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REPURPOSING **PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND PRICE INCENTIVES** FOR AN **INCLUSIVE, RESILIENT, AND COMPETITIVE AGRI-FOOD SECTOR IN NIGER**

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

3NI	'Nigeriens Nourish Nigeriens' Initiative (<i>Nigériens Nourrissent les Nigériens Initiative</i>)
AfDB	African Development Bank
AgPER	Agriculture Public Expenditure Review
ANFO	National Association of Onion Industry Professionals (<i>Association Nigérienne de la Filière Oignon</i>)
APCA	Agriculture Advisory Services Promotion Agency (<i>Agence pour la Promotion du Conseil Agricole</i>)
AUE	Water User Association
BEC	Transport and Marketing Certificates (<i>Bon d'Enlèvement et de Commercialisation</i>)
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CAIMA	Central Supply Agency for Agricultural Inputs and Equipment (<i>Centrale d'Achat des Intrants et du Matériel Agricole</i>)
CIAT	International Center for Tropical Agriculture
COFOG	Classification of the Functions of Government
COTEN	Technical Committee for Fertilizers in Niger
DCCS	Directorate of Seed Control and Certification
DGA	Directorate General of Agriculture (<i>Direction Générale de l'Agriculture</i>)
DGPIA	Directorate General of Animal Production and Industries (<i>Direction Générale de la Production et des Industries Animales</i>)
DGSV	Directorate General of Veterinary Services (<i>Direction Générale des Services Vétérinaires</i>)
DPBEP	Multi-Year Budgetary and Economic Programming Document
DPPD	Ministerial Multi-Year Expenditure Programming Documents
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FASS	Seed Sector Support Fund
FCMN	Federation of Vegetable Cooperatives of Niger (<i>Fédération des Coopératives Maraichères du Niger</i>)
FER	Financial Execution Rate

FISAN	Food and Nutritional Security Investment Fund (<i>Fonds d'investissement pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle</i>)
FMNR	Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration
FNS	Food and Nutrition Security
FSRP	Food System Resilience Program
FUCOPRI	Federation of Unions of Rice Producers' Cooperatives (<i>Fédération des Unions et Coopératives des Producteurs de Riz</i>)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAF	Hydro-Agricultural Facilities
INRAN	National Institute of Agronomic Research of Niger (<i>Institut National de Recherche Agronomique du Niger</i>)
INS	National Institute of Statistics (<i>Institut National de la Statistique</i>)
IWUA	Irrigation Water User Association
LABOCEL	Central Livestock Laboratory (<i>Laboratoire Central de l'Élevage</i>)
LIP	Large-scale Irrigated Perimeter
MAFAP	Monitoring and Analyzing Food and Agricultural Policies
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NRA	Nominal Rate of Assistance
NRP	Nominal Rate of Protection
OCPV	Food Commodities Marketing Board (<i>Office de Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers</i>)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMEN	Niger Fertilizer Market Observatory
ONAHA	National Office for Large Scale Irrigation (<i>Office National des Aménagements Hydro-Agricoles</i>)
OPVN	Niger Food Products Office (<i>Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger</i>)
PAP	Annual Performance Plan
PEA	Public Expenditure on Agriculture
PIA	Price Incentive Analysis
PRAPS	Regional Sahel Pastoral Support Project (<i>Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel</i>)
RAP	Annual Performance Report
RINI	Niger Republic Rice Company
SDDCI	Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth Strategy
SIMA	Niger Agricultural Market Information System (<i>Système d'Information sur les Marchés Agricoles</i>)

SIMB	Livestock Market Information System (<i>Système d'Information sur les Marchés de Bétail</i>)
SIP	Small-scale Irrigated Perimeter
SP/SPIN	Permanent Secretariat of the Small-Scale Irrigation Strategy (<i>Secrétariat Permanent de la Stratégie de la Petite Irrigation au Niger</i>)
VAT	Value Added Tax
WAAPP	West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program
WDI	World Development Indicators



KEY MESSAGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite Niger’s relatively high public spending on agriculture compared to regional peers, the impact on sector productivity and growth has been limited and uneven.

This report—an agricultural public expenditure review combined with an analysis of price incentives for crop and livestock production—serves as a diagnostic tool to guide policy and spending reforms aimed at improving the sector’s performance. In a constrained budget environment with limited fiscal space, it is crucial to ensure the highest efficiency of public expenditure. The recommendations in this report are intended to inform the strategic direction of a reform program to achieve this objective.

| 1.1 Key findings

Agricultural spending levels: Niger allocates a relatively high share of its public expenditure to agriculture compared to regional peers, averaging 8.2 percent during 2018–2022. This is close to the African Union’s target of 10 percent under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). Nominal agricultural spending increased to FCFA 200 billion in 2022 from an average of FCFA 135 billion during 2014–2017. However, despite relatively high spending, this has not translated into consistent productivity growth, with 2021 and 2023 experiencing negative agricultural value added growth (–5 and –3 percent, respectively, according to WDI 2025).

Cordination challenges: Agricultural policy and expenditure in Niger suffer from fragmentation due to the involvement of multiple ministries and agencies, which leads to inefficiencies. Decentralization efforts are incomplete, leaving regional directorates without sufficient budget authority to carry out their mandates effectively. Additionally, public agricultural expenditure depends heavily on donor funding, which accounts for about 70 percent of the budget. Misalignment between donor and national budget cycles causes poor utilization of resources and lower execution rates, especially for donor-funded projects. The program-based budgeting system has not been fully implemented, leading to significant expenditure overruns in some areas despite low overall budget execution.

Large amount of public budget is allocated to untargeted subsidies and rice sector interventions, leaving little support to critical investments in public goods, such as research and extension services.

A large share of Niger’s agricultural budget is allocated to untargeted subsidies, such as those for fertilizer, seeds, and the construction and maintenance of large-scale irrigation infrastructure primarily benefiting rice producers. Meanwhile, critical investments in public goods—such as agricultural research, extension services, climate-smart initiatives, transport and marketing infrastructure, sanitary controls, risk management, and natural resource management—remain chronically underfunded. For example, research spending has stagnated or declined in real terms since 2018,

accounting for only 0.1 percent of agricultural gross domestic product (GDP), far below recommended levels according to international norms. Increasing research funding—especially with reforms to introduce competitive, performance-based grant systems and stronger collaboration among government, academia, and the private sector—could yield high returns.

Rice-focused support: Support mechanisms within Niger’s agricultural sector are heavily skewed toward rice production, which benefits from trade protections, input subsidies, and large-scale irrigation infrastructure designed almost exclusively for this crop. Rice receives disproportionate support amounting to nearly 160 percent of its production value in 2021 and about 100 percent in 2022, despite accounting for only about 1 percent of the sector’s production value. This bias inflates domestic rice prices, effectively imposing an implicit tax on consumers, especially the poor. In contrast, other important crops—such as millet, sorghum, onions, cowpeas—and livestock receive significantly less support or face implicit taxation, leading to inefficient resource allocation and missed opportunities. This imbalance in incentives limits producers’ ability to invest in improving technologies and livelihoods in non-rice sectors and discourages research in areas where Niger has greater comparative advantages.

| 1.2 Key recommendations

To improve the efficiency and equity of public agricultural support, the following investment and policy options are recommended:

- **Rationalize institutional roles and decentralize funding:** streamline the number of institutions involved in agricultural policy, and ensure regional entities are funded to deliver on their mandates.
- **Align donor and national budget cycles:** harmonize planning and disbursement timelines through joint programming frameworks to improve budget execution.
- **Prioritize small-scale irrigation:** focus on high-return small-scale irrigation investments, and support downstream market and value chain linkages.
- **Reorient public support to encourage crop diversification:** invest in infrastructure and policy reforms to improve competitiveness for onion, cowpea, and livestock producers. This may entail repurposing some subsidies and shifting toward efficiency-based competitiveness strategies that do not crowd out other investments.
- **Make spending more climate-smart:** invest in information and early warning systems and risk reduction infrastructure, scale up disaster-linked social programs, and create an enabling environment for climate risk insurance markets.

- **Reorient agriculture spending from private to public goods:** reallocate funding toward research, extension, infrastructure, and climate-smart agriculture that benefit the sector broadly.
- **Improve the enabling environment to develop the seed sector:** encourage private sector participation in seed production and distribution, supported by quality control systems and access to finance.
- **Reform fertilizer distribution:** expand targeted electronic voucher systems integrated with broader input packages and extension services. In the longer term, develop and disseminate fertilization and other production technologies to promote soil health, which are tailored to specific soil and crop types.
- **Reform export barriers for livestock:** reduce or avoid export taxes and support local microenterprises to improve feed supply and food security for pastoralists.
- **Strengthen animal health systems:** accelerate veterinary privatization, improve vaccination programs, and equip national labs to ensure reliable disease control.

In summary, there is a need for a strategic reorientation of agricultural policy to repurpose spending towards public goods. It is also crucial to improve the spending and trade policy bias against production of non-rice crops by, for example, reducing export taxes. This could decrease the need for budgetary support to non-rice crops and livestock, and free fiscal resources to be used for public goods. Table 1 provides a detailed matrix of actions and measures based on these findings.

Table 1: Matrix of recommended measures and actions

Measure/action by theme	Objective/Justification	Responsible structure	Timeline	
Effectiveness of budget execution				
1	Strengthen and coordinate the budgeting processes of internal and external resources	Enhance the credibility and predictability of the budget	MEF	Short term
2	Implement an online procurement system	Improve the financial execution rate of the investment budget	MEF	Medium term
3	Operationalize the program budget	Enhance the effectiveness and accountability of public services	MEF	Short term
Access to quality inputs				
4	Promote the use of efficient technologies developed by agricultural research for rice production	Improve the competitiveness and efficiency of rice production	DGA and INRAN	Short term
5	Establish a local platform for vegetable seed production	Facilitate access to vegetable seeds which are currently imported and subject to rising prices	Public Private Partnership	Medium term
6	Promote adequate treatment of cowpea plants and modern technologies for cowpea conservation	Reduce post-harvest losses due to inadequate treatment and conservation technologies, which force producers to sell their harvest at lower prices	DGA	Short term
7	Strengthen INRAN capacities and budget for operational costs and increase the number and capacity of seeds laboratories	Increase the production of pre-basic and basic seeds for cereals and grains, ensuring the availability of productive and resilient seeds for producers	INRAN and DGA	Short and medium term
8	Operationalize the «Fonds d'Appui au Secteur Semencier» Seed Sector Support Fund	Cover operational costs of seed certification and finance other necessary expenditures (transport for seed inspectors, costs of mission to supervise seeds farms, etc.)	DGA	Short term

9	Promote private distributor involvement and the use of the targeted electronic voucher program for seed subsidies	Encourage private sector development in the seed market, currently dominated by state subsidies and high purchase prices	DGA	Short term
10	Complete the liberalization of the fertilizer market, expanding the targeted electronic voucher program nationwide	Promote private sector entry into the fertilizer market, providing farmers with more options for higher quality and lower-cost fertilizers	DGA, OMEN and COTEN	Short term
11	Strengthen INRAN and the new department in charge of fertilizer quality control, while reducing barriers to private sector entry	Prevent fraudulent practices in fertilizer marketing and encourage legitimate dealers to enter the market	INRAN and DGA	Short term
Irrigation management				
12	Evaluate the current system for managing small-scale irrigation	Design and implement an integrated and sustainable water resource management strategy for small-scale irrigated areas	SP/SPIN	Short term
13	Continue the management reform of large-scale irrigation through the Water User Associations	Improve the sustainability and efficiency of large-scale irrigation and rice production	ONAHA	Short term
14	Improve land security rights on small and large-scale perimeters	Enhance tenure security to encourage investments and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure	ONAHA and SP/SPIN	Medium term
Value chains development				
15	Promote the construction of storage, conservation facilities, and trading counters in main production areas of legumes	Enable farmers to choose when to sell their production, avoiding the need to sell immediately post-harvest at lower prices	Public Private Partnership	Medium term
16	Improve access to finance and promote insurance systems for non-perishable commodities; explore partnerships between farmers and value chain actors	Reduce the need for farmers to sell crops immediately post-harvest, increasing their bargaining power	FISAN	Short term

17	Promote private investments in the processing of perishable legumes	Reduce post-harvest losses and improve producers' revenues	Public Private Partnership	Medium term
18	Reduce or eliminate taxes on exports	Address the disincentives to exportable products that result from relatively higher support for rice and the taxation of non-rice products	Ministry in charge of Trade	Medium term
Livestock sector				
18	Promote rural micro-enterprises in livestock feed production using local inputs	Address livestock food insecurity	DGPIA	Medium term
19	Strengthen the capacities of LABOCEL and its branches; regularly budget for operational costs	Equip veterinary services for epidemiological surveillance and address the low level of operational financing	DGSV	Short and medium term

Note: COTEN = Technical Committee for Fertilizers in Niger; DGA = *Direction Générale de l'Agriculture*; DGPIA = *Direction Générale de la Production et des Industries Animales*; DGSV = *Direction Générale des Services Vétérinaires*; INRAN = National Institute of Agronomic Research of Niger (*Institut National de Recherche Agronomique du Niger*); LABOCEL = Central Livestock Laboratory (*Laboratoire Central de l'Elevage*); MEF = Ministry of Economy and Finance; OMEN = Niger Fertilizer Market Observatory; SP/SPIN = *Secrétariat Permanent de la Stratégie de la Petite Irrigation au Niger*.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

E1. Niger’s agricultural sector, critical for economic growth and employment, faces challenges from climate change, political instability, and economic variability.

The sector remains a key, albeit highly variable, driver of economic growth, food security, and poverty alleviation. Mostly rain-fed, it contributes over 40 percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP) and is the second-largest source of foreign exchange after extractive industries. The sector, which is dominated by subsistence farms under mixed-crop systems, employs approximately 80 percent of the population. The livelihoods of more than 90 percent of Niger’s poor households rely on agriculture; the sector must continue to contribute strongly to inclusive economic growth in the medium to long term and help achieve the government’s objective of reducing the poverty headcount to 20 percent by 2035.

E2. The agriculture sector is dominated by subsistence farming with farm sizes under 3 ha, primarily producing millet, sorghum, and cowpea under rain-fed conditions. Notwithstanding the implementation of the government’s sector strategy, cereal yield has exhibited volatile growth while the population has increased by 3.9 percent annually, resulting in production deficits and growing reliance on imports. Gains in irrigated agriculture and livestock productivity—especially through small-scale irrigation—have led to moderate improvements in overall land productivity. Yet Niger’s agricultural productivity remains among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, underscoring the need for more efficient public interventions.

E3. Niger’s agri-food policy framework is anchored in the Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth Strategy (SDDCI) Niger 2035. Until 2024, this was operationalized through the ‘Nigeriens Nourish Nigeriens’ Initiative (3NI), which has guided agricultural and food security interventions since 2012.¹ The 2021–2025 action plan of the 3NI targeted six priorities, including irrigation, environmental restoration, value chain development, and resilience to climate shocks. Value chain-specific strategies exist for crops like rice and livestock. However, key crops such as onion lack dedicated policy frameworks despite their economic importance. Implementation often faces challenges in coordination, resource allocation, and effective execution at both the central and decentralized levels. Since the suspension of the 3NI following the political events in 2023, Niger’s agriculture sector no longer has a unified operational strategy. The sector is now guided by a mix of long-term development plans like the SDDCI, crop-specific programs, and fragmented policy reforms but lacks a dedicated national agricultural policy.

¹ The 3NI was concluded following the regime change in 2023.

