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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR71.2 MILLION

(US\$100 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

AND A

GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$100 MILLION

FROM THE

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND

AND

A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$98 MILLION

FROM THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EDUCATION

TO THE

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

FOR THE

EQRA

May 11, 2023

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective Nov 30, 2022)

Currency Unit = Afghan Afghani
(AFN)

AFN 88.3 = US\$1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June30

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ALCS	Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CBE	Community-Based Education
CCAP	Citizens' Charter Afghanistan Project
CDC	Community Development Council
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
DA	Designated Account
DED	District Education Directorate
DLI	Disbursement-Linked Indicator
DP	Development Partner
ECE	Early Childhood Education
EEP	Eligible Expenditure Program
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EQUIP	Education Quality Improvement Program
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan
FM	Financial Management
GDP	Gross Development Product
GoA	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IO	Intermediate Outcome
IPF	Investment Project Finance
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
LEG	Local Education Group
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NESP	National Education Sector Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	National Procurement Authority
NPV	Net Present Value
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PED	Provincial Education Directorate
PP	Project Paper
PPG	Project Preparation Grant
RBF	Results-Based Financing

RF	Results Framework
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
SGP	School Grants Program
STEP	Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement
TA	Technical Assistance
TED	Teacher Education Directorate
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPMA	Third-Party Monitoring Agency
TPVA	Third-Party Verification Agency
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID	Project Name
P159378	EQRA
Country	Financing Instrument
Afghanistan	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	Ministry of Education, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

The Project Development Objectives (PDO) are “to increase equitable access to primary and secondary education, particularly for girls, in selected lagging provinces, and to improve learning conditions in Afghanistan”.

FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
World Bank Financing			
IDA-D3810	100,000,000	75,495,165	41,928,039
TF-A8449	100,000,000	42,852,193	42,852,193
TF-A9570	98,000,000	4,545,955	4,545,955
TF-B5406	25,000,000	0	0
Total	323,000,000	122,893,313	89,326,187
Non-World Bank Financing			
Total	0	0	0
Total Project Cost	323,000,000	122,893,313	89,326,187

KEY DATES

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
28-Sep-2018	03-Jan-2019		31-Dec-2023	31-Dec-2023

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
07-Oct-2020	88.11	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
27-Nov-2020	88.11	
24-Feb-2021	88.66	Change in Results Framework Change in Legal Covenants

KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Substantial

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	25-Feb-2019	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.59
02	25-Sep-2019	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	78.93
03	14-May-2020	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	81.23
04	05-Jan-2021	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	91.01
05	04-Oct-2021	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	91.68
06	12-Apr-2022	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	91.68
07	21-Oct-2022	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	91.68

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Education 100

Public Administration - Education 22

Primary Education 39

Secondary Education 39

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)

Human Development and Gender	100
Gender	68
Education	100
Access to Education	68
Teachers	21
Education Governance, School-Based Management	91
Standards, Curriculum and Textbooks	10
Education Facilities	68
Environment and Natural Resource Management	3
Climate change	3
Mitigation	3

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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Country Context

- 1. The August 2021 takeover of the Afghanistan government by the Taliban marked the culmination of 20 years of violent conflict in Afghanistan that killed tens of thousands of civilians and combatants in a protracted civil war.** Despite the optimism of the early years with economic growth averaging over 9 percent a year during 2003-2012, the gradual withdrawal of international forces and assistance starting in 2011-2012 saw a long-term decline in growth. The years 2017-2021 were marked by economic stagnation and deterioration as the country was hit by a worsening conflict and deepening internal political divisions. The contested Presidential elections in September 2019 were followed by a long hiatus until the announcement of a new government in May 2020. Average annual growth fell to 2.5 percent between 2015-2020, below the rate of population increase over most of that period. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a temporary closing of the country's borders, an estimated 2 percent economic contraction and a sharp increase in poverty to reach an estimated 60-70 percent of the population by the end of the year. Most aid to the country was suspended following the seizure of power in August 2021, triggering an economic crisis, widespread and deepening poverty, and major disruption to basic services.
- 2. Displacement, drought, and corruption were additional challenges. Displacement intensified during the period, with more than 3.5 million Afghans internally displaced by conflict by the end of 2020 and more than 2 million returning to Afghanistan—mostly from Pakistan and Iran—since 2015.** Deterioration of rural livelihoods added to displacement: nearly 400,000 individuals were displaced by drought alone in 2018. Private sector development was heavily constrained by insecurity, political instability, weak institutions, inadequate infrastructure, and widespread corruption. Afghanistan was ranked 174 out of 180 countries in Transparency International's corruption perception index in 2021. According to UNDP's Human Development Index, Afghanistan ranked 169 out of 187 countries in 2020. Many of the key educational gains of the past had been long under threat as school attendance levels had steadily fallen over several years, with more than half of children between 7-17 years missing from school in 2018, and girls making up over 60 percent of those affected (UNICEF, 2018).
- 3. Afghanistan's fragility, defined both in terms of weak state institutions, poor governance and dysfunctional societal relations leading to violent conflict between groups, affected almost every aspect of development.** The risks for development partners were high in such an environment. At the same time, development partners had to contend with an increasingly difficult working environment, including managing long periods of remote working, third-party monitoring of projects and frequent restrictions on movement. During the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 many withdrew their international staff from Kabul and national staff worked from home.
- 4. The World Bank (WB) country strategy over the period, which was closely aligned to the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (2017) objectives, was organized around three pillars: (i) building strong and accountable institutions; (ii) supporting inclusive growth; and (iii) expanding and deepening social inclusion (Country Partnership Framework, 2016).** Both the Bank's Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD, 2016) and CPF pointed out the extreme fragility and high risk of operating in Afghanistan. The SCD argued that carefully selecting and tailoring development interventions to the fragile circumstances in the country was imperative. The CPF noted the need for

flexibility in project design and implementation, with the ability to adjust projects quickly as circumstances changed, and selectively downscale some interventions, while putting others on hold until the situation improved.

5. **The rationale for WB support for the EQRA1 Project was strong. The PDOs were relevant and fully aligned with the World Bank Afghanistan Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY2017 to FY2020, Report No. 108727-AF discussed at the Board on October 27, 2016, extended to FY2022 by the Performance and Learning Review, Report No. 136690-AF dated June 24, 2019.** The Project supported the CPF's Pillar 3: Social Inclusion, Objective 3.1: improved human development. This objective stresses the importance of improved access to quality education, especially since previous gains stagnated in primary school enrollment, especially of girls, and large number of children remained out of school and many Grade six students failed to meet basic standard of literacy and numeracy. The intended education outcomes by the end of the CPF period were improved primary school completion rates, a halt to the slide in ratio of girls to boys attending primary schools, and an improvement in the quality of graduates. It also built upon experiences from the WB's previous engagements in Afghanistan's education sector, including the First and Second Education Quality Improvement Programs (EQUIP I and II). Both of those projects were national programs focused on increasing access to basic education (Grades 1 to 12) by financing school construction, quality enhancement grants, in-service and pre-service training for teachers, social mobilization, EMIS strengthening and pilots such as conducting learning assessments.

6. **Following the takeover of government in mid-August 2021, the World Bank paused its disbursements and suspended its operations in Afghanistan. The sudden cut-off of aid from the international community, combined with the impact of drought in rural areas, led to a dramatic fall in living standards and a humanitarian crisis.** In response to the crisis, the World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund donors, and international partners found pragmatic ways to provide support for essential basic services to the Afghan people. On November 30, 2021, the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors supported Approach Paper 1.0 for an immediate Transfer Out of \$280 million of uncommitted ARTF funds to World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for humanitarian gap financing, following a decision by ARTF donors. On March 1, 2022, responding to requests from the international community, the Board approved Approach Paper 2.0 which aims to protect the vulnerable, help preserve human capital and key economic and social institutions, reduce the need for future humanitarian assistance, and improve gender equality outcomes. This includes financing, analytical work, and coordination/convening opportunities. This support is through Recipient Executed grants, decided by the ARTF, and made off budget and outside of the involvement of the interim Taliban administration (ITA), to United Nations agencies and potentially international and national non-governmental organization (iNGOs). Approach 2.0 is designed to respond flexibly, based on experiences of early implementation, and informed by strong coordination among the development partners.

7. In conjunction with this approach, existing projects that were suspended in August 2021 were to be phased out and Implementation Completion and Results Reports (ICRs) prepared for the portfolio by end-2022 to ensure timely capture of results under each project as well as lessons-learned from the World Bank's long engagement in the country.

Sectoral Context

8. **Afghanistan had made great strides in access to general education, but the large number of out-of-school children, especially girls, remained a great concern.** Remarkably, enrollment had increased from 0.8 million in 2002 to over 8 million in 2017 (6.1 million, 1.8 million and 977,000 at the primary, lower secondary and higher secondary levels, respectively). However, enrollment rates did not paint a complete picture: more than 30 percent of enrolled children were not attending school yet the schools maintained them on their records as 'permanently absent'. The disparity

¹ EQRA means "read" in Arabic.

among provinces, both in terms of access and attendance, was also a grave concern, especially for girls. In eight provinces over 70 percent of girls were not attending school, and more than half of out-of-school girls resided in nine provinces.

9. **The expansion of existing schools through construction of additional schools and classrooms had permitted the expansion in enrollment, but half of all schools still lacked buildings, while others lacked surrounding boundary walls considered essential for security.** Half of Afghanistan's students were being taught under tents or in open air, hampering student learning when inclement weather prevented them from attending. Over thirty percent of schools in Kabul Province ran triple shifts, significantly reducing each group's instructional time and causing rapid wear and tear on school facilities. The mandate for school construction had recently been shifted from the MoE to the MRRD for schools in rural areas and to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing for schools in urban areas.

10. **Community-based education (CBE)—the practice of educating students in private spaces—was an important means of education, especially for girls in both conflict-affected and sparsely-populated areas where the nearest school was over three kilometers away.** Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) played a large role in monitoring and ensuring accurate reporting on the activities of CBE. The process of coordination between several NGOs (financed mostly off-budget) and the Ministry of Education (MoE) in instituting a harmonized approach of delivering education through CBE was challenging. Building upon previous experiences with CBE, the MoE had approved revised CBE Policy and Guidelines in 2017 to improve the sustainability of CBE, improve coordination at the national and subnational levels, and establish minimum quality standards. The key challenges had been to: (a) harmonize the costs of service delivery among the various modalities while maintaining good standards; (b) ensure proper monitoring of CBE classes by the MoE; and (c) provide a smooth transition of CBE students to a hub school upon completion of CBE to ensure that students can complete a full schooling cycle.

11. **Education quality outcomes remained abysmally low partly because of low capabilities of teachers.** The teacher force, including the 10,000 trainees that had graduated from Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs) in the previous six years, remained generally underqualified. The MoE estimated that: (i) half of the general education teachers did not meet minimum qualification requirements of a two-year post-secondary degree; (ii) almost 40 percent of the 180,000 general education teachers were not considered qualified; and (iii) only one third of them were female. However, since learning outcomes for children taught by qualified teachers were not discernably better than those taught by unqualified teachers, the quality of teaching irrespective of qualification appeared to be the root cause. Also, the distribution of teachers was uneven across regions and was not related to the size of the school-age population or student number, resulting in inconsistent student-teacher ratios across regions.

12. **Learning outcomes were also affected by the lack of a thoroughly assessed and relevant curriculum and standard learning assessments.** Afghanistan did not have a system of standards against which to benchmark student performance. The curriculum was 'overloaded', with students in all grades studying too many subjects. Instructional materials were not always level-appropriate and did not have sufficient focus on foundational subjects such as reading and writing. Important subjects such as health education and psychosocial counselling did not feature in the curriculum.

