



1. Project Data

Project ID P166622	Project Name SIRAP		
Country Solomon Islands	Practice Area(Lead) Transport		
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-63780,IDA-D4370	Closing Date (Original) 31-Dec-2024	Total Project Cost (USD) 48,991,163.44	
Bank Approval Date 28-Mar-2019	Closing Date (Actual) 31-Dec-2024		
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)	
Original Commitment	51,000,000.00	0.00	
Revised Commitment	49,532,266.00	0.00	
Actual	48,991,630.83	0.00	
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1, page 5) and in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 1):

" Improve operational safety and oversight of air transport and associated infrastructure, strengthen the sustainability and climate resilience of the Project Roads, and in the event of an Eligible Crisis or Emergency, to provide an immediate response to the Eligible Crisis or Emergency ".



For the purpose of this Implementation Completion Results Report (ICRR) review, the PDO is unpacked as follows:

PDO 1: Improve operational safety and oversight of operational safety and oversight of air transport.

PDO 2. Strengthen the sustainability and climate resilience of the Project Roads. and

PDO 3. In the event of an Eligible Crisis or Emergency, to provide an immediate response to the Eligible Crisis or Emergency.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

Yes

Date of Board Approval

22-Aug-2023

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

Yes

d. Components

There were five components.

1. Honiara and Munda Airports Infrastructure Investments. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$33.75 million. The actual cost was US\$27.88 million. There were three subcomponents:

a. Honiara Airport Investment Program. Activities in this subcomponent included: (i) runway surfacing and airfield ground lighting; (iii) a rescue fire service vehicle station; (iv) an automatic weather observation system; (v) very small aperture terminal (VSAT) communication system; (vi) automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) ground stations and aircraft equipage; and (vii) design and supervision of works. All activities associated with Honiara Airport were dropped with the second project restructuring (discussed below).

b. Munda Airport Investment Program. Activities in this subcomponent included: (i) runway surfacing; (ii) a new terminal building, cargo facilities and a service tower; (iii) VSAT communication systems; (iv) ADS-B ground stations; and (v) design and supervision of works.

C. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) surveys. Activities in this subcomponent included; (i) developing technical requirements for UXO survey and clearance; and (ii) undertaking UXO survey and clearance at Honiara and Munda Airports.

2. Malaita Road Improvement and Maintenance Program. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$15.22 million. The actual cost was US\$14.37 million. Activities in this subcomponent included: (i) resealing existing sealed roads in Malaita (approximately 17 kilometers (km)); (ii) replacing Flu bridge;



(iii) upgrading Koa, Bio1 and Bio 2 bridges; (iv) multi-year road maintenance, grading and re gravelling (including upgrading key vulnerable spots and improving road safety) of unpaved main roads (approximately 210 km); and (vi) design and supervision of works. The scope of this activity was significantly reduced with the project restructuring (discussed below).

3. Institutional Strengthening. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$2.93 million. The actual cost was US\$1.81 million. There were three subcomponents.

a. Aviation Sector Support. Activities included: (i) Solomon Airlines strategy review; (ii) master plan for Honiara and Munda Airports; (iii) Aviation Sector Strategy; (iv) training needs analysis; (ii) technical support to the Civil Aviation Authority of Solomon Islands (CCASI) and Solomon Islands Airport Corporation Limited (SIACL).

b. Road Sector Support. Activities in this subcomponent included: (i) support for planning and asset management; (ii) improvement of road safety capacity; (iii) activities to address gender-based violence (GBV) and (iv) establishment of Ministry Of Infrastructure Development (MID) office in Malaita.

c. Preparation for Auki Gwaunaru'u Airport Infrastructure Investments. Activities in this subcomponent planned to finance preparation of safeguards documents and preliminary design in Auki Gwaunaru'u airport (subject to resolution of land issues).

4. Project Implementation Support. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$2.70 million. The actual cost was US\$4.93 million. This subcomponent planned to support the Ministry of Communication and Aviation (MCA) and MID. Activities included support to the Project Support Team (PST) and the Technical Fiduciary Services Unit (TFSU) staff and operating costs associated with project implementation.

5. Contingent Emergency Response. Funds were not allocated for this component at appraisal. This component planned to provide swift response through reallocating project funds in the event of an Eligible crisis or Emergency. This component was not triggered during implementation.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. The estimated cost at appraisal was US\$54.60 million. The actual cost was US\$51.00 million.

Financing. The Project was financed by an International Development Association (IDA) Credit/Grant of US\$51.00 million. The amount disbursed was US\$48.99 million.