E4. Niger’s agricultural policy has focused on inputs, marketing, and trade. Input support includes fertilizer and seed subsidies, though both systems suffer from inefficiencies, limited targeting, and overreliance on public distribution. Recent reforms aim to liberalize input markets and promote private sector participation—for instance, through an electronic voucher scheme for fertilizers—but these have so far been incomplete and of limited scope. In marketing, state intervention persists through institutions like Niger Food Products Office (Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger, OPVN), particularly for rice and other cereals. Trade policy is shaped by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreements, but informal barriers, insecurity, and border closures disrupt regional flows. Overall, the policy environment remains fragmented, requiring improved coherence and capacity for implementation.

Niger’s agricultural public spending is high relative to the regional average but suffers from imbalanced and inefficient allocation and implementation.

E5. Despite fluctuations due to COVID, public expenditure on agriculture (PEA) in Niger has trended upward in recent years, albeit with a significant decline between 2021 and 2022. PEA rose over 2014–2022 to FCFA 220 billion in 2022, compared to an average of around FCFA 135 billion during 2014–2017. This level of PEA—representing 2.1 percent of GDP and 5.4 percent of agricultural value added during 2018–2022—places Niger higher than its neighboring countries (for example, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad). Niger is also one of the few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that comes close to the Maputo commitment of allocating at least 10 percent of the total budget to agriculture (8.2 percent on average over 2018–2022); see Table 2.

Table 2: Comparison of Niger's public food and agricultural expenditures with selected countries

Country	Share of PEA in total PE (%)	Share of PEA in agricultural value added (%)	Share of PEA in GDP (%)
Niger (2018–2022)	8.2	5.4	2.1
Structural peers			
Central African Republic (2015–2018)	4.7	2.9	0.9
Chad (2015–2018)	0.9	2.9	0.8
Mali (2018–2022)	12.2	4.7	1.7
Aspirational peers			
Rwanda (2015–2018)	9.1	11.5	2.9
Senegal (2018–2022)	5.1	9.8	1.5

Source: Based on Financial Information Technology Department of Ministry of Finance (DIF/MEF) data, Malabo/ African Union, and World Development Indicators (WDI) biennial reports.

Note: The share of PEA in total PE for all countries except Niger is for 2020 (ReSAKSS 2025).


E6. Niger's agricultural public budget is highly dependent on external funding, which covers over 70 percent of the total agricultural budget on average.

This dependency raises concerns about the sustainability and predictability of investment flows. Donor funds to agriculture have a lower and more volatile execution rate—close to 50 percent in 2022—than those from domestic resources. This stems mainly from different budgeting cycles and processes and weaknesses in the procurement chain, which lead to low financial and technical capacities of companies and create significant implementation challenges.

E7. The functional composition of agriculture expenditures shows high spending on social safety nets, irrigation infrastructure (both on-farm as capital input and off-farm), and subsidies to private goods, to the detriment of public goods such as agricultural research and extension.

Food aid and cash transfers accounted for 17 percent of expenditure, while investments in on-farm and off-farm irrigation constituted one-quarter of the total PEA (Figure 1). Subsidies on variable inputs (mainly seeds and fertilizers) consumed 7 percent of the budget on average over this period and 13 percent in 2022. In contrast, agricultural research and extension remain significantly underfunded. Agricultural research has consistently been one of the most productive uses of public funds in many countries. Yet in Niger, spending on agricultural research has decreased, reducing agricultural research intensity (the ratio between public spending on agricultural research and agricultural value added) from 0.31 percent in 2014–2015 to 0.10 percent in 2018–2022, well below the 1 percent target set by the African Union.

Figure 1: Functional composition of agricultural public expenditure (actual), average 2018–2022



Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

E8. A similar challenge is observed in implementation of the flagship agricultural program, the 3NI. The rate of funds mobilization for the initiative was high (99 percent), but most resources were allocated to risk management interventions, which had an execution rate of over 250 percent. This resulted in less funding for increasing and diversifying agro-sylvo-pastoral and fisheries production, which was intended to make up nearly 70 percent of the total cost of the initiative but had an execution rate of just 53 percent during 2011–2020.

E9. Large-scale irrigation investments faced implementation issues, while small-scale projects were more effective but did not achieve expected sector-wide growth. Large-scale projects, such as the Kandadji dam, encountered significant implementation problems, resulting in an 11 percent expansion of irrigated land between 2015 and 2023—from 16,685 to 18,502 ha—primarily through rehabilitation. In contrast, small-scale irrigation investments increased production of tubers and vegetables, with annual growth rates of 22 percent for tubers, 17 percent for vegetables (excluding onions), and 12 percent for onions. Nonetheless, the expansion of irrigated crops is constrained by poor seed access, weak market connections, inadequate maintenance, limited managerial capacity of farmer organizations, and insecure land tenure. Additionally, a policy emphasis on rice discourages other crops, redirecting resources and investment away from improved production methods for non-rice farmers.

E10. Public resources devoted to value chain marketing and processing increased substantially in 2021–2022. Currently, a large share of production is lost because of the lack of adequate storage and processing units. In addition, modern contract farming arrangements (between producers and traders or through trading counters) are lacking, leading farmers to accept low prices for their produce. The recent shift in political attention toward the downstream segment of the value chain may indicate a promising shift toward supporting more integrated value chain development and enhancing the enabling environment for private sector involvement in the agri-food sector. The results of these additional investments, if sustained, will be seen more in the medium to long term.

The price incentive analysis in this study shows that, aside from rice, the policy and market environment has led to price penalization for farmers.

E11. Between 2017 and 2024, onion producers received prices averaging 40 percent below international reference levels, largely due to their weak bargaining power. Limited access to credit forces farmers to sell their entire harvest immediately, depressing prices. Better credit access would allow producers to sell gradually, improving their bargaining position. Cowpea producers face similar challenges—selling at low post-harvest prices to meet urgent needs without storage infrastructure. Improved storage could reduce post-harvest losses and enable sales when prices are higher. To address these issues, producer organizations have been calling for public investment in adequate warehouses.

E12. Price incentive analysis reveals disproportionately strong support for rice, considered a strategic food security crop and dominant in large-scale irrigated areas. Rice producers benefit from import tariffs, favorable price negotiations, and input subsidies, particularly for fertilizer and improved seeds. The nominal rate of protection (NRP) averaged 38 percent from 2017 to 2023, while the nominal rate of assistance (NRA), including subsidies, averaged 44 percent. This support has been rising over time (Figure 2). When factoring in the cost of maintaining large-scale irrigation infrastructure—almost entirely benefiting rice—support becomes even more substantial. This ‘augmented NRA’ reached nearly 160 percent of rice production value in 2021 and exceeded 100 percent in 2022. The emphasis on rice production appears to reflect the view that food security is best achieved through high levels of self-sufficiency. However, with a more comprehensive understanding of the multi-dimensional nature of food security, this goal could be more effectively advanced through a balanced support system for agriculture as a whole. Current trade policy and expenditure patterns, while supporting rice producers, also limit resources available for other agricultural priorities and contribute to higher rice prices for consumers through trade protection.

E13. Despite high levels of protection and support, rice production in Niger has underperformed due to limited access to quality inputs and poor management of large-scale irrigation. Key issues include (a) limited capacity of INRAN to supply sufficient pre-basic and basic rice seeds, (b) high fertilizer costs and inadequate supply from importers, (c) ineffective fertilizer quality control, and (d) a lack of working capital among cooperatives to finance members’ production. Additionally, the transfer of irrigation management to cooperatives in the early 1980s proved ineffective, leading to widespread infrastructure deterioration. Land insecurity further undermines the sustainability of irrigated areas.

E14. Support for cereals other than rice remains low. Niger imports about 35,000 tons of mostly subsidized fertilizer annually—far below the estimated 660,000² tons needed for major cereals. The adoption of improved, climate-resilient seeds also lags. Between 2018 and 2022, only 10 percent of millet and less than 2 percent of sorghum were grown with improved seeds. To increase the use of modern, higher-yielding seeds, actions needed include (a) liberalizing the seed market to encourage private sector growth, (b) organizing and supporting community seed production, (c) strengthening INRAN and seed laboratory capacities, and (d) operationalizing the Seed Sector Support Fund (*Fonds d’Appui au Secteur Semencier*).

² Based on the micro-dosing technique, 660,000 tons of NPK 15-15-15 would be needed to cover all the phosphorus and nitrogen needs of the 11 million ha of millet and sorghum plots.

- E15. Niger’s livestock sector receives relatively high public support, especially for developing livestock value chains.** Livestock financing accounts for 18 percent of PEA, one of the highest in West Africa. However, policy and market conditions have undermined this support, resulting in negative price incentives for producers. From 2017 to 2024, livestock prices remained below international reference levels, with average NRP of –20 percent for cattle and –9 percent for sheep—likely due to export fees, taxes, and excessive trader margins. Addressing these disincentives is crucial to ensure recent public investments are effective and to encourage private sector participation.
- E16. Access to animal feed remains a major constraint.** The national strategy for fodder crop development is underfunded, and the government’s annual subsidized provision of 30,000 tons of livestock feed for vulnerable pastoralists and agro-pastoralists is insufficient. Given the recurring pastoral crises driven by climate change, promoting rural microenterprises to produce animal feed from local inputs would help improve feed availability and resilience. However, water availability is a crucial challenge, heightened by climate change.
- E17. Animal health challenges also limit the livestock sector’s export potential.** Vaccination coverage has consistently fallen below the 80 percent target due to procurement inefficiencies and reliance on unstable donor funding. Weak implementation of veterinary privatization, under-equipped epidemiological services, and low funding for the Central Livestock Laboratory (*Laboratoire Central de l’Elevage, LABOCEL*) and its branches further hamper progress.
- E18. These findings underscore the need for a more balanced and efficient allocation of public spending.** First, expenditures should focus more on sector-wide public goods rather than narrowly targeted subsidies. Second, public resources should be more evenly distributed across value chains to avoid excessive emphasis on a single crop—especially rice—and foster a level playing field. Spending decisions should be guided by cost-effectiveness, backed by strong monitoring, evaluation, and cost-benefit analysis. This rebalancing should also include measures to improve budget execution and better target sector-specific challenges.
- E19. Implementing the following actions can help build a more inclusive, resilient, and competitive agri-food sector in Niger.**
- a. Streamline institutions and promote decentralization:** Subsequent institutional changes should consider the need for coordination of public interventions in the agricultural sector and rationalize the number of ministries involved in agriculture. At the same time, the regional directorates in charge of agriculture should receive resources appropriate to fulfill their role of monitoring and appropriation of the investments made by projects.

- b. Strengthen alignment between donor and national budget cycles:** To improve budget execution, Niger could enhance coordination between donor funding cycles and national planning processes. Establishing joint programming frameworks and synchronizing timelines will reduce delays, duplication, and underutilization of funds. This alignment could be institutionalized within the finance ministry and embedded in the multiannual expenditure programming documents.
- c. Repurpose public spending on subsidies to high-impact public goods:** these include research and extension, research and extension, natural resource management (including protecting and restoring land), promotion of more climate-smart on-farm investments, transport and marketing infrastructure, sanitary and phytosanitary control, risk management, information generation and dissemination, and improved monitoring and evaluation. These ‘repurposed’ subsidies could come from subsidies to private goods such as seeds or fertilizers. However, the social sustainability of this reallocation should be assessed since these expenditures currently support relatively poorer producers and consumers.
- d. Invest in small-scale irrigation and downstream value chains:** Prioritize small-scale irrigation projects, which have proven more successful than large ones, while evaluating and improving current management systems. All irrigation investments should be based on rigorous cost-benefit analysis. In addition, an environmental assessment should evaluate the medium- and long-term effect of climate change on water availability. Strengthen recent efforts to develop marketing and downstream infrastructure to enable private sector involvement, targeting high-value crops like onions and tomatoes.
- e. Improve market conditions for products that are currently implicitly or explicitly taxed:** Address market inefficiencies and taxes and fees that penalize producers of onion, vegetables, cowpeas, and livestock. Investments in roads and storage facilities would increase profitability, while removing export taxes on livestock would improve producer prices.
- f. Enhance public support to encourage crop diversification:** Heavy protection and subsidies for rice have crowded out spending on other priorities and increased consumer prices. While targeted measures to improve rice competitiveness are warranted, there is a need to reduce policy bias against other value chains.

- g. Promote private sector development in the seeds market:** To unlock the potential of improved seeds, the government should reduce its dominant role in procurement and distribution. Incentivizing private seed companies through liberalized pricing, access to credit, and capacity building—while maintaining quality control—can increase seed availability and affordability. The Seed Sector Support Fund should be operationalized to support certification and seed business infrastructure.
- h. Improve fertilizer access by promoting private sector development in sales and distribution and reforming the fertilizer subsidy scheme:** The government could implement the fertilizer subsidy program based on lessons from pilot programs, expanding electronic vouchers tied to input packages including improved seeds and extension. This will enable targeting subsidies to vulnerable but productive farmers and coupling them with seasonal credit, enhancing yields and reducing distortions. In the longer term, develop and disseminate fertilization technologies tailored to specific soil types to promote soil health.
- i. Promote livestock feed security through local microenterprises:** Supporting the creation of rural microenterprises that produce livestock feed using local ingredients can alleviate feed shortages. This decentralized model can be effective if backed by training, small grants, and market linkages to ensure feed security. Such enterprises would complement state-subsidized efforts and increase resilience among pastoralists and agro-pastoralists.
- j. Enhance animal health by privatizing veterinary services and improving vaccination:** Accelerate veterinary privatization by licensing private vets, providing start-up support, and integrating them into national vaccination and surveillance. A better public-private mix will reduce donor dependence and improve timely access to animal health services.
- k. Make spending more climate smart by investing in information, early warning systems, and risk reduction infrastructure.** Scale up disaster-linked social programs and create an enabling environment for climate risk insurance markets.



1. INTRODUCTION

- 1. This Agriculture Public Expenditure Review (AgPER) synthesizes analyses related to policy support for the agricultural sector in Niger.** It draws on background studies that examine public spending and investment in agriculture as well as price support for key commodities. The report also incorporates findings from two in-depth studies on agricultural inputs, focusing on variable inputs and irrigation.
- 2. The primary objective of the AgPER is to support the Government of Niger and its development partners in formulating and implementing effective, efficient policies.** These policies aim to tackle the significant challenges facing the agricultural sector, particularly in improving food and nutrition security and reducing poverty—within the context of limited fiscal resources. The report analyzes how current agri-food policies and producer support mechanisms influence farmer behavior, either by offering appropriate incentives or by introducing distortions that hinder efficient decision-making and sector transformation.
- 3. The analysis uses methodologies developed by the Monitoring and Analyzing Food and Agricultural Policies (MAFAP)³ program of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to assess public support to the agri-food (agriculture and food) sector.** The assessment includes two aspects:
 - **Trends and composition of public expenditure:** Budget laws from the Ministry of Finance for 2018–2022 (the latest available data) were reviewed and categorized using the MAFAP classification system.
 - **Price incentive analysis (PIA):** This analysis covers 2017–2024 and evaluates the extent to which producer prices reflect supportive or distorted market conditions. The commodities analyzed—millet, sorghum, cowpea, onion, rice, cattle, and sheep—were selected for their strategic importance to the sustainable development of Niger’s agriculture sector. Together, they account for over 70 percent of the country’s agricultural production value.
- 4. The two strands of analysis—public spending and price incentives—are complementary. The AgPER identifies spending targeted at specific crops, which feeds into the incentive analysis.** Conversely, the incentive analysis reveals whether certain crops benefit disproportionately from support, thereby highlighting potential inefficiencies. For instance, high spending on crops that, at the same time, face large price disincentives may suggest a miscalculation of resources or misalignment of public policies.