13. **Centrally managed education policies left little room for Provincial Education Directorates (PEDs) to innovate or to adapt to the diverse range of local contexts.** The relationship between PEDs and the MoE was complicated by several factors, including PEDs' need to comply with the reporting and other requirements of the Provincial Governor's Office and provincial council members. Clear lines of accountability were not in place. Intra-PED coordination across programs was inadequate, inhibiting the ability of both the MoE and provincial-level authorities to manage PEDs effectively. There was little monitoring of PEDs by the central level, and most information reported was not verified.

14. **The MoE had been constrained by an oversized mandate and critical capacity constraints.** The MoE staff constituted 68 percent of the total civil service, with a mandate ranging from general, vocational, and Islamic education to adult literacy and teacher training. Cumbersome internal processes, lack of interdepartmental coordination, and limited public financial management capacity all hampered the timely delivery of services and execution of civil works. Further, regulations and guidelines were not enforced consistently, and there was significant divergence between policy and practice in key functions at all levels of the service delivery chain.

15. **Continued reliance on externally funding technical assistance (TA) remained a concern from both a sustainability perspective and due to its adverse impact on capacity of the permanent civil servants and regular structures.** The MoE had 1,208 national technical assistants. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)-financed TA study reported that the recruitment of donor-funded TA to support the MoE led to several unsustainable parallel structures. The TA raised the short-term capacity of the MoE but paid less attention to medium- and long-term institutional, operational, and individual capacity development.

16. **Corrupt practices had worsened the condition of the education sector.** Corruption, including patronage, favoritism, abuse, and theft, was perceived to be widespread in Afghanistan's public sector, and the education sector was no exception. Afghans perceived the sector, particularly the MoE, as severely prone to corrupt practices, with ghost teachers, students, and schools, as well as the buying and selling of teacher positions, all of which eroded trust in the sector. Reports and surveys on girls' education indicated critical governance challenges that ranged from teacher management to corrupt practices in teacher recruitment and systematic failures to prioritize girls' education. The lack of a rigorous, transparent system for allocating and delivering resources such as provincial budgets, teaching positions and educational materials (primarily textbooks) was among key constraints that affected educational outcomes negatively.

17. **The country's deteriorating security at the time affected supply and demand of educational services, but the impact was rather complex.** The lack of regular government presence in large parts of the country made the equitable delivery of education a challenge and constrained the MoE's ability to monitor and evaluate education progress and program outcomes in those areas. Even within insecure provinces, there were unstable districts, with a high security incidence and violence rate, where several boys' schools were open, and a large number of boys attended class. Then there were districts considered relatively safe where despite schools being open parents did not send their children. In several relatively safe districts in northern provinces, access and attendance to school was affected by social, cultural, and religious beliefs.

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

18. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not present a Theory of Change (TOC). The TOC (Figure 1) was excerpted from the Program Paper (PP) for the Additional Financing (Section I B) and adjusted, with modifications introduced through restructurings highlighted by bold text.

Diagram 1: Theory of Change

Objective	Inputs	Outputs/Intermediate Outcomes	PDO Outcomes	Long-term Outcomes
Equitable Access to Basic Education	<i>Improving School Infrastructure:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop school site selection policy • Expand school construction infrastructure upgrading/rehabilitation 	School infrastructure policy developed Schools constructed or expanded with gender segregated latrines, boundary walls (IO)	<i>Improved Equitable Access</i> Increased number of students attending school regularly in	

	<p><i>School Grants Program:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide resources to schools to address demand (e.g., gender-friendly environments) and supply constraints 	Number of grants received and executed (IO)	selected provinces by gender (PDO) Reduced out-of-school children in selected provinces by gender (PDO)	
	<p><i>CBE:</i></p> <p>Harmonize existing CBE arrangements and CBE expansion</p>	Establishment of standard and cost harmonization to inform future expansion		
Improving Learning Conditions	<p><i>Strengthening Teacher Quality:</i></p> <p>Conduct formal subject-based in-service training, EGR training Support observation and intensive coaching and mentoring Improve teacher recruitment and monitoring</p>	<p>Increase in teaching quality and subject-specific content knowledge (DLI/IO) Improved skills of primary grade teachers to teach reading Teacher policy implemented (DLI/IO)</p>	<p><i>Improved Learning Conditions</i></p> <p>Increase in teachers meeting subject-specific qualifications (PDO) ‘Increase in teaching quality based on classroom observations (DLI) ratings</p>	Increased equitable access to primary and secondary education and improved learning conditions in the education sector, and eventually better educated population leading to increased productivity, earnings and well-being
	<p><i>Improved curriculum and Learning Materials:</i></p> <p>Curriculum reform and development of textbooks, teacher guides and instruction materials</p>	Teaching and learning materials for the new curriculum developed for all grades (DLI/IO)		
Strengthening Planning Capacity and Transparency	<p><i>Improved planning, data systems, and transparency:</i></p> <p>TA and information technology equipment to refine EMIS datasets, integrate fragmented systems and strengthen data verification processes TA to establish a personnel database and support MoE in clarifying and communicating relevant regulations, policies, guidelines, norms and targets TA to develop norms for the annual O&M budget allocation to provinces and a basic performance management system for PEDs and DEDs TA to support implementation of GBV action plans</p>	<p>Personnel/database established for teachers and administrative staff (DLI/IO) Improved planning, budgeting, and monitoring of NESP III (DLI/IO) Annual results-based reporting implemented in PED/DEDs (IO) Provincial workshops held (IO) GBV action plans implemented</p>	<p><i>Improved Transparency</i></p> <p>Improved data collection and quality assurance procedures implemented (DLI) Improved teacher recruitment and management Improved awareness and process in place to address GBV issues</p>	

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

19. The PDOs were to increase equitable access to primary and secondary education, particularly for girls, in selected lagging provinces, and to improve learning conditions in Afghanistan. Lagging provinces were identified based on the 2016 Afghan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) as provinces with the highest proportion and the largest number of out-of-school girls (>70 percent). The project introduced a shift from monitoring only enrollment of students (which included also permanently absent students) to focusing on bringing children into school and their attendance.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

Increase equitable access to general education in selected lagging provinces, especially for girls

- Students attending school regularly in selected provinces, by province and gender. In practice, this means students attending Grades 1-12 (who meet the requirements to participate in end-of-year exam, that is, attending 75 percent of the academic year), and
- Out-of-school children in selected provinces, by gender.

Improve learning conditions

- Teachers meeting subject-specific qualifications.

*The Project's Results Framework (RF) also included 16 Intermediate Outcome (IO) indicators.

Components

20. The Project comprised four components under an Investment Project Financing (IPF) instrument. Components 1 and 4 followed a traditional IPF approach with disbursement conditions for Component 1. Components 2 and 3 followed a results-based modality, with disbursements against an Eligible Expenditure Program upon achievement of results as measured by Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs).

Component 1: Equitable Access to Basic Education

21. Component 1 was designed to increase access to basic education, especially for girls in selected lagging provinces. It would achieve this by easing the constraints that limit school participation and regular attendance in Afghanistan—including deteriorating security, cultural norms that undervalue education, opportunity costs to attending school, distance to school, lack of gender-segregated latrines and lack of female teachers—through interventions under three subcomponents, as follows:

22. Subcomponent 1.1: Improving School Infrastructure (US\$175 million) would support improving school infrastructure in rural areas in selected provinces through: (i) construction of new school buildings and additional classrooms to upgrade temporary structures (e.g., tents and outdoor classrooms) to permanent structures; (ii) provision of Missing Essential Elements (e.g., missing classrooms, boundary walls, water points and latrines of a school building) for rehabilitation of existing school buildings; and (iii) strengthening MRRD's capacity, including with respect to school construction under sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) above. EQRA was to focus on construction of schools in rural areas that would be implemented by MRRD by involving Community Development Councils (CDCs) supported by its engineers and technical staff. It would prioritize physical structures for schools operating in open areas or under tents, and constructing buildings for girls', mixed and then boys' schools.

23. Subcomponent 1.2: Provision of School Grants to Eligible Schools for Improved Access and Retention (US\$5 million) would provide schools with financial resources, capacity building and operational autonomy to carry out interventions to address local demand and supply-side constraints and would be implemented by MoE. To accommodate local-level variations in priorities EQRA would provide grants to eligible schools to finance from among: (i) school supplies; (ii) access to hygienic products for girls; (iii) transport facilities for female students and female teachers; (iv) bridge courses; and (v) O&M expenditures.

24. Subcomponent 1.3: Supporting Community-Based Education (US\$10 million) would support the expansion of CBE through on-budget support, to extend service delivery in remote locations and in emergency situations. EQRA would support: (i) strengthening MoE's capacity to develop an implementation plan for the CBE Policy with a mapping of CBE needs and guidelines on harmonized approach to content, institutional setup, teacher salaries, operating costs, and data to be collected and reported, and (ii) expanding CBE classes in selected provinces applying the new quality and cost standards and financing contract teachers, learning materials/services, including NGO contracting if selected by the MoE.

Component 2: Improving Learning Conditions (US\$35 million)

25. Component 2 was designed to strengthen the teaching and learning process, by focusing on improving the capacity of teachers to deliver quality instructions in the classroom through three subcomponents: Subcomponent 2.1: Supporting Subject Knowledge Training of Teachers of Selected Grades and Developing Standardized Examination for TTCs would improve standardization of teacher capabilities and quality assurance across the system through subject knowledge training of teachers of selected grades and standardized examinations for TTCs.

26. Subcomponent 2.2: Supporting a Pilot Program including its Evaluation to Strengthen: (i) Coaching and Training of Teachers, and (ii) Classroom Observations would improve the quality of teaching for existing teachers through a pilot using classroom diagnostics with teacher observations, followed by the provision of coaching and capacity building. EQRA would aim to improve the quality of teaching without displacing teachers from classrooms by using the World Bank's 'TEACH' classroom observation technique to strengthen the feedback loop for teachers, highlighting areas for improvement to further their professional development and providing coaching tailored to their needs. It would also seek to improve the capacity of school administrators so that they could coach teachers on an ongoing basis.

27. Subcomponent 2.3: Supporting: (i) Development of New Curriculum and Learning Materials for Schools, and (ii) Delivery of Textbooks from PEDs to Schools would support distribution of the current set of textbooks to schools as well as the reform of the curriculum and development of new textbooks, teacher guides, and other instructional materials. The curriculum reform was designed to comprise the review, revision, and development of national learning standards, the revision of the curriculum framework, development of formative and summative learning assessments, and the development of syllabi and instructional materials. This was designed to impact teacher practices in the classroom in the longer term.

Component 3: Strengthening Education Sector Planning Capacity and Transparency (US\$39 million)

28. Component 3 was designed to strengthen planning and implementation capacity, coordination, and transparency of the MoE at both the central and subnational levels.

29. Subcomponent 3.1: Improving Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) would: (i) refine datasets for education planning and management, including off-budget CBE; (ii) integrate fragmented systems; and (iii) strengthen data verification processes. EQRA would automate and integrate information systems for financial management (FM), human resources, procurement, and payroll, and introduce a system for tracking student attendance and strengthen data management capacity at all levels.

30. Subcomponent 3.2: Improving Teacher Recruitment and Management would buttress a transparent recruitment process for teachers and support the MoE to clarify and communicate transparently key policies, targets, norms, regulations, and guidelines regarding teachers to stakeholders. The process would rely heavily on the use of technology at the application and examination phases, and regulations would be clarified regarding temporary contract teachers, overtime payments, and incentive systems, and would include emphasize the hiring of female teachers. EQRA would

introduce the establishment of a personnel database for the MoE's more than 270,000 tashkeel² and contract teachers and administrative staff.

31. *Subcomponent 3.3: Improving Budget Planning and Introducing Results-based Reporting* would improve annual planning and reporting through the NESP III operational plan, foster greater coordination and transparency of on-budget and off-budget resources, and leverage better resource allocation and expenditures across the operation and development budgets. It would support the introduction of a norm-based O&M budget allocation formula to provinces disaggregated at the DED level that would exclude the permanently absent students and allocate a higher amount for girls attending school and introduce a basic performance management system for PEDs and DEDs. Citizens, through facilitation of CDCs in CCAP areas or school shuras³ in non-CCAP areas would be involved in monitoring key indicators such as textbook delivery, presence of teachers, construction of classrooms, and use of school grants.

