DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Not For Public Use Report No. WH-213 (a) CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF BOLIVIA November 9, 1972 Latin America & Caribbean Department This report was prepared for official use only by the Bank Group. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. The Bank Group does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Current Unít - Bolivian Peso $bl.00 - US$0.084 US$1.00 - $bl1.88 $b1 million - US$84,175 AfIter October 31, 1972 $bl.00 = US4o.o5 USel.OO = $b20.OO 4bl million = Us$50,00o 1/ All figures in this report are computed at the exchange rate prevailing before October 31, 1972. BOLIVIA X ¡ 7 2 B O L I V I A~~~~I ~20 ~ i~~ I03~~~0DK4ETERS 19, ~ ~~~~~~~~~TRINIDAD E ' ';. ... . .OC iA ;j<,r~~jOeO S MoA N Ar7 1 -::;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,te < regular sbíp i nes ji - tr-- -Seconzolay c.dro CapinaDa i 2 A " "", ,;""",, u,~~~~~~~~~~~........... ezt-. .iiás A U.tmt G UST ' 971 P A R A G U Y TARIJA053 5,238 /1 Provincial capitals only. 20. As a result of regional growth disparities, income per wage earner -- excluding mining and the public sector -- was on the average, twice as high in the Llanos than in the Altiplano. This should hopefully increase the demographic pull of the Llanos and result in a pattern of population dis- tribution more in líne wíth natural resources endowments. The increased mobil- ity of the labor force should, however, be well planned so as to prevent so- cial tensions and frustrations wjhich it usually generates. - 10 - III. DEVELOPI4ENT PROSPECTS 21. Bolivia is currently confronted with serious short-term economic problems which require the prompt adoption of a set of policies and measures largely involving strengthening a debilitated public sector. Provided an appropriate solution is found (see Chapter IV), Bolivia can look forward to a period of satisfactory growth. There are, however, other problems of a longer-range nature which will have to be dealt with over time in order to ensure a sound growth performance in coming years. These problems can best be identified by analyzing in some detail the structural characteristics, policy constraínts and future prospects of the principal sectors of economic activity. Identification of these problems and possible approaches to their solutions is attempted in the following paragraphs. A. Sectoral Problems and Policies Agriculture 22. The agricultural sector provides employment for over one-half of Bolivia's labor force, generates one-fifth of GDP and contributes 7 percent of exports. Considerable structural impediments and the absence of adequate policies resulted in a slow growth of output and productivity in recent years. 23. The principal problem affecting the agricultural sector is the exísting structural imbalance between demographic and natural resources in Bolivia's three main geographic regions: (i) the cold, dry and largely barren highlands (Altiplano); (ii) the temperate and humid valleys (Valles); and (iii) the tropical and subtropical plains (Llanos). The existing demographic concentration in the Altiplano is the result of a centuries-old process. The dry flat and disease-free margins of Lake Titicaca were the cradle of ancient cultures which developed advanced agri- cultural techniques capable of sustaining the then prevailing population. Tropical health hazards and lack of communications made most of the Llanos, except for a few old colonial settlements, uninhabitable until recently. Modern technology and the improvement in communications has, however, greatly increased the potential of the Valles and Llanos vis-a-vis that of the Alti- plano. At the same time, the population concentration in the Altiplano has outstripped its capacity to feed the increased population. - 11 - Table 5: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, CULTIVATED LAND AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT (1970) TOTAL ALTIPLANO VALLES LLANOS Population (%) 100 56.1 29.8 14.1 Cultivated Land (%) 100 43.5 33.0 23.5 Agricultural Product (%) 100 33.9 39.3 26.8 Agriculture Product per lJorker Value in pesos 1970 prices 1,575 960 1,980 3,144 Growth in % per annum (1965-1970) 1.4 -5.1 3.0 7.0 24. While the unbalanced geographic population distribution constitutes the biggest obstacle to the sector's development, it is perpetuated by such factors as: the land tenure system; inadequate transportation facílities; the lack of technical and financial support for the sector and the high cost of colonization which precludes a large scale re-settlement in the face of limited availability of public financial resources. 25. The prevailing land tenure systein is an outgrowth of the Agrarian reform inaugurated in 1952. Its implementation proceeded slowly until 1967, but accelerated since then thanks to an improved titling program carried out with USAID teclinical and financial support. At the end of 1971, some 520,000 land titles were issued to about 80 percent of the famílies living from agri- culture. In the course of this process, a sweeping land redistribution took place, but it was largely confined to the Altiplano. The lowlands were bare- ly touched by the reform. The maximum size of holdings in the Llanos was set much larger than in the Altiplano and the many loopholes in the law fre- quently rendered control over size meaningless. Moreover, the low population density in the lowlands was not conducive to spontaneous land occupations, which were frequent in the Altiplano. As a result, most of the accessible land in the Llanos is occupied by large commercial farms, which is not only the cause of increasing discontent among peasants residing there, but also discourages any substantial migration of peasants from the Altiplano. 26. The high population density in the Altiplano resulted in the pro- lferation of small properties with limited possibility to absorb more ad- vanced techniques of land cultivation. While the agricultural surplus had - 12 - not been adversely affected by agrarian reform measures, 1/ there has been no notable increase in the marketable surplus. On the whole, income of the peasants increased as a result of the breakdown of the feudal system of land- holdings. While the merits of large-size farms in the Altiplano might have been exagrerated, 2/ some of the economic advantages of size could have been achieved through cooperative efforts in the use of capital and in marketing, which have not been fostered sufficiently. The lack of comprehensive assist- ance programs limited the productive capacity of most Altiplano smallholders to a very low level. 27. Tne effects of the Agrarian Reform on the lowlands reflected them- selves mainly, if not exclusively, in the colonization of new lands, while the latifundia/minifundia system was largely continued on the already cul- tivated land. The Bolivian authorities have attempted to induce migration to the Llanos, but not more than one-tenth of the rural population has chosen to settle in the new lands during the last two decades. Tne return rate nas been ihigh among spontaneous settlers, and it has been even higher among those who took advantage of official colonization schemes. One of the principal reasons for this faílure has been the disappointingly low income received by new settlers in the colonized areas. As settlers were left to clear land with their hand tools and the manpower of an average family was inadequate for clearing more than one hectare per annum, production on colonized lands could not have yielded much in terms of income during the early years. The high cost of transportation and large commercial margins accruing to market- ing intermediaries further contributed to depress the colonists' incomes. Finally, the shortage of credit and of technical assistance contributed to limit the product choice to a few and often nonprofitable línes of production. T;us, in the absence of any effective official prograrns, the desirable pattern of cash crops in the colonized areas did not materialize. 28. In retrospect, while land redistribution was largely limited to the ltighlands of the country, it had a considerable impact. llowever, lt was iiot followed up by other measures, usually associated with Agrarian Reform. Although official government objectíves for the sector were to achieve self- sufficiency in production of íniported agricultural products and to generate exportable surpluses through diversification of output, the authorities failed to apply a set of consistent measures conducive to reaching these goals. Little progress was made in increasing the supply of credit, or improving technical support to smallholders, which appear to have been important con- straínts to an increase in the productivity of traditíonal agriculture. 1/ See Melvin Burke "Land Reform and Its Effect upon Production and Produc- tivitv in the Lake Titicaca Region" in Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 1970, pp. 410-50. 2/ See Juan Felipe Scott "Comments" in Economic Development and Cultural Change July 1972, pp. 738. - 13 - 29. Three questions with regard to the Agrarian Reform in Bolivia deserve further investigation because of their importance and the present absence of information on which to base answers. The first question relates to the technology of land use. It is possible to improve yields in the Altiplano by upgrading the technology, given the small size of landholdings, or will a more advanced technology necessitate a changeover to a new pattern of landholding? The second question relates to the sociology of migration. The Bolivian authorities had little success in promoting migration from Alti- plano to the Llanos, but no clear sociological reasons have been given for this failure, e.g. the peasants' attachment to ancestoral land in the Alti- plano, the survival of strong cultural ties among Altiplano Indians; the dif- ferences between the techniques and crops of the Altiplano and the Llanos. Even the difference in climates between the two regions might have played a certain role, considering that centuries of living in atmospheric conditions of the high plateau conditioned physiological responses of the inhabitants which may be difficult to adjust to the climatic conditions in the Llanos. The third question relates to the economics of production and marketing. It is widely thought that inappropriate pricing policy, obsolete marketing techniques and inadequate credit facilities constitute an important impedí- ment to the improvement of agriculture. These factors are also frequently cited as obstacles to migration to the lowlands. Although all three points warrant additional study, the Mission addressed itself primarily to the third question and has reached some tentative conclusions which follow. 