


Lake Chad

Regional Risk and Resilience Assessment

December 2021



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Abbreviations

ACTN	Association des Chefs Traditionnels du Niger (Association of Traditional Chiefs of Niger)
ACTT	Association des Chefs Traditionnels du Tchad (Association of Traditional Chiefs in Chad)
ALGON	Association of Local Governments in Nigeria
AMN	Association of Municipalities of Niger
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CBO	community-based organization
CDD	community-driven development
CDP	community development plan
CDPSP	Community Development Program Support Project Response to Forced Displacement
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
CMU	Country Management Unit
CNCTC	Conseil National des Chefs Traditionnels du Cameroun (National Council of Traditional Chiefs of Cameroon)
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CSO	civil society organization
CVUC	Communes et Villes Unies du Cameroun (Communes and United Cities of Cameroon)
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCV	fragility, conflict, and violence
GDP	gross domestic product
GEMS	Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision
GNI	gross national income

HDI	Human Development Index
IDA	International Development Association
IDA19	19th Replenishment of the International Development Association
IDP	internally displaced person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPF	investment project financing
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ISR	Implementation Status Report
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad
JASDJ	Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad)
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
LDP	Livestock Development Program
LGA	local government area (Nigeria)
MCRP	Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria
MNJTP	Multinational Joint Task Force
ND-GAIN	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NESAP	Niger Solar Electricity Access Project
NGO	nongovernmental organization
ODA	official development assistance
PAD	project appraisal document
PARCA	Projet d'Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Communautés d'Accueil (Refugees and Host Communities Support Project)
PforR	Program-for-Results financing
PIB	public investment budget
PIU	project implementation unit
PNDP	Programme National de Développement Participatif (National Community-Driven Development Program)
PROLAC	Projet pour la relance et le développement de la région du Lac Tchad (Lake Chad Region Recovery and Development Project)
REDISSE	Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement
RESILAC	Redressement Economique et Social Inclusif du Lac Tchad

RRA	Risk and Resilience Assessment
RSS	Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram–Affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region
RSW	Refugee Sub-window
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	water, sanitation, and hygiene
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group

Executive Summary

Located at the southernmost edge of the Sahara, the Lake Chad region is shared by four countries: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. A complex and interdependent system, marked by high mobility, migration patterns and trade, the Lake Chad region is a diverse and socioeconomically integrated area, characterized by its rich biodiversity. Its ecosystem allows communities to develop productive activities, significantly contributing to the food and job security of people in the hinterland, and two metropolitan centers with large populations, Maiduguri (the capital of Borno State in Nigeria) and N'Djamena, with a network of secondary urban centers and rural markets.

The Lake Chad region is plagued by a combination of mutually reinforcing challenges, which impede its development and trap the region in poverty, including the deterioration of the security situation, structural economic and social vulnerabilities, recurrent economic shocks, and climate-related risks. The region has one of the largest concentrations of extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite efforts at better representation, the exclusion of some groups and limited avenues for civic engagement fuel grievances and frustration. Human development indicators in the region are low, and access to services and infrastructure remains difficult. The impact of climate change exacerbates those structural challenges, with direct consequences and risks for livelihoods, food security, and job opportunities linked to the lake and its resources.

The current security crisis linked to Boko Haram is amplifying pre-existing structural drivers of fragility and deep-rooted vulnerabilities. The Boko Haram insurgency, which started in 2009 in Maiduguri, has rapidly spread from North East Nigeria to Cameroon (since March 2014), then to Niger and Chad (since early 2015), prompting the deployment in 2015 of an anti-terrorist coalition, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Between 2010 and 2015, Boko Haram scored several military victories and seized a large portion of territories in North East Nigeria, pushing the government of Nigeria to declare a state of emergency in 2013, followed by Niger (February 2015) and Chad (November 2015). However, despite its initial successes, Boko Haram remains a fragmented organization. In March 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and the organization became the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Disagreement over the tactic of continuing attacks against civilians led to Boko Haram's split into two factions in 2016 – ISWAP and the Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad (Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād; JASDJ). With the death of Shekau in May 2021, ISWAP could seize this opportunity to absorb other fighting groups into its ranks, therefore potentially emerging as the dominant player in the conflict, expanding areas under its control and intensifying attacks against Nigerian military. For the purpose of this assessment, the name Boko Haram is used to refer to the group before the 2016 split and in referring to both the ISWAP and JASDJ factions since.

Extensive violence has occurred, resulting not only in largescale loss of life, but also psychological trauma and the weakening of social networks. The effects of the Boko Haram insurgency on the population are disastrous – triggering an acute humanitarian crisis, widespread insecurity, substantial displacements of population and the disruption of economic activities. These conflict dynamics have had an impact on the deterioration of

the living conditions of the population in the Lake Chad region in the areas of education, health, local governance, economic exchanges, social activities, and security – and therefore considerably increase the instability of the region and the vulnerability of the population.

Increased violence and insecurity, in a region already marked by deep structural vulnerabilities, feelings of exclusion among the population and high levels of poverty, have had a profound impact on the social fabric. Existing tensions have intensified, with sustained violence and rivalry over access to resources, and the control of economic opportunities and land ownership. This has had negative repercussions for relationships and cooperation within communities, between different population groups, and between population groups and state institutions.

This regional Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA), a World Bank Group (WBG) commitment for the 19th Replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA19), is intended to diagnose the key factors of fragility and resilience in the Lake Chad region along with operational recommendations to highlight the possibilities for the World Bank (WB) to address and mitigate fragility and support resilience. The objectives of the RRA are (i) to strengthen the WB’s understanding of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) drivers and resilience factors in the Lake Chad region, focusing on the 10 regions most severely impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency and related displacement crisis; (ii) to inform strategic, operational, and policy approaches with the objective to prevent further conflict spillovers, the Lake Chad region being one of the four hot spots under IDA19; and (iii) to explore the potential role of the WB in addressing these drivers and building on resilience factors.

The regional RRA identifies five drivers of fragility (figure ES.1):

REGIONAL DRIVER 1

Geographical isolation, combined with historic political and economic marginalization, translates into weak governance, uneven service delivery, and limited opportunities, fueling disenfranchisement and entrenching inequalities, exclusion, and perceptions of injustice, thus undermining state legitimacy.

- **The Lake Chad region is marked by low levels of national integration, geographic isolation, and historical government neglect.** The region is plagued by a combination of development challenges, including weak services, governance shortcomings, strong inequalities, limited state presence, and a lack of economic opportunities, especially for youth. These are exacerbated by the current security crisis, as growing violence amplifies deep-rooted vulnerabilities.

REGIONAL DRIVER 2

Collective efforts to respond to the crisis are constrained because the four neighboring countries also face violence in several hot spots beyond the Lake Chad area.

- **The four countries are experiencing broader conflict dynamics that, to some extent, constrain their capacities to respond to multiple crises.** All four countries face several concomitant security crises, including the crisis in the North West and South West regions of Cameroon, insecurity due to clashes between farmers and nomads in Chad, conflicts between the state and the Tuaregs in Niger, as well as conflict spillovers from Libya, Mali, and multiple conflict hot spots in Nigeria, including in the North West, Niger Delta, Igboland, and Middle Belt, as well as rural banditry and intercommunal violence.
-

REGIONAL DRIVER 3

High livelihood dependency on and heightened competition for dwindling natural resources lead to increased economic hardship, grievances, and tensions within and between different Lake Chad communities.

- **The compounded effects of climate change, high demographic growth, and ongoing conflicts risks**, including the large-scale forced displacement crisis, exacerbate competition over access to resources and undermine community resilience.
-

REGIONAL DRIVER 4

The predominantly securitized responses disrupt mobility, the economy, and trade routes, reinforcing citizens' distrust and frustration with the state while also weakening social cohesion.


- **The ongoing conflict and counterinsurgency measures have had important social and economic consequences on the Lake Chad region.** They have negatively impacted economic activities, and conflict dynamics have deteriorated living conditions, shattered the local economy, and caused considerable damage to socioeconomic infrastructure. The conflict and counterinsurgency have therefore led to a reconfiguration of the Lake Chad regional system, with the modification of trade routes, mobility patterns, and land tenure.
-

REGIONAL DRIVER 5

The limited rule of law and the increasingly entrenched war economy have progressively normalized violence in the Lake Chad region, creating an ecosystem in which violence has become incentivized and employed by different armed groups for different purposes.

- **The conflict itself and the security-driven response have further fractured trust between state and society and between families and communities.** Extensive violence has occurred—by the insurgency, the counterinsurgency and vigilante groups, and many different actors—and has transformed the Lake Chad crisis into a multilayered conflict, resulting in psychological trauma and the weakening of social networks.
-

Figure ES.1: The Dynamic Interaction of the Multiple Grievances and Factors of Fragility Combine to Produce Regional “Drivers” of FCV



The regional RRA also identifies five factors of resilience (figure ES.2):

REGIONAL RESILIENCE FACTOR 1

The Lake Chad region features continued resilience as an agropastoral and halieutic socioeconomic system thanks to adaptation strategies (especially at the community level) in the face of ongoing challenges.

- **The lake is a valuable and integrated agropastoral and halieutic socioeconomic system that is likely to remain so thanks to adaptation strategies that mitigate ongoing challenges.** With the insecurity, communities in the region have shown their capacity to adapt in various ways: introducing new techniques or changing ways of living, from nomadism to sedentary livestock herding. The informal sector has also adapted by using new spaces, circuits, and products and by remodeling value chains, and informality, though precarious, remains an important coping strategy.
-

REGIONAL RESILIENCE FACTOR 2

Mobility remains a hallmark of Lake Chad communities.

- **Mobility has been a hallmark of the Lake Chad system for a long time and has allowed for the regulation of social pressures linked to seasonal climate variability, demographics, and access to resources.** Cross-border dynamics are characterized by historical trade and ethnic, cultural, and political ties, reinforced by interconnected local networks and alliances, kinship, ethnicity, and family relationships across border communities. These solidarities are key to understanding how social, economic, and power relations are being reconfigured in the current crisis.
-

REGIONAL RESILIENCE FACTOR 3

Citizens, civil society organizations and the private sector increasingly mobilize to demand better governance and inclusion.

- **There are increasing demands for better governance, inclusion, and justice from various groups in the Lake Chad region.** Civil society organizations (CSOs); citizen platforms, the private sector; women and youth groups; investigative media; nongovernmental organizations and grassroots activism constitute a force to be reckoned with. In addition, a range of peace and conflict resolution initiatives exists that can promote resilience of the Lake Chad region.
-

REGIONAL RESILIENCE FACTOR 4

Customary and religious leaders, often instrumentalized by the state, can nonetheless help diffuse tensions and manage conflicts, especially at the community level.


- **Traditional mechanisms are considered the foundations for justice and social cohesion at the local level.** They are represented by the Lamidos, Sultanates, and several other traditional political entities with specific nomenclature and organization. However, this form of resilience is also vulnerable because the ongoing conflict has led to a reconfiguration and weakening of traditional chiefdoms. In addition, these mechanisms do not constitute a guarantee of impartiality or access to justice.
-

REGIONAL RESILIENCE FACTOR 5

There is a growing realization by the four countries of the need to improve cross-border cooperation and foster the reintegration of former combatants.

- **Despite challenges, the growing realization of the importance of increased regional cooperation has materialized in different ways.** The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has the potential to play an important regional role, if supported by capacity-building initiatives. In addition, the four countries have established programs to encourage the defections of individuals associated with Boko Haram and help with their reintegration, reflecting the growing recognition that a security-focused response will be insufficient to end the conflict.
-

Figure ES.2: Regional Factors of Resilience and Capacities for Risk Mitigation



The regional RRA also identifies four potential risks (figure ES.3):

RISK 1

The security situation in the Lake Chad region could further deteriorate as armed groups continue to spread and capture ground.

- **The successful push by ISWAP into JASDJ territory and Shekau's death in May 2021, as well as the way his succession will unfold, pose significant risks in the Lake Chad region.** If ISWAP succeeds in taking control of Shekau's forces and rallying his commanders under its banner, it will open new spaces for the insurgency to extend its area of control, consolidate and extend its networks. Potential alliances between ISWAP and bandits operating in the North cannot be excluded.
-

RISK 2

The worsening of country-specific political or security risks could impact the region.

- **Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria face specific risks that have the potential to further destabilize the entire Lake Chad area.** The ongoing political transition constitute a systemic risk to Chad's stability and a continued engagement of Chadian troops in Nigerian territory remains uncertain. Recent attacks in Wulgo (Nigeria) in March 2021, warded off by the Cameroonian army, deployed from across the border, and in Diffa (Niger), have been successfully repelled, but both countries continue to face multiple insecurity hot spots, which could, in the long term, constrain their capacities to effectively respond to the insurgency. Finally, the growing presence of foreign private security actors in the region could potentially further destabilize the region.
-

RISK 3

The COVID-19 pandemic could exacerbate structural vulnerabilities.


- **In a conflict-affected region, the current pandemic could exacerbate structural FCV drivers, even though international exposure remains low.** The impact of the pandemic on the economy, combined with border closures, could lead to austerity measures and budget cuts that would impact social sectors.
-

RISK 4

Future climate impacts could intensify existing vulnerabilities and lead to new conflicts, thus further undermining people's adaptation capacities.

- **In the Lake Chad region, future climate impacts could exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and lead to new forms of conflict.** Climate models predict more frequent extreme and unpredictable weather, which could undermine people's coping capacities and resilience.
-

Figure ES.3: Regional Risks



The regional RRA outlines recommendations that were formulated after considering the diagnostic of FCV drivers, factors of resilience and risks, as well as a review of the WB regional portfolio. The objective of these recommendations is to strengthen the effectiveness of WB engagement in the Lake Chad region, in tackling FCV drivers but also building on and strengthening existing sources of resilience. Given the diversity of the four countries covered in the regional RRA, these recommendations should be seen as overarching principles of engagement that should inform programmatic discussions in each country, rather than prescriptive directions for WB programming. The recommendations presented in this RRA should not be read as the total sum of actions needed, or as 'quick fixes,' to be

addressed within the next round of IDA alone. Instead, they should be embedded within a regional vision, and accompanied by strategic investments in boosting staffing in the region, convening development partners, and strengthening client relationships, over a sustained period.

Given the multiplicity of challenges in the Lake Chad region, the WB should adopt a phased and sequenced approach. Therefore, WB interventions should focus, in the short-term, on addressing the most urgent needs, but with the objective to support stabilization and recovery on the medium- to long-term. In a context of diminished trust and broken social contract, and to promote people-centered approaches in development processes, emphasis should be given on both investments (the “what”) and decision-making and implementation processes (the “how”). In addition, the WB should continue its engagement with the security-humanitarian-peacebuilding-development nexus to enhance regional coordination and dialogue and promote an integrated response to the multidimensional FCV challenges the Lake Chad region faces. The recommendations fall within four key areas:

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- ✓ Keep the modalities of WB engagement simple, flexible, and focused.
- ✓ Mobilize WB convening power to foster regional coordination and dialogue.
- ✓ Enhance coordination among partners along the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through concrete cooperation mechanisms.

PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- ✓ To respond to the multidimensional crisis in the Lake Chad region, government projects and programs supported by the WB should pursue engagement and efforts along the following dimensions: (i) Address governance challenges; (ii) Support human capital development; (iii) Support the economic inclusion of youth and women; (iv) Focus on employment creation and inclusive local economic development; and (v) Enhance disaster risk management and climate change adaptation and mitigation.

OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- ✓ Adjust operating modalities to accommodate diverse security situations and enhance implementation/supervision.
- ✓ Prioritize a specific and distinct approach to addressing the root causes and mitigating the impacts of the conflict in the Lake Chad region.

ADDITIONAL ACTION POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

- ✓ Deepen engagement with local actors, from project design to implementation.
- ✓ Strengthen coherence and inter-connectedness of conflict prevention and mitigation efforts across countries.
- ✓ Maximize available resources in a context of a thin network of private actors.

CROSS-CUTTING PRINCIPLES FOR WB ENGAGEMENT IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION

- ✓ Ensure fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) sensitivity across the portfolio.
 - ✓ Mobilize the full range of tools available to work in conflict-affected environments.
 - ✓ Mainstream citizen engagement in government programs supported by the WB.
 - ✓ Invest in analytics and data collection to boost the understanding of key risks in the short and medium term.
-

I. Introduction

The African Union (AU) calls the crisis in the Lake Chad region “a global concern,” with “three separate but inter-related and mutually reinforcing crises having converged in the same locale: a structural and persistent development deficit; a breakdown of the social contract that has manifested in lawlessness and a violent extremist insurgency; and an unfolding environmental disaster that cannot be stopped, but which requires attention and resources to mitigate the impact on people, and to help them absorb shocks and adapt over time” (AU and LCBC 2018). Although the shrinking of Lake Chad has long dominated the headlines and, more recently, with media attention focused on the Boko Haram insurgency, it is clear that the crisis unfolding in the Lake Chad region is complex, multidimensional, and also very often misunderstood (see box 1).

This regional Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA), a World Bank Group (WBG) commitment for the 19th Replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA19), is intended to diagnose the key factors of fragility and resilience in the Lake Chad region along with operational recommendations to highlight the possibilities for the WB to address and mitigate fragility and support resilience. The objectives of the RRA are (i) to strengthen the WB’s understanding of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) drivers and resilience factors in the Lake Chad region, focusing on the 10 regions most severely impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency and related displacement crisis; (ii) to inform strategic, operational, and policy approaches with the objective to prevent further conflict spillovers, the Lake Chad region being one of the four hot spots under IDA19; and (iii) to explore the potential role of the WB in addressing these drivers and building on resilience factors.

This regional RRA uses the foundation laid by the *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence* (WBG 2020c) and the analytical framework developed in the United Nations (UN) and WBG (2018) study *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* to understand the dynamics at play in the Lake Chad region and help identify drivers of fragility as well as risks and resilience factors. The methodology followed an iterative process, beginning with a desk review to synthesize available data and information on fragility and resilience in the Lake Chad region. This was followed by interviews with task team leaders, program leaders, and Country Management Units (CMUs) to solicit perspectives on the key FCV challenges and factors of resilience and to understand how projects have sought to address FCV drivers (see appendix E). To that effect, a portfolio analysis (see appendix D) was conducted. Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, the findings from the desk review were explored and validated with civil society, researchers, practitioners, and development partners via a series of virtual conversations on fragility and resilience in the Lake Chad region, as a collaboration between Chatham House’s Africa Programme and the WBG between May and June 2021.

Importantly, in contrast to country-focused RRAs, the Lake Chad RRA analyzes the regional root causes of fragility and sources of resilience. Therefore, it focuses on the FCV factors that exist as a result of cross-border and regional dynamics. Nonetheless, analyses on regional dynamics are often difficult to disentangle from country-level discussions; therefore, this RRA builds on and complements country-level RRAs produced in recent

years, including those for Niger (WBG 2015b), Cameroon (WBG 2016), Nigeria (WBG 2020a), and Chad (WBG 2021b), as well as the Sahel RRA (WBG 2020b).

The RRA is organized as follows: Section II outlines the regional context. Section III analyzes the underlying structural factors pertinent to understanding FCV in the Lake Chad region. Historical background information has been included, for contextualization purposes, because it is key to understanding the current situation in the Lake Chad region. Section IV describes the ongoing Boko Haram conflict, its impact, and how it exacerbates existing deep-rooted development challenges. Section V summarizes and synthesizes the specific regional drivers of FCV. Section VI highlights key factors and sources of resilience to these drivers. Section VII looks ahead to highlight potential risks or shocks to the Lake Chad region. Section VIII outlines key findings of the portfolio analysis and presents strategic and operational recommendations for WB programming in the Lake Chad region.

Box One

Unraveling Common Myths about Lake Chad

The literature on the Lake Chad crisis is dominated by a set of strong narratives but incomplete reporting. These gaps in coverage are due to the conflict and violence occurring in inaccessible and dangerous areas, and they often result in reporting that oversimplifies or makes inaccurate statements about a crisis that is both multidimensional and complex. There are five common misunderstandings in the literature that not only affect the way the crisis is framed but also impact discussions about appropriate responses:

- **The use of the *Boko Haram* label for a host of complex and quite different realities (from one country to another and one locality to another) does not do justice to the root causes behind the insurgency.** The insurgency is the consequence of preexisting conditions and structural drivers of fragility, triggered by sudden events such as insecurity in the neighborhood and the economic crisis, but it became, in turn, a cause of continued crisis.
- **The “disappearance” of the lake through water abstraction and climate change is often presented as the main cause of the crisis.** Environmental factors are important contributing factors, but they are by no means the only ones explaining the scale of current, continued violence. Geography (a violent neighborhood), and poor governance are more important. In addition, recent studies have debunked the widely held view that the lake is shrinking, therefore unraveling the myth that the current crisis in the region is linked to the disappearance of the lake.
- **High population growth tends to be over blamed for violence and conflict.** Experience suggests that channels that translate high population growth or high population density into violent conflict are specific, relating in some context to the role and status of youth and the gap between expectations and day-to-day struggles. In the context of the Lake Chad region, high population growth is indeed a challenge, but it should not be seen as the sole cause of violence and should instead be considered in relation to the other FCV dimensions of the crisis.
- **The Bring Back Our Girls campaign was lauded for bringing unprecedented international attention to usually underreported issues involving girls, Africa, and girls in Africa.** However, this sudden but short-lived international media coverage had little effect on the quality and effectiveness of the governments’ response in addressing the root causes of the conflict.
- **Boko Haram is sometimes presented as a local branch of the Islamic State.** The strategies and tactics of Boko Haram factions are dictated by local contexts, internal tensions, and militants’ decisions in the Lake Chad area rather than by external actors. In addition, the umbrella term “Boko Haram” is often used to identify very different groups, each with their own specific objectives and tactics. However, for the purpose of this assessment, the name Boko Haram is used to refer to the group before the 2016 split and in referring to both the ISWAP and JASDJ factions since.

PART ONE


Analytical Diagnostic & Overall Context

II. Regional Context

Located at the southernmost edge of the Sahara in the subregions of West and Central Africa, the Lake Chad region is shared by four countries: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. The entire Lake Chad Basin (LCB) represents 8 percent of the African continent and spreads over seven countries (Nagarajan et al. 2018). The Lake Chad region¹ comprises the areas that are most severely impacted by the Boko Haram insurgency and related displacement crisis: the Far North region in Cameroon; the Chari-Baguirmi, Hadjer-Lamis, Kanem, and Lac regions in Chad; the Diffa region in Niger; and the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in Nigeria. Zinder in Niger has been added to this group due to prior WBG analytical work² and operations³ in the Lake Chad area, although it is less affected by conflict (see map 1).


Map 1: The Lake Chad Region

West & Central Africa



Data providers: OCHA-HDX, SWAC-OECD & Natural Earth

Lake Chad administrative regions




Source: WBG 2021a.

Visualisation: J. Luengo-Cabrera


The Lake Chad region is a diverse and socioeconomically integrated area. With an estimated 30 million inhabitants as of 2021, the Lake Chad region is characterized by religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversity (see map 2 and appendix A).⁴ The region is characterized by its rich biodiversity, with high agro-halieuetic-pastoral potential, and the diverse ecosystem services it provides, allowing communities to develop productive activities, including fishing, agriculture, and livestock rearing, thus fostering significant indirect employment in trade, transport, and manufacturing. The lake, its banks, and its islands significantly contribute to the food and job security of people in the hinterland, and two metropolitan centers with large populations, Maiduguri (the capital of Borno State in Nigeria) and N'Djamena, with a network of secondary urban centers and rural markets (LCBC 2016). The region can be defined as a regional system, marked by the interplay of three dimensions: mobility, multiactivity, and multifunctionality⁵ of livelihoods (Magrin and Pêrouse de Montclos 2018; see box 2).

Map 2: The Lake Chad Region: A Highly Diverse Environment

a. Ethnolinguistic Boundaries



b. Religious Boundaries



Source: WBG 2021a.

Various Definitions of the Lake Chad Region

Various definitions exist for the Lake Chad region, highlighting the multiple but rarely integrated dimensions of the current analysis.

- **In productive, bioclimatic, and hydrologic terms**, the Lake Chad Basin sits on the southern edge of the Sahara and comprises the lake and the corresponding hydrographic basin. It contains pastoral areas (north of the lake), agriculture and agropastoral areas (Borno and the Mandara Mountains), savannas, forest areas, and more densely populated areas, including Maiduguri and N'Djamena. In a Sahelo-Saharan environment characterized by aridity and erratic water availability, the Lake Chad Basin has been called “an oasis in the desert.”^a Its unique biodiversity, inherited from the paleolithic Lake Mega-Chad, enables local communities to develop productive activities that can adapt to climate variability, contributing to trade, food security, and employment.
- **In historical terms**, the Lake Chad Basin was the center of the Kanem and then Kanem-Bornu empires (10th–19th centuries), which extended as far as the Sudan and the Fezzan (in present-day Libya) regions, and it served as a major Saharan crossroad.^b Kanuri is spoken in much of the historical Bornu area,^c but this imperial project was always resisted by some groups, particularly those found in the Mandara Mountains, the forests of southern Borno, and the islands of Lake Chad. The region is therefore very diverse in terms of languages, cultures, social organization, and local histories. Other lingua francas exist, including Hausa and Arabic. Fulfulde, the language of the Fulani, a group historically involved in herding cattle, is also widely spread.
- **In economic terms**, the Lake Chad Basin has high potential. Before the Boko Haram crisis, the Lake Chad region was at the center of vibrant trade routes, connecting the four neighboring countries and linking areas with high economic and agriculture potential to more fragile zones, as well as providing ties to North Africa. In 2017, an estimated 2 million people lived directly off the resources of Lake Chad on the shores and islands of the lake itself (fishing, livestock herding, flood-recession and irrigation agriculture, hunting and gathering).
- **In legal terms**, the Lake Chad Basin Commission is authorized to manage water resources common to its six member countries (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria). Its mandate is to “sustainably and equitably manage the Lake Chad and other shared water resources of the Lake Chad Basin, to preserve the ecosystems of the Lake Chad Conventional Basin, to promote regional integration, peace and security across the Basin.”^d
- **In regional terms**, the Lake Chad region is characterized by an ongoing conflict system, with regional ramifications. The spillovers across borders are mostly from North East Nigeria, with much of the violence against civilians committed by Boko Haram factions and military forces. When violence spread into countries neighboring Nigeria, tensions between social groups emerged or were exacerbated: through the instrumentalization of Boko Haram and counterinsurgency narratives by parties to *local* conflicts, through the impacts of forced displacement, and through disrupted trade relations. Lake Chad region countries have long been havens for rebel groups from Chad and Niger.

Note:

a. Vivekananda and Born 2018.

b. Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018.

c. This does not correspond to current-day Borno State.

d. AU and LCBC 2018; see also the Lake Chad Basin Commission, <https://cblt.org/>.

