

# Policy Preferences in Response to Large Migration Inflows

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## Abstract

What are the preferred policy responses of host country residents to large migration inflows, and to what extent are these preferences driven by contact with migrants as well as values such as humanitarianism? This paper addresses these questions using new data on preferences of Colombians for responding to the large inflow of Venezuelans into their country. In a conjoint survey experiment, respondents selected and rated different policy packages comprising variations in six policy dimensions: (1) labour market access, (2) location restrictions, (3) public service access, (4) family reunification, (5) numerical limits, and (6) length of residency. The results suggest support for the options of

conditional access to the labour market (i.e., only in certain occupations) or full free access to the alternative of no access. There is support for unrestricted location choices and access to public services, as well as conditional rights to family reunification (i.e., only if able to support dependants). Respondents also support the use of numerical limits and limiting the length of the residency permit. The results show that those who have less contact with Venezuelans, those who put more weight on economic priorities, and those who see the situation in Venezuela as mainly an economic problem, tend to support policies that are more restrictive..

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# Policy Preferences in Response to Large Migration Inflows\*

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## 1. Introduction

What are the preferred policy responses of host country residents to large migration inflows, and to what extent are these preferences driven by contact with migrants as well as values such as humanitarianism? Forced migration has been central to recent electoral shifts in many host countries (Altındağ and Kaushal 2021; Campo et al. 2021; Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann et al. 2019; Marbach and Ropers 2019; Roza and Vargas 2021; Steinmayr 2021). It has also arguably contributed to the erosion of public trust in governments who are perceived to be ineffective in dealing with these inflows and raises questions about the role for policymaking in addressing public concern (Connor 2018; Jeannet et al. 2021; McLaren 2015).

A large body of work examines the patterns and determinants of immigration attitudes (Dinesen and Hjorth 2020), as well as public preferences for immigration levels (Citrin et al. 1997; Facchini and Mayda 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). However, the control of inward flows is just one of several kinds of policies available to policymakers in response to migration. In reality, migration policies—either as proposed by political parties or implemented by governments—are multidimensional and comprise several elements. Existing observational surveys, typically measuring public support for single policy proposals in isolation from other topics that are also relevant for migration, provide limited insights on how host country citizens perceive these bundles of policies and distinguish among their constituent parts (Helbling et al. 2017; Helbling and Leblang 2019). Yet expressed public preferences potentially contribute to the ways that national and regional policymakers think about and act upon this issue, as implementing migration policies relies on a degree of public consent.

We address this problem by considering the case of Venezuelan migration to Colombia. Over the last decade, Venezuela has experienced a multifaceted humanitarian, economic and social crisis that has led to a large outflow of its citizens. Official figures from the R4V platform indicates that, by the end of October 2021, 5.91 million Venezuelans had left the country (about 16% of the country's population), with over 1.75 million migrating to neighbouring Colombia<sup>1</sup> This case is important for empirical and theory development because both populations share ethnolinguistic, social and cultural features. These similarities potentially present divergent possibilities: on the one hand, if Colombians and Venezuelans possess similar occupational skills—then they may be close substitutes in the labour market, giving rise to more restrictive policy preferences on the basis of greater economic

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<sup>1</sup> Statistics obtained from the R4V website – The platform for interagency coordination for refugees and migrants from Venezuela: <http://www.r4v.info>

competition (Borjas 2014). On the other hand, cultural similarity and shared history between the two groups (such as by being part of the same country in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century) could lead to greater solidarity—and less restrictive preferences—in light of the serious humanitarian situation experienced by Venezuela.

Using a pre-registered conjoint survey experiment fielded online during March 2021 (N=2,508 adult Colombian nationals), we first address how Colombians perceive different packages of policy options towards Venezuelan migrants, and which dimensions they are more willing to support in the aggregate. Conjoint designs, as they have been generally used across political and economic settings, involve asking respondents to evaluate a profile or object that contains randomly varied features (Bansak et al. 2021). In our experiment, we presented respondents with sets of hypothetical policy packages (the ‘treatments’) comprising six dimensions available to policymakers and which are relevant to public debate in both Colombia and in many host countries globally: (1) labour market access, (2) location restrictions, (3) public service access, (4) family reunification, (5) numerical limits, and (6) length of residency.

This design reflects how people may encounter policy proposals as several options bundled together by legislators or parties, while also reduces social desirability bias by allowing respondents to justify their choices to themselves along any of the given dimensions. It is also resource efficient because it enables researchers to simultaneously test many more dimensions than would typically be possible using conventional designs that only vary a few elements in each treatment without resorting to unfeasibly large sample sizes.

Next, we look for heterogeneous effects involving three factors: the role of economic and humanitarian priorities, perceptions on the Venezuelan crisis, and personal contact with Venezuelans. The political economy literature on preference formation indicates that economic priorities more strongly relate to policies that are more likely to be perceived as protecting the labour market from foreign worker competition. Meanwhile, humanitarian priorities relate to policies that are more likely to be perceived as protecting the wellbeing of migrants (Bansak et al. 2016; Giray-Aksoy and Ginn 2021; Hager and Veit 2019). In forced migration situations, the humanitarian context and past conflict experiences may foster higher levels of empathy and altruism (Adida et al. 2018; Hartman and Morse 2017).

Finally, we explore whether heterogeneity also exists with respect to social contact. Increased *meaningful* contact with migrants can foster more positive attitudes and increase understanding of the migrant community and their challenges and therefore further support for policies seen as humanitarian (Betts et al. 2021; Ghosn et al. 2019; McLaren 2015). By

contrast, indirect contact or simple exposure, typically measured by the proportion of migrants in a local area, can increase hostility towards the migrant group and thus support for more restrictive and exclusionary policies (Enos 2014; Hangartner et al. 2019). Therefore, in this study, we emphasize and test for the role of contact using a battery of questions focusing on meaningful forms of contact.

Our findings indicate that there is more support for conditional access to the labour market (i.e., only in certain occupations) or full free access compared to the alternative of no access. There is support for unrestricted location choices and access to public health services. Respondents also prefer giving conditional rights to family reunification (i.e., only if able to support dependants), applying numerical limits on inflows, and limiting the length of residency permits. We show that those who put more emphasis on economic priorities relative to humanitarian ones and those who see the situation in Venezuela mainly as an economic problem, tend to support policies that are more restrictive. Finally, respondents reporting higher levels of meaningful social contact with Venezuelans show less restrictive policy preferences, particularly in terms of labour market access and family reunification, compared to those reporting lower levels of such contact.

This study makes three novel contributions to scholarly understanding of the politics and economics of migration. First, it moves beyond immigration *attitudes* to consider which *policies* host communities are willing to support in response to large-scale migration. Much prior conjoint experimental work has focused on identifying patterns in attitudes towards immigrants along different dimensions such as nationality, reason for entering, occupational skill, and gender (Bansak et al. 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Ward 2019). While attitudes are important antecedents for policy preferences, we present a more direct test of specific policy options bundled together as voters are more likely to encounter them. Here, the conjoint experimental design allows us to measure public support for a variety of policy options as they appear alongside each other, in a manner that has been shown to closely match actual preferences in naturalistic settings (e.g., Hainmueller et al. 2015).

