34221 Policing and Local Level Conflict Management in Resource Constrained Environments Case Studies in Kabupaten Sikka (NTT) and Kabupaten Ponorogo (East Java), Indonesia Final October 2004 www.ncg.dk Table of Contents Summary____________________________________________________________ i 1. Background______________________________________________________1 2. Study approach and methodology_____________________________________3 2.1. Data collection instruments______________________________________3 2.2. Work plan and time schedule ____________________________________4 3. Findings_________________________________________________________5 3.1. Profile of police in Sikka and Ponorogo____________________________5 3.1.1. Towards Community Policing? ______________________________5 3.1.2. Police service level and proximity to citizens____________________6 3.1.3. Personal profile___________________________________________7 3.1.4. Police education and training ________________________________7 3.2. Conflicts and disputes__________________________________________9 3.3. Conflict Resolution in Practice___________________________________9 3.4. Overall findings _____________________________________________11 3.5. Success factors ______________________________________________11 4. Findings in the context of ongoing national police reform initiatives ________13 4.1. Ongoing national-level police reform initiatives ____________________13 4.2. SERP and Local Level Policing _________________________________13 5. Conclusions_____________________________________________________16 6. Recommendations________________________________________________17 Annexes Annex A: Background Papers Sikka and Ponorogo Annex B: Questionnaires and Police Data Matrix Annex C: Workshop Process and Handouts Annex D: Participant list Annex E: Workshop Group Work Samples Annex F: Workshop Evaluation Form and Evaluation Results Annex G: Data tables and illustrations List of Acronyms/ Indonesian terms SERP Social and Economic Revitalization Project Polri Indonesian National Police KaPolRes Head of District Police NTT Nusa Tenggara Timur KaPolSek Head of sub-District Police PolRes District police offe PolSek Sub-District police office PosPol Police Post CDD Community Driven Development Pencak Silat Indonesian martial art often including elements of mysticism PAD Project Appraisal Document Summary1 Introduction This policing study was implemented in July-August 2004. It focuses on the role of policing in local conflictsi in Kabupaten (district) Sikka, NTT, and Kabupaten Ponorogo, East Java. The immediate purpose is to identify factors internal and/or external to the Indonesian police that contributed either constructively or negatively to outcomes of third-party intervention by the police in local conflicts. This study is part of ongoing preparations of the World Bank supported Social and Economic Revitalization Project (SERP). Starting in 2005, this project will implement community driven development programs in several of Indonesia's conflict-affected areas. Firstly, in order to optimize its implementation strategy SERP needs to know why the police sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails. Therefore the World Bank commissioned this study as a supplement to community studies conducted in 2003. Secondly, the study explores ways in which SERP could strengthen community driven development processes by promoting/facilitating police engagement. The way this would be done needs to true to community empowerment, decentralization reforms, and be consistent with the overall efforts of Government to reform the police. The study specifically aims at providing a police perspective on successful interventions in local conflict. One limitation is that the broader context including community perspectives on local conflicts in Ponorogo and Sikka is not provided in this report. These were covered by the 2003 community studies. The second limitation is that the policing study identifies success factors, but it is not designed to examine how widely successful police practice actually is applied. Methodology The study methodology has four distinct elements: (i) revisiting available SERP data on policing and local conflict from community studies conducted in 2003; (ii) participant observation and social interaction with police during residency periods at PolRes (district/Kabupaten) police barracks, ahead of (iii) data collection workshops with police stationed at PolRes and PolSek (sub-district, Kecamatan); (iv) a questionnaire survey establishing personal and professional profiles of the police; (iv) structured data collection on police assets and staff deployment at Kabupaten and Kecamatan levels. In addition key documents on current directions of police reform in Indonesia were consulted Study findings The study confirms earlier SERP community studies showing that the most common disputes and conflicts in Sikka and Ponorogo include domestic violence, land issues, disputed village head elections, and various other conflicts deteriorating in to situations that require mob/crowd control. The latter category includes development project related conflicts that were most prominent in Ponorogo. 1This report presents the views of the study team which not necessarily are shared by the Polri or the World Bank. i In Sikka violence against women is a severe social issue. An NGO survey (2000- 2001) showed that nine out of ten women had been victims of domestic or other violence against women (600 women out of a 650 women covered in the survey). However, also in Ponorogo violence against women is an important issue: 19% of police had handled domestic violence cases and 13% had handled heterosexual rape cases. The capacity of the police to respond to violence against women and the special needs of female victims of crime is seriously undermined by the fact that there are only few women in the service (1% and 2% percent respectively in Sikka and Ponorogo). Moreover, all these women are stationed at Kabupaten (PolRes) level. On a more positive note offices for special services to women had been opened at PolRes level in both Kabupaten (RPK, Ruang Pelayanan Khusus Wanita). Still, this is far away for most rural women and does little to address their special needs ­ especially in light of the high prevalence of domestic violence. The police force in Sikka has 341 police; the equivalent number is 700 in Ponorogo. The proportion of police stationed at Kabupaten level (PolRes) is relatively high in both places: 59% and 46%, respectively. When calculated against the total population per Kabupaten, in Sikka there is one police officer for each 789 citizens, while in Ponorogo there is one for each 1,297 citizens. These ratios obscure that the actual police service levels close to communities vary significantly and in general are much lower, ranging from 574 to 4,060 citizens per police officer in Ponorogo, to a range of 789 to 6,118 in Sikka. This indicates low, and at time perhaps almost irrelevant, access to police services in rural areas. Police preparedness to respond to local conflict also may be low because they are few and far away. And, at the best, Kecamatan police depends heavily on swift back-up from the police headquarters at Kabupaten level. In general, police in Sikka and Ponorogo do not use the terms `conflict' resolution', `mediation' or `arbitration'. Current practice appears to be mainly based on personal aptitude and learning by example/doing instead of formal police training in these matters. The use of persuasive power to resolve disputes or conflicts is captured by the Indonesian term `Kekeluargaan'. In both areas