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HELLENIC REPUBLIC

Greece 2.0
NATIONAL RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE PLAN

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REIMBURSABLE ADVISORY SERVICES AGREEMENT ON SUPPORT FOR REFORM OF THE JUDICIAL MAP OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS AND PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL CLERKS (P177672)

COMPONENT 1: SUPPORT FOR THE OPTIMIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL MAP

Deliverable 1.1. Report on the update of Judicial Map baseline and Judicial Map benchmarking and analysis of the list of planned justice sector infrastructure projects set out in the Greek National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP)

This report is made up of two Volumes, as follows:

Volume 1. Report on the Update of Judicial Map Baseline and Judicial Map Benchmarking

Volume 2. Analysis of the List of Planned Justice Sector Infrastructure Projects Set out in the Greek National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP)

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COMPONENT 1: SUPPORT FOR THE OPTIMIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL MAP

VOLUME 1. REPORT ON THE UPDATE OF JUDICIAL MAP BASELINE AND JUDICIAL MAP BENCHMARKING

March 2023

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About this report

This report has been delivered under the Reimbursable Advisory Services Agreement on Support for Reform of the Judicial Map of the Civil and Criminal Courts and for the Development of a Performance-based Human Resources Management Framework (P177672) signed between Hellenic Republic through the Ministry of Justice and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on March 31, 2022. It corresponds to Deliverable 1.1. Report on the update of Judicial Map baseline and Judicial Map benchmarking and analysis of the list of planned justice sector infrastructure projects set out in the Greek National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) under the abovementioned agreement.

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Acronyms

CEPEJ	European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
CMS	Case Management System
CoE	Council of Europe
ΕΑΠ	National Payment Authority (*Ενιαία Αρχή Πληρωμών)*
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ELSTAT	Hellenic Statistical Authority
EU	European Union
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
NRRP	National Recovery and Resilience Plan
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
RAS	Reimbursable Advisory Services
ROLI	Rule of Law Index
RRF	Recovery and Resilience Facility
ΤΑΧΔΙΚ	Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (*Ταμείο για τη Χρηματοδότηση Δικαστικών Κτιρίων)*
WJP	World Justice Project

English-Greek Translation of Common Terms Used in Tables and Figures

English	Ελληνικά
appellate (court)	εφετείο
appellate region	εφετειακή περιφέρεια
clearance rate (CR)	ποσοστό εκκαθάρισης (ΠΕ)
(judicial) clerks	δικαστικοί υπάλληλοι
cost per case	κόστος ανά υπόθεση
disposed (case)	περαιωθείσα (υπόθεση)
disposition time (DT)	χρόνος διευθέτησης (ΧΔ)
efficiency category (EC)	κατηγορία αποδοτικότητας (ΚΑ)
first instance	πρώτος βαθμός
first instance court	πρωτοδικείο
incoming (case)	εισερχόμενη (υπόθεση)
lower quartile	κάτω τεταρτημόριο
magistrate (court)	ειρηνοδικείο
median	διάμεσος
pending (case)	εκκρεμής (υπόθεση)
petty crime (court)	πταισματοδικείο
prosecution office/service	εισαγγελία
second instance	δεύτερος βαθμός
upper quartile	άνω τεταρτημόριο

Glossary

Term	Definition
backlog	total number of pending cases at any given point in time
case weighting system	scoring system to assess the degree of complexity of case types based on the understanding that one case type may differ from another case type in the amount of judicial time required for processing[1]
clearance rate (CR)	ratio obtained by dividing the number of resolved cases by the number of incoming cases in a given period, expressed as a percentage[1]
correlation	the degree to which two variables fluctuate in relation to each other (in the same or in the opposite direction)
cost per case	total expenses of a court divided by the number of cases disposed by this court in the year of reference
disposed (case)	case which terminated in the court concerned either through a decision by the court, or through any other procedural step which ended the case (e.g., a discontinuance of the case or a settlement) within the year of reference[1]
disposition time (DT)	the calculated number of days it would take the court to dispose of all backlog at the current pace of work (i.e., if it continues to dispose of the same number of cases per year)
efficiency category (EC)	the classification of courts into 6 categories based on their clearance rates and relative disposition times during the reference period (1: very high clearance rate, 2: standard, 3: creating backlog, 4: fighting backlog, 5: warning, 6: very high disposition time)
incoming (case)	case filed in the court concerned in the year of reference[1]
litigious case	case involving a dispute which is determinable by a court[1]
lower quartile	the value below which 25 percent of data points lie
median	the middle value of a dataset, i.e., the value for which 50 percent of data points lie above it, and the other 50 percent below (or on) it
non-litigious case (non-contentious proceedings)	case processed by a court which does not involve the determination of a dispute (e.g., an incontestable application for registration of an interest or entitlement or an uncontested payment order case)[1]
pending (case)	case which remains to be resolved by the court concerned on the 31st of December of the year of reference
positive correlation	the degree to which two variables increase or decrease in parallel
upper quartile	the value above which 25 percent of data points lie

[1] Source: CEPEJ Glossary, CEPEJ (2020), https://rm.coe.int/cepej-2019-5final-glossaire-en-version-10-decembre-as/1680993c4c

Executive Summary

1. **Purpose of the report.** This Baseline Report has been developed under a Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS) Agreement between the Government of Greece and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). It implements Component 1 of the RAS (Support for the Optimization of the Judicial Map). For this report, the term 'judicial map' refers to the network of courts, including their geographic distribution, territorial jurisdiction, and size. The report examines Greek civil and criminal courts and prosecution services with their respective performance indicators. A demand-supply approach is used. Relevant demand factors include the population served by courts as well as the number of incoming cases per inhabitant and per judge. Supply factors include human resources, the output of courts and prosecution services, judicial infrastructure, and budget.

2. **Scope of the report.** The RAS Agreement and this Baseline Report target only the courts of general jurisdiction and the respective prosecution services. They do not cover the system of administrative courts, any ad hoc tribunals, or the Supreme Court or the Supreme Court prosecution service. The courts of general jurisdiction of Greece comprise 154 magistrate courts and 154 petty crimes courts, 63 first instance courts, and 19 appellate courts. Petty crimes courts and magistrate courts are usually integrated; therefore, they are examined jointly. Magistrate courts adjudicate only civil cases; since Greece abolished petty crimes in 2019, petty crimes courts have only evidence collection functions.[2] Furthermore, the report covers first instance courts and the corresponding prosecution services. These courts examine the majority of civil and criminal cases in Greece when they are first brought to the justice system. They also act as a second instance for some of the civil disputes resolved by the magistrate courts as well as for some misdemeanor cases, which the first instance court has already examined in a single-judge panel. Finally, the report covers the appellate courts of Greece, with their corresponding prosecution services.

3. **Comparison with European benchmarks.** A comparison of the Greek justice system with its Council of Europe (CoE) counterparts provides a context for the state of play in the sector. With regard to courts, Greece has significantly more judges per inhabitant than its CoE counterparts; however, judges receive much less clerical support than their European peers. Furthermore, the demand for civil and criminal justice services in Greece is higher than the European benchmarks, with a strikingly higher number of incoming appellate criminal cases per inhabitant. Regarding performance, in the area of civil justice the aggregate performance as indicated by the clearance rate (that is, ratio between disposed and incoming cases per year) of Greek magistrate and appellate courts is better than the CoE median, while the aggregate clearance rate of first instance courts is at the CoE median, but disposition times (that is, number of days the court would need to clear all its existing backlog) are much longer, which indicates backlog issues. Regarding criminal cases, the clearance rate appears good at the first instance level but quite poor at the appellate level. Disposition times for criminal cases across both instances are much higher than in CoE member states. With regard to prosecution services, and in contrast to the situation with courts, Greece has much fewer

[2] In 42 of the magistrate court locations, the evidence collection functions are served by appointed petty crime judges and clerks. In the rest of the locations, the respective magistrate court judges and clerks serve this function.

prosecutors per inhabitant, but the clerical support they receive, especially at the first instance level, is double the European benchmarks. Demand for prosecutorial services is substantially higher than that in comparator jurisdictions. Performance of first instance prosecutorial services, as measured in percentage of cleared cases of the total incoming, raises concerns as it appears low and seemingly deteriorating over the years. This is quite probably generating significant backlog that, due to deficiencies in statistical reporting, remains unknown.

4. **Approach to the demand and supply analysis of courts and prosecution services.** In conducting a demand and supply analysis of the different levels of Greek judicial services, the report examines their resourcing and performance. Resourcing imbalances are identified based on metrics such as judges/prosecutors per inhabitant, incoming cases per inhabitant, incoming cases per judge/prosecutor, and ratio of clerks per judge/prosecutor. Performance imbalances are assessed by means of metrics such as productivity (that is, disposed cases per judge/prosecutor per year), clearance rate, disposition time, and efficiency category (an indicator defined by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice [CEPEJ], which combines clearance rate and disposition time into a single metric). For prosecutors specifically, only the first two performance metrics are used, in line with the European practice and due to the lack or unreliability of relevant data. The examination of resourcing metrics helps identify well-resourced and poorly resourced judicial services; the examination of performance metrics points to judicial services that may have performance issues. Based on this, a juxtaposition of the findings on performance with the findings on resources seeks to answer the question whether deficiencies in performance might be attributable to poor resourcing or something else. Similarly, the report seeks to verify whether or not judicial services with resources above the median for Greece exhibit better performance than their poorly resourced peers.

5. **Demand and supply analysis of magistrate courts.** The landscape of Greek magistrate courts is defined by a multitude of single-judge courts serving small communities. This inevitably leads to significant resourcing imbalances between such small territorial units and larger ones. Serious resourcing issues are noted in the magistrate courts of the greater Athens area, which appear overburdened and have human resources below the median for Greece. On the whole, none of the well-resourced courts seem to have a particularly stellar performance. While they keep up with their incoming caseload, an effort beyond that is not apparent from the data. The poorly resourced courts, on the other hand, present a heterogenous picture. Some have been struggling with performance due to the lack of sufficient human resources. Others appear to have risen to the challenge and performed well, some even exceptionally well, given their dire circumstances. Importantly, the analysis establishes a strong correlation between caseload and productivity at the magistrate level, meaning that judges with higher caseload try to keep up with demand and display higher productivity. This, in turn, indicates that there are significant opportunity costs to keeping judges at locations with low caseload.

6. **Demand and supply analysis of first instance courts.** The examination of the resourcing and performance of first instance courts points to important imbalances. First, the first instance court of Athens is disproportionately large, and given the exorbitant population

it serves, any issues affect a disproportionately large group of people. The court has a large number of judges relative to demand but an insufficient number of court clerks. Importantly, the large number of judges seems unable to handle well the civil caseload, resulting in a low clearance rate, a long disposition time, and a poor efficiency category. Second, some first instance courts appear to operate with insufficient human resources, and this might be affecting their performance in the area of civil law, criminal law, or both. Third, there are courts that are well resourced but still exhibit serious performance issues (for example, Nafplio).

7. **Demand and supply analysis of appellate courts.** At the level of appellate courts, there are again significant imbalances in both resourcing and performance. The best resourced courts are the largest ones. They perform well with regard to their civil caseload but appear to be facing issues when it comes to processing criminal cases. By contrast, there are some well-resourced and some not so well-resourced courts which appear to be doing well with criminal caseload but facing problems with the civil one. Finally, the appellate court of Thrace is an outlier since even though it has the lowest number of judges relative to demand, it appears to manage well both civil and criminal cases and is not raising concerns.

8. **Demand and supply analysis of first instance prosecution services.** First instance prosecution services display resourcing and performance imbalances, which are somewhat more moderate than the ones observed at courts of the same level. In terms of size, the huge first instance prosecution service of Athens dominates the landscape. It is well resourced in terms of prosecutors but, similar to courts in the capital city, has a lower level of clerks per prosecutor, as compared to the median for Greece. There are imbalances among first instance prosecution services in terms of incoming complaints per prosecutor per year with the lightest caseload present at the smallest prosecution services. Regarding disposed cases per prosecutor, the correlation between caseload and productivity that was visible in the court system applies to prosecutors as well. Overburdened prosecution services have a high output, whereas ones with a light caseload have a relatively modest number of disposed cases per prosecutor. In terms of clearance rate, the first instance prosecution services of Greece appear to perform rather poorly overall. Services where performance is particularly poor include both those at strained locations with a low number of prosecutors relative to demand and as ones with a lighter caseload. By contrast, prosecution services with a clearance rate above 100 percent are almost uniformly well resourced. The clearance rate of the two largest prosecution services in Athens and Thessaloniki is well below 100 percent. Given the great weight of these two prosecution services in the overall caseload, this negatively affects the overall performance of the Greek criminal justice system.

9. **Demand and supply analysis of appellate prosecution services.** The imbalances at the appellate prosecution level of Greece are similar to the ones at the appellate level of courts. The large prosecution services of Athens and Piraeus are well resourced. However, the Thessaloniki appellate prosecution office, unlike the respective appellate court, seems somewhat strained for resources. As with appellate courts, the appellate prosecution office of Thrace has the lowest human resources relative to demand. In terms of performance, a high caseload is found to lead to excellent productivity, potentially at the expense of a great strain on personnel. The clearance rate at the appellate prosecution level appears excellent

across the board. That is in sharp contrast to the performance with regard to criminal caseload in appellate courts. It is not clear whether these unusual patterns are a result of the highly problematic statistical reporting for criminal caseload or the COVID closures that strained the first instance relieved some pressure off second instance prosecution.

10. **Infrastructure.** The physical infrastructure of judicial services is an important supply factor since adequate buildings allow judges and prosecutors to perform their duties in an optimal manner and improve user experience. In reviewing the infrastructure of judicial services, the report produces a snapshot of the status quo; the situation of specific judicial services would be considered in more detail once options for reforming the judicial map are identified in a subsequent report. Overall, the physical infrastructure of Greek judicial services leaves a lot to be desired. Almost half of the buildings are assessed by their users as being in a poor or very poor condition. Aspects of judicial infrastructure with a direct bearing on the working conditions for judges and prosecutors such as courtrooms, offices, and space for storing archives appear insufficient. Courtrooms are particularly important for the timely scheduling of hearings and processing of cases, but their availability varies greatly among courts of the same level with large courts being particularly strained. There are also numerous issues with the facilities pertaining to citizen interaction with the justice system and user access such as waiting areas, parking spaces, access for people with special needs, and building security.

11. **Justice system expenditure.** The funding of the justice system represents an essential supply factor; therefore, cost estimates for the operation of Greek civil and criminal justice are used as an additional metric for identifying imbalances in the resourcing of judicial services. By dividing the average annual cost per judicial service by the number of disposed cases per year for that judicial service, this report arrives at a *cost per case* metric, which renders the costs for the operation of justice services comparable across different courts and prosecution offices of the same type. On this basis, imbalances are identified. A disposed case in certain judicial services appears to cost the Greek state much more than a disposed case in other judicial services of the same type, with the biggest imbalances present at the magistrate level. Costs per case are overall lower in larger courts and prosecution offices in urban centers, except at the appellate level, where the courts of Athens and Piraeus especially exhibit high costs for the number of cases they process, compared to other appellate courts in the country.

12. **Conclusion.** Overall, Greek civil and criminal justice appears to perform relatively well in terms of clearing incoming cases, but the weight of the effort to maintain an adequate performance is unequally distributed among judicial services. Furthermore, the current level of performance appears insufficient to significantly reduce total backlog in the system. Significant imbalances in resourcing are observed for both human and material resources. To improve performance, a rationalization of the court network (for example, by rebalancing of resources and caseload or by mergers of judicial services) may be necessary for achieving more equitable workload, increasing output, and clearing backlog.

I. Introduction

1. **The Greek judicial system faces long-standing challenges with its overall effectiveness, efficiency, and quality and requires sustained reform efforts to improve its performance.** Despite some recent progress, the slow and inefficient justice system continues to hamper private investments, weighing on potential growth and employment.[3] The need to improve the administration of justice is therefore considered a key factor for the economic development of Greece, in support of increasing productivity, competitiveness, and a well-functioning business environment.

2. **Significant reforms were initiated under the financial adjustment programs in 2010–2018.** Reform efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the justice system have been focusing on making organizational changes to courts and operational and procedural issues, establishing new specialized chambers in courts for certain types of cases and training judges, deploying e-justice tools and services, creating a specialized 'JustStat' unit for data collection and processing to measure and improve the performance of the judicial system, and improving the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the Integrated System for the Inter-Operability of the Civil and Criminal Courts is being rolled out nationally.

3. **Despite progress in the justice system over the recent years, there is still considerable room for improvement in comparison to similar jurisdictions.** The justice system continues to face multiple challenges, such as outdated infrastructure and human resources insufficiencies, along with an inefficient distribution of resources under the current judicial map that affects its efficiency and quality. International comparative examinations have consistently shown that the country's judiciary is performing below European comparators. For example, according to the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), the time needed to resolve civil and commercial disputes in first instance courts in Greece was estimated at 559 days in 2018, well above the median for Council of Europe (CoE) member states of 201 days,[4] and the clearance rate for civil and commercial disputes has been reported as 86 percent and much lower than the CoE median of 101 percent at the time.[5] In essence, this would mean that the judiciary of Greece has been generating backlog which threatens to weigh down its performance in the years to come.[6]

4. **International comparisons indicate that there are issues in terms of effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of justice in the areas of both civil and criminal justice.** According to the Rule of Law Index (ROLI) of the World Justice Project (WJP) for 2022, Greece ranks 26 among 31 countries (from European Union [EU], European Free Trade Association [EFTA], and

[3] See Greece's Recovery and Resilience Plan, Economic and Social Resilience at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/recovery-coronavirus/recovery-and-resilience-facility/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en#economic-and-social-resilience.
[4] See Council of Europe, European judicial systems CEPEJ Evaluation Report, 2020 Evaluation cycle (2018 data), p. 115 at https://rm.coe.int/rapport-evaluation-partie-1-francais/16809fc058. The 2022 Evaluation cycle of the same report does not provide data for Greece on these metrics.
[5] Ibid.
[6] While the context, in which this project has been conceived, was informed by CEPEJ comparisons, the current study uses newer and much more granular statistical data on the performance of the Greek judiciary and therefore arrives at more nuanced findings.

North America) in the field of civil justice.[7] Furthermore, the WJP ROLI ranks Greece 28 in the field of criminal justice among the same 31 jurisdictions with a similar level of socioeconomic development.[8]

5. **Efforts to address structural challenges were recently bolstered under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP).** The NRRP of Greece sets out the reforms and public investment projects that the country plans to implement with the support of the European Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) over 2021–2026. The European Commission endorsed Greece's NRRP on June 17, 2021. The Greek plan is structured around four pillars: (1) green transition; (2) digital transition; (3) employment, skills, and social cohesion; and (4) private investment and economic and institutional transformation. The fourth pillar combines measures to strengthen public administration, the justice sector, and the financial system; promote research and innovation; enhance competitiveness in key sectors; and facilitate private investment. It includes critical investments and reforms aimed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the justice system (Component 4.3).

6. **To implement some of the key reforms identified under the NRRP and continue to improve the justice system, the Greek government has entered into a Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS) Agreement with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank).** Specifically, as the entity responsible for implementing these reforms, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) requested World Bank support for the reconsideration of the judicial map of the civil and criminal courts and the development of a judicial performance tool for judicial clerks, which fall under the *Accelerating the Administration of Justice* component of the NRRP. The RAS Agreement has three components: (1) Support for the Optimization of the Judicial Map; (2) Support for the Introduction of a Performance-based Compensation Framework for Judicial Clerks; and (3) Stakeholder Engagement, Change Management, and Roll-out of Reforms.

7. **This Baseline Report is developed as part of Component 1 of the project.** The RAS Agreement between the Greek Government and the World Bank and this Baseline Report target only the courts of general jurisdiction. A parallel process has been under way to optimize the judicial map of administrative justice. At the time of completion of this Baseline Report, there was no conclusive outcome of that effort.[9]

[7] Factor 7 of the WJP ROLI measures whether ordinary people can resolve their grievances peacefully and effectively through the civil justice system. It measures whether civil justice systems are accessible and affordable as well as free of discrimination, corruption, and improper influence by public officials. It examines whether court proceedings are conducted without unreasonable delays and whether decisions are enforced effectively. It also measures the accessibility, impartiality, and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. See https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022/Greece/Civil%20Justice/.

[8] Factor 8 of the WJP ROLI evaluates a country's criminal justice system. An effective criminal justice system is a key aspect of the rule of law, as it constitutes the conventional mechanism to redress grievances and bring action against individuals for offenses against society. An assessment of the delivery of criminal justice should consider the entire system, including the police, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and prison officers. See https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2022/Greece/Criminal%20Justice/ as well as https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022/Greece/Criminal%20Justice/.

[9] The report of the expert committee has been delivered to the Government of Greece, the legislative procedure has been initiated, and the first draft law is already undergoing 'public consultation', before entering the parliamentary procedure.

8. **The report is structured as follows:**

- Introduction of the context in which the current project has been conceived and its main components
- Presentation of the principal concepts of judicial map and judicial map reform and the purpose of the report
- Methodological section presenting the main data sources, limitations, and the approaches employed to analyze the data
- Presentation of the judicial map reforms conducted in other Council of Europe member states, with their purposes, criteria, content, challenges and impact
- Brief outline of the current status of the Greek justice system, examining its structure, evolution, recent procedural rationalizations, and status of digitalization
- Demand and supply analysis of Greek magistrate, first instance, and appellate courts and of first instance and appellate prosecution services and identification of any imbalances in terms of resourcing and performance
- Review of the physical infrastructure available to Greek judicial services
- Expenditures of justice services and identification of cost per case imbalances
- Conclusion providing a summary of the identified imbalances in the resourcing and performance of examined judicial services.

II. Judicial Map Reforms and Purpose of the Baseline Report

9. **Even though there is no established definition of the term 'judicial map', it is widely understood to refer to the network of courts in a given country, including their geographic distribution, territorial jurisdiction, and size.** The court network is intended to ensure universal and uniform access to justice across the entire territory. In that regard, it is important that users and potential users of the system, even in remote or hard to access areas, have a court within a reasonable distance. It is also equally important that the human and material resources of the judiciary are distributed such that, across the country, the speed and quality of justice are comparable and no community is put at a disadvantage in either having to travel excessively or expensively to reach the nearest court or having to wait much longer than others for the court to adjudicate on their dispute. A rational judicial map needs to ensure equal access to high-quality justice in the entire country. Since the demographic and economy of states as well as their procedural and substantive laws change over time, periodic adjustments to the judicial map are needed to ensure that it continues to meet its goals.

10. **Major adjustments of the judicial map of a jurisdiction, based on a comprehensive examination of supply and demand factors related to justice, are referred to as judicial map reforms.** In a narrow sense, such reforms are understood to entail the opening, closure, merger, or division of courts (and the adjoining prosecution services) to achieve an optimal distribution and reach of the judicial network. However, given the wide-reaching examination

of the needs for justice and the resourcing of judicial institutions that an examination of the judicial map entails, in a broader sense, judicial map reforms entail not only closures, openings, divisions, and mergers but also any adjustments to the jurisdictional rules or the allocation of resources available to individual justice institutions across the territory, based on the judicial map analysis.

11. **Although judicial map reforms are being implemented across the globe, there is little in terms of internationally recognized standards for this process other than the Revised Guidelines on the Creation of Judicial Maps to Support Access to Justice within a Quality Judicial System** issued in 2013 by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) of the CoE.[10] The CEPEJ Guidelines provide a framework by which administrators and policy makers may undertake reforms and take operational decisions to design or redesign the judicial map of an entire country or part of its territory. While recognizing that the baseline for initiating a judicial map reform and the aims pursued may be different from one country to another, the CEPEJ Guidelines lay out the process for designing a judicial map, which entails four phases: (a) assess current judicial map and indicators, (b) set objectives and criteria, (c) build and measure indicators, and (d) define new judicial map. Furthermore, the CEPEJ Guidelines identify the factors that could be considered in redesigning a judicial map. These include main factors such as size of courts, population density, flows of proceedings and workload, geographical location, infrastructure, and transportation as well as additional ones such as computerization, level of business, court facilities, and cooperation with external systems, for example, prisons or police.[11]

12. **This report implements the first stage of a judicial map reform; namely, it assesses the current judicial map of Greek civil and criminal courts and prosecution services with their respective performance indicators.** The purpose of the report is to comprehensively examine the resources available to the Greek civil and commercial courts and prosecution services; the distribution of these resources, at both the territory and court levels; the output of the courts and prosecution services with the resources available to them, in terms of workload and resolved cases; and any imbalances or problem areas that may affect the performance of judicial services or the Greek justice system as a whole.

III. Methodology

13. **The development of the baseline for the judicial map of Greek civil and criminal court and prosecution services follows a demand and supply approach.** Examined demand factors include the population served by judicial services, the number of incoming cases per inhabitant, and the number of incoming cases per judge. Examined supply factors include available human resources, output of courts and prosecution services in terms of disposed cases, available infrastructure, and costs. Numerous comparisons are drawn between judicial

[10] CEPEJ, CoE. 2013. *Revised Guidelines on the Creation of Judicial Maps to Support Access to Justice within a Quality Judicial System As adopted on the CEPEJ's 22th plenary meeting, on 6 December 2013.* https://rm.coe.int/european-commission-for-the-efficiency-of-justice-cepej-revised-guidel/168078c492. It should be noted that the guidelines themselves are already outdated as some of the reforms they describe (for example, the ones in Italy, Portugal, Croatia) either have not progressed in the intended way or have undergone many subsequent cycles of changes.

[11] A subsequent report under this project will present a comparative examination of judicial map reforms in CoE member states.

services of the same type and the same level (for example, appellate courts with other appellate courts. Where appropriate, comparisons are made among appellate regions with the goal of highlighting regional imbalances in demand and supply. Furthermore, where the data allow it, the demand for justice services in Greece, the resourcing of the Greek justice system, and its performance are compared to CoE benchmarks as measured by the latest CEPEJ Evaluation Report. Unless indicated otherwise, all tables and figures used in this report have been developed by the project team based on data and information collected in the framework of the project.

14. **In assessing the current state of the Greek justice system, the Baseline Report uses caseload statistics, human resources data on the judicial system, data regarding the infrastructure available to Greek courts, population statistics, and budgetary data.** These datasets were obtained using several sources and approaches. Each dataset presents different limitations. These are examined in the following subsections.

3.1 Caseload Data

15. **Caseload statistics were obtained from the statistical department of the MoJ.** In line with the CEPEJ methodology, the project team has sought data on incoming, pending, and disposed cases for courts and only on incoming and disposed cases for prosecution services.[12] Data on civil caseload have been self-reported by courts annually and were compiled from these reports. Historically, courts have not been reporting data on criminal caseload at all. Prosecutor offices were tasked with this reporting for both the pretrial and the trial phases of a criminal case; however, the types of information covered in these reports differ substantially from the well-established disaggregation into incoming, pending, and disposed cases under the CEPEJ methodology, which is used in this report. Additionally, individual judicial services interpret these three terms differently. For this reason and for this analysis, the MoJ statistical department sent a targeted central request to all courts and prosecution services for criminal caseload data, including definitions for every type of data sought, to avoid differing interpretations.

16. **The collection of criminal caseload data posed significant challenges due to the idiosyncrasies of Greek criminal procedure and case management practices.** In most countries, from the moment the pretrial phase ends with an indictment, the criminal case enters the trial phase and is physically kept at the court. However, in Greece, such a case would stay at a Designation Office, which is part of the structure of prosecution services, until it can be scheduled for a trial date at the court. Furthermore, if the hearing of a scheduled case is postponed, it would be withdrawn back to the Designation Office (and would thus essentially stay again with the prosecution) to await rescheduling. This leads to a situation, where there is no clarity, at the court or the prosecution office, as to the actual number of new criminal cases (because usually, every time a case is brought back to court following a postponement, it would be considered as a new incoming case entering the court), with the

[12] For courts, the CEPEJ methodology uses the terms 'incoming', 'pending', and 'resolved' cases. For the analogous events, this report uses the terms 'incoming', 'pending', and 'disposed' cases. Furthermore, for prosecutors, CEPEJ uses the terms 'received' and 'processed'" cases. For the analogous events with regard to prosecutors, this report uses the terms 'incoming' and 'disposed' cases. The goal has been to have consistency between terms used for courts and for prosecutors in this report, to facilitate its readability.

potential for significant overcounting of cases. Furthermore, there is also no clarity as to the actual number of criminal cases pending at the court or the prosecution office (because the postponed cases would not be physically present at the court and the court would not have a clear idea of their number).

17. **Prosecution offices are considered to have a better view of criminal case flow than courts in Greece, but they also appear to experience difficulties with consistently and accurately reporting the number of cases that are pending or disposed at any point.** The reasons are various. One is that often and for many lesser crimes, prosecutors consider disposed cases that have been forwarded to the Designation Office without so much as an indictment (a court clerk may write the indictment), much less a court date. Another is that cases sent to investigative judges are also frequently reported as disposed by the prosecution and then counted once again as disposed when, having returned to the prosecution office, they are forwarded to the Designation Office. Generally speaking, every time a case leaves the prosecution office through the Designation Office or otherwise, the tendency is to report that case as disposed. This potentially leads to double and triple and quadruple counting of cases as disposed by the prosecution or as incoming for the criminal courts. At the same time, it means that the actual size of the criminal case backlog (either at the pretrial or trial phase) is obscured in statistical reporting, although widely known to be regularly ballooning, to the point where laws would be enacted every four or five years, specifically for the reduction of the unmanageable criminal backlog (see below).

18. **To distinguish new cases from postponed cases that are returning to the court over and over again until eventually resolved or proscribed, the project team worked closely with the MoJ statistical office and some courts and prosecution services to make sure that incoming cases are accounted for just once** (when first brought to court). To address the issue with the unclear number of criminal cases pending at the trial stage, the project team took into account both the data as reported by the courts (which is understood to omit all or part of the criminal cases that have reached the trial stage but have been postponed and withdrawn back to the prosecution office) as well as the data reported by prosecution offices, to arrive at an estimated number of pending cases, correcting for parts of the picture that were not visible from the perspective of the courts. This has generated significant methodological issues, which may lead to inaccuracies in the data used and the resulting analysis, and certainly warrants rethinking of related judicial processes and the system of case management and statistical reporting of criminal cases in Greece.

19. **Measuring criminal backlog is further complicated by laws enacted periodically, which state that persons who have committed misdemeanors up until a certain date would not be held liable, as long as they did not commit a new crime within a certain period.** Such laws[13] would lead to periodic archiving of part of the pending cases, which would reduce the backlog by an unspecified number of cases. In this manner too, the true number of pending criminal cases would be obfuscated for both the prosecution services and the court. Furthermore, the periodic issuance of laws that absolve perpetrators of criminal liability

[13] The two latest such laws were Law 4411/2016 and Law 4689/2020. For example, Law 4689/2020 stipulated that criminal penalty shall be eliminated and the prosecution shall cease for the described criminal acts, which have been committed up to April 30, 2020.

essentially incentivizes[14] defendants to prolong the pretrial and the trial phases of the criminal case by employing whatever procrastination tactics might be procedurally available, in the hope that if the delay is long enough, yet another such law would be issued, and the defendant might evade criminal liability.

20. **The data on incoming, disposed, and pending cases were collected for five years (2017–2021).** For comparing courts' caseload and performance and identifying imbalances, the median numbers of incoming, disposed, and pending cases for these five years have been used to minimize the distortions that one-time events could have caused to the usual operations and reporting of the court or the prosecution service. One-time events include the COVID-19 pandemic, intermittent changes in reporting practices, or the 2020 amendment to the Katseli law (examined in some detail in Section 4.3) or the 2020 law that removes criminal liability for crimes committed up until a certain date.

21. **Based on the caseload data, this report conducts a comparative examination of the performance of courts and prosecution services.** The comparison is done at the court level (magistrate, first instance, and appellate) and at the prosecution service level (fist instance and appellate). Performance of courts is measured in terms of four factors: productivity, clearance rate, disposition time, and efficiency category. Performance of prosecution offices is measured in terms of two factors: productivity (measured as disposed cases per prosecutor) and clearance rate (since, as per the CEPEJ approach, no data on pending cases for prosecutors are used, and in any case Greek data on pending criminal caseload were deemed particularly unreliable, disposition time and efficiency category cannot be assessed).

22. **Productivity is measured in terms of disposed cases per judge/prosecutor per year.** It is not a measure of individual performance but is calculated based on the overall annual output of each individual judicial service divided by the number of approved judicial or prosecutorial positions.[15] For first instance prosecution services, the number of disposed cases is the sum of all cases discontinued/permanently archived plus cases sent to court for the first time. For appellate prosecution services, disposed cases include cases sent to court.

23. **Clearance rate indicates how well the court, or the prosecution service, manages the current inflow of cases.**[16] The clearance rate is calculated by dividing the number of disposed cases per year by the number of incoming cases in that year. The result is measured by percentages. If the number of disposed cases is approximately equal to the number of incoming cases, the clearance rate would be approximately 100 percent and will indicate that the court is able to manage the current inflow of cases without accumulating backlog. A lower clearance rate means that backlog is being accumulated, and a clearance rate higher than 100

[14] In essence, what is created are the so-called perverse incentives. A 'perverse incentive' is defined as an unintended and undesirable result that accidently rewards the wrong behavior, causes people to act on exceptions, perpetuates a broken process, measures results too late, or omits the influence of natural human motivations. See International Data Corporation at https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=US47987221#:~:text=A%20%22perverse%20incentive%22%20is%20an,influence%20of%20natural%20human%20motivations.

[15] Examined positions are full-time ones.

[16] For prosecutors, rather than using the term 'clearance rate', the CEPEJ report uses the term 'total processed cases as percentage of received'. However, this report has opted to use the term 'clearance rate' for both courts and prosecution offices, for consistency and readability.

percent indicates that the court or the prosecution service not only manages to handle its current inflow of cases but also disposes of old cases, thus reducing the overall backlog.

24. **Disposition time is a theoretical measure of the length of proceedings in a given court.** Disposition time is calculated by dividing the number of cases pending at a court at the end of the year (December 31) by the number of cases resolved during the same year. The result is then multiplied by 365 (the number of days in a year). The resulting value indicates how many days it would theoretically take a court to clear its existing backlog assuming that it works at its current pace and no new cases are coming in. A short disposition time means that a court is able to deal with its backlog quickly. The longer the disposition time, the bigger the potential for delays in that court.

25. **Several methodological challenges emerged in respect of the calculation of disposition time for criminal cases.** First, and as discussed above, due to the difficulties in identifying the number of criminal cases pending at courts, the team obtained (a) a measure of the backlog as reported by the courts that validity checks indicated had many issues and (b) an estimate of criminal backlog by combining metrics obtained from both courts and prosecution services over several years. Furthermore, another methodological challenge in respect of calculating disposition times was linked to the effect of COVID-19 pandemic on caseflow. It appears from data trends, as well as from interviews conducted with representatives of the judicial system, that the pandemic significantly affected the caseflow of criminal cases in 2020 and 2021 (much less so for civil cases), leading to a situation where the hearing of a large number of already scheduled cases was postponed and they were withdrawn back to the Designation Office. As a result, in these years, the number of criminal cases disposed by the courts is significantly lower than the number of disposed cases in pre-COVID years. The lower number of disposed cases in 2021 has a direct effect on the calculation of disposition time, which compares the current backlog with the number of cases resolved during the last year. Given that during the last year for which data were available (2021) courts had an unusually low number of disposed cases (presumably due partly to COVID-19 closures), the resulting disposition times appear inordinately long.

26. **To account for all these complexities and present a picture of disposition times which is both robust and fair to courts, the project team opted to develop three scenarios, or estimation methods, with regard to criminal case disposition time.** The first scenario uses data on pending cases as reported by the courts. Since the data point to a low backlog, the resulting disposition times seem extremely short, in a manner that is not in agreement with the observed variations in clearance rates or the experience on the ground, where courts appear to struggle to contain criminal backlog.[17] The second scenario makes a conservative estimate of the number of pending cases by combining data on incoming and postponed cases obtained from both courts and prosecution services to reflect a number of pending cases that is in line with what the cumulative caseload data suggest. When this scenario is used, disposition times seem extremely long.[18] Finally, the third scenario uses the second

[17] For example, when this 'as reported' scenario is applied, it appears that if the Athens first instance court were to stop receiving new cases today, it could resolve its entire backlog in just 135 days. Interviewed representatives of the court regarded this value as completely unrealistic.
[18] For example, when this 'estimate' scenario is applied, it appears that if the Athens first instance court were to stop receiving new cases today, it could resolve its entire backlog in 890 days.

(estimated as opposed to reported) data on pending cases, which the project team finds more realistic, but makes a correction for the extraordinary circumstances related to the COVID pandemic. Instead of presuming that the courts will continue to work at the same rate at which they resolved cases in 2021, this scenario presumes that they will go back to pre-COVID rates of resolving cases. That third scenario (estimated number of pending cases, with a rate of resolution of cases corrected for COVID) presents disposition times that are between the two extreme values obtained using the other two methods and is the one used as the main guidepost in this report.[19] When making a comparison among courts, regardless of the scenario used, it is usually the same courts that stand out as outliers, which suggests that the findings regarding disposition time are relatively robust.

27. **The third performance metric, efficiency categories, was developed by CEPEJ and is a composite measure of court performance.** It juxtaposes disposition time with clearance rate and, based on that, divides courts into six categories: (a) Standard, (b) Creating Backlog, (c) Fighting Backlog, (d) Warning, (e) Very High CR, and (f) Very High DT. For this paper, the CEPEJ definitions of efficiency categories and color coding are used; however, they are also ranked and assigned a respective number based on the level of concern they raise: Very High DT (assigned No. 6), Warning (assigned No. 5), Fighting Backlog (assigned No. 4), Creating Backlog (assigned No. 3), Standard (assigned No. 2), and Very High CR (assigned No. 1).

Figure 1. Efficiency categories[20]

Efficiency categories		Disposition Time	Clearance Rate
	Very High DT	DT > = 4xMedian	all values
	Very High CR	all values	CR > 200%
	Warning	4xMedian > DT > 2xMedian	CR < 100%
	Fighting Backlog	4xMedian>DT > 2xMedian	CR >= 100%
	Creating Backlog	DT < 2xMedian	CR <95%
	Standard	DT < 2xMedian	CR >= 95%
	NA	NA	NA

Note: CR = Clearance rate; DT = Disposition time.

28. **Furthermore, when analyzing caseload data and comparing to European medians, this report works with two main case groups that are used as a basis for caseload analysis in CEPEJ evaluations: civil litigious cases and criminal cases.** The determination of which cases are criminal is straightforward, but the classification of civil cases into litigious and non-litigious poses some challenges. The Greek justice system does not formally classify civil cases into litigious and non-litigious. However, such distinction is made by CEPEJ, used for its

[19] For example, when this 'corrected for COVID' scenario is applied, it appears that if the Athens first instance court were to stop receiving new cases today, it could resolve its entire backlog in 333 days. This scenario appears the closest to reality, without discounting the fact that there is some uncertainty as to the actual size of criminal backlog, and neither courts nor prosecution offices, much less our team, are able to give a definitive answer as to the exact size of the criminal backlog and respective disposition times around the country.

[20] See European judicial systems CEPEJ Evaluation Report, 2020 Evaluation cycle (2018 data), p. 113 at https://rm.coe.int/evaluation-report-part-1-english/16809fc058. The 2022 Evaluation cycle uses the term 'reducing backlog' rather than 'fighting backlog' to describe the same efficiency category. However, this report has opted to use the 'fighting backlog' term, as it considers it more appropriate.

evaluations across Europe, and defined in the CEPEJ Glossary.[21] According to it, a non-litigious case (*affaire non-contentieuse*) is a "case processed by a court which does not involve the determination of a dispute (e.g., an incontestable application for registration of an interest or entitlement or an uncontested payment order case)."[22] This definition was used to distinguish between litigious and non-litigious civil cases in Greece too, with the purpose of allowing for a proper comparison between clearance rates and disposition times of the Greek courts and their European counterparts.

29. **Insight into the size of litigious versus non-litigious caseload in magistrate and first instance courts of Greece is provided in Figure 2.** The median for 2017–2021 is taken as indicative to mitigate the effect of temporary distortions and changes in reporting practices. The picture clearly indicates that magistrates are more heavily burdened with non-litigious cases than first instance courts. The following have been classified as non-litigious: orders for payment, 'voluntary jurisdiction' cases, the issuance of certificates of succession, and others.

Figure 2. Median litigious and non-litigious incoming cases at the magistrate and first instance court levels for 2017–2021



30. **It is well recognized that cases differ greatly in terms of level of complexity and required judicial time and effort.** For this reason, it is more appropriate to measure caseload by assigning certain weight to different types of cases, in accordance with their complexity. Thus, a regular civil claim may have the weight of two small claims or four orders for payment cases. Case weights are specific to every jurisdiction and are assigned based on a complex and participatory analysis of judicial work. In Greece, a recent legal amendment[23] provides for the

[21] See CEPEJ Glossary as adopted at the 33rd plenary meeting of the CEPEJ Strasbourg, December 5–6, 2019, p. 9 at https://rm.coe.int/cepej-2019-5final-glossaire-en-version-10-decembre-as/1680993c4c.
[22] Even though some Greek judges see order for payment cases as litigious ones, they are not considered litigious cases under the definition of CEPEJ because the order for payment case is meant only to verify whether the debtor contests the claim or not. In case there is no objection by the debtor, the order for payment case would be completed with the issuance of an enforceable title; however, if there is an objection, the dispute will need to be examined in a new, litigious case. For this reason, this report too views order for payment cases as non-litigious ones.
[23] Code on the Organization of Courts and the Status of Judges (Law 4938/2022), article 19, para 2, subpara b.

introduction of a case weighing system, one that would assign to cases complexity levels from one to five and based on them would aim to ensure equal allocation of cases among judges and prosecutors. However, the provision is laconic and is not linked to any already developed methodology for assigning weights to cases, a process that is usually rather lengthy. [24] Furthermore, the development and implementation of this system requires decisions of the respective supreme courts, which have not been made yet. As currently there is no case weighting methodology for Greece, even a draft one, for this Baseline Report, cases were counted and compared in absolute numbers, regardless of their complexity. For future iterations of this analysis, it is recommended that once a case weighting methodology for Greek justice is developed, it shall be factored into the caseload analysis.

31. **It should also be noted that the approach to analyzing caseload as derived from CEPEJ metrics reflects the core judicial task of resolving disputes but does not reflect all types of work conducted by a court.** A substantial part of the work of courts includes the issuance of various certificates as well as non-litigious cases such as orders for payment, voluntary jurisdiction, and so on. The World Bank team attempted to collected data on the number of certificates issued per court, but that proved highly unreliable and circumstantial and was therefore not used. Another segment of judicial work that is not reflected in caseload data is the activity of judges tasked with investigative functions, which does not result in adjudication and is therefore not covered by the categories of incoming, disposed, and pending cases. The assumption here is that generally courts of the same type have a workload with regard to certificates and non-litigious matters that is proportionate to their size and their caseload of litigious cases. Therefore, even though these parts of a court's work do not factor into the caseload analysis, the comparisons among courts of the same type remain valid.

32. **The process of collecting caseload data presents numerous limitations.** All caseload data are self-reported. The case management system (CMS) for civil and commercial courts is operational in the courts of Athens, Chalkida, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki only. In these locations, courts can query the system for aggregate data, albeit with limitations, as the system was developed more with real-time tracking of cases than with reporting in mind. Moreover, data are not standardized, and there is no direct interface between the CMS and the statistical platform of the MoJ. Therefore, court clerks must interpret data requests from the MoJ as system queries and then self-report the system's output. For this reason, there is potential for mistakes and discrepancies even in courts where the CMS is operational. For the majority of the courts, where the CMS is not operational yet, such data collection is made based on archives and the potential for mistakes is even greater. It is difficult for both the MoJ and the project team to assess the reliability and validity of the self-reported data by the courts, except by conducting statistical tests, looking for outliers in the data, identifying potentially erroneous input, and so on. The result of this process is that MoJ staff must query some courts multiple times for a data request, to elicit response, provide clarifications, and investigate abnormalities in the self-reported data. This often leads to delays in data

[24] On methodologies and experiences for conducting case weighting analyses, see World Bank Group. 2017. *Case-Weighting Analyses as a Tool to Promote Judicial Efficiency: Lessons, Substitutes, and Guidance.* Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29044.

collection and issues such as missing values, where courts are nonresponsive or unable to find the information requested within a reasonable time frame.

3.2 Human Resources Data

33. **Human resources data were also obtained from the MoJ.** The requested data sought information on judges, prosecutors, and court clerks while examining approved positions, positions per payroll, and actually working personnel (that is, excluding vacancies, persons on long-term leave, and persons on long-term secondment to another judicial service but including persons on long-term secondment to the respective court or prosecution service). Data on approved full-time positions and positions on payroll (for 2021) were collected from the MoJ. Data on actually working judges were collected from the survey of courts and prosecution offices. Regarding judges, for calculating caseload and performance, the project team decided to use data on approved positions based on information received by the MoJ that these were close to positions on payroll since there was always an effort to fill them on time and because they would presumably fluctuate less over time. Regarding judicial clerks, there is a great difference between approved positions and positions on payroll; therefore, the positions on payroll for 2021 have been used.

34. **The combined analysis of caseload and human resources data posed some methodological issues regarding magistrates and petty crimes courts.** Magistrate courts in Greece examine only civil cases, and therefore, only civil caseload data were necessary to analyze their workload. Since the new penal code, Law 4619/2019, Art. 468, abolished petty crimes, petty crimes courts have only been performing evidence collection functions with regard to ongoing criminal investigations. These do not result in the adjudication of cases; therefore, petty crimes courts' workload could not be assessed in terms of incoming, pending, and disposed cases in the same manner as for magistrate courts. Additionally, the organizational structure and internal functioning of petty crimes courts appear to differ substantially from one location to another. In the majority of locations, there are no dedicated (or, as referred to in Greece, 'organic') positions for petty crimes judges, and magistrate judges perform these functions as well.[25] However, there are some locations where petty crimes courts are separated from magistrate ones in terms of staff. Given that in most locations the petty crimes court and the respective magistrate court operate as a single unit and share work, the approach taken is to consider the staff of both types of courts as operating in the same judicial service, which combines the positions of magistrate and petty crimes court for each respective location. In terms of assessing the combined workload of these judges and staff, only the civil cases are being factored because only they result in adjudication at this court level.

3.3 Financial Data

35. **The collection of financial data, as well as the disaggregation of expenses among the various judicial services, was fraught with challenges stemming from the peculiarity of**

[25] In 42 of the magistrate court locations, the evidence collection functions of petty crime courts are served by appointed petty crime judges and clerks. In the rest of the locations, the respective magistrate court judges and clerks serve this function.

funding sources and the manner in which funding is being requested and documented. This led to difficulties in data collection and analysis and limitations with regard to the emerging picture. The types of data collected and analyzed, the approach taken, the principal difficulties encountered, and the resulting limitations are described in the following paragraphs.

36. **Greek judicial services are funded by two main sources: (a) the national budget and (b) a special fund for the financing of judicial buildings (*Ταμείο για τη Χρηματοδότηση Δικαστικών Κτιρίων*, ΤΑΧΔΙΚ).** The Greek national budget for justice is used to finance central (ministry) operations, court and prosecution office operations, other judicial service operations (forensic experts, land registry[26]), procurement, judicial service rental costs, and the salaries of judges, prosecutors, judicial clerks, and administration employees. ΤΑΧΔΙΚ operates as a self-financing public law treasury that is financed through the management and exploitation (for example, rental) of state property (for example, office space), court and document submission fees payable by litigants, and certificate issuance fees, payable by requesting citizens or their attorneys. The ΤΑΧΔΙΚ budget is used to finance judicial building operations and some other services such as legal aid. The fact that there are two distinct sources of funding for judicial services and they jointly cover different aspects of operating expenses poses a challenge for the accurate accounting for and reporting of judicial service expenses. For example, while cleaning and maintenance of judicial buildings are financed through ΤΑΧΔΙΚ, heating expenses and utility bills are covered by the national budget for justice.

37. **In addition, the manner in which funds are requested, approved, and allocated to different judicial services varies depending on the type of expense and the funding source.** For operating expenses covered by ΤΑΧΔΙΚ, for example, higher courts typically make requests concerning their entire territorial jurisdiction. Thus, appellate courts make requests with the MoJ's finance department and ΤΑΧΔΙΚ for entire appellate regions, while the Athens first Instance court make requests concerning not only its own expenses but also these of the magistrate courts within its jurisdiction. The amounts approved are then disbursed to lower courts within a given jurisdiction by the requesting higher courts and not necessarily in the same manner across regions. Local arrangements may vary from location to location, so that knowledge of the actual disbursement of funds to individual courts lies solely with the higher courts and not with the ministry or ΤΑΧΔΙΚ. As a result, to identify these categories of costs for this project, MoJ records had to be complemented with requests for information from the respective higher courts, to arrive, where possible, at a breakdown of costs per judicial service. Where this was not available at all, estimates were made based on the relative size of each judicial service.

38. **Another challenge in correctly accounting for the costs of judicial services stems from the fact that many judicial services are co-located and therefore jointly incur certain categories of costs, for example, rental or electricity costs.** To properly disaggregate these costs, the exact locations of all judicial services must be established, and co-located services must be identified. While the MoJ does maintain some records of locations and properties (for example, lists indicating whether properties are rented or not), in the context of this

[26] Correctional facilities were within the purview of the MoJ until 2019, when they were placed under the Ministry of Civil Protection (Government Gazette No. 81/A/119/08.07.2019).

project and with the aid of the nationwide survey, a more definitive and updated list of judicial services and their locations was produced. This allowed for a disaggregation of certain cost categories among co-located judicial services to arrive at estimates for the annual cost of each judicial service.

39. **A final challenge lies in the fact that while judicial services around the country may have a better view of some expenses (for example, cleaning expenses), they have absolutely no knowledge of other expenses they incur.** Electricity, telephony (mobile and fixed), and internet bills go directly to and are paid for by the MoJ for all services under its purview. Apart from some individual bills mailed to the MoJ from judicial services around the country, the MoJ's finance department receives regular thousand-page bills that are paid in bulk, so neither the MoJ nor the judicial services themselves have direct knowledge or do disaggregated accounting of the costs incurred at different locations. Acquiring such knowledge requires poring over the bills to identify services and locations, an approach which is practical only in some cases or if there is interest in one specific location or judicial service.

40. **The financial data analyzed in this report account for three major cost categories: salaries, procurement, and operating expenses.** Salaries are covered by the state budget, with different departments within the MoJ in charge of judge and prosecutor salaries, on the one hand, and judicial clerk salaries, on the other. Procurement expenses (equipment purchases from computers to air conditioners and any materials used in construction, repairs, and renovations) are covered by the ΤΑΧΔΙΚ budget. Some operating expenses are covered by ΤΑΧΔΙΚ (cleaning, maintenance, and others[27]), while other operating expenses are covered by the state budget (rental, heating, utility bills, travel, and fuel). With respect to utility bills, only electricity bills were disaggregated per judicial service, as this was the only category which was both substantial and feasible to attribute to specific buildings and services, with significant effort to parse. Telephony and internet bills proved impossible to disaggregate, as they concerned thousands of voice and data lines and mobile subscriptions, often with no (or incomplete) address information and no easy means of associating them with specific judicial services. Water bills were not included as they are by far the smallest of utility expenses.

41. **The aim of the analysis is not to produce a complete and accurate breakdown of all expenses; it is to capture the main expense categories and break them down in a consistent fashion by judicial service, such that the main annual costs of judicial services become known and comparable across courts and prosecution offices.** This produces a view of expenses that was hitherto nonexistent in the Greek justice system and required the labor of several project team members and ministry employees. Given the complexity of the endeavor, issues with extracting accurate data from systems and file cabinets, suboptimal record keeping and accounting practices, lack of human resources in the finance department of the MoJ, and the lack of prior baseline data to compare to (as this is the first time this cost baseline is created), the resulting data are provided in good faith that they are an accurate portrayal and especially useful in comparing relative costs across the country but in the knowledge that they may contain errors and omissions.

[27] Including security expenses. It is worth noting that security measures were increased during COVID-19, to better enforce related health protocols.

42. **The approach taken with regard to different types of expenditures and the respective limitations is as follows:**

- **Salaries.** Information on judge, prosecutor, and judicial clerk salaries was sourced from the National Payment Authority (*Ενιαία Αρχή Πληρωμών*, ΕΑΠ) of the Ministry of Finance, through the MoJ. Due to different accounting practices and time frames in ΕΑΠ, there are small differences between the salaries presented herein and the numbers of staff reported on payroll (salient especially at the magistrate level).
- **Electricity.** All available electricity bills from 2019 to 2021 were sourced from the MoJ's finance department and processed from image files to OCR-ready PDFs and Excel files. Bills with duration longer than one month were adjusted to monthly equivalents and then added to any monthly bills. The annual cost per judicial service was calculated by summing all bills of each year. For cases where data for certain periods were missing, available data were scaled to annual. For several judicial services, no electricity bill was issued in their name. In such cases, their expenses might be included
    - **In a buildingwide electricity bill concerning all co-located services unless otherwise noted.** In such cases, the bill was split between courts and prosecution offices housed in the same building according to their percentage share of employees on payroll. For petty crimes courts that receive no bill at all, the bill was split between magistrates and petty crime courts if they are housed in the same building. For petty crimes courts where no employee number was given, the project team assumed that the court had at least one employee, or
    - **In the electricity bill of a higher-level court, usually appellate and in some cases first instance.** If a court was found to receive no bill or a small bill that did not seem appropriate compared to other courts of the same type and similar size, the team would check if the bill of a court of a higher level could be assumed to include the expenses of the court in question. When that was surmised to be the case, the respective bill was again split between these courts based on their percentage share of employees.[28]
- **Travel and fuel and heating.** For these cost categories, the information sourced from the ministry's e-Budget system (e-Προϋπολογισμός) was sparse. It was thus complemented with data from the nationwide survey, where courts did report on these categories of expenses. For heating expenses specifically, a disaggregation among co-located judicial services was made based on the relative number of staff on payroll for each service.
- **Rental.** For any building that is leased, the annual rent was split between courts and prosecution offices housed in the building based on their relative numbers

[28] This time-consuming process with regard to electricity expenditure involved not only knowledge of the structure of the judicial system and exact locations of each judicial service but also several manual examinations of the data, some fine-tuning, and some guesswork. It should thus be considered a best effort estimate rather than an accurate accounting of all electricity expenses per judicial service.

of staff (judges/prosecutors and clerks). Rental contract information was sourced from existing records at the MoJ, but it is possible that these were not completely up-to-date and some rentals expired or were renegotiated since.

- **Cleaning and maintenance.** A split of expenses per judicial service within every appellate region was sourced by the MoJ's Finance department, where available. The process was incomplete and thus required further steps. For cleaning and maintenance expenses specifically, three major cases exist:
    - **Case 1.** Only one court reported expenses in each building. In this case, expenses were split between courts based on their percentage share of employees.
    - **Case 2.** Of several co-located judicial services, only one court reported (disproportionately) large expenses, usually the appellate, while some of the other co-located courts presented only minor expenses in each building. In this case, the large amount was split between courts based on their percentage share of employees on top of any minor amount reported by each court.
    - **Case 3.** Large expenses were reported for an entire appellate region, while some courts within that region reported relatively minor expenses. In this case the large amount was split between courts based on their percentage share of employees in the region on top of any minor amount reported by each court.

3.4 Population Data

43. **Population data used in this report were prepared by Kapa Research on assignment by the World Bank.** Raw data were obtained from the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) and cover the population permanently residing in Greece (including immigrants and refugees) based on the 2021 census. The datasets have been provided at the municipality level according to the 'Kallikratis reform' of 2010 (that is, with 327 municipalities throughout the country plus the self-governed region of Mount Athos). For the analysis, the municipal-level population data had to be disaggregated based on the territorial jurisdiction of Greek civil and criminal courts. Information on the territorial jurisdiction of courts was provided by the MoJ. A limitation in used population data stems from the fact that the judicial structure of the country does not strictly follow the administrative division created by the 'Kallikratis reform' in 2010, which reduced the number of municipalities from 1,027 to 327 and its improvement in 2019, which created some more municipalities in large islands increasing the number of municipalities to 332. Another population data limitation is related to the fact that the datasets provided by ELSTAT do not incorporate the 2019 'Kallikratis' map of municipalities. Still, these discrepancies lead to only minor deviations in the population data for a small number of regions.