Second, it provides evidence of public preferences in a region that, in terms of gross numbers, is far more consequential for the host country. Most existing work on the topic has focused on European or North American contexts, particularly around Europe's "migration crisis" of 2015 (Bansak et al. 2016; Jeannet et al. 2021).<sup>2</sup> By contrast, current forced

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<sup>2</sup> One exception is the study by Alrababa'h et al. (2020). They consider attitudes and policy preferences towards Syrian refugees in Jordan. However, the emphasis of their experimental study is on attitudes and not on policy preferences.

migration patterns demonstrate how neighbouring countries in the Global South actually host the majority of forced migrants worldwide (UNHCR 2020). The relatively few studies involving host communities in the Global South observe how, despite obvious differences in the scale of forced migratory flows, most published work focuses on the experiences of higher-income destination countries (Alrababa'h et al. 2020).

Third, we extend and improve upon prior work that considers key moderating factors for migration policy preferences. Specifically, we consider the role of humanitarian and economic values in impacting preferences for specific policies. This is relevant in a context in which the saliency of the economic and humanitarian crisis is particularly strong in explaining the driving forces of the migration inflows. We also revisit the role of social contact with migrants by moving beyond approaches used in existing observational studies (e.g., measures of distance to the border or migrant density as an approximation of exposure), instead using a detailed battery of questions regarding self-reported encounters with Venezuelans.

The paper is organised as follows: section 2 of the paper presents the conceptualisation of the different dimensions of policy; section 3 reviews the context of Venezuelan migration into Colombia; section 4 discusses the research design for the conjoint survey and the analysis and estimation strategies; section 5 presents the results; section 6 presents a series of robustness tests; and section 7 contains the conclusion and policy implications.

## **2. Policy Preferences and Dimensions of Policy Responses**

### **2.1 Dimensions of Policy Responses to Large Migration Inflows**

Policymakers in host countries must decide among several options when setting migration policies. In this section, we describe the six dimensions that we included in our hypothetical policy packages: (1) labour market access, (2) location restrictions, (3) public service access, (4) family reunification, (5) numerical limits, and (6) length of residency. Then, we show how they theoretically relate to economic and humanitarian priorities.

#### **Labour market access**

Restricting labour market access is a popular policy in the forced migration context. This policy intends to reduce concerns about labour market competition between hosts and the

newcomers (e.g., labour market replacement of the local population, reduction in wages, worsening of employment conditions). However, labour market restrictions can have negative consequences for migrant well-being. These policies can push forced migrants into informal employment where there is greater vulnerability and higher likelihood of exploitation. Moreover, labour market restrictions can have other effects such as psychological discouragement and the potential for mental health problems (Hainmueller et al. 2016; Hvidtfeldt et al. 2019; Laban et al. 2004). The global evidence on labour market access suggests that concerns regarding job competition dominate other concerns about the well-being of migrants, particularly in economies with weak labour markets (Zetter and Ruadel 2016).

### **Location restrictions**

Restricting the location of incoming migrants is also common around the world and it is particularly popular in the forced migration context. This includes restricting mobility to a “camp” location or temporary restrictions on moving across administrative divisions (e.g., municipalities, provinces). This policy aims to create a balance regarding the “burden” of immigration on regional labour markets and to protect domestic workers in certain regions from foreign competition (Auer 2018; Bratsberg et al. 2020; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2016).

### **Public service access**

Restricting access to public services such as health access is a common policy in the case of migrants without formal legal status (Juanmarti Mestres et al. 2021). In the cases of other migrants, including those with refugee status, there is typically some level of access to public services, which varies across countries. In general, these restrictions aim to reduce concerns about a decrease in the quality of services received by the host population, for example, waiting times for health services (Giuntella et al. 2018). However, the evidence suggests that public services restrictions have substantial negative long-term effects for migrant well-being (Bozorgmehr and Razum 2015) and there is strong public support for some types of access (e.g., maternity services).

### **Family reunification**

Restrictions on family reunification are also common around the world. These restrictions are typically imposed to reduce the possible burden on public finances of having additional dependants entering the country (Cholewinski 2004; Jeannet et al. 2021; Sumption and

Vargas-Silva 2019). Across countries, there is substantial evidence that family migrants have low employment rates compared to other types of migrants (Gillespie et al. 2020; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2018). However, there is evidence that policies restricting family reunification have major negative consequences for the well-being of migrants (Bragg and Wong 2016). This separation can increase financial vulnerability for some groups and create substantial mental distress.

### **Numerical limits**

Using numerical restrictions to limit immigration is a common practice around the world, taking form in policies such as limiting the number of visas or caps on work permits. These restrictions can be seen as a way to protect the economic situation of workers that compete with migrants in the labour market (Borjas 2014; Boubtane et al. 2016). Restricting numbers is a more controversial practice in the context of forced migration as there is an internationally recognised right to claim asylum. However, in many cases of large-scale forced displacement, most of those who are in need of protection are not recognised as refugees, hence different restrictions on numbers could be imposed. Yet from a humanitarian perspective, limiting the number of individuals who are allowed to enter the country can be seen as providing fewer numbers of people with essential protection.

### **Length of residency**

Finally, countries often only offer protection for the period of the crisis or conflict and require forced migrants to return home after this period (Black and Koser 1999; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2021). Requiring the return of migrants is a way of avoiding the abuse of humanitarian protection as way to gain long-term access to the labour market. However, there is a strong humanitarian concern that temporariness related to the status of forced migrants affects their well-being and leads to mental distress (Tize 2020).

## **2.2 Treatment Design and Hypotheses**

In our experimental design, we chose the possible levels within each dimension to correspond with the reality of current Colombian policy towards Venezuelans, as well as the range of possibilities available to policymakers. These options are expressed in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Policy dimensions and levels

<b>Policy</b>	<b>Levels</b>
<b>Access to labour markets</b>	Venezuelans can work in Colombia <b>without restrictions.</b>
	Venezuelans can work in Colombia <b>only in in selected occupations.</b>
	Venezuelans <b>cannot</b> work in Colombia.
<b>Geographic Location</b>	Venezuelans are allowed to locate in <b>their city of preference</b> in Colombia.
	Venezuelans are allowed to locate in <b>certain designated cities</b> in Colombia.
<b>Access to health</b>	Venezuelans <b>can</b> access the subsidised public healthcare system <b>on an equal basis to Colombians.</b>
	Venezuelans <b>cannot</b> access the subsidised public health care system in Colombia.
<b>Family reunification</b>	Venezuelans <b>are allowed</b> to bring their spouse and children.
	Venezuelans are allowed to bring their spouse and children <b>if they can pay for their cost of living.</b>
	Venezuelans are <b>not</b> allowed to bring their spouse and children.
<b>Numerical limit</b>	Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia <b>without numerical limits.</b>
	Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia <b>until an annual limit is reached.</b>
<b>Protection period</b>	Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for <b>an indefinite period.</b>
	Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for a <b>period of ten years, which can be renewed.</b>
	Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia <b>for a period of ten years, which cannot be renewed.</b>

Based on the above discussion, we set out four pre-registered hypotheses about aggregate Colombian policy preferences, as well as the extent to which contact and either

economic or humanitarian priorities are driving those preferences ([Table A1](#) presents a summary of the hypotheses and expected results). First, we expect that economic concerns will cause respondents to express more restrictive preferences with respect to Venezuelans' access to the labour market and the extent to which they are free to settle across the country. Meanwhile, we expect that humanitarian concerns will cause respondents to express less restrictive preferences with respect to Venezuelans' abilities to access public health services and be reunited with family members.