The countries in the Lake Chad region present both similarities and differences that are often rooted in history and shaped by geography. All four countries became independent in 1960, although from different colonial rules, and each inheriting a different administrative culture and following a distinct trajectory. Since independence, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria have experienced periods of complex political instability, and, more recently, Cameroon has been destabilized by the Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North and the crisis in the English-speaking North West and South West regions. Periods of military rule have punctuated the political landscape in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, with an eventual transition to democracy in Niger and Nigeria. Politics in Chad and Nigeria are permeated by oil exploitation. All four countries have had at least one attempted coup d'état (Cameroon), and some have had up to seven (Niger and Nigeria).⁶ Political alternation in Niger and Nigeria contrasts with the highly centralized presidential regimes in Cameroon and Chad,⁷ where the head of state retains power over the legislative and judicial branches of government. These regimes⁸ are characterized by their longevity, which does not necessarily guarantee long-term stability.⁹ From the colonial period, Nigeria, which never had a one-party rule, inherited a federal parliamentary form of government. In 1979, however, the country transitioned from military to civilian rule and adopted a presidential system. This began the short-lived Second Republic (1979–83). The presidential system, with three tiers of government—federal, state, and local, covering 36 states and 774 local government areas (LGAs)—was reinstated in 1999 when civilian rule was restored. By contrast, Niger moved from a presidential to a semipresidential regime.¹⁰ The Lake Chad region is remote from the capitals, except for N'Djamena, which is relatively close to the Lake Chad area, especially when compared to Abuja, Niamey, and Yaoundé.¹¹ Persistent feelings of marginalization are prevalent in Nigeria, even though the states of Borno and Adamawa feature a wealthy business class and the current head of state is from the North; these feelings manifest differently in Cameroon because of the country's ethnolinguistic and religious population composition and dynamics, but the current crisis in the English-speaking regions shows the growing sense of marginalization among English-speaking Cameroonians.¹² The special Nigerian history of North/South divisions and inequalities, as well as those within the North itself, associated with poor governance and the instrumentalization of religious sectarian movements by state governors, also explain the rise of Boko Haram in the region (see box 3).

There are also commonalities between how pertinent nationwide factors affect the ten Lake Chad regions. With a deep common history and a partly shared ethnolinguistic diversity, the four countries are characterized by similar governance attributes. These include weak state capacity, which translates into limited state legitimacy and low presence in rural areas; poor governance practices; and the concentration of powers or the absence of separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Pérouse de Montclos 2010). Focusing on the Lake Chad region, the area is marked by the ecological and socioeconomic interdependency of predominantly rural economies connected through trade to distant markets, limited public investment, and a degree of economic and political marginalization. More recently, the four countries have borne the direct impact of the Boko Haram–related violence on livelihoods, a protracted forced displacement crisis, and chronic food insecurity. Outside the epicenter of the crisis, in the Nigerian state of Borno, the region is prone to other forms of violence and conflicts, including land disputes, rebellions against governments, ethno-regionalist tensions, kidnappings, banditry, and cattle rustling.

Box Three

Boko Haram: A Nigerian Challenge?

Although influenced in various ways by the global jihad, Boko Haram is very much a Nigerian challenge. The conflict has affected Nigeria's North East more deeply than it has in the neighboring areas of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. It was in North East Nigeria that Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic scholar, formed the movement that came to be known as Boko Haram well before the uprising of 2009.^a Yusuf preached against the underdevelopment and poverty that plagued the North East of Nigeria, placing the blame on Western values. The militant and bellicose type of Salafism that forms the basis of Boko Haram owes a lot to the history of Nigeria as a whole and its longstanding national debate about the relationship and balance of power between a North (mis)perceived as Muslim and a South (mis)perceived as Christian.^b

This debate was already key during the 1960s and led to the adoption of a federal system, which failed to prevent the civil war that rocked the country from 1967 to 1970. Nigeria's uncertain postcolonial trajectory saw Nigerians of all stripes—from successful business or state bourgeoisie to discontented students or rural poor trying to make it in big cities—embark on religious quests for improvement of self and society through various forms of Islam and Christianity. Missionary efforts inspired by global trends, from evangelical Christianity to revolutionary Shi'ism and Wahhabism, competed with one another.^c Some preachers built mass followings, offering access to religious education as well as systems of solidarity and sometimes economic opportunities. As early as the 1980s, several local episodes of violence pitted Christians and Muslims against one another. With the end of military rule in 1999 and the reemergence of competitive politics in each of the federated states, several political entrepreneurs harped on identity politics. In the North, which was home to some of the main military rulers, the end of military rule fed fears of marginalization, especially because the South had a longer history of access to Western education and a more privileged direct and indirect access to the oil wealth that is central to Nigeria's economy.^d Since 1999, several politicians in the North have been courting Islamic leaders and activists, supporting campaigns for “public morality”. In its most extreme version, this led to the belief that the state was “corrupt” because it was un-Islamic/foreign/Christian.

The growing divide between state officials and Mohammed Yusuf led to the radicalization of Boko Haram. The souring of the alliance with local politicians^e played a part in Yusuf's increasingly aggressive positioning, which resulted in the 2009 uprising. Although conspiracy theories abound,^g there have been no documented attempts by politicians to ally with Boko Haram since then.

Note:

a. Thurston 2018, 6.

b. Substantial portions of local communities from northern Nigeria have converted to Christianity, and the Yoruba of the South West are about 50 percent Muslim and 50 percent Christian (see Kyari 2018; Thurston 2018, 67–72).

c. Marshall 2009

d. Notably, oil-producing states receive a special share of the oil revenue.

e. Thurston 2016.

f. Governor Mala Kachalla of Borno had Yusuf serve on his sharia implementation committee. However, deeming Kachalla reluctant, Yusuf resigned and allied with Ali Modu Sherif, who won the gubernatorial election in 2003. In 2005, Sherif designated a close associate of Yusuf as his commissioner for religious affairs. But Sherif did not deliver on his promise of fully implementing sharia, and he and Yusuf parted ways in 2007. See Thurston 2018.

g. Kendhammer and McCain 2018, 147–51; Mustapha 2014; Pommerolle 2015.

III. Key Structural Factors of FCV Across the Lake Chad Region

Even before the start of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, the Lake Chad region was facing multidimensional challenges. The Lake Chad region is situated within fragile countries. On the WBG's list of fragile and conflict-affected situations for fiscal year 2022, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria are all classified as experiencing medium-intensity conflict. Marginalization, weak service provision, climate change, and violence have trapped the region in poverty. On the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), which ranked 189 countries, Niger ranked 189th; Chad, 187th; Nigeria, 161st; and Cameroon, 153rd. For the Lake Chad area, between 1990 and 2018, the Far North in Cameroon, Diffa and Zinder in Niger (since 2011), Yobe and Borno (since 2004), and Adamawa (since 2018) in Nigeria had the lowest HDI scores compared to other regions in the four countries.¹³

A. The Lake Chad Region Remains Economically Marginalized


The economies of the four countries, which are resource dependent, were hit by economic crises during the 1980s, 1990s, and mid-2010s. The Lake Chad region has seen little economic progress over the past 30 years, despite a dynamic transnational trade before the conflict that offered opportunities and resources. The combination of the oil price slump of late 2014 (which caused a drop in federal transfers to the region), the fall in the naira, and the impact of the Boko Haram crisis has further exacerbated existing vulnerabilities and has led to a severe economic crisis in the region, especially in Chad and Nigeria. Although the Lake Chad region accounts for 17 percent of the total area of the four countries, its economy only makes up 5 percent of the relevant gross domestic product (GDP).¹⁴ Economic activity in the region is concentrated in Maiduguri, N'Djamena, and a few secondary urban cities¹⁵ that support rural transformation through their links to agriculture and value chains. In Cameroon, economic activities are particularly dynamic in the Far North, especially around Maroua and Kousseri, the latter being the main entry and exit point for goods between Chad and Cameroon (International Crisis Group 2017a).

The Lake Chad region has one of the largest concentrations of extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Households living in the area are, on average, poorer than those living in neighboring regions of their respective countries (WBG 2021a). In the Far North of Cameroon, the poverty rate reaches 59 percent, three times higher than the national average (19 percent)(WBG 2021a). In the states of Yobe and Adamawa in Nigeria (WBG 2021a),¹⁶ it reaches 72 percent, nearly twice as high as in the rest of the country (38 percent). Chad is the exception, with a poverty rate in the Lake Chad area (31 percent) lower than the national

rate (40 percent) (WBG 2021a) due to its proximity to the capital, higher urbanization rate, and population density (Mahmood and Ani 2018). Differences within the Lake Chad region are also noteworthy. Poverty is most prevalent in North East Nigeria, with Adamawa and Yobe hosting the largest number of poor in the Lake Chad region (WBG 2021a). Moreover, the pace of poverty reduction in the four countries remains slow, with no indication that the spatial gap in poverty between the Lake Chad and neighboring regions is narrowing over time (WBG 2021a).

Strong regional inequalities persist between regions.¹⁷ Although some regions seem better off, such as Diffa in Niger,¹⁸ overall, the Lake Chad region lags in terms of economic wealth. In Nigeria, before the conflict, Yobe State had the lowest gross national income (GNI) per capita of all 36 states (and the Federal Capital Territory). In Cameroon, the Far North's income is well behind the rest of the country, especially the Centre and Littoral regions. The marginalization of the Lake Chad region is also reflected in state budget allocations. In the Far North of Cameroon, the decentralized public investment budget's per capita allocation for basic and secondary education, health, and agriculture is considerably lower than the national average. In North East Nigeria, public spending per capita is much lower than the national average (see figures 1 and 2).


Figure 1: Public Investment Budget in Cameroon



Source: WBG 2018.

Note: PIB = public investment budget.

Figure 2: Revenues and Expenditures per Capita in North East Nigeria



Source: WBG 2021a.

B. The Lake Chad Region Is Characterized by Political Isolation

Despite decentralization being a fundamental mechanism for power sharing and political inclusion, and federal Nigeria aside, progress on the decentralization agenda in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger has been slow. Central governments have tended to neglect the Lake Chad region due to its geographic situation (located far from capital cities and the main economic centers) and its demographic weight (the region represents 30 percent of the population of Cameroon, 29 percent of Chad, 9 percent of Nigeria, and only 3 percent of Niger; Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018). Postindependence public policies also played a role in the isolation of these outlying areas, with the priority being to consolidate nation-states. Furthermore, ongoing decentralization processes have remained incomplete (De Catheu and Maoundonodji 2020). Local governments in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger face the same challenges: little fiscal autonomy and no control over the redistribution of resources from the central government, despite official decentralization and devolution policies (De Catheu and Maoundonodji 2020; Olivier de Sardan 2006). Nigeria, however, is a special case because it is a federation with powerful elected governors; this has ensured a form of institutional pluralism, but it has also tended to create inefficiencies and ultracompetitive, sometimes violent, state-level politics.

Highly centralized systems of governance reinforce exclusion from power and diminish accountability. Although state services have long been present in regional capitals,¹⁹ state presence is at its weakest in hard-to-access areas such as the islands of Lake Chad or the Mandara Mountains, which have generally been unappealing for civil servants, with no incentives to attract them. In addition, few public servants originate from these areas, given the low access and quality of education systems in the region (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018). Even though decentralization is more advanced in Nigeria, federal states remain highly dependent on the redistribution of resources from the central government and LGAs have limited decision-making powers and financial resources (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018). Federalism did not pave the way for equal power sharing, and certain groups²⁰ have retained more power (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018). In the three other countries, limited decentralization explains the weak capacities of elected officials and local actors, and the poor financial viability of local governments. Weak governance practices²¹ and insufficient inclusiveness in local governance processes also help to considerably undermine the credibility and legitimacy of government institutions (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018).

Alternative forms of governance have emerged, mostly in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as the result of incomplete decentralization and limited transfer of power. State legitimacy remains contested, though expectations tend to be low because of the state's limited presence in the Lake Chad region, which further hinders its ability to establish its legitimacy and build a social contract, especially as other actors and institutions appear to be more legitimate. The state's remoteness has led to a limited sense of national identities in the Lake Chad region. Even though Lake Chad elites tend to be represented in the political sphere,²² the divide with citizens, who feel they are insufficiently represented, remains strong. In northern Diffa, the Movement for Justice and Rehabilitation of Niger was formed in response to the recurrent marginalization of the Tebu – which demonstrates the willingness of certain communities to gain stronger recognition (International Crisis Group 2017e). To engage with the central state, local elected officials have formed coalitions, such as the Communes and United Cities of Cameroon (Communes et Villes Unies du Cameroun; CVUC), Association of Municipalities of Niger (AMN), Association of Local Governments in Nigeria

(ALGON), and National Association of Municipalities of Chad. Traditional leaders also play an important role, resolving local disputes and voicing social demands, but they have been weakened by the insurgency; many have either been killed, have fled the area, or have lost the trust of the population, therefore leaving a power vacuum (Nagarajan et al. 2018).

Some groups have faced recurrent exclusion, despite efforts for better representation.

Feelings of exclusion are multifaceted and can be based on regional identities,²³ ethnolinguistic features,²⁴ age, gender, or a mix of all these dimensions. Some groups have been historically disenfranchised,²⁵ such as descendants of slaves, the “montagnards” from the Mandara Mountains (Seignobos 2014), the Buduma (Cohen 2015), and certain “deep rural” Fulani clans.²⁶ Attempts have been made to better balance group representation in decision-making processes,²⁷ but those have remained insufficient. In addition, the northern regions of Cameroon²⁸ and Sahelian areas in Nigeria are stereotyped as being backward and benefiting from preferential treatment from the central state because of their situation as disadvantaged regions; such stereotypes continue to fuel divisions between groups. In the Diffa region, members of the Buduma minority have suffered from discrimination due to the widespread perception that they support or facilitate the insurgency (U.S. Department of State 2016).

Exclusion and limited avenues for civic engagement constitute important sources of frustration among the region’s youth.

The region has a very youthful population, but this demographic is among the most marginalized from political and economic development in the Lake Chad region. Young people face many challenges, including limited economic opportunities and political representation, difficulties accessing land,²⁹ high underemployment, low levels of education, and weak access to basic services, all of which fuel their feelings of abandonment by their governments (see box 4). Youth feel disconnected from those in power, whom they perceive to be of another generation. To reduce this growing divide, governments have authorized the establishment of youth organizations, such as national youth councils. Although shunned by some youth, who find these institutions to be instrumentalized and not anchored in rural areas, national youth councils have nevertheless positioned themselves as consultative bodies representing their interests. Furthermore, young people’s lack of socioeconomic empowerment is exemplified by the increasing age of marriage—delays in entering adulthood and gaining their independence from their families. The insurgency is often considered a symbol of a “youth revolt” that stems from an intergenerational crisis (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018) and offers a way for young people to afford a marriage³⁰ and be autonomous.³¹ The conflict has aggravated unemployment³² in a region with few formal employment opportunities. Youth are pushed toward the informal sector, which constitutes an important share of the regional economy but remains on the verge of illegality. At the start of operations against Boko Haram, the systematic targeting of young people³³ fueled their lack of trust in and fear of national armies while further contributing to their disenfranchisement, pushing them to join the ranks of the insurgency to get out of their precariousness and profit from the war economy.³⁴

Box Four

Being Young in the Lake Chad Region: Perceptions and Aspirations. A Snapshot from Selected Interviews

Defining oneself means representing oneself in a specific (*terroirs*, villages, communities) and regional environment and facing many challenges at the same time. In different regions of Lake Chad, young people live on border areas that make them unique citizens. A weak state presence, with few civil registry offices and limited public infrastructure, has led to a community “ownership” of citizenship; while some young people identify with the state, some represent themselves as belonging to an ethnolinguistic group or community rather than being state citizens.^a

In the Lake Chad region,^b youth are defined by the polarization between different groups.^c To be young is to reaffirm one’s belonging to these groups. Buduma youth in Chad and Niger, and Kanuri in Nigeria and Cameroon, are accused of supporting Boko Haram and face stigmatization. However, the representation of young people differs depending on circumstances. In Cameroon and Nigeria, economic exchange opportunities have also shaped youth identity. Young people, in particular those living near the lake and the Logone and Chari Rivers, experience a citizenship crisis on several fronts: finding it difficult to access civil status documents^d as well as low feelings of belonging to the nation itself.^e This “citizenship by opportunity,” which manifests itself by owning several national identity cards from different neighboring countries, allows young cross-border workers to identify themselves within a regional geocultural space rather than with one country.

Facing Both Local and Regional Challenges

In the Far North of Cameroon, young people face cultural constraints that limit their opportunities to access agricultural land (especially in the Mandara Mountains), resources (fishing and grazing areas), market spaces, and formal employment. These opportunities are controlled by elders, such as parents, village chiefs, and dominant groups.^f

In Chad, contrasting trends can be observed in different lake regions.^g In addition to access to services, young people complain about the domination of a traditional order that controls polders that provide water, fish, and market garden products. The islands of the lake, although controlled by the chef de canton Buduma, remain strongly polarized between the Buduma and the Kanembu. In Chari-Baguirmi, Hadjer-Lamis, and Kanem, access to employment remains an issue. The appropriation of land by the political-administrative and military ruling class^h is a source of frustration for youth.

In the Diffa region,ⁱ young people define themselves by the challenges they face. Being young means either taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the agropastoral and fishery resources of the Lake Chad region and the Komadugu-Yobe River, as well as by trade specifically with Nigeria (agriculture, livestock, fishing, trade, smuggling), or joining one of Boko Haram factions as a way to express dissent. High poverty in rural areas has fostered youth migration to urban centers, in particular Niamey, Tahoua, and Zinder.

Box Four Cont'd

In North East Nigeria, during consultations with 73 young people,^j interviewees viewed Boko Haram as an opportunity to improve their living conditions, get support to set up their businesses, and distinguish themselves in their communities. More recent analyses show that young women join Boko Haram either to survive or to rebel against a system they perceive as patriarchal.^k The promise of a loan, a motorbike, or the possibility of getting married are key incentives that push some youth to join Boko Haram. However, most young people have refused to join the movement; these youths share counter narratives about Boko Haram being corrupt and focusing on the enrichment of its commanders.^l Social (family, friends) and business networks play an important role in their motivation to join or leave the movement.^m

Note:

- a. Based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- b. Especially in the towns of Bagasola, Bol, and Ngouboua.
- c. Cohen 2015; MacEachern 2018.
- d. For instance, a birth certificate and national identity card.
- e. Ntuda Ebode et al. 2017.
- f. INS 2018.
- g. UNDP 2018.
- h. International Crisis Group 2021b.
- i. Especially in the communes of Diffa, N'Guigmi, Bosso, Kablewa, and Chétimari.
- j. Consultations took place from September- November 2015. Among these 73 youth, 47 were former members of Boko Haram and 26 youth had resisted recruitment efforts. See Mercy Corps 2016
- k. International Crisis Group 2019b.
- l. Mercy Corps 2016; International Crisis Group 2019b.
- m. Mercy Corps 2016.

Similarly, women struggle to access economic and political opportunities in a context of increased violence.

Women and girls are among the most vulnerable population groups across the region due to unequal power relations, social and cultural norms, their disproportionate presence in the informal sector, and limited property rights. In addition, due to the low access and quality of services in the region, women have limited education, face high maternal health risks, and have few economic opportunities, which hampers their ability to meet their full potential. In North East Nigeria, few women have access to political leadership positions, they rarely influence policy directions,³⁵ and access to community leadership remains difficult.³⁶ Women also face increased risks of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) due to entrenched social norms.³⁷ This situation is exacerbated by the conflict; the breakdown of family and community structures; changes in social roles and increased socioeconomic vulnerability, especially among displaced communities; and recourse to survival sex. Child marriage is the most reported form of violence in refugee camps.³⁸ The conflict has also changed gender roles, especially in North East Nigeria. In that region, as men fled for fear of being killed by Boko Haram or being arrested, women were forced to engage in new types of economic activities and decision-making roles (Vivekananda et al. 2019). Women have also joined the ranks of Boko Haram, forced to do so or voluntarily (see box 5).

Box Five

The Role of Women: Wives, Weapons and Witnesses

Women have been particularly affected by the ongoing conflict. The forms of violence they have suffered are manifold: killings, sexual violence and slavery, forced marriages, captivity, and being used as suicide bombers.^a In North East Nigeria, thousands of women have been abducted, and the 2014 kidnapping of Chibok schoolgirls has been widely publicized.^b In the Far North of Cameroon, women who had been kidnapped and then released after the operations of the Cameroonian army have reported murders and the use of young girls in attacks, rapes, torture, and various ill treatments.^c

The conflict has reconfigured women's role in society. Women have lost their livelihoods, leading to increased poverty, and forcing them to find new ways of making a living, including through survival sex. As men have fled or been killed, women have had to engage in new economic activities and take on decision-making roles because in some areas they constitute most of the demographic, especially in North East Nigeria.^d

Women have also played a supporting role within Boko Haram, voluntarily or not. In Nigeria, because they are not seen as a threat or viewed with suspicion, they tend to enjoy greater freedom of movement than men, which allows them to act as spies, messengers, recruiters, and smugglers.^e Recruited in armed groups, they have participated in attacks, recruited members, such as other women or family, and have been used to commit suicide attacks. To survive, some women have married Boko Haram fighters for protection. In Cameroon, dozens of women have moved to areas with a strong presence of Boko Haram fighters to join their husbands or abducted children.

Women have also been active in vigilante groups. They sometimes participate in active fighting, such as in Nigeria, or engage in different activities, such as denouncing suspects, gathering intelligence, and providing logistics and sometimes financial support to members of vigilante committees.^f

The situation of women associated with Boko Haram varies. Women who have been arrested and detained end up in prisons or camps for their reintegration, where living conditions are extremely harsh. When returning to their communities, either voluntarily or because of army operations, they often face community stigmatization and sometimes rejection. In Cameroon, some female ex-combatants live in makeshift camps (Gréa) not far from their villages of origin. Children born during captivity or in areas under Boko Haram control tend to be stigmatized.

Note:

- a. Nagarajan 2017.
- b. This has been the case in several towns (Damasak, Bama) and villages (around Damaturu, Gwoza, and Pulka) of North East Nigeria.
- c. Especially in Moskota and the villages around Amchidé, Fotokol, and Kolofata.
- d. Nagarajan 2017.
- e. International Crisis Group 2016b; International Crisis Group 2019b.
- f. Koulthoumi 2019.

C. Uneven Service Delivery Increases the Divide Between the Center and the Periphery

Human development indicators are low and access to services remains difficult, with strong regional disparities. Although some progress was achieved in the health care and education sectors between the 1960s and early 2000s,³⁹ it failed to significantly improve the health and education outcomes in the region. Literacy and completion rates for primary education are lower in the Lake Chad area than national averages, with low school enrollment and sharp gender disparities. Child stunting is roughly 10–15 percent higher in the Lake Chad region (WBG 2021a). The area lacks basic services and is characterized by poor infrastructure provisions, both public and private, in every sector (e.g., education, health, water, sanitation, and roads), especially in rural areas. Access to services remains particularly difficult for the poorest population and those living far from cities and market towns. The shortage of trained and skilled health workers remains a major challenge. Access to electricity remains poor. In the Lake Chad region, it reaches 20 percent for Cameroon, 2 percent for Chad, 10 percent for Niger, and 38 percent for Nigeria, considerably lower than the national average rates.⁴⁰

High demographic growth in the Lake Chad region puts additional stresses on already limited resources and basic services. Over the past 50 years, the four countries have experienced strong population growth—driven by high natural increase rates—at around 3 percent per year.⁴¹ Fertility rates are high, and there is no sign of a demographic transition occurring. With current population increase levels, it is projected that the total population in the Lake Chad region countries will double over the next 25 years (UNFPA 2017). With limited access to basic services, this population growth will significantly challenge institutions that are already struggling to meet the basic needs of the population, potentially increasing popular grievances and heightening tensions (WBG 2020b).

The chronic underinvestment in the Lake Chad area, characterized by poor access to services and infrastructure, constitutes a direct and visible source of isolation and a perceived source of exclusion. In Cameroon, important differences exist between more advantaged areas with better access to services, centered around major cities,⁴² and marginalized territories such as the Lake Chad region, which was largely underadministered until the early 2000s. The Diffa region saw very little investment⁴³ until the 2000–14 period, when it was an important base for President Mamadou Tandja. In April 2013 in the Diffa region, tensions over an oil project’s environment impacts led to the revision of the 2007 Oil Code, granting additional oil revenues to department and regional authorities.⁴⁴ Poor road infrastructure also limits economic opportunities and further excludes large swaths of the population living in these areas.

Marginalization and the perception of unfairness drive contestation. Gaps in access to services between the Lake Chad area and the central regions constitute a major source of grievances. In Nigeria, differences in terms of access to education and employment opportunities within the civil service generated tensions between northerners and southerners. This contributed to the establishment of organizations aimed at promoting the interests of the North, such as the Northern Elders Forum and the Arewa Consultative Forum. In the North and Far North regions of Cameroon, feelings of general injustice over imbalances in terms of availability and access to services, infrastructure, poverty, and underemployment in comparison to the South are widespread. This perceived neglect led key figures from the northern regions of Cameroon to write the 2002 Memorandum from

the Greater North, which noted the stark contrast in education between the North and the South, and in 2020 to launch the 10 Million Northerners movement to promote and defend the interests of the northern regions, which proponents felt were being ignored by the central government (Foute 2020).

D. The Lake Chad Region Remains Environmentally Fragile

The debate over whether the lake has dried irreversibly or not, through water abstraction and climate change, and the impact of a shrinking lake on violent conflict, is lively. The popular perception is that the lake is shrinking as a result of climate change,⁴⁵ and several political scientists and sociologists have claimed that lake shrinkage was the main cause of a variety of social ills (see Owonikoko and Momodu 2020). But geographers have nuanced or refuted the fact that the water level of the current Small Lake Chad is currently at its lowest ever, diminishing irreversibly (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018) due mainly to climate change, showing instead that the lake has partly replenished since its low of the 1970s and 1980s (Magrin 2016).

However, even though the lake is not disappearing, resources are increasingly scarce and impact livelihoods. On the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Country Index, which measures a country's vulnerability to climate change and other challenges to improve resilience, out of 182 countries, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon rank 182, 176, 161, and 143, respectively.⁴⁶ Therefore, more than the shrinking of the lake, the issue at hand lies with the impact of climate change (Vivekananda et al. 2019). Most of the people living around Lake Chad engage in fishing, agriculture, livestock farming, and trade for their subsistence. They rely on the ecosystem for their livelihoods and have been negatively impacted by the unpredictability and relative decline in rainfall levels. Climate variability, increasing temperatures, and, more importantly, uncertainty about the future climate, especially over water availability, constitute important challenges with direct consequences and risks for livelihoods, food security, and job opportunities linked to the lake and its resources (Nagarajan et al. 2018). To mitigate those risks, people migrate—for example, to the southern pool of the lake during flood recession—or change occupation, rotating between different agricultural practices.⁴⁷ However, these traditional coping mechanisms are unlikely to remain adequate due to the occurrence of weather extremes and variability in recent years. In addition, the large-scale forced displacement crisis that is unfolding in the region will increase competition over dwindling natural resources, which in turn can generate economic and social stress for communities. If the shrinking of Lake Chad has opened up fertile land for crops and pasture, it has also negatively impacted fishing and irrigated agriculture. Since then, however, the lake has expanded again to roughly 14,000 square kilometers; therefore, the alleged impact of the lake's contraction on the crisis the region is currently facing should be nuanced (Vivekananda et al. 2019).