the police describe the importance of having `discretionary' room for policing disputes. This implies leeway for individual police officers to be creative and flexible while still acting within the boundaries of current standard policing procedures. All successes reported had an element of `deskresi kepolisian' (`discretionary policing'). This was often combined with endorsement of the suggested approach by superiors and senior leadership (KaPolRes). Leadership by example and change from above create room for individual initiative of lower ranks. Junior field officers showing initiative without orders is counter-intuitive in the hierarchical `order and act' policing culture. Therefore responsiveness and endorsement by senior management of individual initiative and efforts is very important as it releases the energy for change that many police express they posses. It is evident from the study that there exists a considerable, but un-articulated and underutilized, knowledge-base and best practice relevant to persuasive conflict management by the police in local disputes and conflicts. However, this potential is constrained by a number of factors. ii Firstly, the move away from militaristic policing towards a democratic policing is only a couple of years old. Much of the culture and backbone response of the police still may be determined by the old militaristic institutional culture. Militaristic policing engenders obedience to orders instead of initiative and personal judgment; it prioritizes coercive instead of persuasive police responses; and, it is to a high degree used to impunity instead of accountability to the people. Furthermore, democratic policing can only thrive when the military respect the preeminence of the police's assessment on initial responses to local conflict. Secondly, police in Sikka and Ponorogo are overstretched, understaffed and under- resourced. Anecdotal evidence from Ponorogo confirms assertions made in national reports on police financing that up to 70% of police funds/resources come from extra- budgetary sources. Lack of operational and capital investment resources places severe constraints on the overall performance of the police. It also hampers its ability to resolve/prevent local disputes and conflicts, or deploy appropriately in situations calling for crowd control measures. Thirdly, it seems common practice that the police depend on `community members' for operational expenditures (fuel) and subsistence (food and shelter during investigations). Of particular concern would be that in a number of cases influential community members/organizations have made donations in kind or in cash to, for example, extensions/repairs of PolSek offices, computers, and other equipment etc. Fourthly, a balanced policing approach requires neutrality. This is crucial for a constructive police involvement in SERP's community driven development processes. The (perceived) neutrality of the police (or the lack there off) suffers from patron- client type relationships with the `village' elite. In case of intra-village disputes it weakens the effectiveness of the police, not only in law enforcement but also in dispute mediation/arbitration. Success factors Through participatory group exercises and role plays, police in Sikka were facilitated to identify and reflect on their own best practice. While thus identifying factors that contribute to successful involvement of the police, unhelpful, ignorant, and wrong practices were also identified. Mostly these where formulated as the opposite or absence of a success factor. In the following the success factors are listed related to policing approaches, internal police dynamics, and external dynamics. Policing approach Where the police has been successful in resolving local disputes contributing factors (elements of success) in the approach included: · Behavior in line with duties of the police (serve and protect people); · Networking with local leaders and community members; · Repeated visits/proximity to the location of the conflict; · Consultations with conflicting parties (individual and bilateral); · Formulation of resolution options; · Discretionary application of Standard Operating Procedures; · Arbitration (domestic violence); · Cultural and religious sensitivity. iii Internal factors Where the police has been successful in resolving local disputes contributing factors (elements of success) internal to the police included: · Senior Management's prioritization of use of persuasive power (Kekeluargaan) in civil disputes; · Senior management's prioritization of persuasive power during crowd control; (practice to minimize carrying of arms/not showing arms); · Management by example and by encouragement leading to a conducive institutional environment; · Investing in good relations with community leaders and members and local government. External Factors Where the police has been successful in resolving local disputes contributing factors (elements of success) external to the police included: · Willingness of civil, religious and cultural leaders and networks to engage the police by providing early warnings of conflicts and also active support to the police efforts to handle crowds with persuasive power. · Incremental improvements in coordination with the national army stationed in Kabupaten Sikka reflected in a willingness of the army to provide space for the police to apply a persuasive approach to crowd control, while at the same time ensuring that the army is on call should the police request for back-up. National police reform and police involvement in local level conflict Since July 1st, 2000 the police reports directly to the President and has been fully de- linked from the Indonesian National Army. The importance of police reform for the consolidation of democracy and improved governance in Indonesia's is recognized by Government and development partners. It is noted that in line with current policies, police reform is not financially supported by the World Bank. It is outside the scope of this study to discuss the full range of police reform initiatives. The study mainly considers ongoing efforts promoting community policing because effective community policing perhaps can contribute to conflict resolution as part of community driven development in SERP areas. Conclusions Even within under-funded and understaffed Kabupaten level police, good practices for police involvement in local conflict resolution exist. Typically these prioritize using persuasive power. The practices identified in Sikka and Ponorogo are mostly rooted in `learning by doing' and are not the result of specific training. They are nevertheless highly compatible with community policing principles. It cannot be automatically concluded that the conflict resolution practices encountered in Sikka and Ponorogo also will be found in the SERP implementation areas. This would need to be established during the start-up activities of SERP in each Kabupaten. The aim of SERP start-up consultations/assessments would be identifying existing persuasive policing approaches that are conducive to local level conflict resolution. Where similar good policing practices are encountered, SERP can be more iv effective in reaching its stated conflict resolution and development objectives. This would require proactive engagement with the respective Kabupaten police forces. Where justified by specific analysis of opportunities and constraints, SERP needs a response mechanism to policing gaps caused by resource constraints of the police; especially where these have a negative impact on the ability of the police to constructively engage in the resolution of specific