**H1 (economic concerns).** On average, respondents will prefer more restrictive policies related to labour market access and location restrictions.

**H2 (humanitarian concerns).** On average, respondents will prefer less restrictive policies related to access to health services and allowing for family reunification.

We also consider possible variation in preferences between respondents who hold either economic or humanitarian priorities. In the methods section, we explain how we measured these priorities.

**H3 (economic versus humanitarian concerns).** Respondents who prioritize economic values or see the Venezuelan crisis as a primarily economic problem will prefer more restrictive policies related to numerical limits, location, labour market access and length of residence, compared to those who prioritize humanitarian values or see the Venezuelan crisis as a primarily humanitarian problem.


Finally, we consider the role of personal contact with Venezuelan migrants. Existing work on contact suggests that there is theoretical scope for contact to foster more favourable attitudes towards outgroups, particularly when the type of contact in question is more personal (Ghosn et al. 2019; McLaren 2003). Additionally, recent experimental work from Europe suggests that contact specifically matters by shaping how receiving communities differentiate between Western and non-Western migrants (Clayton et al. 2021). Given the relative lack of research specifically examining the moderating effects of contact in the Global South—and on outcomes beyond attitudes—we test whether contact produces differences in policy preferences. We move away from the conventional idea of contact as mere exposure, instead focusing on *meaningful* contact as reflected in longer standing or more substantial forms of interaction.

**H4 (social contact).** Respondents who report having higher levels of contact with Venezuelans will prefer less restrictive policies across all dimensions.

### 3. Venezuelan Migration to Colombia and Institutional Context

The Venezuelan humanitarian, economic and social crisis over the last decade, has resulted in the outflow of over 5.91 million Venezuelan citizens (around 16% of the country's population) from the country. Over 4.5 million have stayed in the Latin American region, with Colombian being the main host.

Colombia shares a large border with Venezuela spanning 1,378 miles (see [Figure A1](#)). In addition, Venezuela and Colombia were part of the same country in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century (*Gran Colombia*). As a result, both countries have a shared history and share important cultural similarities. It is therefore not surprising that Colombia has been a major recipient of Venezuelans with an estimated 1.75 million now living in the country.<sup>3</sup> The official crossing points at the Colombia-Venezuela border have remained open for much of the Venezuelan crisis. The border crossing points were temporarily closed in 2015 but re-opened in 2016, after which a large number of migrants crossed (see Figure 1). It has always been relatively easy for Venezuelans to cross the border at unofficial border-crossing points.




Source: Authors' calculations using data published by the Ministry of External Relations 2020. The vertical solid line indicates the border closure in 2015 and the dashed line the re-opening of the border in 2016.

<sup>3</sup> This represents about 3.6% of Colombia's population and 7.2% of the labour force (Santamaria 2020).

The situation of Venezuelan migrants displays many similarities to the situation of refugees (i.e., those deserving the legal status). Mindful of Venezuelans’ conditions of vulnerability, in 2017 the Colombian government created a new migratory status called the ‘*Permiso Especial de Permanencia*’ (Special Permanency Permit), known as PEP. This permit has had different versions: the 2018 iteration was initially valid for up to two years and renewable every 90 days. Moreover, Venezuelans who held that version of the PEP were able to join the labour market and access public services.<sup>4</sup> While the permit regularised a significant proportion of Venezuelans, the number of unauthorised Venezuelans in the country remained high. In fact, until late 2020, nearly 50% of Venezuelans did not have regular status as shown in Figure 2 (Migración Colombia 2020). However, given the large level of informality in the Colombian labour market—estimated at over a third of all employment in Colombia (Departamento Nacional de Estadística 2021)—the lack of regularisation and formal work authorisation might not have represented a major impediment for Venezuelans to find employment.<sup>5</sup>

Figure 2 - Number of Regular and Irregular Venezuelan migrants since 2018



Source: Authors' calculations using data published by the Ministry of External Relations 2020.

<sup>4</sup> The PEP was initially rolled out in 2017 and came to be known as the PEP-I. Three resolutions were enacted in 2018 with three different forms of the PEP. Current evidence shows negligible effects of these amnesties on the Colombian labour markets (Bahar et al. 2021).

<sup>5</sup> There is evidence that, even after being eligible for regularisation, some migrants chose to keep working in the informal sector (Bahar et al. 2021).

Comparing demographic and labour market characteristics of Colombians and Venezuelans during the first quarter of 2021 (when our survey fieldwork occurred) reveals patterns that largely accord with prior studies. As shown in Table 2, while both labour market populations have similar sex ratios, Venezuelans are younger and have slightly higher levels of education (Bahar et al. 2021; Santamaria 2020) compared to Colombians. Venezuelan migrants also work longer weekly hours and report lower wages. They also present a much higher level of informality.

**Table 2:** Demographic and labour market characteristics of Colombian and Venezuelans – 1st quarter of 2021.

	Colombians		Venezuelans	
	Average	Std. Dev	Average	Std. Dev
<b>Gender</b> [1 = Male]	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49
<b>Age</b>	35	22.0	25.7	16.5
<b>Married</b>	0.15	0.36	0.08	0.26
<b>Years of education</b>	5.6	3.9	6.1	4.4
<b>Education</b>				
None	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.24
Primary	0.25	0.43	0.24	0.43
Secondary	0.40	0.48	0.52	0.50
Tertiary	0.23	0.42	0.14	0.35
<b>Labour market</b>				
Labour force	0.84	0.36	0.76	0.42
Employment	0.46	0.49	0.56	0.49
Informal	0.34	0.47	0.76	0.42
Weekly hours worked	44.4	14.3	47.8	15.3
Monthly wages	1,392.3	1,522.8	814.3	571.7

*Note:* Data comes from the Colombian Labour Market Survey (GEIH), Q1 2021. Monthly wages expressed in thousands of Colombian pesos.


In February 2021, immediately prior to our survey fieldwork, the Colombian government announced a mass regularisation for Venezuelan migrants currently living in the country, called *Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos* (ETPV). This granted Venezuelans a temporary regular migratory status for a non-renewable 10-year period.<sup>6</sup> It also granted permit holders access to formal labour markets and public services

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/2/60214cf74/unhcr-iom-welcome-colombias-decision-regularize-venezuelan-refugees-migrants.html>

such as health and education.<sup>7</sup> This scheme, which requires Venezuelans to apply for it, covers migrants already living in Colombia with either regular or irregular status.