Component 4: Technical Assistance

32. Component 4 aimed to strengthen MoE's capacity at the national and subnational levels to achieve results and manage the delivery of education services promoted under the NESP III. It would support: (i) TA to strengthen essential functions within the MoE which constitute either bottlenecks in service provision and management or represent high fiduciary risks; (ii) a pilot of early childhood education, including consultancies, training, and materials; and (iii) the costs of an external third-party verification agency.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

33. The Project was restructured three times; the third restructuring was approved in conjunction with a US\$25 million Additional Financing from the Global Partnership for Education (Table 1).

Table 1. Project restructurings, changes introduced, ratings, amounts disbursed and justifications

ate(s)	Change	ISR Ratings		Disbursed (US\$M)	Reason for Restructuring & Key Change
		DO	IP		
October 7, 2020	Changes in RF, DLIs/PBCs ⁴ allocations, Components and Costs, Reallocation between Disbursement Categories, and Disbursement Estimates	MS	MS	88.12	The restructuring modified the Project to re-allocate US\$16.3 million to COVID-19 response efforts. Component 4 was modified to sort activities into three sub-components: (i) sub-component 4.1 (Project Management, TA and M&E); (ii) sub-component 4.2 (ECE Pilot) and (iii) new sub-component 4.3 (COVID response by MoE). A new Component 5 (Contingency Emergency Response Component) was introduced with an allocation of \$0, only effective to IDA. The amounts allocated to DLIs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 were modified to accommodate the inclusion of new activities. Disbursements conditions for Component 1.2 were modified due to COVID-19. Funds were reallocated for each funding source. The RF was modified to reflect the expected results of the new activities and adjustments to the target values for existing indicators. Condensed procurement procedures were incorporated for activities related to COVID-19 under subcomponent 4.3. A new economic analysis was prepared with the restructuring.
November	Changes in RF, DLIs	MS	MS	88.66	The restructuring adjusted the due date for the Disbursement Condition

² Tashkeel refers to the organizational structure of the civil service.

³ Shuras are consultative councils or assemblies that provide a forum for decision making through consultation and deliberation.

⁴ The Results Framework generated by the Portal refers to Performance Based Conditions (PBCs) instead of DLIs. This report uses the term DLIs throughout.

27, 2020	and Legal Covenants NOTE: See justification for this 2 nd restructuring so soon after the 1 st restructuring in this section on Rationale for Changes below.				for school construction, DLIs and allocated amounts and the RF to adjust the end targets to reflect delays due to COVID-19. The due date for Disbursement Conditions of sub-component 1.1 (completing construction of a minimum of 600 project and providing details of funds used and verified by MRRD) was revised from December 31, 2020 to June 30, 2021. The disbursement conditions for Component 1.2 was removed. The DLRs and amounts allocated to DLIs 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 were revised to respond to the delay due to COVID-19 and other external factors (e.g., ongoing education reform and amending the mandate of the National Statistics and Information Authority to include EMIS reforms at the MoE). Changes to the RF to reflect the revised DLRs, and the end target description for existing indicators (DLIs 3, 5 and 7).
February 24, 2021	AF and changes in RF	MS	MS	88.66	The AF and third restructuring scaled up activities under the Project such as the constructing school buildings, establishing CBE classes, and expanded the Project to cover two new activities in support of the PDO: (i) implementation of the GBV action plan, and (ii) teacher training focused on Early Grade Reading as part of subject teacher training under the Project's sub-component 2.1. The restructuring also: (i) revised the EEP budget codes from two digits to five digits to all for a more efficient review of EEPs; (ii) adjusted the RF to: (a) reflect changed in targets in line with the AF; (b) add performance-based conditions (PBCs) for the activities included under the AF; and (c) correct a clerical error in the financial allocation for PBCs 2 and 5 in the second restructuring.
	Cancellation				US\$25 million was cancelled as part of a collective portfolio restructuring to support the REACH project COVID response.
August 15, 2021	Pause in disbursements followed by cancellation	MS	MS	89.33	A disbursement of US\$75 million was in process as the disbursement conditions for Component 1.1 had been met and verified by the TPVA on June 15, 2021.

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

34. The Project's PDO was not revised. PDO Indicator targets were revised to reflect the adjustments to and scaling up of the Project (Table 2).

Revised PDO Indicators

35. The PDO Indicators were not revised.

Revised Components

36. Component 4 was modified to categorize activities into three sub-components (Table 1): (i) sub-component 4.1 (Project Management, TA, and M&E); (ii) sub-component 4.2 (ECE Pilot) and (iii) new sub-component 4.3 (COVID response by MoE). Sub-component 4.3 was designed to support: (i) immediate maintenance works of school infrastructure in targeted schools to prepare schools for reopening, and (ii) provision of supplementary courses from Grade 10-12 student in Math and Science to mitigate the learning loss during the school closure period. A new Component 5 (Contingency Emergency Response Component) was introduced with an allocation of \$0, for which only IDA funds could be used.

Other Changes

37. Other changes are described in Table 1.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

38. As described in Table 1, the rationale for the three restructurings was mainly to address financing needs for the COVID-19 response efforts and to adjust the project's timelines, including target dates and DLI/DLR targets to delays resulting from the pandemic. The objectives of the COVID-19 financing were to improve the learning environment to bring the students back to schools and provide learning opportunities for mitigating students' learning loss due to the school closures. The proposed revision to DLIs could not be included in the October 2020 restructuring because the restructuring, including the GPE variable portion, required an official approval from the management committee of the GPE Secretariat, as well as the DPs' endorsement. Therefore, the revision to DLIs was included in the subsequent 2nd restructuring. The rationale for the AF was to scale up activities under the original program, support the expansion of teacher training under the Early Grade Reading program pilot and support implementation of MoE's GBV Action Plan. Indicator targets were revised to reflect: (i) the adjustments to the scale of the project, and (ii) adjustments to the baseline (and hence targets) since the original baseline was developed based upon a welfare-based household survey and a subsequent revision, based proxy indicators obtained from a phone survey, revealed that baseline data had been severely overestimated. The implication of changes on the Original Theory of Change are shown in bold in Diagram 1.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

39. The overall relevance of the PDOs is rated **High**. The PDOs were relevant and fully aligned with the CPF for FY2017 to FY2020 when it was prepared (Section I A) and continued to be relevant to the government's priorities and the Afghanistan Approach Paper 2.0 at completion⁵. By adjusting its activities and financing to reflect emerging priorities through the AF, the PDOs maintained their relevance throughout. The Project's design supported the PDO by emphasizing not only increasing equitable access and improving learning conditions through implementation, but also by strengthening the Government's capacity in the implementation process so that it could continue to deliver these education services thereafter.

40. The Project's PDO was also aligned with the government's National Education Sector Plan (NESP) III prepared by the MoE and widely consulted with policy makers, education representative, development partners (DPs) and official in other sectors. NESP III laid out the government's vision for the period 2017-2021 and informed CPF engagement. The Plan is anchored in three priority areas: (a) Quality and Relevance – ensuring that learners at all levels acquire the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values needed to be productive, health and responsible citizens; (b) Equitable Access – ensuring increased equitable and inclusive access to relevant, safe, and quality learning opportunities for children, youth and adults, especially women and girls; and (c) Efficient and Transparent Management – ensuring transparent, cost-effective and efficient delivery of equitable quality education services at national and subnational levels.

⁵ Afghanistan Approach Paper 2.0: Options for World Bank Engagement to Support the Afghan People, February 15, 2022, R2022-0018/IDAR2022-0036.

41. Despite the ITA's announcement in March 2022 that girls could only attend school through Grade six the Project's PDO remains relevant given the importance of delivering quality, inclusive education in an efficient manner. Afghanistan continues to be challenged to balance increased access at all levels with improved learning outcomes in a fiscally constrained environment to ensure that out-of-school children, especially girls, get into and stay in schools with improved learning conditions. As of end-April 2022, a few provinces have reportedly provided secondary education for some girls, but the picture remains fluid. With a gross enrollment rate of only 22 percent, access to secondary education for girls has been a historical problem. The ban is affecting directly 1.1 million secondary school girls and impacts provinces differently as 43 percent of secondary female students are concentrated in six major cities with the remaining 57 percent distributed across 29 provinces. The Afghanistan Approach Paper 2.0 proposed to commit about 50 percent of the released and available funds from the ARTF for four initial priority engagement areas. For the education priority engagement, the objective is completely relevant to the PDO: to sustain access to primary and secondary education, with a focus on girls and women teachers.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

42. The achievement of PDOs is evaluated by applying a split rating quantifying performance according to two phases: from approval through August 15, 2021 (this phase subsumes the first, second and third restructuring cum AF) and from August 15, 2021, forward, according to the rating procedures agreed for the Afghanistan portfolio. A split rating has not been applied for any of the restructurings in the first phase since the targets for key indicators fluctuated marginally up and down in the periods between restructurings, and none of the PDO indicator targets were met. There was some progress towards IO indicator targets (Table 2) in the phase before August 15, 2021. The discussion that follows refers mostly to achievements during this first phase, since no further progress was recorded after August 15, 2021.

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

PDO 1: Increase equitable access to primary and secondary education in selected lagging provinces, especially for girls

43. The PDO indicator targets for the indicators selected to measure achievement of this PDO made some progress—in fact, the numbers for all the indicators deteriorated from baseline, but this was in part due to incorrect original baseline data (Sections I B and IV A), and to increasing insecurity in project-targeted remote locations, social problems, and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Section III B). However, good progress was made towards intermediate outcomes, especially through mid-2020 towards constructing/renovating of schools. The infrastructure component which included construction of new schools and renovating existing schools was considered an essential input to improve access to primary and secondary education. Similarly, in the theory of change of this project, the significant part of impact to increasing access was expected to be realized from this component, particularly in the context of Afghanistan where around 50 percent of schools do not have a school building and operate under tents or in open areas. Therefore, a large part of financing went to the infrastructure component (62% of the total EQRA budget: \$185M/\$297M, 80% of disbursement: \$75M/\$93.8M). The target for the first disbursement condition for the school construction component was over met and were on track for meeting the target under the project Both the construction and improvement of schools followed criteria designed to ensure that these were placed in locations determined on the basis of needs (especially of lagging gender enrollment) and not political interference (Section III A). Other intermediate indicators were also set for establishing a school grants program, and planning for expansion of the CBE program, but these were pilot programs and the scale of programs were not comparable with the school construction (CBE for 50,000 Out Of School Children, School Grant for 527 schools out of approximately 17,000 schools nation-wide) for the PDO1. Based upon this, it is likely that the PDO-level indicator targets were on track to be met by the original December 31, 2023, Closing Date..

Hence, efficacy is rated **Substantial** for this PDO before August 15, 2021, and Modest thereafter as school construction continued after that date. Preliminary data from the ongoing UNICEF Education Survey for enrollment as of June 2022 shows that attendance has increased at the primary level reflecting fewer concerns with security, but that it has decreased at the secondary level in view of the Taliban's views on female education.

44. *School Construction/Renovation.* Although school construction and renovation faced numerous fiduciary and safeguard issues (Section IV B), by August 15, 2021, the MRRD had completed and handed over to the MoE 772 school projects (561 new buildings and 211 buildings with upgraded features (IO Indicator 1). A disbursement of US\$75 million against compliance with the school construction DLI had been verified by the TPVA and was in process on August 15, 2021 (but never disbursed). Another 777 buildings were under construction at different stages of implementation on August 15, 2021. Of these, construction was actively underway at 371 sites, but had stalled at 406 sites (303 due to shortage of funds, 68 due to security issues, 30 due to social problems and five due to land problems). Construction of approximately 109 of these schools has been completed since August 15, 2021⁶. The MRRD was surveying these sites to assess repair and rehabilitation costs and re-estimate the cost of completing works. The WB had agreed to finance the works needed to address the disaster risk reduction measures for 12 schools that had major safeguard risks⁷.