³ For more details on the methodology, see *Repurposing Agricultural Support Policies for Sustainable Food Systems - Toolkit*: [Open Knowledge Repository](#).

5. The synthesis report is organized in five chapters, including this introduction.

Chapter 2 provides background on the agricultural sector and outlines Niger’s agri-food strategies and policies. Chapter 3 examines the trends and composition of agricultural public expenditure. Chapter 4 assesses how public spending influences incentives for agricultural and livestock producers, identifying whether it encourages or discourages productive activity. Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and policy recommendations.



2. OVERVIEW OF NIGER'S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR AND RELATED POLICIES

| 2.1 Brief country and sector context


- 6. Niger faces growing constraints on its agricultural ecosystem due to agro-climatic, socioeconomic, political, institutional, and security challenges.**

Around 75 percent of the country's territory is desert, and most of the population is concentrated in the southern regions—specifically the Sahelo-Saharan, Sahelian, and Sahelo-Sudanian zones—which make up only about 20 percent of the land area. Agriculture in Niger is highly vulnerable to low and erratic rainfall, land degradation, desertification, and frequent droughts. The effects of climate change are increasingly evident, with a notable rise in extreme weather events over the past two decades, including nine major droughts and several severe floods, the most recent in August 2024. These events have significantly affected livelihoods and food security, destroying productive assets and reducing agricultural output (World Bank 2022).
- 7. Agriculture is the primary source of income for over 80 percent of Niger's population and plays a significant role in ensuring food and nutrition security.**

The sector contributes more than 40 percent to the national gross domestic product (GDP) and is the country's second-largest source of foreign exchange, following extractive industries. It also provides employment to approximately 80 percent of the population, including women and youth, making it critical for poverty reduction and rural development.
- 8. Agriculture in Niger is predominantly rain-fed and characterized by smallholder, subsistence-based production under mixed crop-livestock systems.** Over 95 percent of farming households cultivate less than 3 ha, mainly for their own consumption. The principal crops grown are staple foods such as millet (occupying about 46 percent of cultivated land), cowpea (32 percent), and sorghum (18 percent).
- 9. In response to the increasing risks posed by climate change, Niger has made significant investments in irrigated agriculture over the past decade.** Between 2012 and 2023, the total area under irrigation tripled, reaching over 315,000 ha—90 percent of which is accounted for by small-scale irrigation. As a result, irrigated production has increased more than fourfold, reaching the equivalent of 1.3 million tons of cereal, or approximately 20 percent of total rain-fed cereal output. Large-scale irrigation is almost exclusively used for rice cultivation, while small-scale systems support a more diverse range of crops.

- 10. Niger's agriculture sector has exhibited mixed performance.** Efforts by the government and its partners have led to an increase in cereal production (Figure 3), primarily millet and sorghum, which are central to Niger's diet. However cereal production does not exhibit a clear upward trend from 2011 to 2022, while the population grew at an average rate of 3.9 percent over the same period. Additionally, yields remain lower compared to neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso (FAOSTAT 2025). Yields of the main cereals in Niger, millet and sorghum, have not surpassed 500 kg per ha since 1960. Conversely, cowpea yields have increased by 3.6 percent annually, leading to a 6 percent rise in annual production between 2011–2015 and 2018–2022. Overall land productivity (including pastoral land) has grown by 6 percent annually due to improvements in the performance of irrigated crops and livestock. Despite this growth, the added value of land (which was US\$262 per ha in constant US dollar in 2018–2022) remains the lowest among Sub-Saharan African countries. Niger's agriculture sector is among the better-performing countries in the Sahel, with average agricultural growth of 7.4 percent during 2011–2022.
- 11.** Rice is Niger's main import in terms of value, partly re-exported to other countries in the region. In 2023, rice was Niger's main import at US\$312 million, ahead of aircraft parts (US\$300 million), iron structures (US\$126 million), and refined petroleum (US\$93 million) (OEC 2025). Rice accounted for close to half of all food and agricultural imports on average over 2018–2023, followed by palm oil (11 percent) and food preparations (9 percent). Niger's main exports include palm oil (27 percent of food and agriculture export value) and husked rice (24 percent). The value of palm oil exports is close to half the value of imports, which might signal significant re-export, while the value of rice exports is close to 10 percent of the value of imports, suggesting limited small-scale cross-border trade. Onion is also a significant export, accounting for 17 percent of agri-food export value.

Figure 2: Performance of cereal crops in Niger



Source: Based on Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAGEL) data.

2.2 Overview of agri-food sector strategies and policies

12. **The overarching development framework guiding the sector is the Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth Strategy Niger 2035 (SDDCI 2035).** This long-term vision provides a reference framework for all government policies and actions. Its core objectives include controlling demographic growth, developing human capital, modernizing rural areas, revitalizing the private sector, and reforming public administration. While broad in scope, it includes agriculture as a key pillar for inclusive growth and food security.
13. **Until 2024, the primary strategy for food security and agricultural development was the 3NI.** Launched in 2012, the 3NI served as Niger’s strategic framework to address food and nutrition security (FNS) and promote sustainable agricultural development. It aimed to increase food production and the resilience of family farms while also improving food supply to markets. The 3NI aligned with the SDDCI 2035 goals and was implemented through multiyear action plans, each organized around key priority areas consistent with government objectives.

- 14. The 2021–2025 Action Plan of the 3NI, based on the lessons learned from previous phases and commitments, comprised 10 operational programs stemming from five strategic programs reflected in six priorities of the Act III Renaissance Program.** These priorities are (i) water management for irrigation, (ii) environmental restoration, (iii) the Peasant’s House,⁴ (iv) development of value chains for agro-sylvo-pastoral and fishery products, (v) resilience of populations to climatic shocks and hazards, and (vi) improving of the nutritional status of Nigeriens. However, following the political events in 2023, the 3NI was suspended. Since then, Niger’s agriculture sector has lacked a unified operational strategy. While long-term frameworks like SDDCI 2035 remain in place, the sector is now guided by fragmented crop- or theme-specific programs, with no dedicated national agricultural policy in effect.
- 15. In the absence of a comprehensive sector strategy, several sub-sectoral and crop-specific strategies are being implemented.** Among the most notable is the National Strategy for Rice Development 2021–2030 (SNRP). The rice strategy aims to (i) increase rice production and productivity, (ii) promote processing, marketing, and competitiveness of local rice, and (iii) strengthen the institutional environment and stakeholder capacity. Large-scale irrigation investments are closely aligned with these rice-focused goals.
- 16. The government also prioritizes key food security crops—millet, sorghum, and cowpea.** Millet and sorghum are staple foods, while cowpea is a significant cash crop and source of household income. In response to the country’s rapid population growth (estimated at 3.9 percent annually), policies aim to boost production of these crops through investments in soil fertility, expanded use of modern and climate-resilient inputs, and improved access to agricultural advisory services.
- 17. Despite its importance, the onion value chain lacks a dedicated strategy.** Onion is a major cash crop and export product, and it is referenced in national documents such as the SDDCI 2035 and the 3NI. It is also included in small-scale irrigation strategies. However, no stand-alone policy or investment framework exists specifically for onion, limiting the coordination and scale of interventions in this high-potential sub-sector.
- 18. For livestock, the government adopted the Sustainable Livestock Development Strategy (SDDEL) 2013–2035.** This long-term strategy outlines three main objectives: (i) improving animal health and hygiene of animal products; (ii) expanding, diversifying, and modernizing livestock production; and (iii) establishing a supportive legal and institutional framework for the sector’s sustainable development.

⁴ The ‘Maison du Paysan’ (smallholder or peasant’s house) is an integrated, multifunctional set of infrastructures and services set up at the local level to improve the range of support services available to producers and agricultural businesses. It aims to improve the availability of production factors and promote the use of proven innovative technologies adapted to local realities.

| 2.3 Agricultural input policies

Fertilizer policy

- 19. Niger's fertilizer market, once fully controlled by the state, has been undergoing gradual liberalization.** Despite this, fertilizer use remains among the lowest in Africa, with an average application rate of just 3 kg per ha (INS 2018), compared to 12 kg per ha continent-wide. Since 2008, the government has implemented a universal fertilizer subsidy through the Central Agricultural Input and Equipment Supply Agency (CAIMA). On average, 20,000 tons of fertilizer were subsidized annually at a 50 percent rate. The subsidy was universal, not targeting specific farmers or crops (Di Lorenzo et al. 2021). The main beneficiaries were producers of rice and legumes and, to a lesser extent, tomato, potato, and onion.
- 20. However, the subsidy program faced several issues that reduced its efficiency: a low credit recovery rate, high administrative and operational costs for CAIMA, and expensive fertilizer procurement and distribution.** According to World Bank (2020) estimates, these inefficiencies cost roughly 0.15 percent of GDP. In response, the government launched a reform initiative in 2018 with support from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). This reform aimed to liberalize fertilizer import and distribution and introduce a targeted subsidy system for vulnerable farmers by 2021. Although CAIMA was meant to exit the market beginning in 2018, it continued procurement and distribution until 2021. Three multi-stakeholder bodies were created to implement the liberalization of the fertilizer market and the fertilizer subsidy reform: (i) the Niger Fertilizer Market Observatory (OMEN), to monitor markets and promote competition; (ii) the Technical Committee for Fertilizers in Niger (COTEN), to oversee technical aspects of fertilizers; and (iii) the Common Fertilizer Fund (FCE), to finance subsidies, supported by both the state and development partners.
- 21. Under this reform, the Fertilizer Sector Reform Support Program (PARSEN)⁵ piloted an electronic voucher (e-voucher) system.** The pilot distributed 1,600 tons of fertilizer during the 2019/2020 agricultural season. Building on this, the first large-scale implementation took place in 2022/2023, reaching 11,801 out of 22,480 registered producers across 35 communes in all eight regions. In parallel, the government launched an emergency subsidy program supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB), targeting about 60,000 farmers across 114 communes with 10,000 tons of fertilizer subsidized at approximately 60 percent.

5 This was funded by the MCA.

- 22. Despite these efforts, the results of liberalization have been mixed.** Fertilizer imports rose from an average of 30,630 tons during 2010–2018 to 39,500 tons between 2019 and 2023, still far below the estimated potential demand of 100,000 tons (IFDC 2023). Much of this increase is not directly attributable to the reform, as CAIMA continued its activities—acquiring 45,000 tons in 2019 with German support and 51,000 tons in 2020–2021 due to COVID-19. Global price spikes (due to the pandemic and the war in Ukraine) and the limited financial capacity of private operators further constrained access and availability.
- 23. Although the targeted subsidies have improved productivity, the scale remains inadequate (IFDC 2022).** The pilot e-voucher program was only partially successful. Many beneficiaries lacked the financial capacity to cover their share, leading to widespread diversion: wealthier farmers would buy subsidized fertilizer indirectly from registered poor producers. Others fell into debt with informal buyers, undermining their resilience. A targeted agricultural credit mechanism could improve the voucher program’s effectiveness. Additionally, the e-voucher platform could be expanded to offer bundled support—such as seeds and agronomic advice—instead of fertilizer alone.
- 24. The piloted targeting mechanism itself can be improved.** Currently, new beneficiary lists are generated each season, raising significant administrative costs. A more cost-effective approach would be to establish a national beneficiary database with biometric identification. Integrating the e-voucher platform with an e-extension service could further improve both efficiency and outreach. Transparency in fertilizer distributor selection is also limited, partly because OMEN is placed under the Ministry of Agriculture, contrary to the reform rules. The lack of transparency raises concerns about distributor quality and inflated prices. Additionally, the current system for setting fertilizer benchmark prices should be reviewed to align more closely with true international market rates.

Modern seeds policy

- 25. Niger's seed production sector has undergone partial liberalization.** Since the government's withdrawal in the 1990s, the sector has been governed by a strategy adopted in 2012. This policy aims to foster an enabling environment for the production and distribution of improved seeds by private sector entities and agricultural producer organizations. The key actors driving the seed sector include (i) the National Institute of Agronomic Research of Niger (*Institut National de Recherche Agronomique du Niger*, INRAN), which plays a crucial role in varietal creation, selection, and the production of pre-basic and basic seeds; (ii) the Directorate of Seed Control and Certification (DCCS) alongside the decentralized services of the Ministry of Agriculture; (iii) private companies primarily engaged in the multiplication of basic and certified seeds, as well as their packaging and marketing; (iv) private seed producers organized within the Association of Private Seed Producers of Niger; and (v) professional organizations involved in the multiplication and distribution of certified seeds. The National Committee for Seeds and Plants (CNS), a consultative body, facilitates dialogue among stakeholders.
- 26. Despite the partial liberalization, the state remains heavily involved in seed distribution, limiting private sector growth.** Most certified seeds are bought by the government and development partners and then distributed for free to vulnerable farmers under the subsidy program. This government-led demand distorts the market: high procurement prices serve as reference points, making certified seeds two to three times more expensive than local alternatives (CRA Maradi 2019) and unaffordable for most farmers. As a result, private distributors are crowded out, reducing both access to and adoption of improved seeds.

Irrigation strategy

- 27. Given Niger's reliance on rain-fed agriculture and increasing climate risks, irrigation is a central pillar of agricultural policy.** Since 2005, irrigation development has focused on four areas:
- › **Hydro-agricultural facilities (HAFs)**—large-scale schemes (over 100 ha), with full water control, mainly for rice; managed by ONAHA since 1978
 - › **Small-scale community irrigation schemes**—typically under 100 ha, often with partial water control; guided by Niger's Small-Scale Irrigation Strategy (*Stratégie de la Petite Irrigation au Niger*, SPIN) since 2015
 - › **Private irrigation**—small, individually managed schemes (one to a few ha), partially or fully water controlled

› **Rainwater harvesting**—complements rain-fed agriculture by enhancing yields.

- 28. The performance of large-scale irrigation systems has been limited.** Initially managed by the state, HAFs were transferred to farmer cooperatives in the 1980s. However, poor fee collection and maintenance led to deterioration. In response, reforms in 2014 introduced Irrigation Water User Associations (AUEIs) to take over water management. ONAHA retained a supervisory role, and farmers pay a water fee of FCFA 4,000 per hectare per season, collected directly by ONAHA.
- 29. Despite this reform, financial sustainability remains a major challenge.** From 2017 to 2020, the required funding to support AUEI creation and HAF maintenance was FCFA 5 billion, but fee collections totaled only 352 million FCFA. The state subsidy during this period was FCFA 1.4 billion. Only about 20 AUEIs have been formed, and only 10 are fully operational. Although the reform is relatively new, low fee recovery and limited subsidies raise concerns about the long-term viability of large-scale irrigation infrastructure.
- 30. For small-scale irrigation, the sustainability of schemes is similarly constrained by weak maintenance practices and a lack of integrated water resource management.** The Ministry of Agriculture promotes the establishment of community-based organizations—such as Water User Associations (AUEs), Management and Maintenance Committees (CGEs), or cooperatives—to handle maintenance. Farmers are responsible for routine upkeep, while technical repairs are contracted to private service providers. Local governments and decentralized services are also expected to contribute oversight and support. However, no comprehensive evaluation has been conducted to assess how well these arrangements are working in practice.

| 2.4 Agricultural market policies

- 31. Since the early 1990s, the marketing of agricultural commodities in Niger has been liberalized as part of structural adjustment reforms.** However, to safeguard food security and support family farms, the government continues to intervene in grain markets through limited operations—primarily through the Niger Food Products Office (*Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger*, OPVN) and other institutional mechanisms. Although these interventions are small relative to total production, they play a strategic role in price stabilization and food crisis management.

