Approved by: Prepared by the staff of the International Manuela Francisco and Hassan Zaman (IDA), Development Association (IDA) and the and Catherine Pattillo and Fabian Bornhorst International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IMF) RWANDA: JOINT BANK-FUND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS Risk of external debt distress Moderate Overall risk of debt distress Moderate Granularity in the risk rating Limited space to absorb shocks Application of judgment No The updated Bank/Fund debt sustainability analysis (DSA) for Rwanda continues to indicate a moderate risk of external and overall public debt distress. The current debt-carrying capacity is consistent with a classification of ‘strong’.2 The baseline scenario is based on the macroeconomic projections presented in the accompanying staff report for the fourth PCI/RSF review and second SCF review. Rwanda’s financing strategy assumes continued support from official development partners over the medium term, with highly concessional loans for new external borrowing under IDA20 and an increasing share of domestic financing in the long term. Debt indicators and standard stress tests classify debt sustainability risks as moderate with limited space to absorb shocks, with near-term breaches of the benchmark for PV of public debt to GDP and the threshold for PV external debt-to-GDP highlighting vulnerability to external and climate shocks. Heightened uncertainty around key external risks to concessional financing over the medium-term, baseline risks to domestic resource mobilization, and sustained exchange rate pressures could intensify debt sustainability risks over the medium-term. The authorities are encouraged to progress on fiscal consolidation, support the external adjustment with real effective exchange rate adjustment, and implement RSF reform measures in support of their climate agenda. 1 This debt sustainability analysis was conducted using the Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries (LIC-DSF) that was approved in 2017. The fiscal year for Rwanda is from July to June; however, this DSA is prepared on a calendar year basis. 2 Rwanda has a debt carrying capacity indicator score of 3.17. This implies a classification of strong debt carrying capacity, which is the same classification as under the previous DSA. 1 >>> 1. The DSA covers the central government, guarantees, and state-owned enterprises (Text Table 1). The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) publishes annual debt data in a semi-annual statistical bulletin, covering domestic and external debt of the central government, broken down by multilateral, bilateral and commercial debt, as well as information on guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt held by all state-owned enterprises (SOEs).3 Public guarantees are only extended to SOEs. There is no debt stemming from extra budgetary funds, long term central bank financing of the government, nor the state-owned social security fund. The local government debt is also covered but the existing stock to date is marginal,4 and its contracting is subject to approval by MINECOFIN. The contingent liabilities shock (6.5 percent of GDP) accounts for potential fiscal costs associated with a theoretical banking crisis, and fiscal risks of existing public-private partnerships (PPPs). All SOE guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt is included in the baseline. Subsectors of the public sector Check box 1 Central government X 2 State and local government 3 Other elements in the general government X 4 o/w: Social security fund X 5 o/w: Extra budgetary funds (EBFs) X 6 Guarantees (to other entities in the public and private sector, including to SOEs) X 7 Central bank (borrowed on behalf of the government) X 8 Non-guaranteed SOE debt X The central government plus social security and extra budgetary funds, central bank, government- 1 The country's coverage of public debt guaranteed debt, non-guaranteed SOE debt Default Used for the analysis Reasons for deviations from the default settings 2 Other elements of the general government not captured in 1. 0 percent of GDP 0 3 SoE's debt (guaranteed and not guaranteed by the government) 1/ 2 percent of GDP 0 SOE debt is covered in PPG debt 4 PPP 2/ 35 percent of PPP stock 1.5 default, i.e. 35 percent of PPP stock 5 Financial market (the default value of 5 percent of GDP is the minimum value) 5 percent of GDP 5 Total (2+3+4+5) (in percent of GDP) 6.5 1/ The default shock of 2% of GDP will be triggered for countries whose government-guaranteed debt is not fully captured under the country's public debt definition (1.). If it is already included in the government debt (1.) and risks associated with SoE's debt not guaranteed by the government is assessed to be negligible, a country team may reduce this to 0%. 2/ When PPP stock is less than 3 percent of GDP, as reflected in the World Bank’s database, then test is set to zero. 2. Rwanda’s public and publicly-guaranteed (PPG) external debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 45.9 percentage points over the last decade, driven by loans to meet the development needs envisaged in the National Strategy for Transformation (NST), but also to respond to the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. The development needs have been supported by a comprehensive public investment strategy, including three large projects to support trade and tourism through a series of public-private partnerships and external guarantees outside the budgetary central government (construction of the Kigali Convention Center completed in 2016, the expansion of the national airline RwandAir, and the ongoing construction of the Bugesera International Airport). These developments contributed to an increase in PPG external debt by 22.3 percentage points in the five years preceding the COVID-19 shock. At the same time, the increase in the fiscal deficit due to revenue shortfalls and a scaling 3 Operational leases on RwandAir (SOE) aircrafts and existing public-private partnerships (power purchase agreements, water purchase agreements, etc.) are not part of the PPG debt. 4 Local government debt stood at RWF 29 bn or 0.18 percent GDP at end-2023. 2 >>> up in spending to address the COVID-19 crisis led to a sharp debt increase by an additional 15.6 percentage points in 2020. Following the economic recovery, external and domestic inflationary pressures helped reduced the nominal PPG debt ratio in 2022. Weather-related shocks in 2023, including devastating floods, led to increased borrowing to meet reconstruction needs. Together with nominal exchange rate pressures from higher imports, PPG debt rose again in 2023 to 73.5 percent of GDP (Text Figure 1). Sources: Rwandan authorities and IMF Staff Calculations 3. Rwanda benefits from a high share of concessional external debt, mostly to official multilateral creditors (Text Table 2). Over 77 percent of Rwanda’s total PPG debt is owed to external creditors, three-quarters of which is to multilateral creditors, with highly concessional World Bank financing accounting for the majority. Rwanda issued a USD 620mn Eurobond in 2021 with a 10-year maturity, its second issuance on external markets since its debut issuance in 2013 (a USD 400mn 10-year bond that matured in 2023). Over 2021-22, the government facilitated SOE’s buyout of USD 104 mn in external debt with domestic debt financed with domestic bank loans. 3 >>> Debt Stock (end of period) Debt Service 2023 2023 2024 2025 2023 2024 2025 (In US$ mn) (Percent total debt) (Percent GDP) 5 (In US$ mn) (Percent GDP) Total 9,511.6 100.0 73.5 1,106.7 1,013.1 579.8 7.9 7.5 4.2 External 7,362.5 77.4 56.9 267.0 267.7 307.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 Multilateral creditors2 5,627.3 59.2 43.5 123.4 175.4 213.6 0.9 1.3 1.5 IMF 718.1 7.5 5.5 8.0 35.5 51.7 0.1 0.3 0.4 World Bank 3,286.5 34.6 25.4 62.5 79.5 94.8 0.4 0.6 0.7 ADB/AfDB/IADB 1,174.6 12.3 9.1 33.3 40.1 47.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 Other Multilaterals 448.0 4.7 3.5 19.6 20.3 19.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 o/w: IFAD 192.2 2.0 1.5 5.6 6.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 BADEA 87.2 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 Bilateral Creditors 917.0 9.6 7.1 35.7 45.1 46.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 Paris Club 346.3 3.6 2.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 o/w: JICA 139.5 1.5 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 AFD 165.8 1.7 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Non-Paris Club 570.7 6.0 4.4 33.7 43.1 44.9 0.2 0.3 0.3 o/w: EXIM-CHINA 347.1 3.6 2.7 17.2 26.9 26.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 SFD 78.1 0.8 0.6 5.2 4.5 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 Bonds 620.0 6.5 4.8 94.3 34.1 34.1 0.7 0.3 0.2 Commercial creditors 32.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 o/w: Trade Development Bank 32.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 o/w: EDC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other international creditors 166.1 1.7 1.3 13.6 13.1 13.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Domestic 2,149.1 22.6 16.6 839.7 745.4 272.1 6.0 5.5 2.0 Held by residents, total 2,149.1 22.6 16.6 839.7 745.4 272.1 6.0 5.5 2.0 Held by non-residents, total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 T-Bills 348.1 3.7 2.7 402.1 352.9 0.0 2.9 2.6 0.0 Bonds 1,213.5 12.8 9.4 226.6 226.0 166.5 1.6 1.7 1.2 Loans 587.5 6.2 4.5 211.1 166.6 105.6 1.5 1.2 0.8 Memo items: Collateralized debt3 0.0 0.0 0.0 … … … … … … Contingent liabilities4 0.0 0.0 0.0 … … … … … … Nominal GDP (US$ million) … … … 14,097 13,583 13,941 … … … 1 As reported by country authorities according to their classification of creditors, including by official and commercial. Debt coverage is the same as the DSA. 2 "Multilateral creditors” are simply institutions with more than one official shareholder and may not necessarily align with creditor classification under other IMF policies (e.g. Lending Into Arrears). 3 Debt is collateralized when the creditor has rights over an asset or revenue stream that would allow it, if the borrower defaults on its payment obligations, to rely on the asset or revenue stream to secure repayment of the debt. Collateralization entails a borrower granting liens over specific existing assets or future receivables to a lender as security against repayment of the loan. Collateral is “unrelated” when it has no relationship to a project financed by the loan. An example would be borrowing to finance the budget deficit, collateralized by oil revenue receipts. See the joint IMF-World Bank note for the G20 “Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers” for a discussion of issues raised by collateral. 4 Guaranteed debt is included in public debt. 5 Data is reported by the authorities based on calculations in national currency, deviates from U.S. dollar-based calculations due to the difference between end- of-period exchange rate (applied for nominator) and period-average exchange rate (applied for denominator). Sources: Rwandan authorities and IMF Staff Calculations 4. The depth and capacity of the domestic market has grown in recent years. The authorities’ primary financing strategy is to maximize external concessional financing before turning to non-concessional or domestic financing. In response to heightened spending needs due to the shock from the pandemic and limited external financing, domestic PPG debt jumped by about 6 percent of GDP between 2019 and 2021 and is expected to revert in the medium-term as external financing recovers. The main domestic creditors are banks and a pension fund providing financing through loans and Treasuries. The domestic bond market has been growing, from about RWF 60bn to RWF 300bn annually in recent years, reflecting heightened financing needs from the pandemic shock and increased bank holdings of 4 >>> T-bonds as collateral. While issuances are predominantly short-term T-bills, the government is shifting towards T-bonds and has extended maturities to 20-year bonds. In 2019, the government began implementing a bond “re-opening” strategy which aims to identify benchmark market rates by re-issuing previously issued bonds to determine market pricing for remaining maturities. This strategy helps to develop a market yield curve and lower domestic portfolio refinancing risks by increasing average maturities. In 2023, the Development Bank of Rwanda (BRD) successfully issued its first Sustainability Linked Bond (SLB) for RwF 30bn (0.18 percent of GDP) with support from the World Bank. It issued a second SLB in October 2024 for RwF 33.5bn (0.20 percent of GDP). 5 Both SLB’s have a seven-year maturity with an annual coupon rate of around 12.9 percent. As of September 2024, average T-bill rates stood at 6.8 percent, 5-year T-bonds at 11.8 percent, and 15–20 year T-bonds around 13.2 percent. 5. The macroeconomic assumptions underlying the baseline scenario reflect recent economic developments and policies (Text Table 3). The devastating floods in May 2023 amplified the underlying imbalances, leading to significant reconstruction costs, estimated at around 3 percent of GDP over the next five years. The authorities have reported that post-flood reconstruction spending for FY2023/24 has already reached approximately 0.6 percent of GDP. Compared to the previous DSA, the outturn for 2023 growth was much better than anticipated (8.2 percent vs. 6.2 percent). • Growth: Growth in 2024 has been more robust than previously envisaged and is expected to reach 8.3 percent compared to 6.6 percent in the previous DSA, reflecting continued recovery in agriculture and services, and strong construction activity. Growth is expected to soften to 7.0 percent in 2025 due to the contractionary effects of the projected fiscal consolidation. Over the medium term, growth projections remain unchanged and economic activity is expected to be buoyed by private sector-led economic diversification, the pickup in construction of the new airport, and the subsequent boost to the services sector. Private consumption and investment are the main growth drivers in the medium term as fiscal consolidation proceeds. Headline inflation is expected to decline to 5.0 percent in 2024, lower than the previous DSA forecast of 6.0 percent, reflecting easing food inflation. Over the long term (Box 1), growth from the supply-side is expected to be supported by a dynamic service sector, gradual industrialization, and continued significant contributions from agriculture for some period. On the demand side, robust and steady private consumption and investment will support the rebalancing of the economy from public sector-led towards private sector-led growth. • Fiscal: Rwanda's fiscal consolidation efforts have slowed, but the medium-term fiscal path remains ambitious. The general government fiscal deficit for FY2023/24 is estimated at 6.9 percent of GDP, slightly higher than in the previous DSA’s macroframework. This in crease is attributed to capital spending on road, education, and energy projects, financed by higher-than-expected foreign project loan disbursements from development partners. The medium-term budget framework envisages a reduction of the fiscal deficit from 5.6 to 3.1 percent of GDP over the FY2024/25–FY2026/27 period. 5 As a state-owned bank, BRD is not included in the DSA perimeter. For each SLB issuance, the government received a USD 10mn loan from the World Bank (included in DSA perimeter), that was on-lent to BRD which used the funds to purchase Treasuries that served as a credit enhancement for the SLB issuance. 5 >>> The adjustment will require efforts to mobilize domestic revenues and considerable expenditure adjustment, which limits room for further cuts amid substantial development challenges. A comprehensive package, primarily focusing on broadening the tax base by streamlining tax holidays and tax expenditures is under development. Recent IMF technical assistance has recommended that new measures be guided by key objectives to reduce tax relief to the informal sector and support registered businesses, address the VAT system’s regressivity by repealing regressive exemptions, rationalize income tax incentives, and implement environmental sustainability measures through comprehensive fossil fuel taxation. Medium-term contingency plans will involve spending reprioritization while safeguarding essential spending, in particular on investment and social assistance, and preventing budget overruns and financing risks. Potential measures include curbing new hires, further reducing non-essential recurrent spending, and halting underperforming domestically financed projects. Overall, the projections continue to assume strong fiscal policy consolidation that is aligned with the diversifying, private-sector led drivers of growth, builds buffers, and ensures convergence to the nominal debt anchor of 65 percent of GDP by 2031. • External: Relative to the previous DSA, the current account deficit is projected to widen to 13.1 percent of GDP in 2024, mainly due to lower grants and stronger import growth reflecting robust domestic demand, and a weakening exchange rate. The policy-mix underpinning the PCI and SCF assumes greater real effective exchange rate depreciation. 6 Over the medium term, the trade balance and current account deficit are projected to gradually improve, underpinned by further real effective exchange rate adjustment, higher domestic savings from fiscal consolidation efforts and improving exports from higher FDI. 6. Rwanda has identified a pipeline of climate-related investment projects for 2020-25, which supports its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) implementation strategy. According to authorities’ NDC implementation framework, the value of ongoing and planned projects over this period is USD 5.9 billion7. Despite ambitious goals, actual investment has lagged, with only 12 percent of planned spending for the largest of these projects realized in the first three years. Rwanda aims to help bridge this gap through new projects and private sector involvement via Ireme Invest, its green investment facility over time. Ireme has completed the initial capitalization process and identification of project pipelines and has started lending. The total value of Ireme’s green projects pipeline is currently estimated at U S$37 million in 2025, of which around US$4 million has been disbursed, mainly in the areas of e-mobility, green buildings, and waste and circular economy. The scaling up of the pipeline remains challenging, as both the Rwanda Development Bank (BRD) (which manages Ireme’s credit facility) and businesses need time to strengthen their understanding of the technical requirements for green investments. 6 Exchange rate depreciation is expected to have a greater net effect on import prices, contributing partially to a decline in USD GDP deflator in 2024. Higher overall price levels have pushed up deflator levels. 7 See Selected Issues Paper, IMF Country Report No. 23/423. 6 >>> Calendar year 2023 2024 2029 2034 2039 2043 2030-43 Actual Projections Selected indicators from the macro-framework and debt data (Percent, unless otherwise indicated) PV of PPG External Debt to GDP Ratio 2023 DSA (previous) 31.2 37.9 37.5 31.4 25.5 21.1 28.4 2024 DSA (current) 35.4 41.3 41.3 33.1 26.4 21.5 29.7 PV of Public Debt to GDP Ratio 2023 DSA (previous) 50.5 54.6 45.3 44.4 46.0 47.8 45.4 2024 DSA (current) 55.2 55.2 46.6 39.9 39.9 41.6 40.6 Grant Element of New External Borrowing 2023 DSA (previous) 39.6 32.8 41.6 36.9 35.3 33.6 35.9 2024 DSA (current) … 36.6 47.3 37.5 35.7 34.0 35.6 Real GDP Growth (annual percent change) 2023 DSA (previous) 6.2 6.6 7.3 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.8 2024 DSA (current) 8.2 8.3 7.3 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.8 Current Account Balance (percent of GDP) 2023 DSA (previous) -11.5 -11.8 -7.6 -8.4 -7.7 -6.6 -7.9 2024 DSA (current) -11.7 -13.1 -8.2 -10.2 -10.9 -10.5 -10.6 Exports of goods and services (percent of GDP) 2023 DSA (previous) 26.2 28.8 32.1 29.3 28.4 29.0 29.3 2024 DSA (current) 24.9 29.3 42.0 34.9 31.3 30.0 33.5 Fiscal balance (percent of GDP) 2023 DSA (previous) -6.2 -7.8 -3.5 -4.0 -3.7 -3.8 -3.9 2024 DSA (current) -5.8 -7.8 -2.7 -3.2 -3.4 -3.6 -3.3 CPI, period average (percent) 2023 DSA (previous) 14.5 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2024 DSA (current) 14.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 Note: Previous full DSA was completed in November 2023. Sources: Rwandan authorities; IMF and World Bank staff estimates and projections. 7. Baseline financing assumptions reflect Rwanda’s financing strategy, which assumes continued support from official development partners over the medium-term (Table 5). Gross financing needs are expected to continue declining over the medium-term in the context of fiscal consolidation and growth-promoting structural reforms supported by the PCI, RSF, and World Bank development policy financing. • External official financing. Besides financing from the World Bank and the IMF, the projection assumes disbursements of external financing from the African Development Bank and several other multilateral and official bilateral partners.8 Under the IDA20 financing terms, the volume of loans is projected to increase given the shift from 50-50 grant-loan financing under IDA19 to 100 percent loans, hence, the 8 Including expanded World Bank DPO from previously projected USD 125mn to USD 255mn for 2024 . 7 >>> fiscal deficit and the nominal debt will increase as well, but given the higher concessional terms of IDA20 loans, the expected impact on the present value of debt is marginal. 9 IDA financing signed after 2024 is assumed to be in the form of 100 percent credit on regular IDA terms. • External market financing. The share of market-based external financing is projected to increase starting 2030, although slowly under the baseline. The USD 620 million Eurobond is projected to roll- over in 2031. Against the broader trend of declining concessional financing over the medium-term, coupled with the authorities’ development spending needs and prospects for scaling up market -based climate- and development spending, risks are such that the share of market-based external financing may need to increase faster than envisaged. • Domestic financing. With declining financing needs under the baseline led by fiscal consolidation and negotiated new external resources, the share of domestic financing is projected to remain low until 2030 and pick up thereafter. Gross issuances will continue to support the domestic demand and smoothen the government’s liquidity needs, while net issuances are projected to be negative in the medium-term as the build-up in domestic debt from pandemic-related borrowing unwinds and drives down domestic debt-to-GDP and debt service levels back towards low levels compared to median values of other peer countries (see Text Figure 2). Without information on SOE borrowing plans, domestic financing needs are modestly underestimated. Risks are broadly balanced given relatively low debt levels and steady demand from banks who hold Treasuries as collateral. Key downside risks emanate from fiscal exposures to large development projects, including construction of Bugesera Airport which is included in the baseline, and concentrated banking sector exposures to rapidly growing mortgage- and construction-related activities. 9 50-year loans under IDA20 have grant element of about 74 percent, while 50-50 grant-loan financing that prevailed under IDA19 has grant element of about 77 percent. With 3 percentage points difference, if cumulative disbursements under IDA20 reach 3.2 percent GDP, the effect on PV of external debt would increase by about 0.1 percent GDP. 8 >>> Domestic debt service to revenues incl. Domestic debt to GDP ratio grants Net domestic debt issuance 1/ 25 50 4.0 30.0 45 3.0 20.0 20 40 2.0 35 10.0 1.0 15 30 0.0 0.0 25 -1.0 -10.0 10 20 -2.0 15 -20.0 5 10 -3.0 -30.0 5 -4.0 0 0 -5.0 -40.0 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 Historical realizations As a ratio to GDP (LHS) Median of average projected values over the first five years of the forecast As a ratio to domestic debt stock in prev. year (RHS) period Borrowing Assumptions (average over 10-year Value Shares in new domesticprojection) debt issuance Medium and long-term 35% Short-term 65% Borrowing terms Domestic MLT debt Avg. real interest rate on new borrowing 8.6% Avg. maturity (incl. grace period) 3 Avg. grace period 2 Domestic short-term debt Avg. real interest rate 5.2% Sources: Rwandan authorities and staff estimates and projections. Note: 1/ Net domestic debt issuance is an estimate based on the calculated public gross financing need net of gross external financing, drawdown of assets, other adjustments and domestic debt amortization. It excludes short-term debt that was issued and matured within the calendar year. 8. Realism tools indicate that the planned fiscal adjustment is ambitious (Figure 4). A 3-year fiscal consolidation in the primary balance is expected to peak at 3.9 percentage points of GDP from 2024 to 2027. Such adjustment lies in the top quartile of the distribution of past adjustments for a sample of low-income countries (LICs), signaling that the envisaged fiscal adjustment in the baseline scenario is ambitious based on past experiences in LICs. The ambitious adjustment depends on successful progress on domestic revenue mobilization covered under the PCI, and building on spending rationalization achieved under the PCI approved in 2022 and the SCF approved in 2023. Underperformance in domestic resource mobilization could be offset by further spending rationalization and preserve the planned fiscal adjustment, although with downside risks to growth and underlying debt dynamics. Other realism tools suggest that projections are broadly in line with historical debt drivers, with some improvements reflecting a tighter yet growth-friendly policy mix to reign in domestic and external imbalances. 9. In the past, PPG debt dynamics have been strongly affected by the materialization of fiscal risks (Figure 3). Changes in total public debt over the past five years have been driven by higher-than- anticipated primary deficits due to the pandemic response and unanticipated developments of the debt outside the budgetary central government, leading to a higher-than-expected debt accumulation of over 20 percentage points of GDP––well in excess of the 75 percent quartile of other LICs. The ongoing efforts 9 >>> to mitigate unanticipated fiscal developments outside the central government, supported by IMF TA, remain a key pillar of the PCI. Going forward, the evolution of public debt will continue to be dominated by the path of the primary fiscal deficit, real GDP growth, real effective exchange rate adjustment, and the availability of concessional financing. Growth. According to World Bank analysis, long term growth projections of 6.5 –7 percent are driven by four broad group of fundamentals: investment (public and private), human capital, total factor productivity (TFP) and demographics. The baseline assumptions for each growth driver are designed to capture a plausible path for the variable if present trends continue, taking into account both Rwanda’s own history, as well as reasonable values among other peer countries. Given the government’s strong historical record on implementing reforms, the baseline also includes “typical” levels of reforms that might be achieved by a typical country in Rwanda’s situation. Thus, the baseline assumes that TFP growth in the long run is 1.8 percent, which is between the averages 2000-19 and 2000–14 averages. The productivity projection is based on assumption of continued increase in FDI and trade openness. The baseline also assumes the government will continue its reform efforts to improve human capital indicators. To calculate this human capital path, the analysis identifies 12 countries that in 1980 had the same years of schooling of 20 –24-year-olds as Rwanda in 2020 (6.5 years ± 0.5 years)––Rwanda’s “schooling peers”––and then trace out the gains in education of the schooling peers over the next 10 years. In terms of investments, the baseline assumption is that investment continues at 28 percent of GDP for the whole projection period. While this represents a slowing of the increase in the 2000s, and a less optimistic assumpti on than in Rwanda’s Vision 2050 document, sustaining investment at or above 30 percent of GDP is very difficult among peer countries or even among growth miracle economies. Finally, the population growth is projected to slow from around 2.3 percent currently to about 1.4 percent over the next 30 years, as Rwanda goes through a “demographic transition” with lower fertility rates. Other things equal, the around1ppt slowdown in population growth will slow GDP growth by around half a percentage point in the medium term but boost GDP per capita slightly. Exports. There is potential for Rwandan exports to increase substantially in medium to long term. First, regional integration via AfCFTA presents an enormous opportunity to boost exports in coming years. To capture this benefit, Rwanda has been a leader driving negotiations of a series of protocols to the AfCFTA Treaty with clear, ambitious, and enforceable rules and disciplines, adopting legislative changes, and building implementation and enforcement capacity. Second, Rwanda has achieved considerable growth in exports of minerals and metals (minerals exports increased more than 10 times from 2010 to 2020), and further growth is expected with recent investments in the sector. Rwanda’s low labor cost could help achieve further increases in exports of textiles and clothing, supported by investments made in recent years. The potential for increasing services exports also is significant. Rwanda has revealed comparative advantage indices of greater than one for government goods and services, construction, travel and transport services. Construction companies in Rwanda have the skills required to operate in other regional countries, for example in building and operating power plants. Rwanda’s booming tourism sector have already recovered from the decline during the pandemic and is expected continue its expansion, as the country maintains a strong focus on the MICE strategy.___________________________________________________ 1/ Based on World Bank analysis from the ongoing Rwanda Country Economic Memorandum 10 >>> 10. Rwanda’s debt-carrying capacity continues to be assessed as “strong”, unchanged from the previous DSA (Text Tables 4a and 4b). The composite index (CI) for Rwanda, which measures the debt-carrying capacity in the new LIC-DSF, stands at 3.17, based on macroeconomic data from the April 2024 World Economic Outlook and from the 2022 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank. This score is above the cut-off value of 3.05 for strong capacity countries. Components Coefficients (A) 10-year average CI Score components Contribution of New framework values (B) (A*B) = (C) components CPIA 0.385 4.062 1.56 49% Cut-off values Real growth rate (in percent) 2.719 6.783 0.18 6% Weak CI < 2.69 Import coverage of reserves (in percent) 4.052 37.849 1.53 48% Medium 2.69 ≤ CI ≤ 3.05 Import coverage of reserves^2 (in percent) -3.990 14.325 -0.57 -18% Strong CI > 3.05 Remittances (in percent) 2.022 3.117 0.06 2% World economic growth (in percent) 13.520 2.909 0.39 12% CI Score 3.17 100% CI rating Strong Reference: Thresholds by Classiciation EXTERNAL debt burden thresholds Weak Medium Strong TOTAL public debt benchmark Weak Medium Strong PV of total public debt in PV of debt in % of percent of GDP 35 55 70 Exports 140 180 240 GDP 30 40 55 Debt service in % of Exports 10 15 21 Revenue 14 18 23 11. The full range of standard stress tests are conducted in additional to tailored natural disaster and contingent liability stress tests. Standard stress tests on real GDP growth, the primary balance, current transfers, foreign exchange depreciation, and the combination are conducted at their default settings. The contingent liability stress test assumes the materialization of liabilities in Text Table 2. In line the previous DSA, the natural disaster stress test is informed by the once-in-100-years flooding scenario discussed in the World Bank’s (2022) Country Climate and Development Report and significantly more severe by recent flooding events in the second quarter of 2023. Damages are assumed to reach 11.2 percent of the physical capital, requiring 17.9 percent of GDP in external financing to be replaced (with capital-to-GDP estimation at 1.6 based on the perpetual inventory method). GDP and exports would each be expected to decline by 4.4 percent. Given Rwanda’s Eurobond, the default market -financing stress test was applied, indicating significant gross financing needs risks and risks from higher sovereign spreads globally compared to when Rwanda accessed markets in 2021. 11 >>> 12. External debt indicators under the baseline remain below their respective thresholds, yet with breaches under stress test scenarios (Tables 1 and 3; Figure 1). Solvency indicators, PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio and of external debt-to-export ratio, remain below their indicative thresholds under the baseline scenario. Breaches of the threshold for PV of external debt-to-GDP under export and combination shock scenarios in the near-term and natural disaster shock scenario over the near- and medium-terms (Table 3) highlight Rwanda’s vulnerabilities to external and climate shocks. Liquidity indicators show that liquidity risks are muted, as the authorities’ debt management strategy to smooth out the debt servicing profile and the financing strategy that relies on concessional financing helped to mitigate the liquidity risks. Though, debt service-to-exports and debt service-to-revenue ratios remain below their thresholds until 2030, the debt service-to-revenue ratio approaches its threshold in the medium-term under an exchange rate depreciation scenario (Figure 1). One-time breaches of liquidity indicators in 2031 reflect the repayment of the existing Eurobond at maturity and underscore that a prudent debt management strategy is still needed to mitigate the repayment risks. 13. A customized alternative scenario illustrates risks to external debt distress stemming from the current uncertain and difficult external environment for Rwanda and key baseline risks not fully captured in standard stress tests, with external debt service-to-revenue reaching and breaching its threshold in the medium- and long-term (Figure 1, Table 1). Key baseline risks for Rwanda include, among others: a decline in the availability of concessional financing over the medium-term, slow progress on crucial domestic revenue mobilization efforts over the coming years, and sustained pressure on the exchange rate as a result of imbalances and resultant risks to the credibility of the nominal debt anchor of 65 percent of GDP. The alternative scenario illustrates the combined risk of not mobilizing revenues to the extent envisaged and relying on external borrowing with increasingly non-concessional terms over the medium-term, which in turn would be at less favorable terms in light of higher elevated public financing needs. In the scenario, the wider fiscal deficit is financed with more expensive external borrowing and less grant support over the medium-term, reflecting the risks around availability of concessional financing. The impulse from the wider deficit and sustained investment spending needs adds to external pressures through higher imports, pressure on reserves, and more sustained exchange rate depreciation. Under this alternative scenario, the external debt service ratios steadily rise, with external debt service-to-revenue reaching its threshold by 2032 (controlling for the 2031 Eurobond repayment). 14. The PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio increases steadily under the historical scenario since the latter assumes large external shock and imbalance reflecting averages of several large shocks and imbalances observed in the past (Table 3 and Figure 1). This is primarily due to the large current account deficit and negative USD GDP deflator calibrated using historical averages, which covered a period including several large shocks (commodity prices and drought) and large external imbalances corrected over 2015–17. Thus, policy adjustment to ensure a steady narrowing of the current account deficit, as envisaged under the baseline scenario (Text Table 3), is key to strengthen robustness of the debt dynamics. 12 >>> 15. Under the baseline scenario, the PPG debt is expected to return to the program debt anchor under the PCI of 65 percent of GDP by 2031, supported by a large, but growth-friendly fiscal consolidation and strong economic activity (Table 2). The nominal PPG debt is projected to peak at 80.0 percent GDP in 2025 then gradually converge to the debt anchor of 65 percent GDP by 2031. 10 The present value (PV) of PPG debt is projected to remain above the East African Community debt convergence criterion of 50 percent until 2028. 16. Contingent on the projected growth trajectory and ambitious fiscal consolidation, the PV of PPG debt stays well below the indicative benchmark of 70 percent of GDP but would breach the benchmark under the natural disaster shock scenario in the near-term (Tables 2 and 4; Figure 2). In the baseline scenario, the PV of PPG debt peaks at 57 percent in 2025 and declines to a low of 39.5 percent in 2036 before rising again as domestic financing assumes a larger role in the authorities’ long-run financing strategy. In the most severe scenario—the natural disaster shock—the PV of PPG debt breaches the 70 percent benchmark over 2025-26, peaking at 73 percent before baseline debt dynamics place it on a declining path. The authorities’ climate -related reform measures, including under the RSF, and priorities in climate-related investment should help reduce variability to climate shocks and strengthen resilience (see illustrative climate scenario below). 17. Rwanda is vulnerable to the consequences of climate change through various channels, which might affect the debt dynamics. World Bank’s (2022) Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR) for Rwanda identified that climate change might increase variability of crop yields, reduce labor productivity, and affect tourism through changing patterns of rainfall, extreme heat, increased incidents of illnesses, while extreme flooding events might become more frequent and damaging. This might reduce the long-term growth, affecting debt sustainability indicators in the long run, and increase risks of damage to infrastructure and other built-up capital requiring strong fiscal response. 18. In a scenario with higher adaptation investment in line with Rwanda’s NDCs, full RSF implementation, and policy adjustments, Rwanda could substantially improve its resilience to climate-related shocks and safeguard debt sustainability. As outlined in IMF Country Report No. 23/423, full RSF implementation would result in positive macroeconomic outcomes because of higher public spending efficiency and mobilization of more private resources. 11 In this scenario, the natural disaster stress test (calibrated based on the World Bank’s CCDR, as described above) is triggered in projection year 6, following five years of adaptation investments of over 2 percent of GDP per year, in line with Rwanda’s NDCs. Due to a global funding squeeze, external financing is only available to meet half of financing needs. The other half is raised through implementation of domestic resource mobilization-related 10 For discussion of the debt anchor see Country Report No. 2021/1 and the accompanying staff report for new PCI and RSF request (EBM/22). 11 See pages 31-33 and Figure 7 (page 11), describing the design and output of the “funding squeeze with policy adjustment and full RSF implementation” simulation. Other scenarios simulate more adverse outcomes as a result of incomplete policy adjustment or RSF implementation, and as a result higher funding costs. 13 >>> reforms, spending rationalization, enhanced public investment efficiency, and greater grants catalyzed by full RSF implementation and policy adjustments. DIGNAD (Debt, Investment, Growth, and Natural Disasters) model simulations illustrate a build-up of debt with increased adaptation investment spending and a related growth impulse, then a substantial resilience to the natural disaster shock which mitigates additional financing needs and impact on debt. Text Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the natural disaster shock with and without the preceding adaptation investments and ongoing reform implementation. Source: Staff estimates and projections . 19. Rwanda’s debt is assessed to be sustainable with a moderate risk of external and public debt distress, which is in line with the previous DSA assessment. Mechanical external and overall risk signals suggest moderate risk of debt distress with limited space to absorb shocks. At the same time, these shock scenarios do not fully capture the current uncertain external environment and key baseline risks, as illustrated by the customized alternative scenario and reinforced by the uncertainty around domestic resource mobilization and the outlook for sustainable investment in long-run growth potential and social spending needs. Given this assessment of moderate risk of debt distress, the limit on the stock of new external PPG debt will continue to be monitored under the PCI. 20. The authorities broadly agree with the results of the DSA and the overall assessment of a moderate risk of external and overall debt distress. The authorities’ debt management strategy will continue to focus on maximizing opportunities for concessional financing. They aim to leverage their Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) Framework (which obtained an S&P Global Ratings Second Party Opinion) and National Climate and Nature Finance Strategy to mobilize blended innovative and sustainable financing solutions. The authorities will continue efforts to deepen the domestic debt market 14 >>> by issuing longer dated securities. They remain committed to safeguarding debt sustainability and building their sustainability and climate resilience agenda in support of climate adaptation and mitigation measures. They also remain committed to ongoing implementation of fiscal consolidation measures (improve revenues mobilization, prudent spending rationalization and fiscal risk mitigation) to avoid higher debt accumulation and reach their target to bring debt to the anchor of 65 percent of GDP by 2031. 15 >>> Actual Projections Average 8/ Historical Projections 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2034 2044 External debt (nominal) 1/ 77.6 87.0 89.6 92.5 92.9 92.6 91.2 82.4 69.1 58.4 88.4 Definition of external/domestic debt Currency-based of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) 56.9 65.4 67.5 70.2 70.4 70.0 67.3 52.9 32.3 42.2 63.9 Is there a material difference between the No two criteria? Change in external debt 10.1 9.4 2.6 2.9 0.3 -0.2 -1.4 -1.0 -1.9 Identified net debt-creating flows 4.7 3.1 1.3 -0.1 -1.0 -1.6 -1.8 0.3 1.4 5.4 0.0 Non-interest current account deficit 10.2 10.9 9.7 8.7 7.9 7.0 5.6 8.1 8.4 10.2 8.2 Deficit in balance of goods and services 16.1 16.3 15.2 14.4 13.3 12.1 10.3 9.8 9.0 15.5 12.0 Exports 24.9 29.3 33.5 36.5 39.0 40.8 42.0 34.9 29.8 Debt Accumulation Imports 41.0 45.6 48.7 50.9 52.3 52.9 52.3 44.7 38.8 9.0 50 Net current transfers (negative = inflow) -6.4 -5.8 -5.9 -6.1 -5.8 -5.5 -5.2 -4.0 -2.8 -6.5 -5.1 of which: official -5.6 -4.8 -4.1 -4.3 -3.9 -3.5 -3.2 -1.4 -0.8 8.0 45 Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.3 2.1 1.1 1.3 7.0 40 Net FDI (negative = inflow) -3.3 -3.5 -4.9 -5.4 -5.2 -4.9 -3.8 -4.6 -5.0 -2.6 -4.5 Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ -2.2 -4.3 -3.5 -3.5 -3.7 -3.7 -3.7 -3.2 -2.0 35 6.0 Contribution from nominal interest rate 1.