45. *School Grants.* Preparatory work for implementing the school grant program was well advanced, but the program had not become operational by August 15, 2021, since schools were closed due to the pandemic (IO Indicator 2). The following activities had either been completed or were underway to operationalize school grants: (i) a train-the-trainers workshop to roll out the program in December 2020; (ii) almost complete collection of SMS data and bank account signatories data; (iii) finalized procedure for school grant disbursement in consultation among the MoE, School Shuras, a private bank and the WB; (iv) contract amendment with a firm for the baseline data collection; (v) the updated project implementation manual for the program, a School Booklet and Grant Management database; and (vi) 50-60 percent of the planned School Grant Provincial workshops in 14 PEDs. The building blocks were mostly in place, but the program did not become operational since remaining workshops were delayed due to the pandemic and then to increasing insecurity in the provinces.

46. *Community Based Education.* There had been advanced progress towards the inputs needed to implement this activity, but the program did not become operational. There were two key disbursement conditions for implementing the CBE program (no IO Indicators were associated): (i) a mapping of CBE needs, and (ii) guidelines on a harmonized approach to CBE implementation. These had been met by August 15, 2021, but no CBE schools or classrooms had been established. The MoE has since: (i) completed the CBE needs mapping exercise to identify target villages using population data, enrollment data and data on existing CBEs; (ii) prepared and secured approval for the operational manual in line with the new CBE Policy for on-budget CBEs, outlining the institutional setup, operational and costing framework, and M&E, data collection and reporting processes; and (iii) recruited one Provincial Coordination Officer (PCO) Team Lead and 24 PCOs.

47. *COVID-19 Response.* The PP for the first restructuring (endorsed by the DPs) described support for COVID-19 efforts and an implementation plan with proposed activities and targets. Despite advanced progress on preparation, no procurement or implementation had taken place by August 15, 2021.

PDO 2: Improve learning conditions

⁶ It is assumed that there were 109 schools completed out of 313 projects (80-99% progress as of August 15, 2022), based on TPMA's follow up visit report (July 2022). TPMA conducted follow-up site visits for 40 randomly sampled schools (80-99% progress as of August 15, 2021) in May-June 2022 and found that 14 of them were completed.

⁷ These will be addressed through EERA (Education Emergency Response in Afghanistan) Project.

48. The Project aimed to improve learning conditions by improving the capacity of teachers to deliver quality instruction through four activities described below. By design, the project was to prepare the foundations for each of these activities in the first year of implementation and then roll-out these activities from the second year forward (Section III A). Improvements in learning conditions were to be measured by the percent of teachers meeting subject-specific qualifications (PDO Indicator 5). The programs were to be rolled-out from the second year of implementation forward (following their design) but were put on hold mostly due to pandemic-related school closures. Despite the pandemic, certain key activities which composed a bigger share of this component such as revision of curriculum and textbooks distribution had advanced substantially. Additionally, as described below, significant progress in the preparatory work for implementation of activities to improve learning conditions had been completed were ready for implementation by August 15, 2021 as per the project goals for the first year of implementation. Hence, efficacy is rated **Substantial** for this PDO before August 15, 2021, and Negligible thereafter as progress was halted.

49. *Subject Knowledge Teacher Training.* Some progress had been achieved but was affected by the restructuring in the MoE (Section III B). Baseline data collection and mapping of target groups (focusing on unqualified teachers in seven out of eight provinces) had been implemented (IO Indicator 8).

50. *Coaching of Teachers and Classroom Observation.* Preparatory activities for this program were completed but coaching of teachers and classroom observation (IO Indicator 6) had not begun on August 15, 2021, since schools were closed due to the pandemic. The following activities were concluded: (i) collecting baseline data on teaching quality in a sample of 200 schools and five provinces using classroom observation tools (PBC1/DLI); (ii) agreeing upon the implementation modality, including the selection strategy for highly qualified coaches and teacher trainers; (iii) forming a technical working group with terms of reference to train the coaches and teachers and oversee implementation; (iv) initiating training and orientation of the technical working group; (v) finalizing the implementation manual for the activity; and (vi) developing training manuals outlining scripts and pedagogical support for coaches and teachers and adapting them to local context.

51. *Curriculum Development and Textbook Distribution.* Project supported a DLI “Existing textbooks distributed and Teaching and learning materials for the new curriculum developed for all grades”. The 2nd year DLR was met: distribution of 12.2 million textbooks from PEDs to DEDs and schools (IO Indicator 5). Project also laid a coordination to support the development of a curriculum framework and syllabi for all subjects. Grades 1-6 textbooks and teacher guides were drafted, but the MoE had not endorsed the new framework or curriculum, and the activity was on hold as of August 15, 2021, because of slow down of an anticipated reduction of school subjects and other curriculum reforms.

52. *Training on Early Grade Reading.* The preparatory activities for roll-out of this activity were completed: (i) completing the project implementation manual; (ii) advertising a technical assistance position; and (iii) preparing a budget/implementation plan and timetable for the training. The progress towards IO Indicator 8 was halted due to the pandemic (Grade 1 to 3 teachers and headmasters trained in Early Grade Reading).

Table 2: Achievement of PDO targets before August 15

PDO Indicators	Baseline	End Target in PAD	Revised End Target in 1 st Restructuring	Revised End Target in AF + 3 rd Restructuring	Achieved as of August 15, 2021	Status		
						1 st rest.	AF	Aug 15, 2021

PDO 1: Students attending school regularly in selected provinces, by province and gender (Number)	4,318,473	5,018,429	4,968,244	4,993,337	4,009,096	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	
PDO 1: Students attending school regularly in selected provinces, female (Number)	1,616,799	1,918,919	1,899,729	1,907,405	1,468,720	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	
PDO 1: Out of school children in selected provinces, by gender (Number)	2,289,880	1,089,880	1,100,778	1,095,329	2,864,6078	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	
PDO 1: Out of school children in selected provinces, female (Number)	1,387,717	643,029	649,459	646,244	1,628,133	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	
PDO 2: Teachers meeting specific qualifications (Percent)	52	72	72	72	NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Selected Outcome Indicators	Intermediate	Baseline	End Target in PAD	Revised End Target in 1st Restructuring	Revised End Target in AF + 3rd Restructuring	Achieved as of August 1, 2021	Status		
Schools constructed or expanded (Number)	0	2,646	2,398	2,398	2,398	722 (561 new, 211 w/missing items)	27% achieved	30% achieved	30% achieved
School grants implemented	0	2,298	2,298	2,298	2,298	0	Not Achieved	Not Achieved	Not Achieved
Students benefitting from direct interventions to enhance learning (Number)	6,447,000	7,247,000	7,247,000	7,247,000	7,247,000	7,531,441	135% achieved	135% achieved	135% achieved
Students benefitting from direct interventions to enhance learning, female (Number)	2,462,000	2,834,000	2,834,000	2,834,000	2,834,000	2,980,850	139% achieved	139% achieved	139% achieved
Existing textbooks distributed (Number)	0	45,000,000	45,000,000	45,000,000	45,000,000	12,200,000	27%	27%	27%
Annual results-based reports implemented between MOE, PEDs and DEDs	None	100% for 2019, 2020, and 2021	100% for 2019, 2020, and 2021	100% for 2019, 2020, and 2021	100% for 2019, 2020, and 2021	Reports for around 90% of the target PEDs were completed	90%	90%	90%

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

53. Achievement of PDO 1 is rated **Substantial** from approval to August 15, 2021, in view of progress with constructing and improving school infrastructure and completing most of the requirements for implementation of the school grants program and expansion of CBE. Progress towards PDO 1 is Modest in the second phase since school construction is being continued by communities. Progress towards PDO 2 was Substantial in the first phase as most of the preparatory work had been completed for implementation, and Negligible thereafter as implementation was halted (Table 4). Overall, efficacy is considered **Substantial** in the first phase as the preparatory work that was built into the Project's design was well advanced, construction was well underway, and the Project was well on its way to achieving its PDO, barring the

exogenous factors that impacted implementation. Efficacy is considered **Modest** in the second phase. Although not formally made explicit in its PDO statement, under Component 3 the Project also achieved notable progress towards strengthening institutional capacity in the education sector (Section II D).

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

54. The Project's efficiency is rated **Substantial** on the basis of implementation efficiency and available data on costs of construction. An ex-post economic analysis has not been prepared. The economic analysis carried out at appraisal estimated the Project's net present value to exceed US\$1 billion, considering only the future productivity gains from the flow of new pupils it would benefit, and a corresponding internal rate of return of about 21 percent. Education projects typically have high returns, and there is no reason to believe that with continued support (Section IV D) the project's investments would not yield positive returns. Implementation efficiency was impacted by the need to address during implementation issues that would normally have been concluded during preparation, but this was by design to help build capacity (Section III A). Delays in contracting the technical assistants needed for implementation (Section IV B) compounded implementation delays, but implementation had accelerated markedly and most of the notable products and outputs were achieved shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic surfaced. During project design, a firm was hired to review the schools' engineering designs. This review helped reduce construction costs by preparing detailed designs, developing detailed Bills of Quantities, etc. It also expedited implementation as the reviews and new designs and drawings were completed when implementation started. Project records show that 208 school construction projects suffered cost escalations whereby approved costs exceeded estimated costs by over 25 percent. A review by the MRRD, the World Bank team and the TPMA found that most of these escalations related to increased transportation costs and to safeguard issues related to school construction, especially those requiring disaster mitigation measures, increased cost estimates. Despite initial delays and exogenous events, the Project by August 15, 2021, was on its way for completion in end-2023, with possibly only minor delays.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

55. Before the August 15, 2021, pause in disbursements, the Project's progress towards its PDO had been impacted by several implementation issues (Section III B), and especially by the onset of COVID-19 and related school closures that constrained its tangible achievements. Although this was by design, the initial years' implementation was focused on finalizing preparation and then impacted by adverse events that followed when the preparatory activities were being finalized (COVID-19, increasing insecurity). However, in analyzing the Project's achievements, several of those described above and in Section II E below are noteworthy (e.g., improvements in budget planning, collecting biometric data of teachers and endorsement of the teacher policy by the MOF and the Civil Service Commission), and had set the basis for full implementation of its programs--were that to be contemplated at a future date. The weighting of disbursements reflects that US\$209.17 million was undisbursed on August 15, 2021; an additional US\$75 million had been verified by the TPVA on June 15, 2021, but not disbursed by the pause.

56. **Overall Outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory based on the Project's High Relevance, its Substantial**

Efficiency, and its Substantial Efficacy before August 15, 2021, and Modest Efficacy thereafter (Table 4).

Table 4: Split Outcome Rating

	Phase I	Phase II
	Approval to August 15, 2021	August 15, 2021, to ICR
Relevance	High	
Efficacy	Substantial	Modest
Efficiency	Substantial	
Phase Outcome Rating	S	MU
Phase Outcome Rating Score	5	3
Disbursed (US\$m)	89.33	208.67
Phase Weight	89.33/298=29.98	208.67/298=70.02
Weighted Rating	1.4990	2.1006
Overall Outcome	3.5996 rounded to 4=Moderately Satisfactory	

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender

57. Addressing gender inequities in access to education was explicit in the PDO. The Project's design addressed constraints to girls' access by adopting school selection criteria that prioritized locations where the highest number of girls were out-of-school, and by following gender-friendly construction standards. However, as presented in Section II B, the Project did not have a marked impact on reducing gender disparities, although marginally girls benefited more from direct project interventions. The project also started discussion on addressing GBV: a dedicated team was established to address the issue and was establishing protocols and uptake channels (see below). The Project aimed to prioritize contracting women for technical assistant positions but was unsuccessful as it proved to be difficult to identify qualified female candidates, even when selection criteria were relaxed. Of the 345 technical assistant positions filled under the Project, there were only 14 females contracted, mostly due to the lack of relevant educational and professional qualifications. Also, it proved difficult to attract female candidates since more than 50 percent of the positions to be filled were at the provincial level. In view of the priority assigned to hiring females, the World Bank's task team request the MoE management to discuss this issue at every EQRA Steering Committee meeting.