- 32. Established in the 1960s, OPVN is tasked with purchasing, storing, and selling staple grains—particularly cereals and cowpeas—as part of Niger’s national food security system.** It manages both the strategic food reserve and the national security stock, serving as a buffer against food crises. OPVN buys grains directly from smallholder farmers, typically at prices above market rates to support rural incomes. It also resells grains at moderate, socially targeted prices to vulnerable populations to stabilize consumer prices during periods of high food inflation. To improve this system, a national local procurement strategy adopted in 2016 encourages contractual arrangements between OPVN, farmer organizations, and institutional buyers.
- 33. In the rice sector, annual contracts are signed between OPVN and the Federation of Unions of Rice Producers’ Cooperatives (*Fédération des Unions et Coopératives des Producteurs de Riz*, FUCOPRI), with implementation supported by the Niger Republic Rice Company (RINI)—a state-owned rice milling company.** These agreements define a negotiated purchase price for paddy rice. Historically, these contracts also served to manage fertilizer credit repayment, where farmers reimbursed CAIMA for subsidized fertilizer with in-kind rice deliveries. Additionally, the contracts aimed to facilitate access to credit for farmer organizations from financial institutions. However, since 2021, rising production costs and international rice prices have made market sales more attractive than OPVN’s negotiated rates. Given that OPVN and RINI handle only about 10 to 15 percent of total national paddy rice production (Gergely 2014), the actual impact of these contracts on the broader rice market remains limited and warrants further evaluation.
- 34. The scale of OPVN grain purchases varies each year depending on harvest outcomes but rarely exceeds 100,000⁶ tons.** For example, in 2017, OPVN directly purchased 60,000 tons of grains—50,000 tons for the strategic food reserve and 10,000 tons for the national security stock. In the more recent 2024/2025 agricultural campaign, the agency planned to procure 61,450 tons of local cereals, 5,000 tons of rice, and 3,000 tons of cowpeas. Although these quantities represent only a small fraction of national production, OPVN’s dual roles—supporting producer prices during harvest and reducing consumer prices through subsidized sales—are central to the government’s food security objectives. The fiscal cost of these interventions remains significant. Based on average farm gate prices for key crops (sorghum, millet, rice, and cowpeas) used in this study, the cost of OPVN’s 2024/2025 purchasing plan is estimated at FCFA 18.5 billion.

⁶ Rough estimation based on public resources allocated to OPVN.

| 2.5 Agricultural trade policies

- 35. Niger's agri-food exports benefited from regional integration under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Free Trade Agreement, which allowed the free movement of goods within member states up until January 2025.** Within this framework, no tariffs were applied to products traded across ECOWAS countries. However, the effectiveness of this agreement was undermined by several challenges, including growing insecurity in the Sahel, informal trade restrictions, and repeated border closures. For example, Nigeria closed its border with Niger for several months in 2019 to contain security threats and again from August 2023 to February 2024 in response to ECOWAS's sanctions on Niger. Despite these closures, trade continued through informal channels due to the porosity of the border.
- 36. For trade with non-ECOWAS countries, standard tariffs are applied.** A notable example is rice imports, which face a 16 percent import tariff when brought into Niger from non-ECOWAS countries. These tariffs aim to protect local production but can also raise domestic food prices in times of supply shortages. On the export side, taxes are levied on specific agricultural commodities, particularly live animals and, to a lesser extent, onions. These taxes are intended to regulate trade and increase public revenues but can reduce competitiveness in external markets. In addition to official taxes, informal fees—especially on livestock—have historically been significant, although their incidence has declined in recent years.
- 37. Rice imports weigh heavily on Niger's trade balance.** Averaging about US\$300 million per year in recent years, rice imports represent significant currency losses for the country. However, the import tax on rice from non-ECOWAS countries may benefit the government's fiscal balance. Any potential reduction of the rice import tariff would therefore need to consider the fiscal implications for government revenue. Conversely, food security and price stability could also be attained through non-trade-related measures such as diversifying food consumption or improving early warning systems.



3. TRENDS AND COMPOSITION OF AGRICULTURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

38. This section analyzes trends in the level and composition of public expenditure on agriculture (PEA)⁷ in Niger, with a focus on sources of funding and budget execution performance. The analysis is based on the FAO-MAFAP methodology, which defines agricultural expenditure broadly to include both agriculture-specific and supportive (rural) investments that enable agricultural development. However, due to data availability constraints, this report focuses exclusively on agriculture-specific expenditures. Further details on the methodology are available in Annex 2.

39. Public expenditure data were obtained from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, disaggregated to the activity level for 2018–2022. Both budget allocations ('crédit de paiement') and actual expenditures ('total mandatement') are included. Budget lines related to food and agriculture were classified according to the MAFAP public expenditure categories (see Annex 2). The analysis covers executed budgets of the main ministries involved in agricultural and rural development, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, and the Ministry of Hydraulics and Sanitation. In addition, expenditures from other relevant entities and projects are included:


- The national food crisis prevention and management system, managed by the Prime Minister's Office
- The Kandadji Dam Program and MCA project under the Presidency
- The Support Fund for Scientific Research and Technological Innovation, managed by the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation
- Projects executed by the Ministry of Planning, such as Development of Information and Climate Foresight (PDIPC), Promotion of Productive Agriculture (PROMAP), and Mobilization and Development of Water Resources (PROMOVARE)
- Interventions by the Ministry of Trade aimed at improving agricultural marketing.

⁷ The following analysis covers public expenditure on food and agriculture, since spending targeting food consumers is also included. However, for simplicity, we refer to PEA.

3.1 Level of agricultural public expenditure

- 40. Niger’s PEA has shown an overall increasing trend, despite short-term fluctuations—particularly related to COVID-19.** The vulnerability of Niger’s agricultural production system, driven by climate-related shocks and degradation of productive resources, has elevated the sector to a national policy priority. As a result, PEA rose in nominal terms from an average of FCFA 135 billion during 2014–2017 to FCFA 220 billion during 2019–2022, despite a notable dip in 2022 (Figure 2). The peak in 2020–2021 reflected increased donor financing for emergency food transfers in response to COVID-19. Although expenditures declined in 2022 due to reduced external support, they remained above pre-pandemic levels (for example, 2019).
- 41. The upward trend in agricultural allocations has been largely donor driven, with external financing accounting for around 70 percent of total PEA between 2018 and 2022.** This heavy dependence on external resources creates budget unpredictability, as most donor funds are tied to the timelines and disbursement cycles of specific development projects rather than direct budget support to the government.

Figure 3: Trends in total PEA by source of financing



Source: Based on Financial Information Technology Department of Ministry of Finance (DIF/MEF) data.

Note: ‘Cofinancing’ indicates expenditures from both domestic and external sources and could not be differentiated.

42. Niger is one of the countries that has come closest to reaching the Maputo Declaration target of allocating 10 percent of total public expenditure to agriculture⁸ among Sub-Saharan African countries. Between 2018 and 2022, Niger dedicated an average of 8.2 percent of its total public budget to the agricultural sector. The highest levels of support were recorded in 2020 (9.2 percent) and 2021 (9.0 percent), reflecting heightened investments during the COVID-19 period (Table 3). However, this share declined to 7 percent in 2022, underscoring ongoing fluctuations in funding levels.

Table 3: Comparison of Niger’s public food and agricultural expenditures with selected countries

Country	Share of PEA in total PE (%)	Share of PEA in ag. value added (%)	Share of PEA in GDP (%)
Niger (2018–2022)	8.2	5.4	2.1
Structural peers			
Central African Republic (2015–2018)	4.7	2.9	0.9
Chad (2015–2018)	0.9	2.9	0.8
Mali (2018–2022)	12.2	4.7	1.7
Aspirational peers			
Rwanda (2015–2018)	9.1	11.5	2.9
Senegal (2018–2022)	5.1	9.8	1.5

Source: Based on Financial Information Technology Department of Ministry of Finance (DIF/MEF) data, Malabo/African Union, and WDI biennial reports.

Note: The share of PEA in total PE for all countries except Niger is for 2020 (ReSAKSS 2025).

⁸ To ensure comparability with the CAADP definition, Public Expenditure to Agriculture refers here to the narrow definition of public expenditures in this section. Consumer transfers and agriculture-supportive expenditures (as defined by the FAO-MAFAP) are not included.

43. Likewise, Niger performs well when comparing PEA to both agricultural value added and GDP. On average, Niger’s PEA represented 5.4 percent of agricultural value added and 2.1 percent of GDP between 2018 and 2022. These figures are considerably higher than those of some neighboring countries, such as the Central African Republic and Chad, where PEA amounted to just 3 percent of agricultural value added and 1 percent of GDP (Table 3). However, this positive performance is largely driven by external funding. The share of domestically funded spending fell from 6 percent during 2014–2017 to 3 percent in 2018–2022. This drop reflects the decline in tax revenues⁹ due to the prolonged downturn in oil and uranium prices alongside higher spending on security prompted by escalating instability in the Sahel region.

⁹ Direct tax revenues declined from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2014 to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2019 (World Bank 2021a).


3.2 Economic composition of agricultural public expenditure

- 44. During 2018–2022, approximately two-thirds of Niger’s domestically financed agricultural expenditure was allocated to investment spending (Figure 5),¹⁰ reflecting a positive emphasis on capital formation in the sector.** The next largest spending category was salaries, accounting for 17 percent of total PEA, primarily for personnel in the Ministry of Agriculture and, to a lesser extent, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development. Subsidies made up 8 percent of agricultural spending, largely dedicated to the National Agricultural Extension System (*Système National de Conseil Agricole*), fertilizer subsidy programs, and financing for agricultural research and development.
- 45. Compared with neighboring countries, Niger performs similarly to Burkina Faso and Mali in the share of investment spending from domestic sources.** In Burkina Faso and Mali, investment expenditure accounted for 71 percent and 84 percent of total agricultural public spending, respectively (World Bank 2021b, 2023c).¹¹ However, these figures should be interpreted cautiously. Some items labeled as ‘investment’ in Niger’s national budget include expenditures on the strategic food reserve—which ensures access to subsidized staple foods during crises—classified by the authors as food aid. Other budget items classified as ‘investments’ are related to the purchase of inputs (seed and fertilizer) at the beginning of the agricultural campaign. Niger’s limited fiscal space constrains public investment in agriculture, a challenge compounded by fragmented responsibilities across many institutions. Consequently, much of the spending goes to operational and recurrent costs rather than long-term, productivity-enhancing investments. These structural issues are discussed further in the next section.

¹⁰ This section examines the PEA composition funded by domestic resources, as nearly 95 percent of the donor-funded budget comprises investments. For comparison, in Burkina Faso, external resources financed 46 percent of investments from 2016 to 2020.

¹¹ Burkina Faso - average of 2016–2022; Mali - average of 2016–2018.

Figure 4: Economic composition of Niger's PEA during 2018–2022




Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

3.3 Administrative composition of agriculture public expenditure

46. Public spending on agriculture is highly fragmented across multiple government institutions, making coordination particularly challenging. During 2018–2022, about 12 ministries and public entities executed agricultural expenditures. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock was the primary actor, accounting for 51 percent of total agricultural spending (Figure 6). The other main institutions executing significant agricultural spending include (i) the Presidency of the Republic (15 percent), which manages coordination of major agricultural programs in partnership with technical and financial partners; (ii) the Cabinet of the Prime Ministry (9 percent), which supports implementation of cross-cutting food and agriculture programs; and (iii) the Ministry of Trade and Promotion of the Private Sector (8 percent), responsible for managing the strategic food reserve. The high number of institutions involved in the sector poses significant coordination challenges.

47. Moreover, inadequate budget decentralization practices in the agricultural sector prevent decentralized units from fulfilling their mission. The current spending (excluding salaries) delegated to the regional directorates in charge of agriculture is insignificant, and their operations are financed mainly by service agreements with externally financed projects. This prevents decentralized units/offices from fulfilling their roles in monitoring and evaluation, coordination, capitalization, and appropriation of project investments. In addition, despite the operationalization of the program budget in 2018, the budget authorization function is still carried out by the Ministry of Finance for all sectors, including agriculture, except for two pilot ministries (that is, Education and Health). This adds complexity to the sector’s budget execution process.

Figure 5: Niger’s PEA by executing unit, average 2018–2022



Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

3.4 Functional composition of agriculture-specific public expenditure

- 48. Between 2018 and 2022, close to 25 percent of Niger’s agriculture-specific public expenditure was allocated to irrigation infrastructure.** Of this, 11 percent went to off-farm irrigation infrastructure—such as public irrigation schemes not directly tied to individual farms—while 13 percent was directed to the development of on-farm irrigation,¹² primarily through capital input subsidies (see Figure 7). While there is no standard benchmark to assess the optimality of this allocation, the relatively high share devoted to irrigation reflects the country’s climatic vulnerabilities. However, Niger’s investment in irrigation is still lower than in peer Sahelian countries, such as Mali (32 percent of agricultural spending from 2010 to 2016) and Burkina Faso (40 percent from 2016 to 2020).
- 49. The second-largest area of expenditure focused on food aid and cash transfers,¹³ together accounting for 17 percent of total PEA.** These consumer-oriented expenditures primarily include food distributions through the national security stock (*Stock National de Sécurité*) managed by OPVN. OPVN sells cereals and sugar at subsidized prices, particularly during crises or religious celebrations. These operations are carried out in coordination with the Food Crisis Unit (*Cellule de Crise Alimentaire*, CCA) under the Prime Minister’s Office. Spending in this area was especially high during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–2021 (see Figure 8). By comparison, the two neighboring countries with the highest share of food aid and cash transfer expenditures are Mauritania and Senegal, respectively 12 and 7 percent, while Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria spend less than 3 percent of their agricultural public expenditures on these categories.¹⁴ The current budget allocation therefore has a high social component.
- 50. Value chain development, marketing, and processing received 14 percent of agricultural expenditure during the same period (Figure 7).** This included public investments in food processing infrastructure, cold chains, and collection points aimed at improving market access for producers and strengthening private sector engagement. Allocations in this area saw a notable increase in 2021–2022, signaling greater policy emphasis on integrated value chain support.


12 Although largely congruent in practice, ‘off-farm irrigation’ does not necessarily equate to ‘large-scale irrigation area’, and ‘on-farm irrigation’ does not necessarily equate to ‘small-scale irrigation area’. The first term in both pairs refers to the ownership of the irrigation area, either private or public, while the second term strictly refers to the size of the irrigation area.

13 Due to the lack of disaggregation of poor household spending toward food, all cash transfers were considered to target food and are therefore captured here.

14 Average 2018–2020. Calculation based on the MAFAP Public Expenditure database, available at <https://www.fao.org/in-action/mafap/data-hub/en>. The choice of countries was based on data availability.

51. Spending on other agricultural infrastructure—excluding irrigation and feeder roads—represented 11 percent of total PEA. These expenditures (categorized as Infrastructure - Other in Figure 7) primarily funded borehole construction to improve water access for pastoralists, thereby benefiting the livestock sector.

Figure 6: Functional composition of agricultural public expenditure (actual), average 2018–2022




Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

52. Subsidies for variable inputs made up 7 percent of total PEA between 2018 and 2022. These included subsidies for seeds, fertilizers, and animal feed, with spending peaking at 13 percent of PEA in 2022, largely due to the emergency support provided during that year’s agricultural campaign. Subsidies were delivered through national programs, specific projects such as the Climate-Sensitive Agriculture Support Project (PASEC), and the Plant Protection Directorate under the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.