local conflicts. Further studies and consultations with Government and other donors would be required to determine the most appropriate way to design this mechanism. Overall recommendation It is recommended that SERP incorporates an immediate response mechanism to `good policing' opportunities in SERP areas. In these cases SERP should pragmatically seek to engage and optimize police performance. Coherence, and where possible, synergies, with ongoing community policing reforms should be ensured. SERP has no comparative advantage where mainstream police reform already is producing the required results on the ground. However, where this is not the case the specific objective of SERP financed policing activities would be promoting positive outcomes in terms of local conflict resolution and reconciliation. In the bigger picture, the sustainability of SERP financial investments would be diminished without exhausting all ways to contribute resolution of conflicts and reconciliation of adversaries. Where policing gaps are identified and where existing police attitudes and practice provide immediate opportunities, actions should be possible within the SERP framework. It should be a precondition that supporting police involvement is in line with community priorities as expressed through the SERP participatory process. Specific Recommendations It is recommended that under SERP's access to justice component a scoping study on financing mechanisms for police related activities in SERP areas be conducted. SERP should have the flexibility to be a last resort for financing of policing activities deemed on a critical path for avoiding a decent in to renewed violent conflict. Financing options to be elaborated should include: (i) direct financing or co-financing of urgent community policing related activities; (ii) co-funding of local government budgets; (iii) financing of pilot project implemented through third- parties including national or international civil society organizations and networks. It is recommended that the policing study as conducted in Sikka and Ponorogo be replicated in three to four SERP Kabupaten as part of the SERP start-up activities. It should be considered to do so concurrently with the scoping study on financing mechanisms mentioned above. It is also recommended that the facilitation approaches applied in the Ponorogo and Sikka workshops be incorporated in the SERP facilitation manual for Kabupaten facilitation teams and that SERP facilitators subsequently be trained. v 1. Background 1. This policing study was implemented in July-August 2004. It focuses on the role of policing in local conflicts in Kabupaten (district) Sikka, NTT, and Kabupaten Ponorogo, East Java. The immediate purpose is to identify factors internal and/or external to the Indonesian police that contributed either constructively or negatively to outcomes of third-party intervention by the police in local conflicts. This study is part of ongoing preparations of the World Bank supported Social and Economic Revitalization Project (SERP). Starting in 2005, this project will implement community driven development programs in several of Indonesia's conflict-affected areas. 2. Firstly, in order to optimize its implementation strategy SERP needs to know why the police sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails. Therefore the World Bank commissioned this study as a supplement to community studies conducted in 2003. These earlier World Bank studies in East Java and Flores documented that police (Polri) involvement in local disputes and conflicts is varied and included: marital disputes and domestic violence; conflicts related to village head elections; endemic and politically instigated violence involving vigilante martial arts groups in Kabupaten Ponorogo; and conflicts related to allegations of corruption of local government officials and village elites involved in diverting rice rations in Kabupaten Sikka. Crowd and riot control issues featured prominently in both locations, as did land ownership disputes. 3. Secondly, the study explores ways in which SERP could strengthen community driven development processes by promoting/facilitating police engagement. The way this would be done needs to true to community empowerment, supportive of decentralization reforms, and be consistent with the overall efforts of Government to reform the police. 4. The study specifically aims at providing a police perspective on successful interventions in local conflict. One limitation is that the broader context including community perspectives on local conflicts in Ponorogo and Sikka is not provided in this report. These were covered by the 2003 community studies. The second limitation is that the policing study identifies success factors, but it is not designed to examine how widely successful police practice actually is applied. 5. The second level purpose of the study is to suggest ways in which SERP could engage the police in community-driven development processes, while making sure that such intervention is consistent with the overall efforts of Government to reform the police. Inefficient and/or bad policing certainly is one of the risks compounding revitalization and development in conflict areas. However, if a body of `good policing' practices indeed exists, the impact of SERP could be increased were Polri to expand the application of these good practices. Therefore, it is relevant to consider how working with local police on conflict mitigation could contribute to averting a relapse to violence and advances the sustainability of SERP results. 6. The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 briefly presents the approach and methodology used. The findings of the study are presented in Chapter 3 below. Chapter 4 places these findings in the context of ongoing national police reforms, foremost the recent introduction of community policing. Chapter 5 1(18) presents conclusions and offers recommendations on the relevance and implication of the findings for SERP. 7. This report presents the views of the study team which not necessarily are shared by the Polri or the World Bank. 2(18) 2. Study approach and methodology 2.1. Data collection instruments 8. The study has four distinct elements: (i) revisiting available SERP data on policing and local conflict from community studies constructed in 2003; (ii) participant observation and social interaction with police during residency periods at PolRes (district/Kabupaten) police barracks, ahead of (iii) data collection workshops with police stationed at PolRes and PolSek (sub-district Kecamatan); (iv) a questionnaire survey establishing personal and professional profiles of the police; (iv) structured data collection on police assets and staff deployment at Kabupaten and Kecamatan levels. In addition key documents on current directions of police reform in Indonesia were consulted. 9. Background papers have been prepared on police involvement in conflicts in Sikka and Ponogoro (Annex A). The reader is referred to these for a general profile of the two Kabupaten, and for an overview of local level disputes and conflicts. 10. Residency at police barracks was part of the fieldwork. The team stayed in the police barracks and had ample opportunity to interact and converse with off duty police officers during evening and early morning hours. During daytime, study team members would follow-up with assigned police officers to compile data on police assets and personnel. 