Institutional Strengthening

58. The project design was structured to build the MoE's institutional capacity. For each of the project's ten activities (construction, school grants, CBE, subject teacher training, COACH, textbook/curriculum, EMIS personnel database, EGRA and COVID recovery), the World Bank's task team provided hands-on support to the MoE's teams in experiencing a PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle. First, each team was requested to draft its Project Operations Manual (POM) for the program, addressing the project description and operational procedures, budget, personnel arrangements, and work plan. The

teams then moved to implementation. As it was the first time that the MoE's teams carried out planning, the first step took some time for them to internalize the process. The Project's Component 3 focused on strengthening the education sector's capacity for planning and transparency through improved data management, management and budget planning and reporting, and teacher management. *Improvements to the EMIS* stalled due to lack of agreement between the MoE and the National Statistics and Information Authority on the division of labor between each in EMIS development. Discussions were still ongoing as of August 15, 2021. A monthly phone call survey was carried out to collect data on teacher and student attendance and the functionality of schools (IO Indicator 13), but the process was considered unscalable as designed.

59. *Budget planning and reporting* was strengthened through two activities. First, annual results-based reports were implemented for around 90 percent of the targeted PEDs (IO Indicator 9), and work to implement them in the remaining PEDs and DEDs was in progress. Second, a simple procedural manual was prepared codifying existing national annual planning, budgeting and implementation processes providing a tool for resource allocation, including on-budget and off-budget resources. This process allows for a norm-based operations and maintenance budget allocation formula that excludes the permanently absent students to provinces disaggregated at the DED level. The formula allocates budget for students that attend school and a higher amount for girls. The NESP III Annual Operation Plan based on actual on-budget allocation and projected off-budget allocations for 2020 was completed and endorsed by Afghanistan's DPs (IO Indicator 10), bringing transparency, and allowing the MoE to track expenditures.

60. *Several* activities were completed to improve the *recruitment and management of teachers*. The MoE, together with the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission collected biometric and biographic data for 223,000 civil servants in education, including teachers (IO Indicator 11). One of the major achievements was the approval of a new Teacher Policy by MoE and endorsement by the MoF and the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IO Indicator 14). The Teacher Policy was developed following inputs on teacher quality, consultations with the MoE's directorates and technical comments received from stakeholders. It was submitted to the WB for final endorsement and DLI verification, and the process was ongoing as of August 15, 2021.

With technical support under Component 4, the MoE advanced on establishing institutional arrangements and preparatory activities for the *ECE pilot* but its implementation on hold due to COVID.

62. In response to allegations of child sexual abuse in one of Afghanistan's provinces (Section III B), an Inter-Agency Technical Working Group including government stakeholders and DPs was established to coordinate efforts to combat GBV across sectors, including education. By August 15, 2021, the MoE had completed: (i) a desk review on the legal and policy frameworks for GBV and sexual exploitation, abuse and sexual harassment; (ii) the Code of Conduct Handbook ready for stakeholders' review and consultation; (iii) a draft of the GBV GRM; (iv) establishment of a Curriculum Review Committee to review the draft National Curriculum Framework and develop a roadmap for sensitizing the curriculum on GBV; and (v) deployment of two GBV experts as technical assistants.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

63. N/A

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

64. The vast majority of the Afghan population was poor and vulnerable before the COVID-19 pandemic. The poverty rate had increased to 55 percent in 2017 when the last household survey was carried out and is estimated to have spiked to 72 percent in 2020. Although it was not poverty-targeted, *per se*, the criteria designed to target increases in enrollment of girls focused the Project in rural areas of “lagging provinces”. Also, the CDC-led modality for school construction had an intentional focus on generating local employment in rural communities to help contribute to poverty reduction.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

65. N/A

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

66. **The Project was designed to support critical system-level reforms required to achieve results outlined in the Governments NESP III (Section II A); its financing would cover the Plan’s financing gap.** The Project was financed jointly through grants totaling US\$298 million by: (i) a US\$100 million grant from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF); (ii) a US\$100 million grant from IDA; and (iii) a US\$98 million grant from the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). An ARTF-financed Project Preparation Grant supported the preparation of a school infrastructure policy to establish nationwide criteria to prioritize school construction in areas of greatest need and improve transparency in site selection.

67. **The Project supported five global-level objectives for GPE financing:** (i) strengthening education sector planning and policy implementation; (ii) supporting mutual accountability through effective policy dialogue and monitoring; (iii) ensuring efficient and effective delivery of grant support; (iv) better financing through grants aligned with national systems; and (v) building a stronger partnership.

68. **Although the Project’s design incorporated lessons learned from the design and implementation of EQUIP I and II and was guided by a detailed review of their implementation, it was nevertheless complex, with numerous sub-components.** Based on lessons, it was designed to: (i) focus on the 17 most lagging provinces in terms of girls’ attendance in schools; (ii) direct the system toward tracking and rewarding retention of students, especially girls, by tracking attendance as opposed to enrollment; and (iii) focus on strengthening the governance of general education to improve service delivery transparently and strengthen accountability (an area that had not been supported systematically under earlier operations). With respect to this latter lesson, the review recommended that to strengthen capacity, the Government needed to be responsible for preparatory work with technical support by donors and, since funding was required, that activities in project’s first years be dedicated to this preparatory work. Issues with procurement and contract management, and construction oversight by the MoE also affected EQUIP I and II, but this responsibility had since been transferred to MRRD. The Project complexity made it extremely ambitious especially since it was to be

implemented in an FCV environment. It might well have been preferable to focus on fewer priority reforms to allow the Government to build capacity for more challenging interventions.

69. **The Project incorporated three-level selection criteria to ensure that schools were constructed based on real needs and not political interference.** *First*, to ensure inclusion of smaller provinces where the challenge of out-of-school girls is more acute, the strategy was defined to select provinces with large numbers as well as rates of out-of-school girls. The strategy selected 17 provinces as follows: (i) nine provinces with the highest numbers of out-of-school girls, and (ii) eight provinces with the highest percentage of out-of-school girls. *Second*, priority was to be given to constructing or improving schools where hub schools could not absorb CBE graduates due to space constraints. *Third*, priority was to be given to constructing girl-only and mixed schools.

70. **Implementation arrangements were streamlined but operating in rural areas through PEDs and DEDs introduced complexity which made the timeline (two years) for school construction extremely ambitious, especially in view of the need to finalize preparation activities after approval (Section III B).** At the national level, the MoE through its Department of General Education was to serve as the project implementing agency with responsibility for implementation, ownership, and accountability of results within a broader NESP III framework. The MoE would need to acquire land for 800 schools where available sites had not been identified. For overall coordination, the MoE and the MRRD would constitute a task force with relevant units in the ministries to oversee the planning of the annual budget, reviewing implementation progress and resolving implementation bottlenecks. At the provincial level and district levels, oversight would be the responsibility of the Provincial Education Director and the Head of DED, respectively. However, the relationships between PEDs and the central MoE were complicated as PEDs were required to comply with reporting and other requirements of the Provincial Governor's Office and provincial council members. For school construction, MRRD would need to operationalize Community Development Councils (CDCs) in over 300 districts and recruit necessary technical staff.

71. **The Project's Investment Project Finance (IPF) instrument applied an innovative results-based design, incorporating a mix of disbursement modalities.** Disbursements under Component 4 would be made against expenditures (Component 4). Disbursements under Components 2 and 3 would be made against expenditures under pre-defined Eligible Expenditure Programs that were relevant for achieving the PDOs upon compliance with pre-defined DLIs in the DLI Matrix. Finally, disbursement under Component 1 would be made against expenditures, but capped to be released in pre-defined timing sequences and only upon compliance with pre-defined disbursement conditions that reflected implementation progress.

72. **The Project's overall risk rating was Substantial and mitigating measures were identified where possible; project design could only mitigate some risks, however.** The identified risks identified were: (i) *Political and Governance* (High): (a) recurrent security incidents had led to widespread and prolonged disruption of government functioning and school operations in an increased number of localities; (b) poor governance and accountability throughout the administrative chain; and (c) widespread politicization and deeply-entrenched corruption in teacher recruitment and management process; (ii) *Macroeconomic* (Substantial)—Afghanistan's Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) ratings portrayed a public sector where financial resources were used mostly for intended purposes, but actual expenditure only represented about 50 percent of budgeted expenditure; (iii) *Institutional Capacity for Implementation* (Substantial): (a) low confidence in program monitoring and reporting and concerns on the reliability of administrative data, and (b) the high number of schools to be constructed and the quality of construction, especially in view of MRRD's lack of experience with such a large construction effort; (iv) *Fiduciary* (High): the FM assessments had identified weaknesses that could limit either the assurance on use of grant resources or achievement of PDOs (Section IV B); and (v) *Environmental and Social* (High). The risk of a major reversal in commitment to the PDO on ideological grounds was

not contemplated, due to optimism at the time of preparation that those ideological grounds would not come to reverse any progress made. The Project's overall risk rating was informed by the findings of Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) 2016, where it was perceived that parts of the challenge of access to girls' education could be remedied by financing certain supply side interventions. The team did not anticipate a sudden policy shift against secondary girls' education since even in the Taliban-controlled areas of the country girls were allowed to attend school prior to August 15, 2021.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

73. The Project's financing from the ARTF and IDA was approved by the World Bank on September 28, 2018 and became effective on January 3, 2019. GPE funding was approved on April 2, 2019. In June 2020, US\$25 million under the IDA grant was cancelled a part of a collective restructuring to support the COVID-19 response program. Then, an additional grant in the amount of US\$25 million from the GPE was approved on March 31, 2021. The LEG designated the WB as the Grant Agent for the parent project (P159378) and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK) (FCDO) as the Coordinating Agency for the additional grant (P173314). During implementation, including its scale up, the following factors impacted the Project's implementation

The project's early years were designed to support improving its readiness by investing in system building tasks required for actual implementation of activities. Although its initial implementation was slow, school construction started before effectiveness with US\$8 million in bridge financing from the MOF, and the design of school grants and the personnel database were progressing. To help build institutional capacity, by design the Project's initial implementation period focused on the need to finalize externally recruited staffing, implementation manuals and plans, site selection, and collect baseline data, among other activities. The first Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR) documents issues with respect to the: (i) recruitment of 408 TA positions in the MoE, of which 121 were identified as high priority; (ii) school construction plan for 2019 approved by MoE and MRRD; (iii) recruitment of 113 district engineers by MRRD; and (iv) finalizing Project Implementation Manuals (PIMs) for most project subcomponents and major activities. These issues were exacerbated by the complex and timely procedures for contracting of consultants that required coordination with and approval by the Ministry of Finance. Issues with delays in contracting technical assistants affected staffing across the board, including project management, fiduciary areas, safeguard management, construction engineers, diverse activity coordinators, etc. Three of four DLIs with 2018 results had been achieved, but the TPVA required to validate compliance with DLIs had not been contracted.

75. **The development of the personnel database under subcomponent 3.3 required coordination with two other projects financed by the WB.** The TAGHIR (P166978) and PAISA (P168266) projects were to develop the foundational requirements for the entire Human Resources Management System to be developed and with which the personnel database financed by the Project had to be aligned. In early 2019, TAGHIR had been declared effective, but PAISA was still to be approved at end-FY19.