53. Administrative costs and other agricultural expenditures—primarily focused on land restoration—each accounted for about 8 percent of total PEA between 2018 and 2022. Administrative spending was mainly allocated to salaries and operational costs within institutions managing the agricultural sector. Other expenditures were directed toward land restoration initiatives, including soil conservation, reforestation, and watershed protection. Niger’s spending on land management is comparable to neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso (6 percent) and Mali (7 percent) (World Bank 2020, 2024). However, this level of investment is insufficient given the accelerating degradation of Niger’s natural resource base, including soils, forests, and surface water, which are critical for sustaining agricultural productivity in a climate-vulnerable context.

Figure 7: Actual PEA trends by category




Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

- 54. Public spending on agricultural extension and research accounted for only 5 percent of total PEA during 2018–2022.** This is low, especially considering the well-established high returns and strategic importance of research and extension services in driving long-term growth of the agri-food sector (see, for instance, Goyal and Nash 2017 or Mogues et al. 2012, although no Niger-specific studies could be found). Within this category, spending on extension services increased significantly over the period, particularly in 2022 (see Figure 9). Extension expenditure rose from FCFA 5 billion to FCFA 12 billion annually, while agricultural research funding stagnated at around FCFA 2 billion per year in nominal terms. Adjusted for inflation, this implies a decline in real spending on research. This share of expenditures toward agricultural extension and research is slightly lower than in neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, or Senegal, which dedicated 7–8 percent of their public expenditures to agricultural research and extension, and much lower than in countries such as Nigeria or Rwanda, which dedicated 13–15 percent of their agricultural public expenditures.
- 55. Niger’s agricultural research intensity—measured as the ratio of public agricultural research spending to agricultural value added—was just 0.1 percent over 2018–2022,** far below the African Union’s target of 1 percent. The decline in research funding can largely be traced to the end of the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP) in 2015, which previously supplied about 70 percent of national agricultural research financing. While the government has since increased its subsidy for research staff salaries—from FCFA 600 million in 2014–2016 to over FCFA 1.5 billion annually in 2018–2022—funding for operational research activities remained low at just FCFA 150 million per year. This imbalance limits the effectiveness of INRAN, as expanded human resources are underutilized due to insufficient operating budgets. Scaling up operational funding is critical to enable INRAN to function effectively. Moreover, increasing public research investments could yield significant returns if accompanied by reforms, such as the use of competitive, performance-based grants and the full integration of government research into a broader innovation ecosystem that includes academia, private sector actors, and civil society organizations.

56. Although funding for agricultural extension has improved, its quality and reach remain limited. A national assessment of the advisory support system conducted in 2016 (RECA 2016) found that services were dominated by technical advice, with insufficient attention to business, legal, and management guidance. In response, the government developed a new National Agricultural Advisory System in 2017 and established the Agricultural Advisory Promotion Agency (*Agence de Promotion du Conseil Agricole*, APCA) in 2019 to implement it. APCA was tasked with enhancing the quality of agricultural advice by introducing systems for service control and certification. However, the results have been mixed. A partial evaluation by the Food System Resilience Program (FSRP) in 2023 revealed that the system suffers from extremely low coverage—with just one advisory agent serving 4,300 producers across 156 communes in the four regions of Diffa, Tahoua, Tillabéry, and Zinder.

Figure 8: Growth of agricultural research and technical assistance expenditure




Source: Based on DIF/MEF data and various project reports.

3.4.1 Public spending on irrigation infrastructure

57. Expanding irrigation infrastructure is a top policy priority in Niger, given the country's vulnerability to frequent droughts and the rising importance of irrigated crops such as onion and rice. During 2018–2022, the government allocated an average of FCFA 103 billion per year to irrigation projects (Figure 10). However, actual spending averaged only FCFA 49.3 billion annually, reflecting a low execution rate of just 48 percent. This gap between planned and executed expenditures can be attributed to several factors, including implementation delays in large-scale initiatives such as the Kandadji project,¹⁵ weaknesses in procurement systems, and the limited financial and technical capacity of many local contractors responsible for infrastructure works. Despite these challenges, irrigation consistently received the largest share of PEA (25 percent) each year. In relation to the broader economy, irrigation spending represented 1.6 percent of agricultural GDP, comparable to Mali (1.8 percent for 2012–2016) but still below Burkina Faso (5 percent for 2016–2020) (World Bank 2020, 2024).

Figure 9: Evolution of budgetary allocations and public expenditure for irrigation




Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

¹⁵ With an initial budget of US\$1.34 billion, the Kandadji project aims to harness the resources of the Niger River to increase the capacity for energy generation, enhance the availability and management of water for agricultural development, and improve livelihoods in the Tillaberi region. A large-scale irrigated perimeter (LIP) of 45,000 ha is planned in the project.

Small-scale irrigation: A key driver of agricultural growth and food security

- 58. Small-scale irrigation has emerged as a central pillar of Niger’s agricultural policy, aimed at improving household food security and increasing resilience to climate shocks.** More than 60 percent of total irrigation spending between 2018 and 2022 was allocated to small-scale irrigation. On average, the government invested FCFA 30.5 billion per year in developing small-scale irrigated perimeters (SIPs), either through direct transfers to private agents or within broader public schemes. These investments supported the development of approximately 94,000 ha of SIPs between 2016 and 2022. In addition, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private irrigators contributed significantly by developing an estimated 51,000 ha of irrigated land during the same period. Altogether, 145,000 ha of SIPs were developed, representing an average annual increase of over 20,000 ha (SP/SPIN 2023). This demonstrates the leverage effect of SPIN, which successfully mobilized complementary investments from non-state and private actors.
- 59. Expansion of small-scale irrigation has significantly boosted the production of vegetables and tubers, contributing to improved food availability and rural incomes.** Among all irrigated crops, tuber production (including cassava, sweet potato, and potato) experienced the fastest growth, rising by an average of 22 percent annually—from 278,000 tons in 2015 to 1.34 million tons in 2023 (Figure 11). Production of other vegetables (excluding onion) also increased rapidly, growing at 17 percent annually over the same period. The total volume of these vegetables—including tomatoes, cabbage, squash, lettuce, moringa, peppers, and carrots—expanded from 800,000 tons in 2015 to about 3 million tons by 2023. Meanwhile, onion production, Niger’s leading horticultural export crop, tripled over the period—from 578,000 tons in 2015 to 1.97 million tons in 2023—reflecting an average annual growth rate of 12 percent. These gains highlight the transformative impact of targeted investments in small-scale irrigation on agricultural productivity and food system resilience.

Figure 10: Crop production trends in small-scale perimeters (tons)



Source: Based on MAGEL data.

60. Despite strong gains in production, small-scale irrigated agriculture faces significant challenges that threaten its long-term sustainability. One major issue is limited access to quality seeds, which are mostly imported and have become more expensive. To address this, producer organizations have proposed creating a national vegetable seed production platform to ensure availability and affordability. Another constraint is farmers' limited technical and managerial capacity, which hinders sustainable yield and income improvements. Although some support is provided by NGOs and donor-funded projects, public agricultural advisory services remain extremely limited and unevenly distributed across regions. Inadequate maintenance of communal irrigation infrastructure, coupled with the lack of an integrated water resource management strategy, further compromises the sustainability of many SIPs. In addition, the weak managerial capacity of farmer organizations reduces their ability to deliver essential services to members. Land tenure insecurity is another key issue: vulnerable groups often lack formal land use agreements, leaving them at risk of eviction or exploitation by landowners, especially in irrigated areas where land value is rising.

61. Marketing challenges are also hindering the development of vegetable value chains. Although Regional Chambers of Agriculture¹⁶ have found that vegetable production is highly profitable under improved yields and efficient market conditions, the Federation of Vegetable Cooperatives of Niger (*Fédération des Coopératives Maraichères du Niger*, FCMN-Niya) reports numerous barriers to effective marketing. These include (i) lack of formal contracts with traders, which leaves producers vulnerable to price volatility and uncertain sales; (ii) insufficient sales counters in production zones, limiting price transparency and bargaining power; (iii) shortage of storage facilities for perishable vegetables, leading to oversupply during harvest and sharp price declines; (iv) lack of processing infrastructure, resulting in substantial post-harvest losses, especially for products like tomatoes; and (v) high interest rates from informal credit providers, as producers face difficulties in accessing formal agricultural finance. In response, FCMN-Niya has advocated expanding vegetable processing capacity and facilitating access to affordable agricultural credit, potentially tied to agricultural insurance products to manage climate-related risks.


Large-scale irrigation: Limited progress due to underfunding and project delays

62. While the government has prioritized the development of large-scale irrigation schemes to mitigate recurring droughts, implementation has been severely hindered by low execution rates and funding shortfalls. Between 2018 and 2022, public expenditure on LIPs totaled only FCFA 94.36 billion, out of a planned FCFA 320 billion, reflecting a low financial execution rate of just 30 percent. A key example of underperformance is the Kandadji program, which aimed to develop 45,000 ha of HAFs. The program faced substantial delays in constructing key hydraulic infrastructure. Despite being allocated FCFA 231 billion over the period, only 21 percent of the budget was spent, stalling progress toward improved water control and agricultural output in these areas.

¹⁶ (CRA/Dosso, 2022), (CRA/Diffa, 2016), (CRA/Tillabéry, 2021), (CRA/Maradi, 2017)

63. The lack of adequate funding and implementation capacity has resulted in stagnation of large-scale irrigated areas. Between 2018 and 2022, only 734 ha of HAFs were constructed, compared to a target of 42,585 ha, leading to a physical implementation rate of just 1.7 percent. Some progress was made in rehabilitating and upgrading existing infrastructure, with 12,107 ha rehabilitated out of a target of 15,400 ha, representing an 80 percent implementation rate. However, these efforts were not enough to significantly alter the overall scale of large-scale irrigation in the country. Over nearly a decade, the total area under LIP increased modestly from 16,685 ha in 2015 to 18,502 ha in 2023—a growth of only 10.8 percent. In stark contrast, small-scale irrigation areas nearly tripled, rising from 108,000 ha to 282,000 ha over the same period (Figure 12).

Figure 11: Expansion of irrigation by type (ha)



Source: Based on SP/SPIN and ONAHA data.

64. The development of irrigation, both small and large scale, should account for changing weather patterns from climate change. The International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) warns that “more variable and unpredictable rains are expected in the near and distant future,” coupled with higher average temperatures (CIAT et al. 2020). Irrigation is a key solution to mitigate the effects of climate change. However, the dimensions of irrigated areas will have to consider the likelihood that water will be scarcer in the future, with a higher opportunity cost. Other climate-smart agricultural practices, such as Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR), intercropping, and composting, should continue to be supported to scale up throughout the country.


3.4.2 Public expenditure on the livestock sector

- 65. Niger holds a strategic position in West Africa’s livestock economy, ranking as the region’s second-largest producer.** The country contributes approximately 23 percent of total livestock output in West Africa (SOFRECO 2022c), benefiting from a vast pastoral area of 620,000 square kilometers and diverse vegetation that supports extensive ruminant production. Owing to this comparative advantage, Niger accounts for 25 percent of regional cattle trade and two-thirds of the trade in small ruminants (Diagne and Pelon 2014), underscoring its prominence in the regional livestock market.
- 66. Livestock plays a critical role in Niger’s national economy and rural livelihoods, accounting for 8 percent of national GDP and 22 percent of agricultural value added (INS 2023).** It provides employment to around 87 percent of the labor force, either as a primary or secondary activity (SOFRECO 2022c). Additionally, an estimated 4 million people, or 17 percent of the population, identify as pastoralists (World Bank 2023b). Historically, livestock has also been a key livelihood asset—contributing more than 15 percent to household income and 25 percent to household food consumption in 2010. The sector continues to serve as Niger’s leading agricultural export and second-largest source of foreign exchange after the mining sector. Livestock trade generates substantial revenues for both the central government and local authorities.

67. Niger’s livestock herd is large and geographically concentrated in the country’s more agriculturally favorable regions. As of 2023, the national herd totaled approximately 55 million animals, including 17.1 million cattle and 33.7 million sheep and goats.¹⁷ While most regions of Niger maintain significant herds, the Tillabéri, Zinder, Tahoua, and Maradi regions collectively account for nearly 80 percent of the country’s cattle and small ruminants. In contrast, the urban districts and Agadez, a desert region, have relatively limited livestock numbers (Figure 13). Niger’s herds also include specialized and well-regarded local breeds, further supporting the country’s comparative advantage in this sector.

68. Domestic consumption of the livestock value chain remains limited, and much of the trade is informal and underreported. Only about 23 percent of cattle, 30 percent of sheep, and 40 percent of goats are consumed locally (INS 2025; SOFRECO 2022c). Of the animals used, 17 percent are self-consumed by farmers, while 83 percent enter the market, including 42 percent exported live, primarily to Nigeria. About 22 percent are slaughtered for meat, and the remaining animals are sold for breeding or milk production. However, official data—both national and from FAOSTAT—likely underestimate exports, as a significant portion of live animal trade occurs informally through porous borders and unregulated markets.

Figure 12: Number of cattle and sheep/goat by region in 2019 (millions)



Source: Based on MAGEL data.

17 FAOSTAT, “Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Database,” accessed April 2025, <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data>.

- 69. The livestock sector in Niger receives high levels of public investment relative to other Sahelian countries.** On average, FCFA 33.5 billion per year was allocated to livestock between 2018 and 2022, accounting for 18 percent of total PEA. This allocation aligns relatively well with the sector's 22 percent contribution to agricultural value added over the same period. In contrast, Burkina Faso and Mali, with livestock contributing 31 percent and 20 percent to their respective agricultural GDPs, allocated only 10 percent and 11 percent of their agricultural budgets to the sector (SOFRECO 2022c; World Bank 2021a).
- 70. Public livestock spending has mainly focused on value chain development, water access, and animal health.** Nearly half of the sectoral allocation was invested in livestock value chains, including market infrastructure and processing facilities. Pastoral hydraulics, essential in Niger's arid context, accounted for 28 percent of livestock spending, while the effects of climate change might further increase these needs.¹⁸ Investments in animal health made up 14 percent, managed through central and regional veterinary services, while 8 percent was allocated to variable inputs, such as feed and forage.
- 71. Despite targeted investments, structural constraints in processing and marketing continue to hinder sector growth.** Niger's meat industry remains underdeveloped, constrained by the absence of modern slaughterhouses and cold chain logistics, which are essential for export markets (SOFRECO 2022c). Demand for Nigerien beef is strong in the region, but infrastructure gaps limit its export potential. Similarly, the dairy sector suffers from low productivity, seasonal supply variations, and weak collection systems, making local milk less competitive than imports. As a result, around 50 percent of urban milk demand is met through imported dairy products.¹⁹
- 72. Animal feed access remains a critical challenge exacerbated by recurring droughts.** Niger suffers from a significant fodder deficit, with annual production estimated at 1,200 tons compared to a national need of 6 million tons. Government programs subsidize about 30,000 tons of feed annually for vulnerable pastoralists, but this remains insufficient. Furthermore, inefficiencies in procurement systems and targeting mechanisms weaken program impact. In the face of climate-induced pastoral crises, supporting rural microenterprises to produce locally sourced feed could improve supply, affordability, and resilience.


¹⁸ *The development of pastoral hydraulics is further detailed in World Bank (2023).*

¹⁹ [Enabel report on Niger's dairy industry](#)

73. Inadequate veterinary services limit livestock productivity and export readiness.

Vaccination coverage has remained below the 80 percent target (Figure 14), fluctuating due to procurement delays and unreliable external funding. Key barriers include the incomplete and partial privatization of veterinary services, poorly equipped surveillance systems, and underfunded laboratories such as LABOCEL and its regional branches. Strengthening these systems would enhance disease control and open access to high-value export markets. Additionally, investing in domestic vaccine production through LABOCEL could reduce dependency on imports and ensure timely vaccine availability.