However, we know very little about the public’s preferences for specific policies towards Venezuelan migrants. To be sure, Proyecto Migración Venezuela has collected data on public opinion towards Venezuelans in Colombia. Using data collected in September 2020, Figure 3 shows the percentage of individuals agreeing to different statements. At the time of that survey, a large percentage of Colombians perceived Venezuelans as a threat to employment (i.e., taking jobs away) (57%) while the majority also perceived them as a fiscal burden (58%). Yet a majority of respondents also agreed that Venezuelan migrants should be given access to healthcare (72%) and employment (54%), while a strong plurality thought they should be granted legal documents to access health and labour markers under the same conditions as Colombians (48%).<sup>8</sup> However, these observational results have several potential limitations, including difficulty in interpreting whether Colombians prioritise some policy aspects over others. A survey experiment is therefore well-suited to elicit Colombians’ views towards realistic policy options and understand their likely drivers.

Figure 3 - Attitudes towards Venezuelan migrants, September 2020



Note: Authors's calculation using data from Proyecto Migracion Venezuela, Revista Semana 2020. Percentage of respondents agreeing with the statements. N(2020-9)= 2,289

<sup>7</sup><https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/presidente-duque-anuncia-decision-historica-crear-estatuto-proteccion-temporal>

<sup>8</sup> Proyecto Migración also collected data in April 2019 and March 2020. The proportions of respondents agreeing to these statements have remained stable between these waves. We thank Adriana Sabogal and Proyecto Migración Venezuela for granting us access to the data. <https://migravenezuela.com/>

## 4. Data and Research Design

### 4.1 Conjoint Experimental Survey

In order to measure Colombian policy preferences, we conducted a fully randomized choice-based conjoint experiment. Specifically, the conjoint design allows estimation of causal effects of different treatment components simultaneously in a multidimensional manner (Bansak et al. 2021; Hainmueller et al. 2014; Rodon and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020). As noted in Bansak et al. (2021) and Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto (2021), evaluating several attributes simultaneously helps to obscure the intent of researchers as well as allows respondents to justify their choices along any number of the dimensions. Indeed, evidence shows that fully randomised conjoint designs do mitigate social desirability bias (Dahl 2018; Horiuchi et al. 2021).

We presented respondents with hypothetical pairs of packages comprising policies towards Venezuelans that reflect current Colombian policy as well as options that policymakers in the country could plausibly implement. Each package contained randomly selected levels from within each of the six policy dimensions shown in Table 1. Then, each respondent was asked to choose which of the two policy packages they preferred more, as well as to rate each package on a 1-7 scale, where 1 indicated “absolutely dislike” and 7 indicated “absolutely like.”<sup>9</sup> Each respondent completed five trials ([Figure A2](#) provides an example of the task within the survey interface). In line with good practice, we randomised the order of the dimensions between respondents to reduce ordering effects (where respondents disproportionately focus on items appearing near the beginning of a list), but kept it constant across the five trials to minimize survey fatigue. We also ask a series of questions that allow us to explore the level of concern regarding economic vs humanitarian aspects, as well as respondents’ levels of social contact. [Table A2](#) and [Table A3](#) in the Appendix explain each of these variables in detail.

### 4.2 Survey Sample

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<sup>9</sup> The introductory paragraph and exact wording of the questions were: “*Imagine that the Colombian government is considering various packages of measures to address migration from Venezuela. Next we will show you two possible options of packages, A and B. Read their descriptions carefully.*” Then, in each conjoint task they are asked: (1) *Which package is closest to what you would prefer?*, and (2) *On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “you absolutely dislike” and 7 means “you absolutely like”, how would you rate each of these packages?*

We fielded the survey experiment between March 1-13, 2021 to a sample of 2,508 Colombian adults who were at least 18 years old.<sup>10</sup> These respondents came from a larger online panel of approximately 140,500 respondents.<sup>11</sup> Our sampling aimed to be representative across different dimensions of the country’s population based on the 2018 Colombian census, including key demographic variables including age, gender, region, and socioeconomic *strata* (a measure of income used in Colombia). [Table A4](#), which displays the distributions of these variables in our sample against those from the 2018 census, indicates how our sample shows close similarity with the census estimates.<sup>12</sup> We also recorded additional socio-demographic and economic variables for the respondents. Description and descriptive of other additional features of our sample appear in the Appendix ([Table A5](#)). Since each respondent saw five pairs of policy packages, our analysis comprises 25,080 observations.

### 4.3 Estimation Strategy

We analyse the data in three steps. First, we estimate both the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and marginal means (MMs) to measure public preferences towards each policy option within each dimension. AMCEs report a series of linear probability estimations where the dependent variable is a binary (forced choice) variable indicating the preferred policy by the respondent. The dependent variable is regressed on the levels of each policy dimension (with a researcher-chosen reference category as the baseline level) to estimate the probability of respondents choosing that policy option in relation to the reference category. To test for the consistency of the results, we also use a scaled rating version as a dependent variable where the policy ratings are re-scaled to vary between 0-1 (see [Table A3](#) for a description). In all estimations, we report robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level since each respondent saw multiple treatments (Hainmueller et al. 2014).

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<sup>10</sup> The survey experiment was reviewed and approved by the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) of the University of Oxford (C1A-20-2) and the pre-analysis plan was registered with As-Predicted (#60418).

<sup>11</sup> We worked with Invamer (<https://www.invamer.com.co/>), a reputable nationally recognised survey firm with one of the largest online panels in the country. They operated through the Netquest platform, and their recruitment strategy is based on incentives that are granted to the respondents at the end of the survey.

<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our use of online sampling might have over-represented individuals with online access and sufficient digital literacy to access an online survey—who in turn may have been more educated and urban-dwelling within broad regions. For context, in terms of internet access, Colombia ranks in the middle of other Latin American countries of similar income levels: according to World Bank estimates, 65% of the population in the country has access to use the internet. This is higher than Ecuador (54%), Peru (60%), and Bolivia (44.2%), but lower than Mexico (70%), Argentina (74%), and Brazil (70%) [<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS>].

Meanwhile, MMs represent the mean outcome across all appearances of a particular feature, averaging across all other features. They are the differences in the outcome of interest caused by the presence of a specific attribute, all other attributes being equal. We report MMs to reduce concerns about how researchers' choices of reference categories might impact the substantive interpretation of the results—particularly among subgroups (Leeper et al. 2020; Ratkovic 2021).

Second, we estimate conditional marginal means (CMMs) to measure subgroup preferences for the policy options. We assessed the extent to which respondents hold either economic or humanitarian priorities in two ways. On the one hand, prior to the experimental treatment we measured respondents' levels of agreement with five statements that covered a range of economic and humanitarian stances: for example, "*protecting the most vulnerable should be given priority even if that reduces economic growth.*" This was measured on a scale from 1 indicating "strongly disagree" to 5 indicating "strongly agree." The full battery of statements appears in [Table A2](#) and the corresponding summary statistics in Figures [A3](#) and [A4](#). We randomised the order of these statements by respondent. Then, after recoding responses so that higher values indicated humanitarian priorities, we assigned respondents whose mean response across the five statements was greater than 3 as holding more humanitarian priorities. By contrast, we assigned respondents whose mean response were below 3 as holding more economic priorities. On the other hand, we measured respondents' views as to whether the situation in Venezuela was primarily an economic or humanitarian problem using a single question (see [Table A2](#) Appendix).