76. **In November 2019, various national and international media outlets reported allegations of child sexual abuse within several schools in one of Afghanistan's provinces.** The World Bank conducted a rapid assessment that indicated the violence, physical, verbal, and sexual abuse against boys and girls and sexual harassment against female staff remained underreported in the school system. Policies to address sexual abuse and harassment were weak and/or not implemented, and procedures for reporting and handling sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment complaints were ad hoc and not in line with the survivor-centered approach and lacked accountability. In response, an Inter-Agency Technical World Group was established, and the AF provided funding to support implementation of a GBV action plan (Section II D).



77. **A structural reform at the MoE, as well as changes in its senior leadership (a new Acting Minister and Deputy Ministers) in November 2020 led to delays.** The new leadership team requested revisions in the design of sub-components such as the School Grants Pilot Program, Subject Knowledge Teacher Training, COACH training and other pilot program development, and put the curriculum revision process on hold, all of which slowed the Project's overall implementation. Slow TA recruitment also contributed to implementation delays, as certain programs were kept on hold due to the MoE's restructuring.

78. **The country's deteriorating security situation affected the supply and demand of education services.** Recurrent security incidents were increasingly impacting school operations in an increased number of localities. Growing insecurity and the consequent constraints on mobility complicated progress towards PDO achievement with respect to increasing enrollment and reducing out-of-school children. Despite progress with school construction, the continued long distances compounded by the worsening security affected especially girls in remote areas—precisely those that were being targeted by the Project.

79. **Afghanistan was extremely vulnerable to the rapid spread of COVID-19 due to limited access to information, high percentage of poor and vulnerable households, constrained access to water and sanitation, weaknesses in basic health systems and violent conflict; the pandemic impacted the Project's implementation in several ways.** *First*, schools were closed for more than a year and half from March 2020 to September 2021 and then reopened only for grades 1 to 6 for girls and for all Grades for boys after the collapse of the government on August 15, 2021. To mitigate the impact of school closures, the MoE developed a two-phase COVID-19 response plan. During the first phase, the MoE focused on emergency response to continue service delivery where possible through television, radio, self-directed learning and limited face-to-face instruction in small groups with social distancing. This phase was financed by GPE COVID-19 funds and other emergency support from NGOs and donors. The second phase focused on a recovery plan for school reopening, without which ongoing reforms could be impacted negatively, in turn setting back the post-pandemic recovery for several years. The Project would help finance immediate maintenance works of infrastructure, supplementary courses for high school students and provision of school supplies. *Second*, a cancellation, an additional grant and the three project restructurings were all approved to adjust WB assistance and the Project's financing to support the COVID-19 response program and this second phase of the MoE's recovery plan. *Third*, many of the Project's outputs were delayed as staff of the MoE and MRRD were also restricted in their work (both in terms of movement to provinces and reduced working hours), with limitations on face-to-face meetings, which prevented monitoring trips to the provinces and required postponement of large workshops with numerous participants, etc. Specifically, preparation for expansion of CBE, the School Grants Program, Teacher Training, and other pilot programs were delayed, as was construction of school buildings and provision of essential elements for existing schools in provinces disproportionately hit by the virus.

80. **At the time of the takeover of the Government in August 2021, the Project was in the third year of its planned five-year implementation period, with 32 percent of the grant disbursed (US\$88.6 million).** Both Implementation Progress and PDO ratings were rated Moderately Satisfactory, reflecting the steady progress that had been made, including concerted efforts to finalized preparation activities (e.g., staffing, manuals, etc.) and to overcome safeguard issues that had surfaced (Section IV B). The PIMs for all subcomponents and recruitment guidelines for hiring technical assistants had been finalized and cleared by the WB. Recruitment of technical assistants was progressing well, although the MoE was finding it difficult to recruit qualified female project staff. Technical proposals for school construction had been approved for 68 percent of planned schools, and 70 percent of those were under construction. In November 2020, construction of 685 schools (480 new school buildings and 205 schools with missing items) had been completed; 721 projects (671 new buildings and 50 with missing components) were under construction; technical proposals had been developed for another 631 schools. The MRRD was conducting site surveys and approving technical proposals

expeditiously, thereby meeting the prerequisite for transferring funds to CDCs for construction. The AF approved in March 2021 was on track to expand the Project's reach and accelerate the achievement of NESP III targets that were aligned with the GPE's objectives. A summary of DLIs that had been achieved is provided in Annex ___.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

81. The Project's M&E was to be carried out by the respective MoE departments, and consolidated by the Department of General Education, based on targets in the detailed Results Framework (RF) with outcomes and intermediate outcomes, and on the DLI Matrix. The RF was concise, with five PDO Indicators and 15 IO Indicators (later 16). Nine (later 10) of the IO Indicators were associated with DLIs selected to incentivize/reward progress towards achievement of the PDO. The project's baseline data was compiled on the basis of a welfare-based household survey. With financing under Component 3, the Project would also strengthen the MoE's monitoring capacity to refine EMIS datasets, introduce individual student identifications and progress and establish a personnel database integrated with payroll. M&E would also support surveys and evaluations of the coaching pilot and the school grant program. The Project was to support surveys and impact evaluations of the coaching pilot and school grant programs.

82. An external Third-Party Verification Agency (TPVA) would be contracted by the MoF to assess the validity and completeness of relevant data demonstrating achievement of DLI targets under Components 2 and 3 based on detailed protocols defined in the Project Appraisal Document, and disbursement conditions under Component 1. The Project also benefited from the existing ARTF Third Party Monitoring Agent (TPMA) contracted by the World Bank to provide monitoring support for WB-financed projects by monitoring progress for soft and hard components at the school level, including inspecting the quality of construction, compliance with safeguard standards and cross checks between physical and financial progress. The TPMA was also responsible for reviewing the fiduciary controls and the statement of expenditures on a regular basis and preparing a detailed report.

M&E Implementation

83. M&E data were collected and analyzed throughout implementation. There were major delays in contracting the TPVA, and the firm to conduct the impact evaluation of the school grant program, all due to issues with procurement implementation. Although these contracts were signed only in September 2020 with substantial delays, the monitoring by the external TPVA was carried out in accordance with detailed protocols described in the PAD and the Procedure Manual. Similarly, the TPMA provided monthly reports on physical and financial progress and safeguards compliance by subproject, flagged areas for attention and highlighted issues such as cost escalation from original estimates, and technical and safeguard observations, including staffing and the extent of consultations with communities and women. The TPMA also responded to specific requests for more in-depth information. The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the ability of the MOE and MRRD to report on the progress against DLIs and indicators in view of constraints in movements to the provinces. A subsequent updating of PDO indicators based on proxy indicators obtained from a phone survey revealed that baseline data had been severely overestimated; indicator targets were scaled back in the project restructurings. Firms to conduct the baseline survey for the coaching pilot

and to conduct the school grant impact evaluation were contracted in late 2020. The contract for the coaching pilot was completed but the school grant evaluation was only partially conducted.

M&E Utilization

84. The results of M&E are essential inputs for disbursements under results-based financing operations, including one with disbursements conditions subject to external verification. The TPVA's assessments served as the source and basis of disbursement authorization, however repeated delays in contracting the TPVA delayed disbursement of funds. As examples, The TPVA's Final Report for compliance with 2019 DLIs was only issued in January 2021; and, the MoE had met three out of five 2020 DLIs, but the TPVA had not been contracted by August 15, 2021, to verify the status of these achievements. The TPMA's regular assessments provided routine information, highlighting inconsistencies and areas for concern and follow-up and while its ad hoc assessments on safeguards helped identify issues to bring all of the construction projects into compliance with safeguard policies (Section IV B).

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

85. Although there were delays in contracting the TPVA, the monitoring was carried out in accordance with the PAD and the Procedure Manual, including the MoE's regular monitoring, supplemented by the TPMA's monthly and ad hoc need based reports. The team also conducted monitoring through satellite imagery that complemented the other monitoring mechanisms. Monitoring through different means and triangulating data helped to provide the information needed to follow implementation progress and identify emerging issues. The Overall Rating of Quality of M&E is **Substantial**.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

86. The Project was classified as Environment Category B in accordance with OP/BP 4.01 as it would support investments for construction activities under Component 1. Environmental issues were expected to be modest but included potentially those related to: site location and planning, building design and construction, and maintenance during the operation period. The Project triggered OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) since construction under Component 1 was to involve land acquisition. Since not all sites had been identified at appraisal, a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), with detailed guidance for preparation of Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) was prepared and disclosed, as required. The MRRD and MoE adopted an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) to address potentially negative environmental and/or social impacts caused by project activities. The ESMF provides guidance for the preparation of site-specific Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) by MRRD, and detailed institutional arrangements, and M&E mechanism, a Grievance Redress Mechanism, and an estimated budget to implement the ESMPs.

87. The safeguards rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory in the second Implementation Status and Results Report (ISR) and was only upgraded to Moderately Satisfactory after the pause in disbursements in August 2021 when the client advanced on the agreed Safeguard Action Plan. Initial issues were related to delays in hiring the required safeguard staff for MoE, in establishing a complaint redressal mechanism at the MoE and in demonstrating that the necessary documentation for land registration were in place. Then, by mid-2020, four school construction projects were identified by the TPMA as having severe safeguard issues, due to poor site selection. In response, MRRD prepared

detailed mitigation plans with technical documents, agreed to finance the required mitigation measures with government funding and conducted a technical survey to identify whether there were similar issues in other on-going projects. By early 2021, around 112 projects were reported by MRRD, the MoE and the WB's TPMA to have environmental safeguards issues. The sites selected for those schools were prone to varying degrees of environmental hazards, 33 of which were categorized as severe for Disaster Risk Reduction safeguards also risks the result of site selection. For these, the MRRD prepared technical designs that were reviewed and approved for financing by the WB. A trilateral meeting was held between MRRD, the TPMA and the WB in July 2021 to identify actions and expedite mitigation measures for the remaining schools. The disaster risk assessment carried out by the project team revealed that 127 construction projects had not considered the adequate mitigation measure to remedy anticipated natural hazards such as landslides, floods, site drainage and slope stabilization.

88. When implementation was halted, the issue of poor site selection was being addressed by allocating resources to the additional mitigation measures for all sites prone to some level of natural disasters, and the MoE had agreed to ensure that site selection followed the project approved checklists. The MoE had made excellent progress in completing land documentation for all private land donations through the application of the project-developed land transfer procedure. Documentation for more than 776 land parcels that had been privately donated was collected and registered. However, the TPMA reports indicated that there was still a gap in the preparation and implementation of safeguard-related documentation such as the ESMP, RAP and GRM logbooks. The project teams reported that this was due mostly to poor coordination among the site engineers and the TPMA staff who monitored the sites, since MRRD records reported 100 percent document compliance for all sites. Finally, compliance to Operational Health Safety requirements was challenging since it was difficult to ensure the use of personal protective equipment with project execution through CDCs as there was no budget allocated for this purpose.

89. The project made good progress in strengthening its Grievance Redressal Mechanism (GRM). The GRM for the Citizens' Chartered Afghanistan Project (CCAP, P160567) was utilized for activities under sub-component 1.1 (Improving School Infrastructure) implemented by MRRD. For other components, the MOE was to establish a functional GRM, but given delays it first established a complaint redressal mechanism for the hiring of technical assistants only. By August 15, 2021, the GRM for activities implemented by MRRD was strengthened by establishing 1560 GRCs, including in areas not covered by the CCAP GRM system. The MoE established a specific mechanism and procedure to resolve human resource-related complaints under the project. MRRD's GRM received 190 complaints, of which 135 were resolved, and the MoE's GRM received and resolved 26 complaints through its system.

90. The project's overall FM risk was assessed as High at approval in view of weaknesses in previous less-than-requested budget allocations, the limited effectiveness of internal audits, the timeliness and quality of financial reporting, among other reasons. The initial procurement capacity assessment also assigned a high-risk rating to MoE and Substantial to MRRD. Several mitigating measures were identified, including FM and procurement capacity building and training by the WB.