E. Justice Delivery and Security Provision are Hampered by Poor Governance and Inefficiencies

Democratic controls over security forces remain uneven. In Nigeria and Niger, civilian authorities have “generally maintained effective control over security forces, although at times individual soldiers and police acted independently of the command structure”

(U.S. Department of State 2020). In March 2021, a failed coup attempt took place in Niger, demonstrating that certain elements of the army still feel entitled to have a say in politics. In Chad, the army is strong but is closely controlled by the government. It plays a key role in counterinsurgency operations both in the Lake Chad region and the western Sahel, through it remains “a source of potential instability at home” (International Crisis Group 2021b). In April 2021, the reactivation of a rebellion in northern Chad and the early days of the transition following President Déby’s passing speak to the continued centrality of warfare in Chadian politics (Debos 2013).

Poor governance practices in the management of the security sector undermines the legitimacy of the state and erodes trust in institutions that struggle to protect civilians.


The security sector remains opaque in the management of public resources (Page 2018). Reports of corruption in military procurement have led to several cases being investigated. These reported bad governance practices, including embezzlement and patronage-based personal management, have a corrosive effect on defense capabilities; they reduce the effectiveness of the security response and, at the same time, undermine public trust in defense and security institutions (Transparency International 2019). In addition, the conflict offers opportunities for enrichment through extortion, racketeering, monetizing protection, and engaging in illicit activities (Avis 2020; Freeman 2019). At various points and in various ways, security forces have been accused of participating in the war economy, embezzling part of the money allocated for looking after the troops, or cooperating with traders selling cattle stolen by Boko Haram. In Nigeria, in particular, these practices have left frontline troops largely underresourced, and instances of desertions, protests, and violence against commanding officers have been reported (Husted 2021).

The lack of oversight for the use of force has led to abuses, fueling distrust among the population. Even though in some instances, like in the Far North of Cameroon, the population initially welcomed the presence of the army (WBG 2018), the poor human rights records of counterinsurgency forces have become an important source of grievances for the population. They are more likely to occur when oversight of security forces and the rule of law is poor and when the army grows increasingly frustrated, especially as Boko Haram troops tend to be better armed (Searcey 2019). Instances of “collective punishment on communities suspected of harboring militants” (International Crisis Group 2017c) have been reported and the failure to protect civilians has been documented, with records showing arbitrary or unlawful killings, physical attacks, and sexual abuses occurring in state-run camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), informal camps, and local communities (U.S. Department of State 2020). In turn, the violence of the counterinsurgency further drives violence and mistrust of systems seen as oppressive, feeding Boko Haram’s “politics of victimhood” (Pérouse de Montclos 2015).

The rule of law and effective access to justice have made little progress in the Lake Chad region. The state of justice nationally and in the Lake Chad region is both a cause and consequence of the crisis. Popular frustration with the inability of states to deliver justice has been recurrent in militant discourses.⁴⁸ Similar issues affect the justice sector in the four countries, including limited access to legal information; weak legal assistance; and slow, expensive judicial processes that are remote from citizens (Das 2018). These challenges are exacerbated by real or perceived corruption of the justice sector⁴⁹ and by language issues,⁵⁰ paving the way for extrajudicial violence and frustration in relation to state institutions that struggle to deliver justice with fairness and efficiency. Access to justice remains uneven across the region, with the highest number of magistrates found in N’Djamena and Niamey (see figure 3);⁵¹ in Cameroon’s Far North, there are 44,539 residents

per magistrate.⁵² Prisons remain congested, which also raises human rights concerns.⁵³ This situation is compounded by the detention of individuals suspected of being members of the insurgency, most of them being imprisoned without official charges brought against them (International Crisis Group 2017e). The justice sector faces diminished trust and insufficient resources and capacity, which impedes timely, affordable, and transparent justice provision. When it comes to access to justice, inequalities are striking and widen the gap between citizens and state institutions,⁵⁴ mostly affecting women, the poor, minorities,⁵⁵ and IDPs due to missing legal identity documents needed to access rights and services, such as title deeds.

Figure 3: Uneven Distribution of Magistrates in Chad and Niger



Source: INS 2018; Ministère de la Justice 2017.

Inefficiencies within the justice sector push the population to seek recourse outside the formal judicial system, in part reflecting greater trust in informal institutions.

Recourse to traditional justice remains important,⁵⁶ and traditional chiefdoms are auxiliaries to the administration and justice system. Trust in informal justice mechanisms is much higher among Nigerians with little or no formal education and in rural areas.⁵⁷ In the Lake Chad region, conflict resolution generally takes place outside formal institutions, mostly by asking the other party, a local chief, relative, or friend to intervene (HiiL 2018). In Borno State (PSWG 2018), the household head resolves disputes within and outside the family circle, and customary leaders⁵⁸ receive complaints and engage in dispute resolution. In the Far North, traditional leaders dispense justice in the Lamidos courts (Dankoff 2011). In Chad, customary and formal justice coexist.⁵⁹ The informal justice sector is recognized in statutory documents and is considered legitimate by communities. In Niger, traditional leaders and headmen are well integrated into the administrative and political structure of the country because the central state is involved in the selection of chiefs and in the application of customary laws by ordinary courts (Danish Institute for Human Rights 2013). However, although informal institutions increase access to justice mechanisms and recourse, issues of inclusiveness remain, and decisions rarely favor women or youth and are not necessarily compatible with the formal justice system.

IV. The Boko Haram Crisis is Exacerbating Structural Vulnerabilities

A. Instability in the Lake Chad Region Predates Boko Haram

Interstate politics have played a role in fueling insecurity, undermining stability, and hampering regional collaboration in the Lake Chad area. If Nigeria has maintained good diplomatic relations with Niger, the situation has been more complex with Chad and Cameroon. Recurring clashes during the 1970s over the exploitation of oil reserves in the Lake Chad region, the legacy of Nigeria's intervention in the Chadian civil war (1965–79), and the conflict over the control of Lake Chad islands in 1983, whose sovereignty was disputed by Nigeria, continue to strain relations between the two countries. The disagreement between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula led to armed clashes between 1994 and 1996, until it was eventually resolved by a ruling of the International Court of Justice and the signing of the Greentree peace agreement in 2006. These interstate conflicts have hindered regional cooperation. The fact that Niger and Nigeria belong to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Cameroon and Chad to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)/ Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)—two regional economic communities with differing capacities and policies—further complicates effective transnational cooperation across the region.

Insecurity and violence in the Lake Chad region date further back than the Boko Haram crisis, and the region has long been prone to political upheavals and insecurity, especially from highway robbery and cattle rustling. Being far from the control of central governments, due to its peripheral position, the area has served as a safe haven and base for various rebellions and guerillas⁶⁰ and has been prone to local conflicts.⁶¹ Moreover, cross-border banditry has been historically prevalent, with a resurgence during the 2000s. Cattle rustling has been especially recurrent on the Nigerien side of Lake Chad. If road blockers⁶² have less affected North East Nigeria⁶³ and South East Niger, they have been a scourge in the Far North of Cameroon, with *zaraguina*⁶⁴ that originated in the North West of the Central African Republic (CAR) in the 1980s and expanded in the south of Chad.

Land conflicts remain prevalent in the Lake Chad region, reflecting poor governance and inequalities that can sometimes have sociopolitical connotations. Even before the conflict, pressures on resources in some rich areas, such as the lake and the Komadugu-Yobe River, were increasing and thus causing tensions⁶⁵ (although not necessarily armed) between and within groups. Conflicts between groups vying for natural resources (land and water)—especially among pastoralists, farmers, fishers, and hunters—have resurged

in recent years. These tensions have been exacerbated by the effects of climate change, in particular the reduction of available arable land, the planting of crops on grazing routes, and the variability of rainfall that negatively impacts crop yields. The current conflict has also seen a resurgence of intercommunal tensions revolving around access to resources in Niger and landownership in Chad (Vivekananda et al. 2019). Increasing urbanization and rural-to-urban migration raise additional concerns for sustainable livelihoods in urban and semi-urban areas. The weakness of land legislation,⁶⁶ land market inequalities, and the resumption of land conflicts—with localized outbreaks of violence⁶⁷—contribute to land insecurity and exacerbate existing inequalities. These governance shortcomings pave the way for opportunistic conduct and benefit influential political and business stakeholders, who grab resources and marginalize local populations (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018). Land inequalities and exclusion exacerbate vulnerability to climate change and undermine resilience. The absence of spaces in which communities can discuss ways to regulate access and share resources prevents the peaceful mediation of land conflicts that can turn violent, especially when they overlap with political and social divides. This is the case in Niger, with recurrent clashes between the Buduma and the Fulani (International Crisis Group 2017e), and in Nigeria (see box 6), where land conflicts are related to intergroup and interreligious struggles (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018).

Box Six

Conflicts over Land, Livestock, and Natural Resources in the Lake Chad Region

Conflicts over land, livestock, and natural resources in the Lake Chad region can be divided into those that predate or occur independently of the Boko Haram insurgency and those that have arisen due to the insurgency or are a direct feature of insurgent violence. Much of the rural economy revolves around agriculture and pastoralism, both of which are directly affected by insecurity and violence in the region—although some areas, such as western Yobe, are currently peaceful. Conflicts over access to land persist. From 2013 to 2021, in Borno and other areas where JASDJ was active, livestock herders and crop farmers were primarily concerned by the risk of attack and predatory violence by insurgents; the majority of pastoral groups and farmers did not join Boko Haram and, in some cases, even resisted. In retaliation, Boko Haram raided and burned down villages, plundered grain stores, and stole tens of thousands of cattle from pastoralists. These deadly attacks have displaced people, disrupted agriculture, and destroyed settlements and camps of Shuwa Arab, Fulani, Koyam, and Badawi pastoralists.^a This widespread and frequent violence was not primarily about land or natural resources, however; the motivation of Boko Haram was to quell any opposition. With ISWAP now in the ascendancy, such violence has reduced because ISWAP has tended not to attack Muslim civilians. ISWAP permits pastoralism and agriculture in the areas it controls, subject to its rules and taxes.^b

Box Six Cont'd

In other parts of the region, conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over land are separate from the activities of Boko Haram and ISWAP. In Adamawa State, ethno-religious violence between Muslim Fulani and a coalition of Christian groups, especially the Bachama, in 2017–18 around Numan, Demsa, and adjacent riverine areas was triggered by disputes over land use between herders and crop farmers. However, this violence was also linked to other issues affecting Muslim-Christian relations in that locality, including historic and religious rivalries, local exclusionary politics, and past violence, all of which contributed to the escalation of land conflicts. This led to heavy fatalities on both sides, the temporary displacement of the pastoral Fulani, damaged or destroyed villages. In other places, traditional institutions manage land disputes, avoiding large-scale violence. What are categorized as “farmer-herder conflicts” are therefore contingent on political, social, and economic issues around pastoral and agricultural production and are often context specific. At times, such a categorization may be a misnomer. Now, criminality, especially kidnapping for ransom, drives much rural insecurity and affects both pastoralists and farmers. Widespread drug abuse by young herders is also a contributing factor.

Grievances over land use and access remain widespread and occur between communities, in relation to local or state elites, who seize land for their own control, alienating local farmers and herders. In Nigeria, the 1978 Land Use Act gives governors control over land in their states. Yet in practice, village and district heads usually also influence the allocation and use of land in their jurisdictions. In parts of Yobe State, available grazing land is scarce due to a combination of demographic pressure and land grabbing by politically connected elites. Grazing reserves have been seized and often cleared of trees, damaging the ecology and reducing the number of usable plants available to local people for consumption or to graze domestic livestock. Those who acquire land fence it off or install security to protect it. Some cultivate sesame and grains, and they graze their own livestock but exclude the wider pastoral population. Land alienation due to local land grabs thus affects local pastoral and agricultural livelihoods and has security implications because it creates opposition to the constituted authorities—traditional leaders and politicians—in the cases where they are perceived to be abusing their power. It is not yet clear if this is feeding into Boko Haram recruitment, but it is a risk and shows the importance of judiciously managing land issues.

Sources:

- a. Adamu and Kirk-Greene 1986.
- b. Köhler 2021.

B. The Ongoing Conflict and Its Impact on the Lake Chad Region

Since 2009, the Lake Chad region has been plagued by a security crisis linked to Boko Haram and other armed groups. Although Boko Haram was created in 2002, the insurgency really started in 2009 in Nigeria, with the start of the insurrection in Maiduguri and other towns in the North East, launching attacks against security forces (see box 7 and appendix B). Since 2010, the group, under leader Abubakar Shekau, has spearheaded a campaign of targeted killings and bombings. From its base in the Sambisa Forest, Boko Haram has morphed from a clandestine terrorist network to a guerrilla army. In 2013 and 2014, Boko Haram considerably expanded its combat zone, and the insurgency rapidly spread from North East Nigeria to Cameroon (since March 2014), then to Niger and Chad (since early 2015), prompting the deployment in 2015 of an anti-terrorist coalition, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).⁶⁸ Between 2010 and 2015, the group scored several military victories and seized a large portion of territories in North East Nigeria, pushing the government of Nigeria to declare a state of emergency in 2013, followed by Niger (February 2015) and Chad (November 2015). Having retreated into inaccessible areas in the Sambisa Forest and the marshlands of Lake Chad, Boko Haram has continued to carry out more frequent and sophisticated attacks as well as suicide bombings (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018). Boko Haram remains a fragmented organization. In March 2015, Boko Haram leader Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and the organization became the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (see box 7). By filling gaps in governance and service delivery, and providing income-generating opportunities, it has reportedly garnered some level of support among local civilians (Samuel 2019).⁶⁹ However, anger among the population remains due to continuing attacks against civilians, a tactic used by the Shekau faction (International Crisis Group 2019a), which led to Boko Haram's split into two factions in 2016 (Samuel 2019). With the death of Shekau in May 2021, ISWAP could seize this opportunity to absorb other fighting groups into its ranks, therefore potentially emerging as the dominant player in the conflict, expanding areas under its control and intensifying attacks against Nigerian military.

Box Seven

Boko Haram and the Regionalization of the Conflict

Although widely used, the designation *Boko Haram* has a complex usage. Generally translated from Hausa as “Western education is forbidden,” it is a derisive designation used by critics of the Maiduguri-born hardline Salafi splinter movement led by Mohammed Yusuf that eventually turned into an extremist organization.^a The insurgency started in North East Nigeria and in the border areas with Niger, Cameroon, and Chad after urban uprisings in July 2009. The movement was eventually named the Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad (Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād; JASDJ). In 2015, when its leader, Abubakar Shekau, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the Islamic State, the group took the name Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).^b

In 2016, internal critics of Shekau split to form their own movement. They secured the endorsement of the Islamic State and have since kept using the ISWAP designation, and Shekau reverted to using the JASDJ designation. With the successful push by ISWAP into JASDJ territory and the suicide of JASDJ leader Shekau in May 2021, the continued separate existence of the JASDJ faction is now uncertain. There were indications that the outreach by ISWAP may rally most of Shekau’s surviving commanders. Even the die-hard pro-Shekau faction based on the northern part of Lake Chad, led by Bakura Doron, expressed its availability to an arbitration by the caliph of the Islamic State. It is estimated that the different armed groups could consist of around 10,000 combatants.^c

Chad and Cameroon, both of which had a history of fraught relations with Nigeria, were at first reluctant to get involved too deeply in the Boko Haram conflict.^d Although some jihadi associates were arrested and deported, others were organizing discrete logistical support networks in the border regions, allegedly collaborating with some local civilian or military officials.^e Furthermore, Boko Haram recruited a significant number of youths in the border regions, including experienced former Chadian soldiers and rebels. But Boko Haram’s hostage taking in Cameroon in 2013 and 2014, the mounting pressure on Route Nationale 1 in Cameroon,^f the global outrage created by the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in April 2014, and the pressure of international partners, combined to get Cameroon, Chad and Niger more involved. At a summit on May 17, 2014, in Paris, Cameroonian president Paul Biya said the presidents of the Lake Chad Basin were assembled to declare war on Boko Haram. An effort was made to revive the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional force that had previously been involved against bandits, though short-term results were limited. Soldiers from Chad and Niger eventually entered Nigerian territory to support the Nigerian army from February 2015 onward, and Cameroonian soldiers later joined, taking part in several offensives into Shekau’s stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. This prompted both preemptive and punitive strikes in all three neighboring countries by Boko Haram. The two Boko Haram factions have since been firmly embedded in the border areas of all four Lake Chad states and have been carrying out attacks there, though their focus remains on North East Nigeria. Unlike his predecessor, President Muhammadu Buhari has been more willing to participate in the MNJTF. The force itself, however, with its headquarters in N’Djamena, a set of units delegated by each member state, and a purview limited to the area of Lake Chad itself, has failed to prevent ISWAP from building its core there.

Box Seven Cont'd

Given the tense history between Nigeria and its neighbors, regional security cooperation—whether institutionalized in the MNJTF framework or proceeding more ad hoc through bilateral operations—is no small feat. However, it remains fraught. Nigeria's neighbors often regret that Abuja is not investing the necessary resources and attention. Recent developments may complicate this cooperation.^g In April 2021, the unexpected death of President Idriss Déby put on hold the expected Chadian push into Borno. ISWAP's apparent victory over the JASDJ increases the danger on all sides, and Cameroonian troops reportedly pulled out of Nigerian territory.^h

A persistent question is whether Boko Haram will extend beyond North East Nigeria to other regions. Early in the conflict, Boko Haram had perpetrated several terror attacks beyond the North East, striking in Lagos, Abuja, and parts of north and central Nigeria. After the counteroffensive of the Lake Chad states in 2015, Boko Haram refocused its effort on the Lake Chad region. Other armed groups are also increasingly active, with more or less success. Ansaru,ⁱ a small group with connections to Al-Qaeda, distanced itself from Shekau, perpetrating several attacks in northern Nigeria, but today the group seems to survive only in a diminished form. Since 2020, the JASDJ branch of Boko Haram has released pledges supposedly emanating from newly associated armed groups elsewhere in Nigeria—specifically in the states of Zamfara and Niger^j—in an effort to compensate for its loss of power relative to ISWAP.^k As for ISWAP, it seems focused on consolidating its presence in the North East. Interactions and circulations between ISWAP and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have been reported but do not seem to amount to an operational connection.^l

Note:

- a. Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018.
- b. MacEachern 2018; Thurston 2018.
- c. Felbab-Brown 2020.
- d. Boko Haram has long been seen, and to some extent continues to be seen, as a Nigerian problem, which impedes effective national strategies to respond to the crisis.
- e. Thurston 2018.
- f. *Route Nationale 1* refers to the north-south road that connects N'Djamena to the sea through the Far North region of Cameroon.
- g. Interview with an expert, June 2021.
- h. Interview with an expert, June 2021.
- i. Jamaat Ansar al-Muslimin Fi Bilad al Sudan.
- j. In this case, *Niger* refers to one of Nigeria's federated states, not to be confused with the Niger republic.
- k. In December 2020, a large group of gunmen abducted 300 schoolboys in Kankara in the state of Katsina, a kidnapping claimed by JASDJ leader Shekau (Samuel 2021).
- l. Interview with an expert, June 2021. The attack claimed in ISWAP's name in the state of Sokoto in October 2019 was probably perpetrated by a pro-Islamic State group based farther west, at the border between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The group, designated in the media as the ISGS, was classified under the official label of ISWAP by the Islamic State.

The conflict in the Lake Chad region has become one of Africa’s main hot spots in terms of fatalities. In North East Nigeria, heavy fighting between insurgents and the state continues, and violence against civilians is rampant. Although the Nigerian government has claimed several times since 2016 that Boko Haram had been “technically” defeated, there were still over 10,802 fatalities from political violence⁷⁰ in 2020 and 5,545 between January 1, 2021, and May 1, 2021, in the Lake Chad area, with much violence unreported. Within the Lake Chad region, Borno and the Far North are the two areas with the highest number of security incidents. Reported incidents are mainly battles involving security forces and Boko Haram and in violent actions pitting Boko Haram against civilians, the MNJTF, and communal militias⁷¹ (see figures 4⁷² and 5). With much of north and central Borno now devastated and encamped, most of the violence is taking place in border areas. The impact of the insurgency on human security is well documented, but sometimes the different actors and agendas are obscured by lumping all violent events under the *Boko Haram* label, which does not necessarily reflect the reality on the ground because the insurgency is rooted in specific local communities and preexisting tensions in some areas.⁷³

The Boko Haram insurgency has triggered a protracted humanitarian crisis and serious protection risks. The crisis has generated substantial displacements of population (to towns or rural areas, with or without crossing borders). As of March 2021, the four countries were hosting 2.7 million IDPs, with 2 million IDPs in North East Nigeria alone, a steady increase since 2018, and 260,000 refugees (see figure 6). In Borno, camps are facing difficult conditions, and people’s needs are particularly acute in isolated enclaves outside Maiduguri. Cameroon is the second most impacted country by the Boko Haram crisis, hosting both Nigerian refugees as well as IDPs. In Niger, more than 60 percent of the displaced and refugee populations were reported living in and around Diffa, having settled in informal sites (MSF 2020). Those who have fled lack shelter, food and access to water and basic sanitation. It is estimated that 6.2 million people are at risk of food insecurity, and 400,000 children are severely malnourished (OCHA 2021b). Attacks on aid workers by armed groups remain a significant challenge.

Figure 4: All Fatalities from Political Violence in the Lake Chad Region, January 2010–May 2021





Figure 5: Violent Incidents by region, 2010–21




Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (database), Madison, Wisconsin (accessed May 2021), <https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard>.

Figure 6: Forced Displacement in the Lake Chad Region

a. Number of Forcibly Displaced


DISPLACEMENT

2.7M Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)³ **260K** Refugees³



Source: OCHA 2021a.

b. Constraints to Access in the Lake Chad Region



Source: UNHCR 2020.

C. The Conflict Is Worsening Existing Development Challenges

Economic inequalities have been exacerbated by the conflict. Insecurity has disproportionately affected borderlands, resulting in the temporary closure of borders and the declaring of states of emergency in Diffa (since February 2015), the Lac province in Chad (March 2020), and Nigeria (August 2019). These measures have significantly restricted border trade and migration movements. In addition, since 2009, the conflict has caused massive departures of population and halted agriculture production, preventing local populations from transporting their products to local markets (Nagarajan et al. 2018), fishing, or farming. With the violence, entire areas have been deserted, especially the most productive rural locations (Lake Chad, Komadugu-Yobe). Until 2015, when Boko Haram reached its maximum territorial expansion, economic hardship increased in Borno State. From 2011 to 2013, poverty rose in North East Nigeria from 47.3 percent to 50.4 percent (WBG 2015a). Furthermore, the conflict has caused considerable damage to socioeconomic infrastructure. In September 2017, infrastructure damages reached nearly US\$9 billion in Nigeria alone (WBG 2015a). The war against Boko Haram has led to important security and humanitarian costs, about 1 percent of GDP annually between 2014 and 2016 in Cameroon (IMF 2017) and more than 10 percent of GDP in Niger, to the detriment of other sectors (International Crisis Group 2017e).

The insecurity crisis has created additional barriers to the equitable delivery of basic services. In North East Nigeria, already the most educationally disadvantaged region in the country, the education sector faces huge challenges due to increased insecurity, mass kidnappings of schoolchildren, and the destruction of public infrastructure. Schools, in particular, are considered to be soft and effective targets; not only are they symbols of Western-style education, but they also are relatively unguarded and attacks on them garner high media attention (Adeniran and Castradori 2021). In Nigeria, between 2009 and 2016, more than 600 teachers were killed and almost 20,000 were forced to flee, more than 900 schools were destroyed, and at least 1,500 schools were closed (Schmidt 2017). In 2016 in Diffa, 151 schools were closed, affecting more than 10,000 students in the region (Human Rights Watch 2018). In the Far North of Cameroon, at the peak of the crisis in 2015, 144 schools were closed, leaving 36,000 girls and boys without education or forcing them to attend school outside of their communities (Schmidt 2017). Kidnappings have become the most frequent threat to health care personnel (Debarre 2019). Health workers and teachers are increasingly unwilling to work in areas affected by insecurity. In Nigeria, this protracted security crisis has resulted in the concentration of state services around militarized urban hubs, decreasing access and increasing inequalities (Zenn 2019).⁷⁴

In terms of access to natural resources, the conflict has created new dynamics that further entrench existing vulnerabilities. The insurgency has constrained access to livelihoods and resources, especially agricultural and pastoral land as well as fishing areas, in part due to military restrictions and widespread insecurity from various actors. This has considerably undermined traditional coping strategies and the ability of the population to adapt to climate change. More traditional communities that depend on access to natural resources for their livelihoods, such as the Buduma in Chad and Niger, are adapting less well to the mix of unpredictable weather patterns, insurgency, and counterinsurgency than those who used to or started to trade in addition to fishing and raising cattle, such as the Kanembu. The situation is especially difficult for IDPs, who do not often have access to resources such as land. In the context of high demographic growth, the displacement crisis stresses already scarce resources, contributing to increased competition between host communities and IDPs, further undermining their resilience. Abandoned areas are reoccupied by other groups, creating tensions with returnees.⁷⁵

D. Vigilantism Is a Significant Challenge to Local Security and Stability

As counterinsurgency measures seem increasingly inadequate, vigilante groups have emerged to provide local security.

The often violent security responses, which are perceived as ineffective and lead the population to feel that the state has failed to protect them, have created a fertile ground for the emergence of anti-Boko Haram militias.⁷⁶ In North East Nigeria, multiple vigilante groups operate, including the main umbrella militia group known as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which is formally under the command of the Nigeria military;⁷⁷ hunter associations; Kesh-Kesh; and the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (Felbab-Brown 2020). The official use of these groups has spread to Cameroon (2014)⁷⁸ and Chad (2015)⁷⁹ under the name of *comités de vigilance*. Their knowledge of the language and terrain allows them to play a key role in the military counterinsurgency, from intelligence gathering to defensive actions and even offensive operations, especially in Nigeria. These community protection groups have risen in connection to military and civilian authorities—often with their encouragement and sometimes under pressure from them. In Nigeria, these groups are involved in high politics, businesses, chiefdoms, and intercommunal relations (International Crisis Group 2017f). Their persistence highlights deficiencies in security provision by the state; hence, the need to rely on nonstate actors to enforce order.

Nevertheless, vigilante groups present challenges that further undermine state legitimacy and fuel the cycle of violence.

Despite their role as security provider, vigilante groups remain a source of insecurity for local communities.⁸⁰ The customary chiefs who support them, and sometimes whole communities and towns, have been targeted in reprisals by Boko Haram. In Borno alone, the CJTF claimed to have lost 680 members between 2014 and mid-2017 (International Crisis Group 2017c). These groups have also been accused of human rights abuses and violations (International Crisis Group 2017f), including extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, revenge attacks, extortion, intimidation, and the recruitment and use of children (SRSB-CAAC n.d.). In addition, because vigilantes yield power but are rarely formally compensated, some exploit their position for revenge or profit, therefore participating in the war economy and criminal activities.⁸¹ Going beyond their role as security providers, these groups perform law enforcement functions, including dispute resolution and judicial processes. In North East Nigeria, government officials have tasked them with a growing variety of policing, including the resettlement of IDPs and counter-narcotics operations. Local politicians are also using these groups for their own agenda (Felbab-Brown 2020). Although this increases the power of vigilante groups, it weakens local governments, traditional chiefs, and community leaders who compete for power and authority, ultimately eroding state legitimacy.

PART TWO

Regional Framework for Operations

V. Regional Drivers of FCV

Although the root causes of fragility across the Lake Chad region are diverse and multifaceted, this section aims to highlight the principal drivers of FCV that are regional in nature. Building on the detailed analysis of the contextual and structural factors discussed in the previous sections, this section identifies five regional drivers of FCV.

REGIONAL DRIVER 1

Geographical isolation, combined with historic political and economic marginalization, translates into weak governance, uneven service delivery, and limited opportunities, fueling disenfranchisement and entrenching inequalities, exclusion, and perceptions of injustice, thus undermining state legitimacy

The Lake Chad region is marked by low levels of national integration, geographic isolation, and historical government neglect. The region is plagued by a combination of development challenges, including weak services, governance shortcomings, strong inequalities, limited state presence, and a lack of economic opportunities, especially for youth. These are exacerbated by the current security crisis, as growing violence amplifies deep-rooted vulnerabilities. The economic, social, and political exclusion of specific groups have increased the risks of violent contestation, especially as these tensions between center and periphery are combined with strong identities (community or religious) and horizontal inequalities (UN and World Bank 2018). As the crisis intensifies, so does resentment that governments have abandoned these lagging regions and never fully invested in their development. This overlaps with perceptions of injustice and further undermines trust and the social contract—with this collective frustration serving as a push factor for groups that provide alternative forms of governance, economic opportunities, empowerment, and justice.⁸²

REGIONAL DRIVER 2

Collective efforts to respond to the crisis are constrained because the four neighboring countries also face violence in several hot spots beyond the Lake Chad area

The four countries are experiencing broader conflict dynamics that, to some extent, constrain their capacities to respond to multiple crises. During the 2000s, three transnational conflict systems emerged in the Sahel (Liptako-Gourma), the Gulf of Guinea, and the Lake Chad region. As a result, all four countries face several concomitant security

crises. In Cameroon, the sociopolitical crisis in the North West and South West regions that was triggered by the peaceful demonstrations of teachers and lawyers in 2017 has led secessionist groups in Ambazonia to self-proclaim their independence from the Republic of Cameroon (International Crisis Group 2017b). In Adamawa and the East and North regions, Cameroon still hosts refugees from CAR, which puts pressure on already fragile systems and weak basic services. Chad also faces insecurity due to clashes between farmers and nomads, especially over access to water and land in the South, and the availability of Libyan weapons in Chad fuels the Lake Chad crisis. In addition, Chad hosts refugees who have fled instability and conflict on the Sudanese border and in CAR (Vivekananda et al. 2019). In Niger, conflicts between the state and the Tuaregs have contributed to undermine stability. The country also suffers from conflict spillovers from Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, and still grapples with militant Islamist organizations on its western border. Finally, Nigeria is facing multiple conflict hot spots, including in the North West, Niger Delta, Igboland, and Middle Belt, as well as rural banditry and intercommunal violence.

REGIONAL DRIVER 3

High livelihood dependency on and heightened competition for dwindling natural resources lead to increased economic hardship, grievances, and tensions within and between different Lake Chad communities

The compounded effects of climate change, high demographic growth, and ongoing conflicts risks, including the large-scale forced displacement crisis, exacerbate competition over access to resources and undermine community resilience. Livelihoods in the Lake Chad region overwhelmingly depend on resources that are becoming increasingly unpredictable and are being used by a growing number of people, including large numbers of IDPs that are fleeing the insecurity, thus becoming a factor of additional tensions and grievances. The region is highly vulnerable to climate change and variability, and it is estimated that 90 percent of livelihoods are “climate sensitive” (Vivekananda et al. 2019). The potential for increased conflicts over scarcer resources is high, especially with the ongoing insurgency that itself amplifies existing tensions between communities, triggers the large-scale displacement of people, and undermines their trust and coping capacities. In particular, the unfolding forced displacement crisis is expected to increase stress on available resources, notably land and water. Climate-related shocks exacerbate poverty and fragility, with the potential for more instability and insecurity. In addition, competition for dwindling resources has intensified due to strong demographic pressure, seasonal migration, and forced displacement. Climate change is therefore understood as a threat multiplier that compounds and intensifies existing fragilities and risks, including livelihood insecurity, other vulnerabilities, and conflict.

REGIONAL DRIVER 4

The predominantly securitized responses disrupt mobility, the economy, and trade routes, reinforcing citizens' distrust and frustration with the state while also weakening social cohesion

The ongoing conflict and counterinsurgency measures have had important social and economic consequences on the Lake Chad region. They have negatively impacted economic activities, and conflict dynamics have deteriorated living conditions, shattered the local economy, and caused considerable damage to socioeconomic infrastructure. Between 2009 and 2015, economic hardship generally increased, albeit with some nuances, as not all zones, communities, and social groups were affected in the same way. Many communities lost everything: their houses, all their possessions, their farms and wealth in livestock, and family members, including breadwinners.⁸³ While the imposition of states of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in 2013, and later in Chad and Niger, was not unpopular, subsequent restrictions on economic activities were not as well received. The closure of borders and markets, bans on certain commercial activities and products (suspected to finance the insurgency), curfews, and states of emergency have restricted border trade and migration movements, constraining key economic activities and fueling frustration among the population.⁸⁴ This has led to the “criminalization of livelihoods.”⁸⁵ These measures have also been detrimental to specific socioeconomic categories—such as fishermen, boat transporters (Hoinathy 2021), herders, and motorcycle taxi drivers⁸⁶—with the means of subsistence for these categories being disrupted by the conflict.

The crisis has reconfigured the Lake Chad region. The “super camp” approach,⁸⁷ adopted in North East Nigeria, has further restricted livelihood opportunities, leaving entire areas deserted of military personnel who have since been occupied by armed groups (Omilana 2019). Maiduguri, a regional trading platform and central transport route, is now hosting the bulk of IDPs and aid agencies and has become a military hub. Announcements by the Borno State government in August 2020 and October 2021 to close all IDP camps in Maiduguri by December 31, 2021, and resettle displaced people in communities across the state raise serious protection concerns, especially in light of the deteriorating security situation. The conflict and counterinsurgency have therefore led to a reconfiguration of the Lake Chad regional system, with the modification of trade routes, mobility patterns, and land tenure. In areas that have been deserted and are now reoccupied, governance with regard to the control of resources and land is a key challenge.

The conflict itself and the security-driven response have further fractured trust between state and society and between families and communities. Blind crackdowns, collective punishment strategies, and the displacement of populations accused of supporting (voluntarily or not) the insurrection—all attempts to cut off potential support for Boko Haram—have triggered resentment against the authorities. Thus far, the security response has neither been accompanied by efforts to rebuild areas recaptured from Boko Haram nor by strategies to address widespread insecurity and also tackle the underlying causes, including feelings of injustice (International Crisis Group 2017d). This has fed into the narrative of the insurgency, and ISWAP, in particular, exploits this resentment.⁸⁸ In addition, the conflict has fueled tensions between families and communities, with widespread suspicion and mistrust about who may be a member of an insurgent group and who might have been radicalized. Former recruits and combatants are stigmatized and marginalized

when they return to their communities and families, preventing their effective reintegration. The conflict has also stigmatized specific groups, such as the Fulani, Kanuri,⁸⁹ and Buduma, and stirred existing tensions. Antagonisms between locals, IDPs, and refugees not only raise concerns about their eventual return⁹⁰ but also questions about where they should return to if their places of origin have been destroyed, reoccupied by other communities, or violence continues.⁹¹ These multiple fault lines have considerably undermined social cohesion. Entire systems and relationships have been ruptured that will need to be rebuilt, and it remains unlikely that the situation will go back to the pre-Boko Haram period.

REGIONAL DRIVER 5

The limited rule of law and the increasingly entrenched war economy have progressively normalized violence in the Lake Chad region, creating an ecosystem in which violence has become incentivized and employed by different armed groups for different purposes

In the context of limited rule of law and the absence of effective and peaceful spaces for contestation, violence has become widespread. Extensive violence has occurred—by the insurgency, the counterinsurgency and vigilante groups, and many different actors—and has transformed the Lake Chad crisis into a multilayered conflict,⁹² resulting in psychological trauma and the weakening of social networks.⁹³ Concerns over the future of those involved in the insurgency and vigilante groups are high due to their propensity for violence. For some stakeholders, the conflict has been a way to settle old scores. A number of the Buduma were keen to engage with Boko Haram because it gave them an edge against the more capitalized Hausa traders (Cohen 2015), and even though many Buduma did not join Boko Haram, some Fulani in Niger have tried to sell this narrative because they were in competition over access to resources (International Crisis Group 2017c). The conflict has also seen the proliferation of weapons, often seized from regular army forces by the insurgency during attacks, raids on police stations and military barracks, providing Boko Haram with ammunitions, assault rifles and military vehicles (Demuynck et al. 2021). The increase in illicit arms trafficking also exacerbates violence and insecurity (Ojewale 2021). Furthermore, the conflict has become an “enterprise,”⁹⁴ with the emergence of “winners,” who have gained power associated with the fighting, which they may not wish to give up.⁹⁵ Opportunities to profit from the war economy have multiplied with the development of new types of transactions, illegal or not, and incentives to pursue peace are therefore low. Becoming a member of a vigilante group is a means to gain power, authority, and income. For the military, the conflict has paved the way for personal enrichment by taxing road traffic and by offering paid protection against attacks (Felbab-Brown 2020). Boko Haram has financed its activities through supporters’ contributions, the imposition of mandatory payments, the collection of tribute from producers and peasants, ransoms,⁹⁶ and plundering of captured towns and villages. As the movement transitioned into an insurgent organization, Boko Haram increasingly financed its operations through local criminal activities, such as bank and cash convoy robberies (Avis 2020).

VI. Regional Factors of Resilience

Though the challenges affecting the Lake Chad region are significant, the region also has important sources of resilience that can help mitigate shocks and offer potential entry points to promote peace and more inclusive development. Sources of resilience are diverse and context specific. Based on the earlier analysis of structural contextual factors, this section identifies five regional resilience factors.

RESILIENCE FACTOR 1

The Lake Chad region features continued resilience as an agropastoral and halieutic socioeconomic system thanks to adaptation strategies (especially at the community level) in the face of ongoing challenges

The lake is a valuable and integrated agropastoral and halieutic socioeconomic system that is likely to remain so thanks to adaptation strategies that mitigate ongoing challenges.⁹⁷ Communities in the region have shown their capacity to adapt in various ways: introducing new techniques to mitigate the impact of water balance variability on fishing yields and irrigated agriculture or changing ways of living, from nomadism to sedentary livestock herding (Abdouraman 2016; Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018; Rangé and Abdourahamani 2014). The informal sector, directly affected by violence and crime, has also adapted by using new spaces, circuits, and products and by remodeling value chains, and informality, though precarious, remains an important coping strategy.

With the insecurity, communities have changed activities and livelihoods. In the Far North of Cameroon, populations struggle to cultivate certain crops (cotton, cowpea, maize, millet, onion, and sorghum)⁹⁸ or carry out breeding, fishing, and trading activities, pushing them to find new roles and livelihoods. In Maroua, former traders from Kerawa have switched to importing *zoua-zoua*⁹⁹ from Nigeria and breeding (International Crisis Group 2018). New professions have emerged in Bosso, Diffa, Kousseri, Maiduguri, Mokolo, Mora, and Mubi. Youth, often former farmers, traders, and herders, have turned to small street or itinerant trade, catering, mobile telephony, and transport services, especially in secondary cities. The crisis has also changed gender roles. With the departure of men in Goré Mahamat, Gouroya Souargué, and Toumboum Ali (recognized as ISWAP strongholds), women had to adapt and have engaged in activities formerly reserved to men. In addition to rural activities and petty trade, they now participate in fishing and wider-scale trade. This evolution in gender relations, opportunistic or forced, is a form of resilience, even if it is not without tension (Koultchoumi 2019). However, resilience in a context of ongoing conflict also means dealing with nonstate armed groups and submitting to their rules, making communities potentially vulnerable to counterinsurgency actions because they can be suspected of sympathizing with Boko Haram.¹⁰⁰

RESILIENCE FACTOR 2

Mobility remains a hallmark of Lake Chad communities

Mobility has been a hallmark of the Lake Chad system for a long time and has allowed for the regulation of social pressures linked to seasonal climate variability, demographics, and access to resources. Cross-border dynamics are characterized by historical trade and ethnic, cultural, and political ties, reinforced by interconnected local networks and alliances, kinship, ethnicity, and family relationships across border communities. These solidarities are key to understanding how social, economic, and power relations are being reconfigured in the current crisis.¹⁰¹ Insecurity and border closures have been major challenges to these networks¹⁰² and to mobility, but new trade routes and hubs have emerged (see box 8), showing the resilience of communities that have adapted thanks to relationships built over decades of trade and mobility.¹⁰³ For instance, lake fishermen no longer limit themselves to selling fish near the piers to traders from large metropolitan areas. They now organize their activities in sectors from fishing to marketing, sometimes including drying or smoking fish. Young people, who were restricted to smuggling *zoua-zoua* from Nigeria, are increasingly developing a system of activities that incorporate selling, transporting motorcycles, and fueling local tillers. In Niger and Cameroon, joining cooperatives enables young people to overcome the difficulties of accessing finance and markets (International Crisis Group 2017a).¹⁰⁴

Box Eight

The Emergence of Alternative Routes and Hubs

The historical trade hubs of Diffa, Kousseri, Maiduguri, and N'Djamena, although still functional, are experiencing a weakening of their regional influence in favor of new trade routes. Toward the south of the Lake Chad Basin, new corridors are emerging between Cameroon and Nigeria, particularly toward the south of the Mandara Mountains. The towns of Yola and Mubi (Nigeria) as well as Garoua, Guider, and Maroua (Cameroon) have emerged as new regional trade hubs at the expense of the traditional cross-border towns of Bama, Banki, Dikwa, Gambaru, Maiduguri, and Ngala in Nigeria and Amchidé, Limani, and Kerawa in Cameroon.^a These also serve secondary towns in Chad, such as Bongor and Léré, which could benefit from these new networks. The northern part of the region, with the axis that connects Diffa and N'Guigmi (Niger) to Chad via Lioua, Kaya, Ngouri, and Mao, is experiencing an increase in transit activities. The expansion of trade networks also better connects secondary localities that are geographically distant from the lake. This is the case of the town of Abéché in eastern Chad, which benefits from routes above the northern basin between Niger and Chad, opening up to Sudan via Kanem, Batha, and Ouaddaï. Due to insecurity, the Diffa region has become more dependent on the Kano-Zinder axis. In Chad, there is a resurgence of transit activities in secondary cities, such as Mao in Kanem, Massakory in Hadjer-Lamis, Moussoro in Bahr al-Ghazal, and Ati in Batha to join the city of Abéché to the east in Ouaddaï and, of course, N'Djamena.

Note:

a. Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018; Magrin et al. 2015.

RESILIENCE FACTOR 3

Citizens, civil society organizations and the private sector increasingly mobilize to demand better governance and inclusion

There are increasing demands for better governance, inclusion, and justice from various groups in the Lake Chad region. Civil society organizations (CSOs); citizen platforms, such as the 10 Million Northerners movement in Cameroon;¹⁰⁵ the private sector; and women and youth groups constitute a force to be reckoned with. The most tangible examples are the slow emergence of solid, investigative media (Humangle, Sembe TV) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots activism (the Knifar movement in Nigeria), which have been exerting a degree of scrutiny over the behavior of security forces. The post-Déby transition in Chad is revealing a growing mobilization of civil society organisations, even if their influence on politics remains limited.

A range of peace and conflict resolution initiatives exists that can promote resilience of the Lake Chad region. Niger's High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace is the most well-known, but other initiatives exist. For example, socioprofessional corporations, such as the Association for the Development of Livestock, work at the community level in Chad, especially in localities plagued by agropastoral conflicts. Similarly, efforts to set up a regional Platform for Dialogue and Cohesion between security forces and civil society organizations in the Far North region in Cameroon could help resolve conflicts exacerbated by the Boko Haram crisis. The National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism in Cameroon works to reduce the divide between Anglophones and Francophones and between the different language groups of the country.

RESILIENCE FACTOR 4

Customary and religious leaders, often instrumentalized by the state, can nonetheless help diffuse tensions and manage conflicts, especially at the community level

In the Lake Chad region, traditional mechanisms are mainly based on chiefdoms, which are considered the foundations for justice and social cohesion at the local level. They are represented by the Lamidos, Sultanates, and several other traditional political entities with specific nomenclature and organization. If some predate the precolonial period (Bornou, Kanem, Kotoko, Mandara, Peul), many others owe it to the will of the German (Cameroon), French (Cameroon, Niger, Chad), and British colonial administrations (Nigeria). Postcolonial states have endowed these traditional structures with assimilatory statuses, which influence their capacity to adapt to challenges and change the perception they convey to the populations.¹⁰⁶

However, the solidity and community roots of traditional institutions do not constitute a guarantee of impartiality or access to justice. With the evolving political environment, customary chiefs, who embody traditional power, agree to enter the arena of domestic politics by serving, to some extent, the politics of the government in place.¹⁰⁷ They have sometimes been co-opted by different regimes and used by ruling parties to strengthen

their community base. They became “auxiliaries of the administration” in Cameroon (Decree of 1977), “guarantors of habits and customs” in Chad (Constitution of 2018), and in Niger, “the traditional chief represents customary and traditional communities, for which he is responsible, in their relations with the administration and third parties” (Constitution of December 23, 1992, article 14). Since 2013, traditional chiefs have been entitled to a monthly allowance, and in Nigeria, each state has a Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, which allocates a budget to them.

This form of resilience is also vulnerable because the ongoing conflict has led to a reconfiguration and weakening of traditional chiefdoms. Customary leaders have been targeted, threatened, and killed by the insurgency.¹⁰⁸ In addition, and even before the insurgency, some community leaders had lost trust and legitimacy; they were considered to be politicized and corrupt, and local resolution mechanisms were perceived as weak (Vivekananda et al. 2019). With the conflict, many have fled, which feeds the perception that traditional chiefs have abandoned their communities and are unable to protect them. Aware of these threats and working to preserve their potential for influence, customary leaders have organized themselves into organizations: the National Council of Traditional Chiefs of Cameroon (Conseil National des Chefs Traditionnels du Cameroun; CNCTC), the Association of Traditional Chiefs of Niger (Association des Chefs Traditionnels du Niger; ACTN), and the Association of Traditional Chiefs in Chad (Association des Autorités Coutumières et Traditionnelles du Tchad; ACTT).

RESILIENCE FACTOR 5

Growing realization by the four countries of the need to improve cross-border cooperation and foster the reintegration of former combatants

Regional cooperation has been hampered by several challenges. Issues pertaining to improved cross-border cooperation remain because Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria do not belong to the same regional economic communities, and regional organizations tend to have overlapping membership and mandates, with funding difficulties and weak capacities. In addition, due to the regional nature of the ongoing crisis, coordination at the regional level remains challenging, given the multitude of stakeholders involved (ministries, partners, NGOs), contradictions between different projects and competing interests, which often result in duplication of efforts, in a context of limited state presence in peripheral areas and weak capacities. Difficulties in adopting a regionally integrated response hinder the recovery of the region and further undermine the resilience of communities.

The growing realization of the importance of increased regional cooperation has materialized in different ways. The four countries seem to be much more cooperative than in the past. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has the potential to play an important regional role, if supported by capacity-building initiatives. With the original mandate to coordinate the management of water resources, it has seen its prerogatives extended to include the fight against terrorism and Boko Haram with the creation of the MNJTF in 2015. However, translating its objectives into reality remains challenging, due to limited capacity and lack of resources to implement its original mandate, in addition to maintaining civilian oversight of the MNJTF. As a result, the LCBC has struggled to effectively coordinate regional efforts and exert its authority over the MNJTF, the latter also suffering from structural

weaknesses, due to confusion over priorities, delays in funding and procurement, and poor human rights records. The Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery & Resilience of the Boko Haram–Affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (RSS), adopted by the Council of Ministers of the LCBC on August 31, 2018, and endorsed by the African Union, offers a common framework for the engagement of humanitarian and development partners in the region. It constitutes a foundational element for coordinated efforts by national and local authorities across the four countries. The associated establishment of the Governors’ Forum (also known as “the Forum”) for regional cooperation on stabilization, peace building, and sustainable development interventions in the region affected by Boko Haram also aims to ensure close coordination with local authorities by offering a platform for regional leaders to foster regional diplomacy.

The four countries have established programs to encourage the defections of individuals associated with Boko Haram and help with their reintegration, reflecting the growing recognition that a security-focused response will be insufficient to end the conflict.

Approaches vary by country. In 2016, Nigeria launched Operation Safe Corridor to help low-risk Boko Haram defectors reintegrate into civilian life (International Crisis Group 2021a). A separate rehabilitation program for low-risk women was also set up (Felbab-Brown 2018). Nevertheless, the implementation of these initiatives remains difficult, hampered by considerable challenges, and faces opposition from both communities and the political class. Seen as guaranteeing amnesty for ex-combatants, these initiatives often misidentify civilians as Boko Haram members due to poor screening procedures, and violence in detention facilities is common (International Crisis Group 2021a). Other initiatives include Cameroon’s National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration for ex-Boko Haram fighters since 2018,¹⁰⁹ and Niger established an internment camp in Goudoumaria for ex-Boko Haram associates (Akum and Samuel 2020). In Chad, there is no structured reintegration program, but a semiformal effort has been carried out through traditional authorities, with state agreement (Bukarti 2020).

VII. Risks

RISK 1

The security situation in the Lake Chad region could further deteriorate as armed groups continue to spread and capture ground

The successful push by ISWAP into JASDJ territory and Shekau's death in May 2021, as well as the way his succession will unfold, pose significant risks in the Lake Chad region. If ISWAP succeeds in taking control of Shekau's forces and rallying his commanders under its banner, it will open new spaces for the insurgency to extend its area of control, consolidate and extend its networks. It could then occupy rural zones that could be taxed and governed, and security forces would face an increasingly mobile insurgency. ISWAP is now able to block all points of entry into Maiduguri. Even though direct attacks on Maiduguri remain unlikely because the army still has superior military means (such as helicopters) and ISWAP does not have access to anti-aircraft weapons, the group has significant nuisance capabilities to cause severe damage by sabotaging roads and forming blockades. Potential alliances between ISWAP and bandits operating in the North cannot be excluded. In addition, the connection between ISWAP and ISGG has led to fears that ISWAP could extend its terror operations in other parts of Nigeria and in Western Africa, and even though there is little evidence of this so far (International Crisis Group 2019a), this risk cannot be overlooked.

RISK 2

The worsening of country-specific political or security risks could impact the region

Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria face specific risks that have the potential to further destabilize the entire Lake Chad area. President Déby's death in Chad and the ongoing political transition constitute a systemic risk to Chad's stability, which could impact the region (WBG 2021b). The political balance in Chad is not yet settled, and further political crises remain possible.¹¹⁰ Chad has been at the forefront of the counterinsurgency, with direct support and involvement from Chadian troops in Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria,¹¹¹ and a continued engagement of Chadian troops in Nigerian territory remains uncertain. Recent attacks in Wulgo (Nigeria) in March 2021, warded off by the Cameroonian army, deployed from across the border, and in Diffa (Niger), have been successfully repelled, but both countries continue to face multiple insecurity hot spots, which could, in the long term, constrain their capacities to effectively respond to the insurgency. Concerns over the weakening of Nigeria's security forces remain high due to public spending inefficiencies, various insecurity hot spots, diminishing trust in the army, and a general atmosphere of skepticism concerning a potential victory against Boko Haram. The end of France's military force in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, which is to be replaced by a multilateral military cooperation via the Takuba task force headquartered in Niamey, could also create a security

vacuum if this strategy does not get sufficient buy-in from European and, more broadly, international partners (Lebovich 2021); thus, risks could increase for the entire region, including Lake Chad. Finally, the growing presence of foreign private security actors in the region could potentially further destabilize the region, given the direct links between these actors and economic activity in neighboring countries, with visible spillover effects, as recently on the border between Chad and CAR (Radio France Internationale. 2021).

RISK 3

The COVID-19 pandemic could exacerbate structural vulnerabilities

In a conflict-affected region, the current pandemic could exacerbate structural FCV drivers.

Despite the region's low international exposure due to its remoteness and isolation, COVID-19 may accelerate threats to both fragile livelihoods and lives (see box 9). The four countries remain at risk because their health systems are extremely weak and due to high vaccine hesitancy. The impact of the pandemic on the economy, combined with border closures, could lead to austerity measures and budget cuts that would impact social sectors. This comes at a time when the ongoing conflict intensifies and requires more resources.

RISK 4

Future climate impacts could intensify existing vulnerabilities and lead to new conflicts, thus further undermining people's adaptation capacities

In the Lake Chad region, future climate impacts could exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and lead to new forms of conflict.

Climate models predict more frequent extreme weather, such as multiyear droughts or floods and increased rainfall. Temperatures are projected to rise one and a half times faster than the global average (Niang et al. 2014; Vivekananda et al. 2019). Weather patterns are expected to become more unpredictable, raising concerns that current adaptation measures may no longer be sufficient (Niang et al. 2014). These worsening climate conditions could lead to new challenges, such as invasive plants and diseases affecting crops and livestock.¹¹² These uncertainties will undermine people's coping capacities and resilience, especially for those who depend on the lake for their livelihoods, therefore amplifying food insecurity. Moreover, new conflicts over land could arise due to changed rainfall patterns that modify land fertility (Vivekananda et al. 2019) and the salination of soils, preventing people from growing crops and pushing them to expand their agricultural lands—and thus leading to potential conflicts around land tenure.

Box Nine

The Impact of COVID-19: A Shock That Exacerbates Existing Vulnerabilities

As of June 2021, available reports indicate the following:

COVID-19 cases fluctuate in the Lake Chad region.^a As of July 30, 2020, 1,100 COVID-19 cases were recorded, with 71 deaths. Between May and July 2020, the highest rates of increase were registered in the Far North (7,050 percent), Adamawa (438 percent), and Borno (161 percent).^b

COVID-19 comes at a time of rising attacks and clashes between Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) on the one hand and government troops and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on the other (2020), but there is no clear connection between the two.

COVID-19 response strategies combined containment measures (relaxed at the end of 2020), temporary border closures in Chad and Niger, health measures, and resilience measures (mainly food packages and household supplies), which were largely deemed as inadequate relative to need.

COVID-19 and its response strategies have triggered a rise in the use of arbitrary powers, including arrests and detentions in the enforcement of COVID-19 containment measures. Aid and humanitarian agencies in Borno and Yobe in North East Nigeria have reported increased operational difficulties since the onset of COVID-19, the upsurge in military operations against violent extremists, and the mounting ISWAP attacks against humanitarian organizations.

Poor governance practices have been reported, in procuring equipment and medical supplies,^c in paying fees and allowances to health care workers and security agencies, and in allocating and distributing food and supplies to vulnerable persons.

The pandemic has impacted elections, including the postponement of planned legislative elections (Chad)^d and related activities such as voter registration (Niger),^e feeding suspicions of political instrumentalization.

The combination of COVID-19 and insecurity since March 2020 has affected fund-raising and the mobility of aid workers, thus disrupting the delivery of health, social, and humanitarian services to vulnerable populations that depend on them. The twin crises also increase the number and vulnerability of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), in turn increasing the risk of infection due to overcrowded refugee and IDP camps as well as limited access to camps and to services.

Note:

- a. To date, Nigeria has 199,538 confirmed cases and 2,619 deaths, followed by Cameroon with 84,210 confirmed cases and 1,357 deaths, Niger with 5,929 confirmed cases and 200 deaths, and Chad with 5,017 confirmed cases and 174 deaths (WHO, September 2021, <https://hungermap.wfp.org/>).
- b. Ismael 2021a and 2021c.
- c. A report of the Audit Chamber has highlighted the mismanagement of COVID-19 response funds in Cameroon (see Kouagheu 2021).
- d. *Le Monde* 2020.
- e. IFES 2020.

VIII. Portfolio Analysis & Recommendations

Country and regional strategies have increasingly recognized the need to address FCV as well as associated development and resilience building in the Lake Chad region.¹¹³

Governments and the WB¹¹⁴ have recognized the need to enhance engagement and support in the Lake Chad region¹¹⁵ to specifically address the emergency needs of populations in conflict-affected areas and provide critical development inputs to address the drivers of FCV and factors of resilience identified in this RRA (see appendix D for more details pertaining to the portfolio analysis).¹¹⁶

Projects align well with the development challenges identified in this RRA. Regional projects concerning the crisis in Lake Chad have focused on delivering basic services and small-scale infrastructure;¹¹⁷ service provision, including for refugees, IDPs, and host communities; and supporting agricultural and pastoral livelihoods. For example, the Lake Chad Region Recovery and Development Project (Projet pour la relance et le développement de la région du lac Tchad; PROLAC) was approved in 2020 to contribute specifically to the recovery of the Lake Chad region. Programming across all four countries and regional projects reflects the need to improve access to productive natural resources, services, and jobs, as well as to address issues of social cohesion, trust in the state, and social accountability (see appendix D). In Nigeria, important resources have been allocated to the Lake Chad area. Projects in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe total over US\$650 million and focus on basic services—health, social protection, education—and public financial management. Just over US\$350 million of this amount is allocated to the Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria (MCRP).

The portfolio analysis highlighted a tension typical of FCV contexts between the need for an ambitious investment strategy and limited delivery capacity. In the Lake Chad region, project teams have generally faced challenges in programming and implementing large amounts of funds, when the institutional capacity to deliver is thin. Going forward, this tension could be addressed by taking a focused and realistic approach in the short-term, as part of a long-term strategy - today's investments are seen as the foundation stones for stronger, country-owned institutions that are strengthened over time.

The impacts of nascent development investments in the Lake Chad region are limited by several challenges. *First*, many projects have experienced significant delays due to both the difficulty of operating in the region and the COVID-19 pandemic. Pandemic-related disruptions have affected the ability of the WB and government counterparts to work together to address bottlenecks, and project implementation, including monitoring and evaluation and procurement. Some projects were able to adapt and resume work fairly quickly, but others remained stalled. *Second*, project designs have not always incorporated design elements consistent with the guidance of the FCV strategy to employ “selectivity, simplicity, and flexibility at the core of the implementation model” (WBG 2020c), and government programs and projects supported by the WB appear, at times, to be missing key areas of project readiness at the time of approval, reflecting trade-offs between delivering quickly and effectively and designs of large, multisectoral, highly ambitious

projects. As a result, many projects have struggled to roll out quickly and effectively and are underperforming. *Third*, projects have suffered from gaps between project ambitions and local skills, the networks of counterparts and contractors, and the ownership needed to successfully design and deliver interventions. This is the case for activities, aimed at building large infrastructure, promoting social cohesion, and/or local governance within project cycles, which have struggled.

The recommendations below were formulated after considering the diagnostic of FCV drivers, factors of resilience and risks. This section sets out how the WB can better respond to and address FCV issues and dynamics, including recommendations for strategic vision, operational focus, and operational effectiveness. Given the diversity of the four countries covered in this RRA, these recommendations should be seen as overarching principles of engagement that should inform programmatic discussions in each country, rather than prescriptive directions for WB programming. This section also considers recommendations outlined in national-level RRAs conducted for the four countries and the Sahel RRA, the findings of the portfolio analysis that was carried out as part of the RRA process as well as the review of operational challenges and opportunities based on interviews and external consultations with the WB country team and development partners (see box 10).¹¹⁸ The recommendations presented in this RRA should not be read as the total sum of actions needed, or as ‘quick fixes,’ to be addressed within the next round of IDA alone. Instead, they should be embedded within a regional vision, and accompanied by strategic investments in boosting staffing in the region, convening development partners, and strengthening client relationships, over a sustained period. This section also outlines cross-cutting principles for WB engagement in the Lake Chad region (see box 11).

Box Ten

Key Takeaways from Internal and External Conversations

Task teams takeaways:^a

- Highly diverse situations^b call for context-specific approaches, tailored to the needs of areas within the broader Lake Chad region.
- To effectively engage citizens, the capacities of both local actors and civil society organizations (CSOs) need to be built in a sustainable manner.
- The fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) strategy highlights the importance of leveraging operational flexibilities, but they remain largely underutilized.
- Although security monitoring is no silver bullet to deal with complex conflict environments, it is critical that project implementation units include experienced security specialists tasked with real-time monitoring of the security situation.
- Creative incentives to ensure continued progress should be further explored.
- Cross-fertilization, or learning through regular exchanges and communication, should be encouraged among task teams working on the Lake Chad region.

Box Ten Cont'd

Development partner and humanitarian agency takeaways:^c

- Deteriorating security conditions and the impact of counterinsurgency measures constrain access, which requires a coordinated effort when engaging with local officials.
- Support should better target marginalized groups to ensure their effective economic and political inclusion.
- The lack of contractors remains an issue, and tools should be developed to foster cooperation between partners.

Middle East and North Africa region takeaways:^d

- Increased insecurity in volatile environments, forced displacement, protracted violence, and the need to address long-standing grievances exacerbated by active conflicts have paved the way for the development of a new approach in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen to complement approaches focusing on physical reconstruction and rebuilding central government institutions. This approach could usefully inform the design and implementation of a more holistic and multisectoral response to FCV challenges through a “build back better” lens in the Lake Chad region. This includes (i) setting a geographic approach through clear targeting criterion, through a double filter of security conditions and population concentration (mutually reinforcing), which could shift the implementation of activities in secured urban centers and their immediate vicinities; (ii) building on existing local capacities to support service delivery in dense urban centers: assessing local capacities in a holistic manner (local authorities, CSOs, community-based organizations) and mapping existing support financed by other partners; clarifying the role of local authorities as part of program implementation; and establishing an agile and flexible mechanism of allocation and reallocation of funds to incentivize results. The amount of the first allocation of funds to support the recoveries of cities liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was limited, and the volume of following allocations depended on progress made in project implementation to create incentives for local authorities to efficiently use support provided by the WBG.


Note:

- a. This includes exchanges with the task teams of the Lake Chad Region Recovery and Development Project, the Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria, the Refugees and Host Communities Support Project, and the Community Development Program Support Project Response to Forced Displacement.
- b. In terms of security, density of population, governance structure, and local capacity.
- c. A workshop with development partners and humanitarian agencies was organized on June 15, 2021, and included the United Nations Development Programme; the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the African Development Bank; the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office; KfW; the German Agency for International Cooperation; the International Committee of the Red Cross; Catholic Relief Services; and Search for Common Ground.
- d. A discussion with task teams in the Middle East and North Africa region was organized on February 19, 2021, to discuss operational modalities in conflict-affected zones such as Iraq, Libya, and Yemen to draw lessons learned from WB engagement in this region.

A. Sequencing Interventions for Enhanced Impact

Given the magnitude of both the needs and the challenges to be addressed in the Lake Chad region, the WB should adopt a sequenced approach, in close coordination with development partners engaged in the region. There is scope for the WB to scale up its development support to the region to facilitate a transition from a humanitarian to a development response in the Lake Chad Region (see figure 7). WB interventions should focus on quick results to address the most urgent needs, such as supporting government counterparts in their efforts to increase livelihoods, basic social services, and small-scale economic infrastructure and provide support to internally displaced persons, refugees, and returnees (short term), with the objective to support stabilization and recovery, such as develop value chains, improve shared water resources management, enhance governance through policy reforms and promote larger investments (medium- to long-term). In a context of diminished trust and broken social contract, and to promote people-centered approaches in development processes, emphasis should be given on both investments (the “what”) and decision-making and implementation processes (the “how”). In addition, to increase effectiveness on the ground, the WB should continue its engagement with security-humanitarian-peacebuilding-development nexus (see figures 8 and 9).

Figure 7: A phased approach: from a humanitarian to a development response




Source: PROLAC

Figure 8: Cooperation with partners alongside the security-humanitarian-peacebuilding-development nexus



Source: PROLAC

Figure 9: Konna Wheel



Source: PROLAC

B. Strategic Recommendations

Keep the modalities of WB engagement simple, flexible, and focused.

Excessively sophisticated designs and expected speed in both design and implementation are recipes for setbacks. To avoid stretching capacities too thin and embarking on overly ambitious operations, designs and objectives should remain simple, flexible, and realistic,¹¹⁹ while recognizing that delivering meaningful results takes time. Needs are huge, but to maximize the impact of government programs supported by the WB, interventions should be sequenced and prioritized by focusing on multisectoral operations that align with FCV priorities. In particular, programs should support regional cooperation, livelihoods, social cohesion, and connectivity (transportation, energy, and digital access). In addition, they should encourage regional dialogue between local government officials in the four countries, data collection, and knowledge generation, particularly through the active PROLAC.¹²⁰ This also aligns with the priority areas identified by governments and the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum, which highlighted the need for a “big push” to break the feedback loop between suboptimal territorial development, fragility, and conflict drivers (WBG 2021a).

Mobilize WB convening power to foster regional coordination and dialogue.

The WB is supporting regionally coordinated efforts to address the crisis in the Lake Chad region with the biannual organization of the Lake Chad Ministerial Roundtable, which aims to sustain a strong regional momentum, even if country participation has been heterogeneous so far.¹²¹ Going forward, government programs supported by the WB that promote regional cooperation and knowledge generation,¹²² such as PROLAC, which organizes the annual International Forum on the Development of the Lake Chad Region, should buttress these high-level initiatives. Building on PROLAC, the Cameroon and Nigeria Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments processes and the Lake Chad Ministerial Roundtable, governments with the support of the WB could explore peacebuilding tools, such as compacts or results matrices, based on a joint understanding of challenges and opportunities for the Lake Chad region, with the objective to bring coherence between humanitarian and development engagement, as well as finding vehicles for discussions related to security and political challenges.

Enhance coordination among partners along the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through concrete cooperation mechanisms.

The coordinated engagement of humanitarian and development partners should be fully aligned with the nine pillars of the RSS. Nonetheless, effective cooperation on the ground remains challenging due to the complex operating environment and the multiplicity of actors present in the region. Two mechanisms could be developed to bring the nexus to life:

- **Clarify the division of labor and roles in key sectors.** Within the Sahel Alliance, the WBG is coordinating the energy work group (as *chef de file*), which improved cooperation at the project level. Such a division of labor could be replicated for the Lake Chad region to prevent duplication of efforts.
- **Support the establishment of a regional database for humanitarian and development partners,** aimed at sharing resources, pooling the preparation of feasibility studies, listing reliable contractors and qualified implementing partners on the ground, and increasing the visibility of bidding demands.

C. Programmatic Recommendations

To respond to the multidimensional crisis in the Lake Chad region, government programs supported by the WB should pursue engagement and efforts along the following dimensions:

- **Address governance challenges** focusing on participation and inclusion, to restore the link between state and citizens and a positive state presence through effective decentralization processes, federal Nigeria aside, with emphasis on participatory local development processes and increased local investments targeting the Lake Chad regions, and strengthened subnational governance (increased fiscal transfers and capacity building to empower local governments for improved performance in areas such as public financial management, procurement, and to address human resource, material, logistical, and institutional constraints). This could include working with traditional and informal governance structures to ensure inclusion, participation, and accountability, but also to support the capacities of CSOs in the technical areas of monitoring, budget and financial analysis and advocacy, and promotion of public transparency in key sectors and areas (public procurement, extractive industries, land management, public works, taxation). In addition, improving the rule of law and access to justice (deployment of mobile legal clinics, support to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms) is paramount in helping address grievances and rebuild trust.
- **Support human capital development** (education, health, social protection) to demonstrate tangible progress and restore state legitimacy and trust. This would entail continued support for improved access and delivery of basic services by improving coverage and the quality of services, supporting decentralized modes of delivery, and focusing on inclusivity (urban/rural, areas with no services, women, and vulnerable groups) as well as reducing inequalities in the provision of public infrastructure and services.
- **Support the economic inclusion of youth and women** by focusing on creating opportunities for employment, livelihood diversification, and training and by emphasizing geographic and economic disparities, including through skills development and training programs in urban areas, especially secondary cities. Economic opportunities and sources of livelihoods would provide alternatives and incentives not to engage with armed groups. Interventions should consider the unintended positive changes that have resulted from the conflict with regard to the position of women in society or economic opportunities for women and youth. Government projects supported by the WB should leverage and support adaptive strategies and not merely focus on restoring preconflict livelihoods.
- **Focus on employment creation and inclusive local economic development** by fostering private sector development and small-scale trade by mobilizing the dynamic network of chambers of commerce and professional and farmers' associations, focusing on women and youth.
- **Enhance disaster risk management and climate change adaptation and mitigation** to alleviate the impact of climate-related shocks that exacerbate poverty, precarity, and fragility and reduce land pressure, emphasizing capacity building among local authorities and communities to build community-level resilience capacities to recurrent climate shocks and stresses. For instance, mitigation activities in the region could include landscape and watershed management, ecosystem restoration, sustainable management of forests, and regenerative agriculture.

D. Operational Recommendations

Adjust operating modalities to accommodate diverse security situations and enhance implementation/supervision.

In insecure environments, building flexibility and adaptability is key and will require close monitoring of the situation while building in risk mitigation measures. WB engagement modalities should be designed to enable swift adaptation to degrading security conditions on the ground. The implementation of government programs supported by the WB should therefore be modular, iterative, and incremental. In areas with worsening risk indicators, security should be immediately reassessed, and operations suspended or relocated to areas deemed safer. In areas where security risks are high (red zones), different forms of implementation and supervision should be explored. This includes third party monitoring through the UN, NGOs, and international and local humanitarian organizations as well as through the use of Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS); these modalities have been used in active conflicts to overcome challenges of limited access. Services can be delivered through a diverse set of governance arrangements and not necessarily through the government or through decentralized structures.

Prioritize a specific and distinct approach to addressing the root causes and mitigating the impacts of the conflict in the Lake Chad region.

Although increased attention has been paid to the specific challenges of the Lake Chad region under the ongoing IDA cycle,¹²³ translation into country-level strategic documents (Systematic Country Diagnostics [SCDs] and Country Partnership Frameworks [CPFs]) and active and pipeline projects has remained uneven and should be strengthened. On the climate front, there is an opportunity to include in WB strategic documents recommendations from the Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR). To reduce marginalization and regional imbalances, it is critical to implement a systematic spatial approach across the portfolio of the four countries.¹²⁴ In addition, differentiating the approach according to the specific needs and vulnerabilities of populations should be mainstreamed, with the development of an appropriate targeting mechanism to ensure that interventions reach high-risk, vulnerable populations and specific marginalized geographic areas. This also includes a more concerted effort to ensure IDPs benefit from national development efforts. As the region suffers from a dearth of periodic data and diagnostics, this would require enhancing the quality of data in the region, which will aid in identifying priorities that call for tailored interventions.

E. Additional Action Points for Consideration

Deepen engagement with local actors, from project design to implementation.

Engaging more widely with nontraditional and local actors would allow for a better understanding of power dynamics at the local level while ensuring inclusion in consultation processes. However, it is critical to understand and identify that first-best policies may not be the optimal implementable policies (second-best but feasible) when in the presence of powerful actors who can block or undermine them. Leveraging available local resources

is therefore paramount. Government programs supported by the WB—from design to implementation—should focus on capacity building (skills, local contextual knowledge, and established coordination structures) over a sustained period and enhanced engagement with local actors, such as CSOs and community-based organizations, traditional and religious leaders, and professional organizations, with the objective to increase bottom-up accountability and transparency in local decision-making and planning processes. In an environment characterized by a relative scarcity of capable and experienced facilitation partners on the ground, interventions aimed at supporting local capacity and encouraging the development of stronger CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) should be prioritized. The community-driven development (CDD) approach, which has a proven track record in FCV contexts, can be a useful way to empower CBOs. At a minimum, task teams managing programs operating in the region should encourage clients to partner with local NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs when possible to deliver investments and ensure that sufficient funding is allocated to capacity building and facilitation support when preparing budgets.

Strengthen coherence and inter-connectedness of conflict prevention and mitigation efforts across countries.

The WB is supporting countries' efforts to address drivers of conflict and the consequences of conflict across the region, including through significant financial top-ups provided for Governments that take proactive measures to prevent the escalation of conflict. In spite of the significant cross-border elements of the conflicts, most country prevention strategies and associated milestones that are conditions for financial support under the IDA FCV Envelope remain focused on national measures and accountabilities. Greater leverage could be sought through this financing to introduce cross-border or regional milestones.

Maximize available resources.

In the context of limited partners and a thin network of private actors, the breaking down of large procurement contracts into several smaller bids would encourage bidding offers from local firms or CSOs.

Box Eleven

Cross-Cutting Principles for WB Engagement in the Lake Chad Region

- **Ensure fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) sensitivity across the portfolio.** Mainstream an FCV-sensitive approach in WB programming, including conflict/peace filters, promoting *do no harm*, and ensuring that government programs supported by the WB address, to the extent possible, FCV drivers, build on resilience factors, and respond to the impact of the crisis (forced displacement; community-based psychosocial support, including for victims of gender-based violence; sensitization sessions and training on nonviolent conflict resolution mechanisms; reintegration of former combatants). At the same time, government interventions supported by the WB should be realistic and achievable, aiming to attain visible results in the short term, and being careful not to overcommit.
- **Mobilize the full range of tools available to work in conflict-affected environments.** Over the years, a range of dedicated tools and flexibilities have been created within WB procedures to facilitate engagement in FCV environments. These tools should be fully leveraged for the Lake Chad region, including technologies allowing enhanced beneficiary engagement, planning, monitoring, and accountability in hard-to-reach and insecure areas (Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision, Iterative Beneficiary Monitoring). Importantly, tasks teams should be encouraged to fully mobilize existing flexibilities in procurement, financial management, and environmental and social frameworks.^a
- **Mainstream citizen engagement in government programs supported by the WB.** This can be achieved by implementing grievance redress mechanisms; state-citizen feedback loops; community-driven development approaches; and participatory local development planning, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation. These engagements can ensure that local voices are taken into account and can help restore social cohesion with the meaningful participation of women and youth; they can also build on existing mechanisms to the extent possible. These activities should include local authorities to ensure sustainability and ownership of government interventions supported by the WB. In addition, local development plans should be inclusive and encompass the needs of both host communities and displaced people.
- **Invest in analytics and data collection to boost the understanding of key risks in the short and medium term.** Special emphasis should be placed on collecting data related to real and perceived grievances—which can be disaggregated by location, gender, and demography—and on sectors, such as justice, for which data are not available. In addition, better leveraging technology could help improve accountability, transparency, and public administration.

Note:

- a. For example, a broadly defined contingent emergency response component, remote monitoring tools, hands-on expanded implementation support, and fast-track procurement.

Appendix A.

Society & Diversity in the LCB

The archaeological record of human habitation in the LCB dates back more than 3,000 years (Connah 1981). The Lake Chad region is defined by mobility and very significant cultural and linguistic heterogeneity. Islam spread to the region through trans-Saharan trade during the 11th century, and Christianity arrived with European missionaries during the 20th century. The largest premodern state was Kanem-Borno. From its origins north of the lake, it lasted—in different iterations and with shifts in its capital—from the 9th century until the 19th century (the Saifawa dynasty, which had ruled for a millennium, ended in 1846, when the el-Kanemi dynasty was established) (Brenner 1973). Smaller states, which were variously rivals or clients, were Baghirmi, Wadai, and Wandala. Many people in the region lived on the peripheries or outside of these polities and were subjected to slave raiding; in response, they established refuge settlements in less accessible areas, especially in hilly terrain (MacEachern 2018).

Throughout the region’s history, economic activities, settlement patterns, and livelihoods have been shaped not only by political relations but also by the ecology, topography, and climate. Rainfall diminishes from south to north, and as it does so, vegetation becomes sparse. Access to water is a major influence on production and settlement. Important water sources (apart from Lake Chad itself) include the Chari-Logone Basin (which supplies some 90 percent of the lake’s water), the Komadugu-Yobe River, and the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands. Farmers, herders, and fishers depend on the water and productive land in these areas, which, at least in the past, were also important for their biodiversity. Farming is also adapted to soil types, which range from black, loamy clay soil (*firgi*) south of Lake Chad—which is well suited to sorghum cultivation—to sandy soil and dune fields (Mohammed 2020) to rocky terrain that is farmed through terracing in the Mandara Mountains and at Sukur in Adamawa.

The LCB is a unique confluence of different languages and people. Kanuri, a Nilo-Saharan language, is spoken by about half the population of Borno State, parts of Yobe, and the border areas of Diffa in Niger. Afro-Asiatic languages are represented by the multitude of Chadic languages spoken in the region and by Shuwa/Chadian Arabic. The Chadic languages are widely distributed and comprise many minority groups, from Bade, Bole, and Karekare in Yobe State to Marghi, Kibaku, and Bura-Pabir in southern Borno to Kamwe, Kilba, and many more in northern Adamawa. More than 20 distinct languages are spoken in the Mandara Mountains of Nigeria and Cameroon (Mafa is one of the larger ones). Whereas some Chadic languages are spoken by small groups in specific villages, others are associated historically with larger chiefdoms. These include Lagwan, spoken by the Kotoko people near the lake in northern Cameroon, and Wandala, the remnants of which are now limited to the Mora area in the lowlands of north Cameroon, adjacent to the Mandara Mountains. At the lake itself, Yedina is a significant language, and the Buduma (or Yedina) people are known as fishers and as herders of Kuri cattle, a breed with bulbous horns adapted to the lake. The Buduma are also known historically as raiders (Baroin 2005), and some in the current conflict joined

Boko Haram to reclaim control of the lake from ethnic rivals. Hausa is the most widely spoken Chadic language in northern Nigeria, and it is the lingua franca in Maiduguri and elsewhere—though it is not spoken everywhere in the LCB, especially in rural areas where Kanuri predominates. Shuwa Arabic is the primary language of the Shuwa Arabs, and they have a substantial population in the region, related historically (tracing back to 17th century migrations) to Baggara herders from the Sudan (Braukämper 2004). The Shuwa are engaged in pastoralism, agriculture, and the cattle trade, and they have been heavily impacted by Boko Haram attacks, especially in the Kala Balge and Marte LGAs of Borno. Fulfulde is the language of the pastoral Fulani/Peul, and as a west Atlantic language of Niger-Congo, it represents the third major language group, converging with Nilo-Saharan and the Afro-Asiatic languages of the LCB. Fulfulde has an extensive regional distribution and is a lingua franca in the town of Maroua and (along with Hausa) in Yola.

Linguistic and ethnographic studies show significant mutual influence between groups, with historic interaction and linguistic borrowings in lexicon and syntax (Jungraitmayr and Leger 2020). There are, nonetheless, social divisions. These divisions were established in the colonial and postcolonial states of the region and, historically, through raiding and slavery; in what are termed *prey-predator interfaces*, the Muslim states of Kanem-Borno, Baghirmi, and Wandala enslaved people in their peripheries (David 2014). Local memory has been reactivated by comparable predations by Boko Haram, notably in minority areas such as southern Borno, northern Adamawa, and the Mandara Mountains (David 2014; MacEachern 2018). Across the LCB, social and livelihood distinctions also exist between pastoralists and cultivators, Christian minorities and Muslim majorities, hill dwellers engaged in terraced farming and lowland farmers, urban and rural, and now between “host” communities and displaced people.

The destruction and dislocations inflicted during 10 years of war need to be understood in detail. There are local specificities in the social and economic impacts of the war. Due to the region’s diversity, the war has affected society in different ways because the conflict dynamics vary across communities and geographies (Monguno and Umaru 2020). In addition to local differences in conflict impacts, there are also regional patterns; these include farmland and pasture being abandoned and up to 2 million people, many from rural areas, being displaced to Maiduguri and other cities, to camps in militarized local government headquarters, or across borders as refugees. In all of this, there is inequality and uneven power between individuals and groups in terms of access to the state and the representation of different groups in government. Finally, access to education will be crucial for the region’s future (NORRAG 2016). Schools and higher education institutions have been badly affected by the conflict, and many schools were destroyed by Boko Haram (“Western education is forbidden”). There are disparities in educational access across locations and social groups—as well as differences in attitudes to Western education—but, in general, young people strongly desire education and skills.

Appendix B.

Chronology of the Boko Haram Crisis

A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOKO HARAM

<p>2003</p> <p>Creation of a more radical militant commune in Yobe State by “Nigerian Taliban”</p>	<p>1990 TO 2002</p> <p>Growing influence of Salafism and militant Islam in the North of Nigeria with the emergence of Mohamed Yusuf, who detaches himself from his mentor, Ja’afar Mahmud Sdam, creating Boko Haram</p>
<p>SEPT 2010 - AUG 2011</p> <p>Under new leader Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram conducted the first significant armed operation (Bauchi prison) with a following campaign of bombings and targeted killings against police and UN headquarters in Abuja</p>	<p>26-29 JULY 2009</p> <p>Start of the insurgency: Boko Haram rises up in arms in Maiduguri and other towns in the North East</p>
<p>SEPT 2013 - APRIL 2014</p> <p>Boko Haram attack on Maiduguri airport and air force base and kidnapping of 276 female students in Chibok</p>	<p>1 JANUARY 2012</p> <p>Ansaru, a jihadi group with connections to Al-Qaeda in Nigeria, announces its creation, condemning Shekau’s extreme violence, notably attacks against Muslim civilians</p>
<p>MARCH 2015</p> <p>Under military pressure from Nigeria and moral pressure from internal critics, Shekau pledges allegiance to the Islamic State and Boko Haram becomes ISWAP</p>	<p>MAY 2014</p> <p>The four Lake Chad heads of state agree in Paris to wage joint war on Boko Haram and to reactivate the Multinational Joint Task Force. Boko Haram begins attacks in Cameroon and Niger</p>
<p>JULY - SEPT 2018</p> <p>ISWAP carnage: attacks against Nigerian military bases in Yobe, 110 schoolgirls kidnapped in Dapchi, and execution of an International Committee of the Red Cross nurse</p>	<p>24 DEC 2016</p> <p>A joint Cameroon-Nigerian offensive reaches into the heart of the Sambisa Forest, Shekau’s stronghold</p>
<p>MARCH 2020 - APRIL 2021</p> <p>Attacks (in Bohoma, Damsak, Mainok, and Dikwa) and counteroffensives by the Nigerian and Chadian armies</p>	<p>JULY 2019</p> <p>Decision of the Nigerian army to regroup troops in northern Borno on a number of key positions, the “super camps,” allowing ISWAP to increase its area of influence</p>
<p>OCTOBER 2021</p> <p>Announcement by the Borno State government to close all IDP camps within Maiduguri by December 31, 2021</p>	<p>MAY 2021</p> <p>Death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau</p>

Appendix C.

Partners

Lake Chad countries are part of different regional organizations and initiatives, and the only common denominators are the LCBC, currently focused on water and natural resource management and formally in charge of the MNJTF, and the continent-wide AU.¹²⁵ Three are part of the LCBC's MNJTF (Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria), two are part of the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (Chad and Niger), two are part of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Chad and Niger), two are part of ECOWAS (Niger and Nigeria), and only one is in the West African Monetary and Economic Union (Niger). Accordingly, only the LCBC and the AU have strategies specifically focused on Lake Chad as a region. The AU and LCBC's RSS was adopted in 2018 at the ministerial level. The RSS aims to restore security and bring relief to communities affected by Boko Haram insurgency in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. For that, the RSS seeks to offer a common framework for the engagement of humanitarian and development partners in the region, around nine pillars spanning the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (see table E.1).

As for international partners, only one has a Lake Chad strategy. In contrast, there are more than 20 West Sahel strategies or plans among international partners. This contrast is stark, especially considering that both crises have similar levels of violence, with an acute and chronic humanitarian crisis, massive forced displacement, and local dimensions and regional channels of transmission, thereby threatening neighboring countries, including poor, unstable countries as well as economic powerhouses. Taking all official development assistance (ODA) to the four countries, the main donors (2017–19) were the World Bank, the United States, EU institutions, Germany, France, the International Monetary Fund and the United Kingdom.¹²⁶ But among all international partners, the only strategy focused on the Lake Chad region is that of France, and it is not a cross-ministerial strategy but rather one written and primarily owned by the Agence Française de Développement.

At a more operational level, several international partners have regional and/or multicountry programs. Here, *regional* implies engaging with regional organizations and initiatives and/or cross-border components; *multicountry* merely means there are direct, bilateral programs with multiple countries. The following are examples:

- The EU has over 30 regional and multicountry projects in West Africa, funded by the Environmental Defense Fund, the Emergency Trust Fund (which ended in 2020), the African Peace Facility, and the Instrument for Stability/Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace. One such project is focused on Lake Chad: the US\$31 million Redressement Economique et Social Inclusif du Lac Tchad (RESILAC) project. RESILAC aims to (i) strengthen social cohesion by supporting territorial development and providing psychosocial assistance to victims of violence, (ii) contribute to the economic recovery of the region by creating jobs on sites to rehabilitate community facilities and supporting agricultural microentrepreneurship and apprenticeship, and (iii) improve the governance of municipalities for a more effective management of territories and natural resources. The EU also supports the MNJTF through its African Peace Facility, in particular by supporting infrastructure and transport and communication assets to allow the force

to effectively coordinate and command operations in line with the tasks outlined in its concept of operations. Overall, the main objectives of the EU response are (i) to help prevent a general destabilization of the Lake Chad region, (ii) to help reduce the physical threat from Boko Haram to the people of the region, and (iii) to contribute a long-term solution for the root causes that fuel the insurgency (EEAS 2015).

- The World Bank is deploying five regional or multicountry projects in West Africa, and one concerns Lake Chad: the US\$170 million PROLAC. PROLAC aims to contribute to the recovery of the Lake Chad region by supporting regional coordinating and crisis monitoring, connectivity, and agricultural livelihoods in selected provinces of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (participating countries).
- The United Nations Development Programme established the Regional Stabilization Facility for Lake Chad in 2017 with support from the EU, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. It is a financing facility that aims to facilitate the implementation of the AU and LCBC's RSS.

Given that most have either continental/West Africa strategies and/or country strategies, the table below lists the one(s) most relevant to the LCB as a region.

Table E.1: Strategies and Projects Most Relevant to the LCB as a Region

REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PARTNER; STRATEGY MOST RELEVANT TO LAKE CHAD AS A REGION	FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE (FCV) ISSUES	RESILIENCE FACTORS
<p>African Union (AU) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC):</p> <p>Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-Affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (2018)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. “A structural and persistent development deficit” 2. “A breakdown of the social contract that has manifested in lawlessness and a violent extremist insurgency” 3. “An unfolding environmental disaster that cannot be stopped, but which requires attention and resources to mitigate the impact on people, and to help them to absorb shocks and adapt over time” 	<p>The strategy is built on nine principles and nine “pillars” that reflect a vision of what is, or should be, the region’s resilience factors.</p> <p>Principles:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National and regional ownership/ political cooperation 2. Leadership: national, regional, and continental 3. Mutual accountability 4. Cooperation and complementarity 5. Mutually reinforcing partnerships 6. Transformative approaches to stabilization/development 7. Respect for regional, continental, and international human rights instruments 8. Capacity building for effective service delivery 9. Gender mainstreaming <p>Pillars:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political cooperation 2. Security and human rights 3. disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, reinsertion, and reintegration of persons associated with Boko Haram 4. Humanitarian assistance 5. Governance and the social contract 6. Socioeconomic recovery and environmental sustainability 7. Education, learning, and skills 8. Prevention of violent extremism and building peace 9. Empowerment and inclusion of women and youth

REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PARTNER; STRATEGY MOST RELEVANT TO LAKE CHAD AS A REGION	FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE (FCV) ISSUES	RESILIENCE FACTORS
<p>LCBC:</p> <p>Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan (2016)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hydrologic risks 2. Pollution risks 3. Underdevelopment and limited access to basic services 4. High demographic growth 5. Insecurity 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A very productive socioeconomic system, supporting the livelihoods of over 2 million people and feeds over 13 million 2. A resilient system, thanks to mobility, multiactivity, and multifunctionality
<p>European Union (EU):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional cooperation with the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the West African Monetary and Economic Union, including the African Peace Facility support to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) • Regional projects, notably funded by the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, including the Redressement Economique et Social Inclusif du Lac Tchad (RESILAC) project (implemented by the Agence Française de Développement) and the EU and International Organization for Migration (IOM) Joint Initiative in the Sahel and Lake Chad region (implemented by the IOM) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Exclusion, inequality, elite capture of resources, endemic corruption, and the failure of successive governments to provide security, justice, and social services to the population in the affected areas; high levels of poverty: an important enabling factor 2. In North East Nigeria, a history of protest movements and reformist jihads dating back to the early 19th century 3. Patronage systems have led to huge inequality between those who have benefited from a close association with the state and those who have not 4. The often heavy-handed response by the Nigerian army in response to the insurgency; resulting sense of grievance and injustice 5. Rapid population growth, exclusive economic growth, a weak business environment, the scarcity of natural resources, and neglect by government has led to high levels of poverty in North East Nigeria and northern parts of Cameroon, compounded by environmental degradation, increasing desertification, and the reduction in the size of Lake Chad, reducing the prospects for employment and sustainable livelihoods 6. Resentment, in particular among the youth, reinforced by weak or failing education and health systems^a 7. Regionalization of the Boko Haram threat; limitations of bilateral responses^b 	<p>None explicitly listed</p>

REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PARTNER; STRATEGY MOST RELEVANT TO LAKE CHAD AS A REGION	FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE (FCV) ISSUES	RESILIENCE FACTORS
<p>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO):</p> <p>Lake Chad Basin Crisis: Response Strategy (2017–2019)</p>	<p>Complex, interrelated socio-environmental and ecological issues affecting rural and urban livelihoods: demographic growth; harsh competition over natural and economic resources; lack of income opportunities; the marginalization of vulnerable groups (returnees, youth, and women); negative coping strategies; social inequalities; governance issues; and the resulting conflict and insecurity. In addition, FCV drivers by sector (fisheries, livestock).</p>	<p>Factors of resilience are not explicitly identified, but the FAO’s approach rests on experience in the Lake Chad Basin and elsewhere:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The “cash+” approach (combination of cash transfers and the provision of short-cycle agricultural/livestock inputs along with technical training) 2. Community-based <i>Caisses de résilience</i> approach 3. Safe access to fuel and energy 4. Ecosystem approach to fisheries 5. Sustainable natural resource management 6. Conflict prevention, sustaining peace and social cohesion
<p>France/Agence Française de Développement:</p> <p>“Initiative Lac Tchad, Réponse de l’AFD à la crise liée à Boko Haram” (2016), which comprises several country-specific projects and one regional project, the Redressement Economique et Social Inclusif du Lac Tchad (RESILAC)</p>	<p>Structural vulnerabilities, including a lack of opportunities for youth, territorial inequalities, and tensions around natural resources, constitute fertile ground for expanding the Boko Haram movement and upset the community and economic balances of the subregion. These vulnerabilities include the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Environmental factors: hydrology of the lake; high variability of ecosystems; high vulnerability of Sahelo-Saharan environments to climate change and seasonality; chronic tensions around access to land and other resources; agropastoral and fishery production systems sometimes inspired by conventional models and often not sustainable 2. Governance: areas remote from the central state; insufficient or obsolete infrastructure; limited (state and nonstate) services; feeling of marginalization and rejection of a state seen as inefficient and “punitive” 	<p>Not systematically listed, but includes the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Local mediation mechanisms (for local conflicts, not region-wide conflicts) 2. In Cameroon, stronger state presence than in other neighboring countries, an “advanced” decentralization process, and an important donor presence^c <p>The RESILAC project is built on components that reflect a vision of what is, or should be, the region’s resilience factors:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Multisector, integrated investment (WASH, health, education) in rural and urban areas that are key to social cohesion 2. Support to institutions for more inclusive and effective public policies regarding basic services as well as training, employment, and private sector development

REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PARTNER; STRATEGY MOST RELEVANT TO LAKE CHAD AS A REGION	FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE (FCV) ISSUES	RESILIENCE FACTORS
	<p>3. Socioeconomic dimensions: pluriactive and mobile populations but impacted by violence; ethnolinguistic mosaic and rivalries prior to the conflict but exacerbated by it; youth excluded from economic opportunities; intergenerational divides; chronic but uneven poverty from one area to another; limited access of small producers to markets</p>	<p>3. Support to food security and natural resources management, targeting value chains and small-scale farming, livestock, and fisheries impacted by insecurity, and investing in community mediation for equitable and sustainable management of natural resources</p> <p>4. Support to the socioeconomic insertion of youth: skills training in higher-potential sectors; labor-intensive works; cultural and sports activities</p>
<p>Germany:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Marshall Plan with Africa (2017) • Financial and technical support to the LCBC • Regional projects, such as Applied Water Resource Management in the Lake Chad Basin (2019–22) 	<p>Climate change, food insecurity, social tensions, rising poverty</p>	<p>Projects funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development focus on</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Building the capacities of local organizations; and 2. Supporting the implementation of local development plans and the sustainable management of natural resources.
<p>Sweden:</p> <p>Strategy for Regional Cooperation with Africa (2016–21)</p>	<p>Climate, resilience, and renewable energy; democracy, gender equality, and political and human rights; economic integration, employment, and migration; human security and freedom from violence; sexual and reproductive health and rights; but no country strategies with the four countries or Lake Chad as region</p>	
<p>United Kingdom</p>	<p>Heavy investment in Nigeria but no Lake Chad strategy or projects; analytical work on Lake Chad (2021)</p>	
<p>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Stabilization Facility for Lake Chad • Regional projects, such improving Lake Chad management by building climate change resilience and reducing ecosystem stress (funded by the Global Environment Facility, 2018–21) 	<p>Regional Stabilization Facility: same drivers of FCV and resilience as in the AU-LCBC’s RSS</p>	
<p>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</p>	<p>Important support to the four countries and a 2020 Central Sahel strategy, but no Lake Chad strategy</p>	

REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PARTNER; STRATEGY MOST RELEVANT TO LAKE CHAD AS A REGION	FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE (FCV) ISSUES	RESILIENCE FACTORS
United States	West Africa strategy (conflict management, inclusive growth, resilience, health) and heavy investment in Niger and Nigeria, but no Lake Chad strategy or projects	
World Bank: Projet pour la relance et le développement de la région du Lac Tchad (PROLAC)	<p>Competition for natural resources exacerbated in a context of rapidly growing population; lack of economic opportunities for the very young population; absence of effective conflict resolution and reintegration mechanisms for former armed groups, fighters, and road blockers</p> <p>Poor governance capacity; weak state-society relations; a lack of resilience to both domestic and external shocks; limited delivery of basic social services (including water, education, health, infrastructure, and electricity), especially in the rural areas; functioning of government institutions further disrupted with the insurgency, which also led to immense psychological trauma, weakened social networks, livelihoods and productivity disruption, and assets destroyed</p> <p>Vulnerable groups, in particular women and youth, have been mostly affected by the consequences of the Boko Haram crisis</p>	<p>The project is built on components that reflect a vision of what is, or should be, the region's resilience factors:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Supporting regional coordinating and crisis monitoring through a knowledge and monitoring platform and the Secretariat for the Development of the Lake Chad Region 2. Restoring rural mobility and connectivity 3. Supporting the recovery of agricultural livelihoods in selected provinces of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger

Note:

- a. Limited distribution document.
- b. EU support to MNJTF project documents.
- c. Limited circulation document.

Appendix D.

Portfolio Analysis for the Lake Chad Region

Methodology

The analysis for this section is based on a desk review of active government projects funded by the World Bank (WB)—national and regional—in the Lake Chad administrative region. The objective of the portfolio analysis was to assess the extent to which the portfolio addresses the identified drivers and factors of resilience, with a view to developing lessons learned in programming.¹²⁷ The intent is not to evaluate the results of the country program or of individual projects, but rather to assess the extent to which the country program already addresses the FCV drivers, risks, and factors of resilience and is invested in the areas of special emphasis, as well as to collect lessons from implementation of the program in the FCV context.

A full list of government projects active in the Lake Chad region was submitted by CMUs from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.¹²⁸ A number of these projects were selected for in-depth reviews¹²⁹ to assess trends across project performance (as reported in Implementation Status Reports [ISRs] and described by task team members during interviews) and explore possible entry points for improvement. Project reviews utilized publicly available documentation, including project appraisal documents (PADs) and ISRs, and drew on CPFs and SCDs for the four countries in the Lake Chad region. Interviews with task teams for five of the projects selected for in-depth review were also carried out.

Findings: Portfolio Composition

Current portfolio investments align well with the identified drivers of FCV and factors of resilience in the Lake Chad Region. Government and WB country and regional strategies have increasingly recognized the need to address FCV and the associated development and resilience-building needs of the Lake Chad region. The need to target the Lake Chad region to close gaps in services and outcomes, to address insecure livelihoods, and to rebuild social contracts/strengthen citizen-state relations are central pillars of national development strategies produced by the four governments and the WB. All four governments have followed through with WB-supported investments in core infrastructure and health; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); and education services, which are cognizant of the need to close gaps in coverage and outcomes. Governments have recognized the need to both address the emergency needs of conflict-affected populations and to support critical development interventions that provide a foundation for longer-term recovery. Specific interventions include the following:

- Regional projects focused on the crisis in Lake Chad have been launched to deliver small-scale infrastructure, provide services (including for refugees and host communities), support fragile agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, and provide knowledge management platforms.
- Programming across all four countries and regional projects reflect the need to improve access to productive natural resources, services, and jobs, including in the context of heightened competition for dwindling natural resources.
- Programming also reflects nascent efforts to address issues of social cohesion, trust in the state, and social accountability.

Project designs reflect a strong understanding of the drivers of FCV in the Lake Chad region.

All projects reviewed demonstrated a level of understanding of the FCV issues identified in this RRA¹³⁰ and their relationship to the development challenge being addressed by the project. Generally speaking, projects directly informed by country RRAs demonstrated a particularly strong understanding of the drivers of FCV and factors of resilience and had designed project interventions to “lean in” to the humanitarian- development-peace nexus (as opposed to “neglecting” FCV issues or taking an approach primarily concerned with minimizing the risks of conflict to achieving project goals).

In line with the WBG FCV strategy and the IDA18 objective to scale up funding to FCV-affected countries, the four countries accessed allocations of IDA to support a scaled-up response to the worsening crisis in Lake Chad. *First*, as countries tagged as facing acute risks of FCV, they have access to an envelope of FCV-related country allocations (IDA n.d.). *Second*, all four countries were able to access funding for regional integration programs from the Regional Integration Window. In total, US\$931 million is allocated to regional projects in the four countries, of which US\$170 million is PROLAC, covering all of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, and US\$376 million contributes to the MCRP in Nigeria, of which US\$359 million (of the project’s total budget) is allocated to the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in the Lake Chad region. *Third*, additional windows for refugees and host communities (the Refugee Sub-window, or RSW) and crisis response have boosted countries’ commitments in the Lake Chad region. Finally, Niger was also one of four countries allocated funding through the Risk Mitigation Regime (RMR).¹³¹ Figures are presented in Table F.1.

Table F.1: Total and Sub-window IDA18 Commitments per Country, Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020

	TOTAL IDA FY18–FY20 (US\$, MILLIONS)	REGIONAL PROGRAMS FY18–FY20 (US\$, MILLIONS)	REFUGEE SUB-WIN- DOW FY18– FY20 (US\$, MILLIONS)	CRISIS RESPONSE WINDOW FY18– FY20 (US\$, MILLIONS)	SCALE-UP FACIL- ITY FY18– FY20 (US\$, MILLIONS)
Cameroon	1,245	385	130	—	—
Chad	649	157	50	—	—
Niger	1,808	255	90	14	—
Nigeria	5,189	168	—	—	464

Source: International Development Association commitments per country, World Bank, Washington, DC (accessed July 21, 2021), <https://ida.worldbank.org/financing/ida-financing>.

Note: The above table shows national commitments. A breakdown of the proportion of this funding active in the Lake Chad region was not available. This also does not reflect the overall International Development Association (IDA) allocations for these countries, only those resources committed to projects approved by the World Bank Board.

Table F.2: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and IDA Commitments and Disbursements—Country Summary

	TOTAL COMMITMENTS FY14–FY21 (US\$, MILLIONS)	TOTAL GROSS DISBURSEMENTS FY14–FY21 (US\$, MILLIONS)
Cameroon	3,383	1,701
Chad	1,416	859
Niger	3,960	2,686
Nigeria	15,758	8,468

Source: IBRD and IDA Commitments and Disbursements—Country Summary (database), World Bank, Washington, DC (accessed July 2021), <https://finances.worldbank.org/Financial-Reporting/IBRD-and-IDA-Commitments-and-Disbursements-Country/k6tm-smim>.

In particular, IDA commitments through the RSW have boosted investments within the Lake Chad region with an FCV focus. Project investments have focused on expanding access to services and building the foundations for longer-term development opportunities in the Lake Chad region. In total, funding from the RSW has been committed to three of the refugee-hosting Lake Chad countries, including for the Refugees and Host communities Support Project (Projet d'Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Communautés d'Accueil; PARCA) in Chad and Niger, and to support a multisectoral crisis response in Cameroon. Cameroon committed US\$130 million in RSW funding to four projects: two new projects and additional financing for two existing projects. Three of these projects are national in scope, but the other, the Community Development Program Support Project Response to Forced Displacement (CDPSP), targets the East, North, and Adamawa. Due to the RSW, these projects focus on areas affected by forced displacement, most notably the Lake Chad region.

Although there are a broad range of relevant and well-resourced projects covering the Lake Chad administrative region, many national projects have a much lighter footprint in more remote and difficult-to-access areas. For example, the States Fiscal Transparency, Accountability and Sustainability project (a PforR program) and the COVID-19 Action Recovery and Economic Stimulus Program in Nigeria do not appear to have bespoke strategies for the insecure North East region, despite being critical capacity development and social protection programs. In Niger, a range of national projects covering several facets of rural development—social protection, energy, transport, agriculture, and the environment—cover Diffa and Zinder in their PADs. However, it is not clear how successful their operations are in accessing and delivering within these most remote and insecure areas. Coverage of national projects in some of the most remote and violent areas is still extremely limited, especially in the most insecure parts of Nigeria.

In addition, heightened insecurity, especially in Nigeria, has meant that many projects are operating under even more difficult conditions than those for which they were designed. Specifically, task teams reported experiencing (i) dramatic increases in prices because conditions have worsened, affecting subcontracts and delivery budgets; (ii) reduced functionality of local government affected by insecurity; (iii) challenges implementing third-party monitoring contracts; and (iv) revisions to procurement plans in response to limited bids received for key contracts, including for feasibility studies, trainings, and specialists to staff project implementation units (PIUs). Across the Lake Chad region, increased prices,¹³² supply shortages of goods and services, and restricted access by PIUs to project areas pose ongoing challenges to successful implementation. In North East Nigeria, some target areas are completely inaccessible. Consistently high procurement and financial management risks¹³³ often materialize, as PIUs affected by the challenges of insecurity prove unable to prepare, issue, and manage contracts on time. Mounting insecurity and increasingly difficult operating conditions present stand-alone challenges and also exacerbate the issues described below.

Findings: Project Reviews

Alignment between development investments and identified drivers of FCV and factors of resilience identified in the RRA begs the following question: if projects are designed to address FCV-development challenges in the Lake Chad region, how well are they achieving their stated impacts? To answer this question, 14 of the projects most relevant to the identified drivers of FCV and factors were reviewed in-depth to assess trends across project performance (as reported in ISRs and described by task team members) and to explore possible entry points for improvement.

Within the extremely challenging context presented by the FCV crisis in the Lake Chad region, significant achievements in some projects' performance offer positive lessons on which to build. In FCV contexts in particular, a number of trade-offs have to be negotiated throughout project design and implementation, including between the need for quick delivery and sustainable, government-owned delivery methods; between ambitious and yet simple and achievable projects; between the need for flexible and adaptive yet sustainable and reliable interventions; and between managing the risks of operating safely while being as close to the ground as possible (WBG 2020c). This review found that, at times, the competing demands can feel impossible to balance. Task team leaders face a range of challenges, including evaluating options, building consensus with government clients as well as local and regional partners, and determining and setting priorities.

This review uncovered several positive examples of projects that were effectively assessing and building on existing institutional capacity to deliver critical development results, such as the use of flexible, performance-based financing mechanisms. Examples of each are offered below. They demonstrate positive examples of “getting the trade-offs right” and also elaborate on the challenges in doing so.

- **Investments in building local institutions over a sustained period of time in Cameroon.** In Cameroon, the long-term experience of the National Community-Driven Development Program (Programme National de Développement Participatif; PNDD) had built a strong foundation for delivery of the Community Development Program Support Project, Phase III (see box F.1). Despite ongoing challenges in building a more sustainable, government-

owned operating model, the project is successfully delivering quality socioeconomic infrastructure through community-based institutions, including by utilizing tools such as participatory budgeting, community scorecards, and participatory monitoring and evaluation. Building on the foundations laid by earlier phases of the PNDP over a decade, the WB team was able to (i) attempt to support decentralization reforms; (ii) support a multisectoral refugee response; (iii) leverage existing community development plans (CDPs) as the foundation for investments under the Livestock Development Program (LDP), another project in Cameroon; while (iv) continuing to deliver basic services and infrastructure through community-based institutions. The positive lesson is the strong foundation in terms of institutional capacity (skills, local contextual knowledge, and established coordination structures), which had been built over time and were able to sustain delivery under difficult working conditions. Within the LDP, the component linked to CDPs is the only component performing at a “satisfactory” level, as compared to other components that have struggled to launch activities following delays in procurement and the development of operating manuals. Although some of the “add-ons”¹³⁴ are struggling to gain traction, core delivery of rural infrastructure and services through local institutions under Component 2 of the PNDP and LDP are making good progress. By contrast, there are examples of CDD projects¹³⁵ in other parts of the Lake Chad region that have been set up with similar levels of complexity and ambition but did not have the established institutional foundations upon which they could build and have struggled to deliver according to plans.

- **Performance-based disbursements and allocations allow financing to incentivize delivery in Nigeria.**¹³⁶ The MCRP operates in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in the Lake Chad region. The MCRP allows for reallocations of the total budget between the three states depending on performance, and it tracks progress in each state independently. Notably, the MCRP has decentralized implementation mechanisms (PIUs) to the state level, meaning that capacity support is concentrated at the same level where performance is incentivized. This mechanism was adopted to permit project flexibility in adapting to the evolving security context, and it has allowed financing to flow in areas with proven capacity to deliver—rather than being tied up in undisbursed funds allocated to poorly performing states or components. From project launch until the most recent ISR in January 2021, performance in Borno had outstripped that of Adamawa and Yobe. Borno was able to get going faster, delivering emergency inputs to 7,800 households within the first year of the project, before the other two states had even achieved readiness criteria. Although this does call into question what should be done about those states that cannot deliver, it should be considered a win that delays and challenges in some areas did not delay progress in others or tie up critical resources in undisbursed balances.

Projects employed a range of operational features suitable to FCV contexts, but further analysis is needed to assess whether these tools should be more consistently applied and how to best operationalize them in context. The assessed projects employed a range of design features, including the use of contingent emergency response components (e.g., PROLAC), third-party monitoring, the use of GEMS, and the establishment of regional (and subnational) PIUs. It was not clear from the review whether enhanced implementation support (hands-on expanded implementation support) was being adopted. Furthermore, it was not possible to assess the extent to which the design features identified in projects have always been applied where needed or are effective in enhancing the FCV sensitivity of projects. As projects are ongoing, it is also too soon to tell. Further analysis of the effectiveness of these tools and any gaps in their application could be warranted in the future.

Project progress reports and interviews demonstrated that the impacts of investments in crisis response and development in the Lake Chad region are limited by several challenges.

First, many projects have experienced significant delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, project designs have not always incorporated design elements consistent with the guidance of the FCV strategy to employ “selectivity, simplicity, and flexibility at the core of the implementation model” (WBG 2020c) and appear, at times, to be missing key areas of project readiness at the time of approval. As a result, many projects have struggled to roll out quickly and effectively and are underperforming. Third, and perhaps most important, projects have suffered from gaps between project ambitions and the local skills, network of counterparts and contractors, and political support needed to successfully design and deliver interventions. Activities, which aim to build large infrastructure and promote improved social cohesion and/or local governance within project cycles, have struggled. These challenges affect different projects to different extents (and are not listed in order of importance). They are explored in more detail below.

1. Delays due to COVID-19.

Most projects reviewed reported delays in delivery since mid-2020 due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Delays due to COVID-19 were not usually the most critical cause of delay, but they did exacerbate other issues. At the same time, some projects received additional financing or restructuring of existing financing to support the response to the impacts of the pandemic. Pandemic-related disruptions have affected staffing in project teams, the ability of the WB and counterparts to work together to address bottlenecks, and project implementation, including monitoring and evaluation and procurement. Some projects were able to adapt and resume work fairly quickly, but others remained stalled. For example, the Youth Employment and Productive Inclusion Project in Niger reported in its April 2020 ISR that the project launch event was on hold due to COVID and that the project implementation manual was being revised to scale up programs to support post-COVID economic inclusion once programming could start up again. By December 2020, the project was running a little behind but had resumed operations and had over 16,000 young people enrolled in economic inclusion activities (though it appears none of them were women).

2. Project readiness and complexity.

Although most projects were aligned on paper (in PADs) with principles of selectivity, simplicity, and flexibility, in practice, several project designs were reported to be overly ambitious and complex given the challenging and dynamic operating conditions. In addition, multiple projects experienced delays between approval, effectiveness, launch, and disbursements,¹³⁷ and cases of restructuring, even before most activities started, indicate that projects could have benefited from more sophisticated designs at the appraisal stage.

- **Project complexity:** Interviews uncovered the perception that there are trade-offs between delivering quickly and effectively and designs of large, multisectoral, highly ambitious projects. *Ambitious* in this sense refers not only to project goals and targets but also to meeting those targets while ensuring a participatory and inclusive approach at all stages, meeting high targets for numbers of female beneficiaries, and so on. For example, Cameroon’s LDP has three large, complex components that each perform several distinct activities—and all of which require slightly different implementation arrangements, subcontractors, and skill sets—over a vast area and with the commitment to facilitate inclusive platforms for conflict prevention and conflict resolution and to meet targets for women and youth beneficiaries. In practice, projects simply could not deliver

everything at once given the capacity gaps on the ground (see the point below). Another example is PARCA in Niger, which has multiple design features guided by the “keep it simple” approach. It utilizes standard national designs for school buildings and leverages existing established mechanisms to determine eligibility for cash-for-work activities. However, these principles were not reflected in the details of implementation modalities, which are highly complex. The “simple” designs for schools, for example, did not extend to the highly complex and arduous institutional arrangements; to ensure the viability of the schools, the project team had to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Education *and* with the local municipality prior to approval for *each* school building contract to ensure the supply of teachers, books, and building operations and maintenance. This added significant complexity (and delays) to implementation, which were not anticipated at the appraisal stage. More broadly, the complexity of the project was also misaligned with the capacity of the implementing agency, which had never implemented a WB project before and was struggling with even more simple aspects of recruitment and procurement, and b) is overloaded not only with PARCA, but also PROLAC, which used the PARCA PIU as preparation team.

- **Project readiness:** In several cases, it appears that project designs which looked simple on paper were missing key elements of project readiness at appraisal stage. These issues emerged in implementation, meaning important aspects of project designs related to coordination mechanisms, stakeholder engagement, institutional capacity assessments, and procurement assessments were pushed down to implementation, rather than being appraised prior to approval. Once a project is appraised, the pressure is on to launch and start disbursing, meaning key design decisions are being made under pressure. Most projects assessed had significant delays in achieving effectiveness and launch (which could not be attributed solely to COVID-related delays), and few were on track to achieve results as planned. Several of the projects that were experiencing the most extreme delays had also failed to demonstrate a strong understanding of the nuanced political and logistical realities that they would face (though, of course, this is easier to judge retrospectively). For example, in the LDP, all components struggled to deliver on time because “the implementation of the preparatory activities [was] more complex and time consuming than expected.”¹³⁸ The review uncovered several cases of project readiness conditions not being in place at the time of project launch, including, but not limited to, insufficient development of the institutional arrangements for effective coordination forums between agencies, a lack of evidence of sufficient government buy-in to support contentious elements of reform and coordination, and little or no analysis of local market conditions and available skills to support implementation. As a result, common challenges included (i) challenging procurement conditions with very few implementing agencies available locally with proven experience with WB-funded projects; (ii) inaccurate price estimates in local markets, meaning multiples rounds of procurement planning and budget adjustment were needed; and (ii) delays in hiring specialists to develop implementation manuals and guidelines, both because of a dearth of local skills and because project teams were not fully in agreement on what approach to take.

In summary, the challenging pattern identified was one of overly complex project designs and a tendency to push some of the difficult design questions (such as local coordination of implementation, preparation of key planning and feasibility assessments/maps, and the specifications of stakeholder engagement instruments required in context) into the development of implementation manuals rather than appraising them as part of the core project design. Notably, the lack of political economy analysis in most projects may have

contributed to projects that appeared “simple” encountering unforeseen challenges and to appraisal documents (and therefore appraisals) that did not address the nuanced political and logistical realities within which the projects would operate, which often mean the difference between success and failure.

Box F.1

Cameroon’s Integrated, Multisectoral Approach to Refugee Response: Lessons Learned

An ambitious vision: In 2018, Cameroon committed US\$274 million (US\$130 million of which is from the Refugee Sub-window) to four projects to help refugees and host communities in Cameroon to access health care, education, social safety nets, and social and economic infrastructure. Funding was allocated to two new projects and additional financing to two existing projects. Three of these projects (health, education, and social protection) are national in scope, but the other, the Community Development Program Support Project Response to Forced Displacement, targets the East, North, and Adamawa. These projects focus on areas affected by forced displacement, most notably the Lake Chad region. This integrated approach to taking on the challenges of the refugee crisis in Cameroon is a standout example of the Country Management Unit (CMU) in Cameroon aligning the Systematic Country Diagnostic and Country Partnership Framework to develop a package of projects that aim to transform the government’s response—and lives on the ground—in the most urgent areas while avoiding fragmentation across sectoral projects that can otherwise occur.

Implementation challenges: In practice, implementation of this integrated approach has been plagued by delays and a misalignment in expectations between government agencies, project implementation units, and the CMU. Coordination across the four implementing agencies and the central government has been challenging, resulting in delays (i) to design of the implementation manual for the integrated approach; (ii) in reaching consensus on the targeting approach; and (iii) in operationalizing joint mechanisms, both at the local level and shared grievance redress mechanisms.

Lessons: In sum, we see an example of an ambitious but targeted, prioritized, and well-resourced approach to addressing the challenges posed by the refugee crisis in Cameroon, which other countries could consider emulating. At the same time, the approach is yet to be fully operationalized. In practice, the challenges of closely coordinating four projects encountered political economy challenges and capacity gaps, which have stalled progress and point to the need to pay closer attention to operational simplicity in the future and to ensure greater levels of government buy-in for the basic tenets of the approach. Other countries would also do well to consider this lesson and not let ambitious commitments cloud the need to carefully design workable implementation arrangements suited to context.

3. Gaps between project ambitions and the local skills, knowledge, and political support needed to successfully design and deliver interventions.

The review uncovered that many projects faced significant delivery challenges due to the limited capacity of local institutions. Misalignments between the skills and institutional capacities required to support ambitious projects and reforms negatively affect the speed and effectiveness of delivery. This “capacity gap” manifests itself in several ways.

First, key sectors have skills and knowledge gaps. As one interviewee explained,

There are a lot of civil servants or project staff with backgrounds in engineering or agriculture, so they have good instincts for design and troubleshooting of core basic infrastructure and rural development activities. However, different skill sets are needed to deliver activities designed to enhance social cohesion, and those are much harder to find, which really affects their ability to implement those activities with quality.¹³⁹

In several cases, project teams admitted that “social cohesion can’t be an ‘add-on’ activity—we should do it well or not at all.”¹⁴⁰ Others commented that aspirations to improve social cohesion within the short life of a project, without having a fully developed understanding of how to do this, was not a recipe for success. Still others commented on the quality issues in project mechanisms designed to address elements of project delivery, which can erode/support social cohesions by building trust, such as a grievance redress mechanism that collected grievances¹³⁹ but did not routinely address them.

Across the board, the perception was that it is a mistake to underestimate the difficulty, capacity, and time it takes to build social cohesion and/or trust in public institutions. Strengthening the state contract and rebuilding trust takes more than one project, and in the words of an interviewee, it “should be done well or not at all, but cannot be a tick-box exercise.”¹⁴¹ Another interviewee shared the view that an approach to building trust in institutions might succeed by lowering ambitions and ensuring delivery, rather than overpromising and underdelivering, and focusing on quality of participation. This is consistent with the literature on state legitimacy and peace building, which emphasizes the importance of the quality of interaction with authorities, even above issues of access to services.

Second, contracting qualified subcontractors remains challenging in many areas. In some cases, the local or central government is distrustful of international agencies present in target areas, which may be better qualified to support implementation than other, preferred subcontractors. In other cases, a lack of market knowledge by centrally based PIU staff translates to unrealistic terms of reference being prepared, leading to delays in procuring locally available subcontractors or employing inexperienced subcontractors who cannot deliver results. In still other cases, there are simply very few agencies that can safely access target areas. Several interviewees advocated for the need for WB-funded projects to work with governments to find innovative solutions to subcontract more effectively with agencies that are already present and trusted by communities in the project’s target area.

Third, there may be gaps in skills and experience across PIUs, local governments, and subcontractors in delivering under conditions of worsening insecurity. In addition to the skills gap mentioned above, this review found that local governments are constrained by a lack of access to insecure areas, linked to high levels of distrust in government, and by overly centralized systems, which limit the opportunities to move project management closer to

project sites. In Nigeria, the capacity of local governments (below state governments) is extremely weak, which is affecting delivery of the MCRP, for example. In Niger, highly centralized decision making often precludes PIUs from recruiting staff familiar with more remote project sites and from decentralizing key decisions to actors closer to the ground. In Cameroon, the additional financing to support refugees and host communities has been tied up in coordination challenges at the local level due to unresolved political differences between implementing agencies, pointing to a gap in the understanding of the political economy challenges that have retarded the progress of the project's goals.¹⁴²

List of Projects Active in the Lake Chad Administrative Region

This list reflects projects that CMUs have reported as being active in one or more of the following areas:

- **Cameroon:** Far North region
- **Chad:** Chari-Baguirmi, Hadjer-Lamis, Kanem, and Lac regions
- **Niger:** Diffa and Zinder regions
- **Nigeria:** Adamawa, Born, and Yobe States

Table F.3 on following page.

Table F.3: Active Projects in the Lake Chad Region

PROJECT ID	PROJECT NAME	SECTOR NAME	APPROVAL DATE	DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE	
Regional/Multicountry Projects					
1	P16078	Regional Off-Grid Electricity Access Project (plus additional financing)	Energy	2019	To increase electricity access of households and businesses using modern stand-alone solar systems through a harmonized regional approach
2	P147674	Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (Chad, Niger)	Agriculture and Food	2015	To improve access to essential productive assets, services, and markets for pastoralists and agropastoralists in selected transborder areas and along transhumance axes across six Sahel countries and to strengthen country capacities to respond promptly and effectively to pastoral crises or emergencies
3	P150080	Sahel Women's Empowerment and Demographics Project	Health, Nutrition, Population	2015	To empower women and adolescent girls and increase their access to quality reproductive, child, and maternal health services in selected areas of the participating countries, including the recipients' territory, and to improve regional knowledge generation and sharing as well as regional capacity and coordination
4	P161163	Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) Phase III (Niger, Nigeria)	Health, Nutrition, Population	2018	To strengthen national and regional cross-sectoral capacity for collaborative disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness in West Africa and, in the event of an eligible emergency, to provide immediate and effective response to said eligible emergency
5*	P161706	Lake Chad Region Recovery and Development Project (PROLAC) (Cameroon, Chad, Niger)	Social Development	2020	To contribute to the recovery of the Lake Chad region by supporting regional coordinating and crisis monitoring, connectivity, and agricultural livelihoods in selected provinces of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger
6	P168185	Cameroon-Chad Power Interconnection Project	Energy	2020	To interconnect the southern and northern power systems of Cameroon, enable electricity trade between Cameroon and Chad, and increase access to electricity in Chad's capita, N'Djamena
7*	P164748 P164563	Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (PARCA) (Chad, Niger)	Social Protection	2019	To improve access of refugees and host communities to basic services, livelihoods, and safety nets and to strengthen country systems to manage refugees
Cameroon					
8	P128534	Social Safety Nets Project	Social Protection	2013	To support the establishment of a basic national safety net system, including piloting targeted cash transfers and public works programs for the poorest and most vulnerable people in participating areas within the recipients' territory

9	P143417	Agriculture Investment and Market Development Project	Agriculture and Food	2015	To support the transformation of low-productivity, subsistence-oriented cassava, maize, and sorghum subsectors into commercially oriented and competitive value chains in four agro-ecological areas
10	P143801	Cameroon-Multimodal Transport Project	Transport	2014	To increase multimodal transport efficiency and effectiveness along the Yaoundé-Kousséri corridor
11*	P144637	Community Development Program Support Project, Phase III (formerly PNDP)	Social Development	2016	To strengthen local public finance management and participatory development processes in communes for the delivery of quality and sustainable social and economic infrastructure
12*	P164803	Additional Financing for the Community Development Program Support Project Response to Forced Displacement Project	Social Development	2018	See the previous entry
13	P150999	Cameroon Transport Sector Development Project	Transport	2017	To strengthen transport planning, improve transport efficiency and safety on the Babadjou-Bamenda section of the Yaoundé-Bamenda transport corridor, and enhance safety and security at selected airports
14	P122153	Cameroon Mining Sector Technical Assistance Project	Mining	2012	To improve the efficiency and transparency of mining sector management and the frameworks for sustainable mining development
15	P152755	Electricity Transmission and Reform Project	Energy	2017	To improve the capacity, efficiency, and reliability of Cameroon's national electricity transmission network
16	P154908	Livestock Development Project	Agriculture and Food	2017	To improve productivity of selected livestock production systems and the commercialization of their products for the targeted beneficiaries and to provide immediate and effective response in the event of an eligible crisis or emergency
17	P156210	Cameroon: Inclusive and Resilient Cities Development Project	Social, Urban Rural, and Resilience	2018	To improve urban management and access to infrastructure in selected urban areas, particularly for poor neighborhoods, and to increase resilience to natural hazards and other eligible crises

18	P156679	Health System Performance Reinforcement Project	Health	2016	<p>To increase utilization and improve the quality of health services—with a particular focus on reproductive, maternal, child, and adolescent health—and also nutritional services for the population of Cameroon, including refugees and refugee host communities, and, in the event of an eligible emergency, to provide immediate and effective response to said eligible emergency</p> <p>Additional financing for the Far North aims to mitigate the health and economic impact of the conflict in the Far North region and the refugee crisis in the northern (Adamawa, Far North, North) and eastern regions of Cameroon by providing essential health, nutrition, and WASH services to refugees and refugee-host communities</p>
19	P160926	Cameroon Education Reform Support Project	Education	2018	To improve equitable access to quality basic education, with a focus on selected disadvantaged areas
20	P163881	CM-Rural Electricity Access Project for Underserved Regions	Energy	2019	To increase electricity access in under-served regions of Cameroon
21	P168332	Third Fiscal Consolidation and Inclusive Growth Development Policy Operation	Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment	2021	To support the government of Cameroon's efforts to ensure fiscal sustainability and improve public-sector management, enhance competitiveness, and enhance the provision of social services and scale up social protection
22	P170561	Secondary Education and Skills Development Project	Education	2020	To increase equitable access to quality general secondary education and market-relevant skills development programs, with a focus on girls
23	P174108	Cameroon COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project	Health	2021	To prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 and strengthen national systems for public health preparedness in selected regions in Cameroon
24	P166072	Valorization of Investments in the Valley of the Benue	Agriculture and Food	2021	To provide sustainable irrigation and drainage services and improve agricultural production in irrigated areas of the Benue Valley
Chad					
25	P132617	Chad Education Sector Reform Project, Phase 2	Education	2013	To improve teaching and learning conditions in primary and upper secondary schools in selected areas and strengthen the system to facilitate evidence-based decision making in the education sector
26	P159434	Chad Statistical Development	Poverty and Equity	2017	To strengthen the capacity of the national statistics institute to collect, process, and disseminate data with improved quality, frequency, and timeliness
27	P164297	Chad Skills Development for Youth Employability Project	Education	2019	To improve access to skills training and labor market outcomes for project beneficiaries and strengthen the technical and vocational education and training sector in Chad

28	P173894	Chad COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project	Health	2020	To prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 and strengthen national systems for public health preparedness in Chad
29	P174495	Energy Access Scale Up Project	Energy	Pipeline	To increase access to modern energy services, including solar-based electricity and clean cooking, by leveraging private sector participation
Niger					
30	P127204	Competitiveness & Growth Support	Finance/Private Sector	2012	To improve selected aspects of Niger's business environment, support the development of the meat industry, and increase local business participation in the extractive industries sector
31	P148839	Niger Investment Climate Support	Finance/Private Sector	2016	To improve critical elements of investment climate for the private sector and enhance competitiveness of small and medium enterprises in selected agriculture value chains
32	P145261	Public Sector Capacity and Performance for Service Delivery Project	Governance	2014	To strengthen public finance and human resource management to improve service delivery capacity in selected sectors
33	P164271	Governance of Extractives for Local Development & COVID-19 Response Project	Governance	2021	To strengthen local governments' capacity and extractive sector management for service delivery in the targeted regions
34	P165062	Quality Data for Decision Making	Poverty and Equity	2018	To improve the quality, availability, and use of macroeconomic and sector statistics
35	P126049	Niger Skills Development for Growth Project	Education	2013	To improve the effectiveness of formal technical and vocational training, short-term skills development, and apprenticeship programs in priority sectors
36	P168779	Niger Learning Improvement for Results in Education Project	Education	2020	To improve the quality of teaching and learning conditions in select regions and strengthen education planning and management
37	P173846	Niger COVID-19 Emergency Response	Health	2020	To prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 and strengthen national systems for public health preparedness in Niger
38	P163157	Youth Employment and Productive Inclusion	Social Protection and Labor	2018	To expand income-generating activities for youths in selected poor areas in Niger
39	P166602	Niger Adaptive Safety Net Project 2	Social Protection and Labor	2019	To improve the capacity of the Niger adaptive safety nets system to respond to shocks and to provide access for poor and vulnerable people to safety nets and accompanying measures

40	P153743	Electricity Access Expansion Project	Energy	2016	To increase access to electricity in Niger
41	P160170	Niger Solar Electricity Access Project (NESAP)	Energy	2017	To increase access to electricity through solar energy in rural and peri-urban areas of Niger
42	P164498	Rural Mobility and Connectivity Project	Transport	2019	To improve and sustain road access of farming communities to production sites, markets, and basic social services in selected areas
43	P171793	Enhancing Niger Northeastern Connectivity	Transport	2021	To enhance connectivity and road safety along the Zinder-Agadez road section in North East Niger through the rehabilitation of the Tanou-Tiguidit road segment and maintenance of the full Zinder-Agadez section as well as to improve access to basic socioeconomic infrastructure for selected communities along the Zinder-Agadez road section
44	P167543	Niger: Smart Villages for Rural Growth and Digital Inclusion	Digital Development	2020	To increase access to cellphone and broadband services in rural areas and to bring digital financial services to selected under-served areas
45	P153420	Climate Smart Agriculture Support Project	Agriculture and Food	2016	To enhance adaptation to climate risks, improve agricultural productivity among the targeted communities, and, in the event of an eligible crisis or emergency, provide immediate and effective response to said eligible crisis or emergency
46	P164509	Agricultural and Livestock Transformation Project	Agriculture and Food	2019	To increase agriculture productivity and access to markets for small and medium farmers and agri-food small and medium enterprises in the participating project regions
47	P125669	Niger Community Action Project for Climate Resilience	Environment and Natural Resources	2012	To improve the resilience of the populations and of production systems to climate change and variability in targeted communes
48	P145268	Niger Disaster Risk Management and Urban Development Project	Social, Urban Rural, and Resilience	2014	To improve Niger's resilience to natural hazards through selected disaster risk management interventions in targeted project sites and strengthening of the government's capacity to respond promptly and effectively to an eligible crisis or an emergency
Nigeria					
49	P161885	Nigeria Electrification Project	Energy	2018	To increase access to electricity services for households, public educational institutions, and under-served micro, small, and medium enterprises
50	P146330	NG-Electricity Transmission Project	Energy	2018	To increase the transfer capacity of the transmission network in Nigeria

51	P12694	Nigeria Youth Employment & Social Support Operation	Social Protection and Labor	2013	To increase the access of the poor and vulnerable, using improved social safety net systems, to youth employment opportunities in all participating states and to provide targeted cash transfers to the poor, vulnerable, and IDPs in the North East states
52	P157898 P090644	Community and Social Development Project (and additional financing)	Social Protection and Labor	2008–16	To increase access by the poor, and particularly by IDPs and vulnerable people in North East Nigeria, to improved social and natural resources infrastructure services in a sustainable manner throughout Nigeria
53*	P157891	Multi-Sectoral Crisis Recovery Project for North Eastern Nigeria (MCRP)	Social, Urban Rural, and Resilience	2017	To improve access to basic services and livelihood opportunities for the crisis-affected communities of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States and enhance coordination among these states and other Lake Chad countries
54	P173980	Nigeria COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project	Health	2021	To prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 at the state level in Nigeria
55	P174114	Nigeria: COVID-19 Action Recovery and Economic Stimulus Program	Social Protection and Labor	2021	To expand access to livelihood support and food security services as well as to grants for poor and vulnerable households and firms
56	P160430	Better Education Service Delivery for All	Education	2017	To increase equitable access for out-of-school children and improve literacy in focus states and also strengthen accountability for results in basic education in Nigeria
57	P162009	States Fiscal Transparency, Accountability and Sustainability PforR	Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment	2018	To strengthen the fiscal transparency, accountability, and sustainability in the participating states
58	P167156	Nigeria Improved Child Survival Program for Human Capital Multiphase Programmatic Approach	Health	2020	To improve the utilization and quality of immunization plus and malaria services in selected states.
59	P124905 and P164082	Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (and additional financing)	Environment and Natural Resources	2012	To reduce vulnerability to soil erosion in targeted subwatersheds
60	P170664	Adolescent Girls Initiative for Learning and Empowerment	Education	2020	To improve secondary education opportunities among girls in targeted areas in participating states

Note:

IDP =internally displaced person; PforR = Program-for-Results financing; WASH = water, sanitation, and hygiene. Projects in bold were selected for in-depth reviews based on their relevance to the identified drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence and factors of resilience. Projects marked with an asterisk (*) indicate those for which interviews were conducted with task teams.

Appendix E.

Analytical Framework & Methodology

The RRA builds on the new methodology developed and tested by the WB, approved by the Vice President Operations (OVP) in December 2020, in line with the engagements outlined in the WBG’s Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence, launched in February 2020. The new methodology takes into account the following three principles:

- **Strengthened CMU engagement process** to ensure the RRA is tailored to specific needs and areas of focus, and to facilitate concrete translation into country strategies and programs
- **Strengthened analytical framework** based on the WBG’s Strategy on FCV and the UN-WB flagship report *Pathways for Peace*
- More robust and operationally actionable narrative of risks and resilience that leads to **more concrete operational recommendations**

Analytic Framework

In line with the framing adopted by the joint UN-WBG study *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, the RRA roots the analysis in a framework of multidimensional risks to better understand the ways in which a multiplicity of risks – which are often interrelated – can combine to deepen and perpetuate fragility and amplify the likelihood of violent conflict in the absence of mitigating factors. In addition to looking at structural factors and exogenous dynamics, *Pathways for Peace* lays out four “arenas of contestation” that will help organize the analysis. These are power, economics and governance; environment, land, natural resources and climate change; service delivery; and security and justice. The ability of a society to manage tensions constructively within and among these spaces is tested continuously by risks that push it towards violence and by opportunities to strengthen resilience and advance sustainable development and peace (UN and World Bank, 2018). Understanding and anticipating risks and their interaction is a critical first step in being able to formulate a prevention-based approach that more explicitly addresses drivers of FCV and supports greater resilience.¹⁴³

Structure and Process

The Lake Chad Regional RRA aimed at capturing the dynamic nature of FCV drivers and resilience factors that exist in the region. There were three phases of this RRA process:

Phase 1:

Comprehensive desk review of relevant reports, studies, academic research and authors’ existing data

Phase 2:

Inclusive consultation process, within and outside the WB, including the WB-Chatham House Conversation Series on Fragility and Resilience to feed into the diagnostic and the operational recommendations section

Phase 3:

Development of the RRA, including the identification of the drivers of FCV, resilience factors and risks, and operational recommendations

Phase 1

Desk reviews of existing literature from an FCV perspective. A systematic desk review was conducted to take stock of the existing body of literature and synthesize relevant research. The literature review was shared internally to foster ownership of the RRA process.

In undertaking the desk review, the following limitations were noted:

- The desk review considered a sample of 500 articles (English and French) and databases. Because of the mass of literature available, this review was in part a “review of reviews,” with the use of literature reviews on specific themes or areas, but aimed to be critical and interrogative, using quantitative data to verify or complement qualitative analysis, and identifying contradictions, differences in approaches, areas of ongoing debate, and gaps. There were some considerable contradictions with certain pieces of work, and these have been treated with care. In part due to difficult research conditions on the ground, most of the literature is secondary research (information gathered from previously conducted studies), and a large part of secondary research is “imperfect and incomplete, if not totally false” (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos, 2018). Therefore, this rapid literature review was careful to include primary research, notably from local researchers in the four countries.
- Most of the available literature focuses either on nation-wide dynamics (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria) or on local dynamics but using different approaches - this was a major constraint and the literature review strived to use comparable data when available. In addition, gaps on subnational data are important.
- Most of the research on the conflict (post-2009) tends to focus on the genesis and modus operandi of non-state armed groups (particularly Boko Haram, JAS and ISWAP, secondarily community-based militias and vigilantes). Other than the French Institute for Research on Development (IRD), Kendhammer, and Thurston, there is limited literature that brings together the different factors of FCV to examine plausible correlations and causalities using a multidimensional framework (i.e. beyond two-factor analysis such as the environment and conflict; the social contract and conflict; poverty and conflict).
- There is a lack of consensus on some issues -including the disappearance or shrinking of the lake Chad, the root causes of the conflict- made all the more divisive by the relative dearth of primary research and the difficulty of doing research, due to the difficult operating environments and COVID-19 related constraints.
- The literature review required long-term, cross-sectional indicators to identify and monitor trends for the ten Lake Chad regions. However, (i) the quality of national statistics differs and is limited by the means and capacities national statistics institutions in the four countries and the political agenda weighing on them; (ii) civil registry and land

registry data are notoriously patchy; (iii) data collected by development and humanitarian actors are often “disparate, sparse, and sporadic in time and space, making them difficult to interpret” (Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos, 2018). They are rarely comparable and centralized. Finally, (iv) the current volatile situation on the ground makes data collected six months ago both incomplete and outdated.

Phase 2

Inclusive consultation process. Consultations and engagement have been carried out throughout the RRA process. The consultations were facilitated to examine issues and/or gaps in the initial analysis of the literature review, to prioritize the most salient themes, and to identify any emerging questions that will require further discussions. The consultation process included the following:

- WB-Chatham House Conversation Series on Fragility and Resilience (May-June 2021), which were concluded by a public event organized on June 30, 2021.
- A discussion with task teams in the Middle East and North Africa region was organized on February 19, 2021
- A workshop with development partners and humanitarian agencies was organized on June 15, 2021
- Bilateral interviews and discussions with WB task teams, the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other experts

Phase 3

Development of the RRA, including the identification of the drivers of FCV, resilience factors and risks, and recommendations. The RRA team used the information gleaned from both the literature review and consultations to develop the RRA draft and identify drivers of FCV and factors of resilience in the region. In addition to the identified FCV drivers, the section unpacked multiple risks that may materialize and exacerbate the fragility situation, including climate-related risks.

Aside from the analytic diagnostic, the RRA includes a portfolio analysis and section on recommendations. Building on the analysis of FCV drivers and resilience factors, and the operational experiences of task teams and project implementation units (PIUs), the portfolio analysis drew lessons learned from the WB engagement in the region thus far, highlighting operational challenges, especially linked to the presence of armed groups in the region, and any political and institutional risks faced during project design and implementation – especially how these have been managed and mitigated. The RRA also extracted lessons learned from global engagement and from other country experiences where the WB engagement has been effective. Based on this analysis, the RRA presents forward-looking recommendations for strategic, operational, and policy approaches. Recommendations were developed in close collaboration with CMUs, the Regional Integration office and task teams in the form of workshops and consultations.

Endnotes

- 1 See, for example, the United Nations Development Programme’s Regional Stabilization Facility for Lake Chad Basin, <https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/regional-stabilization-facility-for-lake-chad-basin.html>.
- 2 Most recently for the Regional Economic Memorandum (WBG 2021a).
- 3 The Lake Chad Region Recovery and Development Project (Projet pour la relance et le développement de la région du Lac Tchad; PROLAC), 2020.
- 4 The northern basin in Niger is mostly Muslim, whereas northeastern Nigeria and Kanem in Chad are home to a less concentrated Muslim majority. The Far North and the regions of Hadjer-Lamis and Chari-Baguirmi are predominantly Christian.
- 5 Multifunctionality refers to the successive use of the same space for fishing, agriculture, and livestock.
- 6 Since independence in 1960, Niger has had four military coup d’états during three republics as well as failed coup attempts.
- 7 Regimes in which the head of government is elected and is not responsible to the legislature.
- 8 The death of President Idriss Déby in Chad triggered a regime change in the country.
- 9 For instance, Chad has been threatened by several armed rebellions.
- 10 This is a system of government in which a president exists alongside a prime minister and a cabinet, with the latter being responsible to the legislature of the state.
- 11 The Lake Chad region is located more than 800 kilometers from Abuja, 1,200 kilometers from Niamey, 1,000 kilometers from Yaoundé, and only about 100 kilometers from N’Djamena.
- 12 In Cameroon, protests against perceived discrimination, marginalization, and lack of inclusion—which began peacefully in the North West and South West regions in October 2016—have escalated into violent conflict (Lazar 2019).
- 13 HDI based on authors’ calculation.
- 14 These figures were calculated based on Ghosh et al. (2010). See WBG 2021a.
- 15 For example, Damaturu, Jimeta, and Mubi in Nigeria; Maroua in Cameroon; and Zinder in Niger. See WBG 2021a.
- 16 Data for Borno are not included because there is no representative household survey for that state.
- 17 Even during colonial times and the postindependence period, the Lake Chad region lacked attractiveness due to its position of outlying area, with governments having little control or interest over the development of these regions. In Nigeria and Cameroon, resources are mostly concentrated in the South on the Atlantic coast.
- 18 The Diffa region is a relatively wealthy territory, compared to other regions of Niger, thanks in part to its proximity to Nigerian markets and the comparative

wealth of the lake, which gives it an advantage over other regions in Niger. In terms of income, Diffa is only third, behind Agadez and Tillabéri, and way ahead of Dosso, Maradi, Tahoua, and Zinder.

- 19 For example, a university has been established in Diffa.
- 20 This is the case for the Kanuri. See Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018.
- 21 Although the legal framework provides penalties for the conviction of official corruption, the law remains poorly implemented and cases of corruption and bribery remain widespread due to weak administrative controls, poor law enforcement, low salaries, and a culture of impunity. A range of anti-corruption institutions have been created, such as the National Anticorruption Agency, the Special Criminal Court, the National Financial Investigation Agency, the Ministry in Charge of Supreme State Audit, and the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court in Cameroon, or the High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses in Niger.
- 22 For instance, the Kanuri are well represented in the military and political spheres in Niger. See International Crisis Group 2017e.
- 23 The “10 Million Northerners” movement in Cameroon or the divide (real or perceived) between northerners and southerners in Nigeria.
- 24 For example, Buduma and Bachama farmers.
- 25 See MacEachern 2018.
- 26 To bridge that gap, President Déby of Chad recruited several Buduma into the security forces—a central connection mechanism in Chad.
- 27 In Cameroon, quotas were introduced in 1982 for northerners (this term refers to the northern regions, comprising the Far North, North, and Adamawa) to get position in the administration. In Nigeria, the system of “consociationalism” aims to protect minorities and ensure that positions and resources are fairly distributed, with the principle of “zoning.” See Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018.
- 28 See Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018.
- 29 In Chad, for instance, in many polders located in Bol, Dalla, Liwa, Ngarangou, Nguéléa, and Tataverom, land grabbing by the political and military elite and traditional leaders prevents young people from accessing resources. In Hadjer-Lamis, several villages in the subprefecture of Mani have experienced a mass exodus of young people, unable to access land already “grabbed.”
- 30 Dowries required for weddings tend to be expensive, something Salafists reject. See Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018.
- 31 Resources such as land are often controlled by elders, which prevents young people from being autonomous.
- 32 In 2012, unemployment in the same region (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe) reached 40 percent (with a higher rate among youth). See WBG 2015a.
- 33 In Nigeria, as the army progressed from Maiduguri to the borders with Niger and Cameroon, young people who feared becoming victims preferred to join Boko Haram. In Cameroon, dozens of young people fled their villages in Kolofata when the army’s arrival was announced, instead joining the ranks of the insurgency in Nigeria. By rallying armed groups, young people are expressing their despair with

- national armies regularly accused of abuses against civilian populations and their distrust of traditional systems.
- 34 Generalizing the motivations of youth who joined Boko Haram is difficult. A few trends emerge, which show contrasts within a region, within a state, or within the subregion. If the starting factors can be classified according to a conventional typology (economic, geopolitical, ideological, social, etc.), the fact remains that, in most cases, motivations are endogenous, linked to specific situations and particular experiences.
 - 35 In 2017, the number of women in elected and appointed positions was as follows: nine in Adamawa, seven in Borno, and only two in Yobe. See Nagarajan 2017.
 - 36 Women who become community leaders have often fled because of the insurgency and are mostly present in state capitals.
 - 37 Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria rank among the top 20 countries in the world with the highest rates of child marriage.
 - 38 Families have reportedly initiated child marriages because of a perceived lack of possibilities, short-term monetary and material gains, and the breakdown of social networks. See Ismael 2021b.
 - 39 For example, the number of schools have increased and the higher education supply has been densified with the ambition to decentralize higher education, with universities in Diffa and Maroua, for instance.
 - 40 National average rates reach 62 percent (Cameroon), 8 percent (Chad), 14 percent (Niger), and 59 percent (Nigeria). See WBG 2021a.
 - 41 Growth is strongest in Niger's Diffa region (+4.3 percent per year) and in Chad (+3.5 percent per year); it is slightly lower (but higher in the northern regions) in Cameroon and Nigeria (from +2.5 to +3 percent per year).
 - 42 For instance, in Cameroon, Garoua in the North region and Maroua in the Far North region.
 - 43 One investment worth mentioning in the Diffa region is the tarmac road connecting Zinder, Diffa, and N'Guigmi.
 - 44 The 2007 Oil Code grants 15 percent of oil revenues earmarked for local authorities in oil-producing areas.
 - 45 Spread through Al Gore's 2006 *An Inconvenient Truth* movie, for example.
 - 46 Data are from the ND-GAIN Country Index, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana (accessed September 2021), <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/>.
 - 47 For example, populations switch from flood recession agriculture to livestock farming and fishing when early flooding risks are high. See Nagarajan et al. 2018.
 - 48 This is also recurrent in Boko Haram discourses.
 - 49 In Cameroon in 2013, 55 percent of respondents of the Global Corruption Barometer said they had bribed someone in the judicial system during the last 12 months (Das 2018; WBG 2018).
 - 50 Some legal documents are only in Arabic or French, for instance.
 - 51 Data were not available for Cameroon and Nigeria. Chari-Baguirmi depends on the N'Djamena high court.
 - 52 The national average is 14,409 residents per magistrate (WBG 2018).

- 53** In the Far North, prisons had an occupancy rate of over 169 percent in 2017 and over 108 percent in 2018 (see INS 2019).
- 54** In Nigeria, for example, low-income people are twice less likely to go to courts; for example, 4 percent for the lowest income group compared to 8 percent for the highest income group in Nigeria (see HiiL 2018).
- 55** For instance, Christians displaced in Northern Nigeria or smaller minority group (see Rasul and Robins 2018).
- 56** Data in this section are from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance database, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London (accessed December 2020), <https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iag>. Subnational data is not available.
- 57** Of this group, 72 percent agree or strongly agree with the sentence “I trust informal justice mechanisms,” compared with 58 percent who agree or strongly agree from higher levels. See HiiL 2018.
- 58** Most notably ward leaders (bulamas or mai anguwa) and village heads (lawans or mai jimila).
- 59** Data on Chad are from the Gender, Institutions and Development Database, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris (accessed September 2, 2021), <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GIDDB2019>.
- 60** For example, the Third Liberation Army of the National Liberation Front of Chad during the 1970s.
- 61** For instance, clashes between Shuwa Arabs and the Kotoko in the department of Logone-et-Chari in Cameroon during the early 1990s.
- 62** These road bandits consist of rebels, soldiers, and herders who collaborate with local officials and traders and mostly attack travelers for ransom. See Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018; Seignobos 2011, 2013.
- 63** In recent years roadblocks, kidnapping and extortions have resumed, especially in Borno state.
- 64** Road blockers.
- 65** Some communities were fighting for the redistribution of administrative territories to improve their access to certain scarce resources.
- 66** With the exception of Niger’s 1993 rural code, land legislation remains insufficient.
- 67** During the 1990s and again in 2006 in Diffa, water conflicts erupted between Mohamid Arabs, who were fleeing Chad, and the Fulani-Tubu. These disputes over the control of wells later became an opportunity to call into question the citizenship of the Mohamid Arabs. See Magrin and Pérouse de Montclos 2018.
- 68** The MNJTF created by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in 1998 to address cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad region, was reactivated by the LCBC in 2012 with an expanded mandate to encompass counterterrorism operations.
- 69** Also based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 70** Including protests, battles, riots, and violence against civilians.
- 71** Armed groups organized around a collective, common feature, including community, ethnicity, region, religion, or, in exceptional cases, livelihood; for example, Bachama and Fulani communal militias. The interplay of intercommunity conflicts and the insurgency is not well documented and could be an area of further research.

- 72** This figure represents the 10 areas of the Lake Chad region analyzed in the report, separated by the country in which they are located.
- 73** Cohen (2015) highlights that “‘Boko Haram’ is a portmanteau word that disguises a range of unrelated political dynamics. We observed this on Lake Chad, where the conflict has masked local issues;” for example, “what the international media referred to . . . as ‘another attack by Boko Haram’ may instead have been a set of reprisals among the Kuri livestock farmers, and fishermen.”
- 74** Also based on an interview with an expert, July 2021.
- 75** Kaya, located not far from Bol, is home to the Buduma, who were displaced from the islands of Fétiné, Nguéléa, and Kotogorom, and want to “take back their land” (interview, May 2021).
- 76** Though it is worth highlighting that vigilantism has a long history in the Lake Chad region, even before the colonial period.
- 77** According to the CJTF, it has around 31,000 members—a number that is probably inflated; analysts estimate that it is probably closer to 10,000. Members include youth gangs, old men, and former prisoners (the latter mostly in Yobe).
- 78** In 2018, it was estimated that vigilantes numbered 14,000 in the Far North of Cameroon. See International Crisis Group 2018.
- 79** This has been less the case in Niger, where the use of vigilante groups did not appear to be necessary and due to past clashes with armed groups.
- 80** Data are sparse but indicate that in 2020, 53 percent of the population in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe was generally satisfied with community policing, a number that is increasing (from a baseline of 26 percent in 2017; Justice, Conflict and Security in Nigeria 2020).
- 81** This includes the following: sharing of spoils captured from Boko Haram, misappropriation of aid meant for IDP camps, small-scale drug trafficking, requests for “donations” at checkpoints, and even trafficking in collusion with Boko Haram.
- 82** Based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 83** Thousands of Shuwa Arabs from central Borno, who had wealth in cattle and sheep, are now destitute and live in or around Maiduguri. Many women now scrape a living by collecting firewood on the outskirts of Maiduguri and selling it in bundles (based on interviews with experts, March 2021).
- 84** In Nigeria, restrictions on the movement of people and certain items, including fertilizers and fuel, and bans on local trade, including cattle and fish, have most impacted livelihoods and fed the population’s frustration with the state. Niger also passed bans on the trading of fish and red pepper, from which insurgents reportedly benefited. The government enforced these bans by seizing or burning cargoes with fish or red pepper and arresting those involved. Nigeria suspended phone service in Borno, and Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria prohibited the use of motorcycles in certain areas to prevent attacks, with security officers seizing and destroying motorbikes. Both activities are a common source of livelihoods for youth in the region and essential to trade.
- 85** Based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 86** Based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 87** Under this strategy, a few well-constructed and militarized “super camps” have been set up for the military, under the assumption that these heavily protected

- hubs could not be overrun by armed groups.
- 88** Based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 89** The Kanuri are also the most numerous recruits into Boko Haram, even though most did not join. See Issa et al. 2020.
- 90** The government of Niger and the governor of Borno have recently agreed to return more than 130,000 Nigerian refugees, currently in Diffa, this year. See Africanews 2021.
- 91** Based on an interview with an expert, July 2021.
- 92** Based on an interview with an expert, July 2021.
- 93** Based on an interview with an expert, July 2021.
- 94** Based on an interview with an expert, July 2021.
- 95** Based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 96** Ransoms are Boko Haram's primary means for self-sustainable funding.
- 97** Taking a long-term perspective, the LCB has always been an integrated economic system. Historically, the emergence of hegemonic kingdoms in central Sudan has long depended on the dynamism of exchanges around the lake in a dual perspective of centripetal (toward the lake) and centrifugal (toward the outside of the lake). Considered an "old African crossroads" (see Magrin and Raimond 2018), the Lake Chad region has seen the establishment of several economic poles, with trade in slaves, ostrich feathers, gum, and skins linking the kingdoms of Borno, Chari-Baguirmi, Kanem, and the caliphate of Sokoto. From these dynamics, economic hubs built on old merchant networks emerged during the 20th century, with Diffa, Dikwa, Kano, Kousseri, Maiduguri, N'Djamena, and Zinder. Several trade routes linked these centers.
- 98** Cowpea refers to white bean.
- 99** Zoua-Zoua refers to adulterated fuel.
- 100** Based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 101** Indeed, these relations define "the professional choices of individuals, and therefore who controls what resources, who has power and is high in the social hierarchy" (see Koulthoumi n.d.).
- 102** Those have been instrumental for large numbers of Boko Haram associates, who sought refuge in the Diffa region and also in the Cameroonian Far North, often areas that they were familiar with and where they could count on some sort of network when attacked by national armies.
- 103** Based on an interview with an expert, May 2021. According to a young man from the locality of Blangoua in Cameroon who was interviewed in 2021, "We used to work between Blangoua and Gambaru, we brought the fish there and we brought back other goods. When we closed the Fotokol border (Cameroon), we made a large canoe and we started the lake line to go to Daba Masara to enter Guia-Maiduguri and then the Boko Haram attacked us, we had abandoned everything over there. After that, we changed again, we buy fish here in Blangoua, we go through Maroua and Garoua to go to Djimmeta (Nigeria) and there we buy other goods to bring back here."
- 104** Also based on Chatham House consultations, May 2021.
- 105** Although the Government of Cameroon does not recognize this movement as a CSO or platform.

- 106** In Borno, there are two categories of courts based on the two legal systems in force: common law (domestic law) and sharia, or Islamic law. In the other three countries, traditional chiefdoms are based on customary courts, traditional chiefs' conciliation courts, or management committees that are governed by rules handed down from generation to generation, even if changes were made over time to make them more participatory and effective.
- 107** Based on an interview with an expert, April 2021.
- 108** For example, the assassination of the Emir of Gwoza in 2014.
- 109** The program also targets armed groups in the North West and South West regions of Cameroon.
- 110** This is noteworthy, especially because the first Boko Haram combatants originated in Chad (based on an interview with an expert, June 2021).
- 111** The Chadian army successfully repelled a Boko Haram attack just after President Déby's passing (based on an Interview with an expert, June 2021).
- 112** This was observed during a mission in the city of Bol in Chad.
- 113** A portfolio analysis has been conducted to assess the WB's current response in the Lake Chad region. It is important to note, however, that even though WB support has been scaled up in recent years, as yet, not a great number of evaluations have been conducted to interrogate the impact of WB interventions.
- 114** The portfolio analysis and recommendations only refer to the WB and not the WBG, as this RRA primarily focuses on IDA, and not the five institutions that constitute the WBG.
- 115** Starting at the Bali Annual Meetings, the WBG has undertaken the design of a regional approach to support governments' coordinated efforts to stabilize the Lake Chad region. These efforts have been compounded by the designation of the Lake Chad region as one of the four priority areas in Africa under IDA19. Following a series of high-level engagements, and in addition to national programs, regional integration programming is structured around four main pillars: (i) support regional cooperation, (ii) restore livelihoods, (iii) enhance social cohesion, and (iv) improve connectivity.
- 116** The intent of the portfolio analysis is not to evaluate the results of the country program or of individual projects, but rather to assess the extent to which the country program already addresses the FCV drivers, risks, and factors of resilience and is invested in the areas of special emphasis, as well as to collect lessons from implementation of the program in the FCV context.
- 117** The list of projects in appendix D shows the size of the WB response and the sectors being prioritized in the Lake Chad region.
- 118** Recommendations presented in this section are based on these takeaways.
- 119** For instance, having a limited number of components in a project.
- 120** Through Component 1, PROLAC supports the establishment of a regional knowledge platform, anchored with the LCBC.
- 121** Notably, with some uncertainty regarding the duration and intensity of Nigeria's commitment.
- 122** WB projects support the following activities: building the LCBC's capacity, developing the regional Knowledge and Monitoring Platform, supporting the International Conference on Lake Chad, and promoting regional authority forums such as the Governors' Forum. PROLAC supports the LCBC with a range of activities related to data collection, knowledge generation, and regional dialogue.

- 123** In the context of the Prevention and Resilience Allocation in Niger, which required a recalibration of the World Bank portfolio to focus on deescalating the conflict and violence through development interventions and IDA19 guidelines on FCV envelopes.
- 124** Recognizing this, the Cameroon CPF for 2017–21 focuses on the specific challenges of the Far North region and has reoriented its country program to better respond to fragility drivers in remote and under-served areas.
- 125** The MNJTF’s mandate is to “sustainably and equitably manage the Lake Chad and other shared water resources of the LCB, to preserve the ecosystems of the Lake Chad Conventional Basin, to promote regional integration, peace and security across the Basin.” See the LCBC website, <https://cblt.org>.
- 126** Data in this section are from the Creditor Reporting System (database), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris (accessed December 2020), <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1>. The main donors to Chad (2017–18) were EU institutions, the World Bank, and France, with total ODA representing 7.9 percent of GNI (2018) and humanitarian aid (the main sector) representing 43 percent of total ODA (2018). The main donors to Cameroon (2017–18) were France, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, with total ODA representing 3.1 percent of GNI (2018) and education (the main sector) representing 20 percent of total ODA (2018). The main donors to Niger (2017–18) were the World Bank, the EU, and the United States, with total ODA representing 13.2 percent of GNI (2018) and social sectors other than education and health representing 35 percent of total ODA (2018). The main donors to Nigeria (2017–18) were the World Bank, the United States, and the United Kingdom, with total ODA representing 0.9 percent of GNI (2018) and humanitarian aid (the main sector) representing 45 percent of total ODA (2018).
- 127** WBG systems, as a rule, do not provide data that easily breaks down the volume of WBG support to specific regions/states/districts, making it difficult to judge the exact size and scope of the investments within the Lake Chad region. As a consequence, it is difficult to precisely assess the support provided specifically to the Lake Chad region through national projects. Of the four countries, only Nigeria breaks projects down into state-based allocations.
- 128** This list is found at the end of this appendix.
- 129** Fourteen projects were selected for in-depth review, based on their relevance to the identified drivers of FCV and factors of resilience. They are identified in bold in the list at the end of this appendix. A cross-section of projects was selected covering all sectors and all countries, including national and regional projects. A review of project appraisal documents revealed those projects most explicitly targeted toward addressing the drivers of FCV identified in this RRA. Of these 14 projects, interviews were conducted with task teams from 5 projects.
- 130** Projects demonstrated an understanding of FCV issues in project design, as demonstrated through PADs. Specifically, “FCV-sensitive” PADS tended to (i) have strong descriptions of the FCV-relevant contextual, political, economical, and historical factors; (ii) identify FCV-related risks and governance and fiduciary risks that would be more difficult to mitigate in FCV settings; (iii) assess institutional arrangements that reflect the guidance of the FCV strategy; (iv) include design and financing components that reflect intentions to address issues at the nexus of development and emergency response/crisis recovery; and (v) include FCV-sensitive mechanisms for project oversight, stakeholder engagement, and risk management, such as GEMS, third-party monitoring, and grievance redress mechanisms.

- 131** Niger developed a country RRA. RMR resources were subsequently allocated to address the root causes and drivers of fragility. Programming supported through the RMR spans several sectors, including health, education, mining and extractive sector governance, agriculture and livestock transformation, skills development, youth employment, and responses to forced displacement. It is not clear from the data reviewed exactly how much goes into the Lake Chad region versus other parts of Niger (IDA 2018).
- 132** Interviewees said that the prices for materials and professional services increased due to insecurity; this was also mentioned in two project ISRs. Price increases in this context include the cost of subcontracts, such as for the delivery of trainings and construction, which are driven up by the need to provide security to personnel.
- 133** Most projects reviewed were classified as having significant fiduciary risk due to the low capacity within PIUs for procurement and financial management and the high levels of corruption. Conditions of insecurity exacerbate these challenges by limiting the extent to which the risks can be offset in the methods commonly stated, in particular, through intensive WB support and oversight on the use of WB procedures.
- 134** Including the additional financing for refugee and host community response and Component 1 on decentralization.
- 135** Such as the MCRP in Nigeria, though it is worth noting that there are a number of challenges facing the MCRP, and the lack of preexisting capacity from local community and government institutions is only one of many factors affecting performance.
- 136** Performance-based financing mechanisms are not unique to Nigeria. It is worth mentioning that, according to the Cameroon SCD, there have been positive experiences of bottom-up reforms in the health sector, where PforRs were used to incentivize performance. This review did not cover the performance of health service delivery operations in the Lake Chad region specifically and thus cannot add to this analysis, but it is worth noting that the combination of fiscal pressure facing the government and targeted, performance-driven financing appeared able to drive reforms even where preexisting political support was limited.
- 137** Although delays are common, they tended to be longer in the Lake Chad region—and the stakes higher—with resources for emergency support being tied up for several years while activity designs were refined, PIUs were recruited, and operating manuals were developed.
- 138** LDP ISR for January 2019. Preparatory activities, which could arguably have been initiated or even finalized prior to launch or even appraisal, include the development of criteria by which grants will be provided to the poorest or the most vulnerable communities affected by the crisis in the North and Far North regions of the country, developing a methodological guide for productive partnerships, and developing business plan templates, to name some examples.
- 139** Interview conducted as part of the portfolio analysis, May–July 2021.
- 140** Interview conducted as part of the portfolio analysis, May–July 2021.
- 141** Interview conducted as part of the portfolio analysis, May–July 2021.
- 142** Specifically, the additional financing from the RSW was to be split across four projects in Cameroon and take an integrated approach in the areas impacted by forced displacement. To (ostensibly) simplify implementation, all four implementing agencies were required to have joint mechanisms (such as grievance redress mechanisms, joint local committees). However, implementation of this has been stalled due to disagreements over the requirement to target

refugee-hosting communities as well as competition between the PIUs. The lesson here is not only one of complexity but also of a gap between a project's core purpose and goals and the buy-in across fractious political actors responsible for implementation.

- 143** For more information regarding how these issues are framed and considered in the RRA analysis, please see Annex 1 of the RRA Methodology.
- 144** For instance, having a limited number of components in a project.
- 145** Through Component 1, PROLAC supports the establishment of a regional knowledge platform, anchored with the LCBC.
- 146** Notably, with some uncertainty regarding the duration and intensity of Nigeria's commitment.
- 147** WB projects support the following activities: building the LCBC's capacity, developing the regional Knowledge and Monitoring Platform, supporting the International Conference on Lake Chad, and promoting regional authority forums such as the Governors' Forum. PROLAC supports the LCBC with a range of activities related to data collection, knowledge generation, and regional dialogue.
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