Figure 13: Vaccination coverage rate



Source: Based on DNSV data.

3.5 Progress of the 3NI

74. Under the 3NI, public expenditure has been characterized by overfunding of food and nutrition crisis management relative to productive investments. Overall, the 3NI appears to have been well implemented financially, with a fund mobilization rate of 99 percent over 2011–2022. However, nearly FCFA 108 billion per year was mobilized to finance food and nutrition crises (areas 3 and 4), with a financial execution rate of 253 percent. By contrast, increasing and diversifying agrosylvopastoral and fisheries production (area 1), which constitutes nearly 70 percent of the total cost of the initiative, was financed at 53 percent over 2011–2020. This imbalance between the strategic priorities of the 3NI and the resources mobilized reflects inefficiencies in the allocation of public resources. Over time, continued attention to crisis response should be complemented by greater investment in productive sectors to unlock the agricultural sector’s growth potential and reinforce sustainable FNS for the Nigerien population.

Table 4: Resources mobilized for the implementation of the initiative over 2011–2020 (FCFA, billions)

Strategic focus	Programmed amount	Amount mobilized	Engagement rate (%)
Area 1: Increase and Diversification of Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral and Fisheries Production	1,703	909	53
Area 2: Regular Supply of Rural and Urban Markets with Agricultural and Agro-food Products	325	437	134
Area 3: Improvement of the Resilience of Populations in the Face of Climate Change, Crises and Disasters	358	861	240
Area 4: Improvement of the Nutritional Status of Nigeriens	68	217	318
Area 5: Creation of a Favorable Environment for the Implementation of the 3NI	91	86	94
Total	2,547	2,511	99

Source: High Commission for the 3NI.

| 3.6 Agricultural budget execution


- 75. The budget execution rate is a useful indicator of financial discipline and planning credibility in the agricultural sector, though it does not reflect spending effectiveness.** In this section, budget execution is assessed as the ratio of budgeted amounts (*‘crédit de paiement’*) to actual expenditures (*‘total mandant’*). While this metric does not indicate the quality of public spending, it offers insights into the predictability and credibility of budget processes. In Niger, annual budget programming is derived from medium-term planning tools, such as the MultiYear Budgetary and Economic Programming Document (DPBEP) and the Ministerial MultiYear Expenditure Programming Documents (DPPD). Performance is monitored via the Annual Performance Plan (PAP) and Annual Performance Report (RAP).
- 76. Execution of domestically funded agricultural budgets has been relatively high but faces operational constraints.** From 2018 to 2022, Niger achieved an average budget execution rate of 90 percent for domestic resources (Figure 15), higher than aspirational peers such as Rwanda and Senegal, each around 85 percent.²⁰ This relatively high rate reflects the relative ease of planning and disbursement for domestic funds. However, execution is hindered by the lack of an automated procurement system, capacity limitations in financial and technical institutions—especially for hydroagricultural works—and centralized budget authorization. While decentralization may introduce delays, it could also enhance the relevance and responsiveness of spending.²¹
- 77. Execution of externally funded agricultural budgets has been significantly lower and more volatile.** The execution rate for external and cofinanced resources fell to 50 percent in 2022, with declining trends since 2020. Key challenges include national actors’ limited familiarity with donor procedures, delays in ‘noobjection’ approvals, and the low capacity of service providers. These systemic bottlenecks result in underexecution of crucial donorsupported projects, especially in irrigation and infrastructure development. By comparison, neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali show an execution rate of close to 65 percent for external resources on average over 2018–2020.

²⁰ Average over 2018–2020, as per the MAFAP Public Expenditure database.

²¹ Decentralization is being piloted by the ministry in charge of education and the ministry in charge of health.

78. Misalignment between donor and national programming cycles weakens agricultural investment coordination. The time lag between donor project planning and national budget formulation results in duplication of interventions, spatial and temporal inconsistencies, and poor investment coordination. Aligning donorfunded Annual Work Plans with the national finance law calendar would enhance budget coherence. Furthermore, sectoral expenditure programming should better reflect the macroeconomic ceilings set in the DPBEP to strengthen fiscal discipline and strategic alignment.


Figure 14: Budget execution rate by source of financing



Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

79. Despite moderately high execution rates (at least for the domestically funded budget), budget challenges remain given significant overruns and misalignments. Budget overruns—where actual spending exceeds planned allocations—indicate gaps in planning and execution. Between 2018 and 2022, overruns reached FCFA 52 billion for domestic resources (17 percent of total domestic expenditure) and FCFA 288 billion for external resources (36 percent).²² For external resources, this mainly reflects the limited integration of donor programming in the finance law. For internal resources, factors include difficulties in anticipating staff costs and limitations in budget monitoring. Excluding these overruns, the effective financial execution rate (FER) declines from 89 to 71 percent for internal resources and from 66 to 30 percent for external resources (Figure 16). This suggests that headline execution rates may overstate actual performance, underscoring the importance of continued efforts to strengthen planning, integration, and monitoring mechanisms.

Figure 15: Impact of overruns on FER



Source: Based on DIF/MEF data.

²² The budget line was defined as overrun when the amount executed is higher than 110 percent of the original budget.



4. PRICE INCENTIVE ANALYSIS FOR KEY CROP AND LIVESTOCK VALUE CHAINS

- 80. Price incentives are a critical indicator of how public policies and market dynamics affect agricultural producers' incomes and competitiveness.** This section presents a Price Incentive Analysis (PIA) for selected crop value chains—rice, onion, millet, sorghum, and cowpeas—as well as livestock products, specifically cattle and sheep.²³ The primary indicator used in this analysis is the nominal rate of protection (NRP), which quantifies the impact of policies and market conditions on domestic prices relative to an international benchmark. The NRP measures the percentage by which a product's domestic price is either raised above (positive NRP) or reduced below (negative NRP) its reference price. This reference price represents the border price (import or export parity), adjusted for transport, quality, handling, and transaction costs, and is considered the undistorted market price that would prevail in the absence of policy interventions or inefficiencies.
- › **A positive NRP** implies that producers are protected or supported, receiving higher prices than they would under free trade conditions.
 - › **A negative NRP** suggests that producers are penalized, receiving lower prices than the international benchmark.
- 81. In addition to the NRP, the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is reported for rice, as this crop benefits from significant input subsidies (for example, fertilizer, irrigation), which provide support beyond market price effects.** For the other crops, NRA is not reported due to lack of disaggregated data and the relatively lower significance of subsidies. The methodological framework and data sources used for this analysis are detailed in Annex 3.

²³ *The agricultural commodities covered in the analysis represent 74 percent of the value of agricultural production and have strategic relevance for the sustainable development of the agriculture sector in the country.*


4.1 Price incentive analysis for key crop value chains

- 82. Price incentives for key crop value chains in Niger vary widely, with rice producers benefiting from strong policy support, while onion and cowpea producers face significant market disadvantages, and millet and sorghum prices are generally aligned with international reference levels.** The analysis highlights how public interventions (such as tariffs, subsidies, and procurement) and market conditions (such as trader dominance and informal cross-border trade) either incentivize or disincentivize production, as measured through the NRP.

Onion: High regional potential undermined by weak policy support

- 83. Niger is the largest exporter and the second-largest producer of onions in West Africa, holding a strong comparative advantage in regional onion production (Karkare et al. 2021; SOFRECO 2022b).** In 2023, onion production reached an estimated 1.6 million tons—an increase of 40 percent compared to 2017 (Figure 17). The Tahoua region accounts for roughly 75 percent of total national output, and about 46 percent of this production is exported. The remaining quantity is sold in the domestic market through a chain of intermediaries, including collectors, semi-wholesalers (often acting on behalf of wholesalers), wholesalers, retailers, and transporters.

Figure 16: Onion production (including shallots) and exports (tons)



Source: Based on FAOSTAT (2025) data.

Note: Exports are estimated at 46 percent of production (SOFRECO 2022b).


- 84. Despite the presence of producer organizations, onion farmers face substantial disadvantages due to market concentration among traders.** The export market is dominated by approximately 260 wholesale traders from Niger who maintain strong networks with foreign wholesalers and capture the highest margins in the value chain. These exporters coordinate the marketing and shipment of onions using around 100 traditional marketing centers located across production zones.
- 85. Traditional marketing remains the norm for many producers and traders in the onion value chain.** To improve transparency in this highly informal trade, modern counters have been introduced to facilitate transactions between sellers and buyers. These counters reportedly handle about 60 percent of exports, although the true share may be lower due to widespread underreporting. Many small-scale producers continue to rely on traditional channels because of their limited financial capacity and low market power. These channels, although often inequitable, allow farmers to quickly obtain the income they need for food and farming inputs. Some producers also barter their onion harvest in exchange for fertilizer or cereals.

- 86. Niger does not have a dedicated government policy to support the development of the onion value chain.** Onion farmers benefit from the national fertilizer subsidy scheme but to a lesser extent than rice producers. While the subsidy reform aimed at targeting only vulnerable farmers is expected to raise input costs, onion producers may be less affected due to relatively low fertilizer use—around 250 kg per ha, compared to 700 kg for rice (SOFRECO 2022a, 2022b). In 2021, producer prices for onions increased by 14 percent, which may partly reflect higher input costs following the subsidy reform.
- 87. Unlike staple crops such as rice, sorghum, and millet, onion is not exempt from value added tax (VAT).** In addition, several other taxes and fees apply along the onion value chain, including communal taxes collected by municipalities, police-related fees, and customs charges. When exporting onions, producers also face customs duties and informal charges (*faux-frais*) levied by importing countries.
- 88. Between 2017 and 2024, onion producers consistently received prices below the international reference level.**²⁴ The NRP averaged negative 42 percent over this period (Figure 18), indicating that farmers were paid, on average, 42 percent less than they would receive in an undistorted market. The NRP remained stable throughout the period. The NRP fell to -10 percent in 2024 due to a strong reduction in the international price;²⁵ the upcoming years will show whether this is a structural change in the value chain or just short-term price volatility.
- 89. Low farm gate prices are driven mainly by the weak bargaining position of farmers relative to large traders.** Many farmers are compelled to sell immediately after harvest—when prices are lowest—to meet urgent cash needs or finance staple crop production (Melesse et al. 2025). Although producer organizations such as FCMN-Niya and the National Association of Onion Industry Professionals of Niger (ANFO) exist, they have limited capacity to negotiate better prices collectively. In response, ANFO and FCMN-Niya have called for the construction of storage warehouses and the creation of economic hubs in production zones. These hubs would combine production sites, storage facilities, sales counters, and access to finance. Improving onion storage and access to credit would enable farmers to delay sales until market conditions are more favorable, potentially raising farm gate prices.

24 The price from the Guidan Iddar-Abidjan corridor, the main production zone, is used for this analysis. Abidjan is the main destination market for onion exports from Niger.

25 For the onion value chain, the team estimated the reference price based on the wholesale price in Côte d'Ivoire due to the lack of data on international trade of onion. This price decreased sharply in 2024 and was passed through the value chain, decreasing the reference price in Niger and therefore the NRP.

Figure 17: Nominal Rate of Protection for onion



Source: Based on *Système d'Information sur les Marchés Agricoles (SIMA)* data.


Rice: A strategic crop with strong policy support but lagging productivity

- 90. Rice has gained strategic importance in Niger due to growing urban consumption, but despite significant public support, productivity and self-sufficiency remain low.** Rice is the third most produced and consumed cereal in Niger after millet and sorghum,²⁶ contributing around 10 percent of daily caloric intake. By contrast, millet and sorghum account for 28 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Despite its strategic role, rice consumption in Niger remains low compared to other West African countries (SOFRECO 2022a). Production is concentrated in the humid regions of Tillabéri and Dosso, particularly in areas managed by ONAHA, which account for about 80 percent of national output.
- 91. Yields in irrigated areas are relatively high, but production still covers only a fraction of national needs.** Rice yields in large-scale irrigation schemes are strong by regional standards, averaging 5.7 tons per ha between 2015 and 2023 and reaching 6.6 tons per ha in 2021 (ONAHA 2024). Still, total production in 2022–2023 was only 143,000 tons—equivalent to 90,000 tons in milled form. This local supply covers just 20 percent of national rice demand. The remaining 80 percent is met through imports, which averaged 510,000 tons annually from 2017 to 2023 (Figure 19).

²⁶ FAOSTAT, "Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Database," accessed April 2025, <https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data>.

92. Rice marketing is dominated by collectors and cooperatives linked to wholesalers. Producers typically sell their paddy rice to either FUCOPRI—the national federation of rice producer cooperatives—or to collectors working for traders and wholesalers. These actors manage post-harvest operations such as milling and parboiling and sell to institutional buyers, retailers, and sometimes traders exporting to Nigeria.

Figure 18: Rice imports and production (tons), and share of imports in total domestic supply (right axis)



Source: Based on FAOSTAT (2025) and ITC (2025) data.


Note: The production of rice is expressed in its milled rice equivalent using a conversion factor of 62 percent.

93. Rice producers benefit from high and increasing price incentives. Between 2017 and 2023, rice producers received prices significantly above the international reference price. The NRP averaged 38 percent during this period, reflecting substantial price incentives (Figure 20).²⁷ These increased further after 2021, reaching 56 percent, largely due to domestic price hikes.

²⁷ The price from the Gaya corridor is used for the analysis. Milled rice is imported at Gaya, the border between Benin and Niger, which competes with local rice from Tillaberi, the main production area of local rice.

94. Import tariffs and negotiated producer prices drive high farm-level revenues in Niger. Two factors are central to these strong price incentives. First, a 16 percent import duty protects local producers from foreign competition. Second, the annual price negotiated between FUCOPRI and OPVN includes a 35 percent margin for producers (Government of Niger 2022). Since 2021, this price has been revised upward to reflect higher input costs, including the partial removal of the fertilizer subsidy and the global surge in fertilizer prices following the war in Ukraine. These adjustments have translated substantially into higher NRPs since 2021.

Figure 19: Nominal Rate of Protection and of Assistance for rice




Source: Based on ITC (2025) data, SIMA, FUCOPRI, and interviews.

Note: Data on subsidies are available for 2018–2022, years for which NRA is computed.

95. As discussed above, fertilizer subsidies further increase support to rice producers. Rice farmers were the main beneficiaries of the universal fertilizer subsidy before its reform in 2021, due to the high input requirements of rice cultivation. When these subsidies are considered, the NRA—which includes both market and budgetary support—averaged 44 percent between 2018 and 2022, nine percentage points above the NRP.

96. Public expenditure on rice is relatively high compared to its sectoral contribution. Although rice-specific spending represented only 2 percent of total PEA, this share rises to nearly 30 percent of PEA—and over 100 percent of rice production value—when including off-farm irrigation investments that primarily benefit rice Production (Figure 21). Rice accounts for only about 1 percent of agricultural value added yet receives a comparatively large share of support. This pattern suggests there is a need to rethink resource allocation across subsectors.

Figure 20: Total support to rice production



Source: Based on SIMA data.

97. Despite substantial public support, rice productivity is constrained by weak input systems and irrigation management. According to FUCOPRI, the quality of seeds and fertilizers is inadequate. INRAN, the national research institute, lacks the capacity to meet seed production needs. Fertilizer application is also constrained by multiple factors: (i) the termination of the universal subsidy in 2021, (ii) rising international fertilizer prices, (iii) reduced imports due to limited credit access for importers, and (iv) lack of working capital among cooperatives. Weak enforcement of fertilizer quality standards and mismanagement of large-scale irrigation further undermine productivity gains.