91. Financial management (FM) implementation was rated mostly Moderately Satisfactory due to delays in procurement of TA for FM, and low budget utilization. The project's FM arrangements for budgeting, accounting, reporting, funds flow, internal controls, CDCs, and audits were in place and operating mainly as designed. Weaknesses included the lack of any internal audit throughout implementation, a significant delay in hiring critical FM and audit staff, and low budget utilization. The main reasons for low budget utilization were the slow hiring process for TA, non-implementation of the School Grant Program due to the closure of schools and lockdown of offices for more than three months due to COVID-19.

92. Procurement was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory starting in the first ISR through early 2021 in view of difficulties in updating the procurement plan, and delays in advancing procurement of major packages and contracting procurement staff. The World Bank team assessed the capacity of the MoE's procurement team to identify gaps, and it was agreed that the MoE's team would take capacity development opportunities provided by the National Procurement Authority. As implementation progressed, the procurement function improved, but continued to be a constant source of delays in implementation.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

93. World Bank Performance for Quality at Entry is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**. The Project was well aligned with the country's development priorities and challenges and with the World Bank's assistance strategy for Afghanistan. Its design incorporated important lessons from previous support to the country's education sector, especially the need to focus on provinces lagging in terms of girls' attendance in schools and rewarding retention of students, especially girls, by tracking attendance as opposed to enrollment and involving the MoE in preparation activities during early implementation. The responsibility for construction and contract management had been transferred by the President's Office to MRRD in an attempt to improve the efficiency of the MoE and address procurement and supervision issues under earlier operations where construction was implemented by MoE. While this new arrangement brought additional complexity in terms of coordination of school construction, it brought improvement in actual results by allocating responsibility for implementation based on to institutional capacity. The results framework was well designed, and the associated disbursement conditions and DLIs were well aligned to incentivize progress in implementation. However, two factors at preparation were influential in the Project's eventual outcome, both before and after August 15, 2021: the status of preparation and the risk assessment (also considering the status of preparation). By design, the project aimed to strengthen institutional capacity by dedicating the early years to completing manuals, staffing, site selection and other tasks that would normally be in place at approval or shortly thereafter. While the NESP III clearly emphasized that equitable access to education was a priority especially for women and girls, the Project's risk assessment severely underestimated the fact that the Project's PDO addressed deeply entrenched ideological positions (i.e., girls' education) of the Taliban. This was the only project in the World Bank's Afghanistan portfolio for which the overall risk rating was Substantial (as opposed to High) at entry. True, it may well have been difficult to mitigate those risks and the decision to support the Project may well have been made given the potential high benefits of addressing a clear development priority to the GoA. But, by recognizing those risks during preparation, the Project could have been scaled down or made less ambitious with respect to both its institutional capacity building and investment objectives.

Quality of Supervision

94. The World Bank's Quality of Supervision is rated **Satisfactory**. As mentioned above, the implementation support team dedicated the early implementation period to supporting an incompletely staffed counterpart team to finalize tasks that would have been in place if the project's design had not prioritized institutional strengthening by involving the MoE in its preparation. This was all the more difficult—and the team's contribution all the more noteworthy—since one of the tasks that needed to be addressed was contracting staff for key fiduciary, safeguard, and other functions, and even project coordination. The WB's task managers provided support through interactions in/with: (i) the broader WB team, including fiduciary and safeguards specialists; (ii) the TPMA; (iii) EQRA monthly meetings (for ARTF donors); (iv) biannual support missions; and (v) several technical missions. A large part of the supervision structure relied upon the TPMA, whose monthly reports were discussed on a monthly basis and upon which remedial actions were agreed with the MoE's

implementation teams. Despite the implementation support team's efforts, the TPVAs (one for soft component, the other for hard component) were only contracted in September-October 2020, thereby delaying verification of DLIs and disbursement conditions, and delaying disbursements. When safeguards issues surfaced (e.g., land titling, schools identified as having severe disaster risk reduction issues, etc.), the World Bank's safeguards team provided strong support to help the MRRD develop a Safeguards Action Plan to help flag key issues and agree upon timebound remedial strategies. The team had to work with GPE to obtain separate approval for changes to the results framework, and hence the first restructuring was advanced, and a second restructuring approved once GPE's approval was secured. The implementation support team also helped address allegations of GBV and seized the opportunity to adjust the Project and support development and implementation of a GBV Action Plan. The one main concern regarding performance in supervision relates to the timing of the AF that expanded the Project's scope, especially in view of the deteriorating situation in the country, major implementation issues with safeguards (construction under subcomponent 1.1 represented the largest share of original funding allocations and was being scaled up under the AF) and only 55 percent of original funding disbursed. However, this was processed and approved to scale up project activities for which implementation was accelerating, and to address emerging priorities such as GBV. The Project Paper did, however, recognize that the overall risk for preparation and implementation had increased to High, with Political and Governance, Fiduciary, Environmental and Social risks all rated High.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

95. The Overall Bank Performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory** in view of ratings and observations for Quality at Entry and Supervision.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

96. The Project did not achieve fully its PDO and therefore any discussion of Risk to Development Outcome refers to the sustainability of outputs achieved during implementation and to what could have been achieved had it been implemented to completion. Even before the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the risk to the development outcome achieved by the project was high for several reasons. First, there continues to be consistent reliance on externally funded TA, raising concerns about sustainability in view of the weak capacity of permanent civil servants. Second, despite claims that there have been efforts to reduce corruption, Afghanistan still faces critical governance challenges ranging from teacher management to inappropriate practices in teacher recruitment and systematic failures to prioritize girls' education. The lack of a rigorous and transparent system for allocating and delivering resources such as provincial budgets, teaching positions and educational materials to schools negatively affects the outcome of investments in education. Third, the country's security situation affects the supply and demand for education services. A shortage of service delivery capacities especially at the subnational levels make equitable delivery of education a challenge and constrain efforts to monitor and evaluate progress and outcomes. More importantly, however, as mentioned in Section II A, girls have now been prohibited by the ITA to attend school beyond Grade six. On the positive side, there is considerable pressure from the international community to reverse this decision, and some provinces are reportedly providing education to girls at the secondary level. Also, following Board of Director's approval of Approach Paper 2.0 in early March 2022, the World Bank is partnering with other funding sources including multilateral institutions, bilateral partners, and international NGOs in support of the Afghan people. The World Bank and the ARTF have taken a programmatic approach of engaging in four priority sectors, including education. The support for education remains under development with a focus on access to primary and secondary education and on girls and women teachers. Still,

prospects for sustaining project results will be very challenging.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

97. **Implementation of projects across a country presents important challenges in an FCV environment, but these are generally the projects that address the greatest needs/gaps in human development.** The Project addressed a high priority—access to education, especially for girls—but the challenges it faced relating to working in underserved, rural areas made implementation challenging. Implementation required coordination by different levels of government—the MoE, and numerous PEDs and REDs, as well as CDCs dispersed throughout the country. The difficult rural topography, coupled with severe weather events and increasing security problems exacerbated the challenges of countrywide implementation. The COVID-19 pandemic only aggravated the difficulties, as the virus spread through rural areas. In an already difficult environment, implementation requires larger number of qualified staff (which are scarce in FCV environments) to support activities in the dispersed areas, results in difficulties in consolidating data and monitoring progress, and make addressing the several problems that can surface (e.g., safeguards) all the more difficult to resolve. In this respect, the services of the TPMA were instrumental in providing regular monitoring and follow-up to issues that surfaced.

98. **As a corollary, working with decentralized community structures such as CDCs is crucial in an FCV context for promoting ownership, utilizing local expertise and triggering economic activity, but this decentralized implementation requires strong M&E.** As highlighted above, the Project's implementation required coordination at multiple levels, including through CDCs across the country. However, this approach has to be complemented by a multi-layered M&E system composed of internal and third-party entities to triangulate results and improve accountability.

99. **Projects with high returns that support highly relevant development priorities that address large unmet needs may be justified, but it is essential to recognize that these may be high-risk and make appraisal decisions accordingly.** By focusing its PDO on expanding girls' access to education, the Project was focused on increasing supply to meet a high priority need, in view of what appeared to be the large unmet demand. Marginally girls benefited more from direct project interventions). But as highlighted above, other factors impacted demand for education, with differences by gender: adverse weather events, increasing insecurity and later COVID-19. Further, there may be entrenched ideologies that especially in rural areas impact the demand for girls' education.

100. **In an FCV context, project risk analysis should also in addition to preparation and implementation risks evaluate the political risks to sustainability of project interventions in terms of the possible reversal of sensitive issues.** The Project's risk analysis at appraisal identified the Political and Governance risks as those related to: (i) recurrent security incidents that had led to widespread and prolonged disruption of government functioning and school operations; (ii) poor governance and accountability throughout the administrative chain; and (iii) widespread politicization and deeply entrenched corruption in teacher recruitment and management process. These were risks that impacted the Project's preparation and implementation, although arguably they could impact continued operation following completion. However, the Project's risk analysis might consider the potential impact of entrenched ideologies especially in rural areas on girls' education. Given the increasingly violent conflict at the time of appraisal the additional analysis could be very relevant since by focusing its PDO on expanding girls' access to education, the Project was focused on increasing supply to meet a high priority need, in view of what appeared to be the large unmet demand.



101. **In an FCV capacity constrained context, a deliberate focus on capacity and system building can help sustain gains and greater ownership by the government, but this could entail delaying project results.** Projects in extremely low capacity FCV environments can aim for project results and institutional strengthening, but it is difficult to achieve both unless the situation stabilizes. The Project was designed purposefully to complete during early implementation tasks that are normally completed during preparation. If instead of adopting this approach that aimed to strengthen institutional capacity, the Project had begun actual construction, training, and introducing new approaches following approval, it could have left in place the infrastructure, policies and procedures that would support achievement of its PDOs. Since the Project faced a serious shortage of qualified staff in the implementing agencies (despite progress on setting the ground for implementation of institutional strengthening programs) its design aimed to address this shortage by contracting 405 technical assistants in practically all technical areas to support implementation and help strengthen institutional capacity.

102. **Approving increased funding for a project facing implementation issues does not help improve performance nor guarantee sustainability and should be approached cautiously.** The AF was approved in early 2021 when the project's foundational work was completed, there had been remarkable progress with civil works and the disbursement rate had accelerated given compliance with several DLIs. However, several issues were pending resolution, including environmental safeguard issues, delays in contracting technical assistants, and overall implementation had become difficult due to the spread of COVID-19. Further, only 55 percent of the original financing had been disbursed and the conflict and political situation was deteriorating, making the decision to approve additional funding debatable issues.

103. **Education projects that aim to increase enrollment and attendance in complex environments should aim not only to assess supply side constraints, but also to explore whether demand side issues are relevant.** Project preparation did a thorough assessment of issues that impacted supply of education, especially in a gender-friendly manner, but may well have underestimated the impact of the proposed solution involving increasing supply through different, efficient mechanisms (e.g., gender friendly school construction/renovation, CBE to reduce travel distances, etc.). The exogenous factors that impacted the Project's implementation (e.g., deteriorating economic conditions that drove further poverty, security issues and the COVID-19 pandemic) may well have exacerbated families' decisions to keep girls at home. In such environments, it might well be worth analyzing whether a combination of supply and demand side incentives (e.g., direct subsidies or incentives to keep girls in school) might have been more effective.

104. **The use of purely results-based instruments in an FCV context should be approached cautiously--a healthy combination of instruments including pure IPF for activities that require heavy financing, results-based financing for improving processes and adopting of policies, and disbursement conditions for civil works, could achieve an ideal impact.** The use of DLIs under the Project was an innovative solution for certain policies to be adopted (teacher policy) and to improve intra-ministerial collaboration (HRMIS). However, in practice it proved to be difficult for the MoE to access financing from the MOF to pre-finance project activities towards meeting the DLIs. In a fragile context and highly reliant on foreign aid, FCV countries are generally unable to pre-finance project activities with high price tags. Hence, the use of results-based financing is encouraged more for those types of activities that are not very costly but still hard to achieve such as to support policy reforms, to improve intra-ministerial collaboration and to incentivize achievement of other soft activities. Further, the verification of achieving of DLIs is also very costly and hence DLIs that require a detailed field verification exercise are not encouraged. DLIs that could be verified through desk reviews could be an effective instrument to achieve certain impact.