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.3 30 Contribution from real GDP growth -5.3 -6.5 -5.8 -6.0 -6.3 -6.4 -6.3 -5.4 -4.2 5.0 25 Contribution from price and exchange rate changes 1.5 … … … … … … … … 4.0 Residual 3/ 5.3 6.3 1.2 3.1 1.3 1.3 0.4 -1.3 -3.3 -0.2 0.4 20 of which: exceptional financing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 15 2.0 10 Sustainability indicators PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio 35.4 41.3 42.9 44.4 44.3 43.6 41.3 33.1 20.8 1.0 5 PV of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio 142.4 140.9 127.9 121.6 113.7 106.7 98.3 95.0 69.8 0.0 0 PPG debt service-to-exports ratio 8.1 7.6 7.1 7.6 8.5 8.5 8.7 6.4 6.7 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio 11.5 12.4 12.5 14.1 16.3 16.7 17.6 10.1 8.5 Gross external financing need (Billion of U.S. dollars) 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 3.1 8.4 Debt Accumulation Grant-equivalent financing (% of GDP) Key macroeconomic assumptions Grant element of new borrowing (% right scale) Real GDP growth (in percent) 8.2 8.3 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.0 6.5 6.7 7.2 GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) -2.2 -8.1 -3.2 -2.1 -1.2 -0.5 0.2 2.0 2.0 -0.4 -0.5 Effective interest rate (percent) 4/ 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.5 3.0 2.8 External debt (nominal) 1/ Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) 17.2 17.1 18.6 14.1 13.1 11.8 10.5 6.1 7.9 11.3 10.1 of which: Private Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) 16.2 10.6 10.7 9.4 8.8 8.1 6.2 6.3 8.3 9.3 7.5 100 Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent) ... 36.6 38.9 43.5 41.6 45.5 47.3 37.5 33.6 ... 39.2 90 Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) 17.6 18.1 18.9 19.5 20.2 20.7 20.8 22.2 23.5 18.1 20.6 Aid flows (in Billion of US dollars) 5/ 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.7 1.2 80 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 6/ ... 8.2 5.4 6.6 5.5 5.3 4.3 2.0 1.4 ... 4.3 70 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 6/ ... 53.1 61.6 61.5 61.2 60.9 64.9 49.9 43.3 ... 54.2 60 Nominal GDP (Billion of US dollars) 14 … … … … … … …… … Nominal dollar GDP growth 5.9 -0.5 3.6 4.8 5.9 6.8 7.5 9.1 8.6 6.2 6.7 50 40 Memorandum items: 30 PV of external debt 7/ 56.2 62.9 65.0 66.8 66.8 66.2 65.2 62.7 57.7 In percent of exports 225.6 214.7 193.6 182.8 171.4 162.2 155.3 179.8 193.6 20 Total external debt service-to-exports ratio 17.8 19.1 16.4 16.5 17.1 17.0 17.3 20.6 31.4 10 PV of PPG external debt (in Billion of US dollars) 5.0 5.8 6.2 6.8 7.1 7.5 7.6 9.5 13.8 0 (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) 5.6 3.1 3.7 2.5 2.2 0.8 1.6 1.1 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio 0.1 1.5 7.1 5.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 9.1 10.2 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 0 1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt. 2/ Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms. 3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes. 4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock. 5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief. 6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt). 7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value. 8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years. 16 >>> Actual Projections Average 6/ 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2034 2044 Historical Projections Public sector debt 1/ 73.5 77.5 80.0 78.9 77.1 74.9 71.7 58.9 54.0 55.4 70.5 Definition of external/domestic Currency- of which: external debt 56.9 65.4 67.5 70.2 70.4 70.0 67.3 52.9 32.3 42.2 63.9 debt based of which: local-currency denominated Change in public sector debt 6.0 4.0 2.5 -1.2 -1.7 -2.2 -3.2 -1.7 0.8 Is there a material difference Identified debt-creating flows 2.3 0.5 -1.3 -2.7 -3.1 -3.0 -3.7 -1.7 0.8 -13.7 -2.2 No between the two criteria? Primary deficit 3.6 5.3 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 0.8 2.1 2.7 -11.6 2.1 Revenue and grants 22.3 22.1 22.1 22.9 23.3 23.2 23.0 23.0 24.0 23.4 22.7 of which: grants 4.7 4.0 3.2 3.4 3.0 2.4 2.2 0.8 0.5 Public sector debt 1/ Primary (noninterest) expenditure 26.0 27.3 24.8 24.5 24.6 24.6 23.8 25.1 26.7 11.9 24.8 Automatic debt dynamics -1.3 -4.8 -4.0 -4.2 -4.4 -4.4 -4.4 -3.8 -1.9 of which: local-currency denominated Contribution from interest rate/growth differential -6.2 -4.8 -4.0 -4.2 -4.4 -4.4 -4.4 -3.8 -1.9 of which: foreign-currency denominated of which: contribution from average real interest rate -1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.2 1.4 of which: contribution from real GDP growth -5.1 -5.6 -5.0 -5.2 -5.3 -5.3 -5.1 -4.0 -3.2 90 Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation 4.9 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 80 Other identified debt-creating flows 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70 Privatization receipts (negative) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60 Recognition of contingent liabilities (e.g., bank recapitalization) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50 Debt relief (HIPC and other) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40 Other debt creating or reducing flow (please specify) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30 Residual 3.7 3.5 3.9 1.5 1.4 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.0 18.3 0.9 20 10 Sustainability indicators 0 PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio 2/ 55.2 55.2 57.0 54.5 52.4 49.5 46.6 39.9 43.0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 PV of public debt-to-revenue and grants ratio 247.1 249.9 257.9 237.7 224.9 213.7 202.2 173.4 179.0 Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio 3/ 52.8 33.9 22.7 30.3 24.0 22.6 21.0 21.2 42.2 Gross financing need 4/ 15.4 12.7 7.7 8.4 6.9 6.6 5.6 7.0 12.8 of which: held by residents of which: held by non-residents Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions 1 Real GDP growth (in percent) 8.2 8.3 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.0 6.5 6.7 7.2 Average nominal interest rate on external debt (in percent) 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.4 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.1 1 Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent) -1.5 6.4 7.0 6.9 7.2 7.1 7.3 6.5 7.9 1.4 6.7 Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation) 11.1 … ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 3.7 ... 1 n.a. Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 10.1 4.5 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.6 5.0 0 Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent) -4.3 14.0 -3.0 5.6 7.9 7.2 3.9 8.0 9.0 1.0 7.0 Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio 5/ -2.4 1.3 0.1 2.7 3.1 3.7 3.9 3.9 1.8 4.7 3.4 0 PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ Coverage of debt: The central government plus social security and extra budgetary funds, central bank, government-guaranteed debt, non-guaranteed SOE debt . Definition of external debt is Currency-based. 2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections. 3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt. 4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows. 5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio ((-): a primary surplus), which would stabilizes the debt ratio only in the year in question. 6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years. 17 >>> PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio 70 300 60 250 50 200 40 150 30 100 20 10 50 Most extreme shock: Natural disaster Most extreme shock: Exports 0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Debt Service-to-Exports Ratio Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 25 45 40 20 35 30 15 25 20 10 15 10 5 A one-off breach excluded: Exports 5 Most extreme shock: Combination Most extreme shock: One-time depreciation 0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Baseline Historical scenario Most extreme shock 1/ Threshold 1 Alternative scenario 1 Stress test with (the largest) one-off breach Customization of Default Settings Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress tests* Tailored Stress Size Interactions Default User defined Shares of marginal debt No No External PPG MLT debt 100% Terms of marginal debt Combined CL Yes Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD 2.1% 2.1% Natural disaster Yes Yes USD Discount rate 5.0% 5.0% Commodity price n.a. n.a. Avg. maturity (incl. grace period) 27 27 Market financing No No Avg. grace period 6 6 Note: "Yes" indicates any change to the size or interactions of the default * Note: All the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests are assumed to be covered by PPG settings for the stress tests. "n.a." indicates that the stress test does not apply. external MLT debt in the external DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections. Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2034. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented. 2/ The magnitude of shocks used for the commodity price shock stress test are based on the commodity prices outlook prepared by the IMF research department. 18 >>> PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 Most extreme shock: Natural disaster 10 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 350 50 45 300 40 250 35 30 200 25 150 20 100 15 10 50 Most extreme shock: Natural disaster Most extreme shock: Natural disaster 5 0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Baseline Most extreme shock 1/ TOTAL public debt benchmark Historical scenario 1 Alternative scenario Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress Default User defined tests* Shares of marginal debt External PPG medium and long-term 79% 79% Domestic medium and long-term 7% 7% Domestic short-term 14% 14% Terms of marginal debt External MLT debt Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD 2.1% 2.1% Avg. maturity (incl. grace period) 27 27 Avg. grace period 6 6 Domestic MLT debt Avg. real interest rate on new borrowing 8.6% 8.6% Avg. maturity (incl. grace period) 3 3 Avg. grace period 2 2 Domestic short-term debt Avg. real interest rate 5.2% 5.2% * Note: The public DSA allows for domestic financing to cover the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests in the public DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections. Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2034. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented. 19 >>> Projections 1/ 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 PV of debt-to GDP ratio Baseline 41 43 44 44 44 41 39 37 36 35 33 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2024-2034 2/ 41 44 48 51 54 56 57 59 60 62 63 Alternative scenario 42 44 48 50 52 51 49 48 47 47 46 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth 41 46 51 51 50 47 45 43 41 40 38 B2. Primary balance 41 45 54 54 54 51 48 46 44 42 41 B3. Exports 41 48 57 57 56 53 51 48 46 44 42 B4. Other flows 3/ 41 45 50 49 49 46 44 42 40 38 36 B5. Depreciation 41 55 52 52 51 49 46 44 42 41 39 B6. Combination of B1-B5 41 51 56 56 55 52 49 47 45 43 41 C. Tailored Tests C1. Combined contingent liabilities 41 46 48 48 48 45 43 41 39 38 36 C2. Natural disaster 41 55 58 59 59 57 55 53 51 50 48 C3. Commodity price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. C4. Market Financing 41 48 50 50 49 46 44 42 40 39 37 Threshold 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 PV of debt-to-exports ratio Baseline 141 128 122 114 107 98 100 98 97 96 95 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2024-2034 2/ 141 130 130 130 131 132 146 154 163 172 180 Alternative scenario 152 138 134 132 130 124 129 129 131 134 137 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth 141 128 122 114 107 98 100 98 97 96 95 B2. Primary balance 141 135 148 139 131 122 124 121 120 118 116 B3. Exports 141 173 225 210 197 182 185 181 178 175 171 B4. Other flows 3/ 141 135 136 127 119 110 112 109 108 106 104 B5. Depreciation 141 128 112 105 99 91 92 90 89 89 89 B6. Combination of B1-B5 141 164 139 163 153 141 144 140 138 136 134 C. Tailored Tests C1. Combined contingent liabilities 141 138 132 124 116 108 110 107 106 105 104 C2. Natural disaster 141 163 159 150 144 135 139 138 137 137 137 C3. Commodity price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. C4. Market Financing 141 128 122 114 107 98 100 97 96 96 95 Threshold 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 Debt service-to-exports ratio Baseline 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 15 7 6 6 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2024-2034 2/ 8 7 7 8 9 9 10 17 9 9 10 Alternative scenario 8 7 8 10 11 13 15 23 15 15 16 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 15 7 6 6 B2. Primary balance 8 7 8 10 10 10 10 16 8 8 8 B3. Exports 8 9 11 14 14 14 14 23 11 12 12 B4. Other flows 3/ 8 7 8 9 9 9 9 16 7 7 7 B5. Depreciation 8 7 8 8 8 9 8 15 7 5 6 B6. Combination of B1-B5 8 8 10 11 11 12 11 20 10 9 9 C. Tailored Tests C1. Combined contingent liabilities 8 7 8 9 9 9 9 16 7 7 7 C2. Natural disaster 8 7 9 10 10 10 10 17 9 9 9 C3. Commodity price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. C4. Market Financing 8 7 8 9 10 10 9 15 7 6 6 Threshold 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 Debt service-to-revenue ratio Baseline 12 13 14 16 17 18 16 27 11 10 10 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2024-2034 2/ 12 12 14 16 17 19 18 30 15 14 16 Alternative scenario 12 12 15 19 21 24 25 39 25 24 24 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth 12 13 16 19 19 20 18 31 13 11 12 B2. Primary balance 12 13 15 19 19 20 18 29 14 12 13 B3. Exports 12 13 15 18 19 19 18 29 14 13 13 B4. Other flows 3/ 12 13 15 17 17 18 17 28 12 11 11 B5. Depreciation 12 16 18 20 21 22 20 34 14 11 12 B6. Combination of B1-B5 12 13 17 19 20 20 18 31 14 13 13 C. Tailored Tests C1. Combined contingent liabilities 12 13 15 17 17 18 16 28 12 11 11 C2. Natural disaster 12 13 16 19 19 20 18 30 16 14 14 C3. Commodity price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. C4. Market Financing 12 13 14 17 19 19 17 27 11 10 10 Threshold 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the threshold. 2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows. 3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI. 20 >>> Projections 1/ 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Baseline 55 57 55 52 49 47 44 42 41 40 40 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2024-2034 2/ 55 59 59 59 59 59 59 58 59 60 61 Alternative scenario 55 58 57 58 57 55 53 52 52 53 54 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth 55 62 65 65 64 62 61 60 61 62 63 B2. Primary balance 55 60 66 63 60 57 53 51 50 48 48 B3. Exports 55 62 67 65 61 58 55 52 51 49 48 B4. Other flows 3/ 55 60 60 58 55 52 48 46 45 44 43 B5. Depreciation 55 64 60 56 51 47 42 39 37 35 34 B6. Combination of B1-B5 55 58 61 59 56 53 50 48 47 47 46 C. Tailored Tests C1. Combined contingent liabilities 55 62 59 57 54 51 47 45 44 44 43 C2. Natural disaster 55 73 71 69 66 63 60 58 57 56 56 C3. Commodity price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. C4. Market Financing 55 57 55 53 50 47 44 42 41 40 40 TOTAL public debt benchmark 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio Baseline 250 258 238 225 214 202 197 187 181 177 173 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2024-2034 2/ 250 266 257 255 255 257 264 261 261 262 264 Alternative scenario 253 266 261 267 255 245 238 235 239 243 247 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth 250 277 279 274 270 266 271 267 267 269 270 B2. Primary balance 250 273 288 273 260 246 240 228 219 213 207 B3. Exports 250 278 292 278 265 252 246 234 224 216 208 B4. Other flows 3/ 250 269 261 247 236 223 218 207 199 193 188 B5. Depreciation 250 293 263 242 222 204 192 174 164 155 148 B6. Combination of B1-B5 250 265 266 253 242 231 227 216 209 204 199 C. Tailored Tests C1. Combined contingent liabilities 250 279 257 243 231 219 214 203 196 191 186 C2. Natural disaster 250 330 306 293 282 271 269 258 251 246 241 C3. Commodity price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. C4. Market Financing 250 258 238 226 214 202 196 187 181 177 173 Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio Baseline 34 23 30 24 23 21 21 32 19 19 21 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2024-2034 2/ 34 23 30 24 23 22 23 34 21 22 25 Alternative scenario 34 23 32 28 27 27 29 41 29 30 33 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth 34 24 35 29 29 28 29 41 27 28 30 B2. Primary balance 34 23 34 31 27 26 25 35 22 23 24 B3. Exports 34 23 31 26 24 22 23 33 21 22 24 B4. Other flows 3/ 34 23 31 25 23 22 22 33 20 21 22 B5. Depreciation 34 23 32 26 25 24 24 37 20 20 22 B6. Combination of B1-B5 34 22 32 30 26 25 24 35 22 22 24 C. Tailored Tests C1. Combined contingent liabilities 34 23 35 25 25 22 22 33 20 20 22 C2. Natural disaster 34 24 44 29 31 26 26 37 25 25 27 C3. Commodity price n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. C4. Market Financing 34 23 30 25 24 23 22 32 19 19 21 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark. 2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP. 3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI. 21 >>> Gross Nominal PPG External Debt Debt-creating flows Unexpected Changes in Debt 1/ (in percent of GDP; DSA vintages) (percent of GDP) (past 5 years, percent of GDP) Current DSA 60 80 Residual 20 Previous DSA proj . 70 DSA-2019 40 Interquartile 15 range (25-75) Price and 60 exchange rate 50 20 10 Real GDP growth Change in PPG 40 debt 3/ 0 5 30 Nominal interest rate 20 0 -20 Median Current 10 account + FDI -5 0 Change in -40 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 PPG debt 3/ 5-year 5-year Contribution of Distribution across LICs 2/ historical projected -1 0 unexpected change change Public debt Gross Nominal Public Debt Debt-creating flows Unexpected Changes in Debt 1/ (in percent of GDP; DSA vintages) (percent of GDP) (past 5 years, percent of GDP) Residu al 60 Current DSA Previous DSA proj. 25 DSA-2019 Interquartile 90 Other debt 40 range (25-75) creatin g flows 20 80 Real 70 15 Exchange 20 rate 60 depreciation 50 Real GDP 10 Change in debt growth 0 40 Real interest 5 30 rate 20 -20 0 Primary deficit 10 Median 0 -40 -5 Chan ge in 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 5-year 5-year Distribution across LICs 2/ debt Contribution of historical projected -10 unexpected change change 1/ Difference between anticipated and actual contributions on debt ratios. 2/ Distribution across LICs for which LIC DSAs were produced. 3/ Given the relatively low private external debt for average low-income countries, a ppt change in PPG external debt should be largely explained by the drivers of the external debt dynamics equation. 22 >>> 3-Year Adjustment in Primary Balance Fiscal Adjustment and Possible Growth Paths 1/ (Percentage points of GDP) 12 3 14 Distribution 1/ 10 12 Projected 3-yr adjustment 8 2 In percentage points of GDP 3-year PB adjustment greater than 2.5 percentage points of 6 10 GDP in approx. top quartile 1 In percent 4 8 2 0 6 0 -2 4 -1 -4 2 -6 -2 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 0 Baseline Multiplier = 0.2 Multiplier = 0.4 more -4.5 -4.0 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 Multiplier = 0.6 Multiplier = 0.8 1/ Data cover Fund-supported programs for LICs (excluding emergency financing) approved since 1990. The 1/ Bars refer to annual projected fiscal adjustment (right-hand side scale) and lines show possible size of 3-year adjustment from program inception is found on the horizontal axis; the percent of sample is real GDP growth paths under different fiscal multipliers (left-hand side scale). found on the vertical axis. Public and Private Investment Rates Contribution to Real GDP growth (percent of GDP) (percent, 5-year average) 20 8 18 7 16 6 14 5 12 10 4 8 3 6 2 4 1 2 0 0 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Historical Projected (Prev. DSA) Projected (Curr. DSA) Gov. Invest. - Prev. DSA Gov. Invest. - Curr. DSA Contribution of other factors Priv. Invest. - Prev. DSA Priv. Invest. - Curr. DSA Contribution of government capital 23 >>> PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio 60 300 50 250 40 200 30 150 20 100 10 50 0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Debt Service-to-Exports Ratio Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 25 30 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 2040 2042 2044 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Threshold Baseline Limited space Some space Substantial space Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ For the PV debt/GDP and PV debt/exports thresholds, x is 20 percent and y is 40 percent. For debt service/Exports and debt service/revenue thresholds, x is 12 percent and y is 35 percent. 24 >>> GFN 1/ EMBI 2/ Benchmarks 14 570 Values 13 509 Breach of benchmark No No Potential heightened liquidity needs Low 1/ Maximum gross financing needs (GFN) over 3-year baseline projection horizon. 2/ EMBI spreads correspond to the latest available data. 60 PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio 300 50 250 40 200 30 150 20 100 10 50 0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Debt Service-to-Exports Ratio Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 25 30 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 Baseline Market financing Threshold Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 25 >>> Actual Projections Creditor profile 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 Total, US$ mn 9,303 10,259 11,024 11,467 11,914 12,425 12,823 13,274 13,871 14,609 15,457 16,399 17,452 18,654 19,990 21,475 23,086 24,866 26,821 29,135 31,710 34,993 External, US$ mn 7,154 8,629 9,277 10,187 10,856 11,603 12,022 12,516 13,013 13,562 14,153 14,701 15,271 15,814 16,354 16,925 17,543 18,206 18,317 19,108 19,972 20,902 Multilateral creditors 5,301 6,673 7,038 7,652 8,143 8,737 9,039 10,008 9,697 9,984 10,315 10,614 10,924 11,244 11,577 11,913 12,270 12,640 13,039 13,467 13,942 14,456 IMF 501 814 781 737 686 595 494 412 353 323 318 299 267 234 202 170 138 105 73 41 14 0 World Bank 3,796 3,745 3,835 4,184 4,436 4,789 4,905 5,121 5,305 5,474 5,621 5,755 5,897 6,050 6,213 6,387 6,573 6,777 6,998 7,238 7,496 7,775 AfDB 1,256 1,248 1,412 1,581 1,747 1,927 2,075 2,192 2,303 2,412 2,515 2,611 2,707 2,799 2,894 2,987 3,080 3,178 3,282 3,403 3,537 3,678 Other Multilaterals -401 689 834 974 1,096 1,240 1,402 2,144 1,622 1,686 1,772 1,859 1,954 2,051 2,150 2,242 2,341 2,432 2,529 2,619 2,719 2,817 Bilateral Creditors 1,033 1,102 1,271 1,479 1,625 1,775 2,014 2,167 2,308 2,446 2,571 2,683 2,800 2,926 3,054 3,195 3,343 3,504 3,676 3,860 4,052 4,250 Paris Club 324 515 670 837 971 1,084 1,237 1,322 1,397 1,466 1,525 1,575 1,627 1,681 1,739 1,799 1,865 1,940 2,020 2,105 2,193 2,283 Non-Paris Club 710 587 601 642 654 690 777 845 911 980 1,045 1,108 1,173 1,244 1,315 1,396 1,478 1,564 1,656 1,756 1,860 1,967 Private Creditors 819 854 968 1,056 1,089 1,091 969 341 1,009 1,132 1,267 1,404 1,547 1,645 1,723 1,816 1,929 2,062 1,602 1,780 1,978 2,196 Bonds 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 0 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 0 0 0 0 Loans 199 234 348 436 469 471 349 341 389 512 647 784 927 1,025 1,103 1,196 1,309 1,442 1,602 1,780 1,978 2,196 Domestic, US$ mn 2,149 1,630 1,747 1,280 1,058 822 801 758 857 1,047 1,304 1,698 2,181 2,840 3,636 4,550 5,543 6,660 8,504 10,027 11,738 14,091 Memo items: Collateralized debt (US$ million) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Multilateral and collateralized debt Multilateral debt, US$ mn 5,301 6,673 7,038 7,652 8,143 8,737 9,039 10,008 9,697 9,984 10,315 10,614 10,924 11,244 11,577 11,913 12,270 12,640 13,039 13,467 13,942 14,456 percent of external debt 74.1 77.3 75.9 75.1 75.0 75.3 75.2 80.0 74.5 73.6 72.9 72.2 71.5 71.1 70.8 70.4 69.9 69.4 71.2 70.5 69.8 69.2 1 percent of GDP 41.0 49.6 50.3 51.9 52.0 52.0 49.9 50.5 44.8 42.3 40.0 37.7 35.6 33.7 31.9 30.2 28.6 27.1 25.8 24.5 23.4 22.3 IMF and World Bank 4,298 4,559 4,615 4,921 5,123 5,384 5,399 5,533 5,657 5,796 5,939 6,054 6,164 6,285 6,415 6,557 6,711 6,883 7,071 7,278 7,509 7,775 percent of external debt 60.1 52.8 49.8 48.3 47.2 46.4 44.9 44.2 43.5 42.7 42.0 41.2 40.4 39.7 39.2 38.7 38.3 37.8 38.6 38.1 37.6 37.2 percent of GDP1 33.2 33.9 33.0 33.3 32.7 32.0 29.8 27.9 26.2 24.5 23.0 21.5 20.1 18.8 17.7 16.6 15.6 14.8 14.0 13.2 12.6 12.0 AfDB 1,256 1,248 1,412 1,581 1,747 1,927 2,075 2,192 2,303 2,412 2,515 2,611 2,707 2,799 2,894 2,987 3,080 3,178 3,282 3,403 3,537 3,678 percent of external debt 17.6 14.5 15.2 15.5 16.1 16.6 17.3 17.5 17.7 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.6 17.6 17.5 17.9 17.8 17.7 17.6 1 percent of GDP 9.7 9.3 10.1 10.7 11.2 11.5 11.5 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.3 8.8 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.2 6.8 6.5 6.2 5.9 5.7 Other Multilateral -401 689 834 974 1,096 1,240 1,402 2,144 1,622 1,686 1,772 1,859 1,954 2,051 2,150 2,242 2,341 2,432 2,529 2,619 2,719 2,817 percent of external debt -5.6 8.0 9.0 9.6 10.1 10.7 11.7 17.1 12.5 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.8 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.8 13.7 13.6 13.5 percent of GDP1 -3.1 5.1 6.0 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.7 10.8 7.5 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.3 Collateralized debt, US$ mn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1/ debt as percent of GDP is calculated by authorities based on debt and GDP values in RwF 26 >>>