Millet and sorghum: Essential staple crops facing structural instability

- 98. Millet and sorghum are Niger’s dietary staples, but production is unstable and increasingly reliant on imports.** Millet and sorghum are the most consumed cereals in Niger, with estimated annual per capita consumption ranging between 100 and 200 kilograms. These crops provide the primary source of calories in the national diet. However, their production is highly dependent on the main rain-fed agricultural season (June to September), which is increasingly unpredictable. While Niger once exported surplus production, recent years have seen growing import dependence, particularly from Nigeria, due to insufficient domestic output (SIMA 2019). This has made the domestic cereal market highly sensitive to both climatic variability and regional trade dynamics.
- 99. Policy efforts have targeted productivity improvements, but results remain limited.** Recognizing their importance, Nigerien policy makers have prioritized millet and sorghum in their agricultural strategies. Interventions aim to raise productivity—currently growing at an estimated 3.9 percent—by expanding access to improved seeds, modern equipment, and advisory services. These crops have also benefited from investments in land restoration and sustainable soil management. However, the full impact of these measures on yields and production stability has yet to materialize.
- 100. Millet and sorghum prices are highly variable and closely tied to regional market dynamics.** Prices for millet and sorghum exhibit significant seasonal and geographic variation, influenced by domestic supply conditions and regional market linkages (FEWS NET 2017). The two crops have strongly correlated price movements. In western Niger (for example, Niamey), millet prices are closely linked to markets in Burkina Faso, while in central and eastern Niger (for example, Maradi), prices correlate more closely with Nigerian markets. These correlations are stronger when accounting for the informal parallel exchange rate between the naira and the FCFA, underscoring the influence of informal cross-border trade (see Table 5).

Table 5: Millet price correlation across selected markets

	Pouytenga (Burkina Faso)	Kano (Nigeria)	Kano ^b	Maradi (Niger)	Niamey (Niger)
Pouytenga	1				
Kano	0.3621	1			
Kano ^b	0.5034 ^a	0.7406	1		
Maradi	0.548 ^a	0.6974	0.8647	1	
Niamey	0.7711 ^a	0.5719	0.7579	0.828	1

Source: FEWS NET 2017.


Note: a. Denotes 1 percent significance level.

b. Considers the parallel exchange rate between naira and FCFA.

- 101. Millet prices were mostly aligned with international reference prices.** An analysis of six production corridors in Maradi and Zinder shows that domestic prices for millet were generally close to the reference price from 2017 to 2024.²⁸ The average NRP was 5.3 percent in Maradi and 3.3 percent in Zinder, indicating that farmers received slightly higher prices than the international equivalent (Figures 22 and 23). In the absence of explicit policies, this is likely due to persistent supply deficits relative to growing demand.
- 102. Trade restrictions imposed by Nigeria contributed to temporary price incentives for millet producers.** The spikes in NRPs in 2020 and 2024 can be attributed to Nigeria's export bans imposed in 2019 and again in 2023–2024. These restrictions reduced the volume of imported millet reaching Niger, limiting competition and allowing domestic producers to command higher prices.


²⁸ The corridors are (i) Maradi producing region to Dan Issa and (ii) Zinder producing region to Magaria. Dan Issa and Magaria are border markets with Nigeria where large cereal quantities are imported, while Maradi and Zinder are the main wholesale markets in the two major producing areas of sorghum and millet.

Figure 21: Millet NRP in Maradi region



Source: Based on SIMA data.

Figure 22: Millet NRP in Zinder region




Source: Based on SIMA data.

103. Sorghum price incentives varied across regions but remained close to the reference price overall. Price incentives for sorghum showed greater regional variation than millet. In the Maradi region, average NRPs ranged from negative 3.5 percent in Tchadoua to 20.5 percent in Mayahi, with a regional average of 6.3 percent (Figure 24). In Zinder, regional NRPs averaged near zero, with Dungass and Koundoumaoua at 4.4 percent and Matameye at negative 2.1 percent (Figure 25). Like millet, these values increased in 2020 and 2024 due to export restrictions imposed by Nigeria, which limited imports and raised domestic prices.


104. Market proximity and trader dominance influenced price outcomes for sorghum producers. The observed disparities in sorghum NRPs appear to be driven by market access and trader behavior. Producers near major commercial centers like Maradi and Zinder generally received prices below the reference, likely due to strong market competition and trader market power. Conversely, farmers in more remote areas—such as Mayahi, Tessaoua, and Dungass—benefited from limited competition from traders and consequently secured prices above the reference. Unlike millet, where persistent supply shortages may explain price alignment, sorghum prices appear more directly shaped by market structure and the degree of integration with regional trade flows. In addition, conflicts in cereal-producing regions might have disrupted the value chain. Further analysis is needed to better understand these dynamics and their implications for farmer incentives.

Figure 23: Sorghum NRP in Maradi



Source: Based on SIMA data.

Figure 24: Sorghum NRP in Zinder



Source: Based on SIMA data.


105. Fertilizer use for millet and sorghum is minimal and insufficient to improve productivity. Yields for millet and sorghum have remained persistently low, rarely surpassing 500 kg per ha since 1960. Although micro-dosing techniques have been promoted since the 2000s, widespread adoption is constrained by the lack of fertilizer availability. To meet the full nitrogen and phosphorus requirements across the 11 million ha cultivated with these crops, an estimated 660,000 tons of NPK 15-15-15 would be needed. In contrast, Niger imported only an average of 35,000 tons of fertilizer per year between 2015 and 2023, primarily under subsidy programs that were phased out in 2021. While specific data on fertilizer use by crop are lacking, this import gap strongly indicates that fertilizer use on millet and sorghum is extremely limited.

106. Access to improved and climate-resilient seeds is restricted by inadequate public support and systemic constraints. The supply of basic and certified seeds is hindered by weak infrastructure and institutional capacity. Mechanization rates are low, seed storage and packaging facilities are inadequate, and field-level advisory and monitoring services are limited due to logistical and financial constraints (Tazi 2022). Although the Seed Sector Support Fund (FASS) was established in 2014 to finance certification operations, it remains unfunded. Moreover, public dominance in seed distribution discourages private sector development. The public research institution INRAN suffers from underfunding, inadequate infrastructure, insufficient staffing, and low wages, all of which limit its capacity to support seed system development.

107. Public spending on seed systems remains low and inefficiently allocated. An average of FCFA 3 billion per year has been spent by the government and donors to support seed development, with two-thirds allocated to seed subsidies and the rest to infrastructure, laboratory equipment, and training. Between 2018 and 2022, millet and sorghum accounted for 81 percent of subsidized improved seeds. However, this support has had limited impact. The overall adoption rate of improved seeds remained at just 3.3 percent during that period—10 percent for millet and less than 2 percent for sorghum (Figure 26). Figure 26 highlights the inadequacy of current efforts to address the core challenges of the seed system.

108. Soil restoration receives more support but remains insufficient to reverse degradation trends. On average, FCFA 12.5 billion was spent annually on soil fertility restoration and sustainable land management—investments particularly relevant for millet and sorghum, which cover 85 percent of cultivated land. These interventions are essential as Niger faces accelerated degradation of its natural resource base—including soils, forests, and surface water—due to human pressure and climate change. However, to be effective, investments in land restoration, as well as complementary irrigation infrastructure, need to be significantly scaled up.

Figure 25: Coverage rate of improved seeds needs for millet and sorghum



Source: Based on MAGEL data.

Cowpeas: Economically important crop but faces market challenges

- 109. Cowpeas are a key source of protein and income for rural households.** Cowpeas are widely consumed in Niger, especially among rural populations, where they often serve as a substitute for meat due to their high protein content. Income from cowpea sales is frequently used to purchase staple cereals, particularly millet. With domestic production exceeding local demand, a significant share of cowpeas is exported, primarily to Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, to Ghana (FEWS NET 2017).
- 110. Cowpea production is closely tied to cereal farming and faces similar constraints.** Over 90 percent of cowpea cultivation is intercropped with millet and sorghum (Strebelle and Boubacar 2011). Since cowpeas are planted after cereals are established, any delay in cereal planting directly affects cowpea yields. Productivity remains low, with improved seed coverage at only 2 percent. Production is heavily concentrated in the Zinder, Maradi, Dosso, and Tahoua regions, which together accounted for about 85 percent of the total 2.15 million tons produced in 2023 (DS/MAGEL 2024).
- 111. The cowpea trade is export driven but increasingly affected by external shocks.** Cowpeas are transported from farms to local collection points—initially by donkey, then by truck—and are mostly exported to Nigeria. Smaller volumes supply domestic markets, particularly Niamey and the country's north and east. The Maradi and Zinder cowpea markets are strongly influenced by prices in Kano, Nigeria (FEWSNET 2017). However, depreciation of the Nigerian naira in recent years has reduced the purchasing power of Nigerian households and decreased demand for Nigerian cowpeas and other regional imports.
- 112. Public procurement has a limited impact despite cowpea's strategic status.** Cowpea is officially recognized as a priority cash crop, and since 2008, OPVN has conducted limited public procurement to stabilize markets. This policy has two goals: (i) to support food security by selling cowpeas from public stocks at low prices or distributing them during the lean season and (ii) to improve farm incomes by offering higher prices through public tenders. Nonetheless, public procurement remains marginal, with OPVN purchasing only about 3,000 tons annually—less than 0.2 percent of the total cowpea output (2.15 million tons) in 2023.


113. Producers face significant price disincentives despite strong export demand.

Between 2017 and 2024, the average NRP²⁹ for cowpeas was negative 15 percent, indicating that producers received prices 15 percent below international reference prices. The strongest penalization was recorded in 2018 (-22.9 percent), with a steady decline in the absolute value of ‘dis-protection’ to negative 4.2 percent in 2024—except for 2023, when the NRP returned to negative 15.6 percent (Figure 27). This downward trend in disincentives suggests a slight improvement, but producers remain disadvantaged overall.

114. Low bargaining power and post-harvest pressures explain negative price incentives.

The absence of explicit price-depressing policies suggests that the main reason for the negative NRPs lies in producers’ urgent need to sell at harvest—when prices are lowest. This pressure stems from several factors: (i) high post-harvest losses due to inadequate field treatment and storage, (ii) limited adoption of triple bagging for pest control and preservation, and (iii) poor access to credit, which forces producers to sell immediately to cover basic needs (SOFRECO 2022d). Despite cowpea’s importance, public support remains insufficient, and weak market structures continue to discourage production.

Figure 26: Average cowpea NRP (Maradi and Zinder regions)



Source: Based on SIMA data.

29 The analysis is based on prices from three relevant corridors: Mayahi-Maradi-Dan Issa, Tessaoua-Maradi-Dan Issa in the Maradi main producing region, and Dungass-Magaria in the producing region of Zinder.

4.2 Price incentive analysis for livestock value chains

- 115. Price incentives for livestock producers in Niger remained weak over 2017–2024, reflecting persistent structural and market challenges despite recent reforms and support programs.**
- 116. Livestock producers face substantial price disincentives relative to international markets.** The PIA reveals that domestic prices for livestock products—especially cattle and sheep—consistently trailed their international equivalents.³⁰ The average NRP was negative across 2017–2024: negative 20 percent for cattle and negative 9 percent for sheep (Figures 28 and 29). Sheep NRPs remained between negative 5 and 15 percent throughout the period, except in 2019 when domestic prices aligned with global prices. Cattle price disincentives slightly declined (in absolute value) in later years, as domestic prices rose more quickly than global prices—possibly due to improvements in market infrastructure and support programs such as the World Bank-financed Regional Sahel Pastoral Support Project (PRAPS). However, in 2024, cattle NRP was less negative, likely due to falling export prices while domestic prices remained stable.
- 117. Export taxes and informal fees contribute to price disincentives for producers.** One of the key factors behind negative price incentives is the cost associated with livestock exports. These include formal taxes—such as a 3 percent statistical tax levied by customs (as per the 2022 customs code)—and informal fees along transport routes. Truckers report paying between FCFA 350,000 and FCFA 700,000 per truck in unofficial charges (Aboubacar 2017). To address these inefficiencies, the government introduced the Transport and Marketing Certificates (*Bon d’Enlèvement et de Commercialisation*, BEC) in 2020.³¹ It aims to reduce unofficial fees and improve traceability of export flows by issuing certificates for agro-sylvo-pastoral products, including livestock. Yet, the NRP did not improve after 2020, suggesting limited effectiveness of the BEC initiative.
- 118. Market inefficiencies and weak producer bargaining power further depress prices.** Beyond taxes and fees, market structure challenges contribute to producer disincentives. Livestock markets remain poorly organized, allowing wholesalers to dominate price negotiations. Limited access to market information, weak market infrastructure, and logistical constraints hamper the ability of producer organizations to secure fair prices. These conditions reduce competition and keep farmgate prices below their potential (SOFRECO 2022c).

30 The PIA is based on prices from the Guidan Iddar-Tchinta corridor. The FOB export price is from the border market at Guidan Iddar, near Nigeria, while the producer price is from the collection market at Tchinta.

31 The BEC was first applied to onion and cowpeas as of 2012.

Figure 27: Nominal Rate of Protection for cattle





Figure 28: Nominal Rate of Protection for sheep and goat



Source: Based on the livestock market information system (*Système d'Information sur les Marchés de Bétail*, SIMB) and Interprofessional for livestock, meat, hides and skins (IP/BVCP) data.



5. CONCLUSIONS

- 119. Niger’s agricultural sector faces structural vulnerabilities that limit growth and resilience.** The sector is predominantly rain-fed and based on subsistence farming under mixed crop-livestock systems. It is highly exposed to climate shocks—particularly erratic rainfall, desertification, and droughts—which undermine food security and livelihoods. In this context, the government must use its limited public resources more strategically to foster a more inclusive, resilient, and competitive agri-food system.
- 120. Agriculture and livestock are central to Niger’s development goals, but productivity gains remain limited.** National strategies such as SDCCI 2035 and the 3NI have prioritized agriculture as a key pillar for FNS. These efforts have supported growth in cereal output and improvements in irrigated and livestock productivity. However, land productivity remains among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and supply still lags behind demand from a rising population.
- 121. PEA has increased but remains below the CAADP target.** PEA rose to FCFA 256 billion in 2021, up from FCFA 135 billion during 2014–2017, reflecting Niger’s policy commitment. However, PEA dropped to 200 billion in 2022, raising concerns on the sustainability of this commitment. While the country has not met the Maputo CAADP target of allocating 10 percent of total expenditure to agriculture, it has reached an average of 8.2 percent over 2018–2022, placing it among the top performers in the region. Niger also fares well compared to its regional comparators in terms of expenditure as a share of agricultural value added and GDP.
- 122. Heavy reliance on external funding undermines budget reliability and investment efficiency.** Over 70 percent of the agricultural budget is externally financed, raising concerns about sustainability and disbursement predictability. Misalignment between government and donor priorities, budget cycles, weak procurement systems, and low implementation capacity often lead to large gaps between planned and actual spending. The under-disbursement of the Kandadji dam project exemplifies these challenges.
- 123. Risk management interventions have an execution rate of as much as 250 percent, suggesting a reactive rather than proactive approach.** When natural disasters such as droughts occur, the government often reallocates resources to emergency relief, at the expense of planned investments. Disaster preparedness and resilience mechanisms could be strengthened, including disaster-linked social protection programs, agricultural insurance schemes, early warning systems, and risk reduction infrastructure.