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: Increase equitable access to general education in selected lagging provinces, especially for girls

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Students attending school regularly in selected provinces	Text	4,318,473 31-Dec-2016	5,018,429.00 29-Dec-2023	1,993,337.00 29-Dec-2023	4,009,096 01-Aug-2021
Students attending school regularly in selected provinces, female	Text	1,616,799 31-Dec-2016	1,918,919.00 29-Dec-2023	1,907,405.00 29-Dec-2023	1,468,720 01-Aug-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

Objective/Outcome: Increase equitable access to general education in selected lagging provinces, especially for girls

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
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Out of school children in selected provinces	Text	2,289,880 31-Dec-2016	1,089,880.00 29-Dec-2023	1,095,329.00 29-Dec-2023	2,864,608 01-Aug-2021
out of school children in selected provinces, female	Text	1,387,717 31-Dec-2016	643,029.00 29-Dec-2023	646,244.00 29-Dec-2023	1,628,133 01-Aug-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

Objective/Outcome: Improve learning conditions

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Teachers meeting subject specific qualifications	Text	52% 01-Jun-2018	72.00 29-Dec-2023	72.00 29-Dec-2023	NA 01-Aug-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Equitable access to basic education

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
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Schools constructed or expanded with classrooms, boundary walls, water points, and gender segregated latrines	Text	0.00	2,646.00	2,398.00	722 (561 School buildings, 211 with missing items) based on MoE certificate
		01-Jun-2018	29-Dec-2023	29-Dec-2023	01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
School Grants implemented	Text	0.00	2,298.00	2,298.00	0.00
		01-Jun-2018	29-Dec-2023	29-Dec-2023	01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Component: Improving learning conditions

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Students benefiting from direct interventions to enhance learning	Number	6,447,000.00	7,247,000.00	7,247,000.00	7,531,441.00
		31-Dec-2016	29-Dec-2023	29-Dec-2023	01-Aug-2021
Students benefiting from	Number	2462000.00	2,834,000.00	2,834,000.00	2,980,850.00



direct interventions to enhance learning - Female					
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Existing textbooks distributed and teaching and learning materials for the new curriculum developed for all grades	Text	Old national curriculum framework in effect 01-Jun-2018	45,000,000.00 29-Dec-2023	45,000,000.00 29-Dec-2023	12.2 million primary textbooks (grades 1-6) distributed from Provincial Education Directorates (PEDs) to District Education Departments (DEDs) and schools. 01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Teaching quality rating based on classroom observations	Text	Baseline to be collected in 2019	Teaching quality rating, based on TEACH classroom observation method,		NA



		01-Jun-2018	increased by 0.4 standard deviations or more among sampled teachers compared to the baseline. 29-Dec-2023		01-Aug-2021
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Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Grades 1 to 3 teachers and head masters trained in Early Grade Reading	Number	0.00 01-Mar-2021	20,000.00 29-Dec-2023		0.00 01-Aug-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Evaluation of Subject Teacher Training	Text	No data collection conducted 01-Mar-2021	Completion of base line and end line data collection of teacher training 29-Dec-2023		No data collection conducted 01-Aug-2021



Comments (achievements against targets):

Component: Strengthening education sector planning capacity and transparency

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Annual results based reports implemented between MOE, PEDs and DEDs	Text	No annual results reporting between MOE, PEDS and related DEDs 01-Jun-2018	100% 29-Dec-2023	100% 29-Dec-2023	Reports for around 90% of the target PEDs were completed and the work on the remaining PEDs and DEDs was in progress. 01-Aug-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
NESP III Operational plan on management and budgeting cycle developed and results reported (Text, Custom, DLI)	Text	New O&M budget allocation formula not established	By February 2021, progress on results toward 2018, 2019, and 2020 annual operational plan reported by MoE per template. By June		Progress on results toward 2018 annual operational plan reported by MOE. Annual Operation Plan based on actual on-budget allocation and



			2021, 2020, 2021, 2022 annual operational plan developed with budget codes specified for on budget- projected off-budget allocations completed as per the template and endorsed by Development Partners.		projected off-budget allocations for 2020 completed and endorsed by DPs as per the template.
		01-Jun-2018	29-Dec-2023		01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Integrated personnel database for education staff established	Text	No integrated personnel database	Organizational mapping of all education Tashkeel staff completed. Agreed minimum information on staff, as described in the Project Procedure Manual, including	Organizational mapping of all education Tashkeel staff completed. The database contains agreed minimum information on all staff as described in the procedure manual	After cleaning the data, the MoE and IARCSC found that some entries were incomplete and hence the current number of staff records at HRMIS stands at 223,000.



		01-Jun-2018	biometric data entered into the personnel database for all staff. Personnel data updated to reflect any changes required for existing entries 29-Dec-2023	including biometric data. Interface between personnel database and payroll completed by December 2022. 29-Dec-2023	01-Aug-2021
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Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Provincial workshops conducted with DEDs, school shura representatiaves to identify constraints to education	Text	0.00 01-Jun-2018	60.00 29-Dec-2023		NA 01-Aug-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Improved EMIS data	Text	No monthly phone	All 2019–2022 CBE	Detailed	The monthly phone



collection and quality assurance procedures implemented		survey data collection procedures	information reported to the MoE and entered in EMIS in accordance with policy guidelines; monthly survey data collection procedures established and functioning; and EMIS data verified with monthly survey data in a random sample of 5% of schools and physically verified with $\pm 3.5\%$ margin of error	arrangements or call center and protocols for monthly phone survey data collection procedures completed; The data verification for phone call survey conducted, EMIS application for CBE data entry into EMIS revised and deployed in MoE server, MoE relevant staff for on-budget CBEs and IPs for off-budget CBEs trained on the module; MoU Between the MoE and NSIA signed and action plan for the implementation of the MoU developed and endorsed by both MoE and NSIA.	call survey was completed but was deemed as an unscalable in its current form
		01-Jun-2018	29-Dec-2023	29-Dec-2023	01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at



				Target	Completion
Development and implementation of a teacher policy for prioritization in the hiring and allocation of teachers based on need	Text	No policy in place for prioritization in the hiring and allocation of teachers based on need	A teacher policy comprising step-by-step procedures for prioritization, needs-based allocation, and criteria for redeployment of teachers developed. At least ninety (90) percent of newly hired permanent teachers and at least seventy five (75) percent of all temporary teachers were based on the methods and criteria identified in the teacher policy; at least ninety (90) percent of new teacher positions were filled through a transparent recruitment process using the IARCSC's		Teacher Policy was drafted and endorsed by MoE, CSC and MoF and submitted for Bank's approval.
		01-Jun-2018	29-Dec-2023		01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Complaints addressed through grievance redressal mechanism	Percentage	0.00 01-Jun-2018	70.00 29-Dec-2023		71.00 01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Implementation of GBV action plan	Text	Implementation of GBV action plan (Text)	The relevant MoE staff, teachers, principals and students, and school management Shuras trained on GBV protocols and reporting systems. Protocols and systems to report and respond to GBV and SEAH incidents at schools is established through consultations with students, teachers, and parents in schools to identify preference for safe, child-friendly		The MoE is in the process of bringing onboard the necessary technical assistance to develop the required protocols and reporting system for GBV cases at schools and training teachers and MoE staff on these.



		01-Mar-2021	referral channels 29-Dec-2023		01-Aug-2021
Comments (achievements against targets):					



ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name	Role
Preparation	
Nathalie Lahire, Matiullah Noori	Task Team Leader(s)
Rahimullah Wardak, Anand Kumar Srivastava	Procurement Specialist(s)
Syed Waseem Abbas Kazmi	Financial Management Specialist
Syed Waseem Abbas Kazmi	Financial Management Specialist
Harsha Aturupane	Peer Reviewer
Joel E. Reyes	Peer Reviewer
Rajiv Aggarwal	Team Member
Ayesha Y. Vawda	Peer Reviewer
Yasuhiko Matsuda	Team Member
Tobias Linden	Peer Reviewer
Scherezad Joya Monami Latif	Peer Reviewer
Zahid Hasnain	Peer Reviewer
Alejandro Welch	Team Member
Juan Manuel Moreno Olmedilla	Peer Reviewer
Cristina Marosan Ling	Team Member
Tazeen Fasih	Peer Reviewer
Karthika Radhakrishnan	Team Member
Kamel Braham	Peer Reviewer
Saamira Halabi	Team Member

Shwetlena Sabarwal	Peer Reviewer
Yashodhan Ghorpade	Team Member
Najla Sabri	Team Member
Abdul Hai Sofizada	Team Member
Mabruk Kabir	Team Member
Atiqullah Ahmadzai	Team Member
Kinley Clemens Salmon	Team Member
Sayed Mujtaba Shobair	Environmental Specialist
Sayed Mujtaba Shobair	Environmental Specialist
Ahmed Shah Ahmadzai	Team Member
Ahmad Shakeeb Safai	Team Member
Ahmad Khalid Afridi	Team Member
Tariq Ashraf	Social Specialist
Tariq Ashraf	Social Specialist
Supervision/ICR	
Tsuyoshi Fukao, Matiullah Noori	Task Team Leader(s)
Muhammad Abbass Rahimi, Rahimullah Wardak, Aimal Sherzad	Procurement Specialist(s)
Akbar Ali Mohammadi	Financial Management Specialist
Syed Waseem Abbas Kazmi	Financial Management Specialist
Ghazal Shobair	Procurement Team
Tariq Ashraf	Social Specialist
Ghazala Mehmood Syed	Team Member
Ahmad Khalid Afridi	Procurement Team
Ahmad Shakeeb Safai	Team Member
Ahmed Shah Ahmadzai	Team Member

Sayed Mujtaba Shobair	Environmental Specialist
Atiqullah Ahmadzai	Team Member
Abdul Hai Sofizada	Team Member
Mohammad Javad Ahmadi	Team Member
Najla Sabri	Team Member
Yashodhan Ghorpade	Team Member
Shwetlena Sabarwal	Peer Reviewer
Saamira Halabi	Team Member
Ria Nuri Dharmawan	Counsel
Kamel Braham	Peer Reviewer
Karthika Radhakrishnan	Team Member
Tazeen Fasih	Peer Reviewer
Nathalie Lahire	Team Member
Juan Manuel Moreno Olmedilla	Peer Reviewer
Alejandro Welch	Team Member
Zahid Hasnain	Peer Reviewer
Scherezad Joya Monami Latif	Peer Reviewer
Tobias Linden	Peer Reviewer
Yasuhiko Matsuda	Team Member
Rajiv Aggarwal	Team Member
Joel E. Reyes	Peer Reviewer
Harsha Aturupane	Peer Reviewer

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		

FY16	0	37,171.99
FY17	16.750	160,034.39
FY18	102.756	641,305.49
FY19	65.075	403,905.31
FY20	52.273	248,892.78
FY21	32.800	139,022.87
FY22	34.850	229,710.40
Total	304.50	1,860,043.23
Supervision/ICR		
FY17	26.744	141,516.21
FY18	0	12,747.03
FY19	39.296	186,506.64
FY20	55.870	366,859.35
FY21	38.251	456,973.54
FY22	26.165	238,806.37
FY23	6.975	45,797.75
Total	193.30	1,449,206.89

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
Equitable Access to Basic Education	0	190.00	0
Improving Learning Conditions	0	29.00	0
Strengthening Education Sector Planning Capacity and Transparency	0	28.00	0
Technical Assistance	0	51.00	0
Contingency Emergency Response	0	0	0
Total	0.00	298.00	0.00