Third, we also consider the extent to which social contact with Venezuelans matters for Colombians' policy preferences. Using a series of three questions measuring self-reported *meaningful* social contact—rather than chance or superficial exposure to a large group—we created an index that allowed us to code respondents as having either "high" or "low" levels contact (Clayton et al. 2021).<sup>13</sup> The questions asked about daily interactions, trust in individuals, and social interactions (i.e., gathering for dinner). The precise questions and construction of the index are reported in the Appendix in [Table A2](#) and the summary statistics in [Figure A5](#). The order of these questions was also randomised across respondents.

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<sup>13</sup> To test whether our results with respect to contact are sensitive to the type of contact in question, we repeated the analysis using a more conventional measure of migrant density. This measure involved calculating the proportion of migrants as a share of the total population of each state (department). Then, using respondents' reported location at the state-level, we split the sample into two groups: those living in states whose proportion of migrants was below the median of all states (coded as 0), and those living in states with migrant proportions above the median (coded as 1).


## 5. Results

In this section, we report the main results of the survey experiment. We focus on the forced choice outcome, but also report the results using the rating outcome in the Appendix. The substantive findings do not change whether looking at the forced choice or rating outcome.

### 5.1 Aggregate-Level Policy Preferences

Figure 4 shows the AMCEs and MMs for each level across the six policy dimensions. Among the AMCEs, the reference category is the least restrictive option within each dimension (except for length of residency). The results provide mixed support for our aggregate-level hypotheses. H1 stated that respondents will favour more restrictive policies with respect to labour market access and geographic location. On the one hand, Colombians prefer restricting Venezuelans' access to the labour market over no restrictions by 2 percentage points. On the other hand, they clearly do not prefer *completely* preventing Venezuelans from employment: this option was 12 percentage points less favoured compared to free access. There is also opposition (by 3 percentage points) to location restrictions compared to the option of no restrictions.

Figure 4 - Colombian policy preferences towards Venezuelan migration  
Average Marginal Component and Marginal Means



Note: N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals. In the AMCE column, single points without horizontal bars denote the reference category used for that dimension.

Meanwhile, H2 stated that respondents should prefer less restrictive policy options with respect to Venezuelans’ access to public health services and ability to reunify with family members. Respondents do indeed prefer allowing Venezuelans to access health services over not allowing access (by 4 percentage points). However, respondents preferred the intermediate option for family reunification that introduced economic criteria over the unrestricted option (by 11 percentage points, respectively).

Although we did not pre-register aggregate-level hypotheses with respect to numerical limits and length of residency, our results suggest that respondents prefer some kind of annual limit (by 6 percentage points, compared to no annual limit) and having a time-limit on residency—whether or not it can be renewed (by 5 percentage points over having an

unlimited time period). The results using the rating outcome are included in Figures [A6](#) and [A7](#) in the Appendix. As mentioned above, the substantive findings remain unchanged.


## 5.2 Role of Humanitarian versus Economic Priorities

In a second step, we move beyond overall policy preferences to consider the role of humanitarian *vs* economic priorities. Our pre-registered hypothesis stated that respondents who held economic priorities would prefer more restrictive policy options with respect to numerical limits, location, labour market access and length of residence, compared to respondents who held more humanitarian priorities. Figure 5 displays the conditional marginal means for each subgroup, using a measure of agreement with our battery of questions to determine respondents' priorities (marginal means and differences in sub-group means are presented in [Table A6](#) and [A7](#) in the Appendix).

The results broadly support this hypothesis, although some nuance is needed with respect to intermediate options. For example, respondents holding more humanitarian priorities are less likely to prefer *completely preventing* Venezuelans from accessing either the labour market or public health services (when looking at the AMCE's, this is 14 and 7 percentage points less likely compared to the base categories), or bringing family members, compared to those holding more economic priorities. Yet in absolute terms, both groups prefer *some* degree of restriction when it comes to labour market access, family reunification, and allowed length of stay.


We repeat this analysis using a question asking whether respondents viewed the Venezuelan crisis as a primarily economic or humanitarian crisis: the substantive results, reported in Figure 6, are broadly the same.

Figure 5 - How economic and humanitarian priorities matter for Colombian policy preferences towards Venezuelans



Note: N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6 - How economic and humanitarian priorities matter for Colombian policy preferences towards Venezuelans



Note: N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals.

### 5.3 Social Contact


We now turn to social contact. The results, presented in Figure 7, partially support our hypothesis that greater meaningful social contact leads to preferences for less restrictive policies.<sup>14</sup> On the one hand, this is clearly the case when it comes to labour market access: respondents reporting higher levels of contact are more likely to prefer policies that allow Venezuelans to have unrestricted access to employment, and less likely to prefer complete restriction, compared to those with lower levels of contact. This is also the case for family reunification, and—to lesser degrees of significance—preferences for numerical limits and

<sup>14</sup> The marginal means and test for statistical difference in sub-group means are presented in [Table A8](#) in the Appendix.

access to healthcare. On the other hand, both groups still outrightly prefer intermediate policies on family reunification and labour market access. By contrast, contact does not seem to matter for policy preferences with respect to length of residency: both groups prefer time-limited options, with the prospects of renewal not making a detectable difference. We further conduct the analysis with an alternative version of the social contact index that was less restrictive (segmenting by those who had any index value greater than zero) and with the question of whether the respondent has shared a meal with a Venezuelan and the results remain qualitatively the same ([Figure A8](#)).

Here, it is worth comparing the results from the self-reported social contact index and measures that rely on migrant density calculations as proxies for contact (included in [Figure A9](#) in the Appendix). As described earlier, we hypothesised that more meaningful forms of contact involving personal interaction would have greater impacts on policy preferences. While the likelihood of contact has often been measured by the proportion of migrants in a local area, it is possible that experiencing groups of migrants at ‘arms-length’ in this way might actually foster greater feelings of threat—although empirically measuring this is beyond the scope of our study. Inspecting the CMMs corresponding to each subgroup labelled as having ‘high’ or ‘low’ contact on either measure reveals that, while the direction of preferences among policy options does not substantively vary, the differences *between* subgroups do change in magnitude for some dimensions. For example, meaningful contact (compared to mere migrant density) appears to matter more for respondents’ preferences on family reunification, health access, and location restrictions. While more work needs to be done to empirically document the mechanisms at play, our results suggest that the *quality* of contact likely matters for migration policy preferences.

Figure 7 - How social contact with Venezuelans matters for Colombian policy preferences



Note: N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals.

#### 5.4 Heterogeneities: Conjoint results by other respondents' characteristics

We also considered other demographic features as potential moderators, which was done in an exploratory manner separate from the pre-registered analyses. These included age, gender, socio-economic status, education, and employment status. The description of all these variables are included in [Table A2](#) in the Appendix. The results are presented in [Figure A10](#).

We observe some notable differences among subgroups in some dimensions that correspond with prior work on the drivers of immigration attitudes in the Global North. For example, younger respondents (those aged below 40) are less likely to prefer restricting work

compared to those that are older, although the two groups express largely similar responses with respect to the other policy dimensions.