3.5 Survey of Courts and Prosecution Services

44. **To obtain additional data on Greek courts and prosecution services, the World Bank commissioned a survey of all courts of general jurisdiction and prosecution services in**

Greece; the survey was conducted by Kapa Research and required extensive preparation. There was an initial development of a questionnaire by the project team, covering the types of information that needed to be collected, including on physical infrastructure of judicial services, human resources, specialization, transitional hearings, level of digitalization, factors influencing demand for justice in examined regions, caseload, and budgeting. In preparing the questionnaire the team used its own expertise while also incorporating some relevant questions that had been used in the survey of administrative courts with relation to the efforts to reform their judicial map. The initial version of the questionnaire was refined using the expertise of Kapa Research and tested in 10 courts and prosecution services. The testing of the questionnaire proved helpful as it indicated that some types of information, that is, on caseload, were not suitable for collection through a survey.[29] Other questions proved ambiguous and were substantially revised to make them clearer. Once the final version of the questionnaire was approved, Kapa Research, in conjunction with the World Bank and MoJ team, trained 70 enumerators through two 2-day training sessions in Athens and Thessaloniki on the structure of the Greek justice system and the substance of the questionnaire. These efforts set the stage for the two-month process of conducting the survey.

45. **The survey was conducted by Kapa Research from September 2022 to November 2022.** It covered 242 courts and 82 prosecution services. The 242 courts consisted of six petty crimes courts,[30] 154 magistrate courts, 63 first instance courts, and 19 appellate courts. The 82 prosecution services consisted of 63 first instance prosecution services and 19 appellate prosecution services. Conducting of the survey entailed sending web-based questionnaires to all targeted judicial services followed by a personal visit by enumerators in each judicial service. All along, a four-member help desk was available at the Kapa Research headquarters to assist judicial services and enumerators with their queries. The MoJ provided the survey company the contact information for all judicial services and assisted in establishing rapport with them, where necessary. Once the survey data were collected, Kapa Research submitted the raw data, pictures of all visited judicial buildings, and the survey report to the World Bank team. Following some revisions to ensure comprehensiveness and readability of the report, all deliverables were finalized and made available to the Greek government.

[29] Regarding caseload questions, courts and prosecution services would question enumerators regarding every definition and term to the extent that the interview took an inordinate amount of time and would not reach conclusive answers. Therefore, it was decided that information on caseload would be more reliably collected by means of centralized statistical requests by the MoJ statistical department.

[30] Only representatives of petty crimes courts that are housed separately from the respective magistrate court were interviewed for this survey.

Figure 3. Surveyed judicial services



46. **The survey results, while presenting a unique and in-depth view of the Greek justice system, were not without limitations.** While the survey responses on topics such as physical infrastructure and demand for justice services seemed comprehensive and consistent, in other areas, the survey results did not seem comprehensive or fully consistent. One such area was financial information, which was fragmented, as expected by the project team. Specifically, some data on costs incurred by judicial services are only available centrally, at the MoJ. However, collecting data available at the MoJ demonstrated that there are parts of the expenses associated with courts and prosecution services, for which information could not be identified centrally but might be available locally. Therefore, questions on expenses were included in the survey, in the knowledge that individual judicial services would have an incomplete picture thereof. Still, the survey results demonstrated just how incomplete that information was and how challenging it was to disaggregate expenses that covered a few judicial services (for example, expenses for the shared premises) from expenses related to an individual judicial service.

47. **Survey questions related to the number of days per month that a judge would normally spend at the court premises generated responses that appeared less than reliable.** Specifically, it is understood that the majority of Greek judges do not stay at the court premises on every weekday but transport casefiles and work from home. To this question, judges from the appellate regions of Athens and Thessaloniki appeared to have reflected that state of affairs in their responses to the survey (reporting that they spent 6.4 and 6.9 days per month physically at the court, respectively). However, judges from appellate regions that comprised mostly island courts such as the Dodecanese, Aegean, and the North Aegean responded that they spent 19.3, 16.7, and 16.1 days per month at the courts, respectively. This would practically mean that these judges are physically at the court on almost every working day, which is at odds with public perception. [31]

[31] Such questions were added to the questionnaire since this was also a topic explored by the questionnaire, implemented with regard to reforming the map of administrative justice. However, the administrative justice survey was conducted by judges of the Council of State whereas the survey regarding civil and criminal courts was by enumerators of a research company. It appears that questions such as this one would receive a more reliable response when asked by a fellow judge than by an outsider.

3.6 Reporting Issues in the Greek Justice Sector

48. **The frequency and severity of issues related to the collection of statistical and accounting data encountered by the project team and participating MoJ staff warrant special mention at this point.** Whether on caseload, human resources, or financials, rarely was a dataset (received or compiled) reliable, valid, complete, and in agreement with other related datasets. While the team recognizes that taking a historical snapshot of the entirety of Greek civil and criminal justice is no small undertaking, one that extends beyond the regular daily tasks and needs of the MoJ and respective courts and prosecution offices, a host of issues have made the collection of accurate data on Greek justice particularly challenging.

49. **The project team identified four main sources of gaps and dysfunctions in Greek statistical reporting: (a) systems, (b) human resources, (c) knowledge, and (d) incentives.** With regard to systems, some progress is being made, and several projects are under way for the digitization of Greek Justice. However, currently, only four locations make use of the civil and criminal caseflow management system, and even there, court and prosecution office staff's knowledge and ability to extract useful information from the system for statistical reporting is severely limited, as also witnessed on site in some locations. Similarly with regard to financial data, there are systems in place for the recording and accounting of expenses, but the digitization process is far from complete, with many queries resulting in time-consuming searches through paper archives. When information was available in electronic form, MoJ staff were often not able to extract and use it effectively for statistical reporting, especially not to produce any assessment of costs per judicial service. Given understaffing in several units at the MoJ and among judicial clerks, where capabilities are available, staff make minimal use of them, only as and when required per their daily tasks and responsibilities. Statistical reporting is not seen as a priority, certainly not at the same level as clearing cases and paying bills, which, given the existing staffing gaps, creates strong disincentives to participate in statistical reporting exercises. Even when incentives are in place, judicial clerks and MoJ staff sometimes lack the knowledge necessary to accurately request and communicate statistical information on caseload, human resources, or budget.

50. **The relative lack of systems and systems integration, and the relatively poor utilization of existing systems' capabilities, where these exist, lead to an overreliance on self-reporting, manual labor, informal channels, and personal networks, to get access to and cross-validate (often incomplete and inaccurate) data.** Also, and especially due to the lack of human resources, there is an overreliance on temporary employees who take any statistical/reporting knowledge they accumulate with them when they leave the service. Finally, there is an overreliance on systems administrators, who are often not with the MoJ or courts but with the third parties that have developed the respective information and communication technology (ICT) systems under contract by the Greek state and sometimes aid in the extraction of data from the respective systems (for example, ΟΣΔΥΠΠ, e-Προϋπολογισμός). These system administrators typically have limited domain knowledge, if any, which further undermines the reliability of any data sourced in this manner.

51. **The importance of accurate and regular statistical reporting for the more proficient management and improved performance of the Greek justice system seems to not have been particularly appreciated until more recently.** The statistics bureau of the MoJ is severely

understaffed and has to therefore rely excessively on self-reporting by judicial services and external IT systems experts for data collection. Given the relative lack of recognition and awareness of the pivotal role that statistics can play, incentives for such external personnel to cooperate in a consistent and dedicated manner with the MoJ in ad hoc analytical endeavors appear quite low.

IV. Judicial Map Reforms from a Comparative Perspective

52. **The judicial map reforms in Europe have generally been based on the approaches embedded in the CEPEJ Guidelines.** Below, a comparative review of judicial map reforms in Europe is presented, with the following structure: (1) Purposes of judicial map reforms; (2) Criteria used in deciding on judicial map reforms; (3) Content of the reforms; (4) Challenges in implementing the reforms; and (5) Impact of the reforms. Annexes 3 and 4 of this report present two case studies on the judicial map reforms of Croatia and the Netherlands, respectively.

4.1. Purposes of judicial map reforms

53. **Judicial map reforms in Europe strive to make improvements or address issues in the functioning of the judiciary.** For these reasons, the purposes of the reform differ greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on the specific local context and needs. Usually, reforms do not pursue a single goal but seek to meet a combination of goals and address more than one issue.

54. **One very typical reason for a judicial map reform is the demographic evolution of the country.** The court network is established at a certain period in time, based on a particular structure of the population. However, large-scale demographic processes such as internal and external migration, urbanization, improvement of transportation connections, etc., may lead to depopulation of certain areas, many-fold increase of the population density of other areas or dramatic improvement of the transport infrastructure in territories which were previously considered isolated. Thus, Croatia and Portugal observed very uneven distribution of population with high concentrations around the coastal areas and around the large cities and depopulation of inland rural areas.[32] In France, too, there were courts serving only 10 000 inhabitants as well as courts serving almost 1 million inhabitants.[33]

55. **Yet another reason for judicial map reform, related to the preceding one, is the unequal distribution of human and material resources in a country's judiciary, which may develop over time.** Such unequal distribution may lead to situations where very large population centers with many cases are served by a relatively low number of judges who struggle to manage their caseload while in other locations judges may be witnessing declining caseloads. This, in turn, may lead to disproportionately long case processing times in some

[32] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, Sciences Po Strasbourg Consulting, Institute of Political Studies (IEP), 2012, p. 7, at https://rm.coe.int/comparative-study-of-the-reforms-of-the-judicial-maps-in-europe/168078c53a.
[33] Ibid.

parts of the country, usually in big urban centers, placing citizens and businesses there at a significant disadvantage in terms of the access to and quality of justice. Examples of jurisdictions where such reasons factored into the decision to implement a judicial map reform are numerous; they include Croatia, France, Portugal, Slovakia.[34]

56. **The growing complexity of business and regulatory arrangements in a jurisdiction is another reason that may necessitate judicial map reform.** As judges need to navigate an increasingly complex regulatory framework and business and societal environments, this may affect both the speed and the quality of their work. Thus, adjudicating on matters of commercial and maritime law or juvenile delinquency, may require specialist knowledge. Specialization in a particular field may help judges process cases more quickly and ensure higher degrees of predictability in their judgments. Naturally, specialization cannot be achieved in very small courts. A relatively high number of judges is necessary for a court to be divided into divisions based on subject matter. Therefore, countries that wish to achieve specialization of judges, implement judicial map reforms aimed at enlarging existing courts through mergers. Ensuring possibilities for the specialization of judges has been one of the goals of the reforms in Croatia, The Netherlands, Slovakia.[35]

57. **Courts that are staffed with just one or two judges and similarly few court clerks may be highly vulnerable to disruptions caused by the absence of even a single person.** Limiting such vulnerabilities may be yet another goal of judicial map reforms. Thus, before 2000, the Netherland had 62 local courts. Some of them were very small and had less than one full time equivalent judge, which made them vulnerable to risks like illness or other discontinuity. To address this vulnerability, a judicial map reform in the Netherlands in 2000[36] transformed local courts into departments of first instance courts. The argument regarding the vulnerability of small structures was brought about also in the French judicial map reform.[37]

58. **Another risk associated with very small courts is the burdening of the judges at those courts with an excessive number of administrative-type tasks.** This was one of the justifications for judicial map reform in Denmark where it was estimated that the judges of the 48 single-judge courts spend on average between 17 percent and 24 percent of their time on management and administration tasks as opposed to performing their judicial duties.[38] This was a concern also in France.[39] Larger organizational structures are better suited to unburden judges from such disproportionate volumes of non-judicial work.

[34] Ibid., pp. 9 and 10.
[35] Ibid, p. 12. See also Judicial Map Reform, Analytical Centre of the Slovakian Ministry of Justice, November 2020 (in Slovak) at https://www.justice.gov.sk/sudy-a-rozhodnutia/sudy/aktuality/?eid=3050.
[36] After the 2000 reform, each of the 19 first instance courts had a local court department. A subsequent and more wide-reaching judicial map reform of first instance and appellate courts was implemented in the Netherlands later, in 2013. See Netherlands case study in Annex 4.
[37] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, p. 13.
[38] Ibid., p. 13.
[39] Ibid.

59. **In pursuing larger judicial structures, some countries may strive to ensure that there would be a random element in assigning a judge to a case.** Such random element is not present in single-judge courts. In closely knit communities, this may create perceptions of impropriety, conflict of interests and ultimately lack of fairness. A larger court would be better positioned to avoid those perceptions, especially if it allocates cases amongst its judges randomly. Thus, in Slovakia, one of the goals of the reform is to ensure a functioning mechanism for random selection of judges.[40] One of the premises of the Slovakian judicial map reform is that court enlargement would improve fairness since a larger team judges and staff would be more resilient to external or internal attempts to influence them.

60. **Another goal of the judicial map reform may be to align the court network with the administrative division of the country.** Having a correspondence between the administrative division of the country and its court organization may bring many benefits. These include potentially better interaction between judicial services and local administration. Furthermore, police headquarters are frequently organized in line with the administrative division of the country and their work is closely tied to that of courts and prosecution services. To improve those links and interactions, a judicial map reform may have as one of its aims the alignment between the network of courts and the administrative divisions of the country. This was the case with the reform in Denmark.[41]

61. **Yet another reason for judicial map reform may be the ambition to achieve cost savings or otherwise modify the structure of the judicial budget.** In closing or scaling down inefficient services, a judicial map reform may lead to cost savings. Thus, in closing half of the jurisdiction's magistrate courts since 2010 and raising at least 223 million pounds from the sale of court buildings,[42] the policy makers of England and Wales stated that their goal was to replace "old, small, inefficient" court buildings with "fewer, more modern buildings that can better serve people's needs" and fund digital transformation.[43] Indeed, the advancements of digital transformation in England and Wales were seen as factor that would, in the near future, lead to a profound change in the manner in which justice is being carried out and to drastic reduction of the need for the physical presence of lawyers and parties in a court building.

62. **Overall, there is rarely a single goal that is pursued by policy makers in considering a judicial map reform.** The goals of the reform are usually several and are defined by the individual context of the country and the specific issues that its judiciary may be facing. These goals are critical to determining both the criteria which would be applied to decide whether

[40] See Judicial Map Reform, Analytical Centre of the Slovakian Ministry of Justice, November 2020 (in Slovak) at https://www.justice.gov.sk/sudy-a-rozhodnutia/sudy/aktuality/?eid=3050.
[41] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, pp. 17 – 18.
[42] See Constituency data: Magistrates' court closures, UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, May 2020 at https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/constituency-data-magistrates-court-closures/.
[43] See Transforming Our Justice System, By the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, September 2016, pp 6 and 7 at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553261/joint-vision-statement.pdf.

certain judicial services are to be optimized and which ones those would be and the manner in which optimization would happen.

4.2. Criteria Used in Deciding on Judicial Map Reforms

63. **CEPEJ Guidelines recommend that judicial maps be re-shaped based on clearly defined criteria or indicators.** While the Guidelines appear to use the terms indicators and criteria interchangeably in this context, the present report is using the term indicators to refer to all measurements or targets that may be used to track or set performance goals for the justice system while the term criteria is used to refer to those ones which are applied in making a decision to re-shape the judicial map. A jurisdiction may choose to open or close courts without announcing justifications for those policy decisions or the criteria used to decide which courts or judicial services to target; however, in the interest of transparency and objectivity, it is advisable that such criteria be made public. An examination of the most typical criteria used in judicial map reforms is presented below.

64. **A very popular criterion used to re-shape judicial maps relates to the minimal number of judges that are deemed necessary for a court to function normally.** Thus, Slovakia, which seeks to introduce specialization into civil, criminal and family departments in its first instance courts, decided on a minimum of three judges per department so as to be able to also allocate cases randomly among them (i.e., a minimum of 9 judges per court).[44] Albania set those minimal numbers in the law, which stipulates that district courts and first instance administrative courts should have at least seven judges, while courts of appeal should have a minimum of 10 judges.[45] In Croatia, the minimum number of judges at a municipal court was set at 5.[46]

65. **Another criterion which is frequently used in judicial map reforms is caseload.** If certain courts have a very low number of incoming cases, this indicates that demand in the region is low, and available human and material resources could be used more efficiently elsewhere. Thus, in Portugal, courts dealing with less that 250 cases per year were closed.[47] Similarly, in reforming the judicial map of its court of general jurisdiction in 2012, France set a norm for the number of judges needed to process a certain number of cases at the first instance court level; if less than two judges were necessary to process the cases at a certain court, its closure would be considered.[48] The same demand-driven approach was adopted in reforming the network of French labor courts in the period 2004 – 2012; a study found that an increase in one percent of the number of incoming cases was associated with a decrease of 0.27 percentage points of the likelihood for that court to be removed. In the Netherlands,

[44] See Judicial Map Reform, Analytical Centre of the Slovakian Ministry of Justice, November 2020 (in Slovak), p. 20 at https://www.justice.gov.sk/sudy-a-rozhodnutia/sudy/aktuality/?eid=3050.
[45] Law No. 98/2016 On the Organization of Judicial Power in the Republic of Albania, Art. 15.3. The judicial map reform of Albania is examined in detail in A New Judicial Map for Albania, Assessment Report by the High Judicial Council, June 2020 provided to the World Bank by representatives of the Albanian Government.
[46] See Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.
[47] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, Sciences Po Strasbourg Consulting, Institute of Political Studies (IEP), 2012, p. 33, at https://rm.coe.int/comparative-study-of-the-reforms-of-the-judicial-maps-in-europe/168078c53a.
[48] Ibid. p. 32.

it was determined that the minimal caseload, which a working unit needed to have, was 20 full-time judicial equivalents (FTE), which would allow it to build and maintain professionalism and specialization.[49] If a court's caseload was less than that, its merger would be considered.

66. **A criterion for judicial map reform recommended by the CEPEJ Guidelines is the population size served by a particular level of court.** This criterion seeks to achieve a uniform distribution of courts relative to population size. It is related to current or expected demand for justice and can take into account either current population or population projected in the foreseeable future. Thus, a judicial map reform conducted in France considered closing courts which served population projected to drop below 168,000 inhabitants by 2030.[50]

67. **Since an important goal of the setup of the court network is to ensure that justice services are accessible to citizens, judicial map reforms often use geographical or transportation links criteria to ensure that any redesign would not unduly affect certain communities.** Thus, France used the criterion that a court should not be closed if more than an hour was necessary to travel from it to the nearest other court;[51] a one-hour travel distance was also adopted as a criterion for the judicial map reform in Denmark. In Croatia, the merger of the court would be considered, if it were located at a distance of less than 50 km from another (larger) court.[52] The British HM Courts & Tribunals Service defended its decision to close a number of courts based on an analysis demonstrating that the vast majority of the public could still travel to their nearest court or tribunal by public transport within two hours.[53] The two-hour travel time criterion was used as a reference point also in Norway, where the recommendations for reforming the map made sure that under the proposed model only five percent of the population would have more than a two-hour journey to the nearest court.[54]

68. **The administrative division of the country can also play a role in determining how to re-structure the judicial map.** Thus, in Norway, it was determined that the judicial districts should not violate the municipal boundaries, so that all inhabitants of a municipality can belong to the same district court.[55] In Denmark, too, alignment of the court network with the administrative division of the country was a major consideration.[56]

[49] See Netherlands Case Study in Annex 4.
[50] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, p. 44.
[51] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, Sciences Po Strasbourg Consulting, Institute of Political Studies (IEP), 2012, p. 31, at https://rm.coe.int/comparative-study-of-the-reforms-of-the-judicial-maps-in-europe/168078c53a.
[52] See Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.
[53] See Fit for the future: Transforming the Court and Tribunal Estate, Ministry of Justice, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, 2018, p. 12 at https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/transforming-court-tribunal-estate/supporting_documents/hmctsstrategyapproachconsultation.pdf.
[54] See Court structure, Norway's public reports 2019: 17, Partial report from the Judicial Commission appointed by Royal Decree on 11 August 2017; Submitted to the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Preparedness on 1 October 2019, p. 13, at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2019-17/id2670671/ (in Norwegian).
[55] Ibid., p. 108.
[56] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, pp. 17 – 18.

69. **Another aspect that may be taken into consideration when reshaping the court network is the criminal justice chain.** The latter term is used to describe the work of the police and the prosecuting authority in preventing, investigating, and solving crimes, the role of the courts in adjudicating on the committed crimes as well as the functions of the penitentiaries in respect of organizing the execution of sentences and the convicts' subsequent return to society. To the extent possible, the court network shall be organized in a manner which accounts for the location of police headquarters and prisons, in order to facilitate a smooth operation of the criminal justice chain.[57]

70. **The physical facilities where courts were hosted were frequently used as an auxiliary criterion in re-shaping the judicial map.** Thus, the judicial map reform of Moldova prioritized to relocate courts with poorer infrastructure to locations with a better one. To carry out this assessment, courts were classified into four categories: (1) Courts in urgent need of repair or urgent need of expansion/relocation; (2) Courts in satisfactory condition; (3) Courts in good condition or in which repair is desirable, but not urgent, and (4) Courts in excellent condition and which do not need any repair or expansion.[58] Similarly, Portugal prioritized keeping buildings which were owned by the Ministry of Justice and where the equipment was in good condition to buildings which were rented and where the equipment was old.[59]

71. **The criteria outlined above are usually used in combination rather than by themselves.** Thus, both the number of judges and the distance from the nearest court were used as criteria in the Croatian judicial map reform. Furthermore, some types of criteria might be defined as main ones and others, as auxiliary ones, meaning that they would only be examined if the main criteria were in place. For example, the Albanian judicial map study established that the ideal ratio between judges and courtrooms at the district court level was 2:1, i.e., two judges per courtroom. Therefore, if an existing court building considered for merger could not accommodate additional judges based on this ratio, other options could be considered. In addition to auxiliary criteria, some special individual considerations could also be factored into deciding on a judicial map reform. Thus, in France, presidents of first instance courts would be given an opportunity to present a counter proposition or special considerations that warranted the preservation or closure of their courts.[60] Overall, the ultimate combination of criteria to be used in reforming the judicial map depends on the local context.

[57] See Court structure, Norway's public reports 2019: 17, Partial report from the Judicial Commission appointed by Royal Decree on 11 August 2017; Submitted to the Ministry of Justice and Emergency Preparedness on 1 October 2019, p. 36, at https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2019-17/id2670671/ (in Norwegian).

[58] See Hriptievschi, Nadajda, Gribincea, Vladislav and Wittrup, Jesper (2014a). Study on Optimization of the Judicial Map in the Republic of Moldova", Legal Resources Centre from Moldova, pp. 56 – 57 at https://crjm.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/2014-Study-Optimis-Jud-Map-MD_en-web.pdf, referring to "Courthouses prioritizing report", United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Rule of Law Institutional Strengthening Program (ROLISP), Chișinău 2013.

[59] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, p. 33.

[60] See Comparative Study of the Reforms of Judicial Maps in Europe, pp. 31 - 32.

4.3. Content of the reforms

72. **Judicial map reforms include various types of interventions or restructuring.** These may entail merging of courts, closure of courts, dividing of courts, re-alignment of the human resources assigned to courts, changes in the organizational structure of courts, amendments to the rules on the territorial jurisdiction of courts and digital transformation. As with criteria for reform, these are frequently used in combination. The ultimate result is usually a reduction in the overall number of courts.

73. **Court mergers are perhaps the most frequent intervention associated with judicial map reforms.** These mergers may take many forms. Firstly, a court may be merged with another (usually larger) court located in the vicinity whereas the old court building is vacated, and judges and staff are transferred to the larger court. The judicial map reform of England and Wales entailed such mergers, coupled with property sales.[61] In the course of that reform, 164 magistrates' courts closed, out of a total of 320. Mergers of courts that are coupled with closures of the operations at a particular location could lead to complaints amongst the local community as the proximity of justice services may be jeopardized. Therefore, in such types of reforms, the travel times to the nearest court are often taken into consideration. At the same time, this is perhaps the type of merger, which leads to the most visible cost economies, especially in jurisdictions where there are significant expenses associated with the physical facility. Furthermore, this type of re-alignment of resources requires a one-time logistical effort for the relocation and may thus be more straightforward than other types of organizational restructuring which may need to be managed on an ongoing basis.

74. **Secondly, court mergers may entail organizational restructuring where several smaller courts are merged under the management structure of a bigger court, but the old court locations continue to function as territorial units.** This setup is very popular in judicial map reforms and is used both as a transitional and as a permanent solution. This kind of measure would generally not bring about the cost economies associated with a straightforward closure of a particular physical facility. At the same time, it can yield other benefits. Merging courts into larger organizational units can improve the mobility of judges within the same organizational structure thus allowing the court management to better distribute workload, address short-time vulnerabilities such as judges' illness or other absences, as well as allow for some degree of specialization, especially as opportunities for electronic communication and distance hearings increase.

75. **The organizational restructuring approach was characteristic for the judicial map reform of the Netherlands.** During the first re-design of its court network in 2000, the management structure of Netherlands' 62 local courts was changed, and they were made into departments of the then 19 district courts but continued to function from the same locations. The main reason for this operation was to make the small local courts less vulnerable to risks like illness or other discontinuity. Later on, in the course of the 2013 judicial map reform, the number of first instance courts was reduced from 19 to 11. However, again, very few locations

[61] See Constituency data: Magistrates' court closures, UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, May 2020 at https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/constituency-data-magistrates-court-closures/.

were closed entirely. Instead, most of the local court buildings were kept on as subsidiary offices and/or hearing locations.[62]

76. **Croatia also relied on such territorial units in its approach to judicial map reform, although the intention was to use those units as a transitional stage.** In 2008, the country reduced the number of its Municipal Courts from 108 to 67, and the number of Misdemeanor Courts from 114 to 63; in 2011, it further reduced the number of County Courts from 21 to 15, and the number of Commercial Courts from 13 to seven. At the same time, the Croatian Ministry of Justice approached physical merger and closing of merged locations gradually. As a first step, all merged locations were turned into so-called permanent services, with the aim to gradually put in place all infrastructural and organizational preconditions for the actual physical merger. Part of the permanent services were closed but some exist to date. Others were even made into courts again, if that proved necessary. Several reasons caused some permanent services to "survive" the efforts for physical merger – lack of adequate infrastructure in the court seat or a need for high-volume investments, high travel expenses for judges and staff, ensuring access to court in those permanent services that were far from the seat of the court or lacked adequate transportation infrastructure, and lastly political will.[63]

77. **Another element of a judicial map reform may be the re-alignment of human resources among courts.** An in-depth analysis of the distribution of resources may establish that there are significant imbalances in the workload of courts of the same level across the country. Thus, the Albanian judicial map analysis established, based on the number of incoming cases and their relative complexity, a workload norm for judges at each court level. Hence forth, it proposed to reduce the number of judges at some courts and increase it in others, thus equalizing the distribution of resources vis-à-vis workload.[64]

78. **A judicial map reform may also lead to dividing courts which are too large to be efficient.** The CEPEJ Guidelines provide an illustration of judicial productivity as compared to the size of courts. Citing research from Italy and the Netherlands, the Guidelines point out that generally, courts that are average in size tend to be more productive than very small or very large courts.[65] In line with this understanding, it may be beneficial to split a very large court in several smaller courts in order to make it easier to manage and improve efficiency. Croatian judicial map reform provides an excellent example of this approach.

79. **The reorganization of the Municipal Court in Zagreb entailed several rounds of splitting it into smaller courts so that it could become manageable in scale.**[66] Until 2005, this was by far the largest municipal court in Croatia with 156 judges and 726 staff (administrative

[62] Subsidiary locations have an office function and a hearing facility. Hearing locations have no office function but are only used for conducting hearings. See Netherlands Case Study in Annex 4.
[63] See Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.
[64] A New Judicial Map for Albania, Assessment Report by the High Judicial Council, June 2020 provided to the World Bank by representatives of the Albanian Government.
[65] See CEPEJ, Council of Europe, Revised Guidelines on the Creation of Judicial Maps to Support Access to Justice within a Quality Judicial System As adopted on the CEPEJ's 22nd plenary meeting, on 6 December 2013.
[66] See Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.

and technical). The Court was overburdened with caseload and backlog, which were too large to manage. There was no sufficient office and courtroom space. To alleviate the dire condition of the court, in 2005 it was divided into Zagreb Municipal Civil Court and the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court. The Civil Court remained in the same building, while the criminal one was relocated to a new one. Due to the vast differences in caseloads, this change was more beneficial for the criminal court which was henceforth able to manage its caseload appropriately. To further address the difficulties that the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court was still facing, in 2012, a new Zagreb Municipal Labor Court was established which took up the labor disputes.[67] The goal of the new court was to facilitate specialization of judges and allow for more efficient, faster and high-quality resolution of labor disputes. The Civil Municipal Court and the Labor Municipal Court remained in the same building. Yet another round of reforms aimed at reducing the size of the Zagreb jurisdiction took place in 2015 with the establishment of a new Municipal Court of Novi Zagreb. This reform divided the capital city in two parts delineated by the Sava River. The larger Northern part is served by the three specialized Civil, Criminal and Labor Courts, while the new Municipal Court of Novi Zagreb has jurisdiction for civil, criminal and labor disputes in the southern part of the city.[68]

80. **An innovative approach to address court network imbalances entails amending the rules on territorial jurisdiction to allow for equal distribution of certain types of cases across the entire territory of the country.** In this manner, as part of its 2015 judicial map reform, Croatia introduced 'universal territorial jurisdiction' of its second-instance courts (county courts). Under the new rules, any first instance decision could be reviewed upon appeal by any county court across the country. Cases are assigned by electronic random allocation based on an algorithm. The task of the algorithm is to equalize second-instance caseloads around Croatia to ensure that (i) judges are equally burdened, (ii) citizens are given equal treatment so as to avoid situations where in one court the appeal would be resolved within a couple of months while in another it would take years. Two additional issues were tackled by this solution: second instance caselaw was harmonized nationwide and local influences were eliminated since the appeal would usually be decided in another part of the country.[69] Based on the new rules on territorial jurisdiction, all second instance judges in Croatia act as part of

[67] The establishment of a specialized court for labor disputes in the city of Zagreb was based on the Justice Reform Strategy of 2011-2015, as well as an Agreement between the Government and the Unions. An analysis conducted in this regard found that the number of labor disputes handled by the Municipal Civil Court in Zagreb was excessive. Thus, in 2010, all municipal courts in Croatia received a total of 15,409 labor cases out of which 7,805 were examined by the Municipal Civil Court in Zagreb.

[68] The judges at the Novi Zagreb Municipal Court were relocated from the other three courts in Zagreb. They took their ongoing cases with them. It should be noted that the Ministry of Justice decided not to divide the ongoing cases between Zagreb and Novi Zagreb in line with the new territorial jurisdiction since that would have been too burdensome and time consuming for the courts. Hence, the ongoing cases followed the re-located judges.

[69] The algorithm does not exclude the possibility that the case will be assigned within the same town/county.

a single national court.[70] This aspect of the Croatian judicial map reform is cited as an "inspiring example" by CEPEJ in its 2020 Evaluation Cycle.[71]

81. **Croatia is not the only country which overhauled the territorial jurisdiction for certain types of cases in order to improve efficiency and equalize the workload of courts; Estonia and Poland did the same with order for payment cases.** In 2009, Estonia digitalized fully its order for payment procedure and assigned all those cases to a single court department of the Pärnu County Court. This specialized department examines exclusively electronic orders for payment and employs only four assistant judges and 29 other court officers. Thus, the examination of orders for payment is streamlined and made quicker while other civil courts are relieved of this duty and their resources can be directed at examining more complex cases.[72] Similarly, in 2010, Poland also digitalized its order for payment cases and assigned them to a new E-court which examines only such cases. The E-court is established as a division of the Lublin-West Regional Court and has jurisdiction over the entire territory of Poland regardless of the defendant's domicile or seat. It works exclusively with electronic orders for payment and employs eight judges and 119 court clerks with legal education (referendarz).[73]

82. **Finally, especially in the 21st century, judicial map reforms very often go hand in hand with digitalization.** Where casefiles are digitalized and judges have remote access to them, they can work from locations other than the one where document initiating the case was filed. Furthermore, if electronic filing and electronic access to casefiles are available, lawyers need not visit the court personally to conduct these actions. If online court hearings are allowed by law and available in practice, both lawyers and parties need not travel to attend those, except in exceptional circumstances. In the above examples of England and Wales, Croatia, Estonia, digital transformation was a key enabler of reforms. All those elements of digital transformation in the field of justice are crucial to making possible the reduction of court locations while increasing investment in information and communication technologies.

4.4. Challenges in implementing the reforms

83. **Judicial map reforms pose numerous challenges.** These reforms may be met with opposition by local communities that are losing a court, by their respective parliamentary

[70] Cases are sent to County Courts via the national court case management system, and the hard copy is distributed by mail or courier. Holding a hearing in the appellate proceedings in Croatia is possible but rarely used. Therefore, there is no consistent practice to date in terms of the organization of those hearings, but the most likely solution would be to hold an online hearing which is allowed by the procedural laws. Such online hearings would surpass two important impediments: the lack of courtrooms in second-instance courts and the travel cost if the case is assigned to a remote location. See Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.
[71] See European judicial systems, CEPEJ Evaluation Report, page 133 at https://rm.coe.int/evaluation-report-part-1-english/16809fc058. See also Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.
[72] See Petkova, Svetozara; Harley, Georgia, Towards effective enforcement of uncontested monetary claims : lessons from Eastern and Central Europe (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, p. 37, at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/748601499954362710/Towards-effective-enforcement-of-uncontested-monetary-claims-lessons-from-Eastern-and-Central-Europe.
[73] Ibid., p. 36.

representatives, by local lawyers who may have to change their way of work, and by judges and court clerks who may need to be relocated or otherwise adapt to a new organizational setup. Furthermore, oftentimes the implementation of the reforms may pose numerous logistical challenges. If judges and/or casefiles are to be re-located, it is important to ensure that the receiving location has sufficient space to accommodate those. Finally, if a country relies on digital transformation to mitigate the effects of judicial map reform on proximity of justice services, it needs to make sure that all the prerequisites are in place in order to enable both justice system representatives and users of justice services to access justice services electronically in a manner that is easy and reliable.

84. **Judicial map reforms should not be thought of as a one-time effort.** In many countries they take place over the course of many years. Thus, in Croatia the reform was carried out in four waves that occurred in 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2019.[74] In England and Wales, the first wave of court closures took place in the period 2010 – 2014 and re-commenced in 2015.[75] In Sweden, too, the merging the district courts from 95 to 48 took place over a period between 2000 and 2009.[76]

85. **The experience of Croatia and the Netherlands demonstrates that sometimes in the course of reform implementation various types of pressures or agendas necessitate compromises with the initial concept.** Thus, in Croatia, the initial idea to gradually close permanent offices was in large part abandoned, limiting the planned reach of the reform. Although leaving permanent offices in place of former courts brought some benefits, it also complicated court management, which needed to encompass more than one location. Furthermore, some of the closed locations had to be re-opened after particular courts merged in 2015 proved to be too large or geographically too complex which affected adversely their functioning. Finally, the frequent changes in the judicial map of Croatia were burdensome on the Ministry of Justice and the courts. As each amendment took a certain preparation and an adjustment period that slowed down regular activities. In the Netherlands, resistance against merging the courts in the two provinces of the Eastern Netherlands from four into one court presented a major challenge. In the last moment, the legislation on the new judicial map was amended to keep the two provinces separate, thus creating not 10 as initially planned, but 11 first instance courts. The extra court would have only 97 judges, which was below the threshold of 100 FTE per court. This split created co-ordination problems for the police and the public prosecution.

86. **In Portugal, the reform took place within a shorter time period but was severely criticized for this very reason as well as for occurring due to external pressure.** In 2008, the country attempted to reform its judicial map by introducing new management models and creating specialized jurisdictions at the national level. The pilot implementation of this setup was underway when the reform was aborted and Portugal signed its 2011 Memorandum of

[74] See Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.
[75] See Caird, Jack Simson, Court and tribunal closures, Briefing Paper, Number CBP 7346, 21 March 2016, House of Commons Library, at https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7346/CBP-7346.pdf.
[76] See Agrell, P.J., Mattsson, P. & Månsson, J. Impacts on efficiency of merging the Swedish district courts. *Ann Oper Res* **288**, 653–679 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03304-0.

Understanding (MoU) with the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (i.e., the group of organizations known as the Troika) which set in motion a three-year financial bailout. The MoU envisaged the implementation of a wide range of austerity measures including a judicial map reform. The reform, which took place in 2013, opted for a model based on one court per administrative district with various sections of the same court functioning in different locations within the district. Apparently, no clear criteria for the grouping of courts were announced and the reform was implemented very quickly. That arrangement was severely criticized by Portuguese scholars who felt that the new judicial map reform did not consider caseloads or physical distances between locations and did not ensure that the receiving courts had the physical capacity to accommodate additional services and human resources.[77] The reform was perceived to have limited access to justice thus creating a "judicial dessert"[78] in the interior of the country. To ameliorate the situation, in 2016 the Ministry of Justice re-opened 20 of the closed locations.

87. **Overall, the challenges in implementing judicial map reforms emphasize the need for careful planning and clear communication of the reform to all stakeholders.** It is important to announce and have a public discussion of the goals of the reform and the criteria for any decision-making. It is furthermore necessary to ensure that all logistical arrangements are in place before any relocations can commence. Finally, jurisdictions envisioning a judicial map reform should be prepared to undertake this effort in stages, possibly over several reform cycles.

4.5. Impact of the reforms

88. **One common issue with judicial map reforms around Europe is the fact that there is rarely a concerted effort to measure their impact.** The reasons seem to be manifold. Firstly, most of the major judicial map reforms conducted in Europe are relatively recent; they occurred in the 21st century. After a period of transition and adjustment to the new setup, it usually takes time for such reforms to produce any measurable results. Thus, when the Netherlands attempted to evaluate its 2011 – 2012 reform five years down the road, some considered the evaluation premature since at that time, many courts were still in the process of implementing new working methods and systems. Secondly, judicial map reforms often occur over extended periods of time or in many waves and may be considered ongoing for a number of years, which again postpones any impact evaluation. Thirdly, since many regulatory, technological, or other changes may occur simultaneously with the judicial map reform, it may be difficult to prove a causal link between a particular intervention (such as a change in the courts network) and a certain impact. Fourthly, a rigorous impact evaluation may be a costly and time-consuming undertaking that many jurisdictions are unwilling to invest in. Nevertheless, some of the limited available information on the outcomes of judicial map reforms warrants examination.

[77] See Dias, João & Gomes, Conceição. (2018). Judicial Reforms 'Under Pressure': The New Map/Organisation of the Portuguese Judicial System. Utrecht Law Review. 14. 174. 10.18352/ulr.448.
[78] C. Gomes, 'Deve Reformar-se a Reforma do Mapa Judiciário?', (2015) Revista Julgar, no. 27, pp. 75-91; J.P. Dias, O Ministério Público no acesso ao direito e à justiça (2013); see Santos, supra note 3; R. Tavares, 'Reforma Judiciária e acesso ao Direito', (2013) Revista Julgar, no. 20, pp. 161-162.

89. **One of the few countries, which attempted to evaluate the impact of its court reorganization, was the Netherlands.** Even though some felt that this assessment was premature, the fact that such efforts are rare makes it worthy of examination. The assessment focused on the 2011 – 2012 court reorganization effort. It took two years and included surveys of stakeholders and quantitative analysis. Unfortunately, there was no baseline of relevant factors; hence, drawing solid conclusions about cause and effect was impossible. Nevertheless, the assessment produced some informative findings. Firstly, it found that the main goal of the reform, namely, to improve the quality of justice and introduce specialization, had not been adequately communicated to stakeholders. As a result, many perceived the reform as an austerity measure and a business management operation. This presumably hampered the process towards achieving the objectives. Secondly, there were cautious first signs that the increase in scale had created more opportunities for further development of judges' expertise and specialization. Thirdly, the assessment committee observed that the operational management of courts and public prosecutors' offices had been professionalized and the continuity of work was better guaranteed. Fourthly, significant efficiency gains have been achieved by closing buildings. However, those cost savings were counterbalanced by an increase in travel, especially in light of the *'travel time is working time'* rule. Fifthly, there were indications of higher default rates (i.e., non-appearance of parties in hearings) in areas where local courts were closed. One reason may have been that judicial map reform in the Netherlands was not combined with enabling online hearings. Finally, the compromise that caused the split of the East Netherlands first instance court into two caused disruptions in the criminal justice chain. Specifically, one prosecution office needed to coordinate with two courts instead of one, and travel distances for staff and case files increased significantly.[79]

90. **The impact of the judicial map reform of Sweden was subject to scholarly examination, rather than an official ex post analysis.** The Swedish judicial map reform took place in the period 2000 – 2009. It merged the 95 district courts into 48 courts and the stated goal was to improve their efficiency. To evaluate the effect of mergers on efficiency, the study compared non-merged courts with merged courts over time. This examination found that at the beginning of the reform, merged courts had lower efficiency than the non-merged ones, which would explain them being targeted for re-structuring; towards the middle of the examined period, the efficiency levels of both groups of courts became very similar, and, towards the end of the period, merged courts were already performing, on the average, better than non-merged ones. The trends indicated a positive effect of mergers on efficiency.[80]

91. **Positive impact appears to be particularly visible in respect of reforms which introduced national-level territorial jurisdiction for certain types of cases.** Thus, the judicial statistics in Croatia demonstrated that in 2014, before the creation of a nation-wide jurisdiction for second-instance courts, disposition time for such cases was 206 days. Since the reform was implemented in 2015, disposition times have been improving consistently

[79] See Netherlands Case Study in Annex 4.
[80] See Agrell, P.J., Mattsson, P. & Månsson, J. Impacts on efficiency of merging the Swedish district courts. *Ann Oper Res* **288**, 653–679 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03304-0.

and, by 2021, amounted to 124 days.[81] The reform of the territorial jurisdiction for orders for payment in Estonia also brough about dramatic efficiency gains. While engaging only 4 assistant judges and 29 other court officers, the specialized orders for payment division of the Pärnu County Court managed to relieve all first instance judges in the country from this category of cases, which in absolute numbers were more numerous than the total absolute number of all other civil cases examined by Estonia's first instance courts.[82]

92. **Regardless of the numerous challenges, it is always advisable to assess the impact of judicial map reforms**. In the face of the inevitable opposition that such reforms face, clear data on positive impact can help respond to criticism. Alternatively, if data indicates that in certain areas the impact has been negative, remedial action needs to be taken. For an impact analysis to be more useful, it is recommended that it be conducted at least 5 years after the end of the reform effort. Furthermore, impact assessments needs to be done based on reliable baseline data that reflects the ex-ante situation. While government-led initiatives to assess the impact of judicial map reforms are to be welcomed, it is also beneficial to encourage scholarly research in this area which is so often neglected. Popularizing the topic and making available open data on the performance of courts can bring about fresh new perspectives on what worked in a judicial map reform and what areas need improvement.

V. Overview of the Greek Justice System

93. **The judicial system of Greece comprises courts of general jurisdiction (civil and criminal), administrative courts, military courts, ecclesiastical courts, and special courts (which may be set up on an ad hoc basis).** The RAS Agreement between the Greek Government and the World Bank and this Baseline Report target only the courts of general jurisdiction and their respective judicial map.

5.1 Structure of Greek Courts of General Jurisdiction and Respective Prosecution Services

94. **The courts of general jurisdiction of Greece comprise magistrate courts, petty crimes courts, first instance courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court.** There are also corresponding prosecution services comprising first instance courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The envisioned judicial map optimization targets only the magistrate courts, petty crimes courts, first instance courts, appellate courts, and the first instance and appellate prosecution services. Therefore, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court prosecution services are not examined for this Baseline Report.

[81] See Croatia Case Study in Annex 3.
[82] See Petkova, Svetozara; Harley, Georgia, Towards effective enforcement of uncontested monetary claims : lessons from Eastern and Central Europe (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, p. 37.

Figure 4. Organizational structure of the courts of general jurisdiction and prosecution services in Greece



95. **Magistrate courts are the lowest instance courts in Greece and have the broadest network.** They are competent to examine private law matters, that is, civil, commercial, and family ones, with a value not exceeding EUR 20,000, matters related to lease contracts where the monthly value of the rent does not exceed EUR 600, and some special matters which fall within their subject matter jurisdiction regardless of the value of the claim. Furthermore, magistrate courts are tasked with a number of non-litigious matters such as publication of wills, issuance of certificate of inheritance, registration or removal of mortgage underwritings, confirmation of a fact for drawing up a civil record, presumption of death, and so on. There are 154 magistrate courts in Greece. It is important to note that the career track of magistrate judges is separate from that of other judges; therefore, a magistrate (and a petty crime) judge would not, in her/his career development, move to the position of a first instance or appellate judge.[83] There is no specialization of judges at the magistrate courts of Greece. Only the largest magistrate courts, such as Athens and Piraeus, have some form of specialization (that is, judges working exclusively on procedures such as regular procedure, personal debt settlement, labor law, and so on).

96. **Petty crimes courts mirror the structure of magistrate courts and are usually closely integrated with them.** Since petty crimes were abolished in 2019,[84] these courts currently perform only evidence collection functions in ongoing criminal investigations and do not adjudicate. In the majority of locations, petty crimes courts share judges and staff with magistrate judges. However, there are 42 petty crimes courts, which have dedicated (or, as referred to in Greece, 'organic') positions. Furthermore, magistrate courts and petty crimes courts usually share a building, but there are four locations in Greece where petty crimes

[83] Law 4938/2022, Art. 90.
[84] Law 4619/2019.

courts are housed separately. Effectively every seat of a magistrate court also serves the function of a petty crime court.

97. **First instance courts examine the majority of civil and criminal cases in Greece when they are first brought to the justice system.** There are 63 first instance courts in Greece. These courts may hear cases in a single-judge, three-judge, or multi-judge panel. In addition to acting as a first instance, they also act as a second instance for some civil disputes resolved by the magistrate courts as well as for some misdemeanor cases, which the first instance court has examined in a single-judge panel. Furthermore, they examine some non-litigious cases, for example, issuance of some types of certificates or orders for payment for monetary amounts that are outside the jurisdiction of magistrate courts. The first instance court of Pireaus (and the respective appellate court) has specialization in maritime law and optional jurisdiction in this field, which covers the territory of all Greece (meaning that even if a maritime case does not have a link to Athens or Piraeus, the plaintiff has the option to litigate it before the maritime division of the Piraeus courts instead of the locally competent civil court).

98. **There is also a low level of specialization in the first instance courts of Greece.** In almost all first instance courts in Greece, judges do not specialize in civil and criminal law and examine both civil and criminal law cases. Only six courts of this level reported having judges who specialize in examining exclusively criminal cases: Athens (47 judges), Drama (2 judges), Veroia (1 judge), Rethymno (1 judge), Serres (1 judge), and Volos (1 judge). In terms of civil law, only four first instance courts report some level of specialization: Athens (order for payment and bankruptcy law), Kavala (land registry, interim measures, bankruptcy, and mediation), Heraklion (expropriation, family, and land registry), and Piraeus (marine, land registry, and family). Furthermore, Law 4700/2020 established special departments in the courts of Athens (with jurisdiction for Southern Greece) and Thessaloniki (for Northern Greece) regarding disputes in the field of e-communications, energy, and personal data. Finally, Law 4529/2018 provided for the setting up of a special department at the Athens first instance court with territorial jurisdiction for the entire country to hear cases for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the EU or its member states.[85]

99. **Appellate courts are competent to examine as second instance most of the judgments of the first instance courts.** Greece has 19 appellate courts. There is a low level of specialization at Greek appellate courts too. In almost all first instance courts in Greece, judges examine both civil and criminal law cases. Only three appellate courts have specialized judges in criminal matters: Athens (110 criminal judges), Thessaloniki (20 criminal judges), and Piraeus (10 criminal judges). Regarding civil law specialization, only the appellate court of Athens has some specialization in the areas of torts, family, labor, motor vehicles liability, land law, and public law.

100. **Based on the territorial jurisdiction of appellate courts, Greece can be divided into 19 appellate regions, each including one appellate court and numerous first instance,**

[85] Law 4529/2018 incorporates into Greek law Directive 2014/104 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 26, 2014 (EE L 349 of 5/12/2014).

magistrate, and petty crimes courts. It should be noted that the 19 appellate regions of Greece do not correspond to the country's administrative division into 13 regional units. Some regional units, such as Central Greece, Attica, Peloponese, South Aegean, and Crete, are covered by two appellate courts each. Furthermore, some appellate regions are spread between two different regional units (for example, the appellate region of Patras includes municipalities which form part of the regional units Ioanian Islands and Western Greece; the appellate region of Corfu includes municipalities which form part of the regional units of Epirus and of Ioanian Islands). Territorial disaggregation made in this Baseline Report is based on appellate regions, rather than regional units to ensure greater granularity of the examination in relation to the justice system of Greece.

Table 1. Appellate regions and regional units of Greece (from North of South)

Appellate region and seat of the appellate court	Regional unit
Thrace (Komotini)	Eastern Macedonia and Thrace
Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki)	Central Macedonia
Western Macedonia (Kozani)	Western Macedonia
Ioannina (Ioannina)	Epirus
Corfu (Corfu)	Epirus Ionian Islands
Larissa (Larissa)	Thessaly
Lamia (Lamia)	Central Greece
Evia (Chalkida)	Central Greece
Patras (Patras)	Ionian Islands Western Greece
Western Sterea Hellas (Agrinio)	Western Greece
Nafplio (Nafplio)	Peloponese
Kalamata (Kalamata)	Peloponese
Athens (Athens)	Attica
Piraeus (Piraeus)	Attica
North Aegean (Mytilene, island of Lesvos)	North Aegean
Aegean (Ermoupoli, island of Syros)	South Aegean
Dodecanese (Rhodes, island of Rhodes)	South Aegean
Eastern Crete (Heraklion)	Crete
Crete (Chania)	Crete

101. **The prosecution offices of Greece follow the structure of first instance and appellate courts and have the same numbers, respectively.** They have authority to direct the preliminary investigation and prosecute individuals accused of criminal activity on behalf of the state. Furthermore, they are responsible for the execution of criminal sentences and the supervision of prisons. This greatly affects the workload of prosecutorial offices on the territory of which there is a penitentiary facility. Most first instance and appellate prosecution offices are housed in the same buildings as respective courts, but there are a few exceptions with prosecution offices being housed separately.

102. **The career of Greek judges is characterized by a high level of mobility.** They are posted to particular locations per a presidential decree, issued following a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council concerned. The council shall be composed of the President of the respective Supreme Court of members of the same court appointed by lot from among those who have at least two years' service in that court. The Supreme Judicial Council of Civil and

Criminal Justice shall also include the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court and two Deputy Prosecutors of the Supreme Court appointed by lot from among those who have at least two years' service in the Prosecutor's Office of the Supreme Court. By law, transfer of a judge shall not be permitted before the completion of a judicial year of service in the place where he/she was assigned. A transfer of a judge may be made either at his/her request or ex officio, to meet an official need, which must be set out in detail in the decision thereof.

5.2 Evolution of the Judicial Map of Greece

103. **Since the establishment of the new Greek state, the judicial map of the country underwent numerous transformations.**[86] The first rudimentary provisions were laid down in a resolution of April 30, 1822 'On courts', which envisioned the establishment of a magistrate court in each commune, a district court in each province, six courts of appeal throughout the country, and a court of cassation. This resolution was never implemented in practice. After the election of Ioannis Kapodistrias as Governor, a Resolution 'On the Organization of the Courts' of 1828 established a magistrate court in each commune. The resolution also created one first instance court in each of the 13 regions of the country and a single appellate court. In 1830, the number of appellate courts was increased, and a court of cassation was established. However, after the assassination of Kapodistrias, a Decree of 1832 abolished all courts, except magistrate ones.

104. **After the initial period of instability in the organization of the Greek justice system, in 1834 a Decree 'On the Organization of Courts and Notaries' Offices' was issued.** It is in essence the first law on the organization of courts and one of the longest-lasting pieces of legislation, which was repealed only in 1988. It created 10 courts of first instance, one in each prefecture (Athens, Kalamata, Lamia, Messolonghi, Nafplio, Patras, Tripoli, Sparta, Syros, and Chalkida) as well as two courts of appeal (one in Athens covering the region of Central Greece [Cyclades] and one in the Peloponnese, with its original seat in Tripoli and from 1836 in Nafplio) and a court of cassation, with its initial seat in Nafplio and later in Athens. This decree retained at least one magistrate court in each of the original 42 provinces of the Greek state.

105. **Over the years, the number of magistrate courts underwent a dramatic rise and fall.** Initially, the number of magistrate courts gradually increased and by 1969, it had reached 360. Attempts were made in both 1910 and 1934 to abolish magistrate courts by integrating them into the structure of first instance courts, but they were unsuccessful. Law 100/1969 reduced their number to 155, but its effect was largely reversed by subsequent laws. At the end of the 1990s, a draft law on the 'Consolidation of the first instance jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts' provided for the definitive abolition of the magistrate courts and their conversion into the seats of first instance courts. The regulation was considered to hamper citizens' access to justice and was not adopted. As a result, until 2012, a total of 301 magistrate courts were operating. Decree 110/2012 on 'Merger of inactive or under-operational Magistrates' Courts

[86] The overview provided has used information from the article of Georgios Mikroudis, President of the Court of Appeal, "The spatial structure of political -criminal justice in 200 years of free life" Applications of Civil Law and Civil Procedure 1/2022, www.qualex.gr, Law Library www.nb.org.

of the country' merged and abolished a total of 147 magistrate courts, leading to the current number of 154 magistrate courts.

106. **The initial number of 10 first instance courts also increased significantly due to Greece's territorial enlargement and its economic development.** Numerous new first instance courts were established in line with the territorial enlargement of Greece, for example, in the Ionian islands, Macedonia, Epirus, North Aegean, Crete, Thrace, and Rodopi. Furthermore, the network of first instance courts around Athens was expanded with the establishment of the first instance court of Piraeus in 1918 and the first instance courts of Chalandri and Peristeri. The newest first instance court was established in Naxos in 1987. That brough the current number of first instance courts in Greece to 63.

107. **The appellate courts, initially only two as established in 1834, also grew in number.** A new appellate court was established in Corfu in 1864 when the Ionian islands were added to the territory of Greece. The subsequent territorial enlargement added the appellate court of Larissa, and after the Balkan Wars, the appellate courts of Thessaloniki, Crete, and Aegean were established. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 led to the establishment of the appellate court of Thrace. The appellate court of Ioannina was established during the Second World War and the appellate court of Dodecanese was established shortly after the end of the war. In 1977, the appellate court of Piraeus was established, mainly to create a naval division and to relieve the Athens appellate court. As of the beginning of the 1990s, there was an abrupt surge in the establishment of appellate courts, which significantly increased the density of these courts' network. The appellate court of Western Macedonia was established in Kozani in 1992, the appellate court of Lamia in 1999, and the appellate court of Kalamata in 2004. Finally, in 2012, four new appellate courts were created: the ones of Western Sterea Hellas (Agrinio), Evia (Chalkis), Eastern Crete (Heraklion), and North Aegean (Mytilene).

5.3 Recent Procedural Rationalizations

108. **The performance of the justice system depends on both its rational organization and the efficiency of procedures.** Given that Greece's civil justice has consistently been performing under European comparators (for example, in terms of disposition time and clearance rate), some recent reforms aimed to improve that situation. To alleviate the pressures on justice, the country has taken certain matters out of court and reduced the need for hearings in other matters.

109. **The promotion of the use of mediation is one popular approach to reducing the burden on courts.** If parties are effectively encouraged to try mediation for resolving their dispute and if a significant portion of the initiated mediations are successful, this may lead both to a reduction of the caseload of courts and to important cultural and behavioral changes in how society seeks to resolve conflicts. In line with this understanding, in 2019, the Greek legislator introduced a mandatory initial mediation in some types of civil cases.[87] If, after a series of mediation sessions, the parties manage to reach an agreement, as certified by the

[87] See Law 4640/2019. The types of cases specified include family disputes; disputes heard under the ordinary procedure and falling within the jurisdiction of the single-member first instance court if the value of the subject matter of the dispute exceeds the amount of EUR 30,000; and disputes for which a mediation clause is provided for in a written agreement between the parties.

signed protocol of the final mediation session, each party can have it approved by the court for a fee of EUR 50. This entails that any action brought in the same matter shall be inadmissible and any pending proceedings shall be dismissed. The approved protocol of the final mediation session shall also constitute an enforceable instrument.

110. **Another well-established mechanism for alleviating the burden on civil courts entails assigning some non-litigious procedures to authorities other than the judiciary.** Such interventions can be expected to reduce the number of both incoming and pending cases allowing the courts to better manage their backlog and focus precious judicial resources on issues that require the attention of judges. This is an approach that Greece has employed as well. In 2017, the procedure for conducting consensual divorce was transferred from first instance courts to notaries. Since there are numerous other non-litigious procedures in the Greek court system, this route for alleviating the pressure on justice can be explored further.

111. **While mediation and the transfer of non-litigious procedures out of the court lower the number of incoming cases, procedural reforms such as the elimination or reduction of hearings contribute to speeding up procedures and sparing court resources.** In recent years, Greece has significantly relaxed the requirement to hold a hearing in a number of civil procedures. The most wide reaching among them is the ordinary civil procedure (or so-called 100-day procedure) effective since the beginning of 2016.[88] It is applicable to all private disputes that are not expressly subject to another procedural route. The ordinary procedure develops entirely in writing with the deposition of the parties' written pleadings within established timelines. Although the process ends with a formal hearing in a courtroom, that is pure formality, the parties are usually not present, and no oral pleadings take place. Exceptionally, the judge may order a new hearing for the oral examination of a witness only if he/she considers it absolutely necessary.[89]

112. **Significant procedural reforms were initiated to handle the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009.** The Katseli law of 2010 introduced a mechanism for restructuring the debts of overindebted households. The procedure was to be conducted before magistrate courts which led to a dramatic increase of their caseload. As of 2020, approximately 80,000 such cases were pending before these courts, leading to a significant backlog. To address the issue, Greece introduced reforms that made the procedure essentially written, much like the ordinary civil procedure described above, while also requiring all applicants to refile their claims via an electronic platform by a specified date. All cases that were not refiled would be terminated. Less than 50,000 applications were refiled under the new requirements, leading to termination of numerous cases. This significantly reduced the caseload of magistrate courts and allowed them to process the remaining cases swiftly. According to data from November 2022, fewer than 5,000 applications were pending for adjudication by the country's magistrate courts under this procedure. Thus, within approximately 10 years, the financial crisis and the related legislative measures led first to an exponential increase in the caseload of magistrate courts and, subsequently, to a sharp

[88] Law 4335/2015.
[89] Art. 237 (6) of the Civil Procedure Code.

decrease.[90] Another procedural rationalization introduced by the amendment to the Katseli law provided for an even distribution of all pending overindebted household cases among all magistrate courts of the same appellate region, which is understood to have led to more efficient and speedier resolution of these cases. At the same time, this provision, coupled with the massive closure of cases that were not refiled, led to a significant distortion of the usual caseflow of magistrate courts.

5.4 Digital Transformation of Justice

113. **Another reform which has a profound effect on the performance of courts is the digitalization of justice.** In July 2021, the Ministry of Digital Governance announced the 'Digital Transformation Bible' for 2020–2025, which constitutes a national strategy for digital transformation of the economy. It focuses mainly on the digital transition of the public sector. Among the approximately 450 digital transition projects, there are 30 projects for the digital transformation of the justice sector. Most of them are still in their planning phase. Only the projects that have the highest relevance for judicial performance and the optimization of the judicial map are discussed in the following paragraphs.

114. **CMSs are essential to the operation of any modern judiciary.** In most general terms, these should allow for integrated processing of casefiles, measure caseload, generate statistical information, and be integrated with a user interface that allows for electronic filings, electronic service of process, and other types of interactions between the court and its users. Ideally, such systems should store an electronic copy of the entire casefiles and allow judges to access them remotely and securely. The latter could help overcome the current practice of Greek judges bringing casefiles to their homes, on a regular basis, so that they could work on them.

115. **Greece has separate CMSs for administrative justice and the courts of general jurisdiction.** The development of a CMS for the court of audit is also being planned. The CMS for administrative courts is already installed across the board and operational and is currently being upgraded whereas the CMS for the courts of general jurisdiction is operational only in Athens, Chalkida, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki and is currently being rolled out to the rest of the country. Even though the user interface of both systems allows for electronic filing, currently, only a small percentage of court users are taking advantage of this option. Furthermore, electronic service is still not available for the system of civil and criminal courts.

116. **The availability of a fully functional CMS for civil and criminal justice, complete with the appropriate user interface and legal framework, is vital for improving the performance of the courts.** Once the CMS is well developed and operational across the country, it should allow lawyers and citizens alike to minimize physical visits to courts for filing submissions and checking casefiles. It should further allow judges to work remotely with the casefiles, without engaging in the time-consuming, cumbersome, and insecure effort of transporting casefiles

[90] A new Bankruptcy Code (Law 4738/2020) entered into force in 2021, which replaced the Katseli law and other laws with similar subject matter. It introduces an extrajudicial procedure for debt settlement via an electronic platform and by an administrative authority (Special Secretariat for Private Debt Management) (Special Secretariat for Private Debt Management). The mechanisms under the new code cannot be used for cases for which procedures under other pieces of legislation have already been initiated.

from the court to their homes and back. All these aspects of digitization are tremendously important to any optimization of the judicial map since they allow judges and court users alike to be more flexible with their time and reduce the importance and frequency of physical visits to the court premises.

117. **Another digitization project which is highly relevant for both the performance improvement of Greece's judiciary and the potential optimization of the judicial map is the installation of videoconferencing services in courts and prisons.**[91] The project has already commenced and envisions the introduction of a videoconferencing network with a high-level flexibility through the use of both fixed (Type A) videoconferencing equipment in 151 facilities and mobile (Type B) videoconferencing equipment in 250 facilities.[92] Numerous jurisdictions allow for conducting court hearings through videoconferences and the use of this approach intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic; however, at this point, such hearings are neither regulated nor used in Greek courts. While this method is not appropriate for every type of court hearing, for routine ones, it can spare the time and judges, parties, and witnesses alike while also bringing savings in terms of transportation costs. The installation of videoconferencing equipment at penitentiary facilities is particularly important as it reduces the need for costly and potentially insecure transportation of prisoners to court premises for routine questioning. Again, by reducing reliance on visits to the court's physical premises, this project may set the stage for optimization of the judicial map.

118. **To enable teleconferencing and in relation to the plans for reform of the judicial map of administrative courts, legislative proposals have been developed, which should create the possibility for the total or partial conversion of some courts to telematic ones.**[93] Specifically, Law 5028/2022 introduces the possibility to designate, by means of a presidential decree, telematic court offices. These would be remote locations where justice services shall be provided by means of remote connection technologies. The decision to designate a court as a telematic location shall be made following a consultative process and based on an opinion of the Plenary of the Supreme Court or the Council of State. These provisions allow the Greek justice system much flexibility in adjusting its judicial map and operations in accordance with actual demand.

119. **Two other digitalization projects that have a bearing on the optimization of the judicial map are (a) development of a system for the collection and processing of justice statistics and (b) digitization of court files and records.** Greece is still developing and improving its system for collecting and analyzing judicial statistics. The availability and reliability of such data are key to assessing the performance of the system and analyzing any imbalances in supply of and demand for judicial services, which is an underlying process for any judicial map optimization. The digitalization of court files and records is also relevant for

[91] An additional component of the same project entails the introduction of a system which would notify parties to cases, in real time, of when their civil or criminal trial is set to commence. Given the high level of unpredictability of court hearings' starting time, the availability of such a system would allow hearing participants to better plan their time and would decrease congestion in courts' waiting areas.
[92] Information provided by the MoJ.
[93] According to the legal definition provided, telematics court office means a remote location, which operates as an agency of the court, to which it is connected using remote connection technologies, for conducting telematics meetings. In the telematics judicial office, the court staff shall provide, by means of remote connection technologies, provisional and final judicial protection and, more generally, judicial services in cases falling within the local jurisdiction of the office.

the optimization of the judicial map since currently every judicial service needs to maintain large archives which take up space at court premises. If such archives were digitized and the time for storing files on paper were minimized, this could free up valuable space at court premises and allow for redistribution of resources.

VI. Demand and Supply Analysis of Greek Civil and Criminal Courts and Prosecution Services

120. **This section of the report presents an examination of the current status of resourcing and performance of Greek civil and criminal courts and prosecution services.** A demand-supply approach is used to identify the challenges that the Greek judiciary is facing. Examined demand factors include the population served by courts, distribution of the court network among regions, the number of incoming cases per inhabitant, and the number of incoming cases per judge. Examined supply factors include human resources, output of courts and prosecution services, infrastructure, and budget.

121. **The approach taken is the following:**

(a) First, the demand for justice services, resourcing, and performance of the Greek justice system are juxtaposed with those of CoE member states, first for courts and then for prosecution services. The goal is to provide a baseline of where Greece stands in Europe, from a comparative perspective.

(b) Second, the report proceeds to present a demand and supply analysis of the different levels of Greek courts, namely magistrate, first instance, and appellate. The demand for justice services in each region and the human resources available to individual courts at each level are examined and juxtaposed with each other to identify resourcing imbalances. Once these are identified, the report goes on to compare the performance of the individual courts at the same level with that of their peers. Once performance imbalances are identified, the report seeks to answer the question whether any deficiencies in performance might be attributable to poor resourcing of the respective court or something else. Similarly, the report seeks to verify whether courts with resources above the median for Greece exhibit better performance than their poorly resourced peers.

(c) Third, a similar examination is conducted with regard to prosecution services, by comparing the resourcing and performance of individual ones, across the level of first instance and then appellate prosecution services.

(d) Fourth, this report takes into account the fact that the available physical infrastructure is a major supply factor for the justice system. However, since courts of different levels, as well as prosecution services, share the same infrastructure, this supply factor does not lend itself to disaggregation by court or prosecution service level. Therefore, it is examined separately.

(e) Fifth, financing is also an important supply factor. Its disaggregation by judicial service poses numerous practical difficulties since many of the expense categories can be tied to the respective building, which frequently houses several

institutions, rather than to the individual court or prosecution service. Nevertheless, the report examines expenditure to shed some light on the distribution of financial resources across the justice system.

6.1 Resourcing and Performance of the Greek Justice System from a Comparative Perspective

122. **A comparison of the demand for justice services, resourcing, and performance of the Greek justice system with its CoE counterparts provides an important context for the state of play in this sector.** While it is well recognized that the organization of justice and procedural laws vary greatly from country to country, the regular reports of CEPEJ which compare the justice systems of CoE member states provide an important framework and benchmarks for assessing judicial systems. The latest CEPEJ Evaluation of European Judicial Systems was published in 2022 and uses data from 2020.[94] This is the benchmark that this report uses to juxtapose Greek justice with European comparators. At the same time, Greek judicial statistics is still in its nascency. In 2018, for the preceding CEPEJ evaluation, Greece provided data to CEPEJ. In 2020, for the current evaluation cycle, some of that data were no longer available as the understanding deepened on many of the reporting categories and it was understood that their reliability needed to be improved. In the framework of this project, much more detailed data on the resourcing and performance of Greek courts were collected compared to what was previously reported to CEPEJ. Therefore, in comparing Greece with other European systems, the current report uses Greek justice statistics as collected in the framework of this project rather than data that Greece had previously submitted to CEPEJ. This ensures that the presented state of play corresponds to the most current and sophisticated understanding of the operations of Greek justice, which is available at this point.

123. **Furthermore, the examination of the main indicators for resourcing and performance of the Greek justice system through the prism of CEPEJ comparisons allows to consider the weight of each individual justice service in the overall pool of resources and output.** Specifically, the subsequent sections of this report compare Greek judicial services at the same level among each other. For this comparison, each judicial service is taken as an individual entity, with its own workload, clearance rate, disposition time, and other resourcing and performance indicators. While this approach is helpful in providing valid comparisons among individual courts and prosecution services and identifying imbalances thereof, it cannot, by definition, reflect the different weight that different judicial services have in the system and their overall contribution to the justice environment in Greece. If the comparison among individual courts finds that just one or two courts in the large towns might be facing issues whereas the vast majority of small courts might be displaying excellent performance patterns, such a finding would not reflect the disproportionate weight that these large courts have in the overall provision of justice services in Greece. By contrast, the comparison of Greek courts and prosecution services in the aggregate to CEPEJ benchmarks in this section treats the caseload of magistrate courts as a pool, as if all magistrate courts represented a single judicial institution. The same approach has been taken at the first instance and

[94] See Special File - Report "European Judicial Systems - CEPEJ Evaluation Report - 2022 Evaluation Cycle (2020 data) at https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/special-file-report-european-judicial-systems-cepej-evaluation-report-2022-evaluation-cycle-2020-data-.

appellate levels. This helps shed light on how well resourced in terms of staffing and how productive first and second instance justice in Greece is compared to CoE member states (as reflected in CEPEJ reports). Also, summing up the resourcing and performance of all courts of a given type properly reflects the weight of individual judicial services in the overall resourcing and performance of the Greek justice system.

6.1.1 Comparison of Greek Courts to CEPEJ Benchmarks

124. **The available data show that Greece has a significantly higher number of judges relative to its population size than its European comparators** (see Figure 5). The biggest number of judges per 100,000 inhabitants is present at the first instance level and the smallest at the appellate level. Furthermore, unlike the data on CoE member states, which also include administrative judges and Supreme Court judges, the data used for Greece exclude these categories of judges. In practice, this means that the actual number of judges per 100,000 inhabitants is even higher than presented here.

Figure 5. Judges per 100,000 inhabitants



Note: Data for Greece are based on approved judicial positions as of 2021, not including administrative or Supreme Court judges. CoE data include administrative and Supreme Court judges.

125. **As is well understood in governance circles in Greece, the country's judges receive less administrative support than their European peers** (see Figure 6). The ratio of court clerks per judge in Greece is 1.3 compared to 3.3 in CoE member states. The ratio of 1.3 factors in the different ratios present at the three court levels. The highest ratio of clerks per judge is observed at the first instance level and the lowest at the appellate level.

Figure 6. Clerks per judge



Note: Data for Greece refer to clerks on payroll per approved judicial position as of 2021. Greek aggregate and breakdown per type of court are presented.

126. **Incoming caseload data suggest that Greece tends to be more litigious than its European peers at the first instance level** (see Figure 7). To assess the level of demand for judicial services, CEPEJ juxtaposes the number of incoming cases (separately for civil and criminal) at the first instance and at the second instance. To ensure comparability, the same approach is taken by this report with the Greek data, whereas some caveats need to be made. In terms of first instance incoming civil cases, the cumulative caseload of magistrate and first instance courts is used. This is by necessity approximative since part of the civil caseload of first instance courts includes some cases which the magistrate courts examined as a first instance and the first instance courts review as a second instance. These cases could not be properly disaggregated and extracted from the mix for this comparison.[95] Regarding first instance incoming criminal cases, the criminal caseload of Greek first instance courts is taken into account, which is again imperfect since for some types of misdemeanors, the first instance courts act both as a first and, subsequently, as a second instance. Regardless of these methodological limitations, with regard to both civil and criminal cases, Greece receives more demand per 100 inhabitants at the first instance level than its European counterparts.

Figure 7. Incoming (a) civil litigious and (b) criminal cases per 100 inhabitants for first instance courts



Note: Data for Greece refer to median of annual incoming over 2017–2021.

127. **When it comes to demand for justice services at the appellate level (as juxtaposed with CEPEJ data for demand at the second instance level), the picture is more nuanced** (see Figure 8). In terms of incoming civil litigious cases, the level of demand is about the same for Greece as for other CoE member states. Part of the reason for that picture may be that a portion of the incoming second instance civil cases in Greece would not be reflected in the appellate courts' caseload but in the first instance caseload. By contrast, even though part of the second instance criminal caseload is also reflected in the preceding figure on first instance courts (for misdemeanor cases where the first instance courts may act both as a first and as a second instance),[96] at the level of appellate courts the number of incoming cases per 100 inhabitants still substantially exceeds European levels. It is not clear whether the reasons for this difference are procedural (that is, there are less disincentives to appealing strong criminal judgments in Greece compared to the rest of Europe) or cultural (that is, parties to the

[95] The project team expects that the disaggregation between the first instance and second instance in other CoE countries as well could have suffered from same methodological limitations, since in many jurisdictions the same level of court may be acting as both first instance and second instance for different types of cases.
[96] But at the same time, for a small number of some serious crimes, the appellate courts may act as a first instance.

criminal process in Greece being inclined to always try their odds at the second instance, regardless of what the likely outcome might be).

Figure 8. Incoming (a) civil litigious and (b) criminal cases per 100 inhabitants for appellate courts



Note: Data for Greece refer to median of annual incoming over 2017–2021.

128. **It is also informative to compare the case mix of civil litigious and criminal cases at the three court levels in Greece (magistrate, first instance, and appellate)** (see Figure 9). While magistrate courts adjudicate only civil cases, at first instance courts the number of incoming criminal cases is much higher than that of civil litigious cases. The combined data for magistrate and first instance courts and their comparison with CEPEJ metrics indicate that overall, both in Greece and in Europe, civil cases dominate the case mix at the first instance. At the second instance though, this picture changes substantially and the ratio in Greece is reversed compared to that in Europe. In CoE member states overall, there are more civil than criminal cases at the second instance as well. By contrast, in Greece, at the second instance the criminal cases outweigh the civil ones.

Figure 9. Case mix



Note: Data for Greece refer to median of annual incoming over 2017–2021. Aggregate and breakdown per type of court are presented (for the CEPEJ comparison, the first instance comprises both first instance and magistrate courts).

129. **In addition to comparing Greece to CoE member states in terms of demand for justice services and resourcing of courts, the available metrics allow for a comparison in terms of performance.** This comparison is organized around several key metrics. First, the performance of Greek courts that act as a first instance (magistrate and first instance ones) is

juxtaposed with CEPEJ metrics on first instance performance. For magistrate courts, this comparison is done only in respect of civil litigious cases; for first instance courts, it is done separately for civil litigious and for criminal cases. Second, the performance of Greek appellate courts is compared to CEPEJ values, again separately for civil litigious and for criminal cases. In every case, performance is assessed by examining clearance rates (that is, ratio between incoming and disposed cases) for the respective case type and then disposition time (that is, the ratio between the number of disposed cases over the last year and the number of pending cases at the end of that year multiplied by 365, which shows how many days the courts would need to dispose of all their pending cases, if they operate at their current pace of work and assuming no new cases are coming in). Finally, Greek magistrate, first instance, and appellate courts are placed into efficiency categories, as defined by CEPEJ, which take into account the combination of their clearance rate and disposition time.[97]

130. **In terms of clearance rates for civil litigious cases, Greek magistrate courts perform better than the CEPEJ median whereas first instance courts perform similarly to their European counterparts** (see Figure 10). Importantly, there is a decline of the clearance rate of Greek courts for the last five years (more so for magistrate than for first instance ones). As the comparison between individual first instance courts in Section 6.3 Demand and Supply Analysis of First Instance Courts demonstrates, the performance of the first instance court of Athens with regard to civil cases contributes substantially to the lower results of Greece in this area.

Figure 10. Civil clearance rates at the first instance (including both magistrate and first instance courts)



Note: Data for Greece refer to average clearance rate over 2017–2021. Average values as well as trends (best fit line) over 2017–2021 are presented for Greece.

131. **Regarding disposition time for civil litigious cases, though, Greece compares unfavorably to its European peers** (see Figure 11). In essence, this means that the courts have a large backlog which would take them years to dispose of at their current pace of work. In this regard, magistrate courts are doing only slightly better than first instance ones. In both types of courts, 2021 disposition time was in the aggregate longer than in 2017 (which marks the beginning of the five-year time under examination here). This gives rise to concerns, as it indicates that disposition times are not only much longer than CoE medians, but Greek first instance courts have been, in the aggregate, unable to decisively rein in their backlog.

[97] For details on how efficiency categories are defined, see the Methodology section of this report.

Figure 11. Civil disposition times for first instance courts



Note: Data for Greece reflect 2021 disposition time. 2021 values as well as percentage difference between 2017 and 2021 values are presented for Greece.

132. **The criminal caseload at first instance courts compared to CEPEJ metrics shows similar dynamics** (see Figure 12).[98] Clearance rate is good but has been deteriorating over time. Similar to civil cases, Greece appears to be performing much more poorly than other CoE member states in disposition time. It is significantly longer than that in Europe (although not as drastically so as with civil disposition time), and the trend points toward some deterioration over time.

Figure 12. Criminal (a) clearance rate and (b) disposition time for first instance courts



Note: Data presented for Greece refer to (a) average clearance rate and trend over 2017–2021 and (b) 2021 disposition time and percentage difference over the same period.

133. **The performance of Greek appellate courts with regard to civil cases displays a pattern which is similar to the one characteristic of both first instance and magistrate courts but with a more positive outlook** (see Figure 13). The clearance rate compares favorably to CEPEJ medians and even shows a slight improvement over time, whereas the disposition time is much longer, again indicating an issue with backlog. However, a downward trend in disposition time is visible over time, which means that strides were made toward the reduction of that backlog from 2017 to 2021.

[98] As discussed in the Methodology section of this report, three different scenarios are used to calculate disposition times for criminal cases. In this subsection, the scenario presenting middle values is used (that is, using estimated data for criminal backlog but correcting the number of disposed cases, to take into account pre-COVID levels of operation).

Figure 13. Civil (a) clearance rate and (b) disposition time for appellate courts



(a) clearance rate *(b) disposition time*

Note: Data for Greece presented refer to (a) average clearance rate and trend over 2017–2021 and (b) 2021 disposition time and percentage difference over the same period.

134. **Unlike civil cases performance, appellate performance in criminal cases raises concerns in respect of both clearance rates and disposition time** (see Figure 14). Clearance rate is poorer than that of CoE member states, way below the standard of 100 percent and trending downward. This indicates a potentially uncontrollable accumulation of backlog over time. Disposition time also compares unfavorably with CEPEJ medians. By way of illustration, data indicate that while CoE member states could dispose of the criminal cases pending at the appellate level in less than half a year (assuming there were no new cases coming in), this would take their Greek counterparts at the appellate level more than a year and a half, with disposition time having more than doubled in the last five years.

Figure 14. Criminal (a) clearance rate and (b) disposition time for appellate courts



Note: Data for Greece presented refer to (a) average clearance rate and trend over 2017–2021 and (b) 2021 disposition time and percent difference over the same period.

135. **The classification into different efficiency categories is the final performance indicator examined here in respect of courts.** This measure helps summarize the performance metrics described above in one simple grouping of courts; in this regard, all levels of Greek courts give rise to concerns (see Figure 15). Efficiency categories have been defined by CEPEJ and reflect the interplay between clearance rate and disposition time. According to this methodology for assessing court performance, each level of court is placed into an efficiency category compared to the CEPEJ median disposition time (which is always much shorter than the Greek disposition times) and with some considerations for the level of clearance rate. This scoring system accurately captures the situation in Greece, as borne out by the data and the comparisons in this section, where all court types are actively fighting backlog to keep it under control. Measures across the board may be needed to address this

situation, with civil case performance of first instance courts exhibiting some more worrisome signs and appellate courts criminal performance requiring immediate attention.

Figure 15. Efficiency categories for Greek courts (compared to CoE median)

All courts	Civil		Criminal	
Magistrate	4	Fighting Backlog	n/a	
First Instance	5	Warning	4	Fighting Backlog
Appellate	4	Fighting Backlog	6	Very High DT

136. **Overall, the comparison of the Greek courts to European benchmarks points to several overarching conclusions.** First, Greece has significantly more judges per inhabitant than its CoE counterparts but also somewhat higher demand for justice in both the criminal and the civil fields. A striking difference is noted in the area of incoming appellate criminal cases per inhabitant where Greece has much higher values than other European countries. An analysis of the Greek criminal procedure, comparing it with other European systems, could shed light on the possible reason for the exceedingly frequent use of appeal. Second, Greek judges receive much less clerical support than their European peers (which may only partly be explained by the high overall number of judges per inhabitant). Third, in respect of civil cases, the clearance rate of Greek magistrate and appellate courts is better than the CoE median and the clearance rate of first instance courts is at the CoE median; however, disposition times are much longer which indicates backlog issues. The situation with civil caseload disposition times is particularly serious at the first instance level, including both in magistrate and in first instance courts. Regarding criminal cases, clearance rate is good at the first instance level but quite poor at the appellate level. Disposition times for criminal cases across both instances are much higher than in CoE member states but not as high as the ones for civil litigious cases.

6.1.2 Comparison of Greek Prosecution Services to CEPEJ Benchmarks

137. **Prosecution services also lend themselves to comparison with CoE benchmarks, albeit across fewer metrics.** First, the only performance metric in respect of prosecution services that CEPEJ explores is clearance rate. Accordingly, this high-level comparison uses only clearance rate for prosecutorial services as a performance metric.[99] Furthermore, since in many CoE member states public prosecutors are not tied to court instances,[100] the comparison with respect to clearance rates is to the Greek first instance prosecution only, whose work includes the typical stage of pretrial investigation that is common across countries, whereas appellate prosecution in Greece deals (not only but) predominantly with appeals to first instance court decisions.

138. **The comparison of the number of prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants points to a picture that is quite different from the one observed with regard to judges; Greece has**

[99] With regard to prosecution services, the CEPEJ report uses the term 'total processes as % of received cases' rather than the term 'clearance rate' used for the courts. However, this report uses the term 'clearance rate' across the board.
[100] For example, public prosecutors in Andorra, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Malta, Monaco, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Israel are not tied to court instances. See Special File - Report "European Judicial Systems - CEPEJ Evaluation Report - 2022 Evaluation cycle (2020 data) at https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/special-file-report-european-judicial-systems-cepej-evaluation-report-2022-evaluation-cycle-2020-data-, page 61.

significantly fewer prosecutors per inhabitant than other CoE member states (see Figure 16). Part of the reason might be that in Greece, many functions related to evidence collection in the framework of the pretrial phase of the criminal case are assigned to judges (including the entire category of petty crime judges), whereas in many other countries these tasks would be within the realm of prosecutorial duties.

Figure 16. Prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants



Note: Data for Greece are based on approved prosecutorial positions as of 2021.

139. **Yet another resourcing aspect where the situation in courts is completely different from the one in prosecution services relates to administrative support; unlike for Greek judges, the level of administrative support available for Greek prosecutors is double the CoE median** (see Figure 17). The ratio of prosecutorial clerks per prosecutors is especially high at the first instance. Naturally, the very low relative number of prosecutors compared to CoE levels makes the difference in ratios particularly striking.

Figure 17. Clerks per prosecutor



Note: Data for Greece refer to clerks on payroll per approved prosecutorial position as of 2021. The data for Greece show the aggregate as well as a breakdown per type of prosecution office.

140. **In terms of demand for prosecutorial services, the number of initiated cases per 100 inhabitants substantially exceeds CoE levels** (see Figure 18). In this metric, only incoming complaints at the first instance prosecutorial level are covered since they are the ones reflecting primary demand for prosecutorial services. The great majority of cases incoming at

the appellate level are ones that have already been processed by the first instance prosecutors and are therefore already reflected in the first instance demand.

Figure 18. Incoming per 100 inhabitants for first instance prosecution offices



Note: Incoming data for Greece refer to median of annual incoming over 2017–2021.

141. **Finally, the comparison of the clearance rate of Greek first instance prosecution services to CoE member states indicates issues with the processing of incoming cases at the first instance** (see Figure 19). Not only is the clearance rate substantially lower than CoE levels, but there is also a decline over 2017–2021. In essence, this means that first instance prosecution services are accumulating backlog over time. Since neither CEPEJ nor Greek prosecution services measure backlog consistently or accurately, it remains unknown.

Figure 19. Percentage of incoming cases that have been cleared for first instance prosecution offices



Note: Trend of clearance rate over the same period is also shown. Clearance rate for Greece is the average over 2017–2021.

142. **The comparison of the Greek prosecution services to European benchmarks points to several conclusions.** First, and in contrast to the situation with courts, Greece has much fewer prosecutors per inhabitant than its CoE counterparts, but the clerical support they receive, especially at the first instance level, is double the CEPEJ median. Second, demand for prosecutorial services is substantially higher than that in comparator jurisdictions. Third, performance of first instance prosecutorial services, as measured in percentage of cleared cases of the total incoming, raises concerns as it is lower than CoE benchmarks and seemingly deteriorating over the years. This is quite probably generating significant backlog that, due to deficiencies in statistical reporting, remains unknown.

6.2 Demand and Supply Analysis of Magistrate Courts

143. **The magistrate (and petty crimes) courts of Greece are the ones closest to citizens.** With 154 magistrate courts operating in the country, this is the broadest category of judicial

services. In addition to bigger population centers, these courts operate at numerous isolated and small locations. There are a total of 905 approved judicial positions at these courts, with 1,235 clerks on payroll.[101] The examination of the magistrate courts of Greece points to significant imbalances in terms of both the human resources available to them and their performance. These imbalances are examined in this subsection.

Figure 20. All magistrate court locations (154 in total)



6.2.1 Resourcing of Magistrate Courts

144. **The human resources assigned to a court should be based on objective criteria and should, ideally, correspond to demand for justice services in a given area.** The number of judicial positions in a court usually depends on the population served. Furthermore, considering that some areas are more litigious than others, it is even more appropriate to set the number of judicial positions based on the number of incoming cases (that is, on the actual demand). Yet another important measure of resourcing reflects the ratio of court clerks per judge. For courts to be able to function under comparable conditions, judges should have the support of a comparable number of clerks. In respect of the magistrate courts in Greece, however, there appear to be significant multifold imbalances in terms of all three ratios. Sometimes these imbalances can be attributed to the historical raison d'être of magistrate courts, which is to achieve as broad geographical coverage as possible, serving local communities with the issuance of certificates and the resolution of minor disputes, as well as to some peculiarities of the Greek landscape. For example, the fact that there are island courts serving small populations naturally means that even a single judge assigned to such a court

[101] The numbers of judicial positions cited herein include both magistrate judges and judges with petty crimes courts, since these are in most cases integrated.

could not be compared meaningfully in terms of the judge per inhabitant ratio to a judge serving at an urban center—not unless a different model of geographical coverage is considered, where small populations centers are served remotely by larger courts. In other cases, though, that is, when comparing courts in areas with populations of similar characteristics and sizes, such imbalances appear inexplicable and suggest that personnel decisions could be optimized. Such resourcing imbalances and possible explanations for them, or lack thereof, are examined in more detail in the following paragraphs (see Table 3 and Table 4—due to the large number of small magistrate courts, information regarding their resourcing and caseload has been presented in two subsequent tables, based on the size of the court).

145. **A particular feature of Greek magistrate courts, which is linked to the country's geographic and demographic peculiarities, is that there are numerous tiny courts in small settlements as well as a few large ones in the biggest population centers.** There are only four magistrate courts in Greece that can be considered large or at least relatively large (having more than 15 judges): the ones in Athens (213 judges), Thessaloniki (87 judges), Piraeus (30 judges), and Patras (28 judges). Then, there are several midsize courts with no more than 13 judges each, while the vast majority of Greek magistrate courts are small indeed and operate with only one or two judges. As a result of the great divide between the few large and the numerous tiny Greek courts, direct comparisons between them may not always be appropriate. For this reason and whenever appropriate, this examination seeks to draw comparisons not only among all magistrate courts but also, and especially, between courts of similar sizes.

146. **The vast differences in the sizes of magistrate courts are reflective of the different population size of the respective areas that they serve.** While the median value for the number of citizens served by a magistrate court is 32,103 people, there are great discrepancies in this regard among individual courts. The largest magistrate court in terms of population served, the one of Athens, is responsible for a territory with a little under 1.5 million inhabitants and the smallest ones (for example, the ones in Akrata, Kythera, Spetses) are responsible for the population of a little over 4,000 inhabitants.

147. **In principle, it can be expected that in a predictably resourced judiciary, the number of judges assigned to a court would to a large extent correspond to the number of citizens that this court serves.** While this is often the case in Greece, there are also some quite stark deviations from this approach. Sometimes these deviations can be attributed to the characteristics of the location served; other times, though, there is no apparent reason.

148. **The median number of magistrate judges per 100,000 inhabitants in Greece is seven.** However, there are significant ranges. Some courts have more than double this median number of judges and others more than triple the median value. For locations that are small and have a single-judge court (such as Akrata, Konitsa, Kythera, Plomari, and Spetses), these ratios between the number of inhabitants and the number of judges are natural; if locations of such a small size are to have a court at all, even the presence of a single judge would be disproportionate to the number of citizens. However, the same explanation would not apply to other locations that have double or even triple the number of judges per inhabitant compared to the Greek median. These include Melos whose population of less than 10,000

has three approved judicial positions (which, when converted to the same basis of 100,000 inhabitants, would be 30 judges per 100,000 people, or more than four times the national median), Nafplio whose population of a little over 30,000 has seven approved positions for judges (which would equate to 21 judges per 100,000 people, or three times the median value), and Valtos whose population of less than 20,000 is served by three judges (that is, 18 judges per 100,000 people). At the same time, there are numerous locations with population ranging between 30,000 and 55,000 that are served by only two judges. Another court with a starkly high number of judges is Patras. With a population of around 220,000, Patras is smaller in size than locations such as the Athens suburbs of Chalandri and Kropia, but Patras' 28 judges are more than double the number of judges serving in each of the two suburbs (11 judges in Chalandri and 10 in Kropia).

149. **Alongside the courts with human resources exceeding multiple times the median, there are others that have disproportionately fewer judges per inhabitant.** There are courts with four (for example, Chalandri, Eordea, Kalloni, Kastoria, Komotini, Kropia, Lagadas, Sparta, Vasilika, and Xanthi), three (Atalanti, Istiea, and Pangaion), or even two (Moires) judges per 100,000 inhabitants. Some of these are magistrate courts in midsize cities, while others are in major suburbs of large cities, with the size of these suburbs rivaling that of entire cities, due to the high concentration and rapid growth of the population around major urban centers, especially the ones of Athens and Thessaloniki.

150. **Naturally, demand for justice services does not depend solely on the number of inhabitants; some regions of Greece appear to be more litigious than others, in that their demand is higher.** Such higher demand can be driven by factors including the level of economic activity, wealth, social tension, and trust in the courts to provide a viable solution. Therefore, it is important to verify whether the significant imbalances in the number of judges per inhabitant identified above can be explained with substantially higher, or lower, demand for justice services in the respective regions. Such differences could be attributable to varying levels of litigiousness in the population or to the level and type of economic activity in a region. The level of demand for justice services in a given area can be determined by juxtaposing the number of inhabitants with the number of incoming cases per year. This juxtaposition demonstrates that the median number of incoming cases per 100 inhabitants in the magistrate court regions of Greece is 0.68. However, there are regions with twice as many incoming cases per inhabitant. These include some highly urbanized areas such as Athens, Thessaloniki, and Maroussi as well as the regions of some small courts such as Karpathos, Kyparissia, and Nemea. The magistrate court with the highest number of incoming cases compared to its population size is the Karpathos magistrate court (2.09 cases per 100 inhabitants) followed by Athens (1.99 cases per 100 inhabitants). Interestingly, none of these regions with excessive demand for justice services coincide with the courts where the number of judges per inhabitant appears excessive.

151. **At the other end of the spectrum, there are regions where the demand for justice services is disproportionately low.** Compared to the median of 0.68 cases per 100 inhabitants, ranges in regions with low demand go as low as half this median (Andros, Astros, Eurytania, Lagadas, Melos, Psofida, and Pylos). The magistrate court with the lowest number of incoming cases compared to its population size is the one in Andros (0.21 cases per 100

inhabitants). Again, one may seek to identify whether these regions of low demand coincide with the magistrate courts that have a significantly lower level of resources in terms of judges per inhabitant. In this case, only Lagadas stands out where the low number of judges may be explained by low demand. At the same time, Melos, which was identified as overstaffed in terms of judges per inhabitant, also stands out with low demand for justice services per inhabitant.

152. **The interplay between demand for justice services and the resourcing of courts is reflected directly in another important metric, namely incoming cases per judge.** In a well-dimensioned, responsive, and rationally resourced justice system, it should be a relatively rare occurrence that some judges' workload is disproportionately heavy, while judges of the same level in other locations operate under a much lighter workload. The median for Greece is 95 incoming cases per magistrate judge per year.[102] However, the demand per judge exceeds 150 cases per judge per year in numerous courts (Almopia, Chalandri, Ierapetra, Istieia, Karpathos, Kassandra, Kastoria, Kos, Koufalia, Kropia, Kyparisia, Larissa, Maroussi, Moires, Nafpaktos, Pangaion, Samos, Sparta, Thasos, and Vasilika). Based on the data, it appears that the magistrate court which is the most overloaded in terms of demand for justice services is the single-judge court of Pangaion with 245 incoming cases per judge. Some of the large courts that appear overloaded are Chalandri, Maroussi, and Kropia in the Athens suburban area as well as the court in Larissa. At the other end of the spectrum are magistrate courts with little demand per judge, that is, less than 45 incoming cases per judge per year. These include some courts with three or four approved judicial positions (Kastelli, Melos, Salamina, Valtos), as well as courts with two judicial positions (Eurytania, Kymi, Rodolivos), and single-judge courts (Konitsa, Kythera, Psofida, Spetses). Unsurprisingly, based on the imbalances identified above, the court that has the fewest incoming cases per judge in all of Greece is the well-resourced magistrate court of Melos in the Aegean appellate region; it receives just 11 cases per judge per year for its three approved judicial positions.

153. **Judges need significant administrative support to operate properly, so the level of clerical support can influence the effectiveness of the court.** The administrative support available to them is measured by the ratio of court clerks to judges. Unfortunately, in Greece, many approved positions for clerks remain vacant and courts are severely understaffed in this regard across the board.[103] To adequately capture this ratio, the report compares clerks on payroll with approved judicial positions (which are at any given point close to the number of actually working judges). The data provide a clear picture of the dire situation in respect of clerical support in the Greek judiciary. While the median ratio of court clerks to judges in Europe is 3.3, for Greek magistrate courts this median ratio is 1.6. In practice, this means that Greek judges operate with approximately half the clerical support that their European peers receive.

154. **In this area, too, there are great imbalances in the resources available to different Greek magistrate courts with some of them operating with much less than the median**

[102] As detailed in the Methodology section of this report, the median number of incoming cases per year for 2017–2021 is used herein.
[103] While there may be varying explanations as to why there are so many vacant positions for court clerks, the one which appears to be the most widespread is that the combination of low salary and heavy workload may be making these positions particularly unappealing.

number of clerks per judge and others with much more. Of course, oftentimes these deviations in the clerks per judge ratio may be due to the court having too many or too few judges. If the court is overstaffed with judges (based on the number of incoming cases), then the clerks may appear too few and vice versa. For this reason, only such imbalances are highlighted here, where significant deviations of the clerks per judge ratio from the median are not due to imbalances in the number of judges.[104] One such court is in Atalanti. This court has just one judge for its population of a little over 30,000, which is much lower than the median number of judges per inhabitant in Greece (seven judges per 100,000 inhabitants). Furthermore, this single judge receives 142 cases per year, which is higher than the median of 95 cases. At the same time, there is not a single court clerk in Atalanti, which in essence means that the judge works alone.[105] In other courts, the situation is just the opposite, a good number of judges coupled with a high clerk per judge ratio. An example of the latter is the two-judge magistrate court in Elassona where the incoming cases per judge are substantially lower than the median for Greece; however, the clerk per judge ratio is more than double the median. Finally, two prominent outliers in terms of clerks per judge ratio are the single-judge magistrate courts of Nafpaktos and Olympia. The number of incoming cases per judge at Nafpaktos is above the median (but not dramatically so) and its clerks per judge ratio is 10. Even more strikingly, Olympia has a number of incoming cases per judge under the median and a clerks per judge ratio of 9.

155. **Overall, in terms of human resources, there are significant imbalances among Greek magistrate courts.** Some courts in the Athens metropolitan area such as Chalandri, Maroussi, and Kropia as well as the sizeable (in terms of population served) court of Larissa appear understaffed, while other courts such as Melos, Kastelli, Salamina, and Valtos appear to have a higher number of approved judicial positions than warranted by demand. Clerical support, too, is uneven across the board, which may also be due to the peculiar characteristics of the local labor market. Such imbalances affect the operations of the courts and breed a work environment which is perceived as unjust or discriminatory in that the burden on some judges is disproportionately larger than the burden on others. The findings suggest that objective criteria may need to be introduced to streamline staffing policies.

6.2.2 Performance of Magistrate Courts

156. **The second dimension of the operations of Greek magistrate courts, which is examined, is performance.** Performance is assessed by means of several metrics. First, the number of disposed cases per judge per year is examined, as this is a well-established measure of productivity. Second, the clearance rate of courts is explored, that is, the ratio between incoming and disposed cases per year. This examination shows how well the court is able to manage its incoming cases and whether it is generating backlog over time or, on the contrary, decreasing its backlog. The third examined performance metric is disposition time. It indicates the number of days the court would require to clear all its existing backlog, if it resolves cases at its current pace. Fourth, the clearance rate and disposition time for courts

[104] For example, there is a low clerk per judge ratio in Nafplio and Melos, but these courts also appear overstaffed with judges, and this explains the unusual ratio. Similarly, there is a high clerk per judge ratio in Moires, but the court is significantly understaffed in terms of number of judges.
[105] Other courts that have zero court clerks are Epidavros (Limira) and Plomari. However, the population served by these courts is significantly smaller than that of Atalanti.

are combined into an indicator that allows us to place them in efficiency categories as defined by CEPEJ. The examination of the four types of performance metrics described above help identify the courts that may have performance issues. Finally, a juxtaposition of the findings on performance with the findings on resources can tell whether poor or very good performance can be linked to insufficient or generous resources, respectively, or whether the reasons for performance imbalances should be sought beyond resourcing.

157. **The number of cases that a court manages to dispose of per year divided by the number of judges can indicate how productive the judges at the court are on average.** This is not so much a measure of personal performance, as it is an indicator of average output per judge. Naturally, magistrate courts serving small populations, and with a small number of incoming cases per judge, will also exhibit a lower number of disposed cases per judge. The median productivity of a Greek magistrate judge is 119 cases per year. In terms of high performers, there are courts that dispose of more than 200 cases per year per judge. The overloaded courts in the Athens metropolitan area feature prominently among these (Chalandri, Kropia, and Maroussi). Some smaller (one- or two-judge) courts, too, display a productivity of more than 200 disposed cases per judge per year (Ierapetra, Kos, Moires, Nafpaktos, Naxos, and Thasos). The most productive magistrate courts appear to be the ones in Ierapetra and Moires, with 298 and 294 disposed cases per judge per year, respectively.

158. **At the other end of the spectrum, there are courts with low numbers of disposed cases per judge per year, that is, courts with seemingly low productivity per judge.**[106] Smaller (as well as exceedingly well-resourced) courts exhibit lower numbers of decisions (that is, disposed cases) per judge, as the workload per judge is naturally lower in such cases (although a low number of incoming cases per judge can also present an opportunity to reduce the backlog of old cases still pending at the court from previous years). Courts that dispose of less than 50 cases per judge per year include mostly smaller courts serving small populations, which will naturally appear well resourced even with a single judge on staff. These include Kastelli, Melos, Valtos (each with three approved judicial positions), Kymi (with two approved judicial positions), and Konitsa, Kythera, Leros, Neapoli (Vion Lakonia), Psofida, Sami, and Spetsos (with a single judicial position).

159. **It appears that in most cases, the biggest determinant of productivity is the number of incoming cases, that is, the bigger the number of incoming cases per judge, the higher the number of disposed and vice versa.**[107] The well-resourced court in Melos, which this report zoomed in on several times in this paper, receives just 11 cases per judge per year (median value for 2017–2021) and processes only 9, seemingly not seeking to also clear some older cases. Conversely, the severely understaffed courts of Chalandri, Kropia, and Maroussi receive more than 180 cases per judge per year and manage to dispose of more than 200 cases per judge, possibly at a great effort for their staff. What emerges is a picture of some courts where judges produce a greater output by necessity, so that they may not be completely overwhelmed, while other courts are able to operate at a much more relaxed pace. The strong correlation between caseload and productivity is confirmed by studies

[106] Again, this is a measure of productivity in the sense of total output per judge, not a measure of individual performance.
[107] The number of incoming cases per judge and the number of disposed cases per judge at the magistrate court level are strongly correlated, with a coefficient of 0.95.

conducted in other countries as well, which find that at both the country level and the individual level productivity increases with caseload.[108] This in turn means that there are significant opportunity costs in keeping judges at locations with low caseload.

160. **A measure of performance that considers that some courts receive more incoming cases than others, and a key indicator of a court's performance, is the clearance rate, that is, the ratio between disposed and incoming cases** (see Table 5). When examining clearance rates, the performance of Greek magistrate courts is quite good. When comparing Greek magistrate courts across this performance dimension, the median value is an impressive 128 percent. This means that, overall, magistrate courts manage to dispose of more cases than they receive per year, thus reducing their backlog as time goes by. Only five magistrate courts had an average clearance rate below 100 percent for 2017–2021, namely the ones in Platamodes (89 percent), Heraklion (92 percent), Thera (93 percent), Pyrgos (98 percent), and Vamos (99 percent). Numerous courts have a clearance rate above the Greek median of 128 percent with 17 courts exceeding 150 percent. The magistrate court with the highest clearance rate in Greece is the one in Salamina (190 percent). None of the courts that have a clearance rate below 100 percent are among the ones facing a particular resourcing issue.

161. **Historical data on clearance rates also warrant examination** (see Figure 21). As the trends in clearance rate for 2017–2021 are examined, several peculiarities can be observed. First, there was a noticeable one-time improvement of clearance rates of magistrate courts in 2020, possibly attributable to the effect of the amendment of the Katseli law, which led to the closing of numerous cases related to overindebted households. Another reason for this one-time improvement may be the COVID pandemic, which could have reduced the number of incoming cases in that period, thus leading to an improvement of the clearance rate. Second, even though the clearance rates for the entire period were good and regardless of the one-time improvement in 2020, in most courts, the trend in the clearance rate for 2017–2021 was negative; that is, performance in this respect has declined. From a clearance rate of 143 percent in 2017, the magistrate courts had a clearance rate of 102 percent in 2021. It is possible that in 2022, magistrate performance will have bounced back to pre-COVID levels, but meanwhile clearance rates should be closely monitored for any further signs of deterioration.

[108] Mascini, Peter, and Fatih Deyneli. 2020. "Utility Maximizing Judges and Judicial Assistants: Testing Rational Choice Theory in 22 EU Countries (October 15, 2020)." *International Journal for Court Administration* 11 (3). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739794; Dimitrova-Grajzl, V., P. Grajzl, J. Sustersic, and K. Zajc. 2012. "Court Output, Judicial Staffing, and the Demand for Court Services: Evidence from Slovenian Courts of First Instance." *International Review of Law and Economics* 32 (1): 19–29; Dimitrova-Grajzl, V., P. Grajzl, A. Slavov, and K. Zajc. 2016. "Courts in a Transition Economy: Case Disposition and the Quantity–Quality Tradeoff in Bulgaria." *Economic Systems* 40 (1): 18–38.

Figure 21. Evolution of magistrate court clearance rates (2017–2021)



162. **Unlike the clearance rate of Greek magistrate courts, which compares favorably to the CEPEJ median, disposition time leaves a lot to be desired** (see Table 6). The median disposition time in Greek magistrate courts is 354 days. There are great discrepancies in the disposition times among different magistrate courts, with some of them raising serious concerns. There are 24 magistrate courts whose disposition time is between two and three times longer than the median for Greece and further 15 courts where the disposition time is more than three times the Greek median (Piraeus, Nikea, Ierapetra, Chalandri, Rhodes, Peristeri, Acharnes, Chania, Skydra, Kallithea, Maroussi, Vonitsa, Salamina, Corinth, and Sikyona—in descending order in terms of disposition time). In this list, the magistrate court of Piraeus stands out with a disposition time of 3,159 days, which means that, at the current pace of work and if all resources could be dedicated to backlog processing only (with no new incoming cases), it would still take the magistrate court of Piraeus nearly nine years to clear all its backlog.

163. **An examination of disposition times indicates that some of the courts that are facing issues are ones that are understaffed, that is, those that have a low number of judges compared to the number of incoming cases.** Five of the courts with disposition time more than three times the median for Greece and two of the courts with more than double that time are in the suburbs of Athens (Chalandri, Peristeri, Acharnes, Kallithea, Maroussi, Ilion, and Nea Ionia). All of them, with the exception of Peristeri, have a number of incoming cases per judge that exceeds the median for Greece and a ratio of clerks per judge that is below the median. By contrast, there are courts with poor disposition time, which have a good number of judges compared to the demand in their region, and with regard to these courts, there is no clear explanation for the long disposition time. These include Piraeus, Chania, and Lamia, which serve a population similar to that in Chalandri or Acharnes but have demand per judge at the median or lower yet display the same worrisome disposition time as their much busier

counterparts. Other examples of courts that are well staffed but still have long disposition times include Psofida, Neapoli (Lasithi), and Salamina.

164. **There are also courts which perform significantly better than the median in terms of disposition time.** In 10 courts, the disposition time is between half and three times lower than the median for Greece (Lavrio, Atalanti, Akrata, Kythera, Lemnos, Nigrita, Konitsa, Amynteo, Alexandria, and Nafplio—in ascending order) and further 10 courts have disposition times more than three times lower than the median (Arnea, Karpathos, Argos, Rodolivos, Kymi, Neapoli [Vion Lakonia], Orestriada, Pangaion, Gastouni, and Kalloni [Lesvos])—again in ascending order). The magistrate court which, based on the available data, has the lowest disposition time in Greece is the one in Arnea with a disposition time of 53 days. While there is no clear regional pattern of disposition times, the appellate region with the most courts with disposition times shorter than the CEPEJ median (that is, shorter than 237 days) is Thessaloniki where eight magistrate courts have shorter disposition times than this. Furthermore, the courts with a short disposition time are mostly ones that are well resourced, that is, with a low number of incoming cases per judge, such as Valtos and Nafplio. However, there are also a few seemingly understaffed courts that have an excellent disposition time. These include Kassandra, Pangaion, and Karpathos (with more than 150 incoming cases per judge per year) as well as Atalanti, Eordea, Florina, Gastouni, Massitos, and Nigrita (with 120 to 150 incoming cases per judge per year).

165. **The historical trends in terms of disposition time over 2017–2021 (see Figure 22) indicate (a) an overall trend toward a slight reduction of individual court disposition times, including a sizeable reduction in 2020 (possibly the effect of the Katseli law), and (b) a widening of the gap between slower and quicker courts in 2021** (which ultimately led to an aggregate increase in disposition time in 2021 for magistrate courts as a whole, compared to 2017; as shown in Figure 11). The disposition time of courts that performed worse than the median for Greece has in fact become longer in the last five years. In some cases, this increase in the disposition time over the years is between 100 and 200 percent (Elassona, Gythio, Kalymnos, Mytilene, Nemea, Piraeus, Rhodes, Skydra, Sparta, Tinos, and Vonitsa) or even exceeds 200 percent (for example, in Almopia, Andros, Paros, Plomari, Skopelos, and Spetses). Where there has been an improvement in disposition time over the years, it is usually observed in courts where the disposition time is short anyhow and the improvement has not been dramatic—on no occasion did it exceed 100 percent. This is particularly interesting, given the reduction of disposition time observed in the middle of the period, where not only did the overall disposition time decrease, but the gap between the best and worst performers also decreased somewhat.

Figure 22. Evolution of magistrate court disposition times (2017–2021)



166. **Clearance rate and disposition time interact and codetermine a court's performance, relative to itself and to other courts of the same type.** Efficiency categories have been defined by CEPEJ to allow for easy comparison and grouping of courts depending on their relative performance with respect to both dimensions. Most magistrate courts (112 in total) fall under the 'Standard' category, meaning that they are about as efficient as expected, given the median Greek efficiency of magistrate courts (see Table 7). Seven magistrate courts in Greece fall under the efficiency category which raises the most concerns, namely 'Very High DT' which equals or exceeds four times the national median. These are the courts in Acharnes, Chalandri, Ierapetra, Nikea, Peristeri, Piraeus, and Rhodes. There is one court (Vamos) in the 'Warning' category—that is, the disposition time is two to four times the median and the clearance rate is less than 100 percent. It is not surprising that several magistrate courts of the greater Athens area are among the worst performers here, as these courts seem to be facing some of the biggest challenges. Finally, there are 32 courts in either the 'Fighting Backlog' or 'Creating Backlog' category, which is a situation that gives some reasons for concern but is still manageable.

167. **Overall, the interplay between resourcing and performance of magistrate courts points to a complex landscape, one where some courts are understaffed and others are comfortably resourced.** Serious resourcing issues are noted in the magistrate courts of the greater Athens area. On the whole, none of the well-resourced courts seem to have a particularly stellar performance. While they keep up with their incoming caseload, an effort beyond that is not apparent from the data. The poorly resourced courts, on the other hand, present a more heterogenous picture. Some have been struggling with the performance in respect of disposition time due to the lack of a sufficient number of judges and/or clerks relative to demand. Others have surprisingly risen to the challenge and have performed well, some even exceptionally well, given their dire circumstances. An in-depth examination of

these outliers can help shed light on the reasons for the different stories that the busiest courts have to tell. Importantly, the clear correlation between caseload and productivity at the magistrate level indicates that there are significant opportunity costs to keeping judges at locations with low caseload.

6.3 Demand and Supply Analysis of First Instance Courts

168. **The first instance courts of Greece are the backbone of the Greek justice system as they examine as a first instance the high-value civil cases and almost all criminal cases that come to court.** They also act as a second instance for some of the civil disputes resolved by the magistrate courts as well as for some misdemeanor cases, which the first instance court has examined in a single-judge panel. There are 63 first instance courts in Greece with a total of 1,151 approved judicial positions and 1,701 clerks on payroll. Similar to the approach taken with magistrate courts, this report examines the resourcing and performance of first instance courts and seeks to identify any imbalances thereof.

Figure 23. All first instance court locations (63 in total)



169. **The landscape of Greek first instance justice is dominated by the humongous first instance court of Athens.** With its 434 judges and more than 3.3 million people within its jurisdiction, this court is more than three times the size of the second biggest court, the one in Thessaloniki (with 125 judges responsible for a population of over 1.1 million), and receives about one-third of all first instance cases in Greece. The first instance court of Athens includes within its jurisdiction the territories of some of the largest magistrate courts in the country, including the magistrate courts of Athens, Acharnes, Chalandri, Ilion, Kallithea, Kropia,

Maroussi, Nea Ionia, and others. The disproportionately large court in Athens makes any comparisons between it and other courts of the same level less than optimal.

170. **Apart from the one in Athens, first instance courts in Greece present somewhat smaller size ranges than magistrate courts, the reason being that they tend to be larger and fewer than the latter.** At this level, there are no single-judge judicial services that were so characteristic of magistrate courts. The median size (that is, excluding outliers such as Athens and Thessaloniki) of the Greek first instance court is still rather small; it includes just seven judges, with several courts having four judges each. The smallest first instance court in Greece is the one in Eurytania, with three judges. Furthermore, the median population served by a first instance court is 85,609 inhabitants. Athens and Thessaloniki serve manyfold larger populations, though, as discussed above. There are some quite tiny courts that serve less than 40,000 people (Eurytania, Grevena, Kefalonia, Kyparissia, and Naxos) and ones that serve population centers with less than 20,000 people (Gythio and Kalavryta).

6.3.1 Resourcing of First Instance Courts

171. **In terms of judges per 100,000 inhabitants, there are again smaller ranges that the ones observed in terms of magistrate courts.** While the median number of first instance judges per 100,000 inhabitants is 9, just the smallest courts in Gythio and Kalavryta have a substantially larger number of judges relative to the small populations they serve. The court in Piraeus stands out as a rather well-resourced first instance court with 16 judges per 100,000 inhabitants, and the one of Athens, with 13 judges, is above the median as well. The demand for justice per inhabitant is the highest in Heraklion (which has a median number of judges) and is also high in Gythio (which only partially justifies the disproportionate number of judges there) as well as in Naxos, Rhodes, and Piraeus (for a comprehensive examination of resourcing of first instance courts, see Table 8).

172. **The measure that gives the most objective idea of whether the number of judges at a court corresponds to demand is the ratio between incoming cases and the number of judges who are to examine these cases.** Ideally, this is the aspect in which equalization of workload among judges should be sought, to ensure that judges of the same level carry a similar burden and that citizens across Greece can receive a comparable level of service regardless of their location. In this regard, the variations are not as great as with magistrate courts, but there are some notable outliers. While the median number of incoming cases per first instance judge in Greece is 295 (much higher than for magistrate courts), the court of Heraklion appears severely overburdened with as many as 400 cases per judge. Other courts whose human resources appear to be lower relative to demand are Katerini, Kos, and Rethymno. These courts have a number of judges per inhabitant that is close to the median for Greece; however, demand for justice services in these regions is high, leading to a greater burden on available human resources. At the other end of the spectrum are courts with quite light caseload compared to the number of judges. The courts that have the least cases per approved judicial position are the ones in Eurytania and Kalavryta, with just 81 and 87 cases, respectively. Other courts with low demand per judge are similarly small and include Amfissa, Grevena, and Gythio. All these courts are staffed with a higher number of judges than the median per inhabitant even though in many of them (all except Gythio) demand per inhabitant is lower than the median. The two largest courts of Athens and Thessaloniki, which

always warrant special attention because of their unique position, appear to have an adequate number of judges relative to their workload (the incoming cases per judge are slightly lower than the median in both courts). Overall, the judicial resources assigned to first instance courts of Greece seem to not always be based on objective criteria and as a result generate some imbalances in workload.

173. **As with magistrate courts, it is worth examining whether first instance court judges receive adequate administrative support as well as whether the courts that appear to be understaffed or overresourced in terms of numbers of judges have a number of court clerks that might to an extent mitigate the imbalance.** The median ratio of court clerks per judge at the first instance courts is only slightly better than that at magistrate courts and stands at 1.9. It is still lower than the CEPEJ median of 3.3. Here, there are no such sweeping differences in the ratios between individual courts that were present at the magistrate level. Neither are there situations where a court might have too many judges and too many court clerks or vice versa. The courts that have the most clerical support (ratio of 2.8) are the ones in Lefkada and Agrinio, but still the difference with others is by no means drastic (and Agrinio is one of the courts where the number of judges appears somewhat low, so the little extra clerical support seems to be justified). It is important to note that the first instance court that has the lowest level of administrative support in Greece is the one in Athens with a ratio of clerks to judges of 1. This means that there is just one clerk for every judge working in the court, a ratio which is much below international standards and must be severely frustrating the operations of a judicial service which already appears too sizeable to manage with ease.

174. **Overall, in terms of human resources, there are imbalances present among Greek first instance courts, but they are less pronounced than those observed at the magistrate court level.** Approximately four courts seem to have pronouncedly fewer judges than they need and about five courts may have more than the incoming caseload warrants. The clerical support appears insufficient in all courts, with the situation in Athens being particularly dire.

6.3.2 Performance of First Instance Courts

175. **The second examined dimension of the operations of first instance courts is performance.** The approach taken is similar to that with magistrate courts: (a) the productivity of judges is assessed in terms of disposed cases per judge; (b) the clearance rate of courts is examined, that is, the ratio between incoming and disposed cases; (c) the disposition time of courts is assessed by calculating how many days it would take each court to dispose of all its pending cases, at its current pace; and (d) courts are placed in efficiency categories based on the combination of their clearance rate and disposition time. There is one substantial difference in the approach taken with regard to magistrate courts, which stems from the fact that first instance courts adjudicate not only civil but also criminal cases. Therefore, while the examination of judges' productivity takes into account the combined civil and criminal workload (since there is no strict specialization of judges), in terms of clearance rate, disposition time, and efficiency categories, the civil litigious and criminal caseload of first instance courts are examined separately. This allows for comparison with CEPEJ medians for civil litigious and for criminal first instance cases, respectively. Furthermore, since the data on pending criminal cases, which are self-reported by courts, appear particularly unreliable (for reasons addressed also in the Methodology section of this report), the examination of the

performance metrics, which factor in pending cases, features several scenarios, to overcome the reporting deficiencies and discern a picture that is as close as possible to reality.

176. **In terms of productivity per judge, significant discrepancies are observed among Greek first instance courts.** The median for the country is 304 cases per judge per year (again, significantly higher than that of magistrate courts). However, there are sizeable ranges in this regard. The judges in the smallest first instance courts in Greece (Eurytania, Grevena, Gythio, and Kalavryta) dispose of less than 200 cases per year. The lowest number of disposed cases per judge is observed in Kalavryta (89 cases), a court that is perhaps too well resourced for the demand for justice services that it faces. The courts with the highest productivity (that is, more than 400 cases per judge per year) are the ones in Agrinio, Drama, Heraklion, Katerini, Kos, Lefkada, Messologi, Rhodes, and Zakynthos. The court with the highest productivity appears to be the one in Messologi with 626 disposed cases per judge per year in 2017–2021. Like with magistrate courts, all the courts that have particularly high productivity are ones where the demand per judge is higher than the median. In respect of first instance courts, there is again a correlation between caseload and productivity, albeit not as strong as for magistrate courts—the greater the workload of judges, the more productive they are, but there are likely other factors at play too.[109]

177. **The median clearance rate for civil litigious cases of Greek first instance courts (103 percent) is not as stellar as that of magistrate courts but is still good** (see Table 9). This means that the majority of courts are able to dispose of approximately as many cases as they receive during the year. The court with the highest clearance rate is Katerini (121 percent), and the one with the lowest is Amaliada (74 percent). However, the performance that gives the most reasons for concern from a systemic point of view is that of the Athens first instance court. Even though the court is well resourced with judges (but not so well in terms of judicial clerks), its clearance rate is rather low at 90 percent. In essence, this means that every year, approximately 10 percent of all incoming civil litigious cases are added to its backlog. Furthermore, given that this court handles approximately one-third of all first instance cases in Greece, a low clearance rate for civil litigious cases there affects a disproportionately large number of citizens and businesses in Greece. While in the last five years there has been a slight trend toward improvement of the clearance rate at the Athens first instance court (by 7 percent), the overall picture is still one that raises serious concerns.

178. **Regarding the first instance courts that display a clearance rate below 95 percent (14 altogether), one can discern two groups.** The first group includes courts having a low number of judges relative to demand which may be the reason for the issues they encounter in terms of clearance rate. The overburdened first instance court of Heraklion features prominently in this group. Other courts where a low number of judges relative to demand may be contributing to the low clearance rate include Amaliada, Lefkada, Messologi, Chania, Syros, Naxos, Rhodes, and Xanthi. In other courts (similarly to Athens), the number of judges relative to demand is above the median, but they still experience problems, for example, Kalamata, Kilkis, Kyparissia, and Ioannina. Even though overall the clearance rate for civil litigious cases over 2017–2021 was quite high, it is important to note that it experienced a

[109] There is a correlation of 0.72 between incoming cases per judge and disposed cases per judge at the first instance level, as opposed to a correlation of 0.95 at the magistrate level.

rather steady decline (with a one-time surge in 2020, possibly related to a reduction of the incoming cases during the COVID pandemic). The 116 percent median clearance rate of 2017 fell to 89 percent in 2021 (see Figure 24).

Figure 24. Evolution of first instance courts civil clearance rates (2017–2021)



179. **Regarding the clearance rate for criminal cases, the performance of Greek first instance courts appears even better than that for civil litigious cases** (see Table 9). With regard to this metric, the Greek median is at 109 percent. The highest performing courts in this regard appear to be Messologi (it reports a clearance rate of a staggering 196 percent) and Amfissa (180 percent). The lowest clearance rates for criminal cases are observed in Mythilene (63 percent), Syros (67 percent), Thessaloniki (76 percent), and Corfu (79 percent). Of these four courts, Thessaloniki seems to be rather well resourced with judges whereas Syros has fewer judges than its caseload warrants. With regard to this particular metric, the first instance court of Athens stands at 110 percent and does not raise concerns. Overall, in terms of clearance rates for criminal cases, there are much more drastic variations compared to civil litigious cases. It is not clear whether these significant variations are due only to differences in the performance of the courts or are also a reflection of the systemic issues with criminal caseload reporting that are noted on numerous occasions in this report. Furthermore, like civil clearance rates, the criminal ones are declining and despite a one-time surge in 2020 fell from 121 percent in 2017 to 93 percent in 2021.

Figure 25. Evolution of first instance court criminal clearance rates (2017–2021)



180. **Unlike clearance rates, where the statistical data point to a good overall performance of first instance courts, disposition time raises some concerns** (see Table 10). Regarding civil litigious cases, the national median disposition time (that is, the days it would take a court to dispose of all its pending cases, at its current pace) is 382 days. It is longer than the disposition time of Greek magistrate courts (354 days). Unlike with civil clearance rate, with regard to disposition time there are drastic differences in the performance of the courts. First, there are six courts (Athens, Chania, Rhodes, Kalamata, Nafplio, and Lefkada) whose disposition time exceeds 1,000 days and two courts whose disposition time exceeds 900 days (Kos and Heraklion). The first instance court of Athens is an outlier, with the longest disposition time in the country, namely 1,386 days. Again, such a disposition time at the largest court affects a disproportionate number of cases. There are also nine courts whose disposition time is shorter than even the CEPEJ median of 237 days: Kalavryta, Florina, Thesprotia, Drama, Amfissa, Volos, Tripoli, Eurytania, and Kavala.

181. **It is always informative to explore whether the courts that have performance issues (such as a long disposition time) suffer from insufficient staffing relative to demand for justice services or not.** As already discussed, in terms of the number of judges, the Athens first instance court, which has the longest disposition time, appears sufficiently staffed, but its ratio of one clerk per judge is the lowest at that court level. Nafplio stands out as a well-resourced court, in terms of both judges and clerks, but it still faces significant performance issues. Kalamata and Ioannina also appear well staffed but struggle in terms of disposition time. By contrast, in other courts, the performance issues can be explained with a low number of judges relative to demand. Among these, Heraklion and Kos, which have the lowest number of judges relative to demand among all first instance courts in Greece, are particularly prominent examples of situations where low resourcing may be affecting performance.

Chania and Rhodes may also be struggling with a long disposition time because of low human resources. Regarding the courts with a particularly short disposition time, most of them are small courts which at the same time have a high number of judges relative to demand; therefore, their short disposition time is not surprising. There are a few among them, though, namely Drama, Tripoli, and Volos, which have a relatively low number of judges as juxtaposed with demand but appear particularly efficient.

182. **The calculation of disposition time for criminal cases poses significant challenges due to the great uncertainty of data on pending criminal cases and some distortions emerging as a result of COVID closures, which seem to have affected the criminal caseload especially** (discussed in more detail in the Methodology section of this report). Since postponed cases stay with the Designation Office at the prosecution service rather than at the court, at any given time courts are able to see and report on only a portion of the criminal cases that are pending at the trial stage.[110] Furthermore, disposition time is a hypothetical measure that factors in the number of cases disposed in the latest examined year. However, the latest year for which data are available is 2021 when the number of disposed criminal cases was particularly low, presumably due to ongoing COVID restrictions which seem to have affected criminal cases disproportionately. With an unusually low number of disposed cases for the last examined year, the calculated disposition time skyrockets. Such a calculation may therefore be presenting an unduly pessimistic picture without taking into account that with the end of the COVID pandemic, courts could be expected to go back to the rate at which they resolved cases in pre-COVID times.

183. **To account for all these complexities and present a picture of disposition times which is both robust and fair to courts, the project team has opted to develop three scenarios, or estimation methods, with regard to criminal cases' disposition time** (see Table 10). One of the scenarios uses data on pending cases as reported by the courts. Since the data point to a low backlog, the resulting disposition times seem extremely short, in a manner that is not in agreement with the observed variations in clearance rates or experience on the ground where courts appear to struggle to contain criminal backlog.[111] Another scenario makes a conservative estimate of the number of pending cases by combining data on incoming and on postponed cases obtained from both courts and prosecution services to reflect a number of pending cases that is in line with what the cumulative caseload data suggests. When this scenario is used, disposition times seem extremely long.[112] Finally, the third scenario uses the second (estimated, as opposed to reported) data on pending cases, which the project team finds more realistic, but makes a correction for the extraordinary circumstances related to the COVID pandemic. Instead of presuming that the courts will continue to work at the same rate at which they resolved cases in 2021, this scenario presumes that they will go back to pre-COVID rates of resolving cases. That third scenario

[110] This picture is further complicated by the periodic laws (approximately every four years) that eliminate penalties for misdemeanors committed up until a certain date. Such cases are archived without being formally disposed of and disappear from the backlog without leaving a statistical trace.
[111] By way of example, when this 'as reported' scenario is applied, it appears that if the Athens first instance court were to stop receiving new cases today, it could resolve its entire backlog in just 135 days. Interviewed representatives of the court regarded this value as completely unrealistic.
[112] By way of example, when this 'estimate' scenario is applied, it appears that if the Athens first instance court were to stop receiving new cases today, it could resolve its entire backlog in 890 days.

(corrected for COVID) presents disposition times that are between the two extreme values obtained using the other two methods and is the one used as the main guidepost in this report.[113] Furthermore, when making a comparison among courts, regardless of the scenario used, it is usually the same courts that are outliers, which given the abovementioned complexities suggests that the findings here are relatively robust, at least with respect to comparisons between courts (less so regarding the magnitude of the backlog in absolute terms).

184. **In all three scenarios described above, the median disposition time for criminal cases in Greece is longer than the CEPEJ median.** Furthermore, at several courts, the disposition time is much longer than that in their peers, regardless of the scenario used. These are Amaliada, Arta, Corfu, Kalamata, Karditsa, Kos, Lasithi, Lamia, Mytilene, Patras, Rethymno, Rodopi, Syros, and Trikala. Kozani, Aegio, and Thessaloniki that have low self-reported backlog also appear to have issues with long disposition time in the scenarios using an estimated backlog, which raises questions with respect to their ability to accurately report on pending cases. Similar to the situation with the civil cases' disposition time, for some courts these performance difficulties may be explained by low resourcing while for others there is no apparent reason. For example, the busy court of Heraklion, which seemed to struggle with civil cases' disposition time, does not display similar problems in the criminal field.[114] The court in Kos, however, which is similarly underresourced, appears to have difficulties with both civil and criminal cases. Other courts (like Kos) which have a low number of judges relative to demand and long disposition time for criminal cases (that is, where the performance issues may be related to poor resourcing) include Rethymno and Syros. By contrast, some decently resourced courts also have long disposition times; these include Arta (a court that has judges at the median for Greece and a higher number of court clerks than the median but displays long disposition times for both criminal and civil cases); Kalamata and Karditsa (courts with a good number of judges but issues both with civil and criminal performance); Lamia and Mytilene (with issues only for criminal cases' disposition time).

[113] For example, when this 'corrected for COVID' scenario is applied, it appears that if the Athens first instance court were to stop receiving new cases today, it could resolve its entire backlog in 333 days. This scenario appears the closest to reality, without discounting the fact that there is some uncertainty as to the actual size of criminal backlog, and neither courts nor prosecution offices, much less our team, are able to give a definitive answer as to the exact size of the criminal backlog and respective disposition times around the country.

[114] To investigate such discrepancies between civil and criminal case performance, one must examine specific courts of interest in more detail, which is outside the scope of this report but could be a next step in diagnosing potential issues in specific courts.

Figure 26. (a) Estimates of criminal cases' disposition times for 2017–2021 based on court-reported data of incoming, disposed, and pending cases (solid grey); (b) correction made for significantly reduced court activity during 2020 and 2021 (dashed grey); and (c) disposition times based solely on court-reported data of disposed and pending cases



185. **In terms of evolution of disposition time, pronounced differences are observed between the three scenarios** (see Figure 26). The estimated scenario that does not factor for COVID shows a sharp increase of the disposition time during the pandemic. The second estimated scenario eliminates this sharp increase and shows that if a return to the pre-COVID pace of work were to occur, there would have been a small increase in disposition time. Finally, the data as reported by the courts suggest a small decrease of disposition time over time. Given the clear reduction of clearance rate over time (and clearance times do not factor in the uncertain metrics on pending cases), it is unlikely that disposition time decreased. This, again, indicates that data on pending cases as reported by the courts are probably flawed and the truth lies somewhere in the range suggested by the three explored scenarios, of which the project team finds that the middle one is a (possibly too conservative though) more defensible estimate.

186. **The final performance indicator examined is efficiency category per CEPEJ classification.** It reflects the relationship between clearance rate and disposition time (see 1). With respect to civil litigious cases, there are 10 courts in the Warning efficiency category: Athens, Arta, Heraklion, Ioannina, Kalamata, Kos, Lefkada, Nafplio, Rhodes, and Chania. The first instance court of Athens is obviously in a class of its own and it appears that although its number of judges corresponds to demand, the court's size may be generating unique challenges and inefficiencies. In addition, Athens' clear issue with a dearth of court clerks may additionally frustrate work processes. Among the other courts in the Warning category for civil cases, Heraklion and Kos clearly have an issue with too few judges relative to demand and this understaffing may be taking a toll on their performance. The other courts on this list

also have fewer judges relative to demand than the median for Greece, although the difference is not as pronounced as with Heraklion and Kos. One notable exception is Nafplio, which has very few cases relative to its number of judges and still it has performance issues. The reason is unclear.

187. **In respect of efficiency categories for the criminal caseload, although there are some differences between the three examined scenarios, one can clearly discern the courts that give rise to concerns in the criminal field (under any scenario)** (see Table 12). These are the courts of Syros, Trikala, Corfu, Lasithi, Mytilene, Chalkida, Grevena, Kalamata, Karditsa, Kozani, Lamia, Nafplio, and Thessaloniki. Athens is visibly absent from this list, which indicates that the biggest court in the country is clearly doing better processing its criminal caseload compared to its civil caseload. Interestingly, the poorly resourced courts of Heraklion and Kos also do not give particular reasons for concern in terms of efficiency category. Only two courts with a low number of judges relative to demand fall under an efficiency category that gives rise to concerns in terms of criminal caseload—Lasithi and Syros. For these courts, the performance issues might be due to understaffing. By contrast, several of the abovementioned courts are well resourced and still perform less than optimally. In addition to Nafplio, which is in a low efficiency category in terms of both civil and criminal caseloads, other such courts are Grevena (a particularly well-resourced court with much fewer cases per judge than the Greece median), Kalamata, Karditsa, Kozani, Lamia, Mytilene, and Thessaloniki.

188. **Overall, the examination of the resourcing and performance of Greek first instance courts points to some important imbalances.** First, the Athens first instance court is disproportionately large, and given the exorbitant population it serves any issues there affect a disproportionately large group of people. The court has a large number of judges relative to demand but an insufficient number of court clerks. Importantly, the large number of judges seem unable to handle well the civil caseload and as a result, there is a low clearance rate, a long disposition time, and a poor efficiency category. The second important finding with regard to first instance courts is that some of them appear to operate with insufficient human resources and this might be affecting their performance. Of these, Heraklion, Chania, and Rhodes are experiencing difficulties with the civil caseload; Lasithi have difficulties with criminal caseloads; and Kos and Syros have issues with both civil and criminal caseloads. Third, there are courts that appear to be generously resourced relative to their demand. Most of these are small ones. One important exception is the first instance court of Nafplio, which is of average size and has many judges relative to its demand but exhibits performance issues in both the civil and the criminal field, the reason for which is not easily identifiable based on the data. Other courts that are well resourced but have performance issues are Kalamata and Karditsa (both for civil and for criminal), Thessaloniki, Lamia, and Mytilene (performance issues with criminal cases), and Ioannina (performance issues with civil cases).

6.4 Demand and Supply Analysis of Appellate Courts

189. **Greek appellate courts examine civil and criminal cases as a second instance.** For important criminal cases, they may also serve as a first instance. There are 19 appellate courts in Greece with a total of 582 approved judicial positions and 418 clerks on payroll. In the following paragraphs, the resourcing available to the appellate courts of Greece is examined

and any imbalances thereof are identified. Furthermore, performance is assessed with the goal of both identifying imbalances and highlighting where performance issues may be stemming from poor resourcing and where they might be due to inefficiencies or other reasons.

Figure 27. All appellate court locations (19 in total)



190. **The size imbalances at the appellate level appear to be somewhat milder compared to the first instance level, which is to be expected given their much smaller number and larger jurisdictions** (for resourcing of appellate courts, see Table 13). Among the appellate courts, too, the Athens appellate court stands out as the largest by far but since the remaining appellate courts are fewer and are generally responsible for larger population compared to the first instance level, the difference is not as drastic as at the first instance. Still, the appellate court of Athens, with its 311 judges and 3.3 million people under its jurisdiction, stands out as an obvious outlier. It is followed by the Thessaloniki appellate court with 84 judges and approximately 1.8 million people served. Otherwise, the median population served by a regularly sized Greek appellate court is 283,689 and the median number of judges is 8. The smallest appellate court in Corfu serves 147,958 people and has five judges. Overall, appellate courts in Greece are both fewer and smaller in size than first instance courts.

6.4.1 Resourcing of Appellate Courts

191. **In terms of the number of judges, one can observe rather uneven resourcing.** While the median number of appellate judges is three per 100,000 inhabitants, Athens has as many as nine and Piraeus seven. The three courts that are below this median are Nafplio, Thrace, and Western Macedonia—each with two judges per 100,000 inhabitants. In terms of demand

per inhabitant, the most litigious appellate region appears to be Athens and the least litigious is Larissa. Finally, perhaps the most objective measurement of resourcing is the one juxtaposing the number of judges with incoming cases. The median for Greek appellate courts is 130 incoming cases per judge. From this perspective, the Athens appellate court is among the best resourced. It has only 63 incoming cases per judge. Naturally one must also consider the complexity and importance of cases, as appellate courts hear some of the most serious and high-profile cases, especially in the capital. The appellate courts in Piraeus, Aegean, and Thessaloniki are also very well resourced, with just 60, 92, and 98 incoming cases per judge, respectively. In terms of the relationship between demand and supply, the appellate courts that appear somewhat strained for resources are Thrace (with 190 incoming cases per judge), Nafplio (with 164 cases per judge), Evia (with 163 cases), and Eastern Crete (with 160 cases).

192. **In terms of administrative support that judges receive, appellate courts have the smallest number of court clerks relative to the number of judges among all Greek court levels.** Against a CEPEJ median of 3.3, they have just 1.2 clerks per judges. That may be natural, because the other two court levels, magistrate and first instance, issue many types of certificates which engage court clerks disproportionately. In terms of the ratio of court clerks per judge, as with first instance courts, the biggest resourcing problem can be observed in Athens, where there is one clerk for every two judges. This level of administrative support seems insufficient. On the other hand, the issue may partly be because the Athens appellate court has a disproportionately high number of judges. There is also a low ratio of court clerks per judge in the other two courts that have a high number of judges relative to demand, namely Piraeus (1.0) and Thessaloniki (0.8). Appellate courts which have an insufficient number of judges relative to demand (Thrace, Nafplio, Evia, and Eastern Crete) do not appear to operate with a larger number of court clerks who might compensate for the low number of judges.

193. **Overall, in terms of human resources, there are imbalances among appellate courts, although these are milder than the ones observed in respect of magistrate or first instance courts.** The court that appears to have the most resources are Piraeus, Athens, Aegean, and Thessaloniki. The courts that appear somewhat strained relative to their demand for justice services are Thrace, Nafplio, Evia, and Eastern Crete. The examination of appellate courts' performance in the following paragraphs can shed light on the extent to which resourcing imbalances have affected performance.

6.4.2 Performance of Appellate Courts

194. **The performance of Greek appellate courts is examined through the prism of the same aspects that are used for first instance courts:** (a) productivity of judges in terms of disposed cases per judge; (b) clearance rate, that is, the ratio between incoming and disposed cases; (c) disposition time measuring how many days it would take each court to dispose of all its pending cases, at its current pace; and (d) efficiency category, based on the combined data on clearance rate and disposition time. As with first instance courts, clearance rates, disposition times, and efficiency categories are examined separately for civil litigious and for criminal cases whereas productivity combines both civil and criminal output.

195. **Productivity varies among appellate courts.** While the median is 124 disposed cases per judge, the courts which appear most overburdened in terms of demand per judge are also seemingly the most productive ones. The appellate court of Thrace, which is strained for resources, disposes of 197 cases per judge and similarly strained Nafplio and Eastern Crete dispose of 186 cases per judge per year. The courts with the lowest productivity appear to be the most generously resourced ones—the ones in Athens, Piraeus, Aegean, and Thessaloniki. As with magistrate courts, the principal determinant of productivity for appellate ones appears to be the number of incoming cases per judge; the higher the workload, the more cases judges are able to resolve.[115]

196. **The median clearance rate for civil litigious cases of Greek appellate courts is 106 percent** (see Table 14). This means that overall, appellate courts are able to dispose of more cases than they receive. However, there are courts which seem to be struggling. One example is the Crete appellate court with a clearance rate of only 76 percent. The courts of Patras and Corfu also appear to be facing some problems. Of these courts, Crete and Patras have a good number of judges relative to demand; moreover, Crete has the highest ratio of clerks per judges in the country. The data do not suggest an easily identifiable explanation for the low clearance rate of these courts. Furthermore, in most Greek appellate courts, the clearance rate for civil litigious cases has worsened significantly over the last five years and went from 117 percent in 2017 to only 83 percent in 2021 (see Figure 28). This deterioration was the most pronounced in the courts of the Dodecanese and the North Aegean, followed by Crete and Nafplio. Only the appellate courts in Thessaloniki and Lamia appear to have substantially improved their clearance rate during this period.

Figure 28. Evolution of appellate court civil clearance rates (2017–2021)



[115] For appellate courts, the correlation between caseload and productivity is 0.82 (lower than for magistrate courts but higher than for first instance courts).

197. **Unlike with magistrate and first instance courts, the Greek national median clearance rate for appellate criminal cases stands at 96 percent and is lower than the CEPEJ median** (see Table 14). The court that seems to be doing the best is Western Macedonia with a clearance rate for criminal cases of 157 percent. The court with the poorest performance in this category is Thessaloniki, which boasted the best clearance rate for civil litigious cases. Again, the performance in criminal cases does not appear to be tied to resourcing as two of the courts with the highest relative number of judges, Athens and Thessaloniki, have quite low clearance rates (81 and 68 percent, respectively). Thrace, on the other hand, which has the lowest relative number of judges compared to demand has a good clearance rate of 95 percent. Data suggest that clearance rate for criminal cases has fallen substantially in the last years (from 121 percent in 2017 to 67 percent in 2021) (see Figure 29). The court whose clearance rate has deteriorated the most in this period is Piraeus, and the only two courts which have had slight improvement are Corfu and Western Macedonia.

Figure 29. Evolution of appellate court criminal clearance rates (2017–2021)



198. **The median disposition time for civil litigious cases at Greek appellate courts stands at 701 days** (see Table 15). It is much longer than the respective disposition time at both the magistrate and first instance levels. Many appellate courts in Greece have issues in this regard, with seven courts having a disposition time that exceeds 1,000 days (Nafplio, Crete, Eastern Crete, Western Sterea Hellas, North Aegean, Corfu, and Patras). The only appellate court whose disposition time for civil cases is better than the CEPEJ median is the one in Thessaloniki (104 days). Disposition time for civil cases is one area where there appears to be a link between resourcing and performance; the best resourced courts of Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus, and the Aegean do display much shorter disposition times than most other appellate courts. However, the court of Thrace, which appears to have fewer resources, also has a relatively good disposition time. By contrast, Nafplio has fewer judges relative to demand and has the longest disposition time in Greece for civil litigious cases. In terms of historical trends, the disposition time for civil litigious cases was getting longer over the years,

from 580 in 2017 to 701 in 2021 (see Figure 30). Nafplio and the North Aegean display the most significant deterioration in this regard. The only court which significantly improved its disposition time for civil cases over this period is the one in Thessaloniki.

Figure 30. Evolution of appellate court civil disposition times (2017–2021)



199. **Regarding disposition time for criminal cases at the appellate level, the metric had the same issues as the one for criminal courts.** To mitigate this, the same approach of examining three scenarios is employed. In all three scenarios, the disposition time in Greece is longer than the CEPEJ median (see Table 15). Furthermore, in all three scenarios, the appellate court with by far the longest disposition time for criminal cases is the Dodecanese one. Other courts where the disposition time exceeds the median in all three scenarios (but more significantly so in the estimates) include Thessaloniki, Pireaus, Athens, Patras, Ioannina, and Evia. The relative consistency of the findings under different scenarios/estimation methods suggests that the issues are likely as identified, in spite of the problems encountered with collecting reliable criminal caseload data. The court with the shortest disposition time in all scenarios is Corfu. Other courts with low disposition times include Aegean, Lamia, and Larissa. In terms of evolution of disposition times, a similar trend to the one at first instance courts is observed, with the scenarios based on estimated backlog showing a prolongation of the time and 'as reported' data by the courts—a shortening (see Figure 31). Again, the visible deterioration of clearance rates discussed earlier suggests that the estimated values for disposition time might be closer to reality than what the courts were able to provide.

Figure 31. (a) Estimates of criminal disposition times for 2017–2021 based on court-reported data of incoming, disposed, and pending cases (solid grey); (b) correction made for reduced court activity during 2020 and 2021 (dashed grey); and (c) disposition times based solely on court-reported data of disposed and pending cases



200. **As with other performance metrics, it is informative to examine whether long disposition times in criminal cases can be linked to lower resourcing or not.** It appears that there is no such link with regard to criminal cases since the excellently resourced Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki do not display shorter disposition times than their peers in all three scenarios with these times being particularly long in the scenarios using estimated numbers of pending cases. Furthermore, the criminal disposition time in Thessaloniki is among the longest in Greece in all three scenarios. By contrast, the seemingly poorly resourced appellate court of Thrace displays shorter disposition times.

201. **The final examined performance metrics is efficiency category, which considers both the clearance rate and the disposition time.** With regard to civil litigious cases and when juxtaposed with the anyway exorbitant Greek median disposition time, most Greek appellate courts are in the Standard efficiency category[116] (see Table 16). The ones that stand out as most problematic are Nafplio (in the Very High DT category), Eastern Crete and Crete (in the Warning category), and Evia, Corfu, and Patras (in the Creating Backlog category). Of these courts, Nafplio, Evia, Eastern Crete, and to some extent Corfu have a relatively low number of judges compared to demand, which may explain the performance issues. However, Crete has a low pressure in terms of demand, a good number of judges, and the best clerk/judge ratio among all appellate courts; therefore, the performance issues it faces can hardly be explained with insufficient resourcing.

202. **Regarding criminal cases, the appellate courts that raise concerns in terms of their placement in efficiency categories coincide for all three scenarios** (see Table 17). As already

[116] If juxtaposed with CEPEJ disposition times, almost all Greek appellate courts would be placed in efficiency categories that give rise to concerns.

mentioned, Dodecanese stands out as the most problematic. While that court has slightly fewer judges relative to demand, the reasons for the steep deterioration of its disposition time for criminal cases cannot be discerned from the data and it is not clear whether and to what extent a reporting error might be at play. The well-resourced appellate courts of Athens, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, and Aegean also feature prominently among courts with lower efficiency (although, for Piraeus, this is visible only in the scenarios with estimated pending cases). Other courts that fall under substandard efficiency categories for criminal cases include Evia, Ioannina, and the North Aegean.

203. **Overall, at the level of Greek appellate courts, there are significant imbalances in both resourcing and performance.** The best resourced courts of Athens, Piraeus, Aegean, and Thessaloniki perform well with regard to their civil caseload but appear to be facing issues when it comes to processing criminal cases. Crete stands out as a well-resourced court which is managing its criminal caseload well but struggles with civil. Furthermore, the courts in Nafplio, Evia, Eastern Crete, and to some extent Corfu are not so well resourced in terms of the number of judges but, similar to Crete, are doing well with criminal caseload and facing problems with the civil one. Finally, the appellate court of Thrace deserves a special mention since even though it has the lowest number of judges relative to demand, it manages well both civil and criminal cases and is not raising concerns.

6.5 Demand and Supply Analysis of First Instance Prosecution Services

204. **Greek first instance prosecution services examine the great majority of criminal complaints at the pretrial stage and then, if the case is brought to court, support the accusation through the trial stage.** There are 63 first instance prosecution services in Greece, with a total of 399 approved prosecutorial positions and 1,226 clerks on payroll. In this section, the resourcing available to the 63 first instance prosecution services of Greece is examined, and any imbalances thereof are identified. Furthermore, the productivity (disposed cases per prosecutor per year) and clearance rates of prosecution services are assessed with the goal of identifying imbalances and highlighting where performance issues may be stemming from poor resourcing and where they might be due to inefficiencies or other reasons.

205. **In terms of size, there are imbalances that, predictably, mirror the ones present at first instance courts** (for resourcing of first instance prosecution services, see Table 18). The largest prosecution service is that in Athens, with 143 prosecutors and 354 clerks, followed by the one in Thessaloniki with 38 prosecutors and 127 clerks. Other prosecution services with 10 or more approved prosecutorial positions include the ones in Piraeus, Patras, and Heraklion. The median-size prosecution service in Greek comprises just three prosecutors, with numerous services having just two approved prosecutorial positions and two services being staffed with a single prosecutor (Eurytania and Kalavryta). Furthermore, while Athens and Thessaloniki first instance prosecutors serve population of approximately 3.3 and 1.1 million people, respectively, the median size of population served at this level is 85,609. In terms of population served, the smallest prosecution services are Gythio (14,046 inhabitants) and Kalavryta (16,535 inhabitants).

6.5.1 Resourcing of First Instance Prosecution Services

206. **Regarding the human resources available to prosecution services, there are sizeable imbalances in terms of prosecutor per 100,000 inhabitants** (see Table 18). For example, while the median number of prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants is 3.5, Gythio's two approved prosecutorial positions for its relatively small jurisdiction of 14,046 inhabitants corresponds to a whopping 14.2 prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants. The first instance prosecution services in Kyparissia (with two prosecutors) and Thesprotia (with three prosecutors) also appear overresourced, relative to population served (7.3 and 6.9 prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively). The number of prosecutors per inhabitant in Athens is a little over the median but that appears justified in terms of the importance of that location which also presumably needs to deal with high-profile and complex cases. The second largest first instance prosecution service of Thessaloniki is resourced at a median level. At the other end of the spectrum, there are prosecution services with a low number of prosecutors per inhabitant. These include Xanthi, Kozani, and Drama (with 1.8, 2.0, and 2.0. prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively). It is interesting to note that the three prosecution services that have the poorest resources in terms of prosecutors per inhabitant are all in Northern Greece (in the appellate regions of Thrace and Western Macedonia).

207. **Demand per inhabitant differs in different parts of the country, and therefore resourcing is also evaluated in terms of incoming cases per prosecutor; here again a rather uneven workload is observed.** The median number of incoming complaints per first instance prosecutor per year is 1,070. In this regard, and predictably so in light of the metric discussed above, the most overburdened prosecution service is the one in Xanthi, with 2,094 complaints per prosecutor per year. Agrinio, Amaliada, Kalamata, Kos, Messologi, and Zakynthos also have a rather high number of incoming complaints per prosecutor. The lightest workload per prosecutor is observed in the smallest prosecution services of Eurytania, Grevena, Gythio, Kalavryta, and Kyparissia.

208. **Resourcing imbalances are also present with regard to the level of administrative support that prosecutors receive.** As discussed in Section 6.1.2 Comparison of Greek Prosecution Services to CEPEJ Benchmarks, overall, the ratio of clerks per prosecutor in first instance prosecution services in Greece is quite high, with a median of 3.5. However, there are quite significant discrepancies across the board. For some courts that already have a rather low number of prosecutors relative to demand or to population size, it is natural that the ratio of clerks per prosecutors would be high (for example, Xanthi, Drama, and Tripoli). Amaliada stands out with a relatively low number of prosecutors as juxtaposed with demand but still with a strikingly high ratio of eight clerks per prosecutor. Others, however, have both a high number of prosecutors and a high ratio of clerks per prosecutor. Livadia, Evrytania, and Kalavryta have a relatively high number of prosecutors and a similarly high number of clerks. By contrast, in Lamia and Ioannina, both the ratio of prosecutor per inhabitant and the ratio of clerk per prosecutor are lower than the median. The first instance prosecution service of Athens has one of the lowest ratios of clerks per prosecutor among first instance prosecution services (2.5), and this is an across-the-board characteristic of all judicial services in the capital city.

6.5.2 Performance of First Instance Prosecution Services

209. **Imbalances at the first instance prosecution level appear more visible in terms of productivity than in the area of resourcing.** While the median number of cases disposed[117] by a prosecutor per year are 854, there are several prosecution services with more than 1,200 processed cases per year. These are the ones in Agrinio, Amaliada, Arta, Heraklion, Katerini, Messologi, Veroia, and Xanthi. Again, the prosecution service that stands out as having the highest productivity per prosecutor is the poorly resourced one in Xanthi with 1,440 disposed cases per prosecutor per year. Prosecution services with productivity much lower than the median include mostly small entities with light workload (for example, Eurytania, Grevena, Gythio, and Kalavryta). As with courts, the examination of disposed cases of prosecution services indicates that there is a positive correlation between caseload and productivity.

210. **Finally, with regard to clearance rate, the performance of first instance prosecution offices gives rise to concerns since the percentage of disposed cases out of all incoming ones is well below the standard of 100 percent** (see Table 19). The median clearance rate for Greek first instance prosecution is 91 percent, with numerous prosecution services having clearance rates under 80 percent on average over the five-year period examined (for example, Thebes, Kalamata, Lamia, Ilia, Zakynthos, Ioannina, Kalavryta, Serres, Syros, Mytilene, Volos, Kos, Patras, Kastoria, Naxos, and Chalkida—in ascending order in terms of clearance rate). The important first instance prosecution service of Athens also has a low average clearance rate of 92 percent. Even though this is not below the Greek median, the weight of this prosecution service in the overall caseload of Greek criminal justice means that a low clearance rate there affects a disproportionately large number of people and cases. The clearance rate of the second biggest prosecution service, the one in Thessaloniki, is even poorer, at 88 percent. This prosecution service has demand for justice per prosecutor above the median and clerks per judge ratio below the median; therefore, the issues with clearance rate may be stemming from relatively poor resourcing.

211. **Among the prosecution services with a clearance rate below the Greek median, there are ones that have heavy workload and appear to be strained for resources** (Kalamata, Zakynthos, Kos, Xanti, Messologi and Corfu—in ascending order). However, there are also some seemingly well-resourced ones displaying a light caseload and nevertheless apparently struggling with performance as well (for example, Kalavryta, Kastoria, Lasithi, Thesprotia, Karditsa, and Larissa). Insofar as prosecutorial positions were indeed covered for the period under review, performance issues with regard to that second group of entities do not seem to stem from an insufficient number of prosecutors relative to caseload. The few prosecution services which have a clearance rate above 100 percent (Chania, Samos Kyparissia, Arta, Gythio, Rethymno, Livadia, and Eurytania) are predominantly ones with a light caseload per judge (with the exception of Arta where caseload is at a median level). Finally, not only is the clearance rate of first instance prosecution services way below 100 percent, but it also displays a negative trend over 2017–2021 and deteriorated from a median of 93 percent in 2017 to a median of 70 percent in 2021.

[117] Disposed cases for prosecutors include discontinued/permanently archived cases plus cases sent to court for the first time.

Figure 32. Evolution of first instance prosecution clearance rates – percent of incoming complaints discontinued/permanently archived or sent to court (not including postponed cases) (2017–2021)



212. **Overall, first instance prosecution services in Greece display resourcing and performance imbalances, which are somewhat more moderate than the ones observed at courts of the same level.** In terms of size, the huge first instance prosecution service of Athens dominates the landscape. It is well resourced in terms of prosecutors but, similar to courts in the capital city, has a lower than the median level of clerks per prosecutor. A prosecution service which stands out as having the lowest level of human resources relative to demand is the one in Xanthi. Other prosecution services with a low number of approved prosecutorial positions given the high volume of their incoming cases include Agrinio, Amaliada, Kalamata, Kos, Messologi, and Zakynthos. By contrast, the lightest caseload is present at the smallest prosecution services, that is, Eurytania, Grevena, Gythio, Kalavryta, and Kyparissia. Regarding disposed cases per prosecutor, the correlation between caseload and productivity that was visible in the court system applies to prosecutors as well. Overburdened prosecution services have a high output, whereas ones with a light caseload have a relatively modest number of disposed cases per prosecutor. In terms of ratio between disposed and incoming cases, the first instance prosecution services of Greece perform rather poorly overall, with a median clearance rate of only 91 percent. Services where performance is particularly poor include both those at strained locations with a low number of prosecutors relative to demand (Kalamata, Zakynthos, Kos, Xanti, Messologi, and Corfu) and ones that are well resourced and have a lighter caseload (Kalavryta, Kastoria, Lasithi, Thesprotia, Karditsa, and Larissa). By contrast, prosecution services with a clearance rate above 100 percent are almost uniformly well resourced. The performance of the largest first instance prosecution service in Athens is at a median level (92 percent clearance rate) and that of the second biggest one in Thessaloniki is slightly poorer (88 percent clearance rate). Given the great weight of these two prosecution services, the fact that their clearance rate is much lower than 100 percent negatively affects the overall performance of the Greek criminal justice system.

6.6 Demand and Supply Analysis of Appellate Prosecution Services

213. **The appellate prosecution services of Greece support the criminal cases at the trial stage before the appellate court and may also be responsible for the pretrial investigation of certain high-level crimes.** There are 19 appellate prosecution services in Greece, with a total of 196 approved prosecutorial positions and 297 clerks on payroll. In this section, the resourcing available to them is examined, and any imbalances thereof are identified. Furthermore, the productivity (disposed cases per prosecutor per year) and clearance rates of appellate prosecution services are assessed with the goal of identifying existing imbalances and highlighting where performance issues may be stemming from poor resourcing and where they might be due to inefficiencies or other reasons.

214. **The median-size appellate prosecution service in Greece comprises just three prosecutors** (for resourcing of appellate prosecution services, see Table 20). The three largest entities are the appellate prosecution offices of Athens (99 prosecutors), Thessaloniki (26 prosecutors), and Piraeus (14 prosecutors). Five prosecution offices have just two approved prosecutorial positions each (Western Sterea Hellas, Kalamata, Aegean, North Aegean, and Corfu).

6.6.1 Resourcing of Appellate Prosecution Services

215. **In terms of the number of prosecutors relative to the number of inhabitants and demand for justice services (that is, incoming cases per prosecutor per year), an excellently resourced appellate prosecution office is the one in Athens.** Against a Greek median of 1.1 prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants at the appellate level, the ratio in Athens is 3, and against a median of 132 incoming cases per prosecutor per year, the prosecutors in Athens receive just 97 cases. Other well-resourced appellate prosecutor offices are the ones in Piraeus (81 incoming cases), Crete (93 cases), and Patras (99 cases). At the other end of the spectrum, there are the poorly resourced appellate prosecution office of Thrace. The prosecutors there need to deal with 359 incoming cases per year, which is almost triple the median for the country. It is interesting to note that just as the appellate court of Thrace was the most strained in terms of judges relative to demand, the respective prosecution office appears to be similarly underresourced.[118] Other appellate prosecution services which have a heavy workload relative to the number of prosecutors include Corfu, Nafplio, and Western Sterea Hellas.

216. **The appellate prosecution services of Greece are not as well resourced in terms of clerical support as the first instance level but still, with a median of 2.5 clerks per prosecutor, are in a much better position than any level of Greek courts.** However, again, Athens has a much lower ratio of clerks per judge than the rest of the country (0.9). Thrace, which has a significantly lower number of prosecutors relative to demand also has a significantly lower ratio of clerks per judge (1.8), making it clearly the most strained appellate prosecution service in Greece in terms of human resources. Another appellate prosecution

[118] Resourcing issues were also identified in Xanthi, capital of Thrace, at the first instance level.

service which has both a relatively lower number of prosecutors and a low clerk per prosecutor ratio is the one in Thessaloniki.

6.6.2 Performance of Appellate Prosecution Services

217. **The productivity of appellate prosecution offices displays the same strong correlation with caseload that was characteristic for every examined court or prosecution instance.** The light caseload per prosecutor in Athens and Piraeus translates into a low output per prosecutor whereas the seemingly excessive burden on the appellate prosecutors in Thrace leads to the highest productivity in the country.

218. **The clearance rate of all appellate prosecutor services in Greece appears to exceed 100 percent** (see Table 21). Even the prosecution service with the lowest clearance rate, the one in Athens, disposes of 105 percent of its incoming cases. The apparently best performing appellate prosecution service of Evia reports a clearance rate of nearly 200 percent. Interestingly, there was a sharp increase in the clearance rate for appellate prosecution services from 2020 to 2021. Given the endemic issues with criminal caseload reporting in Greece, it is not clear whether this seemingly tremendous improvement of performance is due to a reporting error or is the result of a one-time event such as the COVID closures that significantly affected the output of the first instance level but may have decreased the pressure of new criminal cases incoming at the appellate level allowing appellate prosecution offices to make sizeable strides in clearing old backlog.

Figure 33. Evolution of appellate prosecution clearance rates—percentage of incoming appeals and new cases sent to court (not including postponed cases) (2017–2021)



219. **Overall, the imbalances at the appellate prosecution level of Greece are similar to the ones at the appellate level of courts.** As with the appellate courts, the large prosecution services of Athens and Piraeus are well resourced, which is understandable given the high level of demand and importance of these locations. At the appellate prosecution level, Crete and Patras also rank among the well-resourced entities. However, the Thessaloniki appellate

prosecution office, unlike the respective appellate court, seems somewhat strained for resources. As with appellate courts, the appellate prosecution office of Thrace has the lowest number of human resources relative to demand. In terms of performance, the highest caseload produces excellent productivity, potentially causing a great strain on personnel. The clearance rates at the appellate prosecution level appears excellent across the board, with a sharp improvement from 2020 to 2021. That is in sharp contrast to the performance with regard to criminal caseload in appellate courts, which was not only subpar on average over the five-year period but declined sharply in 2021. It is not clear whether these unusual patterns are a result of the highly problematic statistical reporting for criminal caseload or the COVID closures that strained the first instance relieved some pressure of second instance prosecution (but less for second instance courts, as they were affected by closures too and could not hold as many hearings as they normally would).

VII. Infrastructure of Greek Civil and Criminal Courts and Prosecution Services

220. **The physical infrastructure is an important element of the supply of judicial services.** Adequate buildings would both allow judges and prosecutors to perform their duties in an optimal manner and improve user experience with the court system. This section examines the physical infrastructure of Greek judicial services predominantly based on data obtained from the survey of courts and prosecution services conducted in the framework of this project. This section first presents an overview of the available buildings, including ownership, age, area, condition, and so on. Second, it examines aspects of the infrastructure which have a direct bearing on the working conditions for judges and prosecutors including their offices, courtrooms, and space for storing archives. Third, aspects of the facilities pertaining to citizens' interaction with the justice system and user access are examined such as waiting areas, parking spaces, access for people with special needs, and building security. Finally, the section provides a snapshot of the opinion of representatives of judicial services on whether their building could accommodate additional personnel. This is an important consideration in any judicial map reform.

221. **In describing the physical infrastructure of judicial services, the Baseline Report seeks predominantly to produce a snapshot of the status quo.** The situation of specific judicial services in terms of available facilities would be considered in more detail once options for reforming the judicial map are identified in the subsequent report under this project. However, given courtrooms' significance in the scheduling of hearings and processing of cases, this section of the report also seeks to identify imbalances in the number of courtrooms available to judges at the magistrate, first instance, and appellate levels.

222. **Greek courts and prosecution services are hosted in a total of 182 buildings.** Of these, 73 buildings host more than one judicial service while 109 host a single judicial service. Prosecution services are almost always hosted together with the respective court with three exceptions.[119] Of these buildings, 99 are owned by the Greek state and 83 are rented.

[119] The first instance prosecution services of Amfissa, Gythio, and Chios are each hosted separately, in buildings where they are the only judicial service.

223. **The median area of the premises of Greek courts and prosecution services is 400 m^2**, with the smallest one operating on only 60 m^2 (magistrate court of Karpathos in the appellate region of the Dodecanese) and the largest one being hosted on 65,000 m^2 (appellate court of Athens). The median age of buildings is 44 years, with the newest one only 5 years old (the building of the magistrate court of Skopelos in the appellate region of Larissa) and the oldest 439 years old (the building of the first instance court of Heraklion in the appellate region of Eastern Crete).

Figure 34. Area and age of premises used by judicial services[120]



224. **Half of the buildings have been designed and built with the specific purpose of serving as a court.** This is important, as these buildings can be expected to have numerous features that are specific to courts such as spacious waiting areas and courtrooms with good acoustics, several entrances, and separate circulation patterns for the public, prisoners, and judiciary members.[121] Furthermore, 26 of the examined buildings are listed as cultural heritage. The latter may make the building more aesthetically appealing but leads to more complex approval procedures whenever works on the buildings are required.

[120] Information based on the survey of courts and prosecution offices.
[121] The project team visited the court building in Thebes, which was built specifically for serving as a court and it did have such features.

Figure 35. Purpose of the building and cultural heritage status

Was the building designed to serve as a court (in percentage)?



Is the building listed as cultural heritage (in percentage)?



225. **The physical condition of the buildings leaves a lot to be desired.** Almost half of them (approximately 46 percent) are perceived by their users as being in either poor or very poor condition. The situation seems particularly concerning in the appellate region of Crete, where 100 percent of the buildings are assessed as being in poor condition; Eastern Crete, where 75 percent of the buildings are assessed as being in poor condition; Western Sterea Hellas, where 67 percent of the buildings are assessed as being in poor or very poor condition; Dodecanese, where 60 percent of the buildings are assessed as being in a poor or very poor condition; Thessaloniki, where 60 percent of the buildings are assessed as being in poor or very poor condition; and Thrace, where also 60 percent of the buildings are assessed as being in poor or very poor condition. The physical facilities of judicial services in the appellate region of Patras appear to be in the best condition, with only approximately 18 percent being assessed as being in a poor or very poor condition.

Figure 36. Physical condition of the premises (including disaggregation by appellate region)

*How would you **evaluate the overall physical condition** of the premises?*



Disaggregation by appellate region %



226. **The survey of judicial services identified the building components that are most frequently in need of repair or renovation.** These include finishings of the building such as walls and ceilings, doors and windows, building exterior, and thermal insulation. In terms of equipment, the heating and cooling systems are usually identified as needing improvement. Other elements of the buildings that are frequently seen as problematic comprise waterproofing, entrance, and electric systems. In terms of urgency, most renovation needs are perceived as urgent (on a scale of 1 to 10, urgency is always assessed as exceeding 7), with the most urgent needs related to fire safety, emergency exits, and internet connectivity/telecommunication capacity.

Figure 37. Evaluation of building components



227. **Aspects of judicial infrastructure which have a direct bearing on the working conditions for judges and prosecutors include judges' offices, space for storing archives, and air-conditioning.** With regard to archive space, more than 90 percent of judicial services have such space on the premises. Nevertheless, in approximately half of the premises this space is insufficient (see Figure 38). Furthermore, in approximately 30 percent of these buildings, the available storage space is in poor or very poor condition. The most frequent issues regarding the condition of the space for storing archives include fire protection/security issues or moisture that may endanger the integrity of the files. Finally, while most judicial facilities in Greece are air-conditioned, there is no air-conditioning in 20 percent of buildings. Given the climate of Greece, this may pose difficulties to both court personnel and visitors, particularly in the summer season. The median number of judges' offices available in a single judicial building is just one, indicating that most courts in Greece tend to be rather small whereas judges often share a single working space (see Figure 39). With regard to working space, this has led to a situation where judges usually transport casefiles home and work from there.

Figure 38. Archive storage sufficiency



228. **The availability of courtrooms varies greatly among courts of the same level.** The court with the biggest number of courtrooms is the first instance court of Athens.[122] Co-located courts[123] tend to share courtrooms in the respective building and therefore, it is usually quite difficult to determine with certainty how many courtrooms a particular court uses. For this report, the allocation of courtrooms to courts has been assessed predominately based on the survey of courts. It is approximate, as courts sharing courtrooms were asked to allocate an approximate percentage of use among all courts present in the facility.

229. **At the magistrate level, there is a median of 0.5 courtrooms per judge, meaning that each courtroom is used by two judges.** This ratio is quite high due to the numerous small magistrate courts (see Table 23 on the courtrooms per judge in magistrate courts with one or two judges). Even one courtroom at a single-judge court would mean double the median (that is, a ratio of 1). By contrast, at the bigger courts, many judges have to share a courtroom, and this may give rise to scheduling issues. In magistrate courts with more than two judges (see Table 22), the ratio drops significantly, and all but three of these bigger courts have a ratio of courtrooms per judge below the median for Greece. The magistrate courts which appear to be in the most difficult situation with regard to the availability of courtrooms are in the appellate region of Ioannina (Ioannina and Preveza with a ratio of courtrooms per judge of 0.04 and 0.05, respectively). The magistrate courts of Volos and Lamia also have a low number of courtrooms, at 0.06 per judge, and Kallithea and Acharnes in the Athens appellate region have 0.08 courtrooms per judge. The second largest magistrate court, in Thessaloniki, also appears to be in a difficult position, with 0.08 courtrooms per judge. The largest magistrate court of Athens has 0.13 courtrooms per judge.

[122] It has 67 courtrooms in its own buildings but also uses some courtrooms at the magistrate court of Athens.
[123] In some cases, there might be no courtroom in the building of a particular court, and it may use another court's courtrooms in a different building. Such is the case, for example, with the appellate court of Evia, whose building has no courtrooms and therefore the appellate court uses the courtrooms of the first instance court of Chalkida across the street.

Figure 39. Availability of courtrooms and offices



230. **At the first instance level, where there are no single-judge small courts, the ratio of courtrooms per judge naturally drops (see Table 24).** There is a median of 0.34 courtrooms per judge at first instance courts. Courts that have more than double the median number of courtrooms per approved judicial position include Orestiada, Aegio, Veroia, Thebes, Trikala, and Kalavryta (in descending order). At the other end of the spectrum are courts with less than half the median number of courtroom relative to the number of judges. These include Corfu, Piraeus, Larissa, Kozani, Ioannina, Heraklion, Rhodes, Alexandropouli, Rodopi, Chania, Volos, Chalkida, Thessaloniki, Patras, and Athens, in ascending order. Most of these are rather large courts and the scarcity of courtrooms there is expected to affect a large number of litigants.

231. **Finally, at the appellate level, there are again great imbalances of courtroom per judge availability (see Table 25).** While the median ratio of courtroom per judge is 0.14, there are courts with more than triple that ratio (Kalamata, Corfu, Thrace, Western Macedonia, and Western Sterea Hellas—in descending order), whereas the appellate court of Aegean reports only using courtrooms amounting to 0.04 per judge. It is interesting to note that the ratio of courtrooms per judge appears to be the one area where the otherwise poorly resourced appellate court of Thrace has adequate, and above median, resources.

232. **Another important feature of judicial services infrastructure is the facilities pertaining to citizens' interaction with the justice system and user access.** These include waiting areas, parking spaces, access for people with special needs, and building security. This examination also pointed to numerous issues with the available infrastructure. Approximately 60 percent of judicial services have waiting areas and the remaining 40 percent do not have such designated spaces. More than half of the available waiting areas are evaluated as being very good or good enough, whereas in approximately 15 percent of the facilities, they are evaluated as poor or very poor. The usual issues with waiting areas include insufficient space and number of seats. In terms of parking spaces, 57 percent of facilities have no such spaces

whatsoever. In more than 80 percent of facilities with parking spaces, they are available only to staff and not to visitors. Access to buildings for people with special needs (such as ramps, lifts, toilets for disabled citizens) is available in approximately 60 percent of all facilities. Finally, building security appears to be a serious issue, as in more than 60 percent of facilities is assessed as poor or very poor. The particular security problems that are highlighted most frequently include insufficient security systems, issues with building access control, and an insufficient number of security staff.

Figure 40. Building security



Figure 41. Types of issues with building security



233. **Finally, and especially for a judicial map reform, it may at times be necessary to enlarge certain judicial services, possibly by merging them with other services.** However, in an environment of limited resources, that may not always be possible. Therefore, one important question included in the survey sought to explore which of the current judicial buildings allowed for their expansion to accommodate additional staff. As with other questions related to infrastructure, this one was based on the subjective perception and

opinion of the judicial service staff and does not represent a technical assessment. Nevertheless, in approximately 77 percent of the cases, the building users believe that it could not be expanded to accommodate additional staff. In approximately 15 percent, such expansion was assessed as possible, and in 7 percent of the cases, respondents had no opinion.

234. **Overall, the physical infrastructure of Greek judicial services leaves a lot to be desired.** Almost half of the buildings are assessed by their principal users as being in a poor or very poor condition, with the appellate regions of Crete, Eastern Crete, Western Sterea Hellas, Dodecanese, Thessaloniki, and Thrace appearing to be in a particularly dire state.[124] Aspects of judicial infrastructure which have a direct bearing on the working conditions for judges and prosecutors such as courtrooms, judges' offices, and space for storing archives appear insufficient. The availability of courtrooms varies greatly among courts of the same level. It is mostly large courts that seem to be strained in that regard. Another important feature of judicial services infrastructure is the facilities pertaining to citizens' interaction with the justice system and user access such as waiting areas, parking spaces, access for people with special needs, and building security. There are numerous issues with them, with building security being assessed as particularly problematic. Finally, approximately 77 percent of buildings were assessed by their users as not being suitable for expansion to accommodate additional staff.

VIII. Justice System Expenditure

235. **The costs of the justice system represent an essential supply factor.** Therefore, they are used as an additional metric for identifying imbalances in the resourcing of judicial services. This section of the report presents the sources of funding and the types of expenditures of Greek justice services, highlighting the weight of every type of expenditure within the overall cost. Furthermore, it presents the contribution of each judicial service (that is, magistrate, first instance, and appellate courts and first instance and appellate prosecution services) to each cost component. Finally, an analysis is presented, which divides the average annual cost per judicial service by the number of disposed cases per year for that judicial service, thus arriving at a *cost per case* metric, which renders the costs for the operation of justice services comparable across different courts and prosecution offices of the same type factoring in their relative productivity. On this basis, imbalances are identified in that a disposed case in certain judicial services appears to cost the Greek state much more than a disposed case in other judicial services of the same type.

236. **Greek judicial services are funded by two main sources: (a) the national budget and (b) ΤΑΧΔΙΚ.** The Greek national budget for justice for 2022 was EUR 516,768,000.[125] It is used to finance central (ministry) operations, court and prosecution office operations, other

[124] Large projects for building or renovating court infrastructure are planned for Crete, Eastern Crete, and Thessaloniki, which may be able to ameliorate the situation in these appellate regions.
[125] National Budget for 2022, published November 2021, https://www.minfin.gr/documents/20182/17669520/ΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΣ+ΠΡΟΥΠΟΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ_2022.pdf/7d3e933b-9f03-4eb1-80b1-01966949eb25.

judicial service operations (forensic experts, land registry[126]), procurement, judicial service rental costs, and the salaries of judges, prosecutors, judicial clerks, and administration employees. ΤΑΧΔΙΚ operates as a self-financing public law treasury that is financed through the management and exploitation (for example, rental) of state property (for example, office space), court and document submission fees payable by litigants, and certificate issuance fees payable by requesting citizens or their attorneys. The ΤΑΧΔΙΚ budget for 2022 was EUR 60,150,000,[127] which is used to finance judicial building operations and some other services, such as legal aid. Estimates of annual costs are based on averages taken over 2019–2021. The total annual cost for civil and criminal judicial services is estimated at EUR 336,227,274 (see Table 26). This includes salaries, procurement, and operating expenses of civil and criminal courts and prosecution offices (minus telephony, internet, and water bills). It also does not include the Supreme Court, MoJ, and any ancillary judicial services such as legal aid, coroners' offices, and so on.

237. **The combined salaries of judges, prosecutors, and clerks (including social security contributions) make up the largest cost component, estimated at EUR 315,071,508 per year, or 91.2 percent of total.**[128] Operating expenses amount to EUR 28,131,980 per year, or 8.1 percent of total, while procurement expenses are estimated at EUR 2,226,415 per year, or 0.6 percent of total. Table 26 presents a breakdown of all major cost categories by funding source and expense type. A visual representation of major cost items is presented in Figure 42.

Figure 42. Annual cost and percent of total for main cost categories for civil and criminal courts and prosecution offices



Note: Total = EUR 336,227,274 per year (estimate).

238. **Of the operating costs included in this analysis, electricity is the major expense, at EUR 18,298,651 per year, or 65.0 percent of operating expenses (and 5.3 percent of all expenses).** Cleaning expenses are second, comprising EUR 3,003,161 per year, or 10.7 percent

[126] Correctional facilities were within the purview of the MoJ until 2019, when they were placed under the Ministry of Civil Protection (Government Gazette No. 81/A/119/08.07.2019).
[127] https://taxdik.gr/taxdik/oikonomika-stoixeia/.
[128] With telephony, internet, and water bills included, this would be slightly smaller, but salaries would regardless amount to the lion's share of expenses. This implies that this analysis could also be conducted on salaries alone, but that would render some positive scale effects unknown.

of operating expenses,[129] followed by other expenses (which include security expenses and all other smaller expense categories covered by ΤΑΧΔΙΚ) at 7.8 percent, rental at 7.2 percent, and maintenance at 6.3 percent of operating expenses. Figure 43 presents the complete breakdown of operational expenses.

Figure 43. Average annual cost (and percent of total) for operating expenses[130]



Note: Total = EUR 28,131,980 per year (estimate).

239. **The lion's share of expenses (including salaries and several categories of operating expenses) is covered through the Greek central budget, namely 97.3 percent of total (see Figure 44).** ΤΑΧΔΙΚ covers the remaining costs (other operating expenses and procurement).

Figure 44. Average annual cost (and percent of total) by source of funding



Note: Total = EUR 336,227,274 per year (estimate).

240. **While total expenses are dominated by the salary component, and operating expenses by the electricity component, there are some important differences to be noted**

[129] Possibly inflated during the period examined, as it coincides with the spread of COVID-19, which led to increased sanitization, disinfection, and related measures.
[130] Does not include telecommunications (fixed and mobile telephony and internet) expenses.

in how different types of judicial services contribute to each cost component. Detailed estimates for every type of court and prosecution office are provided in Table 27 through Table 32. A graphic representation of their relative contribution is presented in Figure 45.

241. **While rental expenses are a small component of the grand total of all judicial services, at 0.6 percent, and only a moderate component of total operating expenses, at 7.2 percent, magistrate courts contribute disproportionately to the total rental cost at 58.0 percent (Figure 45).** Rental costs account for 1.8 percent of total magistrate costs, or almost three times the average for judicial services. Moreover, this is not evenly distributed among magistrate courts, with some magistrates incurring disproportionately high rental costs compared to others, as discussed later in this section.

Figure 45. Contribution of each judicial service type to each cost component



Note: Total operating expenses are further broken down by expense type. Staff on payroll and relative surface area of premises attributed to each judicial service category (based on building area (in m^2) and relative number of staff on payroll for each co-located judicial service) are shown for reference.

242. **To the extent that the attempted disaggregation of costs across judicial services was done accurately and to completion, it appears that appellate courts (and to a lesser extent first instance courts) keep for themselves and spend a disproportionate amount of funds relative to their size as determined by the total amount of staff on payroll.** While it is expected that salary costs for appellate courts will be higher than for first instance courts (as

also indicated in Figure 45) and those in first instance courts in turn will be higher than salaries in magistrate courts, it is not immediately apparent why cleaning, maintenance, and other expense categories would be disproportionately higher. On the other hand, an estimate of the relative space that appellate courts may occupy in shared buildings (also shown in Figure 45 as 'surface area') suggests that they may occupy a greater share of the premises than would be expected based on staff numbers alone.

243. **To arrive at a measure that incorporates court performance, the average annual cost per judicial service was divided by the number of cases disposed per year for that judicial service.** This yields a *cost per case* metric, which renders the costs for the operation of justice services comparable across different courts and prosecution offices of the same type, factoring in their relative productivity. Where organic petty crime positions exist, their costs were added to the respective magistrate courts, to make more valid comparisons across magistrate courts. As with the approach taken with caseload, disposed cases for every type of court refer to final court decisions (criminal and civil cases combined). For first instance prosecution offices, again, consistently with the caseload analysis presented earlier, disposed cases refer to new indictments sent to court and cases permanently archived or otherwise discontinued, while for appellate prosecution offices, disposed cases refer to new cases (appeals or straight from the investigative stage) brought to court by the prosecution office.

244. **As with caseload, there are significant imbalances in the cost per case of magistrate courts, presented per appellate region in Figure 46, Figure 47, and Figure 48.** The median cost per disposed case for a Greek magistrate court is estimated at EUR 760. Costs in all appellate regions except Athens exceed that number, with some exceeding it multifold. Great imbalances in cost per case are present in every appellate region except Athens. Kymi, Konitsa, Elassona, Psofida, and Valtos present costs beyond EUR 2,000 per case. These locations seem to be predominantly characterized by a relatively large share of operating costs, coupled with small size and low output. The relationship between size of a judicial service and cost per case is examined near the end of this section.

245. **Notably, many island courts present high costs per case.** These are, for example, the courts in Aegean (Melos, Tinos, Andros, Paros, Ikaria), which are small ones with a low output and disproportionately high operating costs (mostly due to rental prices). Other examples include several island courts in the jurisdiction of the Piraeus appellate court, most notably Spetses and Kythera, at EUR 4,169 and EUR 4,886 per case, respectively.

246. **Magistrate costs are overall high with respect to their output.** This may be the cost of proximity justice that, given Greece's particular geography and geopolitical considerations, may be necessary to incur but is worth considering. Moreover, Greek magistrate courts are disproportionately burdened with non-litigious caseload and the issuance of certificates.

247. **It should be lastly noted that salary costs for some small magistrate courts are likely underestimated in the dataset used for this analysis.** Given that salary is by far the greatest cost component, this means that all the cost per case estimates of respective courts will be underestimated here. There were no salary data for judges for the period examined (2019–2021) for 10 magistrate courts and data corresponding to less than one magistrate judge full-time equivalents (FTEs) for another 16 courts. These are listed in Table 2 and should be

consulted in conjunction with the data on cost per case presented in Figure 46 through Figure 48. Where costs per case appear especially low in these figures, it is likely for courts listed above, which present 0 or less than 1 judge FTE on payroll. Even when this information is accurate and not a result of incomplete data, these costs would not be reflective of the projected steady state of salary costs, as many of the approved judicial positions in these locations have in the meantime been filled or are going to be filled. The potential reasons for this are threefold:

(a) While approved judicial positions should always in principle be (very close to) covered, there were gaps in the staffing of some magistrate courts until 2021–2022.

(b) The data provided for salaries come from the Ministry of Finance, and some salaries will be registered there with some delay, leading to potentially missing data in the dataset used here.

(c) Smaller courts in remote locations, for example, some island courts, are served by judges travelling from other locations in the same appellate region, to conduct some hearings at regular intervals.

Table 2. Magistrate courts presenting less than one judge FTE on payroll (as per actual salary data)

Zero judge FTEs	< 1 judge FTE
Astros	Andros
Dymi	Arini
Kalavryta	Gastouni
Melos	Ierapetra
Nemea	Ikaria
Plomari	Kalloni (LESVOS)
Pylos	Kalymnos
Samos	Karystos
Thera	Myrtountia
Vonitsa	Olympia
	Pyrgos (Crete)
	Sami
	Tamineoi
	Vamos
	Xylokastro

Figure 46. Cost per case for magistrate courts (EUR) (1/3)[a]



Note: a. Ordered by appellate region and then by cost per case (descending).

Figure 47. Cost per case for magistrate courts (EUR) (2/3)[a]



Note: a. Ordered by appellate region and then by cost per case (descending).

Figure 48. Cost per case for magistrate courts (EUR) (3/3)[a]



Note: a. Ordered by appellate region and then by cost per case (descending).

248. **First instance courts also present some imbalances although less so than magistrate ones (Figure 49).** The median cost per case for first instance cases is EUR 380, interestingly only half of the magistrate median. Notable outliers are the courts of Eurytania and Kalavryta, at EUR 1,085 and EUR 1,123 per case, respectively, or nearly three times the median (making the cost per case at those first instance courts comparable to that of an appellate court). Samos, Chios, Gythio, Veroia, Trikala, Kavala, Orestiada, and Rodopi also exhibit higher than usual costs per case, with a notably high operations cost component thereof. Interestingly, with the exceptions of Chios and Samos, the costs per case of island courts are not as prominent as at the magistrate level. The cost per case of the country's largest first instance court, the court of Athens, is slightly below the median, at EUR 317.

Figure 49. Cost per case for first instance courts (EUR)[a]



Note: a. Ordered by appellate region and then by cost per case (descending).

249. **Costs per case at the appellate level are overall significantly higher compared to first instance courts (almost three times as high with a median of EUR 1,028 per case).** Also, while for magistrate and first instance courts, some of the largest courts exhibit a generally lower cost per case, at the appellate level, some of the highest costs relative to output are present at the Piraeus (EUR 1909 per case) and Athens courts (EUR 1,831 per case), at nearly twice the median. At the other end of the spectrum, the appellate court of Thrace disposes of cases at about half the median cost or EUR 543 per case.

Figure 50. Cost per case for appellate courts (EUR)[a]



Note: a. Ordered by cost per case (descending).

250. **With regard to prosecution offices, the picture is similar to that of courts of the same level, with some more pronounced imbalances, and has the same basic pattern where appellate prosecution incurs a much higher cost per case than first instance prosecution.** The first instance prosecution median is EUR 172 per case while the median of appellate prosecution is five times the first instance median, at EUR 890 per case. The prosecution services of Eurytania and Kalavryta, at EUR 554 and EUR 571, respectively, present the highest costs per case at the first instance level, as was the case with the respective first instance courts. The prosecution office of Athens presents one of the lowest first instance costs per case at only EUR 123.

251. **Again at the appellate level, some of the biggest prosecution offices, namely Athens and Piraeus, incur some of the highest costs per disposed case, at EUR 1,207 and EUR 1,239, respectively.** The much smaller appellate prosecution offices of Aegean and Corfu present comparably high costs per case, with operating expenses being particularly pronounced for Corfu (as is also the case for the first instance court). Costs per case are the lowest at the appellate prosecution offices of Eastern Crete and Thrace, at EUR 494 (almost half the median) and EUR 243 (less than one-third of the median of EUR 890), respectively.

Figure 51. Cost per case for first instance prosecution (EUR)[a]



Note: a. Ordered by appellate region and then by cost per case (descending).

Figure 52. Cost per case for appellate prosecution services (EUR)[a]



Note: a. Ordered by cost per case (descending).

252. **Finally, this report examines the relationship between cost per case and the size of the respective court or prosecution office, to better assess potential economies of scale or other effects.** Figure 53 presents cost per case versus the number of staff on payroll for courts, while Figure 54 does the same for prosecution offices. There is no simple relationship between the two dimensions. That is not to say that size does not play a (statistically significant if relatively minor) role in some cases but that other factors seem to obfuscate the picture, by having a large effect on cost per case.

Figure 53. Cost per case versus staff on payroll (judges and clerks) for Greek civil and criminal courts



253. **While a clear linear or nonlinear pattern is not visible, at the lower instances (including and especially the magistrate court) level, larger courts and prosecution offices present generally lower costs per case.** This is not the case for appellate courts and prosecution offices, where some of the biggest services also exhibit the highest costs. At the other end of the spectrum, the costs per case of small courts and prosecution offices vary greatly and seemingly randomly. While more rigorous statistical testing of this relationship is beyond the scope of this Baseline Report, at least some of the variation is not, in fact, random. It can be attributed to imbalances examined in Section VI. Demand and Supply Analysis of Greek Civil and Criminal Courts and Prosecution Services of this report, including imbalances in human resources in workload and productivity, and local inefficiencies and costs arising from the particularities of a specific location and infrastructure that a court or prosecution office uses.

Figure 54. Cost per case versus staff on payroll (prosecutors and clerks) for Greek prosecution offices



254. **Overall, the examination of justice system expenditures points to several overarching conclusions.** There are significant imbalances in the cost per case for all court levels, with the biggest ones present at the magistrate level. For **magistrate courts**, the median cost per disposed case is estimated at EUR 760 with costs in all appellate regions except Athens exceeding that number, sometimes multifold. Furthermore, great imbalances in cost per case are present in every appellate region except Athens. Magistrate courts that present high cost per case are characterized by a relatively large share of operating costs, coupled with small size and low output (for example, Kymi, Konitsa, Elassona, Psofida, and

Valtos) as well as many island courts, for example, in the appellate regions of Aegean (Melos, Tinos, Andros, Paros, Ikaria) and Piraeus (Spetses and Kythera). The median cost per case for **first instance courts** is EUR 380, interestingly only half of the magistrate median. Notable outliers are the courts of Eurytania and Kalavryta with cost per case nearly three times the median. Samos, Chios, Gythio, Veroia, Trikala, Kavala, Orestiada, and Rodopi also exhibit higher than usual costs per case, with a notably high operations cost component thereof. With the exceptions of Chios and Samos, the costs per case of island courts at the first instance level are not as prominent as at the magistrate level. Costs per case at **appellate courts** are overall significantly higher compared to first instance courts (almost three times as high with a median of EUR 1,028 per case). Also, while for magistrate and first instance courts, some of the largest courts exhibit a generally lower cost per case, at the appellate level, some of the highest costs relative to output are present at Piraeus and Athens, at nearly twice the median. At the other end of the spectrum, the appellate court of Thrace disposes of cases at about half the median cost.

IX. Conclusions

255. **This report implements the first stage of a judicial map reform; it assesses the current judicial map of Greek civil and criminal courts and prosecution services with their respective performance indicators.** In doing that, the report first compares the judicial services of Greece with CoE benchmarks to identify where the country stands in relation to European comparators in terms of level of human resources, demand for justice services, and performance of the various types and levels of judicial services. Second, the report compares judicial services of the same type and level among each other, to identify imbalances in the distribution of resources and respective differences in performance as well as whether performance deficiencies could be attributed to poor resourcing or something else.

9.1 Courts

256. **The comparison of Greek courts to European benchmarks points to several overarching conclusions.** First, Greece has significantly more judges per inhabitant than its CoE counterparts but also somewhat higher demand for justice services in both the criminal and the civil fields. A striking difference is noted in the area of incoming appellate criminal cases per inhabitant where Greece has much higher demand for justice services than other European countries. An examination of Greek criminal procedure in comparison with other European countries could shed some light on whether the reason for that might be procedural. Second, Greek judges receive much less clerical support than their European peers (which may only partly be explained by the high overall number of judges per inhabitant). Third, the performance of Greek courts is characterized by relatively high clearance rates (that is, ratio between disposed and incoming cases) for civil cases at both the first and the second instance but much longer disposition times compared to CoE benchmarks. This means that the courts are struggling with backlog in the civil law field. Regarding criminal cases, clearance rate is good at the first instance level but quite poor at the appellate level. Disposition times for criminal cases across both instances are much higher than in CoE member states but not as high as the ones for civil litigious cases.

257. **When comparing magistrate courts with each other in terms of resourcing and performance, a complex landscape emerges, one where some courts are understaffed and others are comfortably resourced.** Resourcing deficiencies are noted in the magistrate courts of the greater Athens area such as Chalandri, Maroussi, and Kropia as well as the sizeable (in terms of population served) court of Larissa. At the same time, other courts such as Melos, Kastelli, Salamina, and Valtos appear to have a higher number of approved judicial positions than warranted by demand. Interestingly, none of the well-resourced courts seem to have a particularly stellar performance. While they keep up with their incoming caseload, an effort beyond that is not apparent from the data. The poorly resourced courts, on the other hand, present a more heterogenous picture. Some have been struggling with the performance in respect of disposition time due to the lack of a sufficient number of judges and/or clerks relative to demand. Others have surprisingly risen to the challenge and have performed well, some even exceptionally well, given their dire circumstances. Importantly, there is a clear correlation between caseload and productivity at the magistrate level, which indicates that there are significant opportunity costs to keeping judges at locations with low caseload.

258. **The comparison of resourcing and performance of Greek first instance courts also points to important imbalances.** First, the Athens first instance court is extremely large and given the population it serves, any issues there affect a disproportionately large number of people. The court has many judges relative to demand but an insufficient number of court clerks. Importantly, the large number of judges seem unable to handle well the civil caseload and as a result, there is a low clearance rate, a long disposition time, and a poor efficiency category. The second important finding with regard to first instance courts is that some of them appear to operate with insufficient human resources and this might be affecting their performance. Of these, Heraklion, Chania, and Rhodes are experiencing difficulties with the civil caseload, Lasithi with criminal caseloads, and Kos and Syros with both civil and criminal caseloads. Third, there are courts that appear to be generously resourced relative to their demand. Most of these are small ones. One important exception is the first instance court of Nafplio, which is of average size and has many judges relative to its demand but exhibits performance issues in both the civil and the criminal field, due to which it was not easily identifiable based on the data. Other courts that are well-resourced but have performance issues are Kalamata and Karditsa (both for civil and for criminal), Thessaloniki, Lamia, and Mytilene (performance issues with criminal cases), and Ioannina (performance issues with civil cases).

259. **At the level of Greek appellate courts, there are significant imbalances in both resourcing and performance although these are milder than the ones observed in respect of magistrate or first instance courts.** The best resourced courts of Athens, Piraeus, Aegean, and Thessaloniki perform well with regard to their civil caseload but appear to be facing issues when it comes to processing criminal cases. Crete stands out as a well-resourced court which is managing well its criminal caseload but struggles with civil. Furthermore, the courts in Nafplio, Evia, Eastern Crete, and to some extent Corfu are not so well resourced in terms of the number of judges but are doing well with criminal caseload and facing problems with the civil one. Finally, the appellate court of Thrace, even though it has the lowest number of judges relative to demand, manages well both civil and criminal cases and is not raising concerns.

9.2 Prosecution Services

260. **The comparison of the Greek prosecution services to European benchmarks points to several conclusions.** First, and in contrast to the situation with courts, Greece has much fewer prosecutors per inhabitant than its CoE counterparts, but the clerical support they receive, especially at the first instance level, is double the CEPEJ median. Second, demand for prosecutorial services is substantially higher than that in comparator jurisdictions. Third, performance of first instance prosecutorial services, as measured in percentage of cleared cases of the total incoming, raises concerns as it is lower than CoE benchmarks and deteriorating over the years. This is quite probably generating significant backlog that, due to deficiencies in statistical reporting, remains unknown.

261. **Overall, first instance prosecution services in Greece display resourcing and performance imbalances, which are somewhat more moderate than the ones observed at courts of the same level.** In terms of size, the huge first instance prosecution service of Athens dominates the landscape. It is well resourced when it comes to a number of prosecutors but, similar to courts in the capital city, has a lower than the median level of clerks per prosecutor. A prosecution service which stands out as having the lowest level of human resources relative to demand is the one in Xanthi. Other prosecution services with a low number of prosecutors given the high volume of their incoming cases include Agrinio, Amaliada, Kalamata, Kos, Messologi, and Zakynthos. By contrast, the lightest caseload is present at the smallest prosecution services, that is, Eurytania, Grevena, Gythio, Kalavryta, and Kyparissia. Regarding performance, the correlation between caseload and productivity applies to prosecutors as well. Overburdened prosecution services have a high output, whereas ones with a light caseload have a relatively modest number of disposed cases per prosecutor. In terms of clearance rate, the first instance prosecutions of Greece perform poorly overall. Services where performance is particularly worrisome include those with a low number of prosecutors relative to demand (Kalamata, Zakynthos, Kos, Xanthi, Messologi, and Corfu) as well as ones that are well resourced and have a lighter caseload (Kalavryta, Kastoria, Lasithi, Thesprotia, Karditsa, and Larissa). By contrast, prosecution services with a clearance rate above 100 percent are almost uniformly well resourced. The clearance rates of the largest first instance prosecution services in Athens and Thessaloniki are also poor (92 and 88 percent, respectively), and this negatively affects the overall performance of Greek criminal justice.

262. **Overall, the imbalances at the appellate prosecution level of Greece are similar to the ones at the appellate court level.** As with appellate courts, the large prosecution services of Athens and Piraeus are well resourced, which is understandable given the high level of demand and importance of these locations. The appellate prosecution services of Crete and Patras also rank among the well-resourced entities. However, the Thessaloniki appellate prosecution office, unlike the respective appellate court, seems somewhat strained for resources. As with appellate courts, the appellate prosecution office of Thrace has the lowest number of human resources relative to demand. In terms of performance, the highest caseload produces excellent productivity, potentially at the expense of a great strain on personnel. The clearance rates at the appellate prosecution level appears excellent across the board, with a sharp improvement from 2020 to 2021. It is not clear whether these unusual patterns are a result of the highly problematic statistical reporting for criminal caseload or

the COVID closures that strained the first instance relieved some pressure off the second instance.

9.3 Infrastructure of Greek Civil and Criminal Courts and Prosecution Services

263. **Overall, the physical infrastructure of Greek judicial services leaves a lot to be desired.** Almost half of the buildings are assessed by their principal users as being in a poor or very poor condition, with the appellate regions of Crete, Eastern Crete, Western Sterea Hellas, Dodecanese, Thessaloniki, and Thrace appearing to be in a particularly dire state.[131] Aspects of judicial infrastructure which have a direct bearing on the working conditions for judges and prosecutors such as courtrooms, judges' offices, and space for storing archives appear insufficient. The availability of courtrooms varies greatly among courts of the same level. It is mostly large courts that seem to be strained in that regard. Another important feature of judicial services infrastructure is the facilities pertaining to citizens' interaction with the justice system and user access such as waiting areas, parking spaces, access for people with special needs, and building security. There are numerous issues with them, with building security being assessed as particularly problematic. Finally, approximately 77 percent of buildings were assessed by their users as not being suitable for expansion to accommodate additional staff.

9.4 Justice System Expenditures

264. **In terms of justice system expenditures, there are significant imbalances in cost per case for all court levels, with the biggest ones present at the magistrate level.** For **magistrate courts**, the cost per case is the lowest in the Athens appellate region. Magistrate courts in all other appellate regions exceed the median cost, sometimes multifold. Also, great imbalances in cost per case are present in every appellate region except Athens. Magistrate courts that present high cost per case are characterized by a relatively large share of operating costs, coupled with small size and low output, and include many island courts. The median cost per case for **first instance courts** is only half of the magistrate median, with the courts of Eurytania and Kalavryta, Samos, Chios, Gythio, Veroia, Trikala, Kavala, Orestiada, and Rodopi exhibiting particularly high costs per case. Costs per case at **appellate courts** are overall significantly higher than compared to first instance courts (almost three times as high). Also, while for magistrate and first instance courts some of the largest courts exhibit a generally lower cost per case, at the appellate level, some of the highest costs relative to output are present at Piraeus and Athens. At the other end of the spectrum, the appellate court of Thrace disposes of cases at about half the median cost.

265. **Overall, Greek civil and criminal justice appears to perform relatively well in terms of clearing incoming cases, but the weight of the effort to maintain an adequate performance is unequally distributed among judicial services.** Furthermore, the current level of performance appears insufficient to significantly reduce total backlog in the system. Significant imbalances in resourcing are observed for both human and material resources. To

[131] Large projects for building or renovating court infrastructure are planned for Crete, Eastern Crete and Thessaloniki, which may be able to ameliorate the situation in these appellate regions.

improve performance, a rationalization and rebalancing of resources and caseload appear necessary for achieving more equitable workload, increasing output and clearing backlog.

ANNEX 1. Tables Detailing the Resourcing and Performance of Greek Courts and Prosecution Services

Table 3. Demand and supply for magistrate courts with more than two judges (approved judicial positions), ordered according to population served[132]

Court (judges>2)	Population	Judges	Judges/100k inhab.	Clerks	Clrk/Jdg	Incoming/100 inhab.	Incoming/judge	Disposed/judge	Pending/judge
ATHENS	1,483,304	218	15	185	0.8	1.99	135	184	163
THESSALONIKI	913,257	87	10	88	1.0	1.30	137	194	293
PIRAEUS	280,122	30	11	38	1.3	0.96	90	108	449
CHALANDRI	271,078	11	4	14	1.3	0.76	187	208	522
KROPIA	267,339	10	4	19	1.9	0.68	182	224	612
LARISSA	233,659	13	6	16	1.2	0.85	154	163	271
HERAKLION (CRETE)	225,574	13	6	14	1.1	0.78	136	155	818
PATRAS	222,861	28	13	34	1.2	1.04	82	126	96
NEA IONIA	182,223	11	6	10	0.9	0.70	116	187	471
MAROUSSI	174,745	15	9	15	1.0	1.56	182	201	652
KALLITHEA	173,717	12	7	15	1.3	0.97	140	168	452
VOLOS	171,396	12	7	22	1.8	0.93	132	159	156
NIKEA	168,875	11	7	11	1.0	0.63	96	128	497
IOANNINA	161,539	10	6	17	1.7	0.61	98	122	91
ACHARNES	152,908	13	9	16	1.2	0.89	104	134	622
ILION	143,772	10	7	12	1.2	0.71	103	142	466
CHANIA	141,889	11	8	18	1.6	0.64	82	127	275
PERISTERI	139,981	9	6	12	1.3	0.57	89	133	511
LAMIA	127,686	11	9	12	1.1	0.59	68	104	140
CHALKIDA	121,023	9	7	11	1.2	1.00	135	175	310
RHODES	119,050	9	8	13	1.4	1.09	145	197	383
KARDITSA	113,544	8	7	16	2.0	0.66	94	114	270
KOMOTINI	112,039	5	4	6	1.2	0.46	104	110	90
KALAMATA	111,504	7	6	15	2.1	0.70	111	127	284
XANTHI	111,222	4	4	7	1.8	0.40	112	149	286
LAGADAS	110,420	4	4	5	1.3	0.30	83	119	129
TRIKALA	109,094	7	6	15	2.1	0.73	114	136	289
KOZANI	104,604	6	6	10	1.7	0.62	109	132	266
CORFU	104,371	8	8	12	1.5	0.81	106	118	208
AGRINIO	102,423	7	7	15	2.1	0.71	104	121	79
CORINTH	98,440	12	12	15	1.3	1.22	100	117	268
DRAMA	98,287	8	8	11	1.4	0.73	90	98	42
KAVALA	92,832	7	8	14	2.0	0.74	98	131	209
SERRES	91,481	8	9	12	1.5	0.68	77	100	76
ALEXANDROUPOLI	90,759	6	7	9	1.5	0.50	75	129	132
KATERINI	85,851	8	9	12	1.5	1.03	110	144	228
RETHYMNO	85,609	6	7	14	2.3	0.61	87	112	191
MARATHON	73,962	5	7	6	1.2	0.65	96	127	262
ARTA	67,877	6	9	15	2.5	0.71	80	107	166
THEBES	67,530	7	10	6	0.9	0.83	80	119	85
VEROIA	66,547	6	9	10	1.7	0.80	89	97	69
GIANNITSA	63,122	5	8	4	0.8	0.93	117	147	216
PYRGOS (ILIA)	62,104	4	6	11	2.8	0.79	122	154	270
PREVEZA	57,491	4	7	6	1.5	0.56	81	98	96
LAVRIO	56,559	5	9	5	1.0	0.81	91	138	62
CHIOS	52,674	3	6	4	1.3	0.51	89	128	112
KILKIS	51,926	4	8	6	1.5	0.64	83	106	105
MYTILENE	51,766	4	8	9	2.3	0.73	95	107	156
LIVADIA	50,390	6	12	10	1.7	0.77	65	82	132
ELEUSINA	47,787	5	10	8	1.6	0.85	82	124	243
TRIPOLI	47,254	3	6	8	2.7	0.84	133	151	235
MESSOLOGI	46,153	6	13	12	2.0	1.14	88	104	120
AEGIALIA	44,383	4	9	8	2.0	0.82	91	153	160
IGOUMENITSA	43,587	4	9	7	1.8	0.77	84	81	97
SINTIKI	43,340	3	7	3	1.0	0.49	71	82	84
ARGOS	42,022	3	7	7	2.3	0.72	101	136	113
ZAKYNTHOS	40,759	3	7	3	1.0	0.85	115	155	183
AMFISSA	40,343	3	7	7	2.3	0.57	76	87	26
SALAMINA	39,283	4	10	5	1.3	0.39	39	76	323
MEGARA	36,924	5	14	6	1.2	1.03	76	108	253
NAFPLIO	33,356	7	21	5	0.7	0.96	46	55	72
AMALIADA	32,219	3	9	6	2.0	0.83	89	129	85
MEDIAN	**32,103**	**2**	**7**	**5**	**1.6**	**0.68**	**95**	**119**	**124**
NEAPOLI (LASITHI)	29,461	4	14	3	0.8	0.63	47	48	83
KASTELLI	23,126	3	13	3	1.0	0.43	33	46	83
VALTOS	17,056	3	18	5	1.7	0.66	38	33	32
MELOS	9,932	3	30	2	0.7	0.32	11	9	7

[132] Because of their sheer number, data on Greek magistrate courts are divided into two tables, one covering courts with more than two judicial positions and the other one covering courts with only one or two judicial positions.

Table 4. Demand and supply for magistrate courts with one or two judges (approved judicial positions), ordered according to population served

Court (judges<=2)	Population	Judges	Judges/100k inhab.	Clerks	Clrk/Jdg	Incoming/100 inhab.	Incoming/judge	Disposed/judge	Pending/judge
VASILIKA	53,201	2	4	4	2.0	0.62	166	236	407
SPARTA	53,150	2	4	6	3.0	0.63	167	167	288
KASTORIA	50,322	2	4	5	2.5	0.62	156	193	196
EORDEA	45,592	2	4	11	5.5	0.61	139	178	174
ALEXANDRIA (IMATHIA)	41,570	2	5	3	1.5	0.51	105	121	108
MOIRES	40,098	1	2	4	4.0	0.55	220	294	465
ORESTIADA	37,695	2	5	3	1.5	0.39	74	115	57
NEA MOUDANIA	36,500	2	5	4	2.0	0.61	111	120	174
KOS	35,176	2	6	3	1.5	0.92	161	229	355
POLYGYROS	34,442	2	6	5	2.5	0.72	125	172	145
FLORINA	34,441	2	6	2	1.0	0.71	122	127	60
KOUFALIA	33,673	2	6	1	0.5	0.38	65	88	59
ISTIEA	33,128	1	3	3	3.0	0.59	196	230	335
NAOUSSA	32,494	2	6	3	1.5	0.70	114	159	129
ELASSONA	32,121	2	6	7	3.5	0.36	58	59	41
MEDIAN	**32,103**	**2**	**7**	**5**	**1.6**	**0.68**	**95**	**119**	**124**
PANGAION	32,085	1	3	3	3.0	0.76	245	390	274
GREVENA	31,757	2	6	6	3.0	0.60	96	140	202
KYMI	31,431	2	6	4	2.0	0.19	30	27	9
ARGOSTOLI	30,597	2	7	5	2.5	0.62	96	115	105
ATALANTI	30,545	1	3	-	0.0	0.46	142	172	283
EDESSA	28,814	2	7	5	2.5	0.69	99	126	128
KALLONI (LESVOS)	28,564	1	4	3	3.0	0.38	109	110	51
POLYKASTRO	28,493	2	7	5	2.5	0.61	87	117	59
NAFPAKTOS	27,800	1	4	10	10.0	0.63	174	258	216
IERAPETRA	27,602	1	4	4	4.0	0.77	213	298	581
ALMOPIA	27,556	2	7	3	1.5	0.79	109	104	174
DYMI	25,916	1	4	4	4.0	0.82	212	253	630
LEFKADA	23,693	2	8	5	2.5	0.71	85	97	100
ERMOUPOLI	22,963	2	9	2	1.0	0.58	67	87	40
SIKYONA	22,794	2	9	6	3.0	1.04	118	132	211
KALAMPAKA	21,991	1	5	6	6.0	0.68	150	183	208
MYRTOUNTIA	21,581	2	9	4	2.0	0.86	93	127	162
RODOLIVOS	21,579	2	9	3	1.5	0.40	44	58	19
PYLOS	21,077	1	5	1	1.0	0.33	69	88	74
GASTOUNI	21,034	1	5	3	3.0	0.59	124	173	87
NAXOS	20,877	2	10	6	3.0	0.85	89	117	99
SAMOS	20,513	1	5	3	3.0	1.00	205	251	224
SKYDRA	20,188	2	10	2	1.0	0.85	86	111	93
ARNEA	20,105	2	10	3	1.5	0.48	49	56	32
EURYTANIA	20,081	2	10	5	2.5	0.33	33	56	58
NIGRITA	20,030	1	5	3	3.0	0.60	121	125	104
DIDYMOTICHO	19,493	1	5	3	3.0	0.41	80	107	46
THERA	18,883	1	5	2	2.0	0.84	158	161	131
ASTROS	18,635	1	5	1	1.0	0.26	48	51	43
ALMIROS	18,614	2	11	2	1.0	1.09	101	123	155
FARSALA	18,545	1	5	2	2.0	0.64	119	152	163
SITIA	18,318	1	5	5	5.0	0.72	131	183	145
KALYMNOS	17,513	1	6	1	1.0	0.78	137	190	203
VONITSA	17,370	1	6	3	3.0	0.36	62	77	108
XYLOKASTRO	17,365	2	12	2	1.0	0.64	56	73	88
LEMNOS	17,262	1	6	2	2.0	0.52	89	89	35
AMYNTEO	16,973	1	6	1	1.0	0.48	82	104	32
PYRGOS (CRETE)	16,692	1	6	3	3.0	0.61	101	102	61
KASSANDRA	16,672	1	6	2	2.0	1.07	179	231	190
AEGINA	16,164	1	6	2	2.0	0.38	61	69	72
PLATAMODES	15,881	2	13	2	1.0	0.82	66	68	106
KOLINDROS	15,179	1	7	1	1.0	0.42	63	78	65
PAROS	14,926	1	7	3	3.0	0.48	72	81	64
VAMOS	14,696	1	7	2	2.0	0.64	94	96	180
SKOPELOS	13,798	2	14	3	1.5	0.65	45	41	25
THASOS	13,770	1	7	1	1.0	1.10	152	205	185
MASSITOS	13,551	1	7	2	2.0	0.94	127	142	69
OLYMPIA	13,409	1	7	9	9.0	0.62	83	116	99
TAMINEOI	13,053	1	8	3	3.0	0.87	114	199	77
GYTHIO	13,005	1	8	2	2.0	0.75	97	104	75
KARLOVASI	12,464	1	8	2	2.0	0.75	93	115	103
KARYSTOS	12,180	1	8	2	2.0	0.95	116	122	55
NEAPOLI (VION LAKONIA)	10,348	1	10	1	1.0	0.37	38	36	18
LEROS	11,939	2	17	2	1.0	0.55	33	46	43
KYPARISSIA	11,492	1	9	5	5.0	1.43	164	150	344
KALAVRIA	11,136	1	9	2	2.0	0.48	53	57	43
KALAVRYTA	11,045	1	9	4	4.0	0.54	60	67	58
EPIDAVROS (LIMIRA)	10,971	1	9	-	0.0	1.00	110	119	134
MEGALOPOLI	10,687	1	9	1	1.0	0.40	43	65	55

MYKONOS	10,134	1	10		2	2.0	1.28		130		123		135	
PSOFIDA	10,109	1	10		1	1.0	0.24		24		31		28	
IKARIA	9,882	1	10		1	1.0	0.63		62		64		64	
ANDROS	9,221	1	11		1	1.0	0.21		19		27		19	
ARINI	8,953	1	11		3	3.0	0.83		74		83		92	
TINOS	8,636	1	12		1	1.0	0.51		44		59		30	
SAMI	8,435	1	12		2	2.0	0.45		38		41		33	
KARPATHOS	7,310	1	14		1	1.0	2.09		153		153		64	
NEMEA	6,483	1	15		1	1.0	1.85		120		145		131	
KONITSA	6,362	1	16		1	1.0	0.41		26		24		11	
PLOMARI	6,106	1	16		-	0.0	0.75		46		48		35	
AKRATA	5,490	1	18		3	3.0	1.17		64		74		72	
KYTHERA	4,041	1	25		1	1.0	0.32		13		16		5	
SPETSES	4,027	1	25		1	1.0	0.74		30		35		20	

Table 5. Average clearance rate and trend for magistrate courts (2017–2021), ordered lowest to highest

Court	Appellate Region	Avg CR ('17-'21)	Trend	Inc./Judge	Clrk/Jdg
PLATAMODES	KALAMATA	89%	-10%	66	1.0
HERAKLION (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	92%	-18%	136	1.1
THERA	AEGEAN	93%	-4%	158	2.0
CEPEJ MEDIAN		**98%**			**3.3**
PYRGOS (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	98%	-6%	101	3.0
VAMOS	CRETE	99%	-3%	94	2.0
PLOMARI	NORTH AEGEAN	100%	-23%	46	0.0
KARPATHOS	DODECANESE	101%	-3%	153	1.0
MYKONOS	AEGEAN	102%	-1%	130	2.0
KYTHERA	PIRAEUS	103%	-11%	13	1.0
ELASSONA	LARISSA	105%	-8%	58	3.5
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	105%	3%	111	2.1
MELOS	AEGEAN	106%	-7%	11	0.7
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	108%	14%	164	5.0
KALLONI (LESVOS)	NORTH AEGEAN	109%	-5%	109	3.0
AMFISSA	LAMIA	109%	3%	76	2.3
KYMI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	111%	2%	30	2.0
PAROS	AEGEAN	111%	-13%	72	3.0
NEMEA	NAFPLIO	111%	-3%	120	1.0
PSOFIDA	NAFPLIO	112%	-1%	24	1.0
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	113%	0%	88	2.0
LEMNOS	NORTH AEGEAN	113%	-3%	89	2.0
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	114%	-13%	97	2.0
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	114%	-15%	90	1.3
TRIKALA	LARISSA	114%	-12%	114	2.1
KALAVRIA	PIRAEUS	114%	1%	53	2.0
NEAPOLI (VION LAKONIA)	KALAMATA	115%	6%	38	1.0
SKYDRA	THESSALONIKI	115%	-12%	86	1.0
ALMOPIA	THESSALONIKI	115%	-37%	109	1.5
SKOPELOS	LARISSA	115%	-20%	45	1.5
NIGRITA	THESSALONIKI	116%	0%	121	3.0
THASOS	THRACE	116%	4%	152	1.0
AMYNTEO	WESTERN MACEDONIA	116%	-5%	82	1.0
DIDYMOTICHO	THRACE	116%	-8%	80	3.0
VONITSA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	116%	-10%	62	3.0
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	117%	-1%	85	2.5
EPIDAVROS (LIMIRA)	NAFPLIO	117%	2%	110	0.0
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	117%	-11%	167	3.0
ASTROS	NAFPLIO	118%	2%	48	1.0
KONITSA	IOANNINA	118%	4%	26	1.0
RHODES	DODECANESE	118%	-30%	145	1.4
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	118%	-14%	133	2.7
IGOUMENITSA	CORFU	118%	-7%	84	1.8
MAROUSSI	ATHENS	118%	-6%	182	1.0
ARINI	PATRAS	119%	-3%	74	3.0
DYMI	PATRAS	119%	16%	212	4.0
KALLITHEA	ATHENS	119%	-15%	140	1.3
CORFU	CORFU	120%	-7%	106	1.5
XYLOKASTRO	NAFPLIO	120%	15%	56	1.0
SAMOS	AEGEAN	121%	-7%	205	3.0
KOS	DODECANESE	121%	-17%	161	1.5
NEA MOUDANIA	THESSALONIKI	121%	-7%	111	2.0
ANDROS	AEGEAN	121%	-8%	19	1.0
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	123%	6%	122	1.0
KARYSTOS	EVIA (EUBOIA)	123%	-5%	116	2.0
KARLOVASI	AEGEAN	123%	-10%	93	2.0
FARSALA	LARISSA	123%	-3%	119	2.0
NAOUSSA	THESSALONIKI	123%	3%	114	1.5
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	124%	-8%	89	1.3
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	124%	-15%	95	2.3
CHALANDRI	ATHENS	124%	-6%	187	1.3
ISTIEA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	124%	-11%	196	3.0
ALMIROS	LARISSA	125%	-2%	101	1.0
MASSITOS	NAFPLIO	125%	-23%	127	2.0
DRAMA	THRACE	125%	-23%	90	1.4
SINTIKI	THESSALONIKI	125%	-4%	71	1.0
RODOLIVOS	THESSALONIKI	125%	-3%	44	1.5
KOMOTINI	THRACE	125%	-12%	104	1.2
KASSANDRA	THESSALONIKI	125%	0%	179	2.0
PYLOS	KALAMATA	126%	-10%	69	1.0
TINOS	AEGEAN	126%	-21%	44	1.0
SIKYONA	NAFPLIO	126%	3%	118	3.0
MEGALOPOLI	NAFPLIO	126%	4%	43	1.0
ATHENS	ATHENS	127%	-25%	135	0.8
NAXOS	AEGEAN	127%	-7%	89	3.0
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	127%	10%	109	1.7
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	127%	5%	100	1.3
POLYGYROS	THESSALONIKI	128%	-1%	125	2.5
GR MEDIAN		**128%**	**-5%**	**95**	**1.6**

EORDEA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	128%	0%	139	5.5
LARISSA	LARISSA	128%	-18%	154	1.2
ARGOSTOLI	PATRAS	128%	-10%	96	2.5
SAMI	PATRAS	128%	-11%	38	2.0
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	129%	-3%	99	2.5
KALAMPAKA	LARISSA	129%	-20%	150	6.0
KOLINDROS	THESSALONIKI	129%	3%	63	1.0
ERMOUPOLI	AEGEAN	129%	-4%	67	1.0
NAFPAKTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	130%	-4%	174	10.0
CHANIA	CRETE	130%	2%	82	1.6
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	130%	-20%	81	1.5
VOLOS	LARISSA	130%	-9%	132	1.8
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	131%	-2%	60	4.0
SITIA	EASTERN CRETE	131%	-16%	131	5.0
RETHYMNO	CRETE	131%	-11%	87	2.3
OLYMPIA	PATRAS	131%	-18%	83	9.0
NEAPOLI (LASITHI)	EASTERN CRETE	132%	-19%	47	0.8
ACHARNES	ATHENS	132%	-6%	104	1.2
ARGOS	NAFPLIO	132%	-6%	101	2.3
MARATHON	ATHENS	133%	-9%	96	1.2
AKRATA	PATRAS	134%	12%	64	3.0
POLYKASTRO	THESSALONIKI	134%	-16%	87	2.5
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	134%	-3%	104	2.1
KALYMNOS	DODECANESE	134%	-17%	137	1.0
ARNEA	THESSALONIKI	134%	3%	49	1.5
KROPIA	ATHENS	135%	-12%	182	1.9
PERISTERI	ATHENS	136%	-11%	89	1.3
KARDITSA	LARISSA	136%	4%	94	2.0
IKARIA	AEGEAN	136%	4%	62	1.0
LIVADIA	LAMIA	136%	-10%	65	1.7
ARTA	IOANNINA	137%	-8%	80	2.5
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	137%	6%	117	0.8
ALEXANDRIA (IMATHIA)	THESSALONIKI	137%	4%	105	1.5
LEROS	DODECANESE	138%	-14%	33	1.0
GASTOUNI	PATRAS	138%	-16%	124	3.0
PYRGOS (ILIA)	PATRAS	139%	0%	122	2.8
ILION	ATHENS	139%	9%	103	1.2
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	139%	-7%	77	1.5
KAVALA	THRACE	140%	5%	98	2.0
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	140%	-11%	89	1.7
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	140%	19%	46	0.7
LAGADAS	THESSALONIKI	141%	3%	83	1.3
KOUFALIA	THESSALONIKI	141%	4%	65	0.5
SPETSES	PIRAEUS	141%	-21%	30	1.0
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	142%	-24%	80	0.9
IERAPETRA	EASTERN CRETE	142%	-6%	213	4.0
AEGINA	PIRAEUS	142%	1%	61	2.0
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	142%	0%	137	1.0
LAVRIO	ATHENS	143%	3%	91	1.0
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	143%	-13%	98	1.7
AMALIADA	PATRAS	145%	-25%	89	2.0
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	145%	-5%	156	2.5
ORESTIADA	THRACE	146%	-12%	74	1.5
VASILIKA	THESSALONIKI	147%	4%	166	2.0
NIKEA	PIRAEUS	148%	25%	96	1.0
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	149%	0%	135	1.2
LAMIA	LAMIA	150%	-13%	68	1.1
XANTHI	THRACE	150%	3%	112	1.8
MYRTOUNTIA	PATRAS	150%	-3%	93	2.0
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	150%	5%	110	1.5
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	151%	-8%	83	1.5
TAMINEOI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	152%	-3%	114	3.0
KASTELLI	EASTERN CRETE	152%	12%	33	1.0
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	153%	-15%	115	1.0
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	154%	0%	96	3.0
ATALANTI	LAMIA	155%	18%	142	0.0
MEGARA	ATHENS	156%	4%	76	1.2
PATRAS	PATRAS	156%	-20%	82	1.2
AEGIALIA	PATRAS	157%	-13%	91	2.0
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	158%	4%	33	2.5
VALTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	158%	-11%	38	1.7
MOIRES	EASTERN CRETE	158%	-7%	220	4.0
PANGAION	THRACE	162%	10%	245	3.0
NEA IONIA	ATHENS	164%	11%	116	0.9
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	165%	29%	75	1.5
ELEUSINA	ATHENS	171%	1%	82	1.6
SALAMINA	PIRAEUS	190%	39%	39	1.3

Table 6. Disposition time (2021) and percentage change from 2017 to 2021 for magistrate courts, ordered highest to lowest

Court	Appellate Region	2021 Disposition Time	% change '17-'21	Inc./Judge	Clrk/Jdg
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	3,159	112%	90	1.3
NIKEA	PIRAEUS	1,953	53%	96	1.0
IERAPETRA	EASTERN CRETE	1,670	78%	213	4.0
CHALANDRI	ATHENS	1,626	35%	187	1.3
RHODES	DODECANESE	1,584	103%	145	1.4
PERISTERI	ATHENS	1,573	0%	89	1.3
ACHARNES	ATHENS	1,494	-17%	104	1.2
CHANIA	CRETE	1,397	58%	82	1.6
SKYDRA	THESSALONIKI	1,374	176%	86	1.0
KALLITHEA	ATHENS	1,208	20%	140	1.3
MAROUSSI	ATHENS	1,132	-19%	182	1.0
VONITSA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	1,104	133%	62	3.0
SALAMINA	PIRAEUS	1,093	-64%	39	1.3
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	1,089	-5%	100	1.3
SIKYONA	NAFPLIO	1,088	53%	118	3.0
VAMOS	CRETE	1,045	96%	94	2.0
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	997	135%	95	2.3
ILION	ATHENS	996	-25%	103	1.2
LARISSA	LARISSA	983	100%	154	1.2
ISTIEA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	941	91%	196	3.0
LAMIA	LAMIA	937	59%	68	1.1
MARATHON	ATHENS	932	35%	96	1.2
ALMOPIA	THESSALONIKI	909	216%	109	1.5
KARDITSA	LARISSA	905	-15%	94	2.0
NEAPOLI (LASITHI)	EASTERN CRETE	870	60%	47	0.8
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	869	-12%	111	2.1
PSOFIDA	NAFPLIO	852	76%	24	1.0
NEA IONIA	ATHENS	831	-27%	116	0.9
KALYMNOS	DODECANESE	813	137%	137	1.0
ARTA	IOANNINA	811	28%	80	2.5
LIVADIA	LAMIA	804	54%	65	1.7
KOS	DODECANESE	799	23%	161	1.5
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	790	59%	89	1.3
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	766	137%	167	3.0
CORFU	CORFU	737	43%	106	1.5
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	732	42%	133	2.7
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	714	14%	135	1.2
NEMEA	NAFPLIO	683	137%	120	1.0
DYMI	PATRAS	679	-10%	212	4.0
ATHENS	ATHENS	659	83%	135	0.8
NEA MOUDANIA	THESSALONIKI	648	62%	111	2.0
TRIKALA	LARISSA	634	-26%	114	2.1
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	625	46%	88	2.0
ELEUSINA	ATHENS	622	-44%	82	1.6
KROPIA	ATHENS	599	-57%	182	1.9
ELASSONA	LARISSA	585	169%	58	3.5
XANTHI	THRACE	568	-13%	112	1.8
PATRAS	PATRAS	565	2%	82	1.2
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	546	-33%	137	1.0
IGOUMENITSA	CORFU	532	39%	84	1.8
PAROS	AEGEAN	532	282%	72	3.0
MYKONOS	AEGEAN	530	58%	130	2.0
THERA	AEGEAN	526	62%	158	2.0
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	513	85%	81	1.5
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	508	33%	80	0.9
EPIDAVROS (LIMIRA)	NAFPLIO	505	54%	110	0.0
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	484	15%	99	2.5
KALAMPAKA	LARISSA	470	49%	150	6.0
PLOMARI	NORTH AEGEAN	469	234%	46	0.0
RETHYMNO	CRETE	452	-45%	87	2.3
VASILIKA	THESSALONIKI	447	-41%	166	2.0
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	439	2%	156	2.5
ANDROS	AEGEAN	433	273%	19	1.0
KASTELLI	EASTERN CRETE	422	-43%	33	1.0
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	422	-28%	96	3.0
IKARIA	AEGEAN	415	11%	62	1.0
POLYGYROS	THESSALONIKI	415	39%	125	2.5
SKOPELOS	LARISSA	402	284%	45	1.5
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	396	-37%	110	1.5
OLYMPIA	PATRAS	393	5%	83	9.0
HERAKLION (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	392	-78%	136	1.1
MEGALOPOLI	NAFPLIO	374	-3%	43	1.0
FARSALA	LARISSA	369	-11%	119	2.0
ARGOSTOLI	PATRAS	365	-11%	96	2.5
MOIRES	EASTERN CRETE	361	-54%	220	4.0
PYRGOS (ILIA)	PATRAS	358	-64%	122	2.8
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	356	164%	97	2.0
GR MEDIAN		**354**	**-9%**	**95**	**1.6**
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	352	-60%	109	1.7

NAOUSSA	THESSALONIKI	337	49%	114	1.5
MELOS	AEGEAN	335	88%	11	0.7
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	325	-73%	164	5.0
POLYKASTRO	THESSALONIKI	323	4%	87	2.5
KOMOTINI	THRACE	323	-3%	104	1.2
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	322	-23%	117	0.8
THASOS	THRACE	319	-10%	152	1.0
TINOS	AEGEAN	316	122%	44	1.0
SINTIKI	THESSALONIKI	307	-50%	71	1.0
MEGARA	ATHENS	306	-67%	76	1.2
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	305	-64%	115	1.0
KAVALA	THRACE	305	-57%	98	2.0
SAMOS	AEGEAN	303	-22%	205	3.0
PLATAMODES	KALAMATA	302	20%	66	1.0
KARLOVASI	AEGEAN	298	7%	93	2.0
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	298	-11%	75	1.5
ARINI	PATRAS	291	-28%	74	3.0
PYRGOS (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	285	74%	101	3.0
NAFPAKTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	284	-23%	174	10.0
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	280	1%	85	2.5
DIDYMOTICHO	THRACE	275	9%	80	3.0
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	274	-27%	77	1.5
XYLOKASTRO	NAFPLIO	272	-48%	56	1.0
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	272	-24%	83	1.5
MYRTOUNTIA	PATRAS	268	-54%	93	2.0
VOLOS	LARISSA	264	-52%	132	1.8
LEROS	DODECANESE	255	-45%	33	1.0
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	253	-50%	60	4.0
ERMOUPOLI	AEGEAN	250	18%	67	1.0
KALAVRIA	PIRAEUS	250	-20%	53	2.0
ASTROS	NAFPLIO	246	-15%	48	1.0
SITIA	EASTERN CRETE	239	-36%	131	5.0
AMALIADA	PATRAS	238	-29%	89	2.0
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	237	104%	104	2.1
CEPEJ MEDIAN		**237**			**3.3**
ALMIROS	LARISSA	234	-58%	101	1.0
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	233	-44%	98	1.7
AEGIALIA	PATRAS	230	-65%	91	2.0
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	227	11%	89	1.7
KOLINDROS	THESSALONIKI	224	-4%	63	1.0
LAGADAS	THESSALONIKI	219	-70%	83	1.3
SPETSES	PIRAEUS	209	300%	30	1.0
MASSITOS	NAFPLIO	206	8%	127	2.0
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	206	28%	122	1.0
VALTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	202	-29%	38	1.7
TAMINEOI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	188	-42%	114	3.0
SAMI	PATRAS	187	45%	38	2.0
PYLOS	KALAMATA	187	-19%	69	1.0
DRAMA	THRACE	181	-10%	90	1.4
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	180	-57%	33	2.5
KASSANDRA	THESSALONIKI	180	-55%	179	2.0
EORDEA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	179	-60%	139	5.5
AMFISSA	LAMIA	171	-9%	76	2.3
KOUFALIA	THESSALONIKI	171	-22%	65	0.5
NAXOS	AEGEAN	171	-53%	89	3.0
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	160	-80%	46	0.7
ALEXANDRIA (IMATHIA)	THESSALONIKI	158	-35%	105	1.5
AMYNTEO	WESTERN MACEDONIA	153	61%	82	1.0
KONITSA	IOANNINA	150	-27%	26	1.0
NIGRITA	THESSALONIKI	148	-43%	121	3.0
LEMNOS	NORTH AEGEAN	147	22%	89	2.0
KYTHERA	PIRAEUS	137	50%	13	1.0
AKRATA	PATRAS	118	-76%	64	3.0
ATALANTI	LAMIA	117	-86%	142	0.0
LAVRIO	ATHENS	113	-32%	91	1.0
KALLONI (LESVOS)	NORTH AEGEAN	108	-25%	109	3.0
GASTOUNI	PATRAS	106	-56%	124	3.0
PANGAION	THRACE	96	-78%	245	3.0
ORESTIADA	THRACE	89	-76%	74	1.5
NEAPOLI (VION LAKONIA)	KALAMATA	86	-43%	38	1.0
KYMI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	85	61%	30	2.0
RODOLIVOS	THESSALONIKI	82	-29%	44	1.5
ARGOS	NAFPLIO	80	-85%	101	2.3
KARPATHOS	DODECANESE	67	-47%	153	1.0
ARNEA	THESSALONIKI	53	-74%	49	1.5
AEGINA	PIRAEUS	-	-100%	61	2.0
KARYSTOS	EVIA (EUBOIA)	-	-100%	116	2.0

Table 7. Efficiency categories for magistrate courts (compared to country median performance for courts of the same type)[133]

Court	Appellate Region	Efficiency Category	
ACHARNES	ATHENS	6	Very High DT
CHALANDRI	ATHENS	6	Very High DT
IERAPETRA	EASTERN CRETE	6	Very High DT
NIKEA	PIRAEUS	6	Very High DT
PERISTERI	ATHENS	6	Very High DT
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	6	Very High DT
RHODES	DODECANESE	6	Very High DT
VAMOS	CRETE	5	Warning
ALMOPIA	THESSALONIKI	4	Fighting Backlog
ARTA	IOANNINA	4	Fighting Backlog
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	4	Fighting Backlog
CHANIA	CRETE	4	Fighting Backlog
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	4	Fighting Backlog
CORFU	CORFU	4	Fighting Backlog
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	4	Fighting Backlog
ILION	ATHENS	4	Fighting Backlog
ISTIEA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	4	Fighting Backlog
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	4	Fighting Backlog
KALLITHEA	ATHENS	4	Fighting Backlog
KALYMNOS	DODECANESE	4	Fighting Backlog
KARDITSA	LARISSA	4	Fighting Backlog
KOS	DODECANESE	4	Fighting Backlog
LAMIA	LAMIA	4	Fighting Backlog
LARISSA	LARISSA	4	Fighting Backlog
LIVADIA	LAMIA	4	Fighting Backlog
MARATHON	ATHENS	4	Fighting Backlog
MAROUSSI	ATHENS	4	Fighting Backlog
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	4	Fighting Backlog
NEA IONIA	ATHENS	4	Fighting Backlog
NEAPOLI (LASITHI)	EASTERN CRETE	4	Fighting Backlog
PSOFIDA	NAFPLIO	4	Fighting Backlog
SALAMINA	PIRAEUS	4	Fighting Backlog
SIKYONA	NAFPLIO	4	Fighting Backlog
SKYDRA	THESSALONIKI	4	Fighting Backlog
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	4	Fighting Backlog
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	4	Fighting Backlog
VONITSA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	4	Fighting Backlog
HERAKLION (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	3	Creating Backlog
PLATAMODES	KALAMATA	3	Creating Backlog
THERA	AEGEAN	3	Creating Backlog
AEGIALIA	PATRAS	2	Standard
AEGINA	PIRAEUS	2	Standard
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard
AKRATA	PATRAS	2	Standard
ALEXANDRIA (IMATHIA)	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	2	Standard
ALMIROS	LARISSA	2	Standard
AMALIADA	PATRAS	2	Standard
AMFISSA	LAMIA	2	Standard
AMYNTEO	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
ANDROS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
ARGOS	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
ARGOSTOLI	PATRAS	2	Standard
ARINI	PATRAS	2	Standard
ARNEA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
ASTROS	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
ATALANTI	LAMIA	2	Standard
ATHENS	ATHENS	2	Standard
DIDYMOTICHO	THRACE	2	Standard
DRAMA	THRACE	2	Standard
DYMI	PATRAS	2	Standard
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
ELASSONA	LARISSA	2	Standard
ELEUSINA	ATHENS	2	Standard
EORDEA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
EPIDAVROS (LIMIRA)	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
ERMOUPOLI	AEGEAN	2	Standard
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	2	Standard
FARSALA	LARISSA	2	Standard
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
GASTOUNI	PATRAS	2	Standard
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	2	Standard
IGOUMENITSA	CORFU	2	Standard
IKARIA	AEGEAN	2	Standard
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	2	Standard
KALAMPAKA	LARISSA	2	Standard
KALAVRIA	PIRAEUS	2	Standard

Court	Appellate Region	Efficiency Category	
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	2	Standard
KALLONI (LESVOS)	NORTH AEGEAN	2	Standard
KARLOVASI	AEGEAN	2	Standard
KARPATHOS	DODECANESE	2	Standard
KARYSTOS	EVIA (EUBOIA)	2	Standard
KASSANDRA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
KASTELLI	EASTERN CRETE	2	Standard
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
KAVALA	THRACE	2	Standard
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
KOLINDROS	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
KOMOTINI	THRACE	2	Standard
KONITSA	IOANNINA	2	Standard
KOUFALIA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
KROPIA	ATHENS	2	Standard
KYMI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	2	Standard
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	2	Standard
KYTHERA	PIRAEUS	2	Standard
LAGADAS	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
LAVRIO	ATHENS	2	Standard
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard
LEMNOS	NORTH AEGEAN	2	Standard
LEROS	DODECANESE	2	Standard
MASSITOS	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
MEGALOPOLI	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
MEGARA	ATHENS	2	Standard
MELOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard
MYKONOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
MYRTOUNTIA	PATRAS	2	Standard
MOIRES	EASTERN CRETE	2	Standard
NAFPAKTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
NAOUSSA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
NAXOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
NEA MOUDANIA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
NEAPOLI (VION LAKONIA)	KALAMATA	2	Standard
NEMEA	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
NIGRITA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
OLYMPIA	PATRAS	2	Standard
ORESTIADA	THRACE	2	Standard
PANGAION	THRACE	2	Standard
PAROS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
PATRAS	PATRAS	2	Standard
PLOMARI	NORTH AEGEAN	2	Standard
POLYGYROS	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
POLYKASTRO	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	2	Standard
PYLOS	KALAMATA	2	Standard
PYRGOS (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	2	Standard
PYRGOS (ILIA)	PATRAS	2	Standard
RETHYMNO	CRETE	2	Standard
RODOLIVOS	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
SAMI	PATRAS	2	Standard
SAMOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
SINTIKI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
SITIA	EASTERN CRETE	2	Standard
SKOPELOS	LARISSA	2	Standard
SPETSES	PIRAEUS	2	Standard
THASOS	THRACE	2	Standard
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	2	Standard
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
TINOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
TRIKALA	LARISSA	2	Standard
VALTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard
VASILIKA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
VOLOS	LARISSA	2	Standard
XANTHI	THRACE	2	Standard
XYLOKASTRO	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	2	Standard
TAMINEOI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	2	Standard

Table 8. Demand and supply for first instance courts (ordered according to population served)

Court	Population	Judges	Judges/100k	Clerks	Clrk/Jdg	Incoming/100 inhab.	Incoming/judge	Disposed/judge	Pending/judge
ATHENS	3,307,241	434	13	437	1.0	3.48	265	267	534
THESSALONIKI	1,110,551	125	11	200	1.6	2.60	231	221	249
PIRAEUS	523,648	84	16	117	1.4	3.06	191	201	244
HERAKLION	305,490	26	9	46	1.8	3.41	400	472	471
LARISSA	284,325	22	8	45	2.0	2.02	261	310	264
PATRAS	248,777	30	12	46	1.5	3.68	305	325	273
CHALKIDA	210,815	19	9	32	1.7	2.84	315	287	261
VOLOS	203,808	16	8	29	1.8	2.69	343	388	172
SERRES	176,430	12	7	21	1.8	2.08	305	304	261
IOANNINA	167,901	13	8	20	1.5	2.01	260	248	407
LAMIA	158,231	11	7	17	1.5	1.88	271	271	361
CHANIA	156,585	14	9	21	1.5	3.12	349	348	574
KOZANI	150,196	10	7	19	1.9	1.84	277	289	378
CORINTH	145,082	14	10	23	1.6	2.84	295	308	434
VEROIA	140,611	10	7	25	2.5	2.26	317	335	325
KAVALA	138,687	13	9	21	1.6	1.88	201	253	204
KALAMATA	132,581	11	8	17	1.5	2.32	280	268	480
TRIKALA	131,085	9	7	23	2.6	2.18	318	295	457
KATERINI	126,698	9	7	21	2.3	2.81	396	423	369
RHODES	126,360	14	11	20	1.4	3.94	356	481	425
AGRINIO	119,479	8	7	22	2.8	2.32	346	548	229
KARDITSA	113,544	7	6	18	2.6	1.71	278	300	471
RODOPI	112,039	7	6	13	1.9	1.85	296	319	301
XANTHI	111,222	6	5	15	2.5	1.85	343	341	313
CHALKIDIKI	107,719	10	9	16	1.6	3.07	331	354	294
CORFU	104,371	13	12	18	1.4	4.01	322	297	470
MYTILENE	103,698	10	10	13	1.3	2.62	272	242	430
DRAMA	98,287	7	7	16	2.3	2.35	329	436	117
NAFPLIO	97,044	10	10	21	2.1	2.53	246	271	328
ALEXANDROUPOLI	90,759	9	10	14	1.6	3.16	319	319	193
TRIPOLI	86,685	6	7	12	2.0	2.20	317	313	250
RETHYMNO	85,609	7	8	13	1.9	3.17	388	387	567
MEDIAN	**85,609**	**7**	**9**	**13**	**1.9**	**2.60**	**295**	**304**	**296**
ILIA	84,466	7	8	17	2.4	2.30	278	303	358
KILKIS	80,419	6	7	13	2.2	2.04	274	294	206
EDESSA	76,558	5	7	12	2.4	1.93	295	325	392
SYROS	75,812	7	9	11	1.6	3.19	345	215	483
LASITHI	75,381	6	8	7	1.2	2.63	330	282	615
SPARTA	75,092	5	7	10	2.0	2.11	317	389	387
AMALIADA	74,834	6	8	12	2.0	2.72	339	283	451
MESSOLOGI	73,953	6	8	15	2.5	2.81	346	626	392
ARTA	67,877	6	9	15	2.5	2.60	295	297	442
THEBES	67,530	7	10	9	1.3	2.60	251	349	230
KOS	64,628	5	8	11	2.2	3.07	397	410	781
GIANNITSA	63,122	5	8	12	2.4	1.83	231	268	250
PREVEZA	57,491	5	9	13	2.6	2.02	232	334	155
ORESTIADA	57,188	4	7	9	2.3	2.24	320	318	152
CHIOS	52,674	5	9	10	2.0	2.41	254	235	215
FLORINA	51,414	4	8	10	2.5	1.90	244	336	77
LIVADIA	50,390	6	12	8	1.3	3.31	278	304	253
KASTORIA	50,322	5	10	12	2.4	2.42	244	258	104
AEGIO	44,383	5	11	9	1.8	2.88	256	305	257
THESPROTIA	43,587	5	11	9	1.8	3.45	301	387	126
SAMOS	42,859	4	9	9	2.3	2.31	247	264	252
LEFKADA	41,063	4	10	11	2.8	3.17	325	434	301
ZAKYNTHOS	40,759	5	12	9	1.8	3.52	287	505	303
AMFISSA	40,343	5	12	10	2.0	2.04	165	259	145
NAXOS	39,760	4	10	7	1.8	3.38	336	336	427
KEFALONIA	39,032	4	10	10	2.5	2.82	275	385	296
GREVENA	31,757	4	13	5	1.3	1.89	150	149	79
KYPARISSIA	27,373	4	15	8	2.0	3.38	231	273	227
EURYTANIA	20,081	3	15	5	1.7	1.22	81	100	27
KALAVRYTA	16,535	4	24	6	1.5	2.09	87	89	98
GYTHIO	14,046	4	28	6	1.5	4.90	172	188	171

[133] Ordered by efficiency category (highest to lowest) and then by name of court (A-Z).

Table 9. Average civil and criminal clearance rates and respective trends for first-instance courts (2017–2021), ordered lowest to highest according to civil clearance rate

Court	Appellate Region	Avg Civil CR '17-'21		Trend '17-'21		Avg Criminal CR '17-'21		Trend '17-'21		Inc./Judge	Clrk/Jdg
AMALIADA	PATRAS		74%		9%		150%		17%	339	2.0
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		83%		-6%		152%		2%	325	2.8
ATHENS	ATHENS		90%		7%		110%		-4%	265	1.0
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI		91%		-2%		115%		6%	274	2.2
HERAKLION	EASTERN CRETE		91%		-9%		104%		-6%	400	1.8
KALAMATA	KALAMATA		91%		-15%		126%		-18%	280	1.5
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		91%		-6%		196%		-18%	346	2.5
CHANIA	CRETE		92%		0%		134%		8%	349	1.5
SYROS	AEGEAN		92%		0%		67%		12%	345	1.6
IOANNINA	IOANNINA		93%		0%		109%		8%	260	1.5
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA		93%		0%		120%		-13%	231	2.0
NAXOS	AEGEAN		93%		6%		140%		19%	336	1.8
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI		93%		-4%		107%		-9%	295	2.4
LASITHI	EASTERN CRETE		94%		-2%		76%		2%	330	1.2
RHODES	DODECANESE		95%		-7%		167%		-23%	356	1.4
XANTHI	THRACE		95%		-4%		106%		-24%	343	2.5
ARTA	IOANNINA		96%		-6%		97%		-2%	295	2.5
ORESTIADA	THRACE		97%		-4%		158%		-67%	320	2.3
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI		97%		-1%		105%		-20%	317	2.5
CEPEJ MEDIAN			**98%**				**95%**				**3.3**
SERRES	THESSALONIKI		98%		-2%		120%		16%	305	1.8
PREVEZA	IOANNINA		99%		-7%		171%		-5%	232	2.6
KOS	DODECANESE		99%		-4%		111%		10%	397	2.2
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE		99%				104%		-19%	319	1.6
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		100%		-6%		160%		-4%	346	2.8
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO		100%		-8%		88%		-10%	246	2.1
CHALKIDIKI	THESSALONIKI		100%		-12%		96%		-3%	331	1.6
RETHYMNO	CRETE		102%		-10%		107%		-3%	388	1.9
SPARTA	NAFPLIO		102%		8%		136%		-6%	317	2.0
RODOPI	THRACE		102%		-8%		99%		-4%	296	1.9
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)		103%		-16%		175%		19%	251	1.3
PATRAS	PATRAS		103%		-3%		98%		-3%	305	1.5
Court (continued)	**Appellate Region**	**Avg Civil CR '17-'21**		**Trend '17-'21**		**Avg Criminal CR '17-'21**		**Trend '17-'21**		**Inc./Judge**	**Clrk/Jdg**
KARDITSA	LARISSA		103%		3%		92%		-8%	278	2.6
GR MEDIAN			**103%**		**-5%**		**109%**		**-4%**	**295**	**1.9**
ILIA	PATRAS		103%		0%		114%		-2%	278	2.4
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS		103%		-2%		109%		6%	87	1.5
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA		104%		-6%		113%		-1%	244	2.4
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI		104%		-5%		112%		-9%	231	2.4
LARISSA	LARISSA		104%		-12%		151%		1%	261	2.0
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA		104%		-6%		143%		-4%	244	2.5
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)		105%		-9%		88%		5%	315	1.7
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI		105%		-12%		76%		2%	231	1.6
THESPROTIA	CORFU		105%		2%		137%		-6%	301	1.8
DRAMA	THRACE		106%		2%		151%		-1%	329	2.3
LIVADIA	LAMIA		106%		-7%		119%		10%	278	1.3
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN		107%		-10%		63%		-5%	272	1.3
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO		107%		2%		140%		11%	317	2.0
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA		109%		-6%		94%		-15%	150	1.3
LAMIA	LAMIA		109%		-9%		94%		-9%	271	1.5
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA		109%		-5%		83%		-1%	277	1.9
GYTHIO	KALAMATA		110%		-3%		99%		-8%	172	1.5
CORINTH	NAFPLIO		110%		3%		93%		-2%	295	1.6
KEFALONIA	PATRAS		110%		-12%		127%		-15%	275	2.5
AEGIO	PATRAS		111%		-5%		105%		-4%	256	1.8
CORFU	CORFU		111%		-4%		79%		-15%	322	1.4
TRIKALA	LARISSA		111%		-10%		66%		-4%	318	2.6
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN		112%		-8%		105%		1%	254	2.0
AMFISSA	LAMIA		112%		-4%		180%		10%	165	2.0
SAMOS	AEGEAN		112%		13%		99%		-24%	247	2.3
EURYTANIA	LAMIA		113%		-10%		150%		8%	81	1.7
KAVALA	THRACE		113%		8%		110%		-12%	201	1.6
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS		113%		-7%		136%		-20%	287	1.8
VOLOS	LARISSA		113%		-8%		99%		-17%	343	1.8
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS		115%		-7%		109%		0%	191	1.4
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI		121%		-5%		101%		-2%	396	2.3

Table 10. Civil and criminal disposition times in 2021 and percentage change (2017–2021) for first-instance courts[134]

Court	Appellate Region	2021 Civil DT		% change '17-'21	2021 Crim. DT Estimate		% change '17-'21	Corrected for Covid		% change '17-'21	As reported		% change '17-'21	Inc./Judge	Clrk/Jdg
ATHENS	ATHENS		1,386	16%		890	116%		333	-19%		135	14%	265	1.0
CHANIA	CRETE		1,141	90%		693	58%		289	-34%		180	-24%	349	1.5
RHODES	DODECANESE		1,120	70%		154	26%		81	-33%		154	26%	356	1.4
KALAMATA	KALAMATA		1,112	64%		1,209	89%		823	29%		1,061	66%	280	1.5
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO		1,098	38%		687	735%		334	306%		209	153%	246	2.1
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		1,018	98%		102	-26%		48	-65%		102	-26%	325	2.8
KOS	DODECANESE		999	49%		897	40%		557	-13%		363	-1%	397	2.2
HERAKLION	EASTERN CRETE		907	118%		669	131%		312	8%		80	-62%	400	1.8
IOANNINA	IOANNINA		855	5%		392	28%		288	-6%		242	-21%	260	1.5
ARTA	IOANNINA		774	107%		1,210	80%		558	-17%		364	11%	295	2.5
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI		764	58%		701	176%		423	67%		148	-42%	295	2.4
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI		672	47%		504	123%		210	-7%		194	-14%	231	2.4
AMALIADA	PATRAS		661	66%		999	163%		416	9%		407	7%	339	2.0
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		623	85%		191	0%		90	-53%		191	0%	346	2.5
KARDITSA	LARISSA		600	-9%		1,219	160%		659	41%		395	-13%	278	2.6
RODOPI	THRACE		597	74%		1,175	398%		319	36%		339	44%	296	1.9
CHALKIDIKI	THESSALONIKI		592	134%		668	145%		318	17%		167	40%	331	1.6
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI		588	130%		194	-14%		127	-44%		133	26%	274	2.2
RETHYMNO	CRETE		573	14%		1,144	224%		559	58%		560	59%	388	1.9
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA		543	43%		505	218%		250	57%		146	-8%	231	2.0
LASITHI	EASTERN CRETE		539	7%		2,431	400%		1,184	144%		785	62%	330	1.2
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)		516	108%		667	49%		300	-33%		209	-53%	315	1.7
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI		492	-14%		1,232	458%		251	13%		377	251%	317	2.5
LARISSA	LARISSA		489	128%		293	-11%		136	-59%		275	-17%	261	2.0
PREVEZA	IOANNINA		472	88%		176	38%		55	-57%		176	38%	232	2.6
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)		470	124%		210	-60%		118	-77%		210	-60%	251	1.3
LIVADIA	LAMIA		459	59%		424	0%		209	-51%		166	-1%	278	1.3
KEFALONIA	PATRAS		424	5%		623	165%		150	-36%		208	71%	275	2.5
SYROS	AEGEAN		415	24%		3,097	687%		1,868	374%		341	-4%	345	1.6
SERRES	THESSALONIKI		413	20%		183	-30%		126	-52%		183	-30%	305	1.8
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS		397	17%		354	59%		117	-47%		240	8%	287	1.8

[134] Criminal disposition times presented separately for the three estimation methods used. Ordered highest to lowest according to civil disposition time.

Court (continued)	Appellate Region	2021 Civil DT		% change '17-'21	2021 Crim. DT Estimate		% change '17-'21	Corrected for Covid		% change '17-'21	As reported		% change '17-'21	Inc./Judge	Clrk/Jdg
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		382	49%		148	30%		70	-39%		148	30%	346	2.8
GR MEDIAN			**382**	**26%**		**669**	**127%**		**309**	**-6%**		**209**	**8%**	**295**	**1.9**
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA		365	-8%		1,266	254%		655	83%		111	-69%	277	1.9
ILIA	PATRAS		362	25%		683	40%		380	-22%		292	-14%	278	2.4
AEGIO	PATRAS		352	2%		1,166	405%		238	3%		265	15%	256	1.8
CORFU	CORFU		350	-24%		2,011	265%		893	62%		566	65%	322	1.4
NAXOS	AEGEAN		343	11%		450	-24%		427	-28%		259	-56%	336	1.8
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE		339	118%		701	343%		333	111%		188	97%	319	1.6
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI		332	122%		964	315%		831	258%		171	-26%	231	1.6
ORESTIADA	THRACE		330	92%		315	112%		211	42%		119	107%	320	2.3
XANTHI	THRACE		327	48%		724	172%		500	88%		226	-15%	343	2.5
LAMIA	LAMIA		317	-18%		1,224	112%		778	35%		503	-9%	271	1.5
GYTHIO	KALAMATA		308	-15%		1,122	341%		371	46%		296	80%	172	1.5
CORINTH	NAFPLIO		302	-36%		1,138	204%		484	29%		379	1%	295	1.6
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN		293	26%		2,334	172%		1,184	38%		476	-45%	272	1.3
TRIKALA	LARISSA		288	-11%		2,804	284%		1,108	52%		633	-13%	318	2.6
SAMOS	AEGEAN		282	-52%		800	252%		427	87%		201	69%	247	2.3
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA		276	83%		166	20%		54	-61%		129	175%	244	2.4
SPARTA	NAFPLIO		276	-11%		450	12%		222	-44%		431	8%	317	2.0
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS		271	-18%		859	60%		472	-12%		194	-10%	191	1.4
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA		261	54%		636	706%		253	221%		278	252%	150	1.3
PATRAS	PATRAS		245	11%		881	136%		353	-6%		403	8%	305	1.5
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI		241	-29%		817	156%		346	8%		237	11%	396	2.3
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN		239	0%		649	127%		264	-8%		436	52%	254	2.0
CEPEJ MEDIAN			**237**			**149**			**149**			**149**			**3.3**
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS		205	51%		664	129%		491	129%		282	99%	87	1.5
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA		198	27%		104	155%		26	155%		104	169%	244	2.5
THESPROTIA	CORFU		188	-19%		183	303%		73	303%		131	189%	301	1.8
DRAMA	THRACE		183	-10%		-	-100%		-	-100%		-	-100%	329	2.3
AMFISSA	LAMIA		178	-35%		164	-57%		102	-57%		164	9%	165	2.0
VOLOS	LARISSA		171	-20%		610	605%		178	605%		159	84%	343	1.8
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO		170	-30%		364	45%		121	45%		339	35%	317	2.0
EURYTANIA	LAMIA		141	34%		53	-8%		52	-8%		53	-8%	81	1.7
KAVALA	THRACE		138	-56%		765	121%		309	121%		144	-45%	201	1.6

Table 11. First instance efficiency categories according to civil court performance (compared to country median)[135]

Court	Appellate Region	EC - Civil	
ATHENS	ATHENS	5	Warning
ARTA	IOANNINA	5	Warning
HERAKLION	EASTERN CRETE	5	Warning
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	5	Warning
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	5	Warning
KOS	DODECANESE	5	Warning
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	5	Warning
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	5	Warning
RHODES	DODECANESE	5	Warning
CHANIA	CRETE	5	Warning
AMALIADA	PATRAS	3	Creating Backlog
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	3	Creating Backlog
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	3	Creating Backlog
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	3	Creating Backlog
LASITHI	EASTERN CRETE	3	Creating Backlog
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	3	Creating Backlog
NAXOS	AEGEAN	3	Creating Backlog
SYROS	AEGEAN	3	Creating Backlog
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard
AEGIO	PATRAS	2	Standard
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	2	Standard
AMFISSA	LAMIA	2	Standard
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
VOLOS	LARISSA	2	Standard
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	2	Standard
DRAMA	THRACE	2	Standard
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	2	Standard
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	2	Standard
ILIA	PATRAS	2	Standard
THESPROTIA	CORFU	2	Standard
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	2	Standard
KAVALA	THRACE	2	Standard
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	2	Standard
KARDITSA	LARISSA	2	Standard
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
CORFU	CORFU	2	Standard
KEFALONIA	PATRAS	2	Standard
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
LAMIA	LAMIA	2	Standard
LARISSA	LARISSA	2	Standard
LIVADIA	LAMIA	2	Standard
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	2	Standard
XANTHI	THRACE	2	Standard
ORESTIADA	THRACE	2	Standard
PATRAS	PATRAS	2	Standard
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	2	Standard
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	2	Standard
RETHYMNO	CRETE	2	Standard
RODOPI	THRACE	2	Standard
SAMOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
TRIKALA	LARISSA	2	Standard
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	2	Standard
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	2	Standard
CHALKIDIKI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	2	Standard

[135] Sorted by efficiency category (worst to best) and then by court name.

Table 12. First instance efficiency categories according to criminal court performance (compared to estimated country median)[136]

Court	Appellate Region	EC - Crim. DT Estimate		EC - Corrected for Covid		EC - As reported	
SYROS	AEGEAN	6	Very High DT	6	Very High DT	3	Creating Backlog
TRIKALA	LARISSA	6	Very High DT	5	Warning	5	Warning
CORFU	CORFU	5	Warning	5	Warning	5	Warning
LASITHI	EASTERN CRETE	5	Warning	5	Warning	5	Warning
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	5	Warning	5	Warning	5	Warning
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	2	Standard
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog
KARDITSA	LARISSA	3	Creating Backlog	5	Warning	3	Creating Backlog
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	3	Creating Backlog	5	Warning	3	Creating Backlog
LAMIA	LAMIA	3	Creating Backlog	5	Warning	5	Warning
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	3	Creating Backlog	5	Warning	3	Creating Backlog
AEGIO	PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
AMALIADA	PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
AMFISSA	LAMIA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
ARTA	IOANNINA	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
ATHENS	ATHENS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
CHALKIDIKI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
CHANIA	CRETE	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	2	Standard	2	Standard	4	Fighting Backlog
DRAMA	THRACE	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
HERAKLION	EASTERN CRETE	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
ILIA	PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	2	Standard	4	Fighting Backlog	6	Very High DT
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
KAVALA	THRACE	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
KEFALONIA	PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
KOS	DODECANESE	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
LARISSA	LARISSA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
LIVADIA	LAMIA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	1	Very High CR
NAXOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
ORESTIADA	THRACE	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
PATRAS	PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
RETHYMNO	CRETE	2	Standard	2	Standard	5	Warning
RHODES	DODECANESE	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
RODOPI	THRACE	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
SAMOS	AEGEAN	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	2	Standard	2	Standard	4	Fighting Backlog
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	2	Standard	2	Standard	1	Very High CR
THESPROTIA	CORFU	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
VOLOS	LARISSA	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
XANTHI	THRACE	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	3	Creating Backlog

[136] Compared across three different methods for estimating criminal disposition time to assess robustness. Sorted according to the first method of estimation and then by court name.

Table 13. Demand and supply for appellate courts (ordered according to population served)

Court	Population	Judges	Judges/100k inhab.	Clerks	Clrk/Jdg	Incoming/100 inhab.	Incoming/judge	Disposed/judge	Pending/judge
ATHENS	3,304,786	311	9	143	0.5	0.60	63	60	89
THESSALONIKI	1,882,108	84	4	65	0.8	0.44	98	92	167
LARISSA	732,762	21	3	19	0.9	0.30	106	123	133
THRACE	608,182	15	2	17	1.1	0.47	190	197	212
PATRAS	548,786	20	4	19	1.0	0.48	131	124	190
PIRAEUS	523,648	37	7	37	1.0	0.42	60	64	109
NAFPLIO	403,903	10	2	12	1.2	0.41	164	186	295
EASTERN CRETE	380,871	10	3	11	1.1	0.42	160	186	266
IOANNINA	293,269	9	3	13	1.4	0.40	130	123	169
WESTERN MACEDONIA	283,689	6	2	6	1.0	0.33	157	178	124
MEDIAN	**283,689**	**8**	**3**	**11**	1.2	**0.42**	**130**	**124**	**159**
EVIA (EUBOIA)	278,345	7	3	11	1.3	0.41	163	134	136
LAMIA	269,045	7	3	9	1.3	0.28	108	107	195
CRETE	242,194	8	3	13	1.6	0.39	117	126	158
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	234,495	6	3	7	1.2	0.35	137	154	175
DODECANESE	190,988	7	4	9	1.3	0.54	148	121	191
KALAMATA	174,000	6	3	7	1.2	0.44	126	128	119
AEGEAN	160,886	7	4	8	1.1	0.40	92	88	96
NORTH AEGEAN	156,372	6	4	8	1.3	0.43	113	117	87
CORFU	147,958	5	3	6	1.2	0.51	151	143	159

Table 14. Average civil and criminal clearance rates and respective trends for appellate courts (2017–2021), ordered lowest to highest according to civil clearance rate

Court	Avg Civil CR '17-'21		Trend '17-'21		Avg Criminal CR '17-'21		Trend '17-'21		Inc./Judge	Clrk/Jdg
CRETE		76%		-10%		128%		-7%	117	1.6
PATRAS		89%		-7%		97%		-9%	131	1.0
CORFU		90%		-4%		96%		6%	151	1.2
EASTERN CRETE		93%		-1%		117%		-10%	160	1.1
NAFPLIO		94%		-10%		124%		-17%	164	1.2
EVIA (EUBOIA)		94%		-4%		74%		3%	163	1.3
NORTH AEGEAN		98%		-20%		95%		-9%	113	1.3
AEGEAN		99%		-7%		87%		-9%	92	1.1
IOANNINA		102%		-4%		95%		-18%	130	1.4
CEPEJ MEDIAN		**104%**				**99%**				**3.3**
WESTERN MACEDONIA		106%		2%		157%		5%	157	1.0
GR MEDIAN		**106%**		**-4%**		**96%**		**-10%**	**130**	**1.2**
LARISSA		106%		-2%		125%		-24%	106	0.9
ATHENS		110%		8%		81%		-12%	63	0.5
PIRAEUS		114%		6%		96%		-31%	60	1.0
DODECANESE		117%		-21%		69%		-13%	148	1.3
LAMIA		119%		11%		112%		-4%	108	1.3
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		121%		-8%		108%		-12%	137	1.2
KALAMATA		124%		-6%		124%		-12%	126	1.2
THRACE		126%		5%		95%		-9%	190	1.1
THESSALONIKI		140%		15%		68%		-10%	98	0.8

Table 15. Civil and criminal disposition times in 2021 and percentage change (2017–2021) for appellate courts[137]

Court	2021 Civil DT		% change '17-'21	2021 Crim. DT Estimate		% change '17-'21	Corrected for Covid		% change '17-'21	As reported		% change '17-'21	Inc./Judge	Clrk/Jdg
NAFPLIO		3,691	228%		228	63%		113	-20%		124	-11%	164	1.2
CRETE		1,927	129%		378	115%		252	44%		190	8%	117	1.6
EASTERN CRETE		1,858	62%		255	92%		146	10%		101	-24%	160	1.1
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS		1,250	98%		383	97%		228	17%		116	-40%	137	1.2
NORTH AEGEAN		1,162	258%		505	189%		314	80%		160	-8%	113	1.3
CORFU		1,102	86%		166	190%		128	123%		75	31%	151	1.2
PATRAS		1,057	104%		688	147%		427	53%		183	-34%	131	1.0
IOANNINA		920	35%		687	138%		514	78%		198	16%	130	1.4
EVIA (EUBOIA)		703	60%		654	58%		481	16%		172	-58%	163	1.3
LARISSA		701	21%		441	71%		241	-6%		95	-44%	106	0.9
GR MEDIAN		**701**	**33%**		**505**	**147%**		**328**	**56%**		**152**	**-12%**	**130**	**1.2**
WESTERN MACEDONIA		601	33%		195	22%		135	-16%		119	-25%	157	1.0
AEGEAN		597	16%		934	499%		438	181%		92	12%	92	1.1
LAMIA		579	-36%		464	50%		395	27%		95	-29%	108	1.3
DODECANESE		483	19%		2,956	1641%		822	384%		1,010	495%	148	1.3
THRACE		454	-36%		466	159%		341	90%		129	-28%	190	1.1
PIRAEUS		400	-25%		1,430	458%		808	215%		152	-12%	60	1.0
ATHENS		389	-40%		1,279	396%		698	171%		183	-8%	63	0.5
KALAMATA		306	-39%		558	185%		310	58%		217	145%	126	1.2
CEPEJ MEDIAN		**177**			**121**			**121**			**121**			**3.3**
THESSALONIKI		104	-82%		1,921	264%		1,186	125%		201	-62%	98	0.8

[137] Criminal disposition times presented separately for the three estimation methods used. Ordered highest to lowest according to civil disposition time.

Table 16. Appellate efficiency categories (EC) according to civil court performance (compared to country median), sorted by efficiency category (worst to best) and then by court name

Court	EC - Civil	
NAFPLIO	6	Very High DT
CRETE	5	Warning
EASTERN CRETE	5	Warning
CORFU	3	Creating Backlog
EVIA (EUBOIA)	3	Creating Backlog
PATRAS	3	Creating Backlog
AEGEAN	2	Standard
ATHENS	2	Standard
DODECANESE	2	Standard
IOANNINA	2	Standard
KALAMATA	2	Standard
LAMIA	2	Standard
LARISSA	2	Standard
NORTH AEGEAN	2	Standard
PIRAEUS	2	Standard
THESSALONIKI	2	Standard
THRACE	2	Standard
WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard

Table 17. Appellate efficiency categories according to criminal court performance (compared to estimated country median)[138]

Court	EC - Crim. DT Estimate		EC - Corrected for Covid		EC - As reported	
DODECANESE	6	Very High DT	5	Warning	6	Very High DT
ATHENS	5	Warning	5	Warning	3	Creating Backlog
PIRAEUS	5	Warning	5	Warning	2	Standard
THESSALONIKI	5	Warning	5	Warning	3	Creating Backlog
AEGEAN	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog
EVIA (EUBOIA)	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog
IOANNINA	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog
NORTH AEGEAN	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog	3	Creating Backlog
CORFU	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
CRETE	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
EASTERN CRETE	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
KALAMATA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
LAMIA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
LARISSA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
NAFPLIO	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
PATRAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
THRACE	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2	Standard	2	Standard	2	Standard

[138] Compared across three different methods for estimating criminal disposition time to assess robustness. Sorted according to the first method of estimation and then by court name.

Table 18. Demand and supply for first instance prosecution offices[139]

Court	Population	Prosec.	Prosecutors/100k inhab.	Clerks	Clrk/Prsc	Incoming/100 inhab.	Incoming/prosecutor	Disposed/prosecutor
ATHENS	3,307,241	143	4.3	354	2.5	4.68	1,082	943
THESSALONIKI	1,110,551	38	3.4	127	3.3	4.20	1,227	1,129
PIRAEUS	523,648	22	4.2	64	2.9	3.32	790	840
HERAKLION	305,490	10	3.3	31	3.1	4.21	1,285	1,208
LARISSA	284,325	9	3.2	28	3.1	2.70	852	790
PATRAS	248,777	11	4.4	31	2.8	4.54	1,027	850
CHALKIDA	210,815	8	3.8	20	2.5	3.49	920	825
VOLOS	203,808	6	2.9	20	3.3	3.22	1,095	862
SERRES	176,430	5	2.8	18	3.6	2.98	1,053	801
IOANNINA	167,901	4	2.4	12	3.0	2.40	1,006	696
LAMIA	158,231	4	2.5	11	2.8	2.82	1,114	702
CHANIA	156,585	5	3.2	16	3.2	2.98	934	918
KOZANI	150,196	3	2.0	12	4.0	2.21	1,106	951
CORINTH	145,082	6	4.1	14	2.3	4.63	1,121	1,109
VEROIA	140,611	3	2.1	17	5.7	2.61	1,222	1,209
KAVALA	138,687	4	2.9	12	3.0	3.30	1,145	1,127
KALAMATA	132,581	4	3.0	14	3.5	4.37	1,448	908
TRIKALA	131,085	3	2.3	16	5.3	1.97	859	839
KATERINI	126,698	3	2.4	17	5.7	3.05	1,288	1,321
RHODES	126,360	6	4.7	14	2.3	4.56	960	854
AGRINIO	119,479	3	2.5	13	4.3	3.48	1,384	1,211
KARDITSA	113,544	3	2.6	16	5.3	2.26	855	752
RODOPI	112,039	3	2.7	9	3.0	2.96	1,106	1,041
XANTHI	111,222	2	1.8	12	6.0	3.77	2,094	1,440
CHALKIDIKI	107,719	4	3.7	9	2.3	4.08	1,098	971
CORFU	104,371	4	3.8	12	3.0	5.65	1,474	1,045
MYTILENE	103,698	4	3.9	11	2.8	4.52	1,171	827
DRAMA	98,287	2	2.0	12	6.0	2.53	1,245	1,224
NAFPLIO	97,044	4	4.1	10	2.5	4.77	1,157	887
ALEXANDROUPOLI	90,759	3	3.3	10	3.3	4.21	1,272	1,041
TRIPOLI	86,685	2	2.3	11	5.5	2.53	1,098	1,065
RETHYMNO	85,609	3	3.5	13	4.3	3.48	992	1,142
MEDIAN	**85,609**	**3**	**3.5**	**10**	**3.5**	**3.48**	**1,070**	**854**
ILIA	84,466	3	3.6	16	5.3	3.80	1,071	813
KILKIS	80,419	2	2.5	9	4.5	2.87	1,156	811
EDESSA	76,558	2	2.6	10	5.0	2.42	926	935
SYROS	75,812	3	4.0	8	2.7	4.31	1,088	845
LASITHI	75,381	3	4.0	8	2.7	3.21	807	689
SPARTA	75,092	2	2.7	6	3.0	2.81	1,054	903
AMALIADA	74,834	2	2.7	16	8.0	3.54	1,324	1,203
MESSOLOGI	73,953	2	2.7	12	6.0	3.63	1,343	1,340
ARTA	67,877	2	2.9	9	4.5	3.23	1,097	1,201
THEBES	67,530	3	4.4	7	2.3	5.67	1,276	714
KOS	64,628	2	3.1	8	4.0	4.57	1,476	1,111
GIANNITSA	63,122	2	3.2	9	4.5	2.39	754	681
PREVEZA	57,491	2	3.5	7	3.5	2.51	721	716
ORESTIADA	57,188	2	3.5	8	4.0	3.55	1,016	829
CHIOS	52,674	2	3.8	7	3.5	2.81	741	685
FLORINA	51,414	2	3.9	4	2.0	2.45	631	538
LIVADIA	50,390	2	4.0	10	5.0	3.56	897	1,002
KASTORIA	50,322	2	4.0	7	3.5	2.63	661	544
AEGIO	44,383	2	4.5	8	4.0	4.58	1,017	957
THESPROTIA	43,587	3	6.9	7	2.3	5.45	792	624
SAMOS	42,859	2	4.7	7	3.5	3.38	724	747
LEFKADA	41,063	2	4.9	6	3.0	5.21	1,070	983
ZAKYNTHOS	40,759	2	4.9	7	3.5	6.90	1,407	850
AMFISSA	40,343	2	5.0	7	3.5	3.16	637	552
NAXOS	39,760	2	5.0	6	3.0	5.75	1,144	857
KEFALONIA	39,032	2	5.1	8	4.0	4.14	807	786
GREVENA	31,757	2	6.3	3	1.5	2.44	388	374
KYPARISSIA	27,373	2	7.3	6	3.0	4.41	603	716
EURYTANIA	20,081	1	5.0	5	5.0	1.85	372	399
KALAVRYTA	16,535	1	6.0	5	5.0	3.34	552	421
GYTHIO	14,046	2	14.2	4	2.0	6.32	444	488

[139] Ordered according to population served. Incoming refers to incoming complaints. Disposed refers to cases discontinued/permanently archived plus cases sent to court for the first time.

Table 19. Average clearance rates and respective trends for first instance prosecution offices (2017–2021)[140]

Prosecution Office	Appellate Region	Avg CR '17-'21	Trend '17-'21	Inc./Pros.	Clrk/Prsc
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	63%	1%	1,276	2.3
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	64%	-1%	1,448	3.5
LAMIA	LAMIA	65%	-1%	1,114	2.8
ILIA	PATRAS	70%	-3%	1,071	5.3
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	70%	-5%	1,407	3.5
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	71%	-4%	1,006	3.0
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	75%	-8%	552	5.0
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	76%	-10%	1,053	3.6
SYROS	AEGEAN	76%	-7%	1,088	2.7
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	76%	5%	1,171	2.8
VOLOS	LARISSA	76%	4%	1,095	3.3
KOS	DODECANESE	78%	-2%	1,476	4.0
PATRAS	PATRAS	78%	-12%	1,027	2.8
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	78%	-11%	661	3.5
NAXOS	AEGEAN	79%	4%	1,144	3.0
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	79%	-3%	920	2.5
LASITHI	EASTERN CRETE	81%	-11%	807	2.7
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	82%	0%	1,156	4.5
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	82%	-3%	1,054	3.0
ORESTIADA	THRACE	84%	6%	1,016	4.0
RHODES	DODECANESE	84%	0%	960	2.3
RODOPI	THRACE	84%	-10%	1,106	3.0
XANTHI	THRACE	86%	-1%	2,094	6.0
THESPROTIA	CORFU	86%	-3%	792	2.3
KARDITSA	LARISSA	87%	-2%	855	5.3
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	88%	-7%	1,343	6.0
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	88%	-5%	1,227	3.3
DRAMA	THRACE	89%	-10%	1,245	6.0
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	89%	3%	1,272	3.3
CORFU	CORFU	90%	18%	1,474	3.0
LARISSA	LARISSA	90%	-6%	852	3.1
AMALIADA	PATRAS	91%	-5%	1,324	8.0
GR MEDIAN		**91%**	**-5%**	**1,070**	**3.5**
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	91%	-5%	1,222	5.7
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	91%	-5%	741	3.5
ATHENS	ATHENS	92%	-6%	1,082	2.5
HERAKLION	EASTERN CRETE	93%	-12%	1,285	3.1
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	93%	-6%	1,384	4.3
CHALKIDIKI	THESSALONIKI	93%	-5%	1,098	2.3
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	93%	-24%	1,106	4.0
KAVALA	THRACE	94%	-4%	1,145	3.0
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	94%	-5%	388	1.5
AMFISSA	LAMIA	94%	-11%	637	3.5
AEGIO	PATRAS	94%	-13%	1,017	4.0
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	94%	-5%	926	5.0
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	94%	1%	754	4.5
TRIKALA	LARISSA	95%	-9%	859	5.3
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	95%	2%	1,070	3.0
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	96%	-14%	1,121	2.3
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	96%	-7%	1,157	2.5
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	96%	-6%	790	2.9
CEPEJ MEDIAN		**97%**			**1.3**
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	97%	-12%	631	2.0
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	97%	-7%	1,288	5.7
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	98%	-20%	1,098	5.5
KEFALONIA	PATRAS	99%	2%	807	4.0
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	100%	-4%	721	3.5
CHANIA	CRETE	101%	-10%	934	3.2
SAMOS	AEGEAN	104%	10%	724	3.5
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	105%	0%	603	3.0
ARTA	IOANNINA	105%	-8%	1,097	4.5
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	107%	-4%	444	2.0
RETHYMNO	CRETE	109%	-10%	992	4.3
LIVADIA	LAMIA	114%	-9%	897	5.0
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	116%	-6%	372	5.0

[140] Ordered lowest to highest according to clearance rate. Clearance rate here is the percentage of incoming complaints that are disposed (that is, discontinued/permanently archived or sent to court, excluding postponed cases).

Table 20. Demand and supply for appellate prosecution offices[141]

Court	Population	Prosec.	Prosecutors/100k inhab.	Clerks	Clrk/Prsc	Incoming/100 inhab.	Incoming/prosecutor	Disposed/prosecutor
ATHENS	3,304,786	99	3.0	90	0.9	0.29	97	98
THESSALONIKI	1,882,108	26	1.4	37	1.4	0.23	168	194
LARISSA	732,762	7	1.0	18	2.6	0.10	101	156
THRACE	608,182	4	0.7	7	1.8	0.24	359	554
PATRAS	548,786	9	1.6	19	2.1	0.16	99	174
PIRAEUS	523,648	14	2.7	22	1.6	0.22	81	90
NAFPLIO	403,903	4	1.0	9	2.3	0.19	193	271
EASTERN CRETE	380,871	4	1.1	9	2.3	0.17	160	249
IOANNINA	293,269	3	1.0	8	2.7	0.14	138	220
WESTERN MACEDO	283,689	3	1.1	10	3.3	0.13	122	219
MEDIAN	**283,689**	**3**	**1.1**	**8**	**2.7**	**0.17**	**132**	**219**
EVIA (EUBOIA)	278,345	3	1.1	8	2.7	0.13	124	239
LAMIA	269,045	3	1.1	6	2.0	0.13	118	140
CRETE	242,194	4	1.7	11	2.8	0.15	93	145
WESTERN STEREA	234,495	2	0.9	7	3.5	0.16	192	259
DODECANESE	190,988	3	1.6	8	2.7	0.21	131	210
KALAMATA	174,000	2	1.1	8	4.0	0.18	153	260
AEGEAN	160,886	2	1.2	7	3.5	0.16	132	200
NORTH AEGEAN	156,372	2	1.3	7	3.5	0.22	173	251
CORFU	147,958	2	1.4	6	3.0	0.27	202	240

Table 21. Average clearance rates and respective trends for appellate prosecution offices (2017–2021)[142]

Prosecution Office	Avg CR '17-'21	Trend '17-'21	Inc./Pros.	Clrk/Prsc
ATHENS	105%	1%	97	0.9
LAMIA	117%	20%	118	2.0
DODECANESE	127%	1%	131	2.7
AEGEAN	131%	1%	132	3.5
THESSALONIKI	131%	20%	168	1.4
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	134%	13%	192	3.5
CRETE	135%	23%	93	2.8
CORFU	139%	10%	202	3.0
PIRAEUS	141%	26%	81	1.6
IOANNINA	152%	31%	138	2.7
GR MEDIAN	**152%**	**24%**	**132**	**2.0**
NAFPLIO	154%	26%	193	2.3
KALAMATA	157%	45%	153	4.0
WESTERN MACEDONIA	158%	34%	122	3.3
EASTERN CRETE	160%	22%	160	2.3
PATRAS	166%	24%	99	2.1
NORTH AEGEAN	170%	42%	173	3.5
THRACE	175%	28%	359	1.8
LARISSA	189%	40%	101	2.6
EVIA (EUBOIA)	198%	60%	124	2.7

[141] Ordered according to population served. Incoming is appeals and new cases sent straight to the appellate prosecution offices. Disposed is cases sent to court.

[142] Ordered lowest to highest according to clearance rate. Clearance rate here is the percentage of incoming appeals and new cases that are sent to court.

Table 22. Courtrooms per judge for magistrate courts with more than two judges (approved judicial positions), ordered according to ratio of courtroom per judge—largest to smallest

Court (judges >2)	Appellate Region	Courtrooms	Judges	Courtrooms Per Judge
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	1.8	3	0.60
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	2.32	4	0.58
KOMOTINI	THRACE	2.05	4	0.51
MEDIAN				**0.5**
AEGIALIA	PATRAS	1.39	3	0.46
ARTA	IOANNINA	2	5	0.40
AMFISSA	LAMIA	1	3	0.33
KASTELLI	EASTERN CRETE	1	3	0.33
MELOS	AEGEAN	1	3	0.33
SINTIKI	THESSALONIKI	1	3	0.33
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	1.85	6	0.31
PYRGOS (ILIA)	PATRAS	1.2	4	0.30
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	1.2	4	0.30
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	1.4	5	0.28
TRIKALA	LARISSA	1.62	6	0.27
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	0.75	3	0.25
LAGADAS	THESSALONIKI	1	4	0.25
SALAMINA	PIRAEUS	1	4	0.25
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	1.23	5	0.25
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	1.2	5	0.24
CORFU	CORFU	1.44	6	0.24
KAVALA	THRACE	1.4	6	0.23
PATRAS	PATRAS	5.22	24	0.22
LIVADIA	LAMIA	1.05	5	0.21
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	1.2	6	0.20
ELEUSINA	ATHENS	1	5	0.20
LAVRIO	ATHENS	1	5	0.20
MARATHON	ATHENS	1	5	0.20
MEGARA	ATHENS	1	5	0.20
KROPIA	ATHENS	2	10	0.20
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	1.16	6	0.19
XANTHI	THRACE	0.75	4	0.19
CHALANDRI	ATHENS	2	11	0.18
RHODES	DODECANESE	1.2	7	0.17
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	0.5	3	0.17
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	0.82	5	0.16
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	1.8	11	0.16
IGOUMENITSA	CORFU	0.6	4	0.15
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	0.75	5	0.15
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	0.9	6	0.15
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	1	7	0.14
LARISSA	LARISSA	1.85	13	0.14
MAROUSSI	ATHENS	2	15	0.13
ATHENS	ATHENS	24.08	186	0.13
KARDITSA	LARISSA	0.9	7	0.13
HERAKLION (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	1.6	13	0.12
RETHYMNO	CRETE	0.6	5	0.12
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	0.72	6	0.12
DRAMA	THRACE	0.8	7	0.11
PERISTERI	ATHENS	1	9	0.11
NEAPOLI (LASITHI)	EASTERN CRETE	0.4	4	0.10
ILION	ATHENS	1	10	0.10
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	6	72	0.08
NEA IONIA	ATHENS	1	11	0.09
NIKEA	PIRAEUS	1	11	0.09
CHANIA	CRETE	0.8	9	0.09
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	2	23	0.09
KALLITHEA	ATHENS	1	12	0.08
ACHARNES	ATHENS	1	13	0.08
VOLOS	LARISSA	0.6	10	0.06
LAMIA	LAMIA	0.6	10	0.06
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	0.2	4	0.05
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	0.4	9	0.04

Table 23. Courtrooms per judge for magistrate courts with one or two judges (approved judicial positions), ordered according to ratio of courtroom per judge—largest to smallest

Court (judges <=2)	Appellate Region	Courtrooms	Judges	Courtrooms Per Judge
SIKYONA	NAFPLIO	2	1	2.00
AEGINA	PIRAEUS	1	1	1.00
AKRATA	PATRAS	1	1	1.00
AMYNTEO	WESTERN MACEDONIA	1	1	1.00
ANDROS	AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
ARINI	PATRAS	1	1	1.00
ASTROS	NAFPLIO	1	1	1.00
ATALANTI	LAMIA	1	1	1.00
VAMOS	CRETE	1	1	1.00
VONITSA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	1	1	1.00
GASTOUNI	PATRAS	1	1	1.00
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	1	1	1.00
DIDYMOTICHO	THRACE	1	1	1.00
DYMI	PATRAS	1	1	1.00
EPIDAVROS (LIMIRA)	NAFPLIO	1	1	1.00
THASOS	THRACE	1	1	1.00
THERA	AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
IERAPETRA	EASTERN CRETE	1	1	1.00
ISTIEA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	1	1	1.00
KALAMPAKA	LARISSA	1	1	1.00
KALAVRIA	PIRAEUS	1	1	1.00
KALLONI (LESVOS)	NORTH AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
KALYMNOS	DODECANESE	1	1	1.00
KARLOVASI	AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
KARPATHOS	DODECANESE	1	1	1.00
KARYSTOS	EVIA (EUBOIA)	1	1	1.00
KASSANDRA	THESSALONIKI	1	1	1.00
KOLINDROS	THESSALONIKI	1	1	1.00
KONITSA	IOANNINA	1	1	1.00
KYTHERA	PIRAEUS	1	1	1.00
MASSITOS	NAFPLIO	1	1	1.00
MEGALOPOLI	NAFPLIO	1	1	1.00
MOIRES	EASTERN CRETE	1	1	1.00
MYKONOS	AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
NAFPAKTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	1	1	1.00
NEAPOLI (VION LAKONIA)	KALAMATA	1	1	1.00
NEMEA	NAFPLIO	1	1	1.00
NIGRITA	THESSALONIKI	1	1	1.00
OLYMPIA	PATRAS	1	1	1.00
PANGAION	THRACE	1	1	1.00
PAROS	AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
PLOMARI	NORTH AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
PYLOS	KALAMATA	1	1	1.00
PYRGOS (CRETE)	EASTERN CRETE	1	1	1.00
SAMI	PATRAS	1	1	1.00
SITIA	EASTERN CRETE	1	1	1.00
SPETSES	PIRAEUS	1	1	1.00

TAMINEOI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	1	1	1.00
TINOS	AEGEAN	1	1	1.00
FARSALA	LARISSA	1	1	1.00
PSOFIDA	NAFPLIO	1	1	1.00
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	1	1	1.00
ARGOS	NAFPLIO	2	2	1.00
ORESTIADA	THRACE	1.62	2	0.81
IKARIA	AEGEAN	0.8	1	0.80
SAMOS	AEGEAN	0.6	1	0.60
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	1.1	2	0.55
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	1.05	2	0.53
LEMNOS	NORTH AEGEAN	0.5	1	0.50
ALEXANDRIA (IMATHIA)	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
ALMIROS	LARISSA	1	2	0.50
ALMOPIA	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
ARNEA	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
VALTOS	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	1	2	0.50
VASILIKA	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
ELASSONA	LARISSA	1	2	0.50
KOUFALIA	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
KYMI	EVIA (EUBOIA)	1	2	0.50
LEROS	DODECANESE	1	2	0.50
MYRTOUNTIA	PATRAS	1	2	0.50
NAXOS	AEGEAN	1	2	0.50
NAOUSSA	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
NEA MOUDANIA	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
XYLOKASTRO	NAFPLIO	1	2	0.50
PLATAMODES	KALAMATA	1	2	0.50
POLYKASTRO	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
RODOLIVOS	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
SKOPELOS	LARISSA	1	2	0.50
SKYDRA	THESSALONIKI	1	2	0.50
MEDIAN				**0.5**
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	0.46	1	0.46
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	0.93	2	0.46
POLYGYROS	THESSALONIKI	0.9	2	0.45
EORDEA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	0.8	2	0.40
AMALIADA	PATRAS	0.75	2	0.38
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	0.6	2	0.30
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	0.6	2	0.30
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	0.6	2	0.30
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	0.6	2	0.30
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	0.46	2	0.23
ARGOSTOLI	PATRAS	0.4	2	0.20
KOS	DODECANESE	0.4	2	0.20
ERMOUPOLI	AEGEAN	0.3	2	0.15

Table 24. Courtrooms per judge for first instance courts (ordered according to ratio of courtroom per judge—largest to smallest)

Court	Appellate Region	Courtrooms	Judges	Courtrooms Per Judge
ORESTIADA	THRACE	7	4	1.75
AEGIO	PATRAS	6	5	1.20
VEROIA	THESSALONIKI	10	10	1.00
THEBES	EVIA (EUBOIA)	5.6	7	0.80
TRIKALA	LARISSA	7	9	0.78
KALAVRYTA	PATRAS	3	4	0.75
EURYTANIA	LAMIA	1.95	3	0.65
THESPROTIA	CORFU	3.2	5	0.64
LEFKADA	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2.4	4	0.60
KATERINI	THESSALONIKI	4.8	9	0.53
TRIPOLI	NAFPLIO	3.2	6	0.53
CHALKIDIKI	THESSALONIKI	5.1	10	0.51
GREVENA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	2	4	0.50
GYTHIO	KALAMATA	2	4	0.50
KYPARISSIA	KALAMATA	2	4	0.50
SPARTA	NAFPLIO	2.4	5	0.48
FLORINA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	1.9	4	0.48
DRAMA	THRACE	3.2	7	0.46
ZAKYNTHOS	PATRAS	2.25	5	0.45
KAVALA	THRACE	5.6	13	0.43
AMFISSA	LAMIA	2	5	0.40
KEFALONIA	PATRAS	1.58	4	0.40
AGRINIO	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	3	8	0.38
AMALIADA	PATRAS	2.25	6	0.38
MESSOLOGI	WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2.25	6	0.38
NAFPLIO	NAFPLIO	3.75	10	0.38
XANTHI	THRACE	2.25	6	0.38
GIANNITSA	THESSALONIKI	1.8	5	0.36
PREVEZA	IOANNINA	1.8	5	0.36
SAMOS	AEGEAN	1.4	4	0.35
RETHYMNO	CRETE	2.4	7	0.34
MEDIAN				**0.34**
KALAMATA	KALAMATA	3.73	11	0.34
KOS	DODECANESE	1.6	5	0.32
LIVADIA	LAMIA	1.83	6	0.31
KILKIS	THESSALONIKI	1.8	6	0.30
KARDITSA	LARISSA	2.1	7	0.30
SYROS	AEGEAN	2.1	7	0.30
EDESSA	THESSALONIKI	1.4	5	0.28
KASTORIA	WESTERN MACEDONIA	1.4	5	0.28
LASITHI	EASTERN CRETE	1.6	6	0.27
CORINTH	NAFPLIO	3.6	14	0.26
ILIA	PATRAS	1.8	7	0.26
NAXOS	AEGEAN	1	4	0.25
SERRES	THESSALONIKI	2.8	12	0.23
LAMIA	LAMIA	2.4	11	0.22
CHIOS	NORTH AEGEAN	1.08	5	0.22
ARTA	IOANNINA	1.1	6	0.18
MYTILENE	NORTH AEGEAN	1.7	10	0.17
ATHENS	ATHENS	70.92	434	0.16
PATRAS	PATRAS	4.89	30	0.16
THESSALONIKI	THESSALONIKI	20	125	0.16
CHALKIDA	EVIA (EUBOIA)	3	19	0.16
VOLOS	LARISSA	2.4	16	0.15
CHANIA	CRETE	2	14	0.14
RODOPI	THRACE	1	7	0.14
ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	1.1	9	0.12
RHODES	DODECANESE	1.6	14	0.11
HERAKLION	EASTERN CRETE	2.5	26	0.10
IOANNINA	IOANNINA	1.2	13	0.09
KOZANI	WESTERN MACEDONIA	0.8	10	0.08
LARISSA	LARISSA	1.35	22	0.06
PIRAEUS	PIRAEUS	4.2	84	0.05
CORFU	CORFU	0.2	13	0.02

Table 25. Courtrooms per judge for appellate courts (ordered according to ratio of courtroom per judge—largest to smallest)

Court	Courtrooms	Judges	Courtrooms Per Judge
KALAMATA	9	6	1.50
CORFU	7	5	1.40
THRACE	9	15	0.60
WESTERN MACEDONIA	3.2	6	0.53
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	3	6	0.50
LARISSA	7.65	21	0.36
PIRAEUS	9.8	37	0.26
IOANNINA	1.6	9	0.18
CRETE	1.2	8	0.15
DODECANESE	1	7	0.14
EVIA	1	7	0.14
LAMIA	1	7	0.14
MEDIAN			**0.14**
NAFPLIO	1	10	0.10
ATHENS	30	311	0.10
EASTERN CRETE	0.9	10	0.09
PATRAS	1.71	20	0.09
THESSALONIKI	7	84	0.08
NORTH AEGEAN	0.4	6	0.07
AEGEAN	0.3	7	0.04

ANNEX 2. Tables Detailing Judicial Services' Expenditures

Table 26. Total annual costs of all civil and criminal courts and prosecution offices[143] per funding source and expense type (averages for 2019–2021)

ALL COURTS AND PROSECUTION OFFICES	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			GRAND TOTAL (€)
	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
	3,003,160.69	1,773,286.87	2,199,765.80	2,226,414.52	9,202,627.89	315,134,656.81	2,024,163.72	18,298,650.73	758,991.32	73,960.42	336,290,422.99	315,134,656.81	28,131,979.55	2,226,414.52	345,493,050.88
in % of FUNDING SOURCE SUBTOTAL	32.63%	19.27%	23.90%	24.19%	100.00%	93.71%	0.60%	5.44%	0.23%	0.02%	100.00%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of EXPENSE TYPE SUBTOTAL	10.68%	6.30%	7.82%	100.00%	n/a	100.00%	7.20%	65.05%	2.70%	0.26%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of GRAND TOTAL	**0.87%**	**0.51%**	**0.64%**	**0.64%**	**2.66%**	**91.21%**	**0.59%**	**5.30%**	**0.22%**	**0.02%**	**97.34%**	**91.21%**	**8.14%**	**0.64%**	**100.00%**

Table 27. Total annual costs of magistrate courts per funding source and expense type (averages for 2019-2021).

MAGISTRATE COURTS	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			GRAND SUBTOTAL (€)
	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
	646,287.59	235,128.31	396,791.11	338,753.58	1,616,960.59	60,296,491.83	1,174,376.20	3,774,200.33	168,901.43	5,763.62	65,419,733.41	60,296,491.83	6,401,448.59	338,753.58	67,036,694.00
in % of FUNDING SOURCE SUBTOTAL	39.97%	14.54%	24.54%	20.95%	100.00%	92.17%	1.80%	5.77%	0.26%	0.01%	100.00%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of EXPENSE TYPE SUBTOTAL	10.10%	3.67%	6.20%	100.00%	n/a	100.00%	18.35%	58.96%	2.64%	0.09%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of GRAND SUBTOTAL	**0.96%**	**0.35%**	**0.59%**	**0.51%**	**2.41%**	**89.95%**	**1.75%**	**5.63%**	**0.25%**	**0.01%**	**97.59%**	**89.95%**	**9.55%**	**0.51%**	**19.40%**
in % of TOTAL	21.52%	13.26%	18.04%	15.22%	17.57%	19.13%	58.02%	20.63%	22.25%	7.79%	19%	19%	23%	15%	19%

Table 28. Total annual costs of petty crimes courts (with organic petty crime positions) per funding source and expense type (averages for 2019-2021).

PETTY CRIME COURTS	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			GRAND SUBTOTAL (€)
	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
	122,132.67	51,599.11	79,479.24	66,615.24	319,826.26	13,943,786.56	193,320.46	796,865.22	27,837.47	1,245.55	14,963,055.26	13,943,786.56	1,272,479.72	66,615.24	15,282,881.52
in % of FUNDING SOURCE SUBTOTAL	38.19%	16.13%	24.85%	20.83%	100.00%	93.19%	1.29%	5.33%	0.19%	0.01%	100.00%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of EXPENSE TYPE SUBTOTAL	9.60%	4.06%	6.25%	100.00%	n/a	100.00%	15.19%	62.62%	2.19%	0.10%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of GRAND SUBTOTAL	**0.80%**	**0.34%**	**0.52%**	**0.44%**	**2.09%**	**91.24%**	**1.26%**	**5.21%**	**0.18%**	**0.01%**	**97.91%**	**91.24%**	**8.33%**	**0.44%**	**4.42%**
in % of TOTAL	4.07%	2.91%	3.61%	2.99%	3.48%	4.42%	9.55%	4.35%	3.67%	1.68%	4%	4%	5%	3%	4%

Table 29. Total annual costs of first instance courts per funding source and expense type (averages for 2019-2021).

FIRST INSTANCE COURTS	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			GRAND SUBTOTAL (€)
	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
	918,661.34	724,285.25	841,676.77	936,756.52	3,421,379.88	103,135,517.06	347,579.25	6,296,204.87	315,264.25	32,503.03	110,127,068.46	103,135,517.06	9,476,174.75	936,756.52	113,548,448.33
in % of FUNDING SOURCE SUBTOTAL	26.85%	21.17%	24.60%	27.38%	100.00%	93.65%	0.32%	5.72%	0.29%	0.03%	100.00%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of EXPENSE TYPE SUBTOTAL	9.69%	7.64%	8.88%	100.00%	n/a	100.00%	3.67%	66.44%	3.33%	0.34%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of GRAND SUBTOTAL	**0.81%**	**0.64%**	**0.74%**	**0.82%**	**3.01%**	**90.83%**	**0.31%**	**5.54%**	**0.28%**	**0.03%**	**96.99%**	**90.83%**	**8.35%**	**0.82%**	**32.87%**
in % of TOTAL	30.59%	40.84%	38.26%	42.07%	37.18%	32.73%	17.17%	34.41%	41.54%	43.95%	33%	33%	34%	42%	33%

Table 30. Total annual costs of first instance prosecution offices per funding source and expense type (averages for 2019-2021).

FIRST INSTANCE PROSECUTION	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			GRAND SUBTOTAL (€)
	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
	495,383.17	264,227.90	326,320.25	377,002.66	1,462,933.99	50,342,458.07	147,768.90	3,173,699.99	145,939.56	14,580.96	53,824,447.48	50,342,458.07	4,567,920.73	377,002.66	55,287,381.46
in % of FUNDING SOURCE SUBTOTAL	33.86%	18.06%	22.31%	25.77%	100.00%	93.53%	0.27%	5.90%	0.27%	0.03%	100.00%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of EXPENSE TYPE SUBTOTAL	10.84%	5.78%	7.14%	100.00%	n/a	100.00%	3.23%	69.48%	3.19%	0.32%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of GRAND SUBTOTAL	**0.90%**	**0.48%**	**0.59%**	**0.68%**	**2.65%**	**91.06%**	**0.27%**	**5.74%**	**0.26%**	**0.03%**	**97.35%**	**91.06%**	**8.26%**	**0.68%**	**16.00%**
in % of TOTAL	16.50%	14.90%	14.83%	16.93%	15.90%	15.97%	7.30%	17.34%	19.23%	19.71%	16%	16%	16%	17%	16%

[143] Not including the Supreme Court.

Table 31. Total annual costs of appellate courts per funding source and expense type (averages for 2019–2021)

APPELLATE COURTS	TAXΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			GRAND SUBTOTAL (€)
	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
	696,467.14	**411,634.81**	**433,934.21**	**380,603.67**	**1,922,639.83**	**62,478,190.68**	**107,357.43**	**2,903,896.78**	**75,583.85**	**15,571.04**	**65,580,599.78**	**62,478,190.68**	**4,644,445.27**	**380,603.67**	**67,503,239.61**
in % of FUNDING SOURCE SUBTOTAL	36.22%	21.41%	22.57%	19.80%	**100.00%**	95.27%	0.16%	4.43%	0.12%	0.02%	**100.00%**	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of EXPENSE TYPE SUBTOTAL	15.00%	8.86%	9.34%	100.00%	n/a	100.00%	2.31%	62.52%	1.63%	0.34%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of GRAND SUBTOTAL	**1.03%**	**0.61%**	**0.64%**	**0.56%**	**2.85%**	**92.56%**	**0.16%**	**4.30%**	**0.11%**	**0.02%**	**97.15%**	**92.56%**	**6.88%**	**0.56%**	**19.54%**
in % of TOTAL	23.19%	23.21%	19.73%	17.09%	**20.89%**	19.83%	5.30%	15.87%	9.96%	21.05%	**20%**	**20%**	**17%**	**17%**	**20%**

Table 32. Total annual costs of appellate prosecution offices per funding source and expense type (averages for 2019–2021)

APPELLATE PROSECUTION	TAXΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			GRAND SUBTOTAL (€)
	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
	124,228.79	**86,411.50**	**121,564.21**	**126,682.85**	**458,887.35**	**24,938,212.61**	**53,761.49**	**1,353,783.54**	**25,464.74**	**4,296.22**	**26,375,518.61**	**24,938,212.61**	**1,769,510.49**	**126,682.85**	**26,834,405.96**
in % of FUNDING SOURCE SUBTOTAL	27.07%	18.83%	26.49%	27.61%	**100.00%**	94.55%	0.20%	5.13%	0.10%	0.02%	**100.00%**	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of EXPENSE TYPE SUBTOTAL	7.02%	4.88%	6.87%	100.00%	n/a	100.00%	3.04%	76.51%	1.44%	0.24%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
in % of GRAND SUBTOTAL	**0.46%**	**0.32%**	**0.45%**	**0.47%**	**1.71%**	**92.93%**	**0.20%**	**5.04%**	**0.09%**	**0.02%**	**98.29%**	**92.93%**	**6.59%**	**0.47%**	**7.77%**
in % of TOTAL	4.14%	4.87%	5.53%	5.69%	**4.99%**	7.91%	2.66%	7.40%	3.36%	5.81%	**8%**	**8%**	**6%**	**6%**	**8%**

Table 33. Average annual costs of magistrate courts (2019–2021) per funding source and expense type (ordered by total cost, highest to lowest)[144]

MAGISTRATE COURTS	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			TOTAL (€)
Judicial service	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
ATHENS	78,386.44	7,330.47	43,138.71	31,004.60	159,860.22	13,340,769.20	-	749,909.01	-	150.00	14,090,828.21	13,340,769.20	878,914.62	31,004.60	14,250,688.42
THESSALONIKI	53,666.30	18,957.18	24,854.71	29,925.99	127,404.19	6,030,313.18	-	227,305.14	19,380.21	-	6,276,998.53	6,030,313.18	344,163.55	29,925.99	6,404,402.72
PIRAEUS	8,666.67	3,000.00	12,522.67	5,925.47	30,114.80	2,033,109.05	76,340.76	90,506.03	4,151.00	26.91	2,204,133.75	2,033,109.05	195,214.03	5,925.47	2,234,248.55
PATRAS	9,192.00	1,204.92	2,278.35	5,970.00	18,645.27	1,484,896.93	15,495.24	10,375.53	-	314.28	1,511,081.99	1,484,896.93	38,860.33	5,970.00	1,529,727.26
LARISSA	7,533.84	5,679.25	3,569.28	2,849.22	19,631.58	1,396,545.66	-	44,771.46	-	-	1,441,317.12	1,396,545.66	61,553.82	2,849.22	1,460,948.70
MAROUSSI	7,659.91	1,404.31	4,520.56	-	13,584.78	1,161,603.03	115,776.00	120,269.33	-	-	1,397,648.37	1,161,603.03	249,630.11	-	1,411,233.14
HERAKLION (CRETE)	9,636.90	5,508.61	7,134.64	6,136.57	28,416.73	1,134,273.94	60,000.00	25,753.86	-	-	1,220,027.80	1,134,273.94	108,034.01	6,136.57	1,248,444.53
ACHARNES	7,404.58	1,063.38	571.33	-	9,039.29	1,004,664.59	27,985.68	18,084.73	2,999.67	-	1,053,734.67	1,004,664.59	58,109.37	-	1,062,773.97
KALLITHEA	6,893.92	1,736.15	3,518.50	-	12,148.58	943,939.50	45,561.60	58,099.00	-	-	1,047,600.10	943,939.50	115,809.18	-	1,059,748.67
NEA IONIA	4,780.25	2,035.25	1,802.91	-	8,618.41	901,554.56	52,545.96	27,965.00	-	-	982,065.52	901,554.56	89,129.37	-	990,683.93
VOLOS	4,686.69	3,334.07	4,875.71	3,184.17	16,080.65	870,423.36	3,401.20	37,682.84	-	-	911,507.40	870,423.36	53,980.51	3,184.17	927,588.05
CHALANDRI	6,383.26	1,085.57	3,163.40	-	10,632.23	680,589.31	120,807.96	73,153.87	-	-	874,551.14	680,589.31	204,594.06	-	885,183.37
KROPIA	7,404.58	651.00	3,709.66	-	11,765.24	792,447.63	54,374.52	21,968.77	-	-	868,790.92	792,447.63	88,108.53	-	880,556.16
NIKEA	6,800.00	371.00	2,066.67	5,068.80	14,306.47	787,661.34	22,298.16	24,903.67	1,481.67	21.50	836,366.33	787,661.34	57,942.66	5,068.80	850,672.80
LAMIA	1,263.88	2,743.94	5,011.05	17,266.94	26,285.82	646,796.95	6,005.80	72,832.85	2,878.79	133.33	728,647.71	646,796.95	90,869.64	17,266.94	754,933.53
PERISTERI	5,106.61	1,703.76	4,104.19	-	10,914.56	675,392.99	25,039.92	30,250.67	-	-	730,683.58	675,392.99	66,205.15	-	741,598.14
IOANNINA	1,527.27	7,445.45	9,488.33	3,381.77	21,842.83	651,291.05	-	46,726.70	-	-	698,017.74	651,291.05	65,187.76	3,381.77	719,860.57
ILION	5,361.94	1,573.00	339.35	-	7,274.29	621,374.06	17,136.48	16,557.00	952.09	-	656,019.63	621,374.06	41,919.86	-	663,293.92
CORINTH	4,322.67	1,683.33	2,616.67	4,769.00	13,391.67	597,564.00	-	41,463.33	-	-	639,027.33	597,564.00	50,086.00	4,769.00	652,419.00
KARDITSA	5,179.34	3,905.99	5,319.97	16,342.72	30,748.01	593,554.69	-	24,438.90	2,791.04	-	620,784.63	593,554.69	41,635.23	16,342.72	651,532.64
CHANIA	2,638.33	1,906.67	4,314.33	4,039.93	12,899.26	603,727.71	-	6,488.02	1,379.87	-	611,595.59	603,727.71	16,727.22	4,039.93	624,494.85
TRIKALA	4,543.31	6,059.01	4,329.29	2,447.33	17,378.94	528,744.31	-	72,392.22	3,332.01	-	604,468.55	528,744.31	90,655.84	2,447.33	621,847.49
CHALKIDA	7,796.58	2,876.39	7,266.43	2,117.00	20,056.39	501,039.19	29,622.48	33,937.24	-	7.96	564,606.87	501,039.19	81,507.07	2,117.00	584,663.26
KAVALA	15,796.86	1,218.40	2,287.66	3,937.60	23,240.53	460,118.79	-	71,203.26	4,575.63	720.00	536,617.69	460,118.79	95,801.82	3,937.60	559,858.22
MESSOLOGI	2,053.32	100.00	3,106.85	2,479.37	7,739.53	513,886.92	-	33,064.35	1,063.33	-	548,014.60	513,886.92	39,387.85	2,479.37	555,754.13
DRAMA	4,976.51	1,615.09	1,026.67	1,609.00	9,227.27	508,342.24	-	32,841.39	3,750.00	-	544,933.63	508,342.24	44,209.66	1,609.00	554,160.90
ARTA	3,113.65	1,828.57	5,874.79	1,259.63	12,076.65	496,666.30	15,908.57	17,091.54	1,241.90	-	530,908.32	496,666.30	45,059.04	1,259.63	542,984.97
AGRINIO	2,702.80	-	3,673.83	2,426.19	8,802.82	438,773.18	-	41,135.25	-	-	479,908.43	438,773.18	47,511.87	2,426.19	488,711.25
KALAMATA	8,713.26	12,673.84	21,021.51	916.67	43,325.27	369,632.93	-	72,295.76	-	-	441,928.69	369,632.93	114,704.36	916.67	485,253.96
KATERINI	5,565.39	3,642.30	1,626.28	570.27	11,404.24	418,723.13	-	51,198.47	3,653.93	-	473,575.53	418,723.13	65,686.37	570.27	484,979.77
SERRES	5,167.87	268.42	-	1,577.13	7,013.42	432,039.54	-	26,276.73	2,659.79	-	460,976.06	432,039.54	34,372.81	1,577.13	467,989.48
ALEXANDROUPOLI	-	1,663.30	8,255.10	2,625.24	12,543.64	429,226.56	-	8,994.77	2,607.33	268.10	441,096.77	429,226.56	21,788.60	2,625.24	453,640.41
CORFU	15,601.86	11,329.91	11,125.24	359.56	38,416.58	295,680.03	-	113,510.37	-	-	409,190.40	295,680.03	151,567.39	359.56	447,606.98
VEROIA	3,975.28	300.00	138.33	1,326.00	5,739.61	378,104.29	-	52,154.46	2,802.63	-	433,061.38	378,104.29	59,370.70	1,326.00	438,801.00
XANTHI	4,720.48	2,537.66	2,077.55	3,952.40	13,288.09	357,984.80	-	23,070.57	2,340.43	-	383,395.79	357,984.80	34,746.68	3,952.40	396,683.88
LIVADIA	4,345.36	2,547.53	3,909.11	12,518.27	23,320.28	334,790.28	-	35,353.87	2,952.00	-	373,096.15	334,790.28	49,107.88	12,518.27	396,416.43
KOZANI	4,111.11	700.00	2,455.56	684.54	7,951.21	356,974.40	-	26,661.48	2,833.33	-	386,469.22	356,974.40	36,761.48	684.54	394,420.43
IGOUMENITSA	12,258.60	8,902.07	8,741.26	2,679.47	32,581.41	311,374.79	-	49,545.36	-	-	360,920.15	311,374.79	79,447.30	2,679.47	393,501.55
PREVEZA	4,059.00	-	5,236.00	2,211.13	11,506.13	337,403.59	-	42,810.53	1,305.86	-	381,519.97	337,403.59	53,411.38	2,211.13	393,026.11
LAGADAS	5,856.58	897.54	902.79	116.00	7,772.90	361,551.10	7,675.08	7,418.17	-	-	376,644.35	361,551.10	22,750.16	116.00	384,417.25
RETHYMNO	3,794.56	2,266.67	3,149.67	1,830.00	11,040.89	331,632.94	-	38,967.24	1,140.35	-	371,740.52	331,632.94	49,318.48	1,830.00	382,781.42
MARATHON	2,808.63	514.91	1,660.40	-	4,983.95	344,879.76	14,568.60	14,551.70	-	-	374,000.06	344,879.76	34,104.25	-	378,984.01
RHODES	-	3,699.71	3,848.67	1,078.33	8,626.71	332,405.68	9,423.36	27,410.08	-	-	369,239.12	332,405.68	44,381.82	1,078.33	377,865.83
KILKIS	3,975.28	142.85	144.67	2,098.67	6,361.47	354,248.58	7,050.72	6,894.14	-	-	368,193.44	354,248.58	18,207.66	2,098.67	374,554.91
ELEUSINA	3,063.97	567.77	899.92	-	4,531.66	345,455.65	3,576.00	20,318.43	-	-	369,350.08	345,455.65	28,426.09	-	373,881.74

(continued…)

[144] Staff is the total number of staff on payroll, including judges and clerks. Cost per case is the total cost for the magistrate court and the respective petty crimes court divided by the median number of disposed cases per year (2017–2021).

NAFPAKTOS	2,994.00	2,063.33	2,382.35	2,479.33	9,919.02	303,732.70	24,072.00	24,122.35	-	-	351,927.05	303,732.70	55,634.04	2,479.33	**361,846.07**
LAVRIO	2,553.30	1,493.04	1,335.33	-	5,381.67	330,275.07	13,291.92	8,457.90	-	-	352,024.89	330,275.07	27,131.49	-	**357,406.56**
LEFKADA	1,239.78	1,043.94	2,336.53	-	4,620.25	309,363.56	-	36,535.02	-	-	345,898.58	309,363.56	41,155.27	-	**350,518.83**
PYRGOS (ILIA)	3,577.78	3,300.00	3,666.67	1,730.67	12,275.11	285,935.57	-	50,250.10	2,050.51	-	338,236.17	285,935.57	62,845.05	1,730.67	**350,511.28**
AMFISSA	5,110.00	684.65	2,538.27	6,249.20	14,582.12	305,708.21	-	13,066.60	2,666.67	-	321,441.47	305,708.21	24,066.18	6,249.20	**336,023.59**
GIANNITSA	3,577.75	559.00	189.35	5,409.33	9,735.43	297,145.05	9,825.95	8,136.58	-	626.58	315,734.15	297,145.05	22,915.21	5,409.33	**325,469.59**
MEGARA	2,108.03	769.22	2,052.10	-	4,929.34	294,390.07	12,642.84	5,300.53	333.33	-	312,666.77	294,390.07	23,206.04	-	**317,596.11**
THEBES	5,493.94	3,037.65	3,589.61	266.67	12,387.87	218,746.07	-	79,609.97	3,052.34	607.90	302,016.29	218,746.07	95,391.42	266.67	**314,404.16**
AEGIALIA	1,881.89	533.33	1,856.54	1,835.22	6,106.97	257,157.97	-	42,991.25	1,578.43	-	301,727.65	257,157.97	48,841.43	1,835.22	**307,834.62**
KOMOTINI	5,327.52	863.33	313.33	350.92	6,855.10	251,978.05	-	35,012.63	1,697.78	-	288,688.46	251,978.05	43,214.59	350.92	**295,543.56**
KASTORIA	2,545.45	543.33	1,865.15	1,404.92	6,358.86	264,157.91	-	16,160.31	3,994.95	-	284,313.17	264,157.91	25,109.20	1,404.92	**290,672.03**
SPARTA	2,784.00	1,366.67	1,633.33	297.33	6,081.34	223,348.59	-	41,039.48	800.00	6.36	265,194.43	223,348.59	47,629.84	297.33	**271,275.77**
MYTILENE	1,932.03	1,066.67	1,733.33	-	4,732.03	252,706.93	4,212.61	6,227.53	1,299.82	-	264,446.89	252,706.93	16,471.99	-	**269,178.92**
EORDEA	6,000.00	596.67	3,133.33	1,641.07	11,371.07	214,647.74	17,951.64	6,109.30	3,620.67	-	242,329.35	214,647.74	37,411.61	1,641.07	**253,700.42**
GREVENA	4,363.64	523.33	2,487.88	1,300.00	8,674.85	226,644.24	-	8,764.73	3,340.36	-	238,749.33	226,644.24	19,479.94	1,300.00	**247,424.18**
TRIPOLI	1,435.00	1,583.33	2,266.67	4,442.06	9,727.06	208,073.06	4,200.00	12,153.59	1,995.53	-	226,422.18	208,073.06	23,634.12	4,442.06	**236,149.24**
EDESSA	2,782.70	476.33	99.98	798.33	4,157.35	203,461.13	4,748.75	13,957.01	1,814.81	-	223,981.71	203,461.13	23,879.59	798.33	**228,139.06**
NAFPLIO	1,312.36	2,016.67	2,710.00	5,077.49	11,116.52	199,578.01	645.61	13,239.60	-	-	213,463.21	199,578.01	19,924.23	5,077.49	**224,579.73**
KYPARISSIA	3,153.85	6,076.92	-	704.32	9,935.09	195,740.15	-	15,324.22	807.69	-	211,872.06	195,740.15	25,362.69	704.32	**221,807.15**
ALMIROS	749.87	533.45	780.11	1,019.73	3,083.17	213,813.11	-	3,188.83	683.33	-	217,685.27	213,813.11	5,935.60	1,019.73	**220,768.44**
VASILIKA	3,881.85	851.91	1,375.44	3,377.00	9,486.20	196,472.60	3,042.72	3,888.99	1,802.00	-	205,206.31	196,472.60	14,842.91	3,377.00	**214,692.51**
SINTIKI	2,385.17	8.68	60.00	2,874.00	5,327.85	192,490.87	-	6,451.03	3,504.00	-	202,445.91	192,490.87	12,408.88	2,874.00	**207,773.76**
ALMOPIA	1,590.11	140.33	49.60	722.80	2,502.85	188,278.72	8,640.00	3,923.33	3,000.00	-	203,842.05	188,278.72	17,343.38	722.80	**206,344.90**
NEA MOUDANIA	2,385.17	302.53	200.87	1,105.97	3,994.54	192,754.53	-	7,750.42	733.33	-	201,238.29	192,754.53	11,372.33	1,105.97	**205,232.82**
FLORINA	2,000.00	3,273.33	2,193.33	2,494.79	9,961.45	189,669.27	-	5,446.69	-	-	195,115.96	189,669.27	12,913.36	2,494.79	**205,077.41**
POLYKASTRO	2,782.70	20.67	92.92	147.33	3,043.61	193,736.18	574.20	4,390.09	1,833.33	-	200,533.81	193,736.18	9,693.91	147.33	**203,577.43**
POLYGYROS	2,782.70	730.00	272.92	2,567.77	6,353.39	172,430.90	-	21,074.76	2,759.42	-	196,265.08	172,430.90	27,619.80	2,567.77	**202,618.47**
OLYMPIA	2,400.00	998.33	1,256.93	4,766.16	9,421.43	186,670.90	-	4,452.35	866.67	-	191,989.92	186,670.90	9,974.28	4,766.16	**201,411.35**
ELASSONA	1,614.39	1,216.98	764.85	587.83	4,184.05	170,262.11	-	15,859.18	3,000.00	-	189,121.30	170,262.11	22,455.40	587.83	**193,305.35**
NEAPOLI (LASITHI)	3,335.21	1,531.32	3,881.42	482.33	9,230.28	163,987.18	-	15,719.06	-	1,027.33	180,733.58	163,987.18	25,494.34	482.33	**189,963.86**
SALAMINA	1,297.33	-	248.00	1,093.00	2,638.33	172,246.35	10,453.92	4,492.67	-	57.33	187,250.27	172,246.35	16,549.26	1,093.00	**189,888.61**
ORESTIADA	1,967.83	-	539.21	1,835.47	4,342.51	151,649.80	-	27,759.54	2,060.80	-	181,470.15	151,649.80	32,327.39	1,835.47	**185,812.66**
ARNEA	1,987.64	200.00	-	1,078.27	3,265.91	167,719.33	-	3,617.04	5,500.00	-	176,836.36	167,719.33	11,304.68	1,078.27	**180,102.27**
CHIOS	7,733.22	2,900.00	10,600.00	2,115.00	23,348.22	119,556.46	22,800.00	9,193.16	1,166.67	639.17	153,355.45	119,556.46	55,032.22	2,115.00	**176,703.67**
MYRTOUNTIA	1,688.00	245.00	1,049.53	953.76	3,936.30	153,805.99	9,154.44	4,823.67	931.33	-	168,715.43	153,805.99	17,891.97	953.76	**172,651.73**
NAXOS	3,496.30	2,190.00	2,550.00	190.00	8,426.30	143,985.83	10,465.71	6,831.21	-	-	161,282.75	143,985.83	25,533.22	190.00	**169,709.05**
EURYTANIA	2,988.89	1,202.18	1,874.67	6,998.46	13,064.21	128,757.51	-	27,252.78	-	-	156,010.29	128,757.51	33,318.52	6,998.46	**169,074.49**
ARGOSTOLI	2,325.81	2,866.67	3,600.00	710.00	9,502.47	140,878.24	-	16,651.77	-	-	157,530.01	140,878.24	25,444.24	710.00	**167,032.48**
KALAMPAKA	2,120.21	2,827.54	2,020.34	971.33	7,939.42	149,474.70	-	6,181.93	2,200.00	-	157,856.64	149,474.70	15,350.02	971.33	**165,796.05**
ALEXANDRIA (IMATHIA)	1,987.64	255.63	95.07	901.67	3,240.00	157,084.94	-	2,872.67	2,000.00	-	161,957.61	157,084.94	7,211.00	901.67	**165,197.61**
VALTOS	4,950.55	345.40	1,824.10	559.28	7,679.33	135,294.90	12,396.55	4,954.61	-	-	152,646.06	135,294.90	24,471.20	559.28	**160,325.39**
ARGOS	5,153.33	2,426.67	2,323.33	2,812.56	12,715.89	129,119.51	-	18,002.79	-	-	147,122.30	129,119.51	27,906.12	2,812.56	**159,838.19**
NAOUSSA	1,987.64	111.57	168.16	701.00	2,968.37	143,578.64	-	7,409.24	-	-	150,987.88	143,578.64	9,676.61	701.00	**153,956.25**
RODOLIVOS	1,987.64	360.76	37.30	1,222.67	3,608.37	140,792.30	-	5,034.30	2,500.00	-	148,326.60	140,792.30	9,920.00	1,222.67	**151,934.97**
SKOPELOS	749.87	533.45	780.11	9,026.58	11,090.01	107,411.82	16,680.00	11,615.00	-	-	135,706.82	107,411.82	30,358.44	9,026.58	**146,796.84**
DIDYMOTICHO	4,030.67	339.15	1,870.31	7,685.20	13,925.33	113,921.20	-	13,281.45	5,331.67	-	132,534.32	113,921.20	24,853.25	7,685.20	**146,459.64**
SPETSES	-	107.00	107.00	-	214.00	105,162.62	19,737.00	20,792.67	-	-	145,692.28	105,162.62	40,743.67	-	**145,906.28**
AMALIADA	1,563.49	466.67	1,433.33	1,713.54	5,177.03	124,552.72	-	15,014.56	357.14	620.81	140,545.23	124,552.72	19,456.01	1,713.54	**145,722.26**
MOIRES	1,784.61	522.28	1,857.01	1,207.97	5,371.87	132,755.02	-	5,871.30	-	-	138,626.32	132,755.02	10,035.20	1,207.97	**143,998.19**
PAROS	2,700.00	73.33	1,090.00	106.00	3,969.33	122,376.11	10,652.52	3,332.33	-	-	136,360.97	122,376.11	17,848.19	106.00	**140,330.30**
ZAKYNTHOS	2,666.67	666.67	1,349.36	1,212.57	5,895.26	68,754.10	-	62,640.89	-	-	131,394.99	68,754.10	67,323.58	1,212.57	**137,290.25**
SKYDRA	1,590.11	300.00	-	899.79	2,789.90	126,571.01	-	4,983.90	2,166.67	-	133,721.58	126,571.01	9,040.68	899.79	**136,511.48**
SITIA	2,297.33	953.02	2,564.30	1,942.59	7,757.25	113,593.27	8,400.00	5,186.98	-	10.76	127,191.02	113,593.27	19,412.40	1,942.59	**134,948.27**
XYLOKASTRO	3,216.00	956.67	1,170.00	186.67	5,529.33	124,641.84	-	4,410.77	-	-	129,052.62	124,641.84	9,753.44	186.67	**134,581.95**

(continued…)

GYTHIO	4,633.33	725.49	-	163.33	5,522.16	110,523.68	10,209.84	5,581.50	1,066.67	-	127,381.68	110,523.68	22,216.83	163.33	132,903.84
KOUFALIA	3,085.96	708.72	924.45	5,204.36	9,923.50	105,663.65	-	12,041.31	1,500.00	-	119,204.96	105,663.65	18,260.45	5,204.36	129,128.46
PANGAION	5,566.67	1,077.33	416.67	3,495.58	10,556.25	96,821.43	-	13,034.94	2,333.33	-	112,189.71	96,821.43	22,428.94	3,495.58	122,745.96
ATALANTI	3,150.00	1,382.96	1,015.87	252.13	5,800.96	108,506.82	-	3,428.15	700.00	-	112,634.97	108,506.82	9,676.98	252.13	118,435.93
AKRATA	2,900.00	1,190.89	1,186.67	1,558.33	6,835.89	98,286.02	-	8,545.18	1,000.00	-	107,831.20	98,286.02	14,822.74	1,558.33	114,667.10
IERAPETRA	2,949.68	817.99	3,290.12	3,738.67	10,796.46	97,482.79	-	5,866.92	-	133.33	103,483.04	97,482.79	13,058.04	3,738.67	114,279.49
TINOS	2,066.67	1,210.00	1,450.00	1,468.40	6,195.07	91,879.61	12,764.88	3,431.00	-	-	108,075.49	91,879.61	20,922.55	1,468.40	114,270.56
KYMI	2,601.24	1,429.41	1,616.79	789.33	6,436.77	101,494.09	-	4,594.41	-	33.82	106,122.31	101,494.09	10,275.66	789.33	112,559.08
LEMNOS	1,583.33	433.33	466.67	5,866.67	8,350.00	93,599.88	-	6,394.50	1,666.33	-	101,660.72	93,599.88	10,544.17	5,866.67	110,010.72
KASTELLI	2,141.53	614.54	1,570.22	-	4,326.29	97,691.02	-	6,492.17	-	-	104,183.19	97,691.02	10,818.46	-	108,509.48
FARSALA	807.20	608.49	382.42	574.33	2,372.44	83,310.26	13,312.56	6,128.00	1,992.33	-	104,743.16	83,310.26	23,231.00	574.33	107,115.60
ERMOUPOLI	472.51	1,820.00	2,483.33	978.33	5,754.18	93,474.23	4,317.05	2,988.36	-	-	100,779.65	93,474.23	12,081.26	978.33	106,533.83
KOS	2,205.81	187.21	849.09	766.27	4,008.37	100,370.22	-	1,041.93	-	-	101,412.15	100,370.22	4,284.04	766.27	105,420.52
NIGRITA	1,590.11	341.33	-	2,506.53	4,437.98	94,924.64	2,672.40	3,016.87	-	-	100,613.91	94,924.64	7,620.71	2,506.53	105,051.89
SAMOS	1,495.65	-	933.33	873.22	3,302.21	90,071.37	-	11,481.90	-	-	101,553.27	90,071.37	13,910.89	873.22	104,855.48
KASSANDRA	1,192.58	-	-	1,086.07	2,278.65	90,439.09	-	9,032.04	-	-	99,471.13	90,439.09	10,224.63	1,086.07	101,749.78
MASSITOS	2,689.33	1,023.33	1,656.67	762.05	6,131.39	74,785.38	8,775.12	10,976.30	600.00	-	95,136.80	74,785.38	25,720.75	762.05	101,268.18
THERA	3,200.00	41.67	720.00	466.33	4,428.00	63,754.30	29,468.76	2,329.67	-	-	95,552.73	63,754.30	35,760.09	466.33	99,980.73
KALAVRYTA	3,419.20	500.00	1,649.78	158.67	5,727.65	66,035.20	-	23,097.46	2,753.97	24.80	91,911.43	66,035.20	31,445.21	158.67	97,639.07
KALAVRIA	2,166.67	194.33	940.33	-	3,301.33	81,340.10	8,012.04	4,115.07	-	-	93,467.21	81,340.10	15,428.44	-	96,768.54
KONITSA	145.45	709.09	1,481.00	65.33	2,400.88	78,875.07	8,819.40	3,497.00	700.00	-	91,891.47	78,875.07	15,351.95	65.33	94,292.35
ARINI	-	115.73	874.11	772.33	1,762.18	88,559.08	-	1,086.33	1,333.33	-	90,978.75	88,559.08	3,409.51	772.33	92,740.93
MEGALOPOLI	-	766.67	1,266.67	314.00	2,347.33	77,762.47	7,635.60	3,318.83	1,200.00	-	89,916.91	77,762.47	14,187.77	314.00	92,264.24
AMYNTEO	8,333.33	1,190.00	2,893.33	-	12,416.67	74,274.79	4,982.16	239.80	-	-	79,496.75	74,274.79	17,638.63	-	91,913.42
AEGINA	466.67	-	735.33	340.53	1,542.53	76,478.82	11,000.16	2,604.64	-	-	90,083.63	76,478.82	14,806.80	340.53	91,626.16
ISTIEA	2,451.05	103.33	1,212.57	175.33	3,942.29	82,336.98	-	3,915.80	-	-	86,252.78	82,336.98	7,682.76	175.33	90,195.07
KARLOVASI	-	-	550.00	393.22	943.22	73,881.14	8,190.12	4,417.67	-	-	86,488.92	73,881.14	13,157.79	393.22	87,432.14
IKARIA	2,933.33	853.33	1,376.67	269.33	5,432.67	71,524.20	-	7,654.60	-	-	79,178.80	71,524.20	12,817.94	269.33	84,611.47
SIKYONA	3,530.00	1,136.67	1,486.67	1,427.07	7,580.40	64,686.21	-	10,456.23	966.67	-	76,109.10	64,686.21	17,576.23	1,427.07	83,689.50
LEROS	1,600.00	45.24	933.33	959.53	3,538.11	76,131.18	-	1,777.73	1,000.00	-	78,908.92	76,131.18	5,356.31	959.53	82,447.02
KALLONI (LESVOS)	3,000.00	883.33	1,566.67	210.60	5,660.60	69,314.70	-	6,083.22	1,333.33	-	76,731.25	69,314.70	12,866.55	210.60	82,391.85
DYMI	2,655.20	1,625.29	2,263.70	1,712.63	8,256.82	57,591.69	10,044.00	4,815.60	300.00	-	72,751.29	57,591.69	21,703.79	1,712.63	81,008.11
VONITSA	1,250.00	-	1,149.41	170.50	2,569.91	63,288.45	7,356.48	6,257.42	833.33	-	77,735.68	63,288.45	16,846.64	170.50	80,305.59
KYTHERA	1,800.00	47.67	478.00	746.33	3,072.00	72,377.97	760.68	1,967.52	-	-	75,106.18	72,377.97	5,053.87	746.33	78,178.18
TAMINEOI	2,485.28	2,071.21	2,203.77	402.00	7,162.26	62,972.32	-	7,424.17	400.00	-	70,796.49	62,972.32	14,584.43	402.00	77,958.75
GASTOUNI	1,688.00	-	900.00	149.67	2,737.67	70,866.33	-	2,781.29	466.67	-	74,114.28	70,866.33	5,835.95	149.67	76,851.95
THASOS	3,233.33	300.00	446.67	289.33	4,269.33	53,755.51	7,014.12	6,895.15	700.00	-	68,364.78	53,755.51	18,589.27	289.33	72,634.11
PSOFIDA	-	966.67	1,116.67	3,456.73	5,540.07	62,853.23	-	2,318.83	266.67	-	65,438.73	62,853.23	4,668.83	3,456.73	70,978.79
NEMEA	-	1,256.67	1,686.67	28.93	2,972.27	60,651.07	-	4,146.33	-	-	64,797.40	60,651.07	7,089.67	28.93	67,769.67
KOLINDROS	795.06	250.68	-	277.60	1,323.34	62,588.15	-	2,289.37	1,000.00	-	65,877.52	62,588.15	4,335.10	277.60	67,200.86
MYKONOS	3,000.00	956.67	2,200.00	130.00	6,286.67	34,790.71	16,867.32	5,027.50	-	-	56,685.53	34,790.71	28,051.49	130.00	62,972.19
KARYSTOS	1,463.43	963.76	1,435.47	137.33	4,000.00	46,161.92	8,993.04	2,298.67	-	-	57,453.62	46,161.92	15,154.37	137.33	61,453.62
MELOS	2,700.00	1,190.00	1,050.00	1,708.49	6,648.49	37,829.68	4,644.96	4,994.37	-	333.33	47,802.34	37,829.68	14,912.66	1,708.49	54,450.83
KARPATHOS	500.00	41.33	766.67	506.37	1,814.37	48,467.60	-	3,654.68	-	-	52,122.28	48,467.60	4,962.68	506.37	53,936.65
PLATAMODES	4,166.67	-	-	528.24	4,694.91	44,555.60	-	3,878.48	-	-	48,434.08	44,555.60	8,045.15	528.24	53,128.99
PYRGOS (CRETE)	1,427.69	405.56	908.82	1,319.12	4,061.19	46,276.77	-	1,645.67	-	-	47,922.44	46,276.77	4,387.74	1,319.12	51,983.63
SAMI	1,600.00	1,289.15	707.30	575.33	4,171.78	42,618.97	-	2,214.60	-	-	44,833.57	42,618.97	5,811.05	575.33	49,005.35
ANDROS	2,666.67	783.33	1,226.67	-	4,676.67	23,239.38	13,381.08	3,304.33	-	-	39,924.79	23,239.38	21,362.08	-	44,601.46
NEAPOLI (VION LAKONIA)	4,633.33	-	-	716.65	5,349.99	28,767.51	4,831.44	1,388.33	-	-	34,987.28	28,767.51	10,853.11	716.65	40,337.27
VAMOS	4,008.33	730.00	993.33	1,714.36	7,446.03	30,956.42	-	486.33	666.67	-	32,109.42	30,956.42	6,884.67	1,714.36	39,555.45
ASTROS	2,490.67	1,123.33	1,423.33	241.39	5,278.72	27,370.15	-	3,253.24	-	-	30,623.39	27,370.15	8,290.58	241.39	35,902.11
PLOMARI	2,790.00	366.67	633.33	66.67	3,856.67	19,633.25	5,556.60	1,714.27	-	-	26,904.12	19,633.25	11,060.87	66.67	30,760.79
PYLOS	3,183.33	-	-	100.00	3,283.33	20,661.65	4,671.72	1,392.30	400.00	-	27,125.67	20,661.65	9,647.35	100.00	30,409.00
EPIDAVROS (LIMIRA)	2,526.67	920.00	1,240.00	472.33	5,159.00	16,346.56	4,912.20	1,234.00	-	-	22,492.76	16,346.56	10,832.87	472.33	27,651.76
KALYMNOS	1,000.00	-	84.73	726.73	1,811.46	18,380.15	-	734.57	-	-	19,114.72	18,380.15	1,819.31	726.73	20,926.18

Table 34. Average annual costs (2019–2021) of first instance courts per funding source and expense type (ordered by total cost, highest to lowest)[145]

FIRST INSTANCE COURTS	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			TOTAL (€)
Judicial service	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
ATHENS	216,775.54	39,741.90	174,222.87	141,054.18	571,794.48	34,738,207.55	-	1,422,020.33	44,091.67	-	36,204,319.54	34,738,207.55	1,896,852.30	141,054.18	36,776,114.02
THESSALONIKI	126,811.48	84,011.06	57,588.62	55,942.49	324,353.66	12,104,613.41	-	537,113.63	45,794.72	114.30	12,687,636.05	12,104,613.41	851,433.81	55,942.49	13,011,989.71
PIRAEUS	35,045.67	10,699.67	12,333.33	28,613.59	86,692.26	7,678,460.23	63,722.22	383,666.86	9,166.67	26.46	8,135,042.43	7,678,460.23	514,660.87	28,613.59	8,221,734.69
PATRAS	9,866.25	9,834.32	7,204.88	13,149.28	40,054.73	2,612,264.09	24,023.61	165,920.28	1,594.33	-	2,803,802.32	2,612,264.09	218,443.68	13,149.28	2,843,857.05
LARISSA	18,027.40	13,589.63	8,540.77	25,433.28	65,591.08	2,495,280.60	-	107,131.71	-	-	2,602,412.31	2,495,280.60	147,289.51	25,433.28	2,668,003.39
HERAKLION	25,698.40	11,627.29	20,267.97	21,304.91	78,898.57	2,354,355.36	41,546.64	61,971.26	-	-	2,457,873.26	2,354,355.36	161,111.57	21,304.91	2,536,771.83
CHALKIDA	25,628.09	17,617.52	13,887.34	45,654.87	102,787.81	1,677,438.20	27,300.96	139,677.67	10,290.00	-	1,854,706.83	1,677,438.20	234,401.57	45,654.87	1,957,494.64
VOLOS	8,436.05	6,001.33	8,776.28	3,553.53	26,767.19	1,686,700.04	6,122.16	61,162.44	-	33.27	1,754,017.91	1,686,700.04	90,531.53	3,553.53	1,780,785.10
KAVALA	31,593.72	42,790.40	32,360.00	41,812.41	148,556.53	1,284,445.74	-	142,406.53	9,151.27	1,507.67	1,437,511.20	1,284,445.74	259,809.58	41,812.41	1,586,067.74
VEROIA	13,913.49	491.33	907.62	14,440.79	29,753.23	1,176,961.60	-	182,540.61	9,809.20	250.00	1,369,561.41	1,176,961.60	207,912.25	14,440.79	1,399,314.64
SERRES	12,720.90	3,762.01	407.13	6,653.27	23,543.32	1,292,586.48	-	64,681.19	6,547.17	3,326.00	1,367,140.84	1,292,586.48	91,444.40	6,653.27	1,390,684.16
TRIKALA	9,692.38	12,925.89	9,235.82	6,652.14	38,506.24	1,143,633.53	-	154,436.74	7,108.30	-	1,305,178.56	1,143,633.53	193,399.14	6,652.14	1,343,684.80
IOANNINA	10,503.33	13,200.00	12,588.33	27,774.67	64,066.33	1,149,074.01	-	73,427.67	-	-	1,222,501.68	1,149,074.01	109,719.33	27,774.67	1,286,568.01
CORINTH	4,480.00	4,423.33	5,500.00	4,276.81	18,680.15	1,104,857.97	-	76,707.17	-	-	1,181,565.14	1,104,857.97	91,110.50	4,276.81	1,200,245.28
CHANIA	2,904.00	6,591.33	12,483.67	6,306.83	28,285.83	1,134,149.21	-	15,683.23	2,299.78	-	1,152,132.21	1,134,149.21	39,962.01	6,306.83	1,180,418.04
KALAMATA	17,426.52	25,347.67	42,043.01	4,678.27	89,495.47	944,249.64	-	144,591.52	-	4.12	1,088,845.27	944,249.64	229,412.84	4,678.27	1,178,340.75
KATERINI	11,925.84	7,888.27	3,849.88	9,794.26	33,458.25	1,011,906.19	-	109,711.00	7,829.86	-	1,129,447.05	1,011,906.19	141,204.85	9,794.26	1,162,905.30
LAMIA	1,862.56	7,977.78	16,826.60	11,440.50	38,107.44	1,009,941.84	8,850.65	76,627.12	4,242.42	5.67	1,099,667.69	1,009,941.84	116,392.80	11,440.50	1,137,775.13
NAFPLIO	6,780.52	11,080.00	6,556.67	26,361.89	50,779.08	973,578.62	3,335.64	68,404.58	-	-	1,045,318.84	973,578.62	96,157.41	26,361.89	1,096,097.92
KOZANI	8,222.22	2,100.00	4,477.78	4,182.33	18,982.33	991,821.93	-	53,322.96	5,666.67	-	1,050,811.56	991,821.93	73,789.63	4,182.33	1,069,793.89
AGRINIO	5,791.70	1,533.33	6,537.43	5,893.83	19,756.30	941,622.04	-	88,146.96	-	-	1,029,769.00	941,622.04	102,009.43	5,893.83	1,049,525.30
ILIA	6,133.33	12,559.43	9,677.62	3,556.12	31,926.51	894,532.67	-	86,143.03	3,515.15	-	984,190.85	894,532.67	118,028.57	3,556.12	1,016,117.36
CHALKIDIKI	10,335.73	1,800.00	-	10,474.43	22,610.16	855,808.57	-	78,277.69	10,249.28	350.00	944,685.53	855,808.57	101,012.69	10,474.43	967,295.69
CORFU	34,546.97	25,087.66	24,634.47	11,476.93	95,746.03	678,358.26	-	192,053.93	666.67	-	871,078.86	678,358.26	276,989.70	11,476.93	966,824.89
RODOPI	13,318.80	48,786.03	15,304.35	36,407.68	113,816.86	717,141.14	-	87,531.59	4,244.44	-	808,917.18	717,141.14	169,185.21	36,407.68	922,734.03
DRAMA	8,175.69	16,850.70	2,000.00	15,093.07	42,119.45	812,798.80	-	53,953.72	6,160.71	1,000.00	873,913.23	812,798.80	88,140.82	15,093.07	916,032.69
KARDITSA	7,616.67	5,744.10	7,823.48	65,335.74	86,519.99	782,101.61	-	35,939.55	4,104.48	-	822,145.64	782,101.61	61,228.28	65,335.74	908,665.63
ARTA	14,333.33	2,000.00	9,643.33	9,898.48	35,875.14	802,675.28	5,315.63	58,025.32	3,281.25	-	869,297.48	802,675.28	92,598.86	9,898.48	905,172.62
ALEXANDROUPOLI	17,285.71	2,014.46	19,160.13	20,036.28	58,496.59	789,969.84	7,221.83	44,752.82	6,729.90	135.33	848,809.73	789,969.84	97,300.20	20,036.28	907,306.32
RHODES	-	4,033.33	10,683.33	2,841.00	17,557.67	782,429.75	21,359.62	62,129.52	-	5,600.00	871,518.88	782,429.75	103,805.80	2,841.00	889,076.55
THEBES	9,156.56	40,349.28	20,747.29	2,951.98	73,205.11	607,357.86	-	132,683.29	5,087.24	-	745,128.39	607,357.86	208,023.66	2,951.98	818,333.50
XANTHI	9,440.96	12,502.76	2,773.23	24,047.58	48,764.53	722,923.60	-	46,141.13	4,680.85	4.57	773,750.15	722,923.60	75,543.51	24,047.58	822,514.68
KILKIS	7,553.04	1,212.82	323.28	1,188.85	10,277.99	730,423.68	22,569.19	10,535.02	2,955.56	-	766,483.44	730,423.68	45,148.90	1,188.85	776,761.43
MYTILENE	5,554.58	6,959.00	14,633.33	3,332.33	30,479.24	689,027.27	12,111.26	23,737.49	3,736.97	6,333.33	734,946.32	689,027.27	73,065.96	3,332.33	765,425.56
TRIPOLI	3,895.00	8,486.67	5,976.67	18,007.31	36,365.65	626,265.37	11,400.00	32,988.32	5,416.44	-	676,070.12	626,265.37	68,163.09	18,007.31	712,435.77
AMALIADA	5,628.57	6,280.00	2,833.08	5,771.61	20,513.26	630,244.37	-	54,052.43	1,285.71	-	685,582.51	630,244.37	70,079.79	5,771.61	706,095.77
LIVADIA	5,069.59	10,777.50	3,623.18	8,460.02	27,930.29	620,191.24	-	41,246.18	3,444.00	-	664,881.42	620,191.24	64,160.45	8,460.02	692,811.71
EDESSA	6,757.98	1,198.68	267.33	3,187.67	11,411.66	621,217.32	11,532.69	33,895.60	4,407.41	-	671,053.01	621,217.32	58,059.68	3,187.67	682,464.67
MESSOLOGI	5,419.97	17,663.19	5,765.01	14,872.53	43,720.70	566,313.91	-	63,122.86	2,030.00	-	631,466.77	566,313.91	94,001.02	14,872.53	675,187.47
RETHYMNO	7,668.81	3,622.33	6,044.67	17,528.00	34,863.81	584,520.01	-	45,950.58	1,596.49	5,000.00	637,067.08	584,520.01	69,882.88	17,528.00	671,930.88
CHIOS	5,635.83	3,950.00	88,553.80	7,894.62	106,034.26	516,980.49	16,554.00	23,020.52	2,600.00	-	559,155.01	516,980.49	140,314.15	7,894.62	665,189.27
PREVEZA	8,202.33	2,950.67	9,943.33	5,549.56	26,645.89	562,924.63	-	40,569.39	2,350.54	-	605,844.56	562,924.63	64,016.27	5,549.56	632,490.45
KASTORIA	6,181.82	8,660.00	4,427.27	4,418.56	23,687.65	557,655.97	-	39,246.46	9,702.02	-	606,604.45	557,655.97	68,217.57	4,418.56	630,292.10
SYROS	4,442.11	3,697.54	5,766.67	10,956.63	24,862.94	554,551.70	19,426.74	20,339.06	3,000.00	601.00	597,918.50	554,551.70	57,273.11	10,956.63	622,781.44
SPARTA	5,220.01	8,760.00	5,126.67	12,221.93	31,328.61	493,697.00	-	76,949.03	1,500.00	4.97	572,151.01	493,697.00	97,560.68	12,221.93	603,479.62

(continued…)

[145] Staff is the total number of staff on payroll, including judges and clerks. Cost per case is the total cost for the judicial service divided by the median number of disposed cases per year (2017–2021).

LEFKADA	2,656.67	9,826.21	4,778.27	14,016.62	31,277.77	485,335.05	-	78,289.33	-	-	563,624.38	485,335.05	95,550.49	14,016.62	594,902.15
KYPARISSIA	6,307.69	12,153.85	-	1,359.25	19,820.79	541,192.16	-	30,648.45	4,048.72	-	575,889.33	541,192.16	53,158.70	1,359.25	595,710.12
KOS	7,499.75	2,733.33	7,259.50	2,591.67	20,084.25	558,578.64	-	4,609.22	-	2,500.00	565,687.86	558,578.64	24,601.80	2,591.67	585,772.10
AEGIO	3,494.94	15,317.42	7,895.45	11,421.41	38,129.22	440,974.99	-	67,459.93	2,931.37	-	511,366.29	440,974.99	97,099.11	11,421.41	549,495.51
GIANNITSA	6,757.98	831.13	540.33	6,424.62	14,554.07	496,216.44	-	41,634.33	1,330.00	-	539,180.78	496,216.44	51,093.78	6,424.62	553,734.84
AMFISSA	4,000.00	8,344.13	23,408.16	12,785.93	48,538.23	461,900.33	-	20,906.55	7,000.00	-	489,806.88	461,900.33	63,658.85	12,785.93	538,345.11
THESPROTIA	15,601.86	11,329.91	11,125.24	4,923.93	42,980.95	427,474.10	-	63,057.73	750.00	-	491,281.83	427,474.10	101,864.75	4,923.93	534,262.78
ORESTIADA	5,509.94	6,916.45	9,677.95	7,932.93	30,037.27	419,429.40	-	77,726.71	5,770.25	-	502,926.37	419,429.40	105,601.30	7,932.93	532,963.64
ZAKYNTHOS	6,222.22	6,292.35	3,871.32	9,662.00	26,047.89	355,114.00	-	146,162.07	-	-	501,276.07	355,114.00	162,547.96	9,662.00	527,323.96
LASITHI	6,193.95	2,122.84	5,606.57	16,129.71	30,053.07	424,034.60	-	29,192.54	1,277.90	806.33	455,311.38	424,034.60	45,200.13	16,129.71	485,364.45
FLORINA	7,000.00	7,333.33	3,983.33	1,954.09	20,270.75	425,996.77	-	25,993.33	10,033.33	-	462,023.44	425,996.77	54,343.33	1,954.09	482,294.19
SAMOS	6,481.16	9,350.00	7,466.67	1,164.03	24,461.86	390,077.56	-	49,754.92	-	1,500.00	441,332.48	390,077.56	74,552.75	1,164.03	465,794.34
KEFALONIA	4,651.61	7,678.42	3,936.40	5,835.17	22,101.61	381,310.60	-	33,303.54	1,333.33	-	415,947.47	381,310.60	50,903.30	5,835.17	438,049.08
GREVENA	4,909.09	8,966.67	4,003.03	966.67	18,845.45	380,682.44	-	10,693.65	3,757.91	-	395,134.00	380,682.44	32,330.35	966.67	413,979.46
KALAVRYTA	6,838.39	15,533.36	7,346.41	12,049.03	41,767.19	305,143.31	-	46,194.92	5,507.94	-	356,846.17	305,143.31	81,421.02	12,049.03	398,613.36
NAXOS	4,807.41	5,506.67	7,600.00	2,128.01	20,042.08	333,002.30	14,390.35	16,300.32	-	3,400.00	367,092.97	333,002.30	52,004.74	2,128.01	387,135.05
GYTHIO	4,633.33	3,264.71	-	614.00	8,512.04	331,176.73	30,796.08	10,495.33	1,519.67	-	373,987.81	331,176.73	50,709.12	614.00	382,499.85
EURYTANIA	3,415.87	1,604.24	850.58	4,314.41	10,185.11	271,619.04	-	31,146.03	13,666.67	-	316,431.74	271,619.04	50,683.40	4,314.41	326,616.85

Table 35. Average annual costs (2019–2021) of first instance prosecution offices per funding source and expense type (ordered by total cost, highest to lowest)[146]

FIRST INSTANCE PROSEC.	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			TOTAL (€)
Judicial service	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
ATHENS	123,069.27	18,965.32	10,555.30	67,130.04	219,719.92	15,824,468.50	-	514,961.53	7,311.33	4,036.00	16,350,777.37	15,824,468.50	678,898.75	67,130.04	**16,570,497.29**
THESSALONIKI	64,399.56	22,576.52	22,142.58	18,704.30	127,822.96	5,119,279.31	-	272,766.17	23,256.25	3.85	5,415,305.58	5,119,279.31	405,144.92	18,704.30	**5,543,128.54**
PIRAEUS	15,456.04	2,200.00	9,333.33	20,398.33	47,387.70	2,851,921.68	28,103.13	169,206.92	4,042.74	30.00	3,053,304.47	2,851,921.68	228,372.16	20,398.33	**3,100,692.17**
PATRAS	-	8,566.67	9,889.68	16,650.35	35,106.70	1,506,817.76	13,276.20	64,781.10	-	-	1,584,875.07	1,506,817.76	96,513.65	16,650.35	**1,619,981.76**
LARISSA	9,955.43	7,504.72	4,716.55	4,593.59	26,770.28	1,268,541.79	-	59,162.29	-	331.70	1,328,035.78	1,268,541.79	81,670.68	4,593.59	**1,354,806.06**
VOLOS	4,874.16	3,467.43	5,070.74	2,754.85	16,167.19	949,522.12	3,537.25	40,523.48	-	704.67	994,287.51	949,522.12	58,177.73	2,754.85	**1,010,454.70**
HERAKLION	-	3,114.21	5,971.10	12,318.19	21,403.50	940,210.00	-	39,918.82	-	-	980,128.82	940,210.00	49,004.13	12,318.19	**1,001,532.32**
CHALKIDA	5,527.87	2,207.54	6,294.33	2,028.00	16,057.73	877,628.94	-	4,619.61	1,051.33	-	883,299.88	877,628.94	19,700.68	2,028.00	**899,357.62**
VEROIA	7,950.56	755.00	700.49	6,053.26	15,459.31	637,643.33	-	104,308.92	5,605.26	-	747,557.51	637,643.33	119,320.23	6,053.26	**763,016.83**
ILIA	5,111.11	3,533.33	3,766.67	1,504.00	13,915.11	638,971.18	-	71,785.86	2,929.29	-	713,686.33	638,971.18	87,126.26	1,504.00	**727,601.44**
CORINTH	-	2,640.00	5,080.00	12,374.13	20,094.13	638,865.74	-	41,463.33	-	-	680,329.08	638,865.74	49,183.33	12,374.13	**700,423.21**
RHODES	-	3,633.33	8,649.84	590.00	12,873.18	608,277.94	-	34,719.44	-	2,000.00	644,997.38	608,277.94	49,002.62	590.00	**657,870.56**
SERRES	9,143.15	416.53	515.01	2,173.20	12,247.89	595,823.65	-	46,489.60	4,705.78	-	647,019.03	595,823.65	61,270.08	2,173.20	**659,266.93**
KATERINI	7,950.56	5,469.96	2,646.51	-	16,067.03	563,656.30	-	73,140.67	5,219.90	-	642,016.87	563,656.30	94,427.60	-	**658,083.90**
CHANIA	3,732.00	4,075.67	8,639.33	9,192.45	25,639.45	596,253.63	-	10,615.87	1,379.87	-	608,249.37	596,253.63	28,442.74	9,192.45	**633,888.81**
TRIKALA	5,754.85	7,674.75	5,483.77	7,043.78	25,957.15	507,428.37	-	91,696.81	4,220.55	-	603,345.73	507,428.37	114,830.74	7,043.78	**629,302.88**
KAVALA	14,867.63	1,649.00	1,433.33	2,218.00	20,167.97	517,491.08	-	67,014.84	4,306.48	257.00	589,069.40	517,491.08	89,528.28	2,218.00	**609,237.37**
CORFU	17,830.69	12,948.47	12,714.56	6,975.53	50,469.26	419,061.88	-	129,726.14	-	-	548,788.02	419,061.88	173,219.87	6,975.53	**599,257.29**
KARDITSA	5,788.67	4,365.52	5,945.84	13,229.14	29,329.18	532,228.14	-	27,314.06	3,119.40	-	562,661.61	532,228.14	46,533.50	13,229.14	**591,990.78**
NAFPLIO	3,062.17	3,416.67	5,140.00	5,802.83	17,421.67	524,551.31	-	30,892.39	-	-	555,443.70	524,551.31	42,511.23	5,802.83	**572,865.37**
KOZANI	4,404.76	1,500.00	2,742.86	944.51	9,592.13	519,455.53	-	28,565.87	3,035.71	-	551,057.11	519,455.53	40,249.21	944.51	**560,649.24**
AMALIADA	4,690.48	4,766.67	6,171.96	9,314.06	24,943.17	481,763.44	-	35,043.69	1,071.43	-	517,878.56	481,763.44	51,744.23	9,314.06	**542,821.73**
IOANNINA	9,336.97	9,172.73	8,552.67	18,368.83	45,431.19	460,223.50	-	35,601.29	-	10.74	495,835.53	460,223.50	62,674.40	18,368.83	**541,266.73**
KALAMATA	7,175.63	10,437.28	17,311.83	3,564.79	38,489.52	424,807.71	-	59,537.68	5,000.00	-	489,345.40	424,807.71	99,462.42	3,564.79	**527,834.92**
RETHYMNO	4,047.53	4,506.00	5,032.67	3,130.43	16,716.62	463,453.83	-	35,009.96	1,216.37	-	499,680.17	463,453.83	49,812.54	3,130.43	**516,396.80**
AGRINIO	3,088.91	1,866.67	4,778.91	3,944.67	13,679.15	452,429.08	-	47,011.71	-	-	499,440.79	452,429.08	56,746.20	3,944.67	**513,119.94**
THESPROTIA	11,144.18	8,092.79	7,946.60	1,119.60	28,303.18	441,129.31	-	45,041.24	-	21.78	486,192.32	441,129.31	72,246.60	1,119.60	**514,495.50**
CHALKIDIKI	5,167.87	846.00	634.88	4,129.32	10,778.06	454,353.30	-	39,138.84	5,124.64	-	498,616.78	454,353.30	50,912.22	4,129.32	**509,394.84**
THEBES	6,104.38	5,875.89	4,920.40	4,902.61	21,803.27	391,226.80	-	88,455.53	3,391.49	-	483,073.81	391,226.80	108,747.68	4,902.61	**504,877.09**
LAMIA	997.80	2,468.79	3,776.65	9,864.87	17,108.12	431,138.46	4,741.42	28,907.38	2,272.73	-	467,059.99	431,138.46	43,164.78	9,864.87	**484,168.11**
DRAMA	4,976.51	2,615.09	2,050.00	5,786.00	15,427.60	429,556.42	-	32,841.39	3,750.00	-	466,147.82	429,556.42	46,232.99	5,786.00	**481,575.42**
TRIPOLI	2,870.00	2,800.00	4,750.00	5,677.65	16,097.65	392,036.09	8,400.00	24,307.18	3,991.06	-	428,734.34	392,036.09	47,118.24	5,677.65	**444,831.98**
XANTHI	6,007.89	1,640.53	6,726.50	5,794.55	20,169.46	378,917.06	-	29,362.54	2,978.72	-	411,258.32	378,917.06	46,716.18	5,794.55	**431,427.78**
SPARTA	2,436.00	986.67	2,816.67	645.67	6,885.00	383,696.34	-	35,909.55	700.00	-	420,305.89	383,696.34	42,848.88	645.67	**427,190.89**

(continued…)

[146] Staff is the total number of staff on payroll, including prosecutors and clerks. Cost per case is the total cost for the judicial service divided by the median number of disposed cases per year (2017–2021).

ALEXANDROUPOLI	10,214.29	1,298.69	2,691.58	11,242.61	25,447.17	366,679.54	4,267.45	26,444.85	3,976.76	-	401,368.59	366,679.54	48,893.62	11,242.61	426,815.77
LIVADIA	4,345.36	3,315.63	4,897.35	2,814.05	15,372.39	368,676.26	-	35,353.87	2,952.00	-	406,982.13	368,676.26	50,864.21	2,814.05	422,354.52
RODOPI	7,991.28	1,800.00	1,765.65	3,962.96	15,519.89	347,953.20	-	52,518.95	2,546.67	-	403,018.82	347,953.20	66,622.55	3,962.96	418,538.71
MYTILENE	3,622.55	3,426.67	6,766.67	1,850.67	15,666.55	371,599.53	7,898.65	18,176.62	2,437.16	57.56	400,169.52	371,599.53	42,385.87	1,850.67	415,836.07
MESSOLOGI	6,906.61	1,859.33	9,320.29	4,692.20	22,778.44	352,016.13	-	36,070.20	1,160.00	-	389,246.34	352,016.13	55,316.44	4,692.20	412,024.77
ORESTIADA	3,935.67	12,816.87	16,311.99	1,328.89	34,393.42	309,320.45	-	55,519.08	4,121.61	-	368,961.14	309,320.45	92,705.22	1,328.89	403,354.56
KILKIS	4,372.81	504.67	665.80	2,230.75	7,774.03	369,821.09	13,066.37	13,668.46	1,711.11	-	398,267.03	369,821.09	33,989.22	2,230.75	406,041.06
EDESSA	4,770.34	1,200.00	1,143.48	3,395.05	10,508.86	360,642.58	8,140.72	23,926.30	3,111.11	-	395,820.71	360,642.58	42,291.95	3,395.05	406,329.58
SYROS	2,714.62	4,766.67	5,733.33	9,520.65	22,735.27	351,575.12	11,871.89	12,429.43	-	2,505.67	378,382.10	351,575.12	40,021.61	9,520.65	401,117.38
GIANNITSA	4,372.81	546.32	216.66	4,964.03	10,099.81	343,767.80	12,009.49	16,371.39	-	-	372,148.68	343,767.80	33,516.66	4,964.03	382,248.49
LASITHI	3,335.21	2,889.93	3,026.45	1,077.80	10,329.39	347,354.41	-	15,719.06	688.10	-	363,761.57	347,354.41	25,658.75	1,077.80	374,090.96
ARTA	4,803.33	3,266.67	7,406.67	3,919.37	19,396.04	345,660.35	2,784.38	494.86	1,718.75	-	350,658.33	345,660.35	20,474.65	3,919.37	370,054.37
PREVEZA	5,004.00	2,950.67	7,206.67	3,451.93	18,613.27	309,779.19	-	38,529.47	1,175.27	-	349,483.94	309,779.19	54,866.08	3,451.93	368,097.20
CHIOS	3,381.50	2,750.00	3,100.00	1,947.12	11,178.62	307,712.58	11,646.24	9,351.38	-	-	328,710.20	307,712.58	30,229.12	1,947.12	339,888.82
AEGIO	2,688.41	2,500.00	1,612.43	1,476.33	8,277.17	255,165.31	-	51,892.25	2,254.90	-	309,312.47	255,165.31	60,948.00	1,476.33	317,589.64
KASTORIA	3,272.73	566.67	2,174.24	738.93	6,752.57	288,996.45	-	20,777.54	5,136.36	-	314,910.35	288,996.45	31,927.54	738.93	321,662.92
AMFISSA	2,250.00	3,913.13	4,765.49	8,364.97	19,293.59	285,497.03	-	4,421.00	2,500.00	-	292,418.03	285,497.03	17,849.62	8,364.97	311,711.62
SAMOS	3,489.86	3,033.33	4,816.67	813.85	12,153.71	269,479.39	-	26,791.11	-	708.33	296,978.83	269,479.39	38,839.30	813.85	309,132.54
KEFALONIA	3,322.58	5,366.67	5,066.67	938.47	14,694.38	266,531.10	-	23,788.24	-	-	290,319.34	266,531.10	37,544.15	938.47	305,013.72
KOS	4,411.62	4,356.64	5,903.65	3,774.00	18,445.90	250,974.57	-	2,750.52	-	913.67	254,638.75	250,974.57	18,336.09	3,774.00	273,084.66
NAXOS	3,496.30	3,610.00	3,500.00	1,400.00	12,006.30	228,380.59	10,465.71	11,854.78	-	3,000.00	253,701.07	228,380.59	35,926.78	1,400.00	265,707.37
ZAKYNTHOS	3,111.11	2,900.00	4,242.91	316.67	10,570.69	178,085.75	-	73,081.04	-	-	251,166.78	178,085.75	83,335.06	316.67	261,737.47
LEFKADA	1,416.89	1,151.10	3,136.75	7,301.83	13,006.57	191,683.18	-	41,754.31	-	-	233,437.49	191,683.18	47,459.05	7,301.83	246,444.06
KALAVRYTA	4,103.04	2,728.79	2,347.13	50.00	9,228.96	200,193.80	-	27,716.95	3,304.76	-	231,215.51	200,193.80	40,200.67	50.00	240,444.47
KYPARISSIA	4,205.13	8,102.56	-	1,131.59	13,439.29	199,503.39	-	20,432.30	1,076.92	-	221,012.61	199,503.39	33,816.91	1,131.59	234,451.90
EURYTANIA	2,561.90	1,794.69	1,441.10	1,932.51	7,730.20	189,928.10	-	23,359.52	-	-	213,287.63	189,928.10	29,157.22	1,932.51	221,017.83
GYTHIO	4,633.33	2,176.47	-	1,656.33	8,466.13	185,477.68	7,560.00	13,213.48	-	-	206,251.16	185,477.68	27,583.28	1,656.33	214,717.29
FLORINA	3,000.00	1,196.67	2,150.00	464.23	6,810.90	145,091.41	-	11,140.00	4,300.00	-	160,531.41	145,091.41	21,786.67	464.23	167,342.31
GREVENA	2,727.27	683.33	2,009.09	1,323.33	6,743.03	132,082.57	-	6,311.29	2,087.73	-	140,481.59	132,082.57	13,818.71	1,323.33	147,224.61

Table 36. Average annual costs (2019–2021) of appellate courts per funding source and expense type (ordered by total cost, highest to lowest)[147]

APPELLATE COURTS	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			TOTAL (€)
Judicial service	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
ATHENS	473,426.59	62,805.92	110,768.51	33,346.74	680,347.75	31,649,161.57	-	1,829,136.29	-	32.93	33,478,330.79	31,649,161.57	2,476,170.23	33,346.74	34,158,678.54
THESSALONIKI	57,641.58	90,843.27	108,348.67	74,276.66	331,110.19	9,258,091.67	-	244,142.56	20,815.78	2,350.33	9,525,400.34	9,258,091.67	524,142.20	74,276.66	9,856,510.53
PIRAEUS	13,299.38	68,856.00	60,391.67	120,445.95	262,992.99	4,103,190.16	24,181.77	83,033.16	16,811.97	55.56	4,227,272.61	4,103,190.16	266,629.50	120,445.95	4,490,265.60
LARISSA	10,762.62	8,113.21	5,098.97	38,351.33	62,326.14	2,500,724.29	-	63,959.23	-	-	2,564,683.51	2,500,724.29	87,934.03	38,351.33	2,627,009.65
PATRAS	17,666.67	18,820.75	17,581.89	7,924.27	61,993.57	2,297,835.94	12,327.90	60,153.88	5,000.00	21.67	2,375,339.39	2,297,835.94	131,572.76	7,924.27	2,437,332.96
THRACE	19,978.20	1,133.33	8,411.05	10,329.95	39,852.54	1,429,718.33	-	131,297.38	6,366.67	-	1,567,382.37	1,429,718.33	167,186.63	10,329.95	1,607,234.91
IOANNINA	3,933.33	53,100.00	14,427.33	29,511.88	100,972.54	1,094,544.28	-	48,951.78	8,593.33	-	1,152,089.39	1,094,544.28	129,005.78	29,511.88	1,253,061.93
EASTERN CRETE	7,495.37	7,520.65	22,850.37	3,873.56	41,739.94	1,154,100.80	-	1,916.34	-	-	1,156,017.14	1,154,100.80	39,782.72	3,873.56	1,197,757.08
NAFPLIO	4,811.99	3,016.67	5,233.33	532.37	13,594.36	1,071,500.28	2,367.23	48,545.18	-	-	1,122,412.69	1,071,500.28	63,974.40	532.37	1,136,007.05
DODECANESE	40,766.67	4,466.67	3,531.20	19,548.72	68,313.25	972,532.82	10,051.58	29,237.42	-	242.22	1,012,064.05	972,532.82	88,295.76	19,548.72	1,080,377.30
CRETE	9,441.00	6,708.67	9,320.67	2,633.33	28,103.67	967,258.29	-	37,126.00	1,379.87	-	1,005,764.16	967,258.29	63,976.20	2,633.33	1,033,867.82
LAMIA	1,064.32	2,828.44	16,467.52	4,380.69	24,740.97	863,209.58	42,240.00	26,976.32	2,552.11	-	934,978.01	863,209.58	92,128.71	4,380.69	959,718.98
AEGEAN	5,000.00	1,314.04	3,740.35	3,158.43	13,212.82	873,916.76	16,188.95	9,306.95	-	8,291.33	907,703.99	873,916.76	43,841.61	3,158.43	920,916.80
EVIA (EUBOIA)	2,977.81	4,269.35	6,447.53	3,262.33	16,957.03	869,130.86	-	2,737.55	623.01	-	872,491.42	869,130.86	17,055.26	3,262.33	889,448.45
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	2,509.74	24,708.69	8,484.33	4,058.29	39,761.05	732,398.03	-	38,197.02	9,000.00	-	779,595.05	732,398.03	82,899.78	4,058.29	819,356.10
CORFU	12,258.60	8,902.07	8,741.26	21,047.74	50,949.68	622,452.20	-	148,477.19	-	-	770,929.38	622,452.20	178,379.13	21,047.74	821,879.06
WESTERN MACEDONIA	3,523.81	33,166.67	4,647.62	446.66	41,784.76	693,903.12	-	22,852.70	2,428.57	-	719,184.39	693,903.12	66,619.36	446.66	760,969.15
KALAMATA	6,663.08	9,691.76	16,075.27	468.00	32,898.11	639,331.30	-	55,284.99	-	-	694,616.29	639,331.30	87,715.10	468.00	727,514.40
NORTH AEGEAN	3,246.38	1,368.67	3,366.67	3,006.77	10,988.48	685,190.43	-	22,564.85	2,012.55	4,577.00	714,344.82	685,190.43	37,136.11	3,006.77	725,333.30

Table 37. Average annual costs (2019–2021) of appellate prosecution offices per funding source and expense type (ordered by total cost, highest to lowest)[148]

APPELLATE PROSEC.	ΤΑΧΔΙΚ - Fund for the Financing of Judicial Buildings (all values in €)					National Budget (all values in €)						Expense type			TOTAL (€)
Judicial service	Cleaning	Maintenance	Other	Procurement	Subtotal	Salaries	Rental	Power	Heating	Travel & Fuel	Subtotal	Salaries	Operating	Procurement	
ATHENS	-	1,380.53	-	13,215.99	14,596.53	10,870,976.11	-	774,022.04	-	-	11,644,998.15	10,870,976.11	775,402.57	13,215.99	11,659,594.67
THESSALONIKI	25,044.27	6,285.49	7,793.53	14,860.27	53,983.55	3,506,083.15	-	106,075.73	9,044.10	-	3,621,202.98	3,506,083.15	154,243.12	14,860.27	3,675,186.53
PIRAEUS	6,290.25	3,379.67	4,200.00	11,138.21	25,008.12	1,668,880.32	11,437.32	39,272.44	1,645.30	80.00	1,721,315.39	1,668,880.32	66,304.98	11,138.21	1,746,323.51
PATRAS	33,766.87	26,944.68	30,589.99	25,437.11	116,738.65	1,354,640.64	8,850.80	43,187.40	5,666.67	94.44	1,412,439.96	1,354,640.64	149,100.86	25,437.11	1,529,178.61
LARISSA	6,726.64	5,070.76	3,186.86	4,461.61	19,445.87	956,881.40	-	39,974.52	-	-	996,855.92	956,881.40	54,958.77	4,461.61	1,016,301.78
IOANNINA	4,633.33	4,233.33	5,786.00	7,234.69	21,887.36	621,372.01	-	24,475.89	-	-	645,847.90	621,372.01	39,128.56	7,234.69	667,735.26
CRETE	5,630.00	4,266.67	5,221.67	4,834.65	19,952.98	640,332.56	-	6,875.67	985.62	-	648,193.85	640,332.56	22,979.63	4,834.65	668,146.84
NAFPLIO	2,843.45	2,850.00	4,016.67	1,884.35	11,594.46	569,152.34	-	28,685.79	-	-	597,838.13	569,152.34	38,395.90	1,884.35	609,432.59
CORFU	8,915.35	6,474.24	6,357.28	16,806.69	38,553.56	455,915.49	-	64,863.07	-	1,000.00	521,778.56	455,915.49	87,609.93	16,806.69	560,332.12
WESTERN MACEDONIA	3,817.46	1,866.67	2,561.59	1,574.80	9,820.51	530,345.69	-	24,757.09	2,630.95	-	557,733.73	530,345.69	35,633.76	1,574.80	567,554.25
DODECANESE	-	1,118.27	6,724.81	333.33	8,176.41	530,095.86	-	20,100.73	-	1,135.67	551,332.25	530,095.86	29,079.47	333.33	559,508.66
THRACE	7,325.34	-	9,774.22	6,800.21	23,899.77	463,348.40	-	48,142.37	2,334.44	-	513,825.22	463,348.40	67,576.38	6,800.21	537,724.99
EASTERN CRETE	4,639.99	2,843.94	3,127.25	2,692.37	13,303.55	477,876.48	-	1,186.30	-	-	479,062.79	477,876.48	11,797.48	2,692.37	492,366.33
AEGEAN	3,000.00	3,083.33	5,956.67	3,286.01	15,326.01	420,150.60	9,713.37	29,527.10	-	1,924.33	461,315.40	420,150.60	53,204.80	3,286.01	476,641.41
WESTERN STEREA HELLAS	1,737.51	1,883.33	3,347.79	480.00	7,448.64	432,795.54	-	26,444.09	-	-	459,239.63	432,795.54	33,412.73	480.00	466,688.27
EVIA (EUBOIA)	2,047.25	2,766.76	4,573.37	2,450.93	11,838.31	451,415.32	-	1,882.06	428.32	-	453,725.70	451,415.32	11,697.76	2,450.93	465,564.01
KALAMATA	5,125.45	7,455.20	12,365.59	3,155.27	28,101.50	328,317.98	-	42,526.92	-	-	370,844.90	328,317.98	67,473.15	3,155.27	398,946.40
NORTH AEGEAN	2,086.96	1,239.33	2,833.33	2,089.67	8,249.29	352,075.54	-	14,505.97	1,293.78	61.78	367,937.07	352,075.54	22,021.16	2,089.67	376,186.36
LAMIA	598.68	3,269.31	3,147.60	3,946.68	10,962.27	307,557.19	23,760.00	17,278.35	1,435.56	-	350,031.10	307,557.19	49,489.49	3,946.68	360,993.36

[147] Staff is the total number of staff on payroll, including judges and clerks. Cost per case is the total cost for the judicial service divided by the median number of disposed cases per year (2017–2021).

[148] Staff is the total number of staff on payroll, including prosecutors and clerks. Cost per case is the total cost for the judicial service divided by the median number of disposed cases per year (2017–2021).

ANNEX 3. Case study: Judicial Map Reform in Croatia

Introduction

The most intensive work on judicial reform in Croatia started in 2005, after the opening of negotiations on accession to the European Union (EU). In January 2006, the Parliament adopted the Strategy for Judicial Reform[149], which outlined its general goals. The reform activities were divided into seven thematic units i.e., independence, impartiality, professionalism and expertise, efficiency, free legal aid, the prison system, and war crimes proceedings.

Efficiency was considered as professionally, materially, and technically the most demanding thematic unit due to high backlogs and high disposition times in Croatian courts. The measures foreseen by the Strategy were aimed at reducing the backlog of pending cases with special emphasis on old cases; shortening the duration of the procedure; more efficient organization of the judicial system through a rationalization of the court network; standardization of caselaw; investments in infrastructure and IT equipment; strengthening of judicial inspection; improving relations with the media and the public; and the spread of alternative dispute resolution. The 2006 Strategy became the cornerstone for the subsequent strategies and reform efforts.

To understand the judicial map reform of Croatia, it is important to have awareness of its judicial structure. Currently, in Croatia, there are Municipal Courts which serve as first-instance courts of general jurisdiction; besides, there are two types of specialized first-instance courts – the Commercial Courts and the Administrative Courts[150]. Up to 2019, specialized Misdemeanor Courts also existed at the first instance level, but these were merged into the Municipal Courts. County Courts act as the second instance of general jurisdiction, with a specialized High Commercial Court as the second tier for Commercial Courts and a High Administrative Court for Administrative Courts. The High Misdemeanor Court remained the second tier for misdemeanor cases now deriving from Municipal Courts. As County Courts decide on serious criminal cases in the first instance, the High Criminal Court is established as the second instance on appeals against those judgments. The judicial map reform examined in this case study focuses on Municipal, Misdemeanor, and Country Courts (i.e., the courts of general jurisdiction) as these were the court types principally affected by the reorganization of the judicial map, although the reform involved the prosecution offices as well.

Purposes of the reform

[149] Official Gazette No. 145/2010.

[150] The administrative courts were firstly founded in 2012, from January 1, 2012, the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia continued its work as the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia.

The process of judicial map reform (so-called rationalization of the network of courts) in Croatia began in 2005, and was carried out in four waves, in 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2019. The judicial map, which until 2008 consisted of a total of 108 Municipal Courts, 21 County Courts, and 13 Commercial Courts, was too large and inadequate considering the size of the country and the number of inhabitants.[151] While it represented an excessive financial burden for the country, it could not ensure the timely provision of services to citizens and businesses.

The main goals of the reform through all four stages could be summarized as (i) better organization of court work, (ii) rationalization and better organization of the work of judges/prosecutors and other staff, (iii) evening caseloads and workloads and expanding opportunities for specialization, (iv) greater flexibility in court work (including mobility of judges and staff), (v) faster resolution of backlogged cases and (vi) financial savings. This was intended to lead to faster case resolution, more economical and efficient proceedings, and a reduction in the number of pending files without jeopardizing access to justice as a fundamental right. While in the first three rounds, the number of courts was reduced, in the 2019 one it was partly reduced by abolishing the specialized Misdemeanor Courts but partly increased by reinstating ten Municipal Courts and one Commercial Court. This rollback was performed after particular courts created in 2015 proved to be too large or geographically too complex which affected adversely their functioning. A significant drop in incoming misdemeanor cases ended the need for separate specialized courts while their merger with Municipal Courts facilitated better distribution of resources, primarily assignment of judges and staff to other pending cases.

The judicial map was altered by several editions of the Law on Territorial Jurisdiction and Seats of the Courts. The reform was also accompanied by a package of legislative amendments (laws and bylaws), including the Law on Courts and procedural laws governing civil, criminal, enforcement, misdemeanor, and administrative procedure.

Criteria

For the 2008 judicial map reform, the MoJ conducted an analysis of the current judicial map by reviewing the statistical data for each court on the number of judges, court advisors, interns, court officials and employees, the workload of the courts in terms of number and type of cases, data on the required number of judges for each court according to the Framework criteria for the work of judges, court infrastructure and geographical specifics. It was furthermore considered that cases have become more complex which indicated the need for specialization of judges. Small courts proved to be unsustainable so it was decided that the selected courts will be merged into larger adjacent courts. The criteria for the merging of courts were established very clearly:

- under five judges (no island courts were merged during the first round of reform, although most of them had less than the minimum number of judges; however, some island courts were merged in the course of the 2015 round of reforms),
- at a distance of less than 50 km from another (larger) court.

[151] 56.594 km², 4.4 million inhabitants at the time.

The 2010 reduction in the number of Commercial and County Courts was based on the analysis of the number of incoming and pending cases and the number of judges. In general, smaller courts were merged into adjacent larger ones. However, there were no clear criteria announced as was the case in 2008.

The 2015 judicial map reform consisted of two main components. The reduction in the number of Municipal and Misdemeanor Courts, and the relinquishment of the territorial jurisdiction in decision-making in second-instance courts of general jurisdiction (the County Courts). The main criteria set in these amendments to the judicial map was the alignment of the judicial map with the administrative division of the country (Croatia is divided into 21 counties). The seats of Municipal and Misdemeanor court were to coincide with the seats of County courts. However, if there was no County court a particular County, then a Municipal and Misdemeanor Court would be established at the administrative seat of that county.

As the next logical step, due to a significant decline in demand, in 2019 Misdemeanor Courts were abolished and merged with Municipal ones. There were two exceptions though, the two Misdemeanor Courts in the largest cities, Zagreb and Split, continued functioning independently under new names, Municipal Misdemeanor Court in Split and Municipal Misdemeanor Court in Zagreb. Simultaneously, the Municipal Courts map was reexamined and increased by ten in line with the following factors: size and geographical specificity of certain areas, population, traffic connection, human resources and statistical data on the work of the courts and infrastructure conditions. These factors were, however, not publicly quantified.

Content of the reforms

In 2008, the number of Municipal Courts was reduced from 108 to 67, and the number of Misdemeanor Courts from 114 to 63. In 2011,[152] the number of County Courts was reduced from 21 to 15, and the number of Commercial Courts from 13 to seven. Additionally, only the Municipal Courts in seats of County Courts were given jurisdiction over criminal cases and specific civil ones (such as family relations). In 2015, the number of courts was further reduced to 24 municipal and 22 Misdemeanor Courts. One new Municipal Court was created by dividing the one in Zagreb into two courts due to the substantial size of the court[153]. The number of Commercial Courts was increased by one by the reinstatement of one of the courts merged in 2011. Finally, in 2019 the specialized first instance court type – Misdemeanor Courts were abolished and merged into Municipal Courts with two specific courts established in Zagreb and Split, as mentioned above. Simultaneously, the number of Municipal Courts was increased by ten - to 34, and the number of Commercial Courts by one more - to nine.

[152] The legislative amendments were adopted in late 2010 but they entered into force on Jan 1, 2011.
[153] This newly created court was foreseen by the law many years earlier but was not established until 2015. This was not the first division of courts in the capital Zagreb, in 2005, one Municipal Court in Zagreb was divided into Municipal Criminal Court in Zagreb and Municipal Civil Court in Zagreb. As the Municipal Civil Court in Zagreb still remained verly large in size, a separate Municipal Labor Court in Zagreb was created from it labour department in 2012.

The reorganization of the municipal jurisdiction in Zagreb

In 2005, the **Municipal Court in Zagreb** was the largest Municipal Court in the country with 156 judges and 726 staff (administrative and technical). The Court was overburdened with caseloads and backlogs, too large to manage and with no sufficient office/courtroom space which led to the 2005 division into the **Municipal Civil Court in Zagreb** and the **Municipal Criminal Court in Zagreb**. The Civil Court remained in the building, while the Criminal Court moved soon after into a new building in a different location. Due to the vast difference in caseloads, this change was more beneficial for the Criminal Court.

In 2012 the **Municipal Labor Court** was established based on the conducted analysis of the labor disputes, and in accordance with the Justice Reform Strategy 2011-2015, as well as the Agreement of the Government and the unions. The analysis suggested that the largest number of labor disputes are handled at the Municipal Civil Court court in Zagreb, and the trend is increasing. During 2010 all municipal courts in Croatia received 15,409 labor cases, of which 7,805 relate to Municipal Civil Court in Zagreb. A specialized Municipal Labor Court in Zagreb was established to facilitate specialization of judges, more efficient, faster and high-quality resolution of labor-law disputes. The two courts remained in the same building.

The establishment of the new **Municipal Court in Novi Zagreb** was specific since it was not administered purely as a new division. By it, Zagreb was divided in two - the northern (larger) and the southern part. The border is the river Sava. The northern part was (and still is) covered by the Municipal Civil, Labor and Criminal Courts while for the southern part a new general jurisdiction municipal court was established (handling civil, labor and criminal cases). This court was partly staffed from the previously existing Zagreb Municipal Courts but partly

Regardless of the formal merger of courts, the MoJ approached physical merger and closing of merged locations gradually. As a first step, all merged locations were turned into so-called permanent services, a dislocated part of the court with the aim to gradually ensure all infrastructural and organizational preconditions for the actual physical merger. However, one part of the permanent services was closed but some exist to date. In fact, some were turned to courts again as described earlier. Several reasons caused some permanent services to "survive" the efforts of physical merger – lack of adequate infrastructure in the court seat or a need for high-volume investments, high travel expenses for judges and staff, ensuring access to court in those permanent services that are far from the seat of the court or lack of adequate transportation infrastructure, and lastly political will.

The basic precondition for all four waves of judicial map reform was the implementation of the case management system (along with the associated hardware, software and network infrastructure) which permitted the courts to (i) enter cases in the same registries from different locations without having to hold the books physically, and (ii) conduct random assignment of those cases to all judges within a court in line with the court annual work schedule passed by the court president. By enlarging the individual court territorial jurisdiction, court management could decide on moving judges, court staff and cases without restrictions imposed by procedural laws and laws governing human resources.

In the transition period, some of the courts held so-called court days in particular permanent services. These were days when the judges would sit in the permanent services and conduct hearings thus remaining near the parties. Along court days in some of the permanent offices, other hearings were regularly scheduled in the location where the judge who deals with the case was assigned. The parties were not entitled to any travel cost as the case was resolved within the territorial jurisdiction of the competent court.

Recently, specialized family relations departments have been established in Municipal Courts which are situated in the county seats. For these departments, due to the sensitivity of the cases, court days are envisaged to bring courts closer to this especially sensitive group of citizens.

Within a merged court that covers several locations the judges are assigned to different locations following an annual work schedule passed by the court president. However, the process of adopting this schedule is consultative, and the judges my object to it. In that case the higher instance court president will decide. When developing the annual work schedule, the court president is allowed, but not obliged to, rotate judges freely. In practice, the court presidents take into consideration the judges' residence to reduce travel costs and time. Sporadically, there have been some objections by the judges concerning the location of work (some wanted to continue travelling).

Eventually, most of the courts kept land registry departments in all locations due to their specifics. Those cases are handled mostly by authorized public servants who work closely with public administration and cadaster and entail a large volume of documents which need to be kept for an indefinite period. At one point, there was a bylaw in force that had foreseen for all of the permanent services to be closed by 2019. This bylaw was abolished in the meantime due to the paradigm shift. Permanent offices were no longer considered temporary solutions in locations in which there was a permanent need for them for as long as this need was present.

Apart from changing the court structure, the 2015 reform presented a significant change in the notion of territorial jurisdiction of County Courts in the second instance. Namely, a 'universal territorial jurisdiction' of County Courts was introduced, meaning that any first-instance decision upon appeal may be reviewed by any County Court across the country. Simultaneously, several County Courts became specialized for particular types of cases i.e., labor, land registry and family. This specialisation was however abandoned in 2022, as it did not prove to be effective. Currently, second instance cases are assigned by electronic random allocation, using the appropriate algorithm, following the provisions of the rulebook regulating the work in the information system used in the court. The task of the algorithm is to equalize the caseloads of County courts around Croatia to ensure that (i) judges are equally burdened, (ii) citizens are given equal treatment to avoid that in one court the appeal would be resolved within a couple of months while in another it would take years. Two additional issues were tackled by abolishing territorial jurisdiction at the second-instance level: case law harmonization nationwide and elimination of local influences since the appeal is usually decided in another part of the country. The algorithm does not exclude the possibility that the case will be assigned within the same town/county. It acts as if all second-instance judges

constitute one national court. Exceptions were made for urgent cases for which it would be unfeasible to arrange distant decision-making. Cases are sent to County Courts via the national court case management system, and the hard copy is distributed by mail or courier. Holding a hearing in the appellate proceedings is possible but rarely used. There is no consistent practice formed in terms of the organization of those hearings, but the most likely solution would be to hold an online hearing which is foreseen by the procedural laws. These online hearings would surpass two important impediments: the lack of courtrooms in second-instance courts and the travel cost if the case is assigned to a remote location.

In terms of human resources management, the consolidation of courts facilitated easier relocation of judges and staff within the enlarged court. This enabled the court management to deal with the significant travel costs by placing the judges and staff closer to their place of residence to the extent possible.

Challenges

The 2008 reorganization was the simplest one in terms of setting the criteria, while all the subsequent ones were more complex. This was proven by the reinstatement of some of the courts as the reduced judicial map from 2015 apparently did not prove to be sustainable.

The initial idea to gradually close all permanent offices was abolished in the meanwhile thus limiting the overall planned reach of the reform. Although the existence of permanent offices in place of former courts does bring some benefits, it simultaneously complicated court management. The possibility to relocate judges and staff more efficiently and more economically was mostly a one-time gain. After the first relocation, there was not much opportunity to benefit from this possibility. Furthermore, some of the closed locations had excellent physical (and ICT) infrastructure while the infrastructure in some of 'the surviving courts' was unfit for their needs. Additionally, it was infrastructurally unfeasible for most of 'the surviving courts' to take in the closed ones.

The court management became more complex as it needed to encompass distant locations, as well. This, in turn, led to forming of a new managerial role of a judge who is a permanent office manager who takes care of the locations and oversees the staff. All assumptions applied to the rest of Croatia could not be applied to the capital Zagreb as the courts in Zagreb were disproportionally more burdened and congested in comparison to the rest of Croatia. For that reason, tailor-made measures were introduced in Zagreb by establishing new courts. An attempt to merge the Municipal Court in Sesvete with the one in Zagreb in 2015 ended with reinstating Sesvete[154] again. The frequent changes in the judicial map were burdensome on the MoJ and the courts. Each amendment took a certain preparation and adjustment period that slowed down regular activities.

[154] Sesvete is a large district of the City of Zagreb.

Impact

There are no publicly available analyses concerning the impact of the reform(s). Obviously, each new reform wave was preceded by the state-of-play analyses conducted by the MoJ. However, the success of the second-tier territorial jurisdiction reform is supported by a decline in disposition times as reported by MoJ in its annual reports.

Figure 55. Disposition Time of County Courts in Croatia from 2014 to 2021



Source: MoJ Annual Statistical Reports 2014 - 2021

ANNEX 4. Case study: Judicial Map Reform in the Netherlands

Introduction

The Netherlands judiciary was dramatically reformed in the beginning of the new century. Its most visible change was the institution of the Council for the Judiciary. The Council is the governance organ for the courts in the Netherlands, except the Supreme Court and the judicial division of the Council of State. The Council took over a major part of the governance tasks formerly with the Minister of Justice.[155] This change was subsequently evaluated. One result of this evaluation was the plan to revise the judicial map, also known as Herziening Gerechtelijke Kaart, or HGK. The judicial map had remained the same for more than a century. The revision plan is part of a permanent process of optimizing the quality of the administration of justice.

The judiciary of The Netherlands includes first instance courts, appellate courts, Supreme Court and the judicial division of the Council of State. First instance courts in the Netherlands hear civil, including family and small claims, criminal and administrative cases. The appeal courts hear appeals of civil and criminal cases. Administrative appeals are heard by the judicial division of the Council of State.

Several revision operations can be distinguished. The first round of reforms took place from 1996 to 2000. At the time, there were two types of courts at the first instance level – local and district ones. Legislation to merge the then existing local courts into the then existing district courts was first proposed in 1996. The proposal was withdrawn in 1998, after opposition from the local court judges, and because of new insights into the governance of the courts more generally. A proposal for a general overhaul of the judiciary's governance was introduced in 2000. Governance of the courts was done by a court board, no longer by the MoJ and the court managers who reported to the MoJ. The local courts were merged with district ones and made one of max five sectors in each of the 19 then district courts thus creating the structure for the current first instance courts. The main reason for this operation was to make the local courts less vulnerable to risks like illness or other discontinuity. Some smaller local courts had less than one full time equivalent judge, which made their continuity an issue. There were 62 local courts. After the first reform, each of the 19 first instance courts had a local court sector. The second round of reforms took place in 2013. In this revision operation, the number of first instance courts was reduced from nineteen to eleven. Two appeal courts merged, so there are now four instead of five appeal courts. This revision was officially done to promote court quality, professionalism and expertise. So, the reasons for the two operations were different. The courts now work in teams. Each of the 11 first instance courts has a local court team.

[155] Wet organisatie en bestuur gerechten (*Law on organization and governance of the courts*); Voorstel van wet, 2000, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/kst-27181-1.html

Purposes of the reform

The issues the Netherlands tried to address were many. The official main objective of the reform was to improve the quality of the judicial services. The issues it tried to address were numerous,.[156] They were specialization, quality and access to justice according to the explanatory note thereof. The official main objective of the reform was to improve the quality of the judicial services. According to the explanatory document for the new legislation, the main issue was differentiation in types of cases, which requires specialization on the one hand, and on the other hand concentration of expertise. Smaller courts have difficulty providing the needed expertise and continuity. Increasing the scale of the courts intended to improve the quality of the judicial work with more possibilities to deliver made-to-measure work and develop more expertise and professionalism, and so increase access to justice. This operation was characterized as "large-scale organizing in order to work small-scale".

The second goal was to improve the effectiveness of the criminal justice chain. The new judicial map was applied equally to the organization of the first instance courts, public prosecution and police, in order to unify the geographical organization of the criminal justice chain.

Criteria

There were three main criteria used for the optimization of the judicial map:

- ensuring access to quality service delivery;
- ensuring effective management of the new courts;
- ensuring alignment with the regional prosecutor offices and the police 1st instances.

Additional criteria included:

- geographical position of the areas,
- cultural coherence,
- similarities in crime patterns,
- economic activity, the
- administrative context,
- effects on internal and external management,
- vulnerability of specialisms and
- anticipated costs of reorganization.

Today, professionalism in various areas is increasingly necessary in order to adjudicate on cases well and efficiently. Such professionalism needs a sufficient caseload in order to build and maintain experience, and a large enough working unit in order to apply specialization. For the Netherlands, it was determined that a working unit (or a team) needs at least a case load for 20 full-time judicial equivalents (FTE) in order to build and maintain professionalism

[156] Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid. (2011). *Memorie van toelichting (explanatory note)*. https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/wetsvoorstellen/detail?qry=*&fld_tk_categorie=Kamerstukken&srt=date%3Adesc%3Adate&Type=Gerelateerd&dpp=99&clusterName=Gerelateerde+documenten&fldnot_prl_nummer=2011Z17348&fld_prl_dossiernummer=32891&dossier=32891&id=2011Z17348&fld_prl_soort=Brief+regering

and specialization. Teams can handle different types of cases. There are workload standards for all case types. Those workloads add up to a caseload. A team can handle different types of cases, but at the minimum it needs to have a caseload for 20 FTEs to be viable for providing professional quality service. The courts have discretion on which cases will be heard in the various hearing locations. There is no determination on what the minimum number and types of departments are that a Dutch court of a certain level must have. In the revision operation, a number of FTE below 100 was considered the critical threshold for a first instance court. For a total of 1643 first instance court judges, the average court in the old setup had 86 judges, and in the new setup it had to have 164 judges.

In addition to the seats of the enlarged courts, many subsidiary locations were left to operate around the country as either hearing locations or subsidiary locations to ensure better access to justice. Subsidiary locations have an office function, a front office and a hearing facility. Hearing locations have no office. With 11 first instance courts, the new judicial map has 32 hearing locations. The criteria for setting up a hearing location were:

- The old main locations of the courts stay as hearing locations
- There needs to be a hearing location in the ten largest municipalities in the country
- Hearing locations need to be kept in the old local court locations with a population of more than 300.000.
- Special situations like the national airport.

The subsidiary locations where no hearings are held, have only an office function. Thus, in essence, when the local courts were integrated, only a few very small courts were closed entirely. Most of the local court buildings were kept on as subsidiary office and/or hearing location.

Content of the reforms

The reform entailed predominantly court mergers. At the appeal court level, two appeal courts merged: East Netherlands and Northern Netherlands. The other four appeal courts stayed like before. At the first instance court level, nineteen courts, in all provincial capitals and some other major cities, were merged into ten, and later eleven courts. A motion in Parliament to split the first instance court of East Netherlands into two was accepted, hence one extra first instance court. The eight first instance courts that lost their status all became subsidiary court locations. At the local level, courts had already been integrated into the governance of the first instance courts in the earlier operation. The sixty or so locations were either closed or made into subsidiary court locations or hearing locations. The only court that came out of the operation smaller than before was Amsterdam first instance court, which lost some of its territory to the Central Netherlands court.

The reform also changed the governance structure of the courts. Each court got two departments: public law, comprising criminal and administrative law teams, and private law covering family law, small claims and civil law teams.

The maps below show the old situation, the intended new situation and the final new situation.

Figure 56. Old judicial map of the Netherlands



Figure 57. Intended judicial map of the Netherlands

Figure 58. New judicial map of the Netherlands

Challenges

Resistance against merging the courts in the two provinces of the Eastern Netherlands from four into one court presented a major challenge. At the last moment, the legislation on the new judicial map was amended to keep the two provinces separate, and thus creating not 10, but 11 first instance courts. The extra court would have only 97 judges, which is below the threshold of 100 FTE per court. As will be seen in the section about the impact of the reform,

this split created co-ordination problems for the police and the public prosecution, and thus another challenge for those institutions.

Another major challenge was Northern Netherlands. Here, three provinces that had each had their own courts needed to become one single first instance court. In both cases, geographical distance and historical factors played a major part.

The regulations determining which types of cases will be heard by the different courts, at the subsidiary courts and the hearing locations in a district, were the subject of much debate. The debate centered in particular on the question which institution should decide about those regulations. The MoJ proposed a central deciding role for the Minister of Justice. The Judicial Council argued that the Council should be in charge of drawing up these regulations. Ultimately, the Judicial Council's proposal was followed, with the Minister of Justice having the authority to challenge in exceptional circumstances. Three main criteria were applied to the choice of which types of cases needed to be heard in which hearing location: quality, access for citizens, and efficiency – in that order. The result should be that cases close to citizens will be heard in all 32 locations. Those cases would be all cases that come to the local courts and family cases, police court cases for instance. Each first instance court has discretion as to which cases they want to have heard in which location.

Finally, the operation involved both merging districts instances and reforms in the governance structure of the court system, which increased the complexity of the operation.

Impact

In the first round of reforms, the local courts were only merged into the first instance courts managerially. They became a sector, and later a team, in the first instance courts. Most of the buildings stayed open, hearing locations did not change. An independent evaluation was carried out.[157] They found that, *"In most courts, the subdistrict (i.e., local court) sector, like the other sectors, has a fairly autonomous position. The organization of the subdistrict sector thus in some cases still closely resembles the old situation. In other words, the impact of the WOBG (the law instituting the new governance and organization of the courts) seems to be less than one might suspect. One of the objectives of the WOBG was to promote cooperation of the subdistrict sector with other sectors within the court. For various reasons, this does not seem to have succeeded. That this is not symptomatic of the subdistrict court sector in particular is evident from the picture that rotation between sectors other than the subdistrict court sector also hardly ever occurs. The cooperation of the subdistrict court sector with other sectors is not or hardly different from what it was before the introduction of the WOBG; it was and is in the small courts in particular. All in all, the advantages of subdistrict justice have been preserved. It seems that this outcome is consistent with the limited impact of the WOBG on the organization and cooperation between the sectors. After all, once that impact is less and the organization and culture of the subdistrict court sector is not violated, the way of working and thus the benefits of subdistrict justice will not change either."*

[157] Boone, M., Kramer, P., Langbroek, P., Olthof, S., & Ravesteyn, J. van. (2006). Het functioneren van de rechterlijke organisatie in beeld. Amstelveen. https://repository.wodc.nl/handle/20.500.12832/1487

The second round of reforms was evaluated five years after its implementation. A Committee led the operation. The Committee was composed of a professor of constitutional law, a justice in the Supreme Court, a professor of public management, a mayor, and an emeritus professor.[158] The two-year operation included surveys of stakeholders and quantitative analysis. The Committee produced a report, on which most of this part of this case study is based.[159] The report covered the way the legislation was implemented and the changes that happened in relation to it since implementation. The investigation did not cover the quality of judicial decisions or hearing competencies of the judges, since they belong in the judicial domain.

The investigation had three phases:
1. evaluating the Cabinet's **plans**,
2. evaluating the **process** of what happened in order to implement the legislation and
3. evaluating the **effects** of the legislation.

Each phase had its own research questions. They were answered with various methodologies: desk study, a survey and interviews. There was no baseline of relevant factors from the start of the implementation. Hence, drawing solid conclusions about cause and effect was impossible.

The Committee made, however, the following general remarks:

- The evaluation of the Judicial Map Revision Act (HGK Act) was considered premature by some. At the time of the evaluation, many courts were still in the process of implementing new working methods and systems.
- Many have perceived the Act primarily as an austerity measure and a business management operation. The true objectives (with the exception of the objective dealing with operations) of the HGK Act have not been adequately highlighted to these people. This has presumably hampered the process towards achieving the objectives.
- Significant efficiency gains have been achieved by closing buildings. However, due to the increase in travel movements and the 'travel time is working time' regulation, the increase in scale has, on balance, yielded little or no benefit.

Next, the Committee's evaluated the objectives of the operation, as follows:

- **Promoting specialist knowledge and expertise.** The Committee notes that there are cautious first signs in some areas that the increase in scale has created more opportunities for further development of expertise and specialization. More generally, there is no systematic dialogue on, for example, the question of whether the system of 32 hearing locations is adequate and appropriate. The government assumes that accessibility will be guaranteed in the new system. The Committee notes, however, that in the relations between the court boards, the Council for the Judiciary and the

[158] *Instellingsregeling Commissie Evaluatie Wet herziening gerechtelijke kaart.* (2016). https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2016-5624.html
[159] Commissie Evaluatie HGK. (2017). *Evaluatie van de Wet herziening gerechtelijke kaart*. https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-827479.pdf

Ministry of Justice and Security, signals are missed (or insufficiently shared) relating to the distribution of the judiciary within the Netherlands. For example, it is not clear what happens to reports about possible higher default rates in areas where local courts were closed.[160] Little is currently known about the consequences of closing local court locations. Given the importance of the subject, the signals about higher default rates require further attention.

- **Improving governance and administrative power.** The second objective of the HGK Act concerned the quality of the administration (improvement of administrative power). The experiences of those involved and the Committee's investigation findings are too variable to be able to draw an unequivocal conclusion about the extent to which this objective has (already) been achieved. There are large differences in tempo in the process of achieving this objective, not only between merged courts on the one hand and non-merged courts on the other, but also between merged courts themselves.
- **Improving the quality of operational management.** With respect to the third objective, the quality of operational management, the Committee observed that the operational management of courts and public prosecutors' offices had been professionalized. By increasing the size of departments or teams, more possibilities for specialization have arisen within the operational functions. Also, compared to the situation before the HGK Act, the continuity of the work is better guaranteed. No clear effects of scale are visible in the financial figures.
- **Collaboration in the criminal justice chain.** As far as the fourth and final objective of the HGK Act is concerned, the Committee concludes that, on the whole, few major changes are observed in the collaboration in the criminal law chain.[161] The split of the East Netherlands first instance court into two courts caused some issues. One prosecution office now needs to coordinate with two courts instead of one, and travel distances for staff and case files have increased significantly.

From the findings with regard to these objectives, the Committee has distilled a number of recommendations, as follows:

- No new institutional reforms in the short term, but interventions within the existing institutional framework to bridge cultural gaps are advised.
- Strengthen collaboration at the governance and administrative level. In the relation between court boards, Council and MoJ, develop and exercise responsibility for a shared set of values. In this context, signals about higher default rates, the hearing location regulations and other problems deserve attention.
- Strengthen collaboration at the administrative level.
    - In the relationship between boards of courts, the Council for the Judiciary and the Ministry of Justice and Security: draw up a jointly shared set of values

[160] Eshuis, R. (2017). *De rechter op afstand (the judge at a distance)*. Ministerie van Justitie (WODC). https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/930/Me_2017-5__2324_Volledige_tekst_tcm28-293432.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

[161] Kristen, F. G. H. (2017). *Evaluatie van de Wet herziening gerechtelijke kaart – Samenwerking in de strafrechtketen*. Ministerie van Justitie (WODC). https://repository.wodc.nl/bitstream/handle/20.500.12832/2045/2324_volledige-tekst_tcm28-294875.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

about the subjects for which the powers and duties can only be exercised in mutual consultation and propagate them in word and deed; put each other in a position to properly fulfil these duties and responsibilities. Subjects that need attention in this connection, in the Committee's opinion, include signals from the field about possible higher percentages in absentia, the case distribution rules, the (sometimes limited) availability of judges at the various places of session.
    - In the relationship between the Public Prosecution Department and the courts: steps have been taken in the right direction, but the collaboration can and must improve in crucial areas. The Committee had in mind, among other things, the adoption of case distribution rules, the adoption of and compliance with court covenants, the timely provision of information on major ongoing investigations, the different ways of working between places of session and the coordination of the location of the RC's office.
    - In the relationship between the boards of courts: from the joint responsibility for the Judiciary, work (even more) together to supervise the transition process brought about by the HGK Act.
- Share experiences, for example when it comes to dealing with cultural differences, dealing with large physical distances between places of session, vision creation, the division of roles and role stability of court administrators and department or team chairpersons, working in teams that transcend locations, quality control and the (internal translation of the) external orientation.
- Strengthen collaboration at the operational level. The Committee recommends focusing less on the organizational structure and more on the connection between the people working in and around the judicial organization. Administrative interventions aimed at, for example, dealing with cultural differences are desirable.
- Strengthen the effectiveness of the national consultations; consider whether the number of consultative bodies can be reduced. The organization and positioning of the employee participation should also be reviewed.
- Give (real) priority to strengthening middle management; ensure that middle management positions are sufficiently attractive and can be filled with sufficient continuity.
- Organize a dialogue (again) about the desired distribution of the judiciary in the Netherlands; make a clear distinction between interests that may or may not be included in the choices to be made; make a clearer distinction between the question of where office locations are needed and where places of session are needed. Politically, room should be offered for choices that are necessary to safeguard the quality of justice. If there are clear signs of higher percentages in absentia: find (temporary) facilities closer to the public.
- Strengthen cooperation in the criminal justice chain by chain-oriented management with a jointly determined objective and a common agenda.
- Carry out in-depth (quantitative and qualitative) research into signals about higher default percentages in areas where local courts have been closed down.
- Consider, for the longer term, whether the incongruence between the courts in East Netherlands is sustainable.