11. Two-days workshops conducted in Sikka and Ponorogo had around 100 police in attendance, of these 75% were supposed to come from sub-district (Kecamatan) level police offices (PolSek) (Annex D). The workshops were in PolRes meeting halls. The first day focused on real life examples of successful intervention by police in local conflicts. The second day, concentrated on analyzing policing approaches to ongoing conflict cases. (Annex C and E) 12. Structured surveys using a rapid The individual questionnaire collected the assessment questionnaire (Annex B). In following information: principle only workshop participants were intended to fill in this questionnaire. · Duty station level (PolRes, PolSek, PosPol) Taking advantage of an opportunity · Age offered in Ponorogo, Polri staff · Sex · Language skills and area of origin administered the questionnaire to include · Total number of year in Polri, total number of all police in that Kabupaten. The data years in respective Kabupaten presented below is based on a 31% sample · Police education profile of police in Sikka, and 70% sample of · Selected training profile (community policing, police in Ponorogo. Assumptions made in conflict resolution, crowd and riot control) the design of the survey include that: o Proximity to the police is an important factor for the access of communities to policing services; o More experienced, more mature and better trained police have more personal resources and experience to apply to constructive third party involvement in local disputes and conflicts; o Female police, when adequately trained, have a comparative advantage to deal with certain aspects of domestic violence and rape cases, i.e. gender- 3(18) appropriate policing to a large extent is a function of the gender profile of the police force; o On the one hand, proximity, local language skills, cultural and religious affinity combined with experience and lower staff turn-over rates are advantageous to the conflict sensitivity of police officers, and higher scores on these parameters indicate higher potential for constructive engagement in local conflicts. o On the other hand, where the police become too embedded in local communities familiarity with factions or socio-economic interest groups within the community may jeopardize (perceived) police neutrality and become a hindrance for conflict resolution. 2.2. Work plan and time schedule 13. The analysis of existing World Bank data on policing in Ponorogo and Sikka started in July 2004 and was reported in Background Papers. Fieldwork preparations were in early August 2004. The team was in Sikka from 15-20 August and continued to Ponorogo from 22-28 August. A debriefing of the World Bank's SERP team was conducted on August 30, 2004. At the time of writing this report presentations of study results for BAPPENAS and Polri were planned to take place in early October. 4(18) 3. Findings 3.1. Profile of police in Sikka and Ponorogo 3.1.1. Towards Community Policing? 14. In 1999 Polri committed to What is Community Policing? introducing community policing (see Box) as part The notion of "Community Policing" emphasizes knowledge of wider police reforms., In through greater proximity and an increased ability to respond to the 2002 Parliament adopted a needs of the population the police are supposed to serve. However, Community Policing may cover a wide range of policing strategies: new Indonesian Police Law · Strategies to improve community/police relations and build trust in (RUU 2/2002) that the police as an institution; formulates the basic · Consultation of the public by the police to identify problems or mandate of the police as "to other safety/security priorities; serve and to protect the · Collaboration in the activities of policing, such as Neighborhood Watch and other community-based security initiatives; people" (see also Section · Assistance with the investigation of crimes, provision of 4.1).ii information, handing over suspects etc.; 15. Eventually, effective · Cooperation in activities of crime prevention; · Consent, the police is acting with the approval and support of the community policing (see community; Box) would increase the · Accountability, the police takes responsibility for the results of its police' ability to prevent conduct as seen by the community, whether it is successful or not. and manage conflicts. However, currently most In practice, Community Policing may be reflected in such activities as regular consultation between the police and the local community, activities seem to be small- close contact between police officers and community agencies, scale or on a pilot basis. regular foot patrols, a close understanding amongst police officers of the local area and its inhabitants, and "proactive policing" which 16. Findings in Ponorogo and seeks to identify social problems as they emerge and deal with them Sikka suggest that there is a at that stage. long way to go before community policing will have a significant impact Strengthening Community Policing in Indonesia Action Plan 2004 on the ground. Partnership for Governance Reform 17. In Ponorogo, only 17% of police reported to have participated in some community policing training. Preliminary results, that would require additional study, suggest that here community policing was interpreted mainly to mean increasing the number of night guards doing rounds. This very limited interpretation goes against the vision of community policing (see Box), and is problematic in a local conflict context where vigilante martial art groups already control security in many villages. As recent as 2000/1 these groups have been used as part of the machinery of local politicians. 18. In Sikka, 33% of police reported to have been trained in community policing, but according to the KaPolRes (District Head of Police), the quality of training had been not satisfactory. He also saw it as serious omission that he and other senior PolRes police had not been involved in any strategic consideration on how to introduce community policing and, importantly, how to do so by building on compatible existing practice. 19. Community policing is about a change in posture of the police away from its militaristic and coercive ways of responding to tensions and conflict, towards 5(18) embracing the use of physical force as a last resort, once persuasion, advice and warnings have been exhausted. Training in persuasive conflict resolution therefore should be a key element of formal police training. In Sikka and Ponorogo, only 13% and 6% of the police force had received such training. Despite the obvious fact that the Sikka and Ponorogo results cannot necessarily be taken as representative, the opposite is equally unlikely (i.e. that only in these places few police have been trained in basic conflict resolution skills). 3.1.2. Police service level and proximity to citizens 20. Proximity to a police post is an important indicator of the access the population has to police services. From a police perspective, the nearer the police are stationed to communities, the easier it is to respond to conflicts and disputes. 21. The police force in Sikka has 341 police; the equivalent number is 700 in Ponorogo. The proportion of police stationed at Kabupaten level (PolRes) is relatively high in both places: 59% and 46%, respectively. When calculated against the total population in the respective Kabupaten, in Sikka there is one police officer for each 789 citizens, while in Ponorogo there is one for each 1,297 citizens. However, the same calculation for each sub-district (Kecamatan) reveals significant variations in police presence: a range of 574 to 4,060 citizens per police officer in Ponorogo's sub-districts, and a range of 789 to 6,118 in Sikka's sub-districts. The proximity of the police to communities the varies significantly.. 22. The study shows that common ways of calculating police service levels (i.e. Kabupaten level ratios) obscure that the actual police service levels close to communities vary significantly and in general are much lower. (See Annex G). This would indicate low, and at time perhaps almost irrelevant, access to police services. Similarly, police preparedness to respond to conflict is low because they are few and far away. And, at the best, heavily dependent on swift back-up from the police headquarters at PolRes level. Police are swift to point out resource and equipment constraints undermining it's response capacity. Managerial and leadership weaknesses and lack of relevant skills were not mentioned very often. 23. In both locations there are only few police women (1% and 2% percent respectively in Sikka and Ponorogo. Moreover, all these women are stationed at Kabupaten (PolRes) level. This seriously undermines the capacity of the police to respond to violence against women and the special needs of female victims of crime. On a positive note in Ponorogo and Sikka offices for special services to women had been opened at PolRes level (RPK, Ruang Pelayanan Khusus Wanita). Still, this is far away for most rural women and does little to address their special needs ­ especially in light of the high prevalence of domestic violence (see below) 6(18) Sikka Ponorogo (30% sample) (70% sample) Police Service Profile Total population in Kabupaten (PBS 2003) 269,069 907,859 Total number of police /1 341 700 Number of police at District (Kabupaten) police 202 (59%) 232 (46%) office (PolRes) /1 Number of female police at Kecamatan level /1 0 (0%) 0 (0%) Ratio police officer to Kabupaten population 789 1297 (nr.people served by one police) /2 Range of police service ratio variations at 789 to 6,118 213 to 4,060 Kecamatan level /2 Personnel characteristics Ability to speak relevant vernacular languages /3 22% 98% Proportion of police older than 40 years /3 Number and Percentage of female police/1 3 (1%) 14 (2%) /1 source: PolRes Sikka and PolRes Ponorogo /2 Calculated by study team based on PolRes and PBS data 2003 /3 Study questionnaire Survey August 2004 3.1.3. Personal profile 24. The police force in Ponorogo is ethnically and religiously homogenous and mirrors the profile of the general population of Kabupaten Ponorogo: 98% is Javanese and Muslim. In Sikka, a large number of police are from Flores (42%); the rest are from (15%) Java, and from Timor (14%). Only 22% of police officers speak at least one relevant vernacular language (Sikka or Lio). Religiously the force is divers: Islam (33%), Catholic (33%), Hindu (22%), and Protestant (12%). 25. In Ponorogo, the police force is relatively old, 40% to 60% of police are older than 40 years adjusted for possible over representation of PolRes staff in the survey conducted. In Sikka in contrast the force is relatively young: 39% of police has less than 2 years policing experience in Sikka or elsewhere. However, there is a core of experienced police with more than 10 years experience (24%). 3.1.4. Police education and training 26. There are marked differences Sikka Ponorogo in the educational profile of Type of Police education Nr. Of Police Nr. Of Police the police in Sikka and in PPSS 1 1.00% 1 0.20% Ponorogo. In Sikka, 92.4% SELAPA 0 0% 1 0.20% had completed SPN, while in AKPOL 2 1.90% 3 0.60% PTIK 0 0% 1 0.20% Ponorogo this was 67.6%. SESPIM 0 0% 0 0.00% Figures for TAMTAMA are SESPATI 0 0% 0 0.00% 4.8% and 36.3 % for Sikka TAMTAMA 5 4.80% 177 36.30% BRIGMOB 2 1.90% 39 8.00% and Ponorogo, respectively. POLAIRUD 0 0% 2 0.40% In Sikka only 1.9 % reports SPN 97 92.40% 329 67.60% BRIGMOB training, while SECAPA 6 5.70% 28 5.70% this is 8% in Ponorogo. 7(18) Educational Profile Percentages show Sikka / Ponorogo Survey results. World Bank August 2004 0% - 0% SESPATI (Senior Police Officer School) 4 months 0% - 0% SESPIM (Senior Police Officer School) 9 months 0% - 0.2% 0% - 0.2% SELAPA PTIK (Continued Officer Training ) (Higher Police School ) 9 months 2 years Indonesian Police Education 1% - 0.2% 5.7% - 5.7% 1.9% - 0.6% System /1 PPSS SECAPA SECAPA (Officer Training ) (Aspirant Officer Training ) (Police Academy ) 9 months 3 years 92.4% - 67% SPN (National Police School ) 11 months 4.8%36.6% 1.9%/8% / 0%/0.4% TAMTAMA BRIGMOB/POLAIRUD 1% - 0.2% 99% - 99.8% Entry University Public School education level /1: Adapted from "Report on Police Education" Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, 2004 8(18) 3.2. Conflicts and disputes 27. Findings based on structured interviews with police confirm earlier SERP research findings on the dominance of domestic Perkosaan, 13% Silat, 23% violence, land issues, conflicts related to disputed village head Kekerasan dalam rumah Tangga, election, and various conflicts 19% deteriorating in to situations Tanah, 11% that require mob/crowd control. Proyek The latter category includes Pembangunan, 7% Hewan Ternak, 10% (electricity) development Sumber air / Pilkades, 19% Irigasi, 6% project related conflicts that were most prominent in Ponorogoiii. 28. Political manipulation of Pencak Silat martial arts groups has been a particular issue in Ponorogo. Violence against women was a major issue in both Kabupaten. In Ponorogo 19% of police had handled domestic violence cases and 13% had handled heterosexual rape cases. In Sikka violence against women seems to be an even severer social issue. An NGO survey (2000-2001) showed that 9 out of 10 women had been victims of domestic or other violence against women (600 women out of a 650 women covered in the survey)iv. 3.3. Conflict Resolution in Practice 29. In general, police do not use the terms `conflict' resolution', `mediation' or `arbitration' and current practice appears to be mainly based on personal aptitude and learning by example/doing. The use of persuasive power is captured by the Indonesian term, `Kekeluargaan' 30. In both areas the police describe the importance of having `discretionary' room for policing disputes. This implies leeway for individual police officers to be creative and flexible while still acting within the boundaries of current standard policing procedures. All successes reported had an element of `deskresi kepolisian' (`discretionary policing'). This was often combined with endorsement of the suggested approach by superiors and senior leadership (KaPolRes). Leadership by example and change from above create room for individual initiative of lower ranks. Junior field officers showing initiative without orders is counter-intuitive in the hierarchical `order and act' policing culture. Therefore responsiveness and endorsement by senior management of individual initiative and efforts is very important as it releases the energy for change that many police express they posses. 31. Police reports that domestic violence is difficult to act against by purely legal means due to the absence of clear law on the matter. This hampers the police in providing victim-centered solutions in domestic violence cases. Where the police do get involved in these cases their authority is typically used to apply `persuasive power', often together with local authorities or respected individuals. 32. Interestingly, the police use a `letter of agreement/promise' that describes the agreed outcome of a mediation/arbitration process. The legal basis for this type of intervention is unclear, but it is a socially acceptable and appreciated way of 9(18) bringing policing power to bear. However, examples of intervention often mention men instead of women involved in the mediation efforts and this type of `mediation' may not provide women the degree of rights awareness and protection necessary. 33. Persuasion and mediation through networking with traditional and religious leaders is a preferred strategy for most type of disputes. The study's focus on identifying elements of successful conflict resolution practice did, however, not include assessing the scope and extent too which the police actually applies the identified `good policing' experience systematically (see section 2.2). The still low coverage of police service would suggest that in a majority of cases of the police is not involved in types of local disputes or conflicts discussed. This is not a problem where this means that disputes are addressed though community or traditional structures. However, it is often precisely these structures that are under considerable strain in conflict-affected areas. The absence of effective and appropriate policing in these areas may thus have graver consequences. Leadership "Why are [examples] of conflict mapping taken from members of police posts (PosPol), PolSek and also PolRes: it's because [analyzing conflict] is part of our job. As KaPolRes (district Head of Police), this means I have to show the way or give opportunity [to analyze conflict] at PolRes level. We have to coordinate with [local] government and community and religious leaders from the level of PolRes down to each police post. The same is true of each KaPolSek (sub-district head of police)... he needs to know who to approach to work together at the level of religious leaders, government or NGOs .....If we ourselves don't prepare [to work on conflict] before we approach anyone we will not be taken seriously" Personal example ".. for example a KaPolSek who always goes around with two buttons on his uniform open...who is arrogant by showing off his pistol or just by his attitude. Such a figure will not likely be welcomed or respected by community leaders or government bodies......inevitably it will be difficult to resolve the conflict just discussed at PolSek level be cause as an individual he will be rejected [by conflicting parties and stakeholders] ...this will reflect on the police institution. So, if we go out on a conflict resolution tasks, we have to start with being good superiors" Discretionary policing "[by example from superiors] all police [at PolSek level] will get an idea of how to act and behave in a similar manner and community members will view them as consistent and treat them that way. If the KaPolSek is moved to another position or is not present, in case there is a need for "deskresi kepolisian"(discretionary policing) of a dispute the action taken by the police officer can by endorsed and coordinated through the lines laid out by the KaPolSek"... Bagus Wahyono, KaPolRes Kabupaten Sikka August 2004 10(18) 3.4. Overall findings 34. It is evident from the study that there exists a considerable, but un-articulated and underutilized, knowledge-base and best practice relevant to persuasive conflict management by the police in local disputes and conflicts. However, this potential is constrained by a number of factors. 35. Firstly, the move away from militaristic policing towards a democratic policing is only a couple of years old. Much of the culture and backbone response of the police still may be determined by the old militaristic institutional culture. Militaristic policing engenders obedience to orders instead of initiative and personal judgment; it prioritizes coercive instead of persuasive police responses; and, it is to a high degree used to impunity instead of accountability to the people. Furthermore, democratic policing can only thrive when the military respect the preeminence of the police's assessment on initial responses to local conflict. 36. Secondly, police in Sikka and Ponorogo are overstretched, understaffed and under-resourced. Anecdotal evidence from Ponorogo confirms assertions made in national reports on police financing that up to 70% of police funds/resources come from extra-budgetary sources. Lack of operational and capital investment resources places severe constraints on the overall performance of the police. It also hampers its ability to resolve/prevent local disputes and conflicts, or deploy appropriately in situations calling for crowd control measures. 37. Thirdly, it seems common practice that the police depend on `community members' for operational expenditures (fuel) and subsistence (food and shelter during investigations). Of particular concern would be that in a number of cases influential community members/organizations have made donations in kind or in cash to, for example, extensions/repairs of PolSek offices, computers, and other equipment etc. 38. Fourthly, a balanced policing approach requires neutrality. This is crucial for a constructive police involvement in SERP's community driven development processes. The (perceived) neutrality of the police (or the lack there off) suffers from patron-client type relationships with the `village' elite. In case of intra- village disputes it weakens the effectiveness of the police, not only in law enforcement but also in dispute mediation/arbitration. 3.5. Success factors 39. Through participatory group exercises and role plays, police in Sikka were facilitated to identify and reflect on their own best practice. While thus identifying factors that contribute to successful involvement of the police, unhelpful, ignorant, and wrong practices were also identified. Mostly these where formulated as the opposite or absence of a success factor. In the following the success factors are listed related to policing approaches, internal police dynamics, and external dynamics. Policing approach 40. Where the police has been successful in resolving local disputes contributing factors (elements of success) in the approach included: · Behavior in line with duties of the police (serve and protect people); 11(18) · Networking with local leaders and community members; · Repeated visits/proximity to the location of the conflict; · Consultations with conflicting parties (individual and bilateral); · Formulation of resolution options; · Discretionary application of Standard Operating Procedures; · Arbitration (domestic violence); · Cultural and religious sensitivity. Internal factors 41. Where the police has been successful in resolving local disputes contributing factors (elements of success) internal to the police included: · Senior Management's prioritization of use of persuasive power (Kekeluargaan) in civil disputes; · Senior management's prioritization of persuasive power during crowd control; (practice to minimize carrying of arms/not showing arms); · Management by example and by encouragement leading to a conducive institutional environment; · Investing in good relations with community leaders and members and local government. External Factors 42. Where the police has been successful in resolving local disputes contributing factors (elements of success) external to the police included: · Willingness of civil, religious and cultural leaders and networks to engage the police by providing early warnings of conflicts and also active support to the police efforts to handle crowds with persuasive power. · Incremental improvements in coordination with the national army stationed in Kabupaten Sikka reflected in a willingness of the army to provide space for the police to apply a persuasive approach to crowd control, while at the same time ensuring that the army is on call should the police request for back- up.Findings in the context of ongoing national police reform initiatives 12(18) 4. Findings in the context of ongoing national police reform initiatives 4.1. Ongoing national-level police reform initiatives 43. In April 1999 Polri was de-linked from the command structure of the Indonesian National Army (TNI), but remained under the Ministry of Defense. The definitive break with the military was on July 1st, 2000 when then President Abdurrahman Wahid announced the independence of the police declaring that it from that day on would report directly to the President. Police reform aims at structural change of the police' role and capabilities in the security sector. The importance of police reform for the consolidation of democracy and improved governance in Indonesia's is recognized by Government and development partners. It is noted that in line with current policies, police reform is not financially supported by the World Bank. It is outside the scope of this study to discuss the full range of ongoing initiatives. 44. Effective and comprehensive community policing could contribute to increasing the relevance of policing in support of community driven development and conflict resolution in SERP areas. Therefore it is relevant for the study to consider ongoing police reform initiatives introducing community policing including nascent efforts to bring the quality and focus of police education in line with its new mandate. v 4.2. SERP and Local Level Policing 45. According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), SERP is designed to "..while CDD projects provide the beginnings of a framework for community dispute provide a framework for community dispute resolution, none were designed for resolution and peace building. To do so, it peacebuilding and are not suitable for this adds a number of modifications to other purpose without significant modification of the community driven development approaches, type that the proposed SERP project is such as the KDP (see Box). The quality of prepared to provide. These include: policing inevitably affects program · facilitator selection and training will outcomes and the police often are a key highlight peace building skills; stakeholders and actors in local conflict · special attention must be given to involving dynamics. Therefore SERP already opts for traditional leadership which is often is the key a proactive engagement of the police. to ending disputes; · planning and investment activities should Planned police involvement in SERP encourage inter-village cooperation includes participation in provincial and · programs for the alternative dispute district level working groups on post resolution and access to justice; conflict reconstruction (PAD p.36). · planning cycles will be synchronized with improved capacities; 46. The SERP's dispute resolution component · targeted programs for youth, female-headed (see highlight in Box) also engages the households and returning displaced groups. police who will be invited to participate in SERP Project Appraisal Document p. 10-11 community legal education. However, some of this police involvement perhaps is more aimed at ensuring police buy-in and accountability to the participatory process, and less geared towards increasing the application of existing `good police practice' as part of multi-track efforts to avoid a return to violence in post-conflict environments. 13(18) 47. A "common denominator underlying all of Indonesia's community level conflicts is that they feed on an absence of mediating institutions that can channel and resolve local-level conflicts."vi In the preceding chapters we have seen that the police at times fulfill mediation roles in local conflicts. This is also is likely to be the case elsewhere in SERP areas. What we don't know enough about based on the current study is how widespread these kind of good policing practices are. 48. In SERP areas, the first tier of questions to be examined include whether, from a police perspective, similar `good police practice' also exists in conflict affected areas. If so, what is the community perspective on the same issue? This baseline remains to be established at the program's start-up. An important lesson from the policing study is that identifying `good police practice' can and needs to be a deliberate element of the SERP start-up phase. In this respect, the methodology used in the Ponorogo and Sikka workshops could be a useful addition to other data collection that SERP plans to use. SERP facilitators would need training to be able to replicate this kind of workshops. 49. Establishing a baseline on good and bad police practice is but one element of the possible local security dynamics in SERP areas. By omission, the lack of police services altogether may have given rise to vigilante groups, organized along ethnic, religious or political lines. In conflict areas communities initially may have welcomed the security provided by such groups. However, concerns have been raised that "These private security forces often exacerbate rather than reduce security problems, especially when they are linked to particular religious, ethnic, or political groups. The lack of any system of control, supervision, or regulation over them means they all too easily become a law unto themselves"vii. The `private security providers' often are part of the communities that SERP will work with but they have their own interests to protect. This may unduly bias community participation processes. For donor programs, working with the police can be an important strategy to promote that control of security gradually is taken back by state agents and influence and `protection' from private, ethnically, religiously or politically-affiliated groups is minimized. 50. Increased trust between communities and the In building reconciliation and social police is one of SERP's indicators for rebuilding capital, is SERP able to social capital and promoting reconciliation (see box). The current study shows that at times the (i) to help communities manage conflict more constructively? If so, which police can successfully mediate local conflicts. interventions work best and under what Is this enough reason for SERP to go beyond sets of conditions and types of conflict? police involvement in consultative bodies, and directly support the police? Could facilitating (ii) Do SERP activities build greater police mediation in specific local conflicts trust within the community and between the community and government conceivably be part of SERP? Clearly, any institutions (including police and decision would be based on context specific military)?" studies and on the community preferences Project Appraisal Document: 109. expressed through the SERP participatory process. But, does SERP have a mechanism and funding in place? Can it respond in cases where communities genuinely want the police to play a bigger role and there is an opportunity for dealing with local conflict in a way that builds trust between police and communities? If so, how would it be ensured that such action will be coherent with community policing initiatives if these actually are ongoing in SERP areas? How would SERP support fit in to the new decentralized system 14(18) of government, where apparently "the exact balance of authority between Police ands Regional/local authorities" remains an important but unresolved question. And, "there are no common established policies or guidelines on contribution of local or regional governments to Police budgets.viii 51. This second tier of questions and issues revolve around whether it would be a priority for SERP, under certain condition to support police reform, Or if this should be left to national programs, such as the earlier mentioned fledgling community policing reform initiative. 52. Police reform policies and reform programs are moving in the right direction towards structural change and democratic policing. Still, whatever their intentions, many of these programs currently only have a light imprint on the ground. National reform efforts are unlikely to significantly increase police capacity to constructively engage in local conflict resolution prior to, or concurrently with SERP implementation starting in 2005. There will be a `policing gap' in SERP areas that will become more apparent as communities are facilitated to express their security priorities. 53. A key strategic choice to be made by the SERP team then is whether or Broadly speaking, three different donor not to elaborate the current SERP approaches to conflict can be identified, each provisions to work on better policing with its own set of assumptions and associated (see Box). Where conditions allow, strategies this would include promoting and (as · working around conflict ­ which treats conflict a last resort) financing local level as an impediment or negative externality that is to be avoided; police reform. · working in conflict ­ which recognizes the links 54. Possible financing mechanisms between programs and conflict and makes would range from direct funding of attempts to minimize conflict-related risks, so that policing activities, to co-funding of aid `does no harm'; and local government budgets, or direct · working on conflict ­ which are conscious funding of pilot projects. Each attempts to design programs in such a way that they `do good'. option would include concomitant facilitation processes and financing Source: Goodhand/DFID 2001 procedures. 15(18) 5. Conclusions 55. It is concluded that even within under-funded and understaffed Kabupaten level police, good practices for police involvement in local conflict resolution exist. The practices identified in Sikka and Ponorogo are mostly rooted in `learning by doing' and are not the result of specific training. They are nevertheless highly compatible with community policing principles. 56. It cannot be automatically concluded that the conflict resolution practices encountered in Sikka and Ponorogo also will be found in the SERP implementation areas. This would need to be established during the start-up activities of SERP in each Kabupaten. The aim of SERP start-up consultation/assessments would be identifying existing persuasive policing approaches that are conducive to local level conflict resolution. Where similar good policing practices are encountered, SERP can be more effective in reaching its stated conflict resolution and development objectives. This would require proactive engagement with the respective Kabupaten (district) police forces. 57. It is furthermore concluded that where justified by specific analysis of opportunities and constraints, SERP needs a mechanism responsive to resource constraints of the police where these have a negative impact on the ability of the police to constructively engage in the resolution of specific local conflicts. Further studies and consultations with Government and other donors would be required to determine the most appropriate way to design this mechanism. 16(18) 6. Recommendations Overall recommendation 58. It is recommended that SERP incorporates an immediate response mechanism to `good policing' opportunities in SERP areas. In these cases SERP should pragmatically seek to engage and optimize police performance. Coherence, and where possible, synergies, with ongoing community policing reforms should be ensured. SERP has no comparative advantage where mainstream police reform already is producing the required results on the ground. However, where this is not the case the specific objective of SERP financed policing activities would be promoting positive outcomes in terms of local conflict resolution and reconciliation. In the bigger picture, the sustainability of SERP financial investments would be diminished without exhausting all ways to contribute resolution of conflicts and reconciliation of adversaries. Where policing gaps are identified and where existing police attitudes and practice provide immediate opportunities, actions should be possible within the SERP framework. It should be a precondition that supporting police involvement is in line with community priorities as expressed through the SERP participatory process. Specific Recommendations 59. It is recommended that under SERP's access to justice component a scoping study on financing mechanisms for police related activities in SERP areas be conducted. SERP should have the flexibility to be a last resort for financing of policing activities deemed on a critical path for avoiding a decent in to renewed violent conflict. Financing options to be elaborated should include: (i) direct financing or co-financing of urgent community policing related activities; (ii) co- funding of local government budgets; (iii) financing of pilot project implemented through third-parties including national or international civil society organizations and networks. 60. It is recommended that the policing study as conducted in Sikka and Ponorogo be replicated in three to four SERP Kabupaten as part of the SERP start-up activities. It should be considered to do so concurrently with the scoping study on financing mechanisms mentioned above . 61. .It is also recommended that the facilitation approaches applied in the Ponorogo and Sikka workshops be incorporated in the SERP facilitation manual for Kabupaten facilitation teams and that SERP facilitators subsequently be trained 17(18) i The study was conducted by Mr. Anton Baaré of NCG Denmark (Team Leader), Mr. Ichsan Malik of Institut Titian Perdamaian (Senior Facilitator and Conflict Resolution Expert), Mr. Endro Probo (National Researcher in Kabupaten Ponogoro), and Mr. Yohannes Stanislaus Didakus Mbulu (National Researcher Kabupaten Sikka) ii Partnership For Governance Reform in Indonesia June 2004 "Strengthening Community Policing in Indonesia, Action Plan 2004" Partnership For Governance Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta iiiExamples given by police included disputes related to electricity supply and environmental concenrns about a poluting factory. In both cases NGO's were identified as 'provocateurs' in the police' self- analysis. iv Courtesy of the Sikka NGO/religious association group `Truk F' v Polri ­ May 2003, Financial Mapping; Reformasi Berkelanjutan Institusi Polri Bidang Manajemen Keuangan dan Anggaran Collaboration between: Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia; Kemitraan Bagi Pembaharuan Tata Pemerintahan di Indonesia; Lembaga Penyelidikan EKonomi dan Masyarakat; Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia; ­ Financial Management Reform of Polri; Reformasi Berkelanjutan Institusi Polri Bidang Collaboration between: Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia; Kemitraan Bagi Pembaharuan Tata Pemerintahan di Indonesia; Lembaga Penyelidikan EKonomi dan Masyarakat; Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia vi SERP Project Appraisal Document (PAD), page 10 vii International Crisis Group November 2003 `The Perils Of Private Security In Indonesia: Guards And Militias On Bali And Lombok, ICG Asia Report N°67 7, Jakarta/Brussels. http://www.icg.org . See also Partnership For Governance Reform in Indonesia June 2004 "Strengthening Community Policing in Indonesia, Action Plan 2004" Partnership For Governance Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta:p.7 viiiPartnership For Governance Reform in Indonesia June 2004 "Strengthening Community Policing in Indonesia, Action Plan 2004" Partnership For Governance Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta p.6-7 18(18)