## 6. Robustness Checks

We conduct a series of robustness checks for the validity of our results. First, we report the results of Figure 5 when we include additional control variables (age and education level, political orientation, attitudes towards migration). As shown in [Table A6](#), the ACMEs remain unaffected by additional control variables in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. This in turn shows that the experimental estimates are robust across policy dimensions.<sup>15</sup>

We also consider the potential for survey fatigue since conjoint experiments can be cognitively demanding. In our design, respondents completed five tasks which is well within the limits of what respondent can typically complete without significant losses in quality (Bansak et al. 2019; Hainmueller et al. 2014). [Figure A11](#) in the Appendix displays all estimates by task number: the results do not significantly differ among tasks.

## 7. Conclusion

As countries around the world continue to experience large-scale migration inflows, governments face choices of which policies to implement in response. To a certain degree, these choices will be informed by public demands and consent for different kinds of interventions. While existing research has tried to ascertain host communities' preferences for immigration policies, this work often displays shortcomings that limit both theoretical and empirical development—not least of all a lack of focus on cases in the Global South which, by sheer numbers, experience most of the world's forced migration flows.

By harnessing the power of a conjoint experiment fielded in Colombia, we explored the extent to which host country residents prefer a range of policies realistically available to policymakers as they respond to Venezuelan immigration, which is one of the largest migratory flows globally. We have also addressed whether these preferences are driven by different priorities (e.g., economic or humanitarian priorities) and meaningful social contact. Our results reveal support for the options of conditional access to the labour market (i.e., only in certain occupations) or full free access to the alternative of no access, for unrestricted location choices and access to public services, as well as conditional rights to family

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<sup>15</sup> Acknowledging debates about when adding control variables is needed in experimental settings where researchers control randomisation (Mutz 2011) —and particularly when looking for heterogeneous effects among subgroups using covariates which are not randomly assigned (Kam and Trussler 2017) —we lean more heavily on the treatment effects reported in the main text.

reunification (i.e., only if immigrants are able to support their dependants). Respondents also support the use of numerical limits and limiting the length of residency permits. The results also show that those who put more emphasis on economic priorities relative to humanitarian ones, and those who see the situation in Colombia as mainly an economic problem, tend to support policies that are more restrictive. Meanwhile, people who report having higher levels of social contact with Venezuelans also hold preferences for less restrictive policies when it comes to labour market access and family reunification. This is particularly important given our focus on *meaningful* contact rather than incidental exposure.

Our results present several implications for policymaking. First, aggregate public preferences vary among migration policy components, with more support found for those aspects having more direct consequences for migrants' welfare—including access to work, healthcare, and family (Figure 5). This suggests that, at least in the Colombian context, policymakers are likely already working with broadly positive policy preferences in these domains. What is more, as indicated by the lack of polarization on migration policy in terms of sociodemographic characteristics, this appears to cut across major divisions that prior research tends to show as mattering for immigration attitude formation globally (Dinesen and Hjorth 2020; International Organization for Migration 2015; Rodrigues-Chatruc and Rozo 2021). As a result, there may be more political room for manoeuvre whereby legislators may be able to build public consent for a range of practically consequential policies towards Venezuelans.

Second, public messaging that invokes humanitarian messaging and values may be a potentially effective lever for building that consent among citizens, particularly in those migration policy domains that have more directly-felt impacts on migrants' daily lives. People holding stronger humanitarian values or viewing the Venezuelan crisis as a humanitarian issue expressed more favourable preferences in the domains of family reunification and healthcare access (Figure 6 and Figure 7). While testing the durability and longevity of this effect is beyond the scope of this single experiment, future work should investigate the extent to which migration policy preferences are sensitive to different framings that highlight competing values—and for whom these framings are more or less effective. For example, it could be possible that those most opposed to immigration could have a more favourable reaction to messaging indicating that Venezuelans can boost economic growth in Colombia. Moreover, emphasising values and objectives that are shared across national groups may also impact the extent to which citizens perceive migration as having primarily humanitarian features. Besides values, messaging also involves

communicating about the dynamics, drivers, and impacts of migration: we suggest greater attention to the extent to which policy preferences are sensitive to factual information involving migrants and migration—much of which is often filtered through mass media (see e.g., Allen and Blinder 2018; Grigorieff et al. 2020).

Third, meaningful contact may be a mechanism for fostering social cohesion, particularly in settings where the sociocultural distance between host and migrant communities may be less. People reporting higher levels of meaningful contact were more likely to favour fewer location restrictions and granting healthcare access. What is more, such levels of contact are not rare in the Colombian context: about 75% of our sample reported having at least *some* form of meaningful contact with Venezuelans (Figure A5). Our results pave the way for testing interventions that generate substantive interactions among host and migrant communities, suggesting that these kinds of efforts may have consequential effects.

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**Table A1. Summary of pre-registered hypotheses**

More restrictive (+)	Aggregate	Prioritise economic over humanitarian
Labour market	-	-
Location	-	-
Public services	+	
Numerical limits		-
Family reunification	+	
Length of residence		-

Note: - more restrictive, + less restrictive

**Table A2. Definition of socio-demographic and other covariates**

Variable	Definition
Age	Self-reported age in years. Responded coded as “old” if above the median age in the sample or “young” otherwise.
Education	Self-reported highest level of education. The scale contains the following categories: Primary education, Secondary education, Technical education, University (professional) degree, Postdoctoral degree.
Employment status	Self-reported employment status. Respondents answer the following question: “ <i>Which of the following applies to you?</i> ” Answer options included: Currently working as self-employed; Currently working as employed; Full time student, Retired/pension, Unemployed, Not working, Have never worked, Other.
Gender	Self-reported gender.
Humanitarian Index	<p>A humanitarian index was created based on the answer to the following statements: “<i>To what extent do you agree with the following statements, where 1 means ‘strongly disagree’ and 5 means ‘strongly agree’?</i>”</p> <p>[Ranking 1 to 5]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. The government must spend more to help the poor.</li><li>2. The government should ensure that everyone can meet basic human needs such as food and shelter.</li><li>3. Protecting the most vulnerable should be given priority even if that reduces economic growth.</li><li>4. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.</li></ol> <p>Statements are randomised at the respondent level.</p>
Impacted by COVID	<p>The following questions were asked to those that were either employed or unemployed:</p> <p><i>“Many people have been affected financially by the coronavirus. We’d like to know how you have been affected, and how you and your household are coping.”</i></p> <p>[If unemployed] – Have you been unemployed since before the pandemic or did you become unemployed during the pandemic? [Yes, No]</p> <p>[If employed] – think about the last week compared to your life in February of 2020, before the pandemic. Due to the coronavirus outbreak, did you [thick yes/no]: (i) work fewer hours than usual, (ii) earn less money than usual, (iii) had trouble paying for your usual bills or expenses?</p>
Migrant Density	For each state (department), we divided the number of migrants by the state’s population. We split the sample between those above and below the median and created an index of exposure to migrants (0 below median, 1 above median).
Political ideology	Self-reported ideological leaning. The question used was: “ <i>Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms</i>

*“left” and “right” have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? [Ranking 1 to 10]”. Three ideological categories are defined: left (0-4), centre (5) and right (6-10).*

Region of residence of respondent

Region 1 – Bogota  
Region 2 – North/Caribbean  
Region 3 – East Center  
Region 4 – Antioquia and coffee growing area  
Region 5 – West - South

Social Contact Index

Three questions about contact were asked:

1. Over the past few years, how often if at all do you have everyday relationships with people from Venezuela, such as exchanging a few words, for example, or buying a newspaper at the store, and so on? [never, rarely, sometimes, often, every day]; (Schmid et al. 2014)
2. This question concerns people you trust, for example good friends, those with whom you discuss important subjects, with whom you keep in touch, or who are there for you if you need help. How many people you trust are from Venezuela? [0, 1, 2-5, 6-10, More than 10], (General Social Survey)
3. Over the past few years, have you shared a meal in your home with someone from Venezuela? [Yes, No]. (General Social Survey)

We follow (Clayton et al. 2021) and randomised questions per respondent and create an index of proximity to stratify the sample in two groups: those who report high levels of contact, and those who report low levels of contact. These groups are based on an index of contact with Venezuelans (on a scale of 0-3) using the three questions on contact. Respondents will receive one point if they report having everyday interactions with Venezuelans “sometimes,” “often,” or “everyday;” if they report trusting “2-5,” “5-10,” or “more than 10” Venezuelans; or if they report having shared a meal in their home with a Venezuelan in the past year. Those who score either a 2 or 3 on the index will be considered in the “high contact” group, and those scoring either a 0 or 1 will be considered in the “low contact” group. In our robustness checks, we will also re-run the analyses using (a) anyone scoring more than 0 as having “high contact,” (b) anyone answering “yes” to the shared meal question as having “high contact.

Socioeconomic strata

Self-reported social strata [1 to 6]. Social strata (estrato socioeconómico) is considered low for those living in 1, 2 and 3 – which is where residents receive subsidies for their utilities (water, gas, electricity). 5 and 6 are the highest and pay higher rates to subsidised those in lower stratas.

Vote in Presidential election

For those who answer yes in a question that asks: “Did you vote in the last presidential elections in Colombia?” The choices were Gustavo Petro, Ivan Duque, in blank, rather not respond. Our subgroup analysis is based on Petro vs Duque.

**Table A3. Definition of dependent variables**

Variable	Description
Forced Choice	<p>A binary indicator for whether the policy package was the preferred choice from the pair of policy packages presented. The respondent answers based on the following question: <i>“Imagine that the Colombian government is considering various packages of measures to address migration from Venezuela. Next will show you two possible options of packages, A and B Read their descriptions carefully. Which package is closest to what you would prefer?”</i> A dummy variable is created with a value of 1 for the option chosen and 0 otherwise.</p>
Scaled rating	<p>A dichotomised version of the rating outcome coded 1 for profiles rated higher than 4, 0 otherwise. Based on the following question: <i>On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “you absolutely dislike” and 7 means “you absolutely like”, how would you rate each of these packages?</i></p>

**Table A4. Sampling comparison with 2018 Census**

	Sample	2018 Census
<b>Gender</b>		
Female	0.49	0.52
<b>Age Structure</b>	41.31	
18-24	0.17	0.17
25-34	0.23	0.22
35-44	0.19	0.19
45-54	0.15	0.16
> 55	0.26	0.26
<b>Economic Strata</b>		
1-2	0.68	0.69
3-4	0.26	0.27
5-6	0.06	0.04
<b>Region</b>		
Bogota	0.17	0.19
Norte/Caribe	0.22	0.21
Centro/Oriental	0.19	0.24
Antioquia/Eje cafetero	0.16	0.21
Sur Occidental	0.25	0.16

**Table A5. Descriptive statistics of respondent's characteristics**

	Mean	SD
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Single	0.41	0.50
Married	0.29	0.45
Free union	0.21	0.41
Other	0.09	0.28
<b>Economic Strata</b>		
1-2	0.69	0.46
3-4	0.26	0.26
5-6	0.06	0.22
<b>Education</b>		
Less than secondary	0.12	0.32
Less than University	0.38	0.48
University	0.50	0.50
<b>Employment Status</b>		
Employed	0.65	0.47
Unemployed	0.12	0.33
In education	0.10	0.30
Other (e.g. retired)	0.11	0.32
N = 2,508		

**Table A6. Average marginal component effects (AMCEs) of migration policy features**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept				
Numerical limits (baseline: no limit)				
Annual limits	0.065*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.007)	0.065*** (0.007)
Location restrictions (baseline: No restrictions)				
Restrictions	-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.031*** (0.007)
Labour market access (baseline: allowed to work)				
Restricted work	0.022** (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)
Not allowed to work	-0.116*** (0.009)	-0.116*** (0.009)	-0.116*** (0.009)	-0.116*** (0.009)
Public services access – Health (baseline: Access)				
No access	-0.040*** (0.007)	-0.040*** (0.007)	-0.040*** (0.007)	-0.040*** (0.007)
Family reunification (baseline: allowed to bring family)				
Bring family if can support it	0.107*** (0.008)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.107*** (0.008)	0.107*** (0.008)
Not allowed to bring family	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)
Length of residency (baseline: indefinite period)				
Ten years that can be renewed	0.053*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.008)
Ten years that cannot be renewed	0.050*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.008)
Controls for age and education	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for liberalism	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control for attitude to migration	No	No	No	Yes
N	25,080	25,080	25,080	25,080

**Table A7. Conditional marginal means, CMMs (humanitarian vs economic) – Index**

	MMs Humanitarian	MMs Economic	Difference	p-value
Allowed to work	0.542	0.516	0.026 (0.011)	0.024
Restricted work	0.554	0.555	-0.001 (0.011)	0.906
Not allowed to work	0.408	0.43	-0.022 (0.011)	0.052
No restriction on location	0.522	0.505	0.017 (0.009)	0.087
Restricted Location	0.479	0.495	-0.016 (0.009)	0.085
Access to subsidised health	0.531	0.502	0.029 (0.009)	0.002
No access subsidised to health	0.47	0.498	-0.028 (0.009)	0.002
Allowed to bring family	0.482	0.45	0.032 (0.011)	0.005
Only bring family if can support it	0.571	0.58	-0.009(0.011)	0.436
Not allowed to bring family	0.447	0.47	-0.023(0.011)	0.039
No numerical limits	0.468	0.468	0.00(0.009)	0.983
Annual Limit	0.533	0.533	0.00(0.009)	1
Indefinite period	0.471	0.457	0.014(0.011)	0.221
Ten years that can be renewed	0.519	0.521	-0.002(0.011)	0.867
Ten years that cannot be renewed	0.511	0.522	-0.011(0.011)	0.311
N	15190	9890		

Note: Marginal means. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.

**Table A8. Conditional marginal means, CMMs (humanitarian vs economic) – question**

	MMs Humanitarian	MMs Economic	Difference	p-value
Allowed to work	0.545	0.517	0.028 (0.011)	0.01
Restricted work	0.552	0.557	-0.005 (0.011)	0.67
Not allowed to work	0.403	0.431	-0.028(0.011)	0.01
No restriction on location	0.523	0.506	0.017(0.009)	0.06
Restricted Location	0.477	0.494	-0.017(0.009)	0.06
Access to subsidised health	0.533	0.503	0.03(0.009)	0.001
No access subsidised to health	0.466	0.497	-0.031(0.009)	0.001
Allowed to bring family	0.482	0.455	0.027 (0.011)	0.01
Only bring family if can support it	0.575	0.575	0(0.011)	0.97
Not allowed to bring family	0.444	0.469	-0.025(0.011)	0.026
No numerical limits	0.472	0.463	0.009(0.009)	0.319
Annual Limit	0.529	0.537	-0.008(0.009)	0.353
Indefinite period	0.472	0.458	0.014(0.011)	0.244
Ten years that can be renewed	0.507	0.534	-0.027(0.011)	0.018
Ten years that cannot be renewed	0.522	0.508	0.014(0.011)	0.204
N	13300	11780		

Note: Marginal means. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.

**Table A9. Conditional marginal means, CMMs (social contact)**


	MMs High SC	MMs Low SC	Difference	p-value
Allowed to work	0.548	0.52	0.028(0.011)	0.013
Restricted work	0.556	0.554	0.002(0.011)	0.875
Not allowed to work	0.401	0.428	-0.027(0.011)	0.014
No restriction on location	0.529	0.505	0.024(0.009)	0.008
Restricted Location	0.471	0.495	-0.024(0.009)	0.009
Access to subsidised health	0.531	0.511	0.02(0.009)	0.033
No access subsidised to health	0.47	0.489	-0.019(0.009)	0.035
Allowed to bring family	0.489	0.455	0.034(0.011)	0.003
Only bring family if can support it	0.576	0.574	0.002(0.011)	0.795
Not allowed to bring family	0.437	0.471	-0.034(0.011)	0.002
No numerical limits	0.478	0.46	0.018(0.009)	0.054
Annual Limit	0.522	0.54	-0.018(0.009)	0.054
Indefinite period	0.467	0.464	0.003(0.011)	0.763
Ten years that can be renewed	0.512	0.526	-0.014(0.011)	0.228
Ten years that cannot be renewed	0.52	0.511	0.009(0.011)	0.409
N	10760	14320		

Note: Marginal means. Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.

## Figure A1. Distribution of Venezuelans in Colombia

(a) Venezuela and Colombia's shared border

(b) Distribution of Venezuelans in Colombia (by Department)



Note: The Administrative Dataset was obtained from the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The dataset compiles information drawn from the Colombian register of foreigners (Información de Registro de Extranjeros, SIRE), the permit residency data (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP), Migratory entries (Intención de hospedaje) and the 2018 National Census (DANE).

## Figure A2. Examples of policy bundles as presented to respondents

Acá le presentamos otro nuevo par de paquetes de medidas. ¿Si tuviera que escoger, cuál de estos paquetes sería el de su mayor preferencia?

Pregunta: 5/5


	Paquete A	Paquete B
<b>Localización geográfica</b>	A los venezolanos se les permite residir en <b>cualquier ciudad</b> de Colombia, según sus preferencias.	A los venezolanos se les permite residir en <b>cualquier ciudad</b> de Colombia, según sus preferencias.
<b>Acceso al mercado laboral</b>	Los venezolanos pueden trabajar en Colombia <b>solo en ciertas ocupaciones</b> .	Los venezolanos pueden trabajar en Colombia <b>sin ninguna restricción</b> .
<b>Limites numéricos</b>	<b>Solo un número limitado</b> de venezolanos tiene permitido ingresar a Colombia cada año.	<b>No existe un límite</b> al número de venezolanos que tienen permitido ingresar a Colombia cada año.
<b>Permiso de estadia</b>	Los venezolanos pueden permanecer en Colombia por un periodo de <b>diez años</b> , el cual puede ser extendido.	Los venezolanos pueden permanecer en Colombia por un periodo de <b>diez años</b> , el cual puede ser extendido.
<b>Acceso al régimen subsidiado de salud</b>	Los venezolanos <b>no tienen acceso</b> al régimen subsidiado de salud.	Los venezolanos <b>no tienen acceso</b> al régimen subsidiado de salud.
<b>Reunificación familiar</b>	Los venezolanos en Colombia <b>no pueden traer</b> a sus familias (pareja y/o hijos) desde Venezuela.	Los venezolanos en Colombia pueden traer a sus familias (pareja y/o hijos) desde Venezuela, <b>solo si tienen la capacidad de responder</b> por ellos económicamente.



En una escala del 1 al 7, dónde 1 significa que a usted **Definitivamente no le gusta** este paquete, y 7 significa que **Definitivamente le gusta** este paquete: ¿cómo calificaría cada paquete?


	Definitivamente no le gusta 1	2	3	4	5	6	Definitivamente le gusta 7
Paquete de medidas A	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Paquete de medidas B	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Figure A3. Distribution of humanitarian index**



Note: The question prior to each statement was: To what extent do you agree with the following statements, where 1 means 'strongly disagree' and 5 means 'strongly agree'? [Ranking 1 to 5]. For the Humanitaria Index, the values are 0 for Economic Priorities and 1 for Humanitarian Priorities. Details about the construction of the index are in Table A3 in the Appendix


**Figure A4. Distribution of humanitarian vs economic question**




Note: This is the response to a question: If you had to choose one of these statements, which one is closer to what your view is: The situation in Venezuela is mainly an economic one (=0) or the situation in Venezuela is mainly a humanitarian one (=1)  
More details about the construction are in Table A3 in the Appendix

**Figure A5. Distribution of social contact measures**


Daily Interactions




People you trust



Shared a meal




Contact Index




Note: Details about the construction of the index are in Table A4

**Figure A6. Comparison of results: AMCEs for forced and scaled-rating dependent variables**




Note: N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals. Single points without horizontal bars denote the reference category used for that dimension. The scaled variable is a dichotomised version of the rating outcome coded 1 for profiles rated higher than 4, 0 otherwise. Based on the following question: On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “you absolutely dislike” and 7 means “you absolutely like”, how would you rate each of these packages?

**Figure A7. Comparison of results: Marginal means for forced and scaled-rating dependent variables.**




*Note:* N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals. Single points without horizontal bars denote the reference category used for that dimension. The rating outcome is based on the following question: On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “you absolutely dislike” and 7 means “you absolutely like”, how would you rate each of these packages?

**Figure A8. Subgroup analysis: Social contact**




Note: N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals. Blue (Red) coefficients are for high (low) social contact and shared (has not) a meal with Venezuelans



**Figure A9. Subgroup analysis: Migrant Density**





*Note:* N = 2,508 respondents. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals. The migrant density measure involved calculating the proportion of migrants as a share of the total population of each state (department). Then, using respondents' reported location at the state-level, we split the sample into two groups: those living in states whose proportion of migrants was below the median of all states (coded as 0), and those living in states with migrant proportions above the median (coded as 1).


**Figure A10. Subgroup analysis: other moderating factors**







**Figure A11. Testing for survey fatigue**



*Note:* N = 2,508 respondents. Results are from different estimations based on the task or trial number. That is, 2 refers to the second conjoint task. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals.