducing systems to forecast labor market demands for vocational training and tracking the careers of vocational graduates (Sitek and Stasiowski, 2022). Gender differences in secondary education choices in Poland are closely linked to disparities in foundational skills among 15-year-olds, particularly in reading and mathematics. As in many other OECD countries, Polish boys significantly underperform girls in reading; however, this reverse gender gap is among the highest in Europe. According to the 2022 OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the reverse gender gap in reading in Poland was 29 score points, 4 and 2 points higher than the OECD and EU averages (Figure 7). Just over one in four (27.5 percent) of 15-year-old boys was classified as undera- chieving in reading, compared to 16.8 percent of girls. In contrast, boys in Poland slightly outperform girls in mathematics, with a gap of 5.5 score points, though this gap is smaller than in many other countries (Figure 7). These performance patterns have long-term implications: boys are more likely to pursue vocational education — often influenced by weaker reading skills—while girls are more like- 8 ly to follow academic tracks, building on their relative strength in literacy. Given that gender gaps in literacy and numeracy tend to widen over early ages and ad- olescence (Borgonovi et al., 2021), there is a need in Poland for tailored strategies in early education that simultaneously address boys’ challenges in reading and girls’ relative disadvantage in mathematics already at early-stage education (Gulczyński, 2023b). Strengthening foundational skills in both domains early on would help level the playing field and open up more balanced educational and career trajectories for all students.  nrollment of 16- to 18-year olds, by type of education Figure 6. E and sex, 2021 100% 90% 80% General secondary education 70% Vocational high school 60% Basic vocational 50% Not at school/other 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Boys Girls Source: World Bank estimates using Household Budget Survey Mean gender gaps (boys-girls) in reading and mathematics, Figure 7.  2022 15 10 5 10.4 9.1 5.5 0 -5 Reading -10 -26.6 -24.2 -28.6 Mathematics -15 -20 -25 -30 EU average OECD average Poland -35 Source: PISA 2022 Results 9 A pronounced reverse gender gap is also evident in health outcomes in Poland, particularly life expectancy and health behaviors. In 2021, Polish men had a life expectancy of 71.7 years compared to 79.7 for women – both figures falling below EU27 averages of 77.7 and 83.3, respectively.2 As in many countries, the life expec- tancy of Poles declined during the COVID-19 pandemic, with men experiencing a slightly larger drop (2.4 years) than women (2.2 years) between 2019 and 2021. The persistent gender gap in life expectancy reflects high excess mortality of middle-aged men, particularly those aged 40-59 (Zarulli et al., 2021). This dispar- ity stems in part from a combination of behavioral and social factors, such as obesity, alcohol use, smoking habits, and insufficient health prevention (Statis- tics Poland, 2023). Health care utilization data underscores this pattern: men are significantly less likely than women to consult primary care physicians (21.9 vs. 27.8 percent), specialists (12.4 vs. 1.,2 percent), and dentists (7.4 vs. 10 percent) health care, and are also less likely to take prescribed medicines (68.2 vs. 80.1).3 Yet, despite these gaps in both outcomes and engagement, men consistently report better perceived health than women: 69.8 of men rate their health as good or very good, compared to 63.4 percent of men, and are less likely than women to report poor health conditions and chronic diseases.4 This paradox – lower objective health outcomes but higher self-assessed health among men – highlights the need for gender-sensitive health policies. Tackling these chal- lenges requires targeted outreach to men, improved access to preventive servic- es, and a broader shift in health-seeking behaviors to reduce avoidable mortality and narrow the gender gap in life expectancy. 3. LABOR MARKET Despite having stronger educational attainment than men and longer life expec- tancy, Polish women are less likely to participate in the labor market than men. In 2024, the share of Polish women actively involved in the labor market, as meas- ured by the labor force participation rate among the population aged 25 to 64, stood at 76.5 compared to 87.5 for men. The resulting gender difference of 11 per- centage points was similar to the EU average of 10.5 percentage points (with EU averages of 77 for women vs. 87.5 for men). Labor force participation in Poland for 25 to 64 year olds has converged upon the average in the EU27 (Figure 9), but con- 2 Based on World Development Indicators [date of access: 14.08.2023] 3 Based on Statistics Poland: Healthcare in households in 2020: https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ zdrowie/zdrowie/ochrona-zdrowia-w-gospodarstwach-domowych-w-2020-r-,2,7.html [date of access: 10.06.2024] 4 According to 2019 European Health Interview Survey (EHIS) https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/zdrow- ie/zdrowie/stan-zdrowia-ludnosci-polski-w-2019-r-,26,1.html [date of access: 10.06.2024] 10 tinues to ranks below most EU27 countries in female labor force participation: only 4 out of 27 Member States had lower participation rates among females aged 25 to 64 in 2024 (Figure 8). This is despite the significant increase in the female participation rate observed in Poland from 2013 to 202 (Figure 9).  emale labor force participation rates for 25–64-year-olds Figure 8. F in 2010 and 20234, by country 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 EE SE LT FI PT HU LV DK NL SK CZ DE CY SI BG FR IE LU ES MT AT HR PL BE EL RO IT 2024 2010 EU 25-64 average for 2024 Figure 9. Trends in labor force participation rates for 25–64-year-olds, by gender 95 90 EU27 M 85 PL M 80 EU27 All 75 PL All 70 EU27 F 65 PL F 60 55 50 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Source: Eurostat: Activity rates by sex, age and citizenship  (%)[lfsa_argan], [date of access: 27.05.2025] Female labor force participation in Poland falls sharply with age – ranking 16th highest among EU27 countries for women aged 25-54 but dropping to 4th low- est for those aged 55-64. With Poland’s population aging rapidly, boosting par- ticipation among older women is essential—both to strengthen pension adequacy and to mitigate labor force decline in coming decades. Women aged 50 to 64 are significantly less active than younger women and their peers in oth- er European countries (Figures 10 and 11). The labor force participation of older Polish women (aged 55-64) has more than doubled over the past two decades from 20.9% to 49%. However, despite this significant progress, the participation 11 gap between Polish women in this age group and their EU counterparts has widened slightly, increasing from 11.4 to 13.2 percentage points. In contrast, the participation gap between younger Polish women (aged 25-54) and their EU counterparts has reversed, as younger and typically more educated women par- ticipate in the labor force in greater measure. The relatively low participation of older women in the labor market is due, in part, to Poland’s low statutory retire- ment age for women (60 years) – a threshold which continues unchanged de- spite rising life expectancy and increasing fiscal pressures on the pension system (Malec and Tyrowicz, 2017)5. Female labor force participation in Poland continues to vary widely across edu- cation, family status, and place of residence, reflecting the interplay of structur- al and individual factors. Among younger women (aged 15-24), low activity rates reflect continued participation in education (Figure 12). For prime working-age women (aged 25-49), the activity rate is strongly influenced by education level and caregiving responsibilities. Women with lower education, women living in small towns and rural areas, and mothers of two or more children – especially those with children under the age of five – are among the least likely to be em- ployed (Figures 11, 12 and 13; Magda, 2019). In contrast, the women with higher education and women without children exhibit the highest activity rates, high- lighting the critical role of skills, place-based opportunities, factors feeding into geographic immobility – including availability and affordability of housing in dy- namic regions – and family policies in shaping female labor force participation. Figure 10. Trends in labor force participation for 25-54 and 55- to 64-year-olds 25-54 M-PL 25-54 F-PL 25-54 F-EU 27 55-64 M-PL 55-64 F-PL 55-64 F-EU 27 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 5 In 2016 the government decided to rescind as from October 2017 the 2013 reform that would have taken the retirement age to 67 in stages for both women and men. The 2013 reform gradually raised by four months per year the statutory retirement age, starting with men born in 1948 and women born in 1953. For men, the target age was being increased from 65 years in 2013 to 67 years in 2020. For women, the convergence period was longer and a pension age of 67 would be reached in 2040 from an age of 60 in 2013. The law enacted on 16 November 2016 reduced the retirement age back to 60 for women and 65 for men from 1 October 2017 onwards. 12 Figure 11. 2024 activity rates Figure 12. 2024 activity rates in Poland and EU27, by gender among individuals aged 25-64 in and age groups Poland and EU27, by gender and education level6 100 100 90 90 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 15-24 25-49 50-64 ISCD 0-2 ISCD 3-4 ISCD 5-8 EU 27 – males EU 27 – males EU 27 – females EU 27 – females Poland – males Poland – males Poland – females Poland – females Source: Eurostat: Employment rates by sex, age and educational attainment level (%) [lfsa_ergaed], [date of access: 27.05.2025] Figure 13. Maternal Figure 14. Maternal employment rates in Poland employment rates in Poland and EU average, by the and EU average, by the age of number of children aged 0-14 the youngest child 90 90 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 One child Two children Three or more Youngest Youngest Youngest aged 0-14 aged 0-14 children aged child aged child aged child aged 0-14 0-2 3-5 6-14 EU 27 average EU 27 average Poland Poland Source: OECD, [date of access: 27.05.2025]. 2021 or latest available year. 6 ISCED stands for  International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED levels 0-2 refer to less than pri- mary, primary and lower secondary education, ISCED levels 3 and 4 refer to upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education, and ISCED levels 5-8 refer to tertiary education. 13 A range of structural and social factors underlie the diverse labor market partic- ipation patterns among Polish women. First, the division of labor between part- ners remains deeply rooted in traditional gender norms and attitudes in Poland, particularly among lower educated groups and those living in rural areas (see section 6). These norms influence both expectations and choices, often placing the burden of caregiving on women. Indeed, more than 75% of women who are not employed or seeking employment cite childcare or other family duties as the reason (Magda, 2019). This challenge is compounded by limited access to for- mal childcare services, especially for children aged three and under, particularly in rural areas and smaller towns. This persists despite the recent efforts to ex- pand childcare provision and affordability (Szelewa and Polakowski, 2018)7. Sec- ond, the rigidity of Poland’s labor market makes it diff icult for women – particularly mothers – to reconcile work and family life. The availability of part- time job or flexible work arrangements is extremely limited, and long, inflexible working hours often serve as a barrier to participation, especially for women with young children (Matysiak and Węziak-Białowolska, 2016). These structural con- straints reduce women’s options and reinforce gendered employment patterns. At the household level, women’s labor market inactivity can have substantial economic consequences, particularly in lower-income households where a sin- gle income source is often insufficient to make ends meet. The gender gap in employment is wider in worse-off households than in better-off ones, indicating that economic vulnerability and gender inequality often go hand in hand (Fig- ure 15). This is partly due to the design of tax and social benefit system, which, can create disincentives for secondary earners – typically women – to enter the labor market. In some cases, taking up a low-paid job may reduce overall house- hold income due to the withdrawal of social benefits or crossing income thresh- olds, making inactivity a more f inancially rational choice (Magda, 2019). Reforming these systems to make work pay for all women—regardless of house- hold income level or education—will be essential to closing gender gaps in labor force participation. 7 There are various forms of childcare for children aged 0-3: crèches (żłobki), “children's clubs” (kluby malu- cha), “daily childcare workers” (opiekunowie dzienni), and “nannies” (nianie). In 2011 the government intro- duced a program called “Toddler” (Maluch) which provided municipalities and private childcare entities with the opportunity to apply for financial support from state funds. This has resulted in a massive grow of private childcare: while in 2012 42% of all crèches were ran by private companies, in 2017 this share was equal to 78% (Szelewa and Polakowski, 2018). 14 Figure 15. Employment level among individuals aged 24-60 in 2021, by household income quintile 100 90 Working, male 80 Working, female 70 60 50 Employed 40 30 20 10 0 Poorest 2 3 4 Richest quintile quintile Source: World Bank analysis using Household Budget Survey. Even among those who participate in paid employment, significant gender dif- ferences persist in the type of jobs and sectors in which men and women work. The Polish labor market remains highly segregated, both horizontally and verti- cally, with more women than men working in public institutions, industries such as education and health, and service-related occupations. According to OECD data, women accounted for 60.6 percent of in public sector employment in 2020, slightly above the OECD average of 58.9 percent.8 More recent national data for 2022 show an even higher concentration of women in the public sector (62.7 per- cent), compared to just 42.6% in the private sector.9 Occupational segregation is also reflected in sectoral patterns: women in Poland are highly concentrated in service sectors, including education (82% of the workforce versus 73% EU aver- age), health and social work (82% compared to 79%), and accommodation and food services (62% versus 53% EU average); (Figure 16). These sectors, while es- sential to the economy and society, often offer lower wages and more limited ca- reer progression, contributing to gender disparities in pay and pensions. 8 OECD https://stat.link/xb0mk9 [date of access: 16.07.2024] 9 https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/labour-market/working-employed-wages-and-salaries-cost-of-labour/employ- ment-in-the-national-economy-in-2022,7,19.html [date of access: 16.07.2024] 15 Figure 16. The Share of women by industry in Poland and EU27, 2023 Agriculture, forestry and fishing Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply Water supply; sewerage, waste management Construction Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles Transportation and storage EU 27 Accommodation and food service activities Poland Information and communication Financial and insurance activities Real estate activities Professional, scientific and technical activities Administrative and support service activities Public administration and defence Education Human health and social work activities Arts, entertainment and recreation Other service activities 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Source: Eurostat: Employment by sex, age, occupation and economic activity (from 2008 onwards, NACE Rev. 2) (1 000) [lfsa_eisn2] [date of access: 16.07.2024] Working conditions for men and women working in Poland differ significantly, particularly in terms of contract stability and job flexibility. Women are more like- ly than men to be employed on temporary contracts, which offer less job securi- ty and do not grant employment protection – particularly important for women returning to work after childbirth. According to 2023 Eurostat data, 13.8% of fe- male employees in Poland held temporary contracts, compared to 10.3% of male employees, and 11.9% of women across the EU27 on average10. In addition to less contract stability, Polish women also experience lower levels of workplace flexi- bility than male employees. Data from the European Working Conditions Survey reveal that only 15% of female employees found it “very easy” to take an hour or two off during working hours for personal or family matters, compared to 18% of male employees and 22% of women across the EU11. Similarly, 77% of working women in Poland reported having fixed starting and end times, compared to 10 Source: Eurostat: Part-time employment and temporary contracts - annual data [lfsi_pt_a__cus- tom_12184783] [date of access: 16.07.2024] 11 Source: Computed at EIGE using microdata from Eurofound's European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/ta_wrklab_wrk_baltime_flex_timeoff__ewcs_ takehrsoff/datatable?colg=ANSWER&col=sex&row=geo [date of access: 17.07.2024] 16 64% of working men and 66% of women working in Europe on average.12 While telework has become more common, the share of Polish women working from home remains below the EU average. In 2023, 15.4% of both Polish women and men reported working from home either usually or occasionally, compared to around a quarter of women in the EU. These differences highlight ongoing struc- tural barriers to flexible, secure employment for women, which are particularly relevant for balancing work and care responsibilities and for improving women’s long-term attachment to the labor market13. As in most countries, women in Poland continue to earn less than men, though the size of the wage gap has evolved over time. In 2022, the “unadjusted” gender wage gap”, defined as the difference between the average gross hourly earnings of male and female paid employees, expressed as a percentage of male earn- ings, was equal to 7.8%, 5 percentage points less than the EU27 average of 12.7 percent (Figure 17). Despite this relatively small gap, Poland is among the few EU countries where gender wage inequality has increased over time: be- tween 2010 and 2022, the wage gap rose by 3 percentage points. Longer-term historical data suggest that this recent widening may reflect a return to earlier patterns. Between 1995 and 2012, Poland’s average wage gap hovered around 9%, similar to today’s level (Goraus and Tyrowicz, 2014). This indicates that pro- gress in closing the wage gap has stalled or even reversed in recent years, under- scoring the need for more targeted efforts to address both direct and structural drivers of pay inequality – such as occupational segregation, difference in work- ing hours and unequal access to leadership roles. The size of the gender wage gap in Poland varies considerably across different segments of the labor market. One notable dimension is its variation across the wage distribution: women’s earnings disadvantage is most pronounced at the top of the income scale, where disparities are significantly larger than among lower- or mid-paid workers. According to the 2018 data, the gender wage gap among the highest-paid men and women reached 20%, almost three times greater than the gap observed among middle-income earners (Eurofound, 2021). Thus, among the highest-paid workers in Poland, women earn one-fifth less than their male counterparts. By contrast, the gender wage gap was narrower in the public sector than in the private sector, and in some male-dominated indus- tries, such as construction, where pay structures are more compressed and standardized (Magda et al., 2015; Magda and Cukrowska-Torzewska, 2019). These patterns highlight how sector, position and pay level intersect to shape wage in- equalities, particularly at the top of the earnings ladder. 12 Source: Computed at EIGE using microdata from Eurofound's European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/ta_wrklab_wrk_baltime_flex_varystart__ ewcs_worktime [date of access: 17.07.2024] 13 Source: Eurostat: Employed persons working from home as a percentage of the total employment, by sex, age and professional status (%) [lfsa_ehomp__custom_12184283] [date of access: 17.07.2024] 17 While Poland’s unadjusted gender wage gap appears relatively low in a Europe- an comparison, this masks deeper inequalities once differences in education and job characteristics are taken into account. Women in Poland are, on aver- age, significantly better educated than men (see Section 2). When controlling for education levels and broader human capital characteristics, the adjusted gender wage gap in Poland rises to 18-20% (Goraus et al., 2015). Further adjust- ing for occupational and sectoral differences narrows the gap slightly to 15-18%, indicating that women with similar qualifications and job characteristics earn, on average, about 85% of what men are paid for similar work. This persistent dif- ference is often attributed to discriminatory factors, and in Poland, this discrimi- natory component is relatively high (Boll and Lagemann, 2018), highlighting systematic barriers to fair pay for women14. In addition to overall wage disparities, women in Poland face a “motherhood penalty”, albeit relatively small compared to other countries, while men experi- ence a “fatherhood premium”. The penalty is captured as the difference in aver- age wages of mothers and childless women. While it is relatively small in Poland, estimated at 0 to 2%, it contrasts with the 13% wage premium enjoyed by fathers compared to childless men (Cukrowska-Torzewska and Lovasz, 2016, 2020). The motherhood penalty is lower than the average penalty for developed countries, which is approximately 3.6-3.8 percent (Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak, 2020). While the relatively low penalty may reflect strong labor market attach- ment among mothers, fatherhood-related wage gains significantly amplify overall gender pay disparities. These cumulative inequalities – lower labor force participation, occupational segregations, and persistent wage gaps – contribute to a pronounced gender gap in pensions. As of 2023, women in Poland received pensions that were, on average, 17% lower than those of men (Figure 17), and compared to a 25% gap across the EU27. In response to the vulnerability of women in retirement, the Pol- ish government introduced the “MOTHER 4+” program in 2019, offering a mini- mum pension to mothers of four or more children who left or never entered the labor market. While the program aims to provide financial security in old age, the program has been criticized for reinforcing traditional gender roles, as only mothers who left paid jobs or did not work at all are entitled to the benefit, and fathers who did not work can only claim the benefit if the mother is deceased.15 The long-term effectiveness of this policy in addressing gendered pension ine- qualities remains to be seen. 14  he estimates provided by Boll and Lagemann (2018) reveal a raw gender gap of 6 percent and the ad- T justed gap of 12 percent, which is less that the statistics reported by Goraus et al. (2015). The discrepancy may stem from data sources, as the two studies use different databases: Polish 2012 Labor Force Survey Goraus et al. (2015) and 2014 Structure of Earnings Survey (Boll and Lagemann, 2018). 15 https://krytykapolityczna.pl/kraj/mama-4/ [date of access: 22.07.2024]  18 Figure 17. The "unadjusted" gender pay gap in 2010 and 2023, by country 30 Difference in pay as a % of male earnings 25 20 15 10 5 0 EE AT CZ DE SK HU LV FI DK FR BG NL EU27 HR PT LT SE CY MT IE ES SI PL BE RO IT LU EL -5 The unadjusted gender pay gap measures the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male and female paid employees and of female paid em- ployees as a % of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees Source: Eurostat: Gender pay gap in unadjusted form [sdg_05_20] [date of access: 18.05.2025] Figure 18. The gender pension gap among population aged 65 years and older, in 2010 and 2024, by country 50 2010 45 2024 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 MT NL LU AT IE FR IT ES BE CY PT SE DE EU27 EL HR FI RO HU PL BG LV LT CZ SK SI DK EE Source: Eurostat: Gender pay gap in unadjusted form [sdg_05_20] [date of access: 18.07.2024] 19 4. POWER Poland continues to see fewer female voices represented in decision making roles, particular in the economic and social spheres. In 2023, Poland scored 36.4 out of 100 in the “power” domain of the GEI— its lowest score across all six do- mains—and ranked 20th among EU27 countries, well below the EU average of 59.1. This domain captures gender equality in decision-making positions across the political, economic and social spheres. Poland scored below the EU average in all three areas, with particularly large gaps in the social and economic spheres. In 2021, women accounted for 22.6% of decision-makers in research-funding or- ganizations (EU average: 40.2%), 12.5% in media organizations (EU: 36.6%) and 6.1% in sports bodies (EU: 19.1%). In the economic sphere, 23.8% of board seats in listed companies were held by women (EU: 30.5%), and 17.4% of positions in na- tional central banks (EU: 26.5%). More granular data point to a similar picture in the broader corporate sector. Ac- cording to the Gender Board Diversity Dataset (Drążkowski et al. 2024), women make up just 14% of management and supervisory boards in private companies (in addition to the stock-listed ones as in GEI) in Poland16. While there has been gradual progress – with female board representation rising by 6 percentage points between 2001 and 2020, and the share of companies reporting no female board member declining from 91 percent to 84 percent (Figure 19) – Poland con- tinues to lag behind other European countries. Of the 26 countries for which the data were available, 23 countries recorded a higher share of female board mem- bers than Poland (Figure 20)17 in 2020. Figure 19. Women’s representation in boards of private companies in Poland, 2001-2020 100% 30% Share of boards with no women 90% Female share in boards 25% 80% 70% 20% 60% 50% 15% 40% 30% 10% 20% 5% 10% 0% 0% 2004 2008 2006 2009 2007 2005 2002 2020 2003 2014 2001 2010 2018 2016 2019 2017 2012 2015 2013 2011 Share of boards with no women Female share in boards Source: Own work using Gender Board Diversity Dataset (Drążkowski et al. 2024) 16 The data covers 43 European countries and was created using firm-level Orbis data. 17 For 2020 the data are available for 31 countries. The estimated share of women on boards was zero for four countries not shown on the graph: Türkiye, Ukraine, Romania and Russia. 20 Figure 20. Women’s representation in boards of private companies in 2020, by country 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% SE IE FI EE BE LV ES UK CZ IT PT SK FR LT CH MT LU DK NO DE HU AT EL PL HR BG Female share in boards Source: Own work using Gender Board Diversity Dataset (Drążkowski et al. 2024) Women remain underrepresented in political leadership in Poland, despite reg- ulatory efforts to improve gender balance. A 35% quota for women on electoral lists, introduced in 2011, has contributed to greater female candidate but has not translated into proportional gains in elected office. In 2024, women made up 18% of ministers in Poland, compared to 30% across the EU18. In the national parlia- ment, a slightly better situation was observed with 26.8% of female parliament members, albeit still below the average of 31.5% in EU27. Historically, women’s political participation in Poland was low, yet the country managed to increase the proportion of female candidates on the election lists (Myck et al. 2021). This did not translate, however, into a similar rise in the number of female deputies and ministers, pointing to the existence of significant prejudices both of voters and political leaders, who often do not provide women with equal opportunities by not placing them in top positions on electoral lists. The limited representation of women in decision-making roles has implications for the responsiveness of public policy to gender-specific concerns, including for example related to re- strictions to access to legal abortion19. In 2020, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal issued a ruling that significantly re- stricted access to legal abortion, eliminating the grounds for termination in cas- es of severe fetal defects. As a result, Poland now permits procedures to situations 18 Source: European Insitute for Gender Equality: https://eige.europa.eu/modules/custom/eige_gei/app/con- tent/downloads/gender-equality-index-2013-2015-2017-2019-2020-2021-2022-2023-2024.xlsx [date of access: 27.05.2025] 19 In 2020, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal issued a ruling that significantly restricted access to legal abor- tion, eliminating the grounds for termination in cases of severe fetal defects. As a result, Poland now per- mits procedures to situations when the mother's life or health is at risk, or in cases of rape or incest. 21 when the mother's life or health is at risk, or in cases of rape or incest. As of now, the abortion law in Poland remains highly restrictive, permitting abortions only in cases where the mother's life or health is at risk or when the pregnancy is the result of a crime. Thousands of women and men in Poland took to the streets in reaction to these restrictions on legal abortion and the consequences they brought, such as the denial of pregnancy termination by doctors in critical situ- ations that endangered women’s lives due to the fear of legal repercussions. In- deed, since the tightening of abortion laws in Poland several pregnant women have died because they were denied necessary medical interventions. 5. VIOLENCE Available data suggest that reported rates of intimate partner violence in Poland are lower than the EU average, though definitional and reporting differences must be considered. According to OECD data (2023)20, approximately 13% of Pol- ish women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner, compared to one in five on average across the EU (Figure 21). National statistics based on Polish legal definitions and reporting systems indicator even lower prevalence: in 2022, according to Statistics Poland, the percentage of wom- en who experienced sexual abuse in the form of rape21 was around 0.5 percent, whereas the percentage of women who experienced domestic violence22 was about 8 percent (Figure 22). These rates have shown limited change over time, despite a decline in administrative records: the number of “Blue Cards” forms filled out when domestic violence is discovered decreased from 73,531 forms filled out in 2016 to 62,170 in 2023.23 In recent years, Poland has introduced a series of policy measures to protect the victims of domestic violence and prevent secondary victimization of victims of sexual abuse (GREVIO, 2021). Key among these, and the most praised at the EU level, is the introduction of emergency barring orders, which allow law enforce- ment agencies to temporarily evict a domestic abuser from the family residence without requiring a court order. In addition, nationwide training programs have been implemented to strengthen institutional responses and reduce the risk of secondary victimization. 20 https://doi.org/10.1787/f1eb4876-en (Date of access: 29.05.2024). 21 According to art. 197 of the Criminal Code rape is defined as getting another person to have sexual inter- course, to undergo another sexual act or to perform such activity. 22 According to art. 207 of the Criminal Code domestic violence is understood as a physical or mental abuse of a close relative or other person remaining in a permanent or transient relationship of dependence on the perpetrator or over a minor or a person who is helpless due to his/her mental or physical condition. 23 https://statystyka.policja.pl/st/wybrane-statystyki/przemoc-w-rodzinie/201373,Przemoc-w-rodzinie-dane- od-2012-roku.html 22 While official statistics suggest that violence against women in Poland is less prevalent than in many other EU countries, underreporting remains a signifi- cant concern. National civil society organizations, including the Women’s Rights Centre, argue that official figures may substantially underestimate the true scale of the problem. For example, in 2016, the Polish National Police reported approx- imately 67,000 female victims of domestic violence, while the Women’s Rights Centre estimated the actual number to be closer to 90,000, and has estimated that around half a thousand of women die because of domestic violence.24 In ad- dition to these measurement challenges, societal attitudes towards acts of vio- lence against women remain a barrier to effective prevention and response. According to OECD data (2024), nearly 10% of Polish women believe that a hus- band is justified in hitting or beating his wife, compared to an EU average of 6.8% (OECD, 2024). Similarly, only 74.8% of respondents in Poland consider domestic violence against women unacceptable and should be punishable by law – below the EU average of 83.6% (European Commission, 2016). These findings under- score the need for continued public awareness efforts, improved data collection, and stronger institutional responses to prevent violence against women and en- sure that all cases are effectively addressed. Figure 21. Share of women aged 15-49 who have experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner at some time in their life 35 2019 2023 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 LV DK FI BE CZ FR LT EE DE NL SE LU BG HU EU27 EL PT RO SK SI MT CY IE IT AT ES HR PL Source: OECD (2024) 24 https://cpk.org.pl/media/co-tydzien-z-powodu-przemocy-domowej-gina-3-polki-rocznie-umiera-ok-500- kobiet-wiecej-https-zdrowie-radiozet-pl-w-zdrowym-ciele-zdrowie-kobiety-pol-tysiaca-polek-rocznie-umi- era-z-powodu-przemocy/ [date of access: 4.06.2024] 23 Figure 22. Share of women who were victims of rape and domestic violence defined following the Polish Criminal Code 10% 9.3% 8.8% 8.8% 8.7% 8.8% 9% 8.5% 8.5% 7.9% 7.8% 8% 7.7% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 1% 0% 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Domestic violence Rape Source: Statistics Poland, [date of access: 29.05.2024] 6. INSTITUTIONS: NORMS AND FAMILY POLICIES Social attitudes in Poland continue to reflect traditional views on gender roles, particularly concerning women’s responsibilities in the home. In 2017, more than half of the Polish population agreed with the statement that a “preschool child suffers when a mother works”, compared to one-third on average of people across Europe (Figure 23). Similarly, 23% of Poles agreed that men should have priority for jobs when they are scarce, higher than the European average of 16%. Although attitudes have gradually shifted towards more gender-equal views in line with trends in other European countries, progress remains limited, and Po- land remains one of the most conservative European countries. Among the 30 countries for which data were available in 2017, only two had a higher share of the population agreeing with the statement that a preschool child suffers when a mother works. Generational differences are evidence, with younger Poles hold- ing more liberal views than older cohorts (Figure 24). 24 Figure 23. Share of population that agreed with statements on the implications of women's work, in Poland and in the EU 70% 2008 60% 2017 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Europe Poland Europe Poland Preschool child suffers when Jobs scarce: Men should have more a mothers works right to a job than women Source: Own calculations using EVS (2022) and EVS/WVS (2024). Figure 24. Share of population that agreed with statements on the implications of women's work, in Poland and by age category 80% 71% 70% 63% 60% 52% 50% 42% 41% 40% 32% 30% 26% 27% 20% 17% 14% 13% 11% 10% 0% 15-24 25-35 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Preschool child suffers when a mothers works Jobs scarce: Menshould have more right to a job than women Source: Own calculations using EVS (2022) and EVS/WVS (2024). Traditional gender norms continue to shape caregiving patterns in Poland, as re- flected in the low uptake of parental and paternity leave by fathers. Following the transposition of the EU Work-Life Balance Directive in May 2023, working parents in Poland are entitled to 20 weeks of paid maternity leave, followed by 41 weeks of paid parental leave (in the case of a single child birth). Of these 41 weeks, 9 weeks are reserved exclusively for each parent and are non-transfer- able. Within the 20 weeks of maternity leave, the mother is required to take at least 14 weeks, with the remaining 6 weeks available to either parent or shared between them. Parental and maternity leave benefits are compensated at an av- 25 erage replacement rate of 81.5%, except for the 9 weeks reserved for fathers, which are compensated at a lower rate of 70%. The lower payment rate for fa- thers may reduce incentives for men to take leave and participate in childcare, undermining the policy’s intended goal of promoting shared caregiving respon- sibilities. In addition, fathers in Poland are entitled to two weeks of paid paterni- ty leave, which must be used within the first 12 months after the child’s birth. During this two-week period, fathers receive 100% of their pay. In 2021, prior to the implementation of the EU Work-Life Balance Directive, wom- en used 97% of all leave benefit days paid by the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) for maternity, paternity, and parental leave (Kurowska et al., 2022). Between January and May 2021, less than 1% of fathers took parental leave25. Although ev- idence suggests that the use of paternity leave (an additional two-week, fa- ther-exclusive leave) has been increasing in recent years in Poland (from around 148 thousand in 2015 to around 185 thousand in 2020), depending on the source of data26 only around 56-61% of fathers take advantage of it, despite the fact that the leave is paid at 100% of their salary. These patterns suggest that financial in- centives alone may be insufficient to shift entrenched caregiving norms, and that additional policy and cultural measures may be needed to promote greater paternal involvement. In parallel, the Polish government has provided substantial family support through child benefits and support to working parents. Introduced in 2016, the 500+ program initially provided monthly payments of 500 PLN (approximately $125) for the second and subsequent children, later expanded to include the first child. As of January 2024, the benefit increased to 800 PLN (approximately $200) per child. The benefit represents a significant share of household income, par- ticularly for lower-income households, given a minimum monthly salary in Po- land (gross) of 4,242 PLN (approximately $1000), and average salary in the private sector of  8,147 PLN (approximately $2000).27 The program's primary goals were to reduce child poverty, encourage higher birth rates and provide financial assis- tance to families. Research findings show that the direct cash transfers did not lead to significant reduction in female labor supply (Magda, 2018; Myck and Trzciński, 2019; Gromadzki, 2021; Premik, 2022), despite potential incentive shifts. While the program has been shown to contribute to the reduction of child pov- erty (Brzeziński and Najsztub, 2017; Topińska, 2018), it has had limited impact on fertility rates in Poland, with historically low fertility rate of 1,158 children per woman. Rising childlessness and an increasing share of working age individuals without a partner – trends observed across Europe – present ongoing demo- 25 https://www.zus.pl/-/ojcowie-na-zasilku-macierzynskim [date of access: 2.08.2024] 26 Data come from the report by Włodarczyk (2022) and from the Foundation Share the Care (https:// sharethecare.pl/the-work-life-balance-directive-is-finally-being-implemented-in-poland/ [date of access: 6.08.2024]). 27 Data come from the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) statistics: https://www.zus.pl/baza-wiedzy/sklad- ki-wskazniki-odsetki/wskazniki/minimalne-i-przecietne-wynagrodzenie [date of access: 2.08.2024] 26 graphic challenges (Konietzka and Kreyenfeld, 2017).28 Finally, the Polish govern- ment introduced new benefits for parents of children aged 12 to 36 months, Active parent, covering the period after paid parental leave ends and before chil- dren reach the minimum age for kindergarten entry.29 7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Poland has made important strides in strengthening gender equality, particu- larly in education where women now outperform men in many areas of human capital development. However, untapped opportunities remain to better trans- late these strengths into the labor market and society. While Polish women are highly educated, they participate less in the labor force, with differences most pronounced by age, education level, and family situation. Improving access to flexible work arrangements and expanding quality childcare could help more women balance work and family responsibilities – an area where cultural norms still place disproportionate caregiving expectations on women. Strengthening men’s engagement in family life and promoting shared responsibilities would support broader social progress. Addressing persistent gaps in wages, pensions, and leadership roles would also ensure that women’s educational achievements translate into equal economic outcomes over the life course. At the same time, greater focus on men’s well-being - including supporting those in vocational tracks and tackling health disparities—can contribute to more inclusive and bal- anced outcomes for all. 28 As indicated in section 3, balancing paid work with childcare in Poland is challenging, which may also con- tribute to declining fertility rates. Polish women, who are significantly more involved in childcare than men, face difficulties in managing family and work responsibilities due to highly inflexible labor market with low part-time opportunities, and long, fixed working hours. Additionally, the availability of the public childcare for preschool-aged is low, particularly in rural areas and smaller towns, where more than half of Polish population lives. 29 This program offers three ways of financial support: (1) “Active parents at work”: a monthly payment of 1,500 PLN (app. 375 $) to working parents to help with childcare arrangements, (2) “Active in nursery”: co-financing of nursery care, providing up to 1,500 PLN per month per child to cover the costs of nursery care, (3) “Active at home”: a monthly payment of 500 PLN per month for parents who do not work and care for their child at home. https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/pytania-i-odpowiedzi---program-akty- wny-rodzic [date of access: 27.05.2025] 27 To address the gender gaps in Poland the following priority areas could be con- sidered: Promote gender equality in childcare: Childcare responsibilities z  remain disproportionately shouldered by women. The lower payment rate during parental leave for fathers discourages them from taking the leave, reinforcing traditional gender roles. Equalizing the replacement rates for both parents, particularly for the non-transferrable father quota, could incentivize greater parental engagement and foster more balanced caregiving. Expand public childcare services: Limited availability of childcare z  services – especially for children under age three and in rural areas – is a significant barrier to women's labor market participation. Expanding public childcare infrastructure, ensuring adequate quality, and introducing more flexible hours of operation would enable greater labor force participation of mothers with young children and those living in rural areas and small towns. Enhance early literacy programs targeted at boys: Boys in Poland z  significantly underperform in reading compared to girls, contributing to long-term educational disadvantages. Early literacy programs aimed at boys could help mitigate these disparities, and reduce their disadvantage in academic performance, as well as related gender segregation in the labor market. Promote health education and prevention for men: Men in Poland z  have a significantly lower life expectancy than women, largely due to preventable health issues. Improved health education and better access to preventive care could help close this gender gap. Promote flexible working arrangements: Poland’s labor market z  offers limited part-time or flexible work options, creating barriers for workers with caregiving responsibilities. Promoting flexible working arrangements, such as part-time work, flexible schedules, or remote work, would support better work–life balance and enhance labor market participation among those with caregiving responsibilities. Strengthen gender equality in political representation: While the z  introduction of a 35% quota has increased the number of female candidates, it has not fully translated into their higher representation among elected politicians. Raising the quota and implementing placement mandates, i.e. regulations for gender ordering in party lists, would help ensure that more women are elected, enhancing their influence in decision-making (Corrêa and Chaves, 2020). 28 Foster workplace cultures that advance career progression, equality z  of pay: Despite women’s higher educational attainment, adjusted gender wage gaps persist, reflecting systemic disparities in pay. Strengthening enforcement of equal pay for equal work, improving pay transparency, and fully aligning with the EU Pay Transparency Directive will be key to closing the gender pay gap. 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