Counterpart Funding. Counterpart funding of US\$3.60 million was planned at appraisal. The actual counterpart funding was US\$2.01 million.

Dates. The Project was approved on March 28, 2019, became effective on May 23, 2019, and closed as scheduled to close on December 31, 2024.

Changes. There were two level 2 restructurings.



The main change made **through the first restructuring on December 29, 2019**, when US\$1.56 million of the IDA financing was disbursed.

- The implementation arrangements for the aviation sector was changed. As per the original design, a central project unit - the technical and fiduciary Services Unit (TFSU) - hosted by the Tonga Airports Limited (TAL) - was to support implementation of the Pacific Aviation Investment Program (PAIP) countries. With the closing of the " Tonga Aviation Investment Project " on December 31, 2019, alternative arrangements were needed. Under the new arrangement, the remaining PAIP countries including Solomon Islands, were to directly hire consultants to provide implementation support.

The Bank supported the following changes **through the second restructuring on August 22, 2023**, when US\$34.42 million was disbursed.

- There was a financing gap, with the actual costs of activities both in the aviation sector and in the road sector being much higher than the appraisal estimates. Hence, the project scope was drastically reduced. In the aviation sector, the activities were restricted to the Munda Airport. In the road sector, the targets for the indicators were drastically reduced. The activities associated with Auki Gwaunaru'v (Section two activity) were cancelled.
- The results framework was revised as the "State requirements for safety and security non-compliance reach global International Civil Organization Standards (ICAO)" was dropped as its measurement relied on ICAO visit which was outside the Project's control.
- The end target for a PDO indicator "identified climate resilient investments constructed and in use" ' was increased from five to eight to reflect the actual scope of climate resilient investments.

Split rating. The PDO was unchanged. However, as the PDO targets were significantly reduced through the second restructuring, this review uses the split rating methodology to determine outcome rating.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country context. Solomon Islands - a Pacific Island Country (PIC) - is an archipelago nation, with over 70% of its population living in Guadalcanal, Malaita and Western Provinces and the capital territory of Honiara. Challenges associated with geographical isolation and history of conflicts contributed to Solomon Island's fragility. Solomon Islands was also vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change.

Aviation sector. The aviation sector provides vital national, regional and international connectivity for all PICs. The sector is an economic lifeline for Solomon Islands, a prerequisite for tourism and mitigating fragility risks associated with Solomon Island's geographic isolation. Despite its importance, Solomon Island's aviation sector suffered from underinvestment and a clear strategy. The ICR (para 5) notes that the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided a grant of US\$39.4 million for Upgrading Honiara Airports taxiway and apron, both the international and domestic terminal buildings as well as provision of a flood protection dike.



Regional Strategy. The aviation sector component of the project in Solomon Islands, was the fourth phase of the Pacific Aviation Investment Program (PAIP) (earlier phases were in Kiribati, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa and Vanuatu). The objective of the program was to ensure the aviation infrastructure of PICs meets the operational safety requirements and to strengthen the regulatory compliance of international air transport in participating countries. The project intervention was focused specifically on the Honiara and Munda Airports in Solomon Islands.

Honiara and Munda Airports. The Honiara airport, the only international airport in Solomon Islands, plays an essential role linking Solomon Islands to Australia, PICs and connected the capital city to provinces. The airport infrastructure was outdated and poorly maintained. The condition of the apron and taxiway at the airports had deteriorated. The Government prioritized the Munda Airport in Western Provinces to serve as an alternate emergency airport, given Solomon Island's geographic isolation.

The Road Sector. The project areas were in Malaita, the largest province in Solomon Islands, accounting for 26% of Solomon Island's road network and 43% of its bridges. Only 4% of the roads in Malaita were sealed and only 23% of its bridges constructed using concrete or steel. Historically there had been only minimal road maintenance, and this led to poor road and bridge conditions.

Government strategy. The PDO was consistent with the strategies of the National Transport Plan (NTP) for 2017 - 2036, and the Medium-Term Transport Action Plan (MTTAP) for 2017- 2021. Regarding the aviation sector, the documents placed the upgrading the Munda Airport as a priority for Solomon Islands. The NTP set targets for the proportion of the road and the bridge network in maintainable condition to be increased to 85% and 80% by 2020.