- 124. Spending is fragmented across multiple administrative units and poorly aligned with decentralization goals.** Agricultural funding is spread across more than a dozen ministries, leading to coordination inefficiencies. The slow progress of decentralization has weakened the capacity of regional and local entities to deliver services, as these agencies often lack control over necessary financial resources.
- 125. Agricultural public spending shows allocative biases that favor irrigation infrastructure and rice.** Between 2018 and 2022, a quarter of the agricultural budget went to irrigation infrastructure, mostly benefiting rice. Another 8 percent was allocated to other infrastructure. Emphasis on rice-related infrastructure and subsidies has displaced funding for areas such as research, extension, natural resource management, and non-rice crops. Agricultural research intensity remains extremely low at 0.1 percent, far below the African Union’s target of 1 percent. Extension services also suffer from limited reach and mixed results, as seen with the APCA initiative launched in 2019.
- 126. Irrigation investments are crucial but have not yielded high returns.** Although irrigation is essential in a drought-prone country, large-scale irrigation projects suffer from delays, poor management, and underperformance. Small-scale irrigation, despite its impact on tuber and vegetable production, is insufficient to transform value chains without complementary support in seeds, storage, and marketing. Challenges with water management and land tenure further weaken outcomes.
- 127. Community-based irrigation reforms have had limited success.** Efforts to establish Irrigation Water User Associations (IWUAs) since 2015 have been hampered by poor funding for infrastructure rehabilitation, delaying reform rollout. There has been no comprehensive evaluation of the program, but anecdotal evidence points to limited impact. Insecurity of land tenure in irrigation areas remains a key constraint.
- 128. Recent increases in spending on value chain marketing are encouraging.** Public investments in market infrastructure and support for value chain integration began rising in 2021–2022. These are critical to boosting private sector engagement and ensuring the long-term competitiveness of Niger’s agri-food sector. However, results will take time to materialize and depend on sustained investment.

- 129. Price incentives are weak or negative for most value chains.** From 2017 to 2024, most producers faced price disincentives, acting as implicit taxes. Onion and cowpea farmers experienced average NRPs of negative 40 percent and negative 15 percent, respectively, largely due to poor storage and weak bargaining power. Price incentives for millet and sorghum vary by region and are mostly driven by market dynamics rather than policies. While production deficits occasionally lift prices, overall public support remains limited and ineffective. Subsidized fertilizer is insufficient to meet demand, and state control of seed markets—combined with poor quality assurance—has stifled private sector development.
- 130. Rice is the only crop benefiting from strong support, through subsidies and trade protection.** Rice production is supported by a 16 percent import tariff and producer price setting policy, which, along with input subsidies, resulted in an average NRP of 38 percent and an average NRA of 44 percent during 2017–2023. When irrigation investments are included, total support rises to 100 percent of rice production value—despite rice accounting for only 1 percent of agricultural output. However, productivity gains remain limited due to low input quality.
- 131. Fertilizer market reforms show mixed results due to weak implementation.** While Niger shifted from a universal fertilizer subsidy to a targeted e-voucher system, the reform has been only partially implemented. High fertilizer prices, weak private sector capacity, and poor quality control continue to limit impact. Even under the pilot program, only 50 percent of targeted vulnerable producers could afford the subsidized rate.
- 132. The use of improved seeds remains low, hindering productivity growth.** Only 3 percent of cultivated land uses improved seeds. Seed distribution remains heavily state controlled, crowding out private sector participation. INRAN lacks the resources and staffing to produce sufficient foundational seeds. FASS, designed to enhance seed services, remains unfunded.
- 133. Livestock is relatively well-funded, but producers face major price disincentives.** About 19 percent of agricultural spending during 2018–2022 was directed to livestock—more than in peer countries. However, cattle and sheep producers faced NRPs of negative 20 percent and negative 9 percent, respectively, due to export fees, informal charges, and traders’ market power. This discourages private investment despite public spending. Structural challenges—such as insufficient animal feed, poor veterinary coverage, and unfinished reform of privatized veterinary services—continue to constrain growth and export potential.

134. Some value chains suffer from policy incoherence between the budgetary support and the presence of price disincentives. For instance, cowpea and livestock producers face price disincentives despite receiving budgetary support. Onion is one of the most important export crops, but onion producers consistently received prices below the international reference level, discouraging them to increase production and productivity for this important crop. Removing these price disincentives could allow a reduction in budgetary support to these commodities and free fiscal resources for higher-priority public goods. Rice is the main commodity with a coherent policy environment: significant budgetary support is coupled with price incentives for producers. However, the opportunity costs of these supports appear quite high, suggesting a need for re-evaluation.



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
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ANNEXES


5.1 Annex 1. Public expenditure analysis: methodology and data

Monitoring public expenditure following the FAO-MAFAP methodology

The FAO methodology for analyzing PEA—framed under its MAFAP Program—enables tracking the level and composition of public spending (or monetary transfers) specific to the agriculture sector (that is, agriculture is the only or major beneficiary of the expenditure) and those that are supportive of the agricultural sector. The former include (i) agent-specific expenditures benefiting producers, consumers, or other value chain agents; (ii) expenditures on general services targeting the sector; and (iii) administrative costs. Agriculture-supportive expenditures account for rural spending targeting rural areas that benefit agriculture indirectly (for example, spending on education, health, and water and sanitation in rural areas). The classification categories of the MAFAP public expenditure methodology are reported in Figure A1.

This analytical framework is compatible with the agricultural sector definition of the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) methodology developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It allows for granular analysis of the policy support to the agricultural sector not only in terms of type of spending but also source of funding, administrative setup and composition of expenditure, budget execution across spending categories, and coherence of expenditure with national policy priorities and goals. Moreover, being widely recognized and largely applied in several countries, this approach allows for cross-country comparisons and regional and global analysis of policy support to agriculture.

Figure A1: Functional classification of PEA based on the MAFAP methodology



Source: FAO-MAFAP 2015.

Table A1: Public expenditure indicators for Niger (FCFA, billions)

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total PE in Niger (nominal)	1,586,011	1,899,380	1,938,146	2,226,078	2,680,884
CAADP Maputo/ Malabo ratio ^a (%)	7.46	8.5	9.2	9.0	7.0
Total PEA, nominal	152,808	188,616	255,718	274,588	220,103
Agriculture specific	122,422	152,292	218,550	226,915	182,653
Variable inputs	12,223	7,065	12,845	10,784	27,123
Capital inputs	26,292	26,615	33,792	21,809	22,785
Food aid	18,058	14,308	33,321	40,263	13,591
Cash transfers	6,178	4,573	25,480	15,168	2,073
Research and extension	6,973	8,465	11,410	9,238	14,975
Inspection	9,283	5,604	4,548	3,056	1,623
Infrastructure - feeder roads	1,319	15,736	3,889	21,779	11,823
Infrastructure - other	7,572	25,045	41,450	26,312	7,233
Infrastructure - irrigation	14,725	29,326	9,600	32,588	27,877
Marketing	7,176	16,111	16,481	48,012	53,788
Other agricultural expenditure	13,707	7,363	29,705	11,575	6,218
Administrative costs	17,945	20,018	15,182	15,643	13,651
Agriculture supportive	12,441	16,307	21,987	32,031	23,799
T2. Rural infrastructure - rural water	12,441	16,307	21,987	32,031	23,799

Note: a. To align with the CAADP definition, the Malabo target indicator is measured by accounting for all PEA under the MAFAP definition except for food consumer expenditures (food aid and cash transfers).

5.2 Annex 2. Price incentives analysis: methodology and data sources

Measuring price incentives

The NRP measures the effect (in relative terms) of domestic market and trade policies and overall market performance on prices received by agents in the value chain. A positive NRP indicates that the policy environment and market dynamics provide price incentives to produce or commercialize the analyzed product. On the contrary, a negative NRP signals that farmers and/or traders receive disincentives in terms of a specific commodity's output prices.

The NRP is calculated as the ratio between the **price gap** and **reference price** measured at the same point in the value chain. The price gap is the difference between the domestic price and the reference price measured at the same point in the value chain; it measures the same effect as the NRP but in absolute terms. The NRP is expressed as a percentage and calculated as the difference between the border price and the domestic price at the farm gate (and at the wholesale and retail levels) through the following formula:

$$NRP_x(\%) = 100 * \frac{(DP_x - RP_x)}{RP_x}$$

where DP stands for domestic price and RP for reference (border) price at a certain point in the value chain (x) where the NRP is computed (farm gate, wholesale, or retail). At the farm gate, the NRP measures the percentage by which the domestic producer price is raised above (if positive) or has fallen below (if negative) the reference price (the border price adjusted for market costs and quality/quantity factors), which is the undistorted price of a commodity.

To calculate reference prices, an international benchmark price must be identified. World market prices represent the opportunity cost to market participants of a country producing various commodities domestically. International benchmark prices are also considered free from the influence of domestic policies and markets. Reference prices are the equivalent international price, made comparable by considering market access costs (for example, transport, handling, intermediary profit margins, processing, informal taxes and fees) involved in bringing the products from the farm gate to the border (or vice versa), as well as quantity and quality conversion factors that allow comparison of the same product along the value chain.

By adding public expenditure allocated to the commodity (PE in the formula) to the price gap at the farm gate (DP – RP_{fg}), it is possible to obtain the NRA. In addition to the effects of policies affecting the output market, the NRA also captures the effect of budgetary transfers (or subsidies) allocated to the specific commodity on incentives to production. Mathematically, the NRA, expressed as a percentage, is defined as:

$$NRA_{fg}(\%) = 100 * \frac{(DP_{fg} - RP_{fg}) + PE}{RP_{fg}}$$

Data needs for PIA analysis


To calculate the NRP and NRA indicators, the following data are required:

1. Wholesale and producer prices, as well as retail prices, if available (but not strictly necessary).
2. Market access costs at different points in the value chain (retail, wholesale, producers), including storage, transport, handling, marketing margins, and transaction costs.
3. Production data, both volume and value, at the national level. When possible, consumption data, both volume and value, should also be gathered.
4. Qualitative information on the functioning of the analyzed value chain and policy-relevant data on trade and market policies, subsidies provided to farmers, and so on
5. Macroeconomic data (product-related data such as the contribution to agricultural value added and GDP) and data on the currency exchange rate.

Commodity coverage and results

The agricultural commodities covered in the analysis represent 74 percent of the value of agricultural production and have strategic relevance for the sustainable development of the agriculture sector in the country. The share of average production value over 2018–2022 for each crop (at 2019 prices) is reported in Figure A2. Although the share of rice was only 1 percent, it is a strategic product for the Government of Niger. In addition, livestock is important in Niger, as its share of agriculture value added is estimated at 37 percent (World Bank 2023b). The results are reported in Table A3.

Figure A2: Share of value of production by crop (2018–2022 average, in 2019 prices)



Source: Based on DS/MAGEL data.

Table A2: Data specifications and main sources for price incentives analysis

	Pathway analyzed	Price			Access costs
		Border	Farm gate	Wholesale/retail	
Rice	Milled rice imported at Gaya, the border between Benin and Niger, competes with local rice from Tillaberi, the main production area of local rice.	ITC trade data (UNCOMTRADE)	FUCOPRI	FAO FPMA	SIMA, FUCOPRI <i>Association Professionnelle des Importateurs/ Exportateurs du NIGER</i>
Sorghum/ millet	The corridors analyzed are (i) Maradi producing region to Dan Issa border point and (ii) Zinder producing region to Magaria border point with Nigeria. For each corridor, three distinct markets were analyzed.	SIMA	SIMA	SIMA	SIMA
Cowpea	Three relevant corridors analyzed: Mayahi-Maradi-Dan Issa, Tessaoua-Maradi-Dan Issa in the Maradi main producing region, and Dungass-Magaria in the producing region of Zinder.	SIMA	SIMA	SIMA	SIMA

Onion	Guidan Iddar is the main production zone, and Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire is the main destination market for onion exports from Niger.	SIMA, <i>Office de Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers de Côte d'Ivoire</i> (OCPV), ANFO	SIMA	OCPV	<i>Association Nationale des Professionnels de la Filière Oignon du Niger</i> (ANFO)
Cow/ sheep/ goat	The corridor analyzed is Guidan Iddar-Tchinta. The FOB export price is taken from the border market at Guidan Iddar, near Nigeria, and the producer price from the collection market at Tchinta.	SIMB	SIMB	SIMB	<i>Interprofession Bétail Viande Cuirs et Peaux</i> (IP/BVCP)

Source: Original compilation for this publication.

Table A3: NRP and NRA results for selected commodities analyzed (%)

		2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Rice	NRP	37.1	19.8	29.5	30.1	53.5	39.9	56.1	
	NRA		84	86	73	158	104		
Sorghum (Maradi)	NRP	-2.3	4.9	10.5	22.2	3.8	8.9	-6.9	9.2
Sorghum (Zinder)	NRP	-5.0	-12.9	-6.2	5.0	1.1	0.0	5.5	6.8
Millet (Maradi)	NRP	15.8	-0.7	0.3	11.9	6.9	2.0	-2.6	8.9
Millet (Zinder)	NRP	0.6	-2.1	-5.6	13.3	1.7	9.4	4.9	4.3
Cowpea	NRP	-19.3	-22.9	-13.2	-11.1	-10.9	-9.4	-15.6	-4.2
Onion	NRP	-51.8	-51.8	-51.8	-55.0	-40.8	-40.8	-40.8	-6.4
Cattle	NRP	-28.2	-27.5	-19.0	-15.6	-15.3	-18.3	-21.6	-15.8
Sheep and goat	NRP	-11.8	-8.4	-0.7	-13.3	-9.4	-5.9	-9.3	-10.5

Source: Original calculations for this publication.

| 5.3 Annex 3. List of interviewed institutions

No.	Name of the structure
1	Direction de l'Informatique Financière (DIF/DGB/Ministère des Finances)
2	Direction Générale du Génie Rurale (DGGR)
3	Secrétariat Permanent de la Stratégie de la Petite Irrigation au Niger (SP/SPIN)
4	Centrale d'Achat des Intrants et du Matériel Agricole (CAIMA)
5	Réseau des Chambres d'Agriculture du Niger (RECA)
6	Association Nigérienne des Importateurs et Distributeurs des Engrais (ANIDE)
7	Direction Générale de l'Agriculture/MAGEL
8	Direction Générale de la Production et des Industries Animales (DGPIA/MAGEL)
9	Direction Générale de la Santé Vétérinaire (DGSV/MAGEL)
10	Agence de Promotion du Conseil Agricole (APCA)
11	Institut National de Recherche Agronomique du Niger (INRAN)
12	Direction Générale de la Planification du Développement (DGPD/ Ministère des Finances)
13	Direction des statistiques/MAGEL
14	Institut National de la Statistique (INS)
15	Haut-Commissariat à l'Initiative 3N (HC/I3N)
16	Fonds d'Investissement pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle (FISAN)
17	Système d'Information sur les Marchés Agricoles (SIMA)
18	Système d'Information sur les Marchés à Bétail (SIMB)
19	Interprofession Bétail, Viande Cuirs et Peaux (IP/BVCP)
20	ONG Action pour la sécurité et la souveraineté alimentaires au Niger (AcSSA AFRIQUE VERTE)
21	Fédération des Coopératives des Maraîchers du Niger (FCMN-Niya)

- 22 Fédération Nationale des Unions des Coopératives des Producteurs du Riz (FUCOPRI)
- 23 Association nationale des coopératives des professionnels de la filière oignon du Niger (ANFO)
- 24 Association des commerçants de céréales du Niger
- 25 Association Professionnelle des Importateurs/Exportateurs du NIGER



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations

