Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00005638 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT FROM THE SOMALI MULTI PARTNER TRUST FUND ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR(6,431,925) MILLION (US$9 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE SOMALIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE FOR THE SOMALIA URBAN RESILIENCE PROJECT February 25, 2022 Urban, Disaster Risk Management, Resilience and Land Global Practice Africa Eastern and Southern Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective February 15, 2022) Currency Unit = USD .71 = US$1 US$ 1.4 = SDR 1 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BRA Benadir Regional Administration CBO Community-Based Organization CIP Capacity Injection Project EAFS External Assistance Fiduciary Section EFA Economic and Financial Analysis ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan ERR Economic Rate of Return FCV Fragility, Conflict, and Violence FGS Federal Government of Somalia FIMSC Federal Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee FM Financial Management FMS Federal Member State(s) GBV Gender-Based Violence GDP Gross Domestic Product GEMS Geo-Enabling initiative for Monitoring and Supervision GRC Grievance Redress Committee GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism ICR Implementation and Completion Results Report IDP Internally Displaced Person IDA International Development Associaition IFR Interim Financial Report ISM Implementation Support Mission M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MIS Management Information System MoF Ministry of Finance MoPW Ministry of Public Works NDP National Development Plan NPV Net Present Value O&M Operation and Maintenance PAD Project Appraisal Document PAP Project Affected Person PDO Project Development Objective PFM Public Financial Management PICB Precast Interlocking Concrete Block PIU Project Implementation Unit RAP Resettlement Action Plan RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse SMPF Somalia Multi-Partner Fund SRDF Somalia Reconstruction and Development Facility SUIPP Somali Urban Investment Planning Project SURP Somalia Urban Resilience Project TIS+ Transition Initiatives for Stabilization TPM Third-Party Monitor TTL Task Team Leader UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services USAID United States Agency for International Development Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Keith E. Hansen Regional Director: Catherine Signe Tovey Practice Manager: Peter D. Ellis Task Team Leader(s): Makiko Watanabe ICR Main Contributor: Benjamin Kushner TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 5 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................5 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................8 II. OUTCOME ...................................................................................................................... 9 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ..............................................................................................................9 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ........................................................................................9 C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 12 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 13 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ......................................................................................... 13 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 14 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 14 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 15 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 17 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 17 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 18 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 21 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 22 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 23 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 26 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 37 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 40 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 41 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 44 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ..................................................................... 45 ANNEX 7. SUMMARY OF PROJECT CHANGES ........................................................................ 46 ANNEX 8. DETAILED PROGRESS OVERVIEW BY CITY & MAPS ................................................ 48 ANNEX 9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROJECT ACTIVITIES .................................................... 52 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name P163857 Somalia Urban Resilience Project Country Financing Instrument Somalia Investment Project Financing Original EA Category Revised EA Category Partial Assessment (B) Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Ministry of Finance Benadir Regional Administration, Garowe Municipality Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level and support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas. Page 1 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing 9,000,000 9,000,000 8,999,329 TF-A8112 Total 9,000,000 9,000,000 8,999,329 Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 Total Project Cost 9,000,000 9,000,000 8,999,329 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 02-Aug-2018 18-Oct-2018 18-May-2020 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Satisfactory Satisfactory Substantial RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 05-Dec-2018 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0 02 21-May-2019 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.32 03 03-Nov-2019 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.34 04 30-Apr-2020 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.81 Page 2 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) 05 21-Jul-2020 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.18 06 26-Jan-2021 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.88 07 07-Jul-2021 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.15 SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Public Administration 33 Sub-National Government 33 Social Protection 34 Social Protection 34 Transportation 33 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 33 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Social Development and Protection 100 Fragility, Conflict and Violence 100 Forced Displacement 100 Human Development and Gender 100 Gender 100 Page 3 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Urban and Rural Development 100 Urban Development 100 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 100 Urban Planning 100 Municipal Finance 100 Disaster Risk Management 33 Flood and Drought Risk Management 33 Environment and Natural Resource Management 33 Climate change 33 Adaptation 33 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Bella Deborah Mary Bird Keith E. Hansen Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Mark R. Lundell Practice Manager: Bernice K. Van Bronkhorst Peter D. Ellis Zishan Faiza Karim, Makiko Task Team Leader(s): Makiko Watanabe Watanabe ICR Contributing Author: Benjamin Joseph Kushner Page 4 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Key Project Information 1. The Somalia Urban Resilience Program is implemented as part of three interrelated projects – Somali urban Investment Planning Project (SUIPP, P150374), Somalia Urban Resilience Project Phase I (SURP, P163857), and Somalia Urban Resilience Project Phase II (SURP-II, P170922).1 This Implementation and Completion Results Report (ICR) covers the second project of the program, the SURP-I. The project was approved on August 2, 2018, and became effective on August 6, 2018. Context2 - SURP 2. This project was one of the first engagements in the urban sector and infrastructure in the broader context of the World Bank’s reengagement with Somalia, and it was rated as ‘High’ risk. The World Bank’s program for Somalia had focused primarily on support to public institutions and governance reform. Since early 2016, however, it started investment programming largely in urban areas focused on infrastructure through the SUIPP and SURP. This new focus would provide more tangible benefits to Somalis while enhancing the visibility of the Government and helping clarify the roles and responsibilities between the federal, state, and municipal/district government.3 The SURP was prepared during a period of reengagement for World Bank operations in Somalia following the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in August 2012 under a provisional constitution, after an extended period of transitional governments. The political context was established by the September 2013 Brussels Conference, which galvanized domestic and international support for Somalia and endorsed the Somali Compact and its Peacebuilding and State building Goals, as well as the Somaliland Special Arrangement. In the absence of International Development Association (IDA) funds,4 the SURP was supported by the Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (SMPF) managed by the World Bank,5 a key fund under the Somalia Reconstruction and Development Facility (SRDF). SRDF was an overarching governance and aid coordination framework established to pool international support to Somali Compact priorities in support of Somalia’s transition. 3. Despite the positive developments, Somalia remained a country affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) with a volatile security situation, especially in the central and southern regions. Since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991, Somalia experienced cycles of conflict and violence that fragmented the country, destroyed legitimate institutions, and created widespread vulnerability. Relations were still largely unchartered between the FGS and the local administrations maintaining authority in different areas of the country, including in the semiautonomous region of Puntland and the self-declared independent state of Somaliland. Moreover, Somalia’s human development indicators were among the lowest in the world. Poverty incidence was an estimated 73 percent—61 percent in urban areas and 80 percent in rural areas, with extreme poverty estimated at 43 percent.6 More than 6.2 million people needed humanitarian assistance in 2017, with 2.9 million needing urgent assistance.7 Page 5 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) 4. Given the central role cities play in Somalia’s development and stability, managing Somalia’s urbanization and strengthening urban resilience is crucial.8 The SURP strategically used urban infrastructure as an entry point to advance the urban resilience agenda. The project supported participatory decision-making processes to identify key urban investments that contributed to fostering social cohesion and supporting infrastructure that benefits both host communities and the displaced. Eligible urban infrastructure investments needed to meet project criteria which interface with the top- down citywide technical assessment with a bottom-up participatory decision-making process using a multi-variable analysis.9 The SURP was informed by the SUIPP, which served as a preparatory planning and design phase for the priority urban infrastructure works completed under the SURP.10 5. The SURP was the first World Bank project providing financing for infrastructure directly to local governments. By enabling local governments to carry out their own procurements, manage the financing, and monitor implementation, the SURP was testing a high-risk financing modality. This is also why the funding envelope was minimal (US$9 million) and prepared in distinct phases (SUIPP to SURP). Moreover, the SURP aimed to strengthen the nascent national public financial management (PFM) system established in Somalia by channeling all the funds through the government system down to the municipal government level for the first time. The project leveraged the basic PFM capacity that had been strengthened under another World Bank-financed Somalia Capacity Injection Project (CIP, P149971). The SURP was therefore both an urban resilience and a local governance project. It was implemented in the strategically important cities of Mogadishu and Garowe (Puntland)Error! Bookmark not defined. through the PIUs w ithin the BRA11 and Garowe Municipalities. 6. The evolution of the Bank’s urban portfolio reflects the phased scale-up of World Bank engagement as state building in Somalia progressed. In the urban sector, the World Bank’s engagement started with the planning phase under the SUIPP . This was followed by the SURP, where delivery of urban infrastructure using country systems at the municipal level was piloted for the first time. The focus was on building municipal government capacity and establishing their legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Leveraging on the success of the SURP and using the IDA financing that became available since Somalia normalized its relations with IDA in 2020, it has been scaled up from a US$9 million project implemented in two cities of Mogadishu and Garowe to SURP-II worth US$112 million covering all six Federal Member States (FMS) except for Somaliland. With a larger budget envelope, SURP-II investments are focusing on more transformative investments that facilitate better urban development. The appropriateness and efficacy of the SURP thus need to be analyzed in the context of the evolution of the Somali state building. Theory of Change (Results Chain) 7. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was developed with the theory of change illustrated in Figure 1. The theory of change is clear and straightforward. Indicators were identified to monitor progress toward the Project Development Objective (PDO) and to test the links in the results chain. The theory of change and the corresponding Results Framework make logical links between activities, outputs, and outcomes, with a balanced focus on hard infrastructure and qualitative outcomes related to strengthening government capacity for service delivery and state-society relations. 8. The main expected outcome of the project was to help municipal governments deliver priority urban infrastructure investments. The project would simultaneously build government management and planning capacity and systems to prepare for subsequent financing and sustain investments. The effective Page 6 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) delivery of urban infrastructure using local labor would provide tangible benefits to community members, including vulnerable people such as women and IDPs, while enhancing government visibility and legitimacy necessary for political and social stability. The SURP was designed based on the assumption that it would commence immediately after the SUIPP and leverage the momentum, relationships, and capacity of the preceding investment, including by building on partner operation and maintenance (O&M) and governance projects. These assumptions were not borne out due to significant delays in mobilizing project funding and affected the achievement of outcomes, as described in this ICR. Project Development Objective 9. The PDO was to strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level and support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas. Accordingly, the PDO comprises two sub-objectives: Sub-Objective 1: To support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas Sub-Objective 2: To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 10. The key results expected from the project, as set out in the PAD, were as follows: Sub-Objective 1: Support for reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas • People with access to all season roads within a 500-meter range • Beneficiaries satisfied that infrastructure met their needs. Sub-Objective 2: Strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national levels • Sub projects with post-construction community engagement/O&M plans • People’s satisfaction of the municipal government performance on road rehabilitation. 11. See annex 1 for the list of outcome indicators and intermediate results indicators. Figure 1. SURP Theory of Change Page 7 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Components 12. The project was implemented with three main components, emphasizing interrelated activities to simplify the approach and maximize synergies. Component 1: Mogadishu Municipality, US$6.5 million and Component 2: Garowe Municipality, US$2.5 million were similar in scope, as described below. • Infrastructure. Drawing on the feasibility studies and preliminary designs done through the SUIPP, the scope of the component involved the construction of (i) for Mogadishu 19 secondary roads (7.5 km, 6 m wide, 7 districts) with side drains, pedestrian walkways,12 and solar streetlights across 7 districts (allocated 1 km per district for equity purposes), and (ii) for Garowe four secondary roads (4.4 km, 6 m wide) with side drains, pedestrian walkways, and solar streetlights across seven districts. The infrastructure investments adhered to work specifications developed through the project to ensure quality control.13 This component used labor-intensive construction methods14 to create short-term income-generating opportunities for the vulnerable.15 The infrastructure investments contributed to improved market and services access and safety and security. • Capacity building. Building on the institutional assessment undertaken under SUIPP, this component built the capacity of the PIU established in each municipal government in the areas of financial management (FM), procurement, environmental and social safeguards, and engineering. • O&M. The component financed the development of O&M plans for the road and drainage investments, as well as training of district-level maintenance committees and government on routine maintenance, community mobilization, and monitoring and reporting. The component also developed guidelines to help municipalities establish and coordinate maintenance committees. • Project management. This component financed project management costs of the BRA PIU, including staffing, grievance redress and feedback mechanisms, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). BRA PIU also contracted the engineering supervision of the civil works contracts, including for Garowe, by an independent engineering supervision firm. The Garowe PIU contracted a firm to conduct a project baseline survey for both Mogadishu and Garowe. Component 3: Contingency Emergency Response, US$0 million 13. Allowed for rapid reallocation of uncommitted project funds in the event of a natural or man- made crisis in the future, during the implementation of the project, to address eligible emergency needs under the conditions established in its operations manual. This component had no funding allocation initially and would draw resources from the other expenditure categories at the time of activation. B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 14. The PDO and outcome targets were not revised. Revised PDO Indicators 15. The PDO indicators were not revised. Page 8 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Revised Components 16. The components were not revised. Other Changes 17. Several changes were adopted during project implementation to respond to emerging needs, maximizing the flexibility allowed within the project design. There were no project restructurings. A detailed tabular summary of adaptations per city is presented in annex 8. Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 18. There was no implication on the theory of change. II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating 19. The relevance of the PDO is rated as High. The PDO was narrowly defined with clear links between the objective and activities, and the project was well aligned with World Bank and national priorities. Beyond simply providing tangible outputs, the project engaged through local government systems and build government capacity. This had significant impacts on strengthening citizen-state trust and collaboration between the center and periphery of government. The project remains aligned with the World Bank Group’s Country Partnership Framework (FY19–FY22),16 Interim Strategy Note for the Federal Republic of Somalia (FY14–FY16),17 and the Somalia National Development Plan (NDP, 2017–2019), as well as being endorsed and approved through SRDF. This includes priorities to (a) expand service delivery, (b) build resilience to climate shocks, and (c) boost economic opportunities in Somalia. The project contributed to these objectives by (a) rehabilitating priority resilient urban infrastructure to deliver basic services; (b) providing short-term employment to vulnerable groups to construct works; (c) building government urban analytical, planning, and management capacity; and (d) delivering the above through government financial systems. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) 20. Project results were verified by regular data collection and verification including baseline and end line surveys, regular reporting on the Results Framework through monthly reports from United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and contractors and quarterly reports from the PIU, a midterm evaluation, third-party monitoring to triangulate progress and issues in difficult-to-reach areas, and routine implementation support missions (ISMs) as detailed further in the M&E section. 21. The project set out to strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level and support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas. It aimed to do so by (a) providing capacity-building support to the BRA and Garowe Municipality and strengthening government Page 9 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) systems at the sub-national level by channeling funds on-budget; (b) supporting the rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary urban roads in Mogadishu and Garowe; (c) creating short-term income-generating opportunities and improving connectivity for the urban poor and IDPs; and (d) augmenting the municipal government’s planning capacity by financing road connectivity and drainage network assessment in Mogadishu using complementary funds. By achieving the PDO, the project aimed to support the government’s efforts to demonstrate visible and tangible improvements in the lives of its citizens, critical for strengthening the legitimacy of the Government and sustaining social and political stability in the country. 22. Efficacy of PDO Sub-Objective 1: To support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas. The benefit of the reconstruction efforts financed through the project far exceeded the scope originally envisaged in the Results Framework. While the original target is arguably overly conservative, the number of people who now have access to all season roads in their communities is notable. An estimated 148,800 people (50 percent female, 19 percent IDPs, 81 percent host communities) against the original target of 2,000 fall within 500 m of the reconstructed urban infrastructure. An endline survey of beneficiaries in both municipalities revealed high levels of satisfaction that the rehabilitated infrastructure met their needs at 90 percent, with no significant differences of views between women and men or between IDPs and host communities. 23. Efficacy of PDO Sub-Objective 2: To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub- national level. The SURP was deliberately designed to put municipal governments at the forefront as they are primarily responsible for urban governance and service delivery. The SURP therefore established PIUs within the municipal governments and did not set any federal-level line ministry as the implementing agency. The SURP helped build municipal governments’ capacity in several ways: (a) PIU staff were selected by and reported to the respective mayors—this meant that municipal governments owned the SURP and had to oversee the day-to-day project implementation which provided ‘learning-by-doing’ opportunities; (b) the SURP provided training not only for the PIU staff but also for civil servants on key public administration skills such as FM, procurement, safeguards, M&E, participatory planning, and O&M; (c) by instilling a robust FM and procurement system, strict safeguards mechanism, and strong project implementation and monitoring mechanism, the SURP helped strengthen the municipal governments’ accountability; and (d) BRA and Garowe Municipal Governments were introduced to participatory planning, stakeholder engagement, and grievance redress, which helped build their downward accountability. The impacts of all these were well reflected by the increased community satisfaction toward the Government, reported through the endline survey. 24. Project and government staff formally trained. About 286 people received training through the project on topics including public FM, procurement, human resource management, environmental and social safeguards, O&M, and M&E. Training was provided primarily to the Government and project staff, although certain sessions were also offered to staff from the contractor and the UNOPS, as well as to members of the community (including O&M committee members). In Mogadishu, 207 people were trained (39 percent were women); of these, 159 (43 percent women) were project and government staff; other participants included staff from the contractor and UNOPS as well as community members. In Garowe, 79 people were trained (19 percent were women); of these, 72 were project and government staff (19 percent women); other participants included staff from the contractor and UNOPS as well as community members. Having far exceeded the target of 30 in Mogadishu and 20 in Garowe, the recommendation for the next phase is to work on more focused and standardized training package Page 10 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) (including possible certifications) based on a sequential approach to introduce specific topics that build on introductory courses, or teams within the Government (including more targeting of civil servants), or to justify the need for such expansive training efforts. There is also a need for more assessment on the quality and impact of training, which was not envisaged in this initial phase of the project. 25. The project also provided a significant step forward in strengthening intergovernmental transfer using government systems. The SURP was one of the first World Bank-financed project that utilized government systems to channel funds directly to the municipal administration’s project accounts.18 All withdrawal applications for Garowe were processed by the FMS External Assistance Fiduciary Section (EAFS) established within the State MoF and reported to the FGS EAFS under the Federal MoF, while the FGS EAFS processed BRA withdrawal applications. This helped strengthen Somalia’s intergovernmental fund transfer mechanism and the government’s FM capacity. 26. Short-term employment generation. The SURP successfully generated significant short-term employment, including for women, IDPs, and returnees. In Mogadishu, 63,324 person-days of labor were recorded involving over 1,088 workers (80.0 percent male, 20.0 percent female). Of these, 13 percent were IDPs and returnees and 87 percent were from host communities and other communities.19 A little over half of the workers contracted were unskilled (53 percent). In Garowe, the road construction provided 42,512 person-days of labor that involved over 600 workers drawn from the local communities, both host communities (67.6 percent) and IDPs (32.4 percent). Of these, 89.8 percent were males while 10.2 percent were females. About 61 percent of the workers hired were unskilled. The SURP also provided training for unskilled labor in laying precast interlocking concrete blocks (PICB), which is a common road construction method used in the two cities, to communities, including women, IDPs, and youth. This has given them a means for increased income generation beyond the project. Beyond the temporary employment created in both municipalities, the newly established businesses along the refurbished roads are perceived to have increased employment and livelihood opportunities for those residing in the target settlements. 27. Roads rehabilitated. In Mogadishu, 11 roads measuring 7.4 km (slightly below the revised target of 7.4 km) were fully constructed in Bondhere, Hamar Jajab, Hamar Weyne, Howlwadag, Shangani, and Warta Nabada Districts. The twelfth road Agoonta in Abdiaziz District was partially built (603 m out of 753 m), but construction work was stopped because of safeguard issues due to a court case over land ownership of the remaining road section whereby two individuals claimed ownership. There was 3,367 m of sidewalks constructed across five roads and 233 m of drainage built along four roads. The project also financed the installation of 233 solar streetlights, including 142 streetlights along eight project roads and 91 streetlights along non-SURP roads (Casa Italia and Hassan Geedi Abtow Roads in Hamar Weyne District financed by the BRA). In Garowe, four roads measuring 4.93 km (exceeding the target of 4.4 km) were constructed. The roads interconnect creating a bypass that provides motorists an alternative route through the city and thereby decongesting the main Garowe Road. Another urban road (Jilab Road) connects the city’s largest IDP settlements to the urban center, offering IDPs better access to jobs and services. The full length of the roads included drainage on one side and pedestrian walkways on both sides of the road. In both municipalities, these roads were prioritized based on their strategic importance that provide connectivity of urban poor communities and IDP settlements to key socioeconomic facilities, high economic internal rates of return, and high benefit/cost ratio. Page 11 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) 28. A majority of surveyed residents (88.3 percent in Mogadishu and 84.4 percent in Garowe) were satisfied with their respective municipality’s ability to provide road infrastructure. In Mogadishu, this was a marked improvement over the results of the baseline survey which showed that only 25 percent of respondents held a positive view (either satisfied or very satisfied). In Garowe, the change was more subtle with 74.7 percent saying they were satisfied and 0 percent very satisfied in the baseline, compared with 47.4 percent and 37.0 percent saying they were satisfied or very satisfied, respectively, in the endline. 29. See annex 9 for a detailed progress overview per road for each municipality and maps of road investments. 30. The project significantly overachieved several Results Framework targets, which were set keeping in mind data limitations. This is further detailed in annex 1. Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 31. The overall efficacy of the project is rated as High. Significant achievements were made against the two sub-objectives of the PDO. The evidence collected to support this ICR is deemed sufficient to assess project efficacy, as discussed in the M&E section. C. EFFICIENCY Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 32. Based on an economic and financial analysis (EFA) limited to the road infrastructure investments under Components 1 and 2, the net present value (NPV) is estimated to be US$8.4 million at a 12 percent discount rate with an economic rate of return (ERR) of 34 percent over a 20-year period.20 This analysis is based on the full US$9 million project value. The economic benefits included in this analysis are based on travel time and related costs saved for commuters, along with the value of improved skills and new and improved entries into the labor force created through the construction works. On the cost side, the analysis incorporates all project disbursements along with O&M cost estimates over this period. The original PAD did not calculate an estimated ERR due to data limitations. Comparative traffic flow analyses for before and after the project were also not possible due to data limitations. However, all specific investments undertaken by the project were subject to extensive community consultations and review, including a framework for economic analysis. While extensive social benefits under the training and capacity-building activities (for example, local investments based on better planning, better transparency and accountability, reduced incidence of waterborne diseases due to improved drainage on roads, better O&M provisions, increased economic activity, and access to public services) should be strongly noted; the efficiency analysis of this ICR focuses only on the direct road infrastructure investments under Components 1 and 2 since these direct financial benefits provide a clearer estimate of the project value. The social benefits are likely to be magnified through the continued support of SURP-II. Page 12 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) 33. Considering the factors described earlier, efficiency is rated Substantial. As discussed earlier, the project demonstrated strong returns from the infrastructure investments under Components 1 and 2.The SURP also helped improve the investment planning and O&M processes in Mogadishu and Garowe. Despite some delays during preparation, the project showed reasonable implementation efficiency, including reallocating resources based on extensive community consultations. See annex 4 for additional details. D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 34. Based on the relevance (High), efficacy (High), and efficiency (Substantial) ratings, the overall outcome rating is Satisfactory. E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS 35. Based on the impact evaluation, the SURP generated additional tangible socioeconomic benefits for Somalis.21 The new roads contributed to improved access to services for both IDPs and host communities by reducing time and travel costs to health facilities, schools, and so on. In Garowe, the average travel time decreased to 10 minutes (from 30 at baseline) and travel costs reduced to an average of US$1.5 per trip (from US$2.1). The rehabilitation of Jilab Road also helped connect IDP camps to the city, resulting in the extension of electrical services. Although less precipitous, travel time in Mogadishu reduced on average by four minutes. More diverse and larger businesses were opened that increased employment, improved access to goods and services, and extended working hours in the markets, which is also increasing municipal revenues.22 The average daily customers in Mogadishu increased to 25 (from 19 at baseline) and to 36 in Garowe (from 28). However, no study was undertaken to quantify these economic gains. Endline survey showed that there have been minimal changes to rental and property values or significant displacement due to gentrification, although business rentals increased because of the improved economic activity. 36. Anecdotally, the roads (using gradients, side drains) reduced flooding and stagnant water contributing to health improvements, although no quantifiable evidence was provided. Poor solid waste management and erosion threatens to undermine the benefits of the drainage works as trash and silt can block drainage. The new pedestrian walkways, speed bumps, traffic signage, and streetlighting in several districts reportedly improved road safety and security. The endline survey found that businesses’ operation hours have become longer, women and people with disability find it easier to get to services, and children can more safely commute to schools. In Garowe, more businesses operate for longer hours, with 51 percent opening at 6:00 a.m. and 44 percent closing at 10:00 p.m. (14 percent and 27 percent at baseline, respectively). Mogadishu follows a similar trend with 38 percent opening at 6:00 a.m. and 23 percent closing at 10:00 p.m. (29 percent and 8 percent at baseline, respectively). 37. Some positive impacts on gender inclusion were achieved, including for host communities and IDPs, although more could have been done. Positive accomplishments were achieved particularly by engaging females in stakeholder consultation processes, providing job opportunities in civil works, and engaging in fair working conditions, such as sufficient and suitable toilet and washing facilities, separate for men and women workers. The SURP targeted female beneficiaries through the provision of job opportunities and participation in maintenance/grievance redress committees (GRC), with 20 percent of Page 13 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) employment days benefiting women for Mogadishu and 10 percent for Garowe. Despite some gains, female participation in civil-works-related employment was limited due to socio-cultural barriers; the absence of a structured, criteria-based targeting; and inadequate dissemination of information on job opportunities to women. To improve engagement, Garowe implemented an assessment on how to address barriers to engage more women and IDPs in daily labor opportunities under SURP-II. The project also did not assess the extent of gender-based violence (GBV) in the project areas and the potential for more negative impacts from project activities. 38. The project strengthened community engagement through various means. Specifically, the SURP established basic approaches for community engagement of host communities and IDPs, including outreach, participatory planning of priority urban investments, resettlement management, support to inclusiveness through beneficiary targeting, addressing of grievances, and labor, in line with the project Stakeholder Engagement Framework and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). This included support through existing community structures such as youth and women’s groups to participate in district O&M and grievance redress and resettlement committees, as well as development of PIU capacities for enhanced community engagement, with the hiring of PIU community mobilization officers (male and female) under SURP-II.23 This also entailed funding the development of an O&M manual and work plans, providing trainings to committee members, and the provision of some equipment. However, further work is needed to develop and formalize and structure community engagement into government processes. 39. Since the project locations were susceptible to occasional flooding due to torrential rainfall, improved drainage infrastructure was provided supporting climate change adaptation benefits. Mogadishu installed energy-efficient streetlighting using renewable solar energy and Garowe planted trees, contributing to climate mitigation co-benefits. Pedestrian walkways also enhanced pedestrian mobility and the road investments increased public transport, although road improvements likely increased overall emissions from vehicular traffic, especially in the light of the aging national traffic fleet. However, there was no attempt to assess or quantify the extent of climate co-benefits in the project areas. Future programming should factor localized climate projections into infrastructure designs and explore opportunities for boosting the overall resilience of urban road systems by further greening of road corridors to help absorb urban heat and support drainage. 40. The SURP helped build foundations for future urban investments. The SURP’s focus on assessment and participatory planning helped identify broader development challenges. This entails Bank-executed assessments (totaling approximately US$3 million) from trust fund and SURP-II resources aimed at analyzing needs and piloting potential solutions. The World Bank helped prepare a trunk drainage master plan and road connectivity assessment for Mogadishu to improve the connectivity of SURP roads using funds from the Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction, which informed more strategic selection of roads to be financed under SURP-II. III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 41. Limited donor interest in infrastructure investment in Somalia, especially through local governments, at the time delayed SURP preparation. The project design originally targeted US$86 million Page 14 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) of investments in Hargeisa, Mogadishu, and Garowe but was drastically scaled back to Mogadishu and Garowe with a US$9 million budget envelope. It took more than a year to prepare and appraise the project, with the German Government and the World Bank Group eventually agreeing to finance the operation through the SMPF.24 The German Government was also closely involved in the project design. 42. The preceding SUIPP enabled preparation, but also implementation challenges. The SUIPP established fully operational PIU in each participating municipality. It completed assessments25 and used a participatory planning process to identify priority infrastructure schemes. However, the investment planning did not systematically consider road connectivity to existing and proposed trade and commercial hubs, socioeconomic facilities, or other roads. For Mogadishu, equity in distribution of resources (approximately 1 km road per district) resulted in the selection of disjointed road sections rather than a network of roads that would improve travel, minimizing the developmental impacts that the SURP could have had (though possibly important from equity and peace dividend point of view). UNOPS completed feasibility and preliminary design studies for the prioritized infrastructure.26 The assessments and preliminary designs were also completed before the recruitment of the BRA PIU engineer, a missed opportunity to help contextualize the designs to local conditions. As previously mentioned, the transition from the SUIPP—the planning and preparatory phase—to the SURP—the implementation phase—was significantly delayed by approximately 12 months due to a lack of funding, resulting in lost intuitional memory and momentum. 43. Reduced complementarity with partner programming. The project originally planned to leverage ongoing district-level O&M committees financed through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS+) and the United Nations Joint Program for Local Governance, offering a good potential foundation for the World Bank’s urban engagement to build on.27 However, due to the prolonged project preparations, the SURP was unable to use existing committees as partner programming had closed and would need to establish new committees to support project implementation. Due to limited project funding, actual maintenance would be funded by the participating municipalities, although this financing is yet to be secured. B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 44. Clients lacked experience with World Bank projects. Despite some capacity built through the SUIPP, the project was designed in the context of low implementing capacity and limited experience with World Bank policies and procedures. The PIUs contracted engineering firms from the local market that lacked safeguards management and reporting capacity or experience working with established project work specifications. The PIU also had an inadequate understanding of safeguards planning and monitoring requirements, as well as lacked sufficient contract management capacity; for example, there were seven contract variations/addenda for BRA due to design and cost changes and delays. Client performance gradually improved over the project duration although less so for Mogadishu due to the factors described in the following paragraphs. 45. UNOPS’s technical supervision performance was adequate but faced several challenges during implementation. These included lack of formal handover from the UNOPS SUIPP team to the UNOPS SURP team (different staff were employed) and limited on-the-ground engagement in Mogadishu due to security risks, including limited availability and timeliness of UN security support.28 The management of the remaining two roads in Mogadishu is also illustrative of coordination challenges UNOPS experienced Page 15 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) during the project. The PIU requested design changes from the contractor based on community requests without consulting UNOPS to revise the designs or prepare variation orders for World Bank formal approval. The contractor was not paid until UNOPS retroactively worked with the PIU to prepare the variation order and the World Bank granted approval. While respecting the PIU’s mandate, UNOPS also needs to strike a balance to engage in triangulating information and more closely monitoring implementation progress. That said, coordination across UNOPS and counterparts improved over time, including further clarity on roles and responsibilities and modes of collaboration, such as routine check- ins. 46. Road design deficiencies caused delays. UNOPS completed preliminary designs in 2017. These drawings were not specific to each road site and lacked localized information on drainage and utilities. The designs were gradually adjusted during construction as more local information was collected as well as to accommodate community requests. The final road designs also did not thoroughly consider city drainage causing rainwater to flood neighboring houses or other roads which were lower than SURP- financed roads. 47. The unplanned urban environment slowed implementation. Public utilities are unregulated and unplanned in Somalia and no mapping of underground utility lines was available. This meant that road designs had to be adjusted during construction upon identification of obtrusive septic tanks and buried water pipes and cables. This considerably slowed works and required close coordination with multiple private utility firms to relocate the utility lines using contingency funds, a particular challenge for Mogadishu given the complex urban environment and multitude of utility stakeholders. 48. Quality issues of works for Mogadishu. The quality of construction was generally satisfactory. However, there were problems with quality of some of the works stemming from poor adherence to technical designs and poor workmanship, as well as insufficient supervision by UNOPS and the PIU. In particular, the final works completed in Mogadishu had poor finishing and wearing of blocks as they were completed hastily to meet the project closing, and the contractor was instructed to address these issues during the Defects Notification Period (one year from the date of issuing the completion certificate). 