World Bank (WB) strategy. The PDO was well-aligned with two focus areas of the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2018 - 2023 (extended to 2024): (i) *Promoting Inclusive and Sustainable Growth*; Objective 2.4 of the PDO of this focus area highlighted " *increasing investment opportunities in tourism*" and (ii) *managing uneven development*. Objective 2,2 of this focus area highlighted "*increasing productive opportunities in agriculture*", as Malaita province is reliant on agriculture. The Bank is currently preparing the current CPF of Solomon Islands.

Bank experience and current project scope. This was WB's first engagement in Solomon Islands since 1980. The design of the aviation component of the project which focused on upgrading the airport infrastructure and strengthening the regulatory capacity of the aviation sector agencies, was similar to those of earlier phases of PAIP. The design of the road sector was simple and focused on rehabilitating the roads and providing road maintenance.

Relevance of the PDO. Given that geographic isolation of Solomon Islands, focusing on the aviation and the road sectors, was appropriate in the country context. The PDO was relevant to the government and the Bank strategy for Solomon Islands. The relevance of the PDO is High.

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)



OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

PDO 1. Improve operational safety and oversight of air transport and associated infrastructure.

Rationale

Theory of Change. The causal links between inputs, outputs and outcomes were logical. The intended outcomes were monitorable. The outputs of aviation infrastructure investments (such as overlaying the runways of the Honiara and Munda airports, constructing Munda terminal building, navigation and weather safety aids improvements, constructing Honiara rescue station and improving Honiara's lightning and power, together with institutional strengthening activities such as developing an Airport Master Plan and sector strategy, training staff of the Ministry of Communication and Aviation (MCA), Civil Aviation Society of Solomon Islands (CAASI) and the Solomon Airport Corporation Limited (SIACL), were likely to help in improving the operational safety and oversight of air transport infrastructure at Honiara and Munda airports.

The results framework explicitly makes these assumptions: (i) The International Civil Organization (ICAO) conducts an audit during the project lifetime; (ii) The Technical and Fiduciary Services Unit (TFSC) supports the Project Support team (PST) during implementation. The results framework implicitly assumed that the appraisal cost estimates were realistic. However, the actual cost much higher than the appraisal estimates. As a result, the project scope and activities for the Honiara Airport were cancelled.

Outputs.

Munda Airport.

- The following activities were completed as targeted for the Munda airport: (i) The navigation and safety aids were installed; (ii) The airport's pavement was resurfaced; (iii) A new terminal building and flight services center was constructed but flight services center was dropped at the restructuring in August 2023; and (iv) The airport's equipment and systems were standardized with regional standards.
- The following technical assistance activities were completed as targeted: (i) Solomon Airlines Strategy Review; (ii) Honiara and Munda Airports Master Plan; (iii) Aviation Sector Strategy; (iv) Solomon Airlines Options Analysis; (v) Training Needs Assessment for MICA, CAASI, SIACL and Solomon Airlines; and (iv) Solomon Airlines Strategic Plan for 2024 - 2028. These activities provided the framework required for sustainable sector management and, along with the New Zealand support to SIACL, led to the separation of the airport operator (SIACL) in September 2023, thereby improving aviation oversight.
- The project financed a strategy and action plan for Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and Violence against children (VAC) at Munda Airport site.
- 721,000 people had access to aviation transportation services when the project closed, as targeted.
- The project finance Honiara Airport's runway emergency resurfacing repairs following Fiji Airway's decision to temporarily suspend flights due to poor runway surface. The finance was provided by the Bank Project and the contract was carried out by the JICA contractor.



Infrastructure investments for the Honiara airport were cancelled during the project restructuring.

Outcomes.

The outputs described above were expected to have the following outcomes: (i) The Munda airport obtains certification that its safety and security standards comply with the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) standards; (ii) Munda airports safety and safety non-compliance requirements reach ICAO average; (iii) The air traffic management system of the Munda airport is modernized (monitored through the operationalization of the Very Small Aperture terminal (VSAT) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast systems (ADS-B); (iv) The airport implements the recommended Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) annual work plan.

- Munda airport received certification that its safety and security standards complied with ICAO's standards as targeted. On November 30, 2024, the Civil Aviation Authority of Solomon Islands (CAASI) issued a full Airport Operating Certificate to the Solomon Islands Airport Corporation Limited (SIACL) for Munda airport, valid for 24 months to November 30, 2026. Although CAASI issued certificate to Honiara airport valid until November 30, 2026, this was attributable to investments made by JICA.
- The VSAT and ADB- S -systems in Honiara and Munda airports were operational as targeted, when the project closed. The VSAT enabled secured telecommunications among traffic control in the Pacific, ADB-S made an aircraft visible to air traffic control and other ADB-S equipped aircraft, thereby enabling more efficient aircraft operations.
- The PASO annual work plan was fully implemented, exceeding the target of 80% of the plan.
- The indicator associated with "State requirements for safety and security noncompliance reach global ICAO average could not be verified. At appraisal, the baseline value for non-compliance was 66.48%, as compared to the global average was 32.52%. At closing, the ICAO website showed that the last mission by ICAO to Solomon Islands was in 2014. This indicator was dropped at the restructuring in August 2023 as its measurement relied on the ICAO visit, which was outside the Project's control.
- At appraisal, the existing pavement at the Munda Airport was not suitable for regular jet flights. The project investments in a new international and domestic terminal building, along with upgrades to enhance the climate resilience of the runway, taxiway and apron at Munda airport led to the opening of Solomon Airlines direct flights from Brisbane to Munda on January 6, 2024.

Efficacy of the PDO is rated as Modest, as all WB activities envisioned for the Honiara Airport were cancelled with the project restructuring.

Rating

Modest

OBJECTIVE 1 REVISION 1

Revised Objective

The PDO was unchanged. However, most aviation investments were confined to the Munda Airport.

Revised Rationale



The outputs and outcomes discussed above were relevant to the Munda Airport.

Efficacy of the PDO is rated as High, as the revised targets were met.

Revised Rating

High

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

PDO 2. Strengthen the sustainability and climate resilience of the Project Roads.

Rationale

Theory of Change. The causal links between inputs, outputs and outcomes were logical. The outcomes were monitorable. The outputs of activities (such as resealing paved roads in Malaita, upgrading bridges, providing routine road maintenance, regrading and re gravelling of roads, spot improvements for climate adaptation and updating the road safety audit, along with institutional strengthening activities for asset management, planning, and training staff of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MID), were likely to aid in strengthening the sustainability and climate resilience of project roads.

The results framework implicitly assumed that the appraisal estimates were realistic. However, the actual cost of the road works was much higher than the appraisal estimate. As a result, the end targets for many indicators were reduced rather significantly during implementation.

Outputs.

- 38 kilometer (Km) of roads were maintained as per the original and revised targets.
- The project aided in replacing three bridges and upgrading six key vulnerable spots to improved standards as targeted..
- The project financed a strategy and action plan for Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and Violence against children (VAC) at Malaita project site.
- The Project aided in financing a capacity training workshop for MID, the detailed design consultant for the project and industry stakeholders in February 2020.
- Two Malaita roadworks were awarded to local contractors. There were no targets for this indicator.
- Road safety audits for the roads and bridges were conducted as targeted and a First Road Safety Audit Manual for Solomon Islands was produced.
- 82,000 people had access to enhanced transportation services as targeted, when the project closed.

Outcomes.

The outputs described above were expected to contribute to these outcomes: (i) The number of identified climate resilient road investments constructed and in use; (ii) The percentage of paved roads on Malaita that



was reported to be in very good or good condition when the project closed; and (iii) the percentage of gravel roads on Malaita main roads in good or fair condition.

- Nine climate resilient road roads were constructed and in use, as compared to none at the baseline, and exceeding the original target of five.
- The indicator pertaining to the percentage of paved roads was dropped with the project restructuring.
- 19% of the gravel roads were in good/ fair condition when the project closed, far short of the original target of 50%.

Rating
Modest

OBJECTIVE 2 REVISION 1

Revised Objective

The PDO was unchanged. However, the end targets for the indicators were reduced drastically through the project restructuring.

Revised Rationale Outputs.

as discussed above.

Outcomes.

- Nine climate resilient road roads were constructed and in use, as compared to the revised target of eight.
- 19% of the gravel roads on Malaita main roads were in good/fair condition as per the revised target.

Revised Rating
High

OBJECTIVE 3

Objective

PDO 3. In the event of an Eligible Crisis or Emergency, to provide an immediate response to the Eligible Crisis or Emergency.

Rationale



Theory of Change. The causal links between inputs, outputs and outcomes were logical. The intended outcomes were monitorable. Providing swift response in the event of an eligible crisis or emergency, would likely to help in improving Solomon Island's ability to respond to potential disasters.

Output.

- The contingent emergency response component (CERC) Manual was adopted by the government with appropriate training on activation and implementation.

Outcomes.

- This component was not activated during implementation.

Rating

Not Rated/Not Applicable

OBJECTIVE 3 REVISION 1

Revised Objective

This component was not activated during implementation.

Revised Rationale

Output as described above.

Revised Rating

Not Rated/Not Applicable

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

Overall efficacy is rated as Modest before restructuring due to low achievement in both the aviation and road sectors.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Modest

Primary Reason

Low achievement

OVERALL EFFICACY REVISION 1

Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rationale



Overall efficacy is rated as High, as the revised targets were met.

Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rating

High

5. Efficiency

Economic Analysis. An economic analysis was conducted for the aviation and road project components. These components accounted for 86% of the actual cost. The methodology entailed a calculation of the net economic benefits (through comparing the benefits 'with the project' to 'without the project').

For the aviation component, the analysis was similar to that of the other participating PAIP countries. The benefits of the aviation component were to come from: (i) passenger time and cost savings; (iii) costs for carrying extra fuel to Munda Airport, and (iv) avoided partial disruption to services due to the emergency repairs for Honiara Airport. For the road component, the economic analysis was based on the Road Economic Decision (RED)- a software used for low-traffic volume roads. The benefits were to come from: (i) avoided disruption due to the potential collapse of the bridges; and (ii) vehicle operating cost saving and passenger time costs.

The Net Present Value (NPV) at 6% discount was US\$62.07 million for the aviation and road components when the project closed (as compared to the NPV of US\$68.10 million at appraisal. The ex-post Economic Internal Rate of Return was 28.7% (as compared to the ex ante EIRR of 36%). The reduction of the NPV and EIRR when the project closed was due to the construction delays and removal of a major part of investments at the Honiara Airport.

Administrative and operational issues during implementation. The project experienced initial delays, mainly due to the slow progress of designs relating to the cost estimates. Despite these delays in the initial years and delays over which the project had no control (such as restrictions following the COVID-19 pandemic), there were no time overruns and the project closed on schedule. However, due to the cost overruns, the project financed a reduced scope of activities than that envisioned at design.

Overall efficiency is rated as substantial mainly due to the economic justification for the project.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
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Appraisal	✓	36.00	88.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	28.70	86.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The relevance of the PDO to the country context, regional context, the government strategy and the Bank strategy is as High. Efficiency is rated as Substantial. Efficacy is as Modest before project restructuring and Substantial after restructuring. Taking the share of disbursement before and after restructuring, overall outcome is rated as Moderately Satisfactory.

Table: Split Rating Results

	Without Restructuring in August 2023	With Restructuring in August 2023
Relevance of PDO	High	
Efficacy	Modest	High
Efficiency	Substantial	
Outcome ratings	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Highly Satisfactory
Numerical Value of the outcome ratings	3	6
Disbursement	US\$34.42 million	US\$14.57 million
Share of disbursement	0.70	0.30
Weighted Value of outcome rating	3 x 0.70 = 2.10	6 x 0.30 = 1.80
Outcome Rating	2.10 + 1.80 = 3.90, rounding it to 4 or Moderately Satisfactory	

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Technical risk. There is limited risk to the sustainability of the development outcome in the road sector, as the project enhanced the climate resilience of the project roads and bridges and contributed to increasing the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development (MIT) capacity to develop a climate-resilient road network.



Government commitment. There is limited risk to the sustainability of the development outcome, given that the Government has requested for Bank funding for a transport project covering both the aviation and road components.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

This was WB's first engagement in the transport sector in Solomon Islands since 1980. The design of the aviation component was similar to that of the earlier phases of PAIP. The lessons incorporated included: (i) Recognizing that regional communications, navigation and surveillance systems could have regional spillovers, the design used similar specifications as in other PAIP countries; (ii) Using the Technical and Fiduciary Services Unit (TFSU) of the Tonga Airports Limited (TAL), for facilitating bulk procurement for countries participating in PAIP; (iii) Unlike previous work in Malaita which were supervised from Honiara, road work was to be supervised from Malaita to develop local capacity; and (iv) Given that appropriate standards are required for constructing roads and bridges, the design drew upon recent work, such as the 2014 Vanuatu's Resilient Road Manual.

The Ministry of Finance and Treasury (MOFT) was overall in charge of executing the project. The Ministry of Communications and Aviation (MCA) was the implementing agency for the aviation component and the Ministry of Infrastructure Development for the road sector. As the bulk of project investments were with the MCA, the Project Support Team (PST) was located in MCA to manage the day-to-day implementation of both components. These arrangements proved to be appropriate for implementing the project. Appropriate arrangements were made at appraisal for safeguards and fiduciary compliance (discussed in section 10).

There were substantial shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry. As opposed to conducting detailed appraisal estimates, the design of the road component relied on the costs of previous government-funded road networks. The estimates of the unit costs of the previous government-funded road networks were significantly lower than the costs of the donor funded works due to relaxed technical requirements. Moreover, the estimates did not take into the annual rate of inflation in the Solomon Islands of around 3.5%. This led to a critical financing gap, and this in turn led to reduced project scope. Likewise, the actual costs of the aviation sector were underestimated, and this turn contributed to the significantly reduced scope of the aviation sector component.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank conducted fifteen implementation support missions during the project lifetime. The continuity of leadership was more or less maintained, with the incoming Task Team Leader (TTL) having worked as a co TTL initially. The supervision team proactively addressed problems and acted to resolve them through



the project restructurings. The environmental and social development specialists were involved throughout preparation and implementation and this aided in safeguards compliance (discussed in section10). The supervision team were based in the country offices in East Asia and Pacific during implementation. This assisted in maintaining dialogue with the sector agencies.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The PST was overall responsible for M&E, in close collaboration with the MCA, MID and the Technical and Fiduciary Services Unit (TFSU). The original indicators were for the most part, specific, measurable and time bound. The baselines and target values were clearly specified at appraisal.

There were some shortcomings In M&E design. One, the indicator "State requirements for safety and security at the Honiara and Munda Airports reach global ICAO average" relied on a third-party audit over which the project had no control. and two, the targets for some indicators in the road sector may have been ambitious.

b. M&E Implementation

The weakness in the M&E design were addressed via the project restructuring, during which the indicators were revised to reflect the modified project scope. The ICR (para 56) noted that the PST coordinated with the relevant agencies in the aviation and road sectors. These were submitted in a timely fashion. The collected data were adequate for monitoring project performance.

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E data were utilized to inform project restructurings, to monitor project performance and informing decision-making.

Overall M&E is rated as substantial.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial



10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The Project was classified as a Category B (Partial Assessment Project). Four safeguard policies were triggered at appraisal: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); Natural Habitats (OP 4.09); Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10); and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). (PAD, page 5).

Environmental and Social Safeguards. An assessment conducted at appraisal concluded that the Project was not likely to have irreversible impacts and entail land acquisition. An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) were prepared and publicly disclosed at appraisal to address the issues (PAD, para 81). The environmental and social safeguards compliance was Satisfactory when the project closed, Although, inadequate safeguards resources were in place in the initial years, corrective measures were implemented over time and the project performed well on grievance resolution (discussed in section four).

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management (FM). The Bank conducted a FM assessment of the Technical And Fiduciary Services Unit (TFSU) at appraisal. With mitigating measures, the FM risk was rated as Moderate (PAD, para 76). The FM was rated as Satisfactory when the project closed (ICR para 61). The unqualified audits were, for the most part, submitted in a timely fashion.

Procurement Management. The Bank conducted a procurement assessment at appraisal. The assessment concluded that TFSU had sufficient capacity for managing the procurement aspects (PAD, para 80). Procurement performance was consistently rated as Satisfactory during implementation.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

There were no unintended impacts.

d. Other

Not applicable.

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	



Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	There were shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The ICR draws the following main lessons from the experience of implementing this Project, with some adaptation of language.

1. It would be useful in fragile country contexts for the Bank team to prepare cost estimates at design, rather than rely on other sources. The initial cost estimates for both the aviation and road components were much lower in this project. This contributed to a financing gap and eventually a much-reduced project scope.

2. It would be prudent to factor in higher cost contingencies in project design, especially in remote locations. Like other Pacific Island countries, the remoteness and internal dispersion of Solomon Islands has a significant impact on costs. These geographical challenges and logistical requirements exacerbate vulnerability to external shocks such as price increases for construction materials. Factoring in higher costs for contingencies at design could help to mitigate the risk of cost overruns.

3. Choosing indicators which can be attributable and within the control the Project, can raise the potential for success in fragile contexts. In this Project, a chosen indicator was contingent on third-party audit, over which the project had no control.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is well-written, concise and adheres to the recommended page length. The theory of change articulated in the text clearly articulates the clear causal links between the project activities (inputs), outputs and the intended outcomes. The evidence and analyses provided in the text are adequate for assessing project performance. The ICR draws good lessons from the experience of implementing this project. The photographs provided in the text in Annex Eight are particularly useful and enable the reader to visualize the changes made in the project area.

a. Quality of ICR Rating



Substantial