49. High turnover of mayors constrained project implementation in Mogadishu. The Mayor of Mogadishu changed five times during project implementation. This entailed reestablishing relations and managing ever-changing and intense political pressure. The mayor’s short tenure and focus on ‘quick wins’ and high-visibility roads required re-agreement on project priorities and expectation management given World Bank requirements and the project’s focus on small community roads. The mayor also does not appoint his own deputy mayors or secretary general, making political consensus more difficult within the leadership. Faced with these challenges, the BRA PIU Project Coordinator resigned (December 2020) and it took nearly a year to replace the position and this slowed implementation. This dynamic political environment was particularly stark for financing the resettlement of project affected persons (PAPs) who were expected to be physically displaced by the project, with the road dropped due to the failure to secure resettlement sites for approximately 10 PAPs during a mayoral transition. Since mayors of Mogadishu are appointed by the President of Somalia, they tend to have stronger upward accountability to top political leaders as opposed to downward accountability toward the constituents. This is in contrast with Garowe, where the mayor is popularly elected for a five-year term which guarantees strong downward accountability and continuity. This contributed to timely and smooth implementation of the SURP in Garowe. Page 16 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) 50. The political and economic situation was volatile. Somalia has been gripped by prolonged armed conflict, climatic and health shocks, and economic and institutional weaknesses that exacerbate already high vulnerabilities, affecting project implementation. The project experienced implementation delays due to COVID-19 movement restriction measures and associated supply chain management disruptions, which increased construction costs, although impacts were limited as most works were completed before COVID-19.29 In addition, there were unexpected heavy rains, both in 2019 and 2020, prohibiting work from proceeding, delaying access of material to the sites, and causing damages that required rework. See the Safeguards section for additional details on security risk management. IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 51. The quality of the M&E design is rated Substantial. The theory of change is clear, and adequate indicators were identified to monitor progress toward the PDO and to test the links in the results chain. The combination of more easily verifiable indicators (for example, kilometers of road rehabilitated) with more qualitative indicators (for example, perceptions of government capacity to rehabilitated road) captured both concrete achievements and the more difficult-to-quantify impact on the social compact/state-society relations. As previously discussed, there was significant overachievement of several targets due to overly conservative estimates and strong performance, and targeting should be enhanced moving forward based on lessons learned. The design could have been enhanced with the introduction of a dedicated Management information system (MIS) and the full rollout of the Geo- Enabling initiative for Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS) to standardize, streamline, and enhance record keeping for M&E as well as contract management. 52. Further, some indicators could have been strengthened to focus more on quality over quantity. For example, more emphasis should have been placed on tracking the effectiveness of training or the functionality of committees established, instead of the number of people trained or the number of committees formed. Whereas results were often disaggregated by location, the targets were not location specific, creating some minor confusion among PIUs as to expectations of what each municipality should deliver. Location-specific targets should be defined—either in the Results Framework or in early discussions with the PIUs—to ensure clarity at the design stage. Disaggregation of data by gender and of IDPs/host communities was consistently applied wherever possible, but inconsistent record keeping by the PIUs limited options for analysis. Whereas targets for women and IDPs could have been more consistently applied, the disaggregation alone helped provide incentives for inclusion. M&E Implementation 53. The collection and analysis of M&E data is rated Substantial. Data were collected primarily by the PIUs in Mogadishu and Garowe and by the firm contracted to carry out a baseline and endline surveys. Additional data were collected by a third-party monitor (TPM) to help triangulate progress and issues in difficult-to-reach areas. The PIU also initiated the GEMS, although this training was not applied under the SURP and no comprehensive project MIS or geo-referenced data collection was established. The use of Page 17 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) the same firm to conduct the baseline and endline surveys in both municipalities significantly mitigated the risk of divergent approaches on many of the more qualitative indicators. Yet, a more systematic approach to tracking the results over time, rather than simply updating tables with the latest figures, would have enhanced quality assurance. 54. Project M&E was enriched by contracting a TPM, which helped triangulate information on progress and issues in difficult-to-reach areas and provided direct input on how to improve project implementation and strengthen the robustness of quality assurance processes.30 Both the contractor and UNOPS produced monthly M&E reporting; these were received and monitored closely by the PIU and confirmed by the TPM as being reliable and of good quality. However, the TPM also uncovered significant shortcomings which helped guide improvements to the quality of implementation by the time of the midterm review.31 M&E Utilization 55. The utilization of M&E data to inform project management and decision-making is rated Substantial. The PIU provided regular reporting on the Results Framework through quarterly reports, which improved over the time in response to feedback from the task team and TPM. In addition to the benefits mentioned earlier, the introduction of an MIS would make it easier to digest project results at an aggregate level as well as across locations, standardizing and enhancing record keeping across locations as the project expands geographically. The MIS should be used to set and uphold quality standards expected through the project, going beyond the indicators of the Results Framework. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 56. Based on the above analysis, the overall quality of M&E is rated Substantial. The M&E system as designed, implemented, and utilized was sufficient to assess the achievement of the objectives and test the links in the results chain, especially given the size and scope of the first phase of the SURP. While there are areas that could be improved for future urban infrastructure projects in Somalia, the moderate shortcomings in the design, implementation, and utilization were not significant impediments to the assessment or the achievement of the objectives. B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE 57. Environmental and social safeguards policies and risk category. The project triggered the following safeguards policies: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 4.04 (Natural Habitat), OP 4.11 (Physical Cultural Heritage), and OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). The environmental and social (E&S) safeguards category of the project was B. The E&S instruments prepared at the project level are Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) with subproject-specific RAPs and ESMPs prepared by the Mogadishu and Garowe PIUs. All instruments were cleared by the World Bank and disclosed in-country and on the World Bank website. Due to the nature and relatively moderate scale of the civil works in urban environment, the adverse environmental impacts remained minor, temporary, and confined to the area immediately surrounding the construction. The resettlement impacts of the project were moderate due to the limited size and nature of the individual physical works. No physical displacement occurred in the project. The economic displacement was largely related to temporary livelihood impact on mobile vendors or roadside businesses during the construction Page 18 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) (approximately for one month at a given project road section under the project). As per the RAPs, all project-affected stakeholders were compensated (105 in Mogadishu and 14 in Garowe). The project was not ‘gender tagged’. 58. E&S performance. The implementation of the E&S instruments and compliance was monitored and reported regularly throughout the project life by the contractors, the supervising consultant, and the PIUs with triangulation by the TPM agent and the World Bank task team. While the E&S safeguards performance had been rated Satisfactory (S) or Moderately Satisfactory (MS) since the start of the project implementation, the rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) in January 2021. This was due to the delay in (a) implementing GBV risk mitigation measures and (b) responding to TPM findings identified during their site visits in Mogadishu. Following this lapse, the project immediately initiated corrective actions to implement GBV mitigations (including the adoption of the GBV action plan; training and awareness raising activities for the PIU, community members, and contracted workers; identification of GBV service providers; continued enforcement of code of conduct for project workers) as well as corrective actions to address TPM findings (such as on labor and working conditions, occupational safety and health measures, grievance redress mechanism (GRM] and reporting). Considering above progress, the environmental and social performance of the SURP was upgraded to Moderately Satisfactory (MS) in July 2021, which was maintained until project closure. 59. Functionality of the GRM. The project established GRMs at different levels (district, contractor, and PIU) for which continuous capacity building were provided to improve their functionality. In Mogadishu, approximately 130 grievances were recorded. Key issues raised related to water drainage/flooding problems and damages to septic tanks (both of which can be attributed to road design deficiencies) and access to households. All grievances were resolved by project closure, except for two pre-existing land disputes between the municipality and landowners (no civil work conducted in roads with land disputes). In Garowe, approximately 185 grievances were recorded during civil works, all of which were resolved by project closure. Key issues raised included traffic safety, air pollution, disruption to utilities (water supply and electricity), access to households, and engineering design. An assessment of the grievance uptake channels in Garowe and Mogadishu indicates that almost all grievances were made orally either through telephone or in person. This is due to high illiteracy rates and the oral culture of the local communities. Overall, the grievances were addressed in a transparent and inclusive manner through the project GRMs. The areas for improvement include (a) the functionality of different grievance channels (grievance box, email, toll free number, and so on); (b) documentation of grievance handling, including tracking time frame for resolution; and (c) coordination across different GRM actors (the contractor, district GRC, and PIU). 60. Security risk management was a significant challenge for the SURP, particularly for Mogadishu. While project sites and workers were protected through the deployment of police officers, several districts were dropped from the project during prioritization due to increased security risks. There was also an attack on a PIU vehicle in July 2020, among several near misses experienced during project implementation. Beyond this, with the expansion of works to less secure districts, there were increased cases where security barricades hindered transportation of construction materials. These challenges extended to UNOPS supervision as access was hampered by travel restrictions. To address worsened security risks, additional police officers were engaged for the protection of the SURP office and personnel. Page 19 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) 61. FM risks were rated Moderately Satisfactory throughout the duration of the project. The FGS EAFSs within the Office of the Accountant General have been submitting to the World Bank the quarter interim financial reports (IFRs) on time. Throughout the project duration, the project audited annual financial statements have been consistently submitted to the World Bank as stipulated in the Financing Agreement except for the last two years (FY2019 and FY2020) whereby they were late. This was attributed to delays in hiring the technical assistance firm to support the Auditor General. There were no significant audit findings but there were issues for the FGS as noted in the external audit report for the financial year ending December 31, 2020: (a) failure to hold frequent Federal Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (FIMSC) meetings—the terms of reference for the FIMSC states that the committee shall sit four times a year on a quarterly basis; in FY2020, the FIMSC only held two meetings on February 29, 2020 and September 9, 2020; hence the four meetings were not complied with and (b) there were instances of weak payment verification process on works completion certificates and for Puntland, there was one key audit finding where three quotations were not obtained while sourcing for an internet provider. The project obtained only one quotation to provide internet services for the period under review without single sourcing justification. Despite these findings, overall, the project received an unqualified (clean) audit opinion. The 2021 project audit will be due for submission to the World Bank on or before June 30, 2022. The costs related to this audited will be supported by the ongoing SURP-II, and the project is advised to maintain the records and supporting details for SURP in preparation for this audit. 62. By the end of the project, disbursements were at 99 percent and expected to reach 100 percent before the end of the disbursement grace period.32 The project, with technical assistance from the World Bank FM team, finalized critical FM actions that were agreed in the annual fiduciary forums, FM ISMs, and IFR reviews demonstrating commitment at the highest level. By the completion date, the project had substantially complied with the results in the FM action plan. 63. The project’s procurement rating is Moderately Satisfactory. Procurement was conducted in accordance with the World Bank’s ‘Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers’ 2018 edition, in accordance with the project-approved Procurement Plan. Since the National Procurement Law was not fully operational, the customized World Bank Standard Procurement Documents were used while approaching the national market. The project procurement leveraged some PIU capacity established through the preceding SUIPP. However, project procurement experienced several challenges relating to weak contract management. For example, contract extensions were often completed late, and scope changes were not properly documented or budgeted, leading to disputes between the PIU and the contractor. The PIUs were also unfamiliar with World Bank Procurement Regulations and had few established relationships with local contractors. Project procurement benefited from intensive hand holding and training support from World Bank procurement team, including all transactions were conducted as prior review, and ultimately improved during implementation (reduced transaction times, and so on). Procurement was also delayed at the end of the project due to COVID-19, although adequate mitigation measures were adopted. For example, bidders/suppliers/consultants could submit their bids/proposals electronically with secured passwords as well as through the online opening of bids/proposals. Page 20 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry 64. The World Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated Satisfactory. There were multiple challenges due to the project context. It faced multiple operational and logistical constraints posed by the FCV context, including a lack of security arrangements, policy clarity, and institutional capacity. The World Bank team partially overcame these challenges by developing municipal PIUs and by working with UNOPS to prepare detailed engineering designs. The team also consulted development partners and the SRDF to avoid duplicating efforts and enhance the project design. 65. The PDO was relevant, and the simple design was adapted to the Somali context. The project objectives firmly supported Somalia’s urgent priorities to rehabilitate critical infrastructure using country systems, while promoting poverty reduction. It used a simple project design and interrelated activities replicated in each municipality which was well suited to the FCV environment. Key features include a phased approach to implementation, focus on building government capacity over time and capitalizing on local and international experience through engaging UNOPS and private sector partners to support timely implementation and enhance government visibility locally. The project design was made agile by incorporating a large contingency allocation (up to 15 percent), lengthy implementation time frames, and the use of retroactive financing (US$300,000). The design also reflected necessary fiduciary and safeguards controls and monitoring, including the contracting of an independent TPM agent. 66. The project design could have enhanced the quality of some activities, although the difficult operating context presented significant barriers. As donor funding came in phases, the task team had to anticipate and manage discrete projects with overlapping objectives and time frames, posing continuity challenges and causing delays. While the phased investment approach helped manage capacity gaps and fiduciary risks (and going from mostly Bank-executed to Recipient-executed), the limitations were not fully mitigated at the design stage. For example, delays in securing donor commitments resulted in challenges for clients and beneficiaries’ expectation management. While not the objective of the project, it could have further promoted structured strategies in the design to enhance livelihoods and inclusion, engage more meaningfully with community stakeholders, and mainstream gender. While elaborated further in the recommendations, this could have included a detailed mapping of civic structures to leverage and formalize approaches to incentivize participation, enhance targeted communication strategies to recruit vulnerable groups to benefit from employment opportunities, document approaches to govern and recruit project committees, and formalize engagement with utility firms and local police for security. Although these elements were largely contemplated by the task team, limited government capacity and a challenging operating context prevented uptake. Quality of Supervision 67. The World Bank’s performance in ensuring quality of supervision is rated Satisfactory. The project benefited from a committed World Bank team that successfully identified and resolved implementation challenges and risks and further supported by securing supplementary trust fund resources. The project was led by a Task Team Leader (TTL) in Nairobi with local technical support including engineering and procurement consultants. The team developed close working relationships with each PIU, implementation partners, and development partners throughout the life of the project, which Page 21 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) included seven ISMs. The co-TTL, who had supervised the project for a few years, succeeding the TTLship also helped smooth transition. 68. Sustained implementation support and supervision. The team’s strategy of holding short intensive missions with each municipality, which agreed on short-term action plans with specific goals and deadlines proved crucial in maintaining project momentum. The World Bank proactively worked with the PIUs to identify and address issues that caused implementation delays, emphasizing a relatively unstructured ‘learning-by-doing’ approach and by gradually building strong PIUs. The approach encouraged the PIUs to systematize their monitoring systems and safeguards compliance, conduct more routine reporting against the work plan, track results, and give guidance on roles and responsibilities across stakeholders. The contracting of a TPM who made recommendations both at the midterm and the later phase of the project enabled early identification of key challenges and subsequent course corrections. The World Bank’s FM, safeguards, and procurement teams benefited from frequent and close interactions with the task team, which they credited as being experienced and versatile in handling complex operations, helping them to make quick decisions during the design and implementation of the project. As previously discussed, the task team could have facilitated the development of a more formal M&E system to ensure consistent standards across municipalities as well as provided dedicated M&E support. While respecting the PIU’s mandate, the task team also needs to strike a balance to engage implementing partners to triangulate information and closely monitor implementation progress. 69. Insecurity and COVID-19 complicated supervision. The task team faced security restrictions and was unable to freely visit project sites or meet with stakeholders, although the team routinely conducted field visits once works commenced. The team could only conduct virtual supervision missions from March 2020 due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. Works were 97 percent completed for Garowe and 60 percent for Mogadishu at this time. While supervision was adequate for Garowe, field visits to Mogadishu were still necessary. The task team also initiated monthly check-ins and weekly consultations toward the end of the project. In consultation with World Bank Country Management Unit and Safeguards, the team adequately managed these risks in consultation with the PIU and UNOPS. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 70. Given the Satisfactory rating of the World Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry and Satisfactory rating in ensuring quality of supervision, the overall rating for the World Bank’s performance is considered Satisfactory. D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 71. Sustainability of investments. While there is a strong sense of ownership, capacity built at the PIUs and municipalities runs the risk of not being maintained when funding ceases. Rather than relying narrowly on consultants, the project must consider how to incentivize and recruit municipal civil servants into the PIU to facilitate further integration and capacity building of the municipality to lead implementation. The financial ability of the municipality to maintain assets is at risk unless adequate formal financial commitments and investments in municipal urban planning are made. While the Garowe Municipality secured an initial O&M budget, both cities must systematically evaluate and routinely update infrastructure needs and formulate a precise budget and mobilize the political will for sustained funding Page 22 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) and engagement. This requires strong political will and ownership of the project investments from the Government. 72. Monitoring potential externalities. While these small-scale investments did not result in any significant increase in land value that could contribute to displacement, the municipal government will need to continue to monitor this issue as urban investments expand in each city. For Garowe, there is the risk that increased access to IDP camps may incentivize further inflow and amplify demands on limited services. The Government must monitor and plan for these scenarios. 73. The country’s high exposure to repeated climate change-related shocks and political instability poses further risks to development outcomes. The Somali Government is committed to resilience building as enshrined in the NDPs and mirrored in the World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework for Somalia (FY19–FY22), though weak capacity, limited fiscal space, and concurrent crisis pose ongoing risks to development outcomes. V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 74. Emphasizing a simple project design with a decentralized implementation arrangement contributed to the project’s success. The project entailed simple components and interrelated activities with a decentralized implementation arrangement at the municipal level that were well suited to the challenging context. It also entailed a flexible approach by using large contingency funds and adaptive design specifications to address unforeseen challenges. The decentralized approach where municipal governments played the central role in project implementation reduced political interference in the face of ambiguous division of labor across different tiers of government and helped empower the municipality. On the other hand, this may have hindered strategic and policy-level engagement, such as harmonization of road standards using SURP design standards, which is the responsibility of the State Ministry of Public Works (MoPW). Therefore, it is also important to enhance project sustainability by building the capacity of federal line ministries for national policy and strategic engagement as well as oversight. 75. Engaging an international firm for engineering design and supervision is still necessary in Somalia to ensure quality and timely implementation. Capacity is still limited in Somalia, and for timely project implementation an international agency’s engineering support remains necessary. To maximize this engagement, modes of collaboration and roles need to be routinely refined and closely monitored by all stakeholders. Engagement of third parties can still be balanced with government capacity building if the scope of work for the third parties is well defined, and the Government is in the driver’s seat. 76. Securing multiyear budgeting and substantial allocations would have allowed for more meaningful investments. The SURP budget was small (US$9 million) with no clarity on future funding. This forced the client to focus on smaller investments in a single sector. While Garowe, one of the two target cities under the SURP, used its funding well given the small city size and political coherence within the municipality, in Mogadishu, it led to small and fragmented investments where each of the 17 relatively autonomous districts was allocated 1 km of community road for equity purposes and investments functioned more as ‘peace dividends’ with limited impacts. While this was inevitable and possibly necessary, as the World Bank reengaged in Somalia for the first time in decades, the development impacts were not maximized. It also created a path dependency in that SURP-II funding in Mogadishu continues Page 23 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) to be allocated for the construction of outstanding community roads, making it difficult to embark on a more holistic urban development. 77. Ensuring inclusive consultations inform project planning and management. Early, inclusive, and ongoing consultations are critical to better understand government, community, and counterpart needs; manage stakeholder expectations and project risks; identify partner investments to amplify synergies; and devise appropriate timelines to avoid missed implementation deadlines. Although community consultations and equitable distribution of resources, as described earlier, are critically important in an FCV context, it is also critical to balance consultations with good practices in design, not overly consult or exhaust or spread resources too thinly. The project should also consider formal strategic partnerships with NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and the private sector to leverage their relevant expertise and to endorse these efforts. For example, the project could develop standing contracts with utility firms to mitigate obtrusive utilities as well as explore partnerships with CBOs/NGOs to facilitate participatory planning. This requires structured, yet flexible, approaches to guide and document more transparent engagement, which should be informed by a project communication strategy. 78. Promoting structured and transparent approaches for the recruitment of unskilled labor is critical in FCV contexts. The project did not formalize procedures or guidance for the recruitment of vulnerable groups as unskilled labor. Contractors would approach district administration for the recruitment of unskilled labor based on broad typologies of vulnerability, rather than a participatory, criteria-based approach that targets both vulnerable and marginalized groups. For Mogadishu, district administrations recruited using quotas from pre-existing community groups (religious leaders and elders, youth, and women), which are mostly made up of lower-income groups. Recruitment was less organized in Garowe and relied more on informal recruitment through relatives or neighbors who knew that the contractor was looking for workers. According to female beneficiaries, woman would like more job opportunities, not only as cooks, sweepers, and flag person but also in laying PICB (light manual labor) in some sites. Additional strategies are required for promoting female employment, such as improving awareness of job opportunities, setting minimum quotas for women employment, and offering childcare services through women’s groups. 79. Advancing toward a more holistic urban development project through quality diagnostics and policy dialogue. There is a continued need for Bank-executed analytics to progressively develop urban operations. Many design features along with various technical assistance needs identified under the SURP (for implementation under SURP-II) emerged from the diagnostics undertaken in the recently published Somalia Urbanization Review. The ongoing Somalia Cities Initiative among key development partners also serves as an important platform to have substantive dialogue on urban development in Somalia. As important as it is for the Government to start undertaking more activities themselves, there is a need for continued Bank-executed analytics that can add value and progress the SURP beyond an urban roads project. 80. Deepening impacts and sustainability. As envisaged under the project’s sustainability objectives, there is a need to sustain and amplify project investments. The Government should prepare activity ‘transition plans’ that detail O&M, long-term financial arrangements, communication strategies to maximize political support, strategies to deepen the municipalities engagement in implementation, and options to maximize influence beyond the project. For example, updating or developing local disaster response plans to reflect rehabilitated roads, such as to inform evacuations routes or the siting of shelters. Page 24 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) The Government should also produce detailed documentation of achievements, lessons learned, and best practices to inform broader urban programming and policy dialogue. 81. See annex 10 for recommendations by project activity. . Page 25 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: To support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion People with access to all Number 0.00 2,000.00 148,800.00 season roads within a 500 meter range (number, % 01-Aug-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 female, % IDPs, % host communities) Comments (achievements against targets): Breakdown by location: 140,800 in Mogadishu (50% female, 19% IDP, 81% host communities); 8,000 in Garowe (50% female, 25% IDP, 75% host communities) The actual number of people benefitting from the improved roads far exceeds the original target, which was overly conservative. A greater understanding of the scope for beneficiaries was gained over the course of the Project. In Mogadishu, where the largest population was reached, each road was estimated to have 1,600 households within the 500-meter range for eleven roads. Average household size is eight, with roughly the same numbers of male and female inhabitants. For Garowe, each road was estimated to 250 households, with an average household size of eight, for four roads. Page 26 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Beneficiaries satisfied that Percentage 0.00 90.00 91.50 infrastructure met their needs (number, % female, % 01-Aug-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 IDPs) Comments (achievements against targets): Breakdown by location: 94.3% in Garowe (93% female, 93% IDPs) 89.4% in Mogadishu (89% female, 91% IDPs) [Sample sizes for endline survey: Mogadishu: 536; Garowe: 386] To the people in the target areas, the roads have improved accessibility, economic activity, security and the general environment. With all the positive developments, the vast majority of those surveyed in both municipalities agreed that the road project was relevant as it addressed a pressing need and positively changed the fortunes of the settlements served by the four upgraded roads. Objective/Outcome: To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Sub projects with post- Number 0.00 23.00 16.00 construction community engagement/O&M plans 01-Aug-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): All the completed sub-projects (100%) are covered by accompanying O&M plans. The original target has not been met as the number of roads was reduced, although the overall length of road rehabilitated exceeded original targets. In Mogadishu, the Project originally planned to finance construction of 19 roads in seven districts. During construction, variation orders were given reducing the number of roads to 11 in 6 districts, covering an estimated total distance of Page 27 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) 7.5 km. Variations were mainly due to Environmental and Social Safeguarding concerns. Some of the roads were to pass through areas with underground septic tanks and lacked space for proper drainage. Others were dropped due to budgetary concerns. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion People’s satisfaction of the Percentage 0.00 60.00 86.70 municipal government performance on road 01-Aug-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 rehabilitation Comments (achievements against targets): Most surveyed residents (88.3% in Mogadishu and 84.4% in Garowe) were satisfied with their respective municipality’s ability to provide road infrastructure. In Mogadishu, this was a marked improvement over the results of the baseline survey which showed only 25.0% of respondents held a positive view (either satisfied or very satisfied). In Garowe, the change was more subtle with 74.7% saying they were satisfied and 0% very satisfied in the baseline, compared with 47.4% and 37% saying they were satisfied or very satisfied respectively in the endline. Disaggregated data by location: Garowe: 89.1% of men / 80.9% of women / 88.1% of IDPs / 83.6% of respondents in host communities. Mogadishu: 88.2% of men / 88.4 % of women / 97% of IDPs / 86.7% of respondents in host communities. A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Mogadishu Municipality Page 28 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Person days of employment Days 0.00 22,000.00 63,324.00 created (days, % female, % IDPs, % host communities) 01-Aug-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): The road constructions provided 63,324 person days of labor involving over 1,088 workers (80.0% male, 20.0% female). Of these, 9% were IDPs, 37% from host communities, 4% returnees and 50% from other communities. Beyond the temporary employment created, the newly established businesses along the new roads increased employment and livelihood opportunities for those residing in the target settlements. Unskilled workers were recruited based on certain criteria (vulnerability, female-headed households, households with more than 6 persons, households with elderly parents, persons with disabilities, orphans) and displacement status to ensure that IDPs and returnees were included. The employment generated far surpassed the initial conservative target as decisions were taken favoring manual labor over machines to maximize the impact for the community. There were also some delays due to COVID and which stretched out the implementation period. “Unskilled” are workers who lack technical training, industry experience, and are often trained on the job site, e.g., flag man, security, manual hold digger, etc. “Skilled” are workers attended a vocational school, university, college, or any other technical school, e.g., site engineer, foreman, welder, mechanic, excavator operator, distributor operator, hot-oiler, laboratory technician, survey technician, etc. The average daily rates for unskilled workers were $12, compared with $20 for skilled workers Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Maintenance Committees Number 0.00 7.00 6.00 established and functioning (number, broken down by 01-Aug-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 IDPs, gender) Page 29 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Comments (achievements against targets): Six committees were established in Mogadishu, each with seven members (5 male, 2 female). Each group is comprised of two representatives from the administration and five members drawn from the communities including IDPs. While the initial list of prioritized roads spanned seven districts, the final set of roads covered six districts. As such, the number of Maintenance Committees established corresponds with the need based on the decision to assign one committee per district. Whiles some of the committees have been operationalized, others cover recently finalized roads. More time is needed to assess whether the committees are functioning as planned to maintain the most recently finished roads. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Project and Government Number 0.00 30.00 159.00 staff formally trained 21-Jun-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): A total of 207 individuals (39% women) received formal training through the Project in Mogadishu; of these, 159 were project and government staff. Training included public financial management (20 participants); procurement (45 participants); human resources management in local government (10 participants); M&E (57); operations and maintenance, environmental and social safeguards and grievance redress (75). Training was provided to representatives from BRA / Mogadishu Municipality (159) the PIU (6), the contractor (4), UNOPS (4) and members of the community (40). Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roads rehablitated Kilometers 0.00 7.50 7.40 30-Jul-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 Page 30 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Roads rehabilitated - rural Kilometers 0.00 0.00 0.00 Roads rehabilitated - non- Kilometers 0.00 7.50 7.40 rural Comments (achievements against targets): 11 roads were constructed in Bodh ere, Hamra Jaja, Hamar Weyne, Howlwadag, Shangani and Warta Nabada Districts within Mogadishu City. The twelfth road Agoonta in Abdiaziz district was partially built for 753m but construction work was stopped due to safeguards noncompliance. Component: Garowe Municipality Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Person days of employment Days 0.00 18,000.00 42,512.00 created (days,%female, %IDPs, %host communities) 21-Jun-2018 30-Sep-2021 28-Jun-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): The road construction provided 42,512 person days of labor that involved over 600 workers drawn from the local communities both host communities (67.6%) an IDPs (32.4%). Of this number, 89.8% were males while 10.2% were females. In addition to the temporary employment created, the newly established businesses along the new roads have increased employment and livelihood opportunities for those residing in the target areas. Page 31 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) The employment generated far surpassed the initial conservative target as decisions were taken favoring manual labor over machines to maximize the impact for the community. There were also some delays due to COVID which stretched out the implementation period. “Unskilled” are workers who lack technical training, industry experience, and are often trained on the job site, e.g., flag man, security, manual hold digger, etc. “Skilled” are workers attended a vocational school, university, college, or any other technical school, e.g., site engineer, foreman, welder, mechanic, excavator operator, distributor operator, hot-oiler, laboratory technician, survey technician, etc. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Maintenance Committees Number 0.00 1.00 1.00 established and functioning (number, broken down by 21-Jun-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 IDPs, gender) Comments (achievements against targets): The Project established one O&M committee, which organized its first clean-up campaign in the 2nd quarter of 2021. The committee consists of seven members (three of which are female). Of these, four are district commissioners, two are representatives from the host communities and one is an IDP representative from the Jilab Road. The Committee covers all four roads rehabilitated through the Project. As three of the roads constructed under SURP run through two adjacent neighborhoods (Koowda Agoosto and Hantiwadaag), the District recommended that one committee would be sufficient to handle the operation and maintenance of those roads. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Project and government staff Number 0.00 20.00 72.00 Page 32 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) formally trained (number) 01-Aug-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): A total of 79 individuals (19% women) received formal training through the Project in Garowe. Of these, 72 were government and project staff. Training included public financial management (27 participants) procurement (10 participants), human resource management in local government (5 participants), M&E, (12 participants), contract management (1 participant), project management (4 participants) environmental and social safeguards and grievance redress (5 participants), and Technical Aspect and Maintenance (15 participants). Training was provided to government staff (54), PIU staff (18), UNOPS (2), the contractor (2), the O&M committee (2), and the Grievance Redress Committee for the project in Garowe (1). Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roads rehablitated Kilometers 0.00 4.40 4.93 21-Jun-2018 30-Sep-2021 30-Sep-2021 Roads rehabilitated - rural Kilometers 0.00 0.00 0.00 Roads rehabilitated - non- Kilometers 0.00 4.40 4.93 rural Comments (achievements against targets): In Garowe, four roads were rehabilitated covering a total distance of 4.93 km. These roads were prioritized based on their strategic importance in providing connectivity of urban poor communities and IDP settlements to key socio-economic facilities, high economic internal rates of return and high benefit/cost Page 33 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ratio. The roads interconnect creating a by-pass that provides motorists an alternative route through the city and thereby decongesting the main Garowe road. Page 34 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Page 35 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective/Outcome 1: To support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas 1. People with access to all season roads within a 500-meter range Outcome Indicators 2. Beneficiaries satisfied that infrastructure met their needs Mogadishu Municipality 1. Roads rehabilitated - non-rural Intermediate Results Indicators by Component 2. Person days of employment created (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) Garowe Municipality 1. Roads rehabilitated - non-rural 2. Person days of employment created Objective/Outcome 2: To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level 1. Sub projects with post-construction community engagement/O&M plans Outcome Indicators 2. People’s satisfaction of the municipal government performance on road rehabilitation Mogadishu Municipality 1. Project and Government staff formally trained 2. Maintenance Committees established and functioning Intermediate Results Indicators by Component Garowe Municipality (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2) 1. Project and Government staff formally trained 2. Maintenance Committees established and functioning Page 36 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Zishan Faiza Karim, Makiko Watanabe Task Team Leader(s) Francis Akolu Muthuiya, Anjani Kumar Procurement Specialist(s) Leonard Mutuku Matheka Financial Management Specialist Salome Awuor Aganda Team Member Matthias Mayr Team Member Samuel Ngethe Mbachia Team Member Richard Everett Social Specialist Janerose Muboka Lubisia Team Member Verena Phipps-Ebeler Social Specialist Bernard Harborne Team Member Rildo Santos Team Member Dean A. Cira Team Member Barbry R. Keller Team Member Tracy Hart Environmental Specialist Supervision/ICR Makiko Watanabe Task Team Leader Benjamin Kushner Team Member Francis Akolu Muthuiya Procurement Specialist(s) Leonard Mutuku Matheka Financial Management Specialist Abdirahman Zeila Dubow Team Member Nyabicha Omurwa Onang'o Financial Management Specialist Page 37 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Name Role Michael Okuny Financial Management Specialist Aki Tsuda Social Specialist Samuel Ngethe Mbachia Team Member - Engineer Sangeeta Kumari Social Specialist Seraphine Nsabimana Team Member Barbry R. Keller Team Member Sarah Cramer Smith Team Member, M&E Puja Guha Team Member, Economist Page 38 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) A. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY18 .275 1,833.59 FY19 0 0.00 FY20 0 51,594.64 Total 0.28 53,428.23 Supervision/ICR FY18 6.757 61,639.02 FY19 27.102 267,336.67 FY20 18.994 225,117.84 Total 52.85 554,093.53 Page 39 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Amount at Approval Actual at Project Percentage of Components (US$, millions) Closing (US$, millions) Approval Mogadishu Municipality 0 6.5 0 Garowe Municipality 0 2.5 0 Contingent Emergency Response 0 0.0 0 Total 0 9.0 0 Page 40 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 1. As part of the efficiency analysis for this ICR, the task team conducted an EFA for this project. This annex describes the methodology for that analysis. To the extent possible, the ICR analysis is based on actual data gathered as part of the M&E efforts of the program. Because the quantitative benefits of capacity building and training activities are difficult to estimate, our calculation focuses on the road investments under both Components 1 and 2. 2. The total ERR for all road investments under Components 1 and 2 is estimated at 23 percent based on travel time and costs saved for commuters, jobs created through the construction works, and the value of increased public services and economic integration as a result of these investments over a 20-year period including the period of project implementation. The NPV is estimated at US$8.4 million at a 12 percent discount rate, and US$18.02 million at a 6 percent discount rate. 3. The original PAD did not estimate an ERR due to data limitations. However, all specific investments undertaken by the project were subject to extensive community consultations and review, including a framework for economic analysis. 4. This economic analysis accounts for the benefits that result from the different investments under the project. This includes reduced vehicle operating costs with increased traffic flows, the value of better access to public services for commuters, the value of time and cost saved for commuters, and the value of greater economic integration across the city. To calculate this rate of return, we estimated the monetary benefits of these different benefits, basing our calculations on per vehicle assumptions and the number of beneficiaries reported in the project’s Results Framework. For this analysis, we have considered these time and cost savings and economic benefits as the income of the project investments— therein applying the discounted cash flow model for financial analysis of private investments within the context of a World Bank project. 5. The analysis outlined below calculates the ERR for specific project components. Key variables used as assumptions in our analysis are also tested for sensitivity to ensure robustness of the overall analysis and the potential project interventions. In addition to this quantitative analysis, our discussion provides an overview of qualitative studies that provide additional justification for the economic viability of these investments. 6. For this analysis, we will focus primarily on direct impacts of the project investments. Additional spillover effects and growth nearby project investments are likely to amplify the impact of project investments. This amplified impact will essentially create a multiplier effect related to the investments under this project. However, this multiplier effect has not been included in the project economic analysis for several reasons: (a) for the sake of conservatism, (b) difficulties in attribution and measurement associated with using a sweeping multiplier, and (c) difficulties in determining the correct size and timing of the multiplier effect. Given this exclusion, the impacts from this project, especially social benefit spillovers, will likely be underestimated in the analysis here. 7. In the case of this project, social benefits include better access to public services for commuters and residents, along with wider-scale economic benefits due to the improved connectivity. As noted in the Project Endline Reports for both Mogadishu and Garowe, the newly constructed roads have allowed Page 41 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) residents and commuters to have easier and faster access to a range of both consumer goods and services. Public transport services are also now available along the improved roadways, which have improved safety standards and provisions, including speed bumps, road signage, and streetlights. The improved roadways also incorporate drainage channels and gradients, which residents indicate have resulted in less flooding. Although the data to track this reduction in flooding are not available, this indicates both improved traffic flows and a reduction in waterborne diseases as a result of reduced flooding. Qualitative data in the Project Endline Reports also indicate an increase in the number and type of businesses along the improved roads besides an increase in per business employment rates, opening hours, and number of customers. As such, the Project Endline Reports clearly indicate that improved access to services and wider economic benefits have resulted from project investments. 8. The economic analysis is based on the following channels of impact. Each associated assumption has been tested for sensitivity. • Traffic flows. Road rehabilitation investments will allow for increased traffic flows relative to current traffic volume due to better road conditions, reduced flooding risks, and better connectivity. Due to data limitations, exact traffic data at baseline and endline are not available for the project; hence, the analysis estimates the increase in traffic as follows. At baseline, the analysis uses the number of residents living within 500 m of the road investments (8,000 residents for Garowe and 140,800 residents for Mogadishu) as the basis to define assumptions for traffic figures, estimating annual traffic as 80 percent cars, 12 percent trucks, and 8 percent buses.1 At endline, the analysis estimates that this traffic has increased by 20 percent for each vehicle type. While this is not a benefit incorporated into the economic analysis, reduced vehicle operating costs and commuter time/cost savings are estimated based on these increased traffic flows. • Reduction in travel costs. Because of the improvements in road conditions, we estimate that reduced vehicle operating costs and value of time saved per commuter will be US$12 per year. This estimate is derived from the per commute savings in travel time (four minutes of savings in travel time as noted in the Project Endline Reports) and monetized based on a daily wage rate of US$2.50.2 • Jobs created. The Results Framework notes the number of person-days of employment created by the road investments in both Mogadishu and Garowe. It is assumed that 80 percent of these person-days are for unskilled employment, with the remaining 20 percent for skilled, at an average daily rate of US$7 and US$15, respectively. Although this is a transfer within country, the analysis uses this daily rate to value the generation of skills and new/improved entries into the labor force which are likely to reduce inequities and poverty within the local population. 9. The SURP introduced analysis and participatory planning processes that will improve the efficiency of investment planning processes in Mogadishu and Garowe. As a whole, the capacity-building 1 Based on these percentages, the analysis estimates annual traffic figures of 6,400 cars and utilities, 960 trucks, and 640 buses for the road investments in Garowe and 49,280 cars and utilities, 16,896 trucks, and 11,264 buses for the investments in Mogadishu. 2 This wage is estimated as 30 percent of the daily wage of US$8.6 for jobs created by the project to proxy for the wage rate of low-skill labor in Somalia. Page 42 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) activities under the project will strengthen municipality administrative and operational capacity to deliver basic services, along with incorporating evidence-based solutions. This will also help demonstrate success to a wider range of developing partners, thus streamlining future infrastructure development in the country as it is able to access more development financing. The endline survey of beneficiaries also demonstrates high levels of satisfaction in the project infrastructure investments. As part of this survey, beneficiaries also expressed satisfaction with the efficiency of the construction works. 10. The SURP showed reasonable implementation efficiency despite encountering some delays during preparation. Delays during preparation included the transition from the preceding SUIPP and limited donor interest in urban infrastructure. Although civil works contracts in both Mogadishu and Garowe had to be extended, the project did not require any restructurings. The SURP closed with 99 percent disbursement. It also showed allocative efficiency by reducing Mogadishu road works from 19 roads (7.6 km) to 12 roads (7.4 km) based on community consultations which highlighted significant drainage challenges, high insecurity, and areas intended for stormwater catchment with IDP settlements. 11. Additional assumptions used in our analysis include the following: • Number of commuters per vehicle: Commuters (average #) Car 3 Truck 2 Bus 100 • Annual traffic growth is assumed to be 2.5 percent across vehicle types, mirroring average GDP growth. • It is assumed the major increase in traffic applies beginning in 2020. Table 1.1. Results of the Analysis Mogadishu Garowe NPV (12 percent discount rate) US$8.4 million US$5.9 million US$877,000 NPV (5 percent discount rate) US$18.0 million US$22.4 million US$2.1 million ERR (percent) 34 372 23 Table 1.2. Results of the Sensitivity Analysis Sensitivity Condition ERR (percent) Calculation of vehicle operating cost and time savings based on only 15 percent increase 19 in traffic Two-year lag in benefits 19 US$ benefits reduced by 10 percent 29 Page 43 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS 1. The draft ICR was shared with the BRA and Garowe PIU and the SURP-II Project Coordination Unit for their review and for any clarifications they required from the World Bank. Their feedback was largely editorial, although several recommendations were made as follows: • The need for dedicated World Bank M&E support for future programming, a gap under the SURP • Importance of supporting/developing municipal planning departments through future programming. Page 44 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) • Key project information • Summary of project changes • Detailed progress overview by city and maps • Recommendation for project activities Page 45 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 7. KEY PROJECT INFORMATION Somali Urban Investment Planning Project (SUIPP; P150374), February 15, 2016–December 2021, Budget: US$3 million + US$6 million Additional Financing (P166591), including Hargeisa, Garowe, and Mogadishu + scaled up to Kismayo and Baidoa through Additional Financing (not covered in this ICR) Somalia Urban Resilience Project, Phase I (SURP; P163857) July 31, 2018–September 30, 2021, Budget: US$9 million, including Garowe and Mogadishu (covered in this ICR) Somalia Urban Resilience Project, Phase II (SURP-II; P170922) December 9, 2019–December 31, 2024, Budget: US$112 million, including Garowe and Mogadishu (not covered in this ICR) Project Development Objective SURP, Phase I: To strengthen public service delivery capacity at the sub-national level and support the reconstruction of key urban infrastructure in targeted areas Government counterparts: Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) and Garowe Municipalities (Project Implementation Units - PIUs; Federal Member States - FMS)/Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) Ministry of Finance - MoF (for fund transfers) Beneficiaries: Government counterparts, infrastructure users, including host communities, and vulnerable groups such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and women Geographic coverage: The project intended to benefit the strategically important and relatively more capacitated cities of Mogadishu and Garowe.xxxiii Page 46 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 8. SUMMARY OF PROJECT CHANGES 1. Civil works adaptations. Due to multiple challenges and based on community consultations, civil works were modified, while the PDO indicators remained unchanged: • For Mogadishu, road works were reduced from 19 roads (7.6 km, 7 districts) to 12 roads (7.4 km, 6 districts) and road width increased for several roads to accommodate higher traffic. • For Garowe, 10 Irish bridges were introduced, a third layer of Otta seal was added, and road length increased by 0.07 km (from 4.86 to 4.93 km). 2. Changes to civil works contracts. To accommodate implementation and administrative delays, civil works contracts changed: • Increased civil works firm contract time frame from 14 to 27 months for the BRA and 12 to 14 months for Garowe • Increased implementation costs for the BRA by US$686,339 (original price of US$2,504,627 versus actual price of US$3,190,966) City Details BRA Reduced road works from 19 roads (7.6km) to 12 roads (7.4 km) based on community consultations to drop roads with significant drainage challenges, high insecurity, and where IDPs settled on areas intended for stormwater catchment BRA Increased road width for several roads to accommodate higher traffic BRA Increased civil works firm contract time frame from 14 to 27 months due to multiple challenges/delays/addressing unplanned utilities/unexpected high rainfalls/insecurity/design deficiencies/contractor inefficiencies BRA Increased implementation cost by US$686,339 (original price of US$2,504,627 versus actual price of US$3,190,966) due to reconstruction of septic tanks, retaining walls, increased paved width and drainage in some roads, streetlighting BRA Hired PIU community mobilization officers (male) to enhance community labor engagement. Garowe Increased civil works firm contract time frame from 12 to 14 months due to delays resulting from design deficiencies and to address unplanned utilities Garowe Introduced 10 Irish bridges to accommodate stormwater cross flow underground water pipelines located on the roadway which were not foreseen in the original designs Garowe Introduced a third layer of Otta seal using contingency funds based on community feedback to strengthen road, reduce dust, and improve aesthetics Garowe Relocated underground water pipelines located on the roadway which were not foreseen in original the design Garowe Increased road length by 0.07 km from 4.86 to 4.93 km resulting from vertical and horizontal alignment Garowe Removed solar streetlights due to funding constraints, to be carried out under Phase II Garowe Introduced the rehabilitation of the municipality city meeting hall Page 47 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 9. DETAILED PROGRESS OVERVIEW BY CITY & MAPS Table 2.1. SURP Mogadishu Progress Overview Sidewalk Drainage Original Completed Original Final # of Solar Road Final Road % Length Length District S/No. Road Contract VO1* VO2 VO3 Road Pavement Pavement Lights Ref. No. Length (m) Completion Completed Completed Length (m) Length (m) Width (m) Width (m) Installed (m) (m) Boondhere 1 B1 307 Dropped Binti Fodey Tabeelaha 920 (2 m 2 Jaceylka B20 460 0 497 957 957 13 13 100 348 30 Boondheere width) (new) Isbitalka 3 B2 325 Dropped Jarmalka 4 Daaf Alleley B3 404 404 0 -404 Dropped 5 Simad B4 352 355 0 0 355 355 6 6 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. Degmada 106 (2 m 6 B5 400 579 0 0 579 579 6 6 100 n.a. 8 Hamar Jajab hamarjajab width) Hamar Jajab 90 (2 m 7 B6 387 611 0 0 611 611 6 6 100 195 12 Fartaag road width) Hamar 8 Weyne B7 205 225 0 0 225 225 6 6 100 n.a. n.a. 8 Expost Hamarweyne 9 B8 469 460 0 5 465 465 6 6 100 n.a. n.a. 14 School Hamarweyne Hamarweyne 10 B9 563 822 0 0 822 822 6 6 100 n.a. n.a. 7 Cadayga Casa Italiaa 19 Hassan Geedi 72 Abtowa Ceel 1,400 (2 m Hawlwadag 11 B10 1,000 1,000 0 475 1,475 1,475 10 11 100 115 33 Garweyne width) Page 48 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Sidewalk Drainage Original Completed Original Final # of Solar Road Final Road % Length Length District S/No. Road Contract VO1* VO2 VO3 Road Pavement Pavement Lights Ref. No. Length (m) Completion Completed Completed Length (m) Length (m) Width (m) Width (m) Installed (m) (m) 169 (2 m Garonka width) 12 B11 529 715 0 132 847 847 12 16 100 n.a. 30 Warta Minishibiyo 677 (4 m Nabada width) Wartanabada 13 B12 667 Dropped n.a. n.a. n.a. Mire Bubaal 14 Madbacadda B13 310 300 0 −300 Dropped 0 6 6 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 15 Sidam (new) B21 225 0 0 225 225 6 6 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. Shangani 16 B14 170 175 0 0 175 175 6 6 100 n.a. n.a. n.a. Shariif Abow Shangani 17 Ceymiska B15 160 175 0 -175 Partial 18 6 6 10 Wadadda 18 B16 100 Dropped Degmada Todobatan 19 B17 290 Dropped talo 20 UNDP B18 516 Dropped Abdiaziz 21 Agoonta B19 465 650 0 -47 603 603 12 12 55 n.a. n.a. n.a. Total 7,619 7,156 0 183 7,339 7,357 100.2 3,362 875 233 Note: n.a.= not available. a. Non-SURP road. VO = Variation Order Page 49 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Figure 2.1. SURP Mogadishu Investments Page 50 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Table 2.2. SURP Garowe Progress Overview Original Final Planned Completed FINAL Otta Seal Road Otta Seal Final Shallow Pedestrian % District Road Length Road Length Pavement Ref. No. Pavement Width drains (m) Walkway3 Completion (km) (m) Width (m) (m) (m) Jilab 12 0.968 0.968 7 7 0.968 0.968 100 Sagal 3 1.800 1.695 7 7 1.695 1.695 100 Sh. Abdi Salam 7 1.092 1.230 7 7 1.230 1.230 100 Gen Nur Salad 6 1.000 1.037 7 7 1.037 1.037 100 Total 4.860 4.930 4.930 4.930 Figure 2.2. SURP Garowe Investments 3 Width of pedestrian walkways is 1.5 m on both sides of the road. Page 51 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) ANNEX 10. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROJECT ACTIVITIES Subcomponent The project may maximize outcomes by: Infrastructure Civil works • Establishing a framework and documentation for community consultation and prioritization • Securing solar streetlights by locating them away from scalable structures (walls, trees) • Comprehensively mapping utilities and exploring standing agreements with utility firms • Utilizing climate scenarios to inform feasibility studies • Promoting nature-based solutions/greening • Developing a framework to quantify economic and climate impacts • Leveraging planned/ongoing technical assistance (citywide drainage, informal settlements, solid waste management, O&M) • Enhancing the material testing laboratory (furnishing, equipping, and capacitation)4 • Mapping relevant development partner investments (synergy and complementarity) • Need to update DRM plans (as available) Job creation • Providing a common understanding across PIUs of ‘IDP’. As per UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a person stops being an IDP if one of the three conditions have been met: return of such persons to their former homes, integration at the location they were displaced to, or resettlement to another part of the country • Conducting diagnostics on understanding barriers to women’s participation in construction works to inform evidence-based solutions • Contractors increasing awareness of job opportunities being created among women and IDP populations including involving women groups in recruitment • Contractors offering flexible and part-time opportunities to women • Contractors giving priority to women for women-friendly unskilled works generated by the project (for example, PICB laying jobs, paving, traffic management) • Considering offering childcare services to employees, such as through women groups • Identifying specific opportunities for skills building (on job training, and so on) in the longer term to be implemented by PIUs in collaboration with contractors and other relevant stakeholders • Contractors offering capacity-building opportunities, particular for women/IDPs • Contractors maintaining a worker registry (age, gender, IDP status, skills, contact details, and so on) • Incorporating gender mainstreaming in bid evaluations (reward proposals that advance integration) 4The TIS+ also funded the construction of a material testing laboratory for the BRA and was meant to be further equipped through the SURP as requested by the mayor (not part of the PAD) but was dropped due to funding limitations. Page 52 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Subcomponent The project may maximize outcomes by: • Addressing barriers to the employment of vulnerable groups, such as by offering diverse employment options (job functions) Capacity building • Reviewing/updating the institutional needs assessment (2016) • Developing and operationalizing a costed capacity-building plan (PIU/BRA and GRC) • Engaging the ministry district commissioner for women affairs to support coordination • Enhancing FMS MoPW capacity building for strategic and policy level engagement • Developing intra-city building codes, engaging MoPW (FMS and FGS) • Operationalizing a PIU performance management system • Exploring options for structured approach to support municipal urban departments • Exploring options for recruitment of civil servants in project management/PIU Operations and • Establishing a framework and documentation for formation and operationalization of O&M (timing of establishment, equipment maintenance requirements, recruitment from existing groups, process for recruitment nomination versus appointment, governance structure, formal mechanisms for community reporting, and so on) • Setting up O&M management system for monitoring road maintenance activities and building an inventory of road network. Building on the outputs of the road assessment study (Ipsos) • Leveraging private sector financing for O&M (coordination of resources and maintenance activities by the private sector) • Developing and operationalizing a costed capacity-building plan • Developing traffic safety management plans • Equipping committees • Providing incentives (food and so on) • Supporting solid waste management through women’s groups • Mapping civil organizations to engage in project activities • Sensitizing communities on O&M committees (roles, composition, communication) • Securing municipal budget Project • Establishing a PIU performance management system management • Developing a project MIS • Conducting joint monitoring (includes FMS MoPW) • Enhancing engagement with BRA mayor and Secretary General in periodic technical discussions • Facilitating periodic meetings with MoPW • Developing a project communications strategy • Providing routine update on project progress (webpage, social media, community boards/forums, and so on) • Ensuring routine engagement for all counterparts on roles and collaboration Safeguards • Ensuring informal complaints to GRC are registered Page 53 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Subcomponent The project may maximize outcomes by: • Establishing standing agreements with local police for security • Preparing an approach to quantify climate co-benefits. 1 As detailed in annex 7. 2 Adapted from “ICT Sector Support in Somalia Phase II: ICR” (April 30, 2021). 3 Cities in Somalia have no legal status or boundaries; in urban areas, ‘district’ and ‘city’ or ‘neighborhood’ is considered s ynonymous. The institutional framework (either from the national or FMS level) makes no distinction between urban and rural districts. There are no formal ‘municipalities’ or ‘cities’ that are clearly demarcated. Urban areas that are commonly considered as ‘cities’ or ‘towns’ are subsumed into broader dist ricts, the boundaries of which have yet to be formally defined. Cities or towns have no mayors but are instead governed by the district commissioners of their respective districts. 4 Somalia had been in non-accrual status since 1991 and only restored access to IDA in 2020 after clearing arrears to international financial institutions and reaching Decision Point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. 5 The SMPF, administered by the World Bank, was activated in 2014 under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility, having received US$447 million of pooled funds from 11 donors to provide direct grants to the Government, supporting government-led state building for service delivery and economic growth. 6 World Bank Interim Strategy Note for Somalia, FY-14–16. 7 OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2017. 8 The World Bank urban team defined urban resilience as “the municipal governments’ ability to prepare for, respond to, and ada pt to shocks and stresses while continuing to provide critical services following an adverse event.” Urban resilience is understood as a holistic concept that comprises fi ve composite dimensions—spatial, physical, economic, social, and institutional. Spatial resilience ensures flexibility in spatial plans, policies, and land use management systems. Integration of IDP settlements into the urban fabric is an important aspect of spatial resilience in the Somali context. Physical resilience relates to ensuring that urban infrastructure and service delivery meets the increased demands resulting from large influxes of people and that the infrastructure itself is climate resilient. Economic resilience is the c ity’s ability to manage and adapt to disruptions to the Page 54 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) economic system, such as negative impacts on assets, production factors, and employment. Social resilience relates to strengthening social networks to cope and adapt to external stresses. Finally, institutional resilience relates to local government’s improved capacity to plan and manage the other dimensions of urban resilience. 9 Using an urban resilience framework approach, comprising social, physical, economic, spatial, and institutional dimensions, multiple criteria were considered for road selection including potential economic benefits, traffic volume, road condition, deterioration rate, constraints to flow of traffic, cost of road development, benefits of intervention, socioeconomic centers served, environmental impacts of the selected intervention, population served, poverty level, and stakeholder priority. 10 The main focus of the SUIPP was to conduct urban infrastructure and institutional needs assessments and support participatory planning to identify priority infrastructure investments, as well as prepare feasibility studies and preliminary designs for prioritized works to be constructed under the SURP. The project also established municipal PIUs in Garowe, Hargeisa, and Mogadishu through Subsidiary Agreements with each participating FMS. The PIU for Hargeisa was later dissolved due to a lack of funding under the SURP. 11 Refers to the Municipality of Mogadishu and the capital of the Republic of Somalia. 12 Not all roads included pedestrian walkways due to width constraints. 13 There are no standard construction codes for Somalia. 14 For Mogadishu constructed using precast concrete interlocking paving blocks with properly compacted sub-base and base materials; for Garowe using Otta seal surfacing with properly compacted sub-base and base materials designed to support the anticipated traffic loading. 15 No standard definition was used for ‘vulnerability”’, rather broad typologies prioritizing women, IDPs, and poor. 16 Country Partnership Framework; Report No. 124734 - SO; for the Federal Republic of Somalia; August 29, 2018. 17 Interim Strategy Note; Report No. 75212 - SO; for the Federal Republic of Somalia; November 11, 2013. 18 The Garowe Municipality kept its project account at a commercial bank in Djibouti while the BRA originally used a project account in a commercial bank before shifting to using the Central Bank of Somalia’s Designated Account. 19 Host communities and IDPs from the same district. As referenced in figure 4, ‘other communities’ refers to people hired from nearby communities, not th e host community or IDPs. 20 The estimated NPV at a discount rate of 5 percent is US$12.2 million, which reflects the cost of capital to the Government of Somalia. However, the NPV estimates of US$4 million at 12 percent and US$2.3 million at 15 percent likely better reflect the risk associated with investments in Somalia as a risk-adjusted discount rate. 21 The project endline did not establish causality, and other urbanization factors also likely influenced observed trends. 22 The Garowe Municipality reported a tax collection rate increase from 10 percent to 45 percent over the past two years. 23 The BRA had a male community engagement officer under the SURP, while both male and female officers have since been mobilized under SURP-II. 24 The German Government provided US$6 million to Mogadishu and the World Bank financed US$2.5 million to Garowe through the SMPF. 25 Included institutional and urban needs assessments by Crown Agents. 26 The World Bank contracted UNOPS, who then sub-contracted Apex to do the feasibility and preliminary designs for Mogadishu community roads and facilitate the road prioritization. The feasibility studies were based on topographical surveys, population and traffic growth projections, and rainfall modeling for catchment areas. The World Bank also contracted IPE Global to do feasibility and preliminary designs for Garowe urban roads and also Mogadishu primary roads (not funded under the SURP). 27 Including the USAID-financed TIS+ and the United Nations Joint Program for Local Governance. 28 UNOPS staff in Garowe and Mogadishu included the following: (1) Senior Engineer, (1) Health, Safety, Environment Officer, (2) Site Engineers for Mogadishu, (1) Community Liaison Officer (shared), (1) GIS Surveyor (shared), and (1) Environmental and Social Safeguards (shared). 29 World Health Organization declaration of COVID-19 as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, on January 30, 2020. Garowe civil works were completed by March 2021. 30 A TPM was contracted to carry out reviews for the project in Mogadishu Municipality in October 2020 and November 2020. The TPM (Abyrint) was contracted to (a) verify activities, (b) track implementation, (c) measure the results achieved by the project, and (d) monitor social and environmental sustainability of interventions in line with the Page 55 of 56 The World Bank Somalia Urban Resilience Project (P163857) Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) that the Government and the World Bank had agreed to. The task team also conducted virtual midterm review from May 18 to 22, 2020. The reporting uncovered significant shortcomings that could not have been detected with the Results Framework indicators, including (a) poor quality of works due to inadequate adherence to technical designs and workmanship; (b) insufficient contract management and reporting on social, environmental, health and safety, and GBV/sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) risks; (c) deficiencies in community engagement, particularly with the integrity of grievance redress approaches; and (d) inadequate contract management. Through ongoing support from the World Bank task team, significant improvements were made to address these challenges, such as (a) development of a code of conduct, addressing GBV/SEA, to supplement the basic rules of conduct; (b) formalized required plans for environmental risk mitigation; (c) improvement of grievance redress, including broadening the membership of district GRC, taken measures to enhance awareness, provided training to the district GRC members and, importantly, consolidated grievance data to enable more structures management and follow-up. 31 The reporting uncovered significant shortcomings that could not have been detected with the Results Framework indicators, including (a) poor quality of works due to inadequate adherence to technical designs and workmanship; (b) insufficient contract management and reporting on social, environmental, health and safety, and GBV/SEA risks; (c) deficiencies in community engagement, particularly with the integrity of grievance redress approaches; and (d) inadequate contract management. Through ongoing support from the World Bank task team, significant improvements were made to address these challenges, such as (a) development of a code of conduct, addressing GBV/SEA, to supplement the basic rules of conduct; (b) formalized required plans for environmental risk mitigation; (c) improvement of grievance redress, including broadening the membership of district GRC, taken measures to enhance awareness, provided training to the district GRC members and, importantly, consolidated grievance data to enable more structures management and follow-up. 32 January 31, 2022. The project is yet to document US$1,394,123.01 and in addition there is undisbursed balance of US$670.89. The World Bank team will closely work with the Government to ensure complete reconciliation of the designated bank accounts at East Africa Bank and Central Bank of Somalia before the end of the disbursement period. On the other hand, the project is advised to continue submitting the IFRs until January 31, 2022, and document the outstanding balances. xxxiii The SUIPP originally targeted three cities—Hargeisa (capital of Somaliland), Garowe (capital of Puntland), and Mogadishu. However, Hargeisa was dropped from the SURP as there was budget constraint, and priority urban investment in Hargeisa (solid waste management facility worth US$18 million) could not be entertained. Page 56 of 56