30. National pricing policy for agricultural products is haphazardly conceived and poorly implemented, because of the absence of any clear regional or commodity planning. There is no price support for maize production. Dif- terential support prices exist for rice, but again without information on the relative profitability of different varieties and without any careful evalua- tion of what the national obiectives for rice production should be. No price regulation prevaíls for cotton, even though the price received by farmers for tluis crop determines the pattern of land use in the Santa Cruz area and af- fects production of other nationally-important commnodities such as sugarcane, wheat and oilseeds. At the same time, consumer-oriented price controls on beef act as a major obstacle to the development of the livestock industry, which probably has the greatest long-term potential within Bolivian agricul- ture. Price increases of sugarcane were limited to 2 percent per annum or much lower than the wages of labor employed on sugarcane plantations or the prices of imported fertilizers. This ceiling on sugar prices combined with high export prices for cotton led to cotton preempting the land formerly used for sugacane and discouraged sugarcane production. Finally, while producer prices for wheat are supported, the differentiation between prices of the high yielding Mexican wheat and the local criollo wheat is not sufficient to stimulate growing of the former at the expense of the latter. While the Mexican wheat is priced some 37 percent above criollo wheat and its yields under proper conditions are as much as 80 percent above that of criollo wheat, the net income from cultivation of Mexican wheat is lower than that from criollo wheat. - 14 - 31. rhe Droduction and marketing of agricultural produce, particularly on the Altiplano and in the valleys, is still greatly influenced by conditions that prevaíled to the Agrarian Reform of 1952. For centuries prior to the Reform, virtually the entire farm surplus was acquired by the estate-owners. The peasants had no produce above subsistence requiremaents and lived almost exclusively outside the market economy. Farming on the Altiplano and in the valleys is still primarily carried on for home consumption and only inciden- tally produces a marketable surplus, although with the virtual abolition of payment of rents in cash, kind or labor services, the peasants' income hias increased. Organization of the market for agricultural products is still very deficient. Wheat marketing is semií-organized, but farmers are too dependent on the millers. The corn market is chaotic and benefits mostly the interme- diaries. Storage capacity for all grains and for potatoes is woefully inade- quate. There is also a need for more encouragement for the establishment of small-scale processing industries, as most agricultural produce is sold to consumers in unprocessed or slightly processed forn as in the case of líve- stock. 32. Credit avaílability, except for cattle falls far short of what is required to encourage production and raise peasant incomes. The credit pro- gram of the Banco Agricola de Bolivia (BAB), by far the largest institutional source of credit to agriculture, has grown quite rapidly but remains generally ineffective outside the field of livestock. Several of its commodity-oriented programs have been unsuccessful. The Banco Agricola is now concentrating its efforts in the lowlands and on livestock projects. More than half of its out- standing loans in mid-1971 were in the Santa Cruz and Beni areas, and since 1969, more than two-thirds of the field staff have been assigned to the Santa Cruz and Beni offices. Of new loans made in 1969, amounting to $b73.5 mil- lion, 43 percent went to 337 individual entrepreneurs, for an average of $b94,300 per loan. In addition, nine loans representing another 17 percent of the total amount lent were inade to "societies" which lncluded only 71 pro- ducers, i.e. an average of over $b162,000 per producer. Although less than $b1 million was lent to individual small farimers, for an average of $b6,300 per loan, almost two-fifths of the lending was to "cooperatives", "groups" and "associations" including a total of about 20,400 producers with the average loan of about $b2,200 per producer. 33. The Bank Group has plaved an ímportant role in financing agricul- tural credit in the livestock field. Three projects were financed, beginning with FY1967. The projects were designed to assist Bolivia's livestock pro- gram by financing on-ranch developmen( ín areas of underutilized natural grass- lands and to provide technical services. The first two projects were limited to Beni Department, but the third project also finances sheep development in the Altiplano and provides for employment of consultants to prepare a meat marketing study with a view of financing slaughterhouse and cold storage facilities. All the projects have been administered by BAB through a special Livestock Project, and had on the whole been satisfactory. An emerging major problem, however, is the deteríoration of the BAB's financial position due - 15 - to loans outside the IDA projects. A proposal has been made to split BAB into two institutions -- one to deal with the larger commercial loans and the other with smaller and more risky loarns operations. 34. The structural and poiicy constraints affecting tne sector have re- flected themselves in the production trends of the principal three commodity groups produced in the country -- traditional food staples, import-competing goods and high export-potential products. The first group ís composed of the main food staples of the Altiplano (potatoes and other tubers, barley, high- protein quinoa and mutton) and tbe principal crops of the temperate highlands and the Valles (dent corn, vegetables and fruits). Output of most traditional Altiplano crops has kept pace with growth in demand in the last decade. Pota- to production, which accounts for over one-third of the country's agricultural output, has increased at an average ra,e of 5 percent per annum in the last ten years, and wqhile shortages of flint cora for animal feed have developed, output of corn for human consumption has been adequate to meet domestic de- mand. Output growth in the Altiplano, however, appears to have resulted from additional labor inputs rather than from increased area under cultivation or improved techniques. Thus, agricultural incomes remain very low and the prob- lems of rural underemployment and poverty in the Altiplano persist. 35. The second group of agricultural goods is composed of wheat, flour, edíble fats, oils and milk, where possibilities for replacement of imports are considerable. The annual impor? sralue of these products amounts to US$27 million, wlth imports of wheat representing two-thirds of the total. In the last decade domestic production of wheat increased by 5.2 percent per vear thanks to a USAID-backed development program and the setting of domestic support Drices well above world prices. Mlile the program was successful in raising yields -- from 0.5 tons to 0.8 tons per hectare - land productivity remaíns well below the level reachied ½n other countries with similar ecolog- ical conditions. Low yields result. 'rom the fact that most wheat is grown in snal.l plots and with primitive production teclhniques. Farmers do not use improved seed and fertilizer, largely because of lnsufficient avaílability of credit and extension services. Despíte the productioni increase, imports -- mostlv of wheat flour - iave nearly loublcd in value from 1961, and in 1971 reached about 120,000 tons compared with only 65,000 thousand tons of domestic production. Another product offering good opportunities for import substitu- tion is milc. Despite the low average per capita milk consumption -- 5 lítres per year -- the country's annual milk import bill amounts to US$3 million. Bolivia has only about 16,000 milking cows, mostly in the Cochabamba area, each producíng an average of only 1,700 litres per year. Given the scarcity of land in Cochabamba, efforts should be concentrated on expanding milk sup- ply in Santa Cruz, the Altiplano and in the new colonization areas. Under the current investment program, the CBF milk plant in Cochabamba is being expanded, and a reconstituting plant near La Paz is about to be completed. 36. The third group of agricultural products, those with an important export potential, includes cattle and cotton. Despite Bolivia's vast plains and piedmont areas appropriate for cattle raising and fattening, the country's - 16 - cattle stock barely amounts to 0.5 heads per person. While domestic per capi- ta consumptíon of beef is very low (8 kilograms per annum), official (legal) exports of beef before 1971 were negligible. The principal obstacles to the development of the cattle industry are the lack of roads and/or air transport; few, inefficient and unsanitary slaughter facilities; poor animal health and ranch advisory services; lack of quality grading for either cattle or retail meat; and restrictive price and export policies designed to minimize consumer prices in the urban areas to the detriment of the long-term growth prospects of the industry. 37. The Dresent beef transport and marketing infrastructure is in need of reform. The most serious physical constraint on cattle development is the isolation of the Beni, and the difficulty of the access terrain. There are no all-weather roads out of the Beni, either to La Paz or to the potential fattening areas and it is cheaper to fly cattle out than to drive herd over- land. Even so, air transport of carcasses to La Paz at present costs $b1.20 per kg -- more than one-fourth of the price paid to ranchers. One possible solutíon would be the construction of more and better slaughter and cooling facilitíes in the cattle raising areas, coupled with expansion and moderniza- tion of the air transport equipment. In spite of these shortcomings, the Beni is reputed to have great potential for breeding and fattening operations if Lhe obstacle can be overcome. A careful analysis is needed of alternative means of easing the transportation bottlenecks and of providing adequate in- centives for the long-term growth of livestock in the regíon. 38. Tiie scarcity of budgetary funds allocated to agriculture has severe- ly restricted operations of the animal health service. The government veteri- narians in the Beni region -- the country's principal cattle area -- have lit- tle equipnent and no travel funds to make ranch visits. Work in an important diagnostic laboratory in the area has stopped. The UNDP-supported, FAO-man- aged animal health project was cancelled by FAO in early 1972 because of lack of Government support. 39. The importance of cotton as an export commodity is likely to con- tinue outweighing meat in the near future. Cotton became a major commodity in the Santa Cruz area in 1970/71, as a result of a 47 percent rise in export prices. Output reacted strongly in 1971 and reached 12,000 tons of lint. Almost two-thirds of the year's production was exported with a value of US$6 million. In 1972, cotton production is expected to be 31,000 tons and export earnings, mostly from shipments to Japan and the U.K., should approx- imate US$20 million. 40. Cotton is rainfed and has so far been grown mostly on land which had been previously in sugarcane, although some pasture was plowed up and some secondary forest cleared for the 1971/72 crop. Although no fertilizer was used in cane production and none is used in cotton, the average yield of cotton of 690 kg per hectare is equal co, or higher than, the yields in most of the world's leading producers. Insect attacks have so far not been sufficíently serious to require more than six crop dustings per growing - 17 - season. Weed control and picking are done by hand. The permanent work force available for cotton is about 10,000 as of 1972, but a need for 40,000 migrant pickers for three months is foreseen for the 1972 crop, cost- ing growers the equivalent of about US$1.25 per cotton picker per day or US$82.50 per ton of lint. 41. Despite the immediate boom, the outlook for cotton growing in Santa Cruz is uncertain. On the demand side, a price reversal appears imminent. Current world price levels are the result of a combination of a U.S. acreage cut back, low yields in the U.S. and other principal producing countries in 1971, and a consequent reduction of world stocks. As supplies come back to "normal", most likely in the 1972/73 consumption year, world cotton prices are expected to drop to around 30 cents per pound; by 1975 they may well be back down to 25 cents with corresponding repercussions on the price of hand- picked Bolivian cotton. While the 1972/73 drop may come too late to affect planting intentions of Bolivian growers -- who may double the area again in 1972/73 -- it would affect their income and the country's foreign exchange earnings. At an export level of 25,000 tons, a one-cent per pound price decline entails a half million dollar drop in export earnings to Bolivia. 42. In the face of the prospects of lower prices, production costs may be expected to rise. Insect damage is likely to grow and increase the cost of dusting considerably; wind erosion is threatening to remove the thin mantle of topsoil; rainfall appears to be somewhat low for permanent cotton cultivation -- although introduction of rotations with wheat and soybeans may change the picture somewhat. On balance, rainfed cotton may become an increasingly risky proposition. If production costs increase by only 10 per- cent, prices received by Santa Cruz growers drop to the equivalent of 27 cents per pound, the return on direct costs would fall to 20 percent. It is not certain that this level of profitability would be sufficient to maintain the present area of cotton production. 1/ 43. A remarkablc aspect of tlbe cotton boom is tlhat it has taken place with little help or influence from government lnstitutíons, except for Banco Agricola participation In financing and financial planning. Planting and marketing coordination is provided by tlie growers' association, which pur- chases, ships and distributes the seed (from the U.S.). The association also engages an American entomologist to make an annual survey of the insect sit- uation. Neither the official experiment stations nor the extension service have had any part in the program. The government has limited itself to promulgating in 1972 an ex post facto decree drafted by the association, making membership compulsory and establishing rules and regulations for quality, plant sanitation, and marketing. The decree also obliges growers to establish windbreaks and the Ministry of Agriculture to make regular erosion inspections. On the other hand, the government is not sharing in 1/ At recent prices, growers should net up to 80 percent on direct costs. This is equivalent to US$70 per acre, which is comparable to average net returns in the U.S., including government payments, in 1966/67. - 18 - the financial benefits of the cotton exports except to the extent that income taxes are collected from the indivídual growers. Yet, some of the emerging problens lie clearly in the public domain. There is a need for a controlled investicgation of the feasibilitv of introducing irrigation, 1/ and for ex- nerimentation with alternative crop rotations. Thle suitability for cotton of riore northerly areas with higher rainfall, such as the San Julían coloni- zation reserve, also needs to be explored, both technically and frorm the point of view of allowing more peasant farmners to enga-e in production of this cash crop. The government should also concern itself with the growing social problems of the migrant workers who move to the Santa Cruz at cotton picking time. `rUning 44. 3olivia's economy is heavily dependent on the mining sector and it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Although the share of the mining sector in GDP fell from 16 percent in the early fifties to 11 per- cent in the early seventies, the decline of mineral exports in total exports was quite modest -- frorm 95 to 90 percent. While the miners constitute only 3 percent of the labor force, they are well organized and are considered one of the most powerful political forces in the country. 45. The tnining sector consists of three subsectors: large, medium and small. The large mining sector accounts for 50 percent of total mineral out- put and ís represented by the Corporacion Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL). The rmedium mining sector, accounts for some 25 to 30 percent of total mineral out- put and comprises twenty-two private companies. The small mining sector, with about 20 to 25 percent of total mineral output, consists of units ranging from one-man operations to medium-size cooperatives which generally work with prim- itive tools; their productivity is low and their returns are meager. Over 100,000 Bolivians depend on small mining for their livelihood and there is practically no other immediate alternative for most of them. The main ob- stacles confronted by the mining sector as a whole in recent years have been insufficient exploration, lack of adequate credit to the sector and a climate of political uncertainty. 46. While Bolivia's mineral resources are reputedly substantial, lack of exploration has been a significant factor in hampering output growth of the mining sector. Only one-quarter of the country's territory has been mapped geologically and less than 5 percent has been systematically explored. As a result, no significant new discoveries of minerals have been made during the last two decades despite surface indications of potentially workable ore 1/ Utah State University estimates cotton yields with irrigation but with- out fertilizer at one tone of lint per hectare, and a net return over costs of $b3,668 per hectare at present prices; with fertilizer and irrigatíon, the return would rise to more than $b6,000 per hectare. - 19 - bodies. Even exploration of reserves in existing mines have been neglected wjth unfavorable repercussions on production, output growth has also been hindered by the lack of adequate credit for exploration, investment and work- ing capital. Scarcity of credit has been felt mainly by the small mines and, to a lesser extent, by the medium-sized private mines. Finally, political uncertainty has been an important factor restricting investment in the medium- size mines. Medium-size companies, although small by international standards have been living in fear of becoming too large and attracting criticism and ultimately, nationalization. This factor has restricted investment in domes- tically-owned medium-size mines and has limited foreign investment in the sector. Table 6: MINERAL RESOURCES AND THEIR EXPLOITATION (1970) RESOURCES/1 EXPLOITATION (in thousand metric tons of metal content) Proven Probable Total Production - 1970/2 Growth 1959-70 Annual (Indicated) (In thousand (In US$ (% p.a.) exploi- tons) million) tation of total resources (%) Tin 473 526 999 28 102 1.3 2.8 Copper 80 94 174 9 12 13.5 5.1 A¡ntimony 86 65 151 12 31 7.0 7.9 Tungsten 17 24 41 2 18 5.0 4.9 Lead 64 31 95 26 8 1.5 27.4 Zinc 928 170 1,098 47 14 2.9 4.3 Silver 0.6 - 0.6 0.2 10 2.6 33.3 Bismuth 8 5 13 0.6 8 9.9 4.6 /1 Minerals with low metal content were excluded. /2 Based on export figures. - 20 - 47. COMIBOL's (the state mining enterprise) performance in mine devel- opment has been very poor. Since the formation of the company, no new mines have been brought into operation. Over the last five years, the company's gross savings amounted to less than 6 percent of sales and its total invest- ment expenditures - about $b44 million - have been well below depreciation and depletion allowances. At the prevailing exchange rate COMIBOL's tin mining operations were unprofitable, with production costs greatly exceeding the US$1.75 - 1.85 per pound which it obtains. Most of COMIBOLts mines are decapitalized and operating at a very low level of reserves. As a result, the company is facing increasing costs in most of its operations, as mines become progressively deéper and the oLe grades mined deteriorate. 48. The medium mining sector's growth performance has been more satis- factory. Its share in production of príncipal metals has been growing rapid- ly and it has succeeded in maintaining labor productivity at a level of some 70 percent above that of COMIBOL. Investment by the medium-size mines in existing and new mines amounted to about $b87 million annually (ten times that of COTIBOL) during 1965-69, but because of an unfavorable political climate, ceased during 1970-71. The principal constraint to growth of medium-size mines in future years may come from inadequate credit availabil- lty, considering that difficulties in raising capital have been considerable even when relatively small amounts were required in the past few years. While the principal supplier of credit to the sector - the Corporacion Bol- iviana de Fomento (CBF) - has built up some expertise in mining finance it has tended to neglect this aspect of its operations. It, therefore, appears doubtful that the CBF could provide the finance needed for the expansion pro- grams envisaged for these mines. 49. The small mines lead a day-to-day existence and although they con- tribute as much as US$40 million to exports, it is difficult to assess their development plans. The sector employs about 20 to 25 thousand workers, and despite its primitive methods, productivity per worker has approached that of COMlBOL. Credit availabilíty is a dletermíning factor in the operations of the smnall mining sector. The sole institution lending to small mines ls the Banco bMinero de Bolivia (BAMIN), but it has not succeeded in raising significant resources to complement its capital funds. Because of diaruptive political interference, the combination of marketing and banking activities, inadequate lending policies, ineffective recovery procedures and ínefficient administration BAMIN has proved to be unsuccessful as a banking institution, leaving the small mines in a difficult financial position. 50. A Bank mission recently carried out a comprehensive study 1/ of Bolivia's mining sector and its findings are currently being reviewed by the principal external lending agencies with the view of assisting in the imple- mentation of an overall rehabilitation program. The study considers that, 1/ The Mining and Metallurgical Sector of Bolivia, Vol. II p. 43. Report No. PI-14. - 21 - as a first step towards this goal, implementation of an adequate exploration program is absolutely essential. The intensification of efforts to find and exploit more economic tin deposits to replace existing high-cost operations and to diversify into other metallic and non-metallic minerals is a pressing priority. This entails initiation of a vigorous and concerted effort to com- pensate for past neglect of investment in geological mapping, exploration and mineral reserve evaluation. To carry out these tasks it proposes creation of a government-supported Exploration Fund. This Fund would provide finance on a project-by-project basis to induce and underpin much-needed exploration Ftivity. 51. Exploration expenditures of the order of US$13.5 million over the period 1972-76 are considered as the minimum needed to achieve the targeted output growth of the mining sector. To supplement this financing program, international mining companies (either independently or in the form of joint ventures with Bolivian private and public entities) would have to supply the technology and some of the funds. Exploration assistance to the small mining sector should start with a nationwide survey of the 5,000 small mines to allow a classification into three categories: probably viable, possibly viable and nonviable. It is estimated that the cost of such a survey, which will take 2-3 years, would be about US$2.5-3 million and that the UNDP could assist in carrying it out. The small miners whose operations are classified as probably or possibly viable could seek assistance from the proposed Exploration Fund to prove their reserves. 52. The key to the rehabilitation of the large mining sector lies in the implementation of far-reaching reforms which would permit COMIBOL to operate without undue political and union interference. Changes in the organ- ization and management structure of COMIBOL are also necessary. Decentrali- zation and increased autonomy for individual mine managers would help substan- tially to improve operations; it would also contribute to establishing better financial control on the basis of cost-efficiency procedures. While imple- menting COMIBOL's rehabilitation, new exploration and development projects should be opened to private participation. This could take the form of joint ventures, management contracts, or long-term purchase contracts with foreign groups providing initial financial, technical and management assistance. The key ingredient for the success of these agreements, whatever their form, is to maintain a climate of confidence in the continuity of government policy. 53. The Bank report also recommends the introduction of reforms in the country's credit institutions and the initiation of adequate credit programs with external financial support. Considerable innovation in lending practices is required if the small miners are to derive full benefit from future credit programs. The simplification and speeding up of lending procedures and the improvement of access to credit outlets are important pre-requisites for successful programs. In addition it is considered imperative to ensure adequate technical assistance at the mine level to help identify the specific improvements required and possible, and thereafter to guide and support the miners efforts in utilizing the funds appropriately. The leasing of machinery has been suggested as one simple device for providing equipment such as pneumatic drills and pumps to miners who may be reluctant to enter into commitments spanning 2, 3 or 4 years or incapable of providing the collateral for borrowing the funds. - 22 - 54. The reorganization of the Banco MIinero is an urgent necessity. As a marketing organization, its operating costs are high and the private mine operators are dissatisfied both with the services which it provides and the service charges. More than 90 percent of BAMIN's loan portfolio is either in default or has had to be rescheduled in recent years despite relatively high metal prices. I'hile BAMIN's disappointing performance largely arises from considerable shortcomings in management and organization, it has been partly due to the difficulties involved in appraising and policing the large number of small credita which the institution provides. The proposed nationwide survey of small mines (paragraph 51 above) would greatly enhance the probabilities of success in any future reorganization of BAMIN. Manufacturing 55. Mlanufacturing in Bolivia is at an early stage of development. It contributes some 12 percent to GDP and employs about 170,000 workers, or 7 percent of the labor force. Value added per industrial worker amounts to only US$530 per annum and is lower than in any other sector except agricul- ture. Low productivity appears to be due to the high proportion of the sec- tor's labor force employed in handicrafts (about four-fifths of the total) and to the obsolescence of most of industrial equipment. Production of the food, beverages and tobacco subsector contributes some 40 percent of total manufacturing output, while textiles, clothing and footwear contribute an additional 20 percent. 56. The dominant characteristic of the growth of manufactures has been the concentration on production for import substitution with a high proportion of imported inputs. Imports of intermediate goods for industry represented nearly one-half of the value of industrial output in 1971 while exports of industrial products have been negligible. The adoption of this strategy has resulted in a disappointing growth performance -- 3 percent annually during 1965-71. The domestic market for manufactures is limited due to the low level of urbanization and tlhe skewcd incomie distribution in tlhe country. Eiffective dleniiand for industrial produtcts (otlier than petroleum by-products) ¿niounts to about US$150 million per anurum. Domnestic industry satisfies about 60 percent of the demand while tlhe balance is met, probably in equal parts, by contraband and by registered imports of consumer goods. 57. Opportunities to strengthen and develop the manufacturing sector have to be carefully assessed. Four possible approaches to industrialization are open to Bolivia: (a) the replacement of goods, smuggled into the country by domestic production; (b) diversification of production so as to replace a part of registered imports; (c) creatií-í of new demand for manufactures in rural areas; (d) production for export. - 23 - 58r Competition against contrabard could be undertaken by making contra- band trade a much riskier undertaking than it is at present. The lucrative character of contraband trade appears to be based on exchange rate dífferen- tials rather than on evasion of customs duties. Smuggled goods are reputed <.o be purchased with dollars bought in Bolivia at a very small premium above the official rate and sold in neighboring countries at parallel or blackmarket exchange rates. Since the exchange rates on these markets in several adjoin- ing countries have greatly outpaced increases in domestic prices of consumer goods, the profits derived from this operation are most lucrative. 590 Import substitution offers 1limited possibilities for Bolivian in- dustry because of the narrowly circuimscribed domestic market. Nevertheless, such import substitution could comprise household goods, produced from im- ported plastics or metals, textile apparel and furniture made of local wood. While quantitative restrictions and quotas on imports are now negligible, import duties on consumer goods are substantial -- around 50-60 percent ad valorem. This nominal protection level. while not excessive, could offer enough of an incentive to stimulate domestic production were it not offset by hígh tariffs -- 33 to 40 percent on the average - for intermediate and capital goods. The Mínistry of Finance is in the process of reviewing the operation of the ertire tariff system. 60. Creation of an expanded market for manufactures in rural areas, offers probably the most promising new outlet for the manufacturing sector. It would require, however, an improvement in Lransportation and in marketing. Experience of other countries shows that when products are brought nearer to the potential consumer, the demand for manufactures by the low-íncome rural population can be strongly stlmulated. To generate the requisite purchasing power, production of more cash crops by the peasants through the use of more intensive methods of land cultívation becomes necessary. To activate the procese, however, the Government might stimulate the merchants' interest in expanding theír network !n tlhe rural areas by fiscal or credit incentives. Industrialization through this device could also contribute more to creatíng employment opportunities in depressed areas than other way of fostering in- dustry. There is also ample room for improved regional dispersion of small scale industries considering that their existing network per unit of popu- lation is more than six times larger in urbanized localities than in rural areas. - 24 - Table 7: SIALL-SCALE E12LOrYMENT IN URBAN AND RURAL DEPARTIENTS - 1970 (in %) Population Employment Crafts and Large small scale Construction scale Total industry industry Urbanized Depart- ments (La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba Oruro) 64.1 91.8 72.2 88.0 87.1 Rural Departments (Potosi, Chuquisaca, Tarija, Beni, Pando) 35.9 8.2 27.8 12.0 12.9 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 61. Another, more fruitful approach to Bolivian industrialization would be the development of a broad and diversified manufacturing sector, serving primarily the export market and based on the transformation of Bolivia's natural resources. Some interesting possibilities exist in the agricultural fíeld where Bolivia's supply of the inexpensive indigenous inputs for wood products, processed foods and textiles, have awaken interest in Argentina and Brazil to increase cooperation between the incipient industries of Santa Cruz and Tarija in Bolivia, with those of Jujuy-Tucuman in Argentina and Sao Paulo - Minas Gerais in Brazil. The intensification of this cooperation would greatly benefit Bolivia, since it is an area in which entrepreneurship, if not abundant, is at least clearly present, and where linkages between industry and agriculture would become stronger and not weaker as in many industrializing countries. 62. Prospects for regional cooperation with Argentina and Brazil have been further strengthened by the readiness of these countries to extend credits to Bolivian entrepreneurs, which has been demonstrated in recent months by the rapid response of the Sao Paulo banking system to the credit requirements of the Santa Cruz cotton planters. While agriculture seems to offer interesting possibilities, the greatest opportunities for the industrialization of Bolivia seem to be, however, on its mining resources. There are prospects of supplying the Argentine steel industry with sponge iron and pellets produced from the iron-ore deposits of Mutun. If these prospects materialize, Bolivia could develop a small but economic steel industry, based on electric furnaces, which - 25 - could supply the country's annual requirements of about 100 thousand tons of steel. This would in turn permit numerous forward linkages and allow domestic production of simple hand tools, which are currently imported, as well as production of more sophisticated products such as castings and forgings for rigs, pumps, compressors etc. Bolivia may also have the only large magnesite deposit in Latin America near Cochabamba; exploration is still needed to establish reserves, but if operations prove to be feasible, an industry producing magnesite, granulated refractories and brcks could export up to US$5 million per year to South America alone. Another opportunity seems to exist in developing a tungsten industry which would upgrade the mineral to ttngsten powder and ultimately, tungsten carbide and wire for export. 63, Another approach to Bolivian industrialization is through the export of a few selected goods to the Andean market. Opportunities in this area are now being actively investigated by foreign consultants, retained by the Bolivian authorities. Production for export of internal combustion engines, tractors, machine tools, flat glass, and titanium dioxide is being seriously considered. While possibilities for founding these production lines may exist, it is doubtful whether private entrepreneurs would choose to undertake these ventures rather than the more promising projects in agriculture or mining. Neither does it seem advisable for the Government to enter these línes of production for a number of compelling reasons, not the least of which is its lack of experienced managers to run industrial plants. The only remaining alternative would be to attract foreign private capital to these ventures. The new Investment Code of Bolivia offers rather strong incentives in this direction, but the Andean Investment Code, which foresees a gradual restriction of foreign ownership, may exercise a repelling influence. llectric Power 64. The generations of electricity largely depends on hydroelectric plants which supply about four-fifths of the 832 Gwh generated in the coun- try; the remainder comes from thermal plants. The main suppliers of elec- tricity are Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, S. A. (ENDE), Bolivian Power Company Limíted (BPC) and Corporacion Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), which together supply the overwhelming bulk of all electric power in the country. 65. During the last decade, electricity generation in Bolivia grew at 6.5 percent annually, exceeding by one-fourth the rate of GDP growth. This high growth performance was due to large investments in the sector, which averaged US$11 million per annum in 1965-71. Despite of the considerable investment effort, average annual per capita consumption of electricity re- mains very low at 152 kWh, although not inordinately so in relation to income. More than two-thirds of the Bolivian population have no access to electricity, mainly because of low income and dispersion over a vast territory. 66. The sector is supervised by the Direccion Nacional de Electricidad (DINE), which administers the 1968 Electricity Code and regulates electricity rates. According to the Code, tariffs must allow a 9 percent rate of return on investment. Actual rates of return in La Paz have been allowed to sink to much lower levels. Early this year, the Government took steps to enforce the Code by raising electricity rates in La Paz by 38 percent and 50 percent in Oruro. The increase also contributed to diminish the price differential between large and small consumers and to reduce the gap between electricity - 26 - tariffs in La Paz and tariffs in other parts of the country; before the in- crease rates in La Paz were only one-third of those in Cochabamba. The cost of power generation in isolated areas is up to five times that in the prin- cipal cities, but even in the large centers the load factor is low because little electricity is used for round-the-clock industrial purposes. 67. The Bolivian power sector has to face up to a number of important issues. The first is the selection of energy sources for future development. Although some progress has been made in identifying the hydroelectric reserves of the country, the use of this potential has not been fully investigated. In the long run, natural gas (which could be supplied at some USJ20 per 1000 f3) should be seriously considered as an alternative source to produce electric energy. Whíle Bolivia's hydroelectric resources are abundant, their harness- ing may be less economically justified than would be the case in a country with larger concentrations of consumption and a more accessible countryside. At the present level of consumption and given the lack of any interconnect- ing systemn, lumpy investments in hydroelectric plants may prove to be less justified than generation of electricity based on fossil fuels. This appears to have been recognized in the case of ENDE's new Sucre plant, built with IDB financing, which will use natural gas from the nearby Monteagudo field. 68. Another important issue facing the electric power sector is that of embarking on an area of progressive interconnections of existing generating centers, with the view of laying a foundation for a future national grid. For this purpose DINE recently passed a resolution obligating ENDE and BPC to interconnect their systems. Thus, an interconnection between La Paz, where hydroelectric plants have small storage facilities and the Cochabamba/Oruro area, with its ample storage, age, would increase the use of the water now being wasted in the La Paz area. Preliminary studies for this interconnection liave been completed and the engineering studies will be ready by the end of the year. This project will bring substantial economies by postponing the need to build further generating capacity and will improve the load factor because the present excessive reserve capacity would be reduced without jeopardizing the reliability of the system. Finally, the important but more distant issue of rural electrification will require attention. To bring electricity, along with vocational education to the deprived peasantry, which constitutes two-thirds of the population, would be a very significant step in the direction of improving its economic and social conditions. Hydrocarbons 69. Bolivia's output and exports of hydrocarbons grew rapidly after 1966. Production is currently at a rate of roughly 18 million oarrels per annum. Three quarters of this product - is exported and the remainder ís refined for domestic consumption in seven refineries operating at about 50 percent of capacity. The entire annual production of natural gas of some 55 billion cubic feet is exported to Argentina. Exports of gas started in the spring of 1972 with the completion of the Santa Cruz-Yacuiba gas pipeline and have already reached a level of US$12-14 million per annum. The main ob- stacle to further increases in exports of petroleum lies in the low level of proven reserves and the consequent urgent need for exploration. Proven re- serves of crude are estimated at 181 million barrels or roughly 10 years' production at current rates and of natural gas at 2.6 trillion cubic feet, roughly equivalent to fifty years' output at prevailing production levels. - 27 - 70. Only a little over one-half of the Bolivian territory has been prospected for petroleum. There appears to exist a high likelihood of petro- leum deposits in the Altiplano, in the Chaco-Beni Zone and in the Santander belt. It is estimated that petroleum reserves in these regions may attain a level approximating 630 million barrels and thus more than treble currently proven reserves. While the volume of exploratorv drilling has not increased since 1963, prospects for the industry have brightened with the promulgation of the hydrocarbons law in 'Iarch 1972. The law opens the doors to foreign investment in the form of "operations contracts" and joint ventures and is likely to succeed in supplementing the newi drilling activity of the state enterprise YPFB. Through expenditures of approximately US$67 million during the next five years, YPFB hopes to increase its petroleum reserves to some 220 million barrels, or by 39 inillion above current proven reserves. Another 46 million barrels of reserves rnight be a¿.led by means of `operations con- tracts` with private companies, thus increasing total reserves to 266 million barrels or by 50 percent over presenLt reserves. These reserve increases would take place atter allowance is rmade for t'le extraction of 90 million barrels in the interim. 71. The official plans to establish a local petrochemical industry need careful investiíation. Thle success of such a venture is predicated on the size of the market, which permits (1) attainrnent of economies of scale; (ii) sales of surpluses of principal products abroad, often at marginal cost prices; and (iii) establishinent of a broad spectrum of domestic demand to justify production of rnost hydrocarbon derivatives within one petrochem- ical complex. Bolivia cannot easily satisfy these conditions and unless outlets are guaranteed by tlie Andean Pact Countries within the context of the Cartagena Treaty it may be advisable to c'nannel the country's scarce investntent resources into less capital intensive sectors. Transportation 72. Thlc lack of adequate transport facilIties is one of the principal obstacles to Bolivia's development. It prevents the use of potentially boun- tiful areas, tlie integration of the economy, the creation of a truly national inarket, and reduces the foreign exchnange earning capacity of the country by díminishing the volume and variety of exportable products. The principal impediment to the development of the sector lias been the paucity of financial resources. Investrnent and maintenance of existing facilities has been hin- dered by lack of Central Government funds, which are used not only for the construction of highways 'but also for meeting the large deficits of the state railways and of the only scheduled airline ín the country. 73. Besides serving only a fraction of Bolivia's territory, the rail, road and air transport systems provide poor quality and high cost services. The railways consist of two disconnected systems. Tnie western System (2,302 ;ms) was built in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in response to the needs of the mining industry. The eastern system was built in the early 1960's to connect the Santa Cruz area with Brazil and Argentina. Bolivia's highway network is limited because of scarcity of funds, high construction - 28 - costs and low traffic densities. There are now in Bolivia some 4,000 km of main roads, 2,600 kr'. of secondary roads and 12,000 ;m of local roads. Only 773 1cm are oaved, and there are practically no híghways in the northern part of thie Beni and the eastern portion of Santa Cruz Province. Alr transport services are Drovided by one scheduled aírline, 7 unscheduled lines, 31 taxi operators and the logistics arnm of the Bolivian Air Force. Lloyd Aereo Bol- iviano, tlhe only scheduled airline, covers most of the territory while non- scheduled operators serve routes linking the Altiplano to isolated points in tle lo.,lands. River transport seems to offer some interesting possibilities 'or future developnent but is being underutilized mainly because of lack of connections with other transport modes and scarcity of funds to finance the required hydrographic studies. 74. TÁe railways provide six of the ei-ht principal export routes in the country and carry practically all exports. The western system links the Altiplano with the Pacific ports of Mollendo-Matarani, Aríca and Antofagasta, and with the port of Buenos Aires in Argentina. The Eastern system links Santa Cruz with Santos (Brazil) and Buenos Aires. Although as yet undevel- oped, the Paraguay river system may be used to transport goods to Paraguay and Argentina, while the Bolivian rivers of the Amazon Basin may link the country with Barzil. No major highway routes are available to exporters. 75. The need for efficient, rapid and relatively inexpensive transport is narticularly important for products, in which Bolivia has a good but yet unused export potential. Wood products are a case in point. The present ex-factcry price of mahogany in Southeast Asia is approxirmately US$150 per tlhousand board feet which at the internal and external transport cost of approximately US$50, sells CIF United States at about $200. While Bolivian ex-factory price could be as low as US$115 per thousand board feet, at the 'iigh transport cost of US$185, of which three-fifths accounts for internal t ransport, the CIF sales i.rice of US$300 nuts tlie 130oivian mahogany out of tlbe export competition. Low cost efficeint transport is also vital to the rxpnorts .f nion-ferrous nmetals, wl1ic1i arí llOW stil>ject to xiil'h rates and low quallitv service in compartson with otiler mineral exportílng nations. Finally, t'xport of tgricultural products is llable to be exposed to extensive pilfer- age and frequent delays -- it sometimes takes longer for goods to reach by rail a lacific port than to get from thiis port by steamer to the United States or to Europe. IWith interest rates around 20 percent such delays create serious financial problems for the exporter to say nothing of the inconvenience and uncertainties which must be tolerated by the importer. 76. Except for two small branch línes, the railway system in Bolivia is managed by the National Railway Enterprises (ENFE). ENFE came into being in 1964, and has since its creation suffered from managerial, financial and technical problems which have been aggravated by the paucity of investment. Appraisals by the French consulting firm SOFRERAIL and by the Bank Group staff indicate that ENFE is beset by virtually all sorts of difficulties: poor op- erations; badly maintained and over-aged equipment; lack of experienced man- agement and low standard of staff training; inadequate level and structure of - 29 - tariffs; low traffic density leading to uneconomic lines and services; and excess staff. These adverse conditions resulted in a difficult financial situation, whicn has been further aggravated by the insufficiency of Govern- ment financial suDport. As a consequence, the railways' capabilities to miove export and import traffic liave been continuously diminishing. 77. To modernize the Bolivian Railways so that they can adequately ful- fill their role in the economy, SOFRERAIL prepared a Five-year Rehabilitation and Investment Plan (1972-76), adopted by both the Government and ENFE. The 'ian, estinated to cost about US$36 millíon with a foreign exchange component of U'S$28 million, consists of a time-phased action program covering track re- habilitation and the modernization of rolling stock, as well as the design and implementation of rational commercial planning and financial and account- ing policies. The first stage of this plan is expected to be initiated in 1973. To assist its financing, the Bolivian Government solicited Bank Group help. An IDA credit of US$8 million equivalent, now in preparation, would cover the international procurement content of all equipment and works (US$7 million) and provide almost US$1 million toward the local currency costs of essential track materials. To complete the financing of the project, US$2 million equivalent would be required from the Bolivian Government and US$1 million from the UNDP. 78. Highway transport accounts for 60 Dercent of the internal movement of goods but only for a negligible part of thie movement of exports. The Uighest traffic roads línk Santa Cruz and Cochabamba (400,000 tons per annum); La Paz and Guaqui (350,000 tons); La Paz and the Yungas (220,000 tons); and La Paz and Cochabamba (85,000 tons). Only primary roads such as these are r-aintained in reasonable condition and open to traffic all year round. 79. Because of low traffic densities on most routes no problems of con- o,estion exist but there appears to be an excess of truck capacity due to the Government's liberal irmport polícy for Diesel trucks. Trucking rates vary in the country according to the degree of monopoly-power on different routes. Tariffs are low on the Coclhabamba-Oruro route, where railways and highways are in dírect competition and higlh in areas where no alternative modes exist and trucking syndicates enjoy unchallenged monopoly position. Rates vary accord- ing to weather conditions but generally rise during periods of peak agricul- tural activity. 80. Besides Central Governnent taxes, a -reat many municipal and pro- vincial taxes -- some of them illegal -- are levied on highway transport. Thle existing user charges system, however, does not yield sufficient revenues to maintain existing roads or build new ones. Treasury appropriations cover as much as 92 percent of the network's annual expenditures while road taxes finance only some 8 percent of an already insufficient overall expenditure level. In 1971, the Treasury was unable to mneet the requiremnents for road maintenance and the President's Emergency Fund, financed by USAID, had to contribute a substantial amount to meet the sector's needs. In 1972 the situation is expected to further deteriorate. - 30 - 81. The higlh cost of road buílding is an important constraint to any major construction effort, especially given the gradually diminishing invest- ment resources of the Central Government. There are several roads under con- structíon, i.e. from Cocnabamba to Puerto Patino and from Cochabamba to Puerto Villarroel (both on navigable rivers) as well as from Yapacani to Puerto Grether (on the navigable Icnilo River). These roads will connect tlhe river systemi of the northeast of the country to the road systems of the south. The Government also appears to be considering the construction of a road from Trinidad to Oromomo; from this point the road would branch out and join the existing dirt road Santa Ana de Huachi-Caranavi - La Paz and another dirt road connecting Oromomo with the paved Aighway Puerto Patino - Villa Tunari - CocLa- bamba. These higihways are of major importance for the development of the in- dustrial and lívestock sector of the economy and would si¿nificantly lower road transport costs for meat and meat products between the cattle-raising areas of the Beni and major markets. There hlas also been a fair amount of road improvement. The nation's major paved highway hetween Cochabamba and Santa Cruz is about to be improved and paving of the La Paz-Oruro highway ias been completed recently. The Government is now considering paving the Oruro-Cochabamba highway, thereby improving the línkage between Bolivia's four principal cities: La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. 82. Air traffic in Bolivia is considerable. The commercial air fleet consists of some two hundred airplanes, which carry about 250,000 passengers and 30,000 thousand tons of cargo annually. T'ne niumber of airports is esti- mated to be somewhere between 100 and 300, depending on the definition ap- plied; only three, however, are paved -- those of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. Lloyd Aereo, a mixed enterprise with Governnent majority owner- ship, provides the only scheduled services. The combination of short flights - less than 300 1un on average -- old airplanes, poor maintenance, high in- surance costs and gross overmanning -- about 40 percent of its personnel is redundant -- has been pushing tlhe company increasingly into the red. Its current deficit will almost triple, rising from $b?2 million in 1970-71 to lthOUt $h30 inillion in 1972. A large rroportion of tlhe traffic carried by iion-scheduled operators consists of hauling fresh beef from the lowlands into the principal urban and imining centers in the Altiplano. 83. Á'hile the widespread use of air transport indícates the lack of alternative transport modes air services appear to be over-extended. The sector is badly in need of reform. Even at the present high rates very few airlínes cover their operating costs plus depreciation and interest on loans. Air transport, lhowever, will contínue to be very inportant for the next decade or so but, because of the low quality c Its services, it is likely to present an impediment to the growtlh of the tourismi industry. Hiígh priorities should be given to improving airport facilities, including runways, navigational aids and terninal facilities, and tite state controlled airline should be re- k¡abilitated and nlaced on a sound financial footing. 34. The transport sector falls under the direct responsibility of the 'inistry of Transport and Communications. Although the Government is con- vinced of the need to develop an overall plan coordinating all transport - 31 - modes, several obstacles remaiín ín the way. Tiie Planning Office of the Min- istry 1as a subsector approac.h to transport problemas and lacks the financial and personnel resources needed to increase the sophistication of its planning techniques. Investment policies are ¿istorted because, in the face of paucity of resources on the Central Govermnent level, priority is shifted to projects with negligible contribution from the Treasury. The Planning Office is cur- rentlv studying the interconnection of the western and eastern railway net- works, the upgrading of the Oruro-Cochabamba highway and is carrying out a road user ciharges study. iHowever, as long as the present fiscal stringency continues, only a limited number of largely externally financed projects will be imDlernented. ducation 35. Bolivia's demographic structure presents a serious obstacle to the development of educational services. Thle population is sparsely distributed ard although Spanish is the official language, some two-thirds of Bolivians spea; indigenous languages -- Ouechua, Aymara and Guarani. These obstacles tend to raise education costs but the quantity and the quality of the serv- ices nrovided could be improved considerably through the adoption of more rational policies. Bolivia's education expenditures (excluding uníversities) amounts to some 5 nercent of GDP and exceeds by far the GDP's share devoted to education in countries with a similar per capita income. Despite the rapid growth of the sector's financial outlays -- which increased from under one-fifth of the Central Government budget in 1960 to almost one-third in 1971 -- the illiteracy rate has remained practically unchanged at over 60 percent of the adult population. 86. The principal responsibility for educating the population rests in the hands of the public sector. In 1971, 83 percent of the students at the pre-school and primary school levels and 75 percent at the secondary level attended public schools, while eiígh1t of the nine universities are public. Budget expenditures consist almost exclusively of current expenditures in which wages and salaries exceed 90 percent of the total. The considerable salary increases granted periodically to teachers limit allowances for teach- ing materials and for school maintenance to minimum levels. As a result, according to a Government survey, only four in every thousand schools are considered to be in good condition and close to seventy percent are in need of major repairs or need to be abandoned. 87. The prevailing pupil-teacher ratio of 25 pupils per teacher is aniong the lowest in Latin America. This low ratio is declining over time as the teaching profession continues to absorb invididuals who, although not graduates from Teachers' Colleges, are nonetheless put on the payroll. Ano- ther element contributing to this low ratio is the small size of classrooms in most of the existing schools, which are often located in old residential buildings. New schools are planned now for classrooms for 40 students. If the old buildings were replaced a smaller number of teachers would be re- quired and the cost of construction of new buildings could be easily offset by the savings on the teachers' wages bill. - 32 - S8. Iíe leading agency responsible for school construction is CONES (Consejo ;acional de E»dificaciones Escolares), founded in I4arch, 1971, as an autonomous government institution. The greater part of its financial re- sources for school construction comes from earmarked taxes on wages and sal- aries which contribute 2 percent of the $b420 million of expenditures on education and from support by USAID. While prefectures and municipalities are legally required to contribute 10 percent of their total revenues to school construction, application of the law is uneven. Sometimes these en- tities contribute instead a plot of land for a school or supply community labor. A. waste of resources occurs whenever the community or the Government are incapable to equip and maintain such schools after their construction. 39. The existing educational aetwork seems inadequate to meet the needs of the country. Facilities are severely restricted after the fourth grade and are largely geared to admission to universities. Since there are few em- ployment opportunities for university graduates, a more realistic policy would seem to call for the training of much needed medium-level technicians for agriculture, commerce and mining. The shortcomings of the present edu- cational policy are highlighted by the fact that some 300,000 children between the ages of 10 and 14 have no access to formal education at the same time as a considerable proportion of emigrants from Bolivia are university graduates. 90. Compulsory education in Bolivia applies to children of 7 to 14 years of age, but primary school attendance starts usually at the age of 6, and, be- cause of high repetition rates it takes 9.8 years on the average, to complete 6 years of primary school. Only 55 percent of children living in urban areas, and less than 18 percent of children in rural areas complete the fourth grade; the remaining ones drop out and sometimes lapse back into illiteracy. Among the rnanv reasons for the hiigh drop out rate is the existence of a great num- ber of local schools which do not offer education beyond the second or third -rade, and are not supported by the provincial schools where students could continue their education. In these cases, maintenance of schools with low gzrades only would appear to be a waste of resources, which could be more ef- fectively used in a vertically integrated system. 91. The severe shortage of medium level vocational education is as serious as high illiteracy. More than four fifths of the enrollments in me- dium level education is in traditional secondary schools. Rural teachers' training schools account for only 5 percent of enrollment while 15 percent enroll in technical and vocational schools. Higher non-university education is concerned almost exclusively with the training of urban teachers. The absence of agricultural schools at this level is hard to understand in a country where most of the population lives from agriculture. At least some of the seventeen public rural teaching training schools should be given a more technical character. 92. The educational reform which is now being prepared in Bolivia should offer a good opportunity to correct many of the deficiencies of the existing system. A partial reform has already taken place since 1970. The - 33 - universities, which liave been closed since August 1971, will reopen after the completion and implementation of the Uníversity Reform. Consideration might be given to abolishing chairs, where the number of students is too small and the cost per student excessive. Health 93. The health situation of Bolivia is serious. Life expectancy at birth is only 53 years and the mortality rate ranges between 13 and 19 per thousand of which more than one-half are children under 5 years. Infant mortalitv is even more dramatic as one out of every six children dies before reaching its first birthday. About 10 percent of all deaths are caused by diseases which could be completely eradicated (yellow fever, smallpox, rabies, typhus, malaria) while 80 percent are diseases which could be greatly reduced (tuberculosis, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, measles, etc.). The reasons for this situation could be classified into four groups: (i) demographic char- acteristics (ii) nutritional levels (i.ii) sanitary conditions (iv) subutili- zation of resources for health improvement. 94. The influence of the demographic factors on the healtlh situation is quite strong. Because of the high crude birth rate (40 per 1,000) Bolivia's population is young, with over one-half under t.wenty years of age, and prone to diseases. Furthermore, only 10 percent of all births take place with medical assistance and about one half of the population lives in remote areas where no health service is available. 95. The nutritional level of the population, measured by caloric and animal protein intake is well below minimum needs. The average daily food requirernents per person in Bolivia is estimated at 2,213 caloríes or almost one-fifth over the actual intake, estimated at only 1,890 calornes. The ab- solute deficit is even more acute in the Altiplano region, where the bulk of the rural population lives. - 34 - lable 8: .iUTRITIONAL LEVEL OF THE BOLIVIAN POPULATION BY REGIONS - 1968 (daily intakes in calories or grams) Total Altiplano Valleys Tropical Zone Caloric Requirement 2,213 2,274 2,248 2,117 Caloric Intake 1,890 1,883 1,894 1,892 Absolute Deficit (in calories) 323 391 354 225 Deficit (in percent) 14.6 17.2 15.7 10.6 Animal Protein Reguirement (in grams) 27 29 23 28 Animal Protein Intake 16 15 16 16 Absolute Deficit 11 15 5 12 Deficit (in percent) 40.7 48.3 21.7 42.9 96. Sanitary conditions are sub-standard. On the average, only 11 per- cent of the total population has direct access and another 10 percent an "easy" access to drinking water. In rural areas, the situation is much worse, with only one percent enjoying access to drinking water, compared to 60 per- cent in the urban centers. Sewerage facilities are even more scarce -- less than 7 percent of the population has access to them. Until the country's public finances are reconstructed it will be difficult to ameliorate this situation. 97. The available medical resources are being seriously underutilized. While the population/physician ratio is 2.5 per thousand, the unemployment rate of registered physicians is about 18 percent and the number of medical visits does not exceed 2 per working hour because many physicians are em- ployed in more than two institutions, limiting employment opportunities for their colleagues. This has been also one of the causes for emigration of trained medical personnel. Miost of the 2 million farm workers are deprived of any access to medical assistance. The government channels some 90 percent of its expenditures into current medical services, with only a small residual left for preventive medicine. Health standards could be improved if more attention were given to such measures as vaccination, children's diet, avail- ability of drinking water and sewerage facilities. CORPAGUAS, the water agency, is fostering a project which should provide drinking water to 591 cities with total population of one million people. The first stage of this program, planned to be completed by the end of 1971, has already been delayed - 35 - by difficulties in raising the local currency contribution. The integration of social security systems could also ensure a more rational use for avail- able resources. Xt present annual expenditures per person on health vary from $b1,100 in the petroleum sector to $D15 per person per year in the 1Einistry of Health -- responsible for most of the urban employees. Llousius, 98. Housing construction is carried on by both the private and public sectors. The public Institutions - CONAVI (Consejo Nacional de Vivienda), and the National Councíls for Mining, Petroleum, and IIilitary Housing, are involved in programs of low cost housing. CONAVI finances íts operations from an income it receives from employers under the Social Security System equivalent to 2 percent of the wages bill and from an 0.7 percent sales tax on manufacturing, printing and construction. It has also obtained two IDB loans and is now expecting a third. During the last decade, CONAVI, together with other public sector institutions constructed annually only 800 housing units. rhe labor groups most favored by these programs have been industrial workers (34 percent of the houses), raílroad workers (19 percent) and teach- ers (18 percent). 99. In the private sector, financial resources for housing of medium and hiih income groups are channeled through the dousing Saving and Loan Associations. The system is receiving both Drivate domestic savings and foreign private credits. The depositors are paid 8 Dercent annual interest, while borrowers Day 12 percent interest on 20 year mortgages. In 1971, 437 'houses were funded by this system. In addition, the private housing sector relies on a systeim of housing cooperatives, through which about 400 new housing units are constructed annually and whose loans also finance enlarge- metlts of existing houses as well as purchases of land. 100. There is little infornation on the size of tlie housing deficit, but It appears to be increasing. On the assumption that an average family unit comprises five persons, and that the population growth is 3.3 percent for urban areas and 2.3 percent for rural areas, the number of new housing units needed each year to match the population increase, would be 10,000 in the urban areas and about 15,000 in rural areas. The 1,400 liouses which are annually constructed in urban areas meet only one-seventh of these require- ments. Efforts to improve the housing balance will be required. 101. The authorities have sadly neglected rural housing. This could have undesirable repercussions. Although Bolivian cities have not yet ex- perienced high demographic pressures of migration from rural areas, affecting urban agglomerations of other countries, greater attention to rural housing may help to postpone this almost inevitable phenomenon. The plans should therefore incorporate an improvement of living conditions of rural families through a rural development program, which would help to curtail urban-rural migration. In addition it would also improve living conditions in rural areas. - 36 - Tourisi 102. Bolivia is not exploiting fully its tourist potential and the north-south flow of tourists travellíng through South America does not pass through Bolivia. Tourist inflow is very small, although it increased in 1971 by 65 percent over 1970 to an all-time high level of 36,900 persons. The average length of stay of foreign tourists in Bolivia is only six days, of w'hicli three are spent in La Paz. 103. Ijie country's hotel facilities are far from adequate. There are onlv 70 hiotels in the countrv, wit!h 1,740 rooms and 3,554 beds; only 8 hotels v,jitlh 452 roons aid 804 beds could be classified in the first class category. 'I'Áiis obstacle to tourism has received official recognition. Thie National 1)irectorate for Tourism has been working on a project involving a number of srall h1otels and motels at sites of such tourist attraction as Titicaca Lake, T¡wanaku (pro-Inca ruins) and In provincial capitals. The total cost of the nroject would be ITS$4.5 million, of which US$3 million has been obtained from tiie lI)'I. The difference had to be supplied by private investors and the Gov- ernrient. TUis Project could not ;et under way, however, as the authorities were unable to provide their share of 10 percent of the project cost. 104. Xnotner bottleneck to tourism is the lack of adequate transporta- tion facilities, mnainly the absence of a direct connection between La Paz and Cuzco, the principal tourist attraction in this part of the hemnisphere. A Dilateral treaty between Bolivia and Peru drafted ín 1960 called for the ooening of an air route between Cuzco and La Paz, but it lhas not yet been ratified 5zv the Peruvian Government despite Bolivía's preparedness to supply tlle transportation service. Ratification of this agreement, construction of Uli new iotels and improvenients Jli access roads to points of interest should Ztirmlate tourism1 Lo tlolivia. B. Investment Reguire¡aents 105. The preceding sections focused on the problems confronting the key sectors of the economy. While they identified serious problems, they also pointed up substantial opportunities to overcome them and improve the per- formance of the Bolivian economy. The generally favorable developments ex- pected in the external sector during the coming five years (Chapter V) and the improvement in the investment climate that has already begun to take place, should permit a level of capital formation consistent with the full utilization of these opportunities. Provided that sound policies are fol- lowed, it is believed that aggregate output could grow at an average annual rate of between 6 and 7 percent during the next quinquennium and per capita income could increase by 25 percent during the period. The acceleration of the growth rate, however, will require considerable efforts to increase the volume and productivity of investment. Gross capital formation will have to increase from 16 percent of GDP in 1965-71 to 18 percent in 1972-77, i.e. from an estimated $b1,681 millions in 1972 to $b2,768 millions in 1977 (Table 9). - 37 - Iable 9: GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT, 1965-71 AND PROJECTIONS, 1972-77 (In millions of 1970 Bolivian Pesos) Gross Fixed GFI as Percentage GDP Investment of GDP 1965 7,961 1,234 15.5 1966 8,577 1,094 12.8 1967 9,093 1,256 13.8 1968 9,611 1,871 19.5 1969 9,815 1,648 16.8 1970 10,123 1,580 15.6 1971 10,419 1,569 15.1 1972 11,100 1,681 15.1 1973 11,822 2,152 ) 1974 12,591 2,292 ) 1975 13,409 2,440 ) 18.2 1976 14,281 2,599 ) 1977 15,209 2,768 ) 106. The above investment requirements, however, will only be consistent with the GDP growth target of some 6.5 percent annually, if the productivity of investment increases from 0.18 in 1969-71, to 0.36 in 1972-77. Although this appears to be a formidable task, it is by no means unrealistic since a ratio of 0.45 was attained during 1965-68. The required productivity rates can be achieved by increasing the proportion of investmient in the goods- producing sectors (Table 10), by raising the ahare of early-maturlng private investnient projects and by utilizing existiug capacity in public enterprises more efficiently than ín the recent past. - 38 - Table 10: GROSS CAPITAL FOR-MATION, 1965-77 (In millions of 1970 Bolivian Pesos) Amnual Average Distribution 1965-71 1972-77 1965-71 1972-77 Agriculture 63.5 215.8 4.3 9.3 ;lining 153.2 409.7 10.7 17.6 Petroleum 338.0 257.7 23.1 11.1 Industry 78.1 184.7 5.3 8.0 Transport and Communications 448.8 517.8 30.6 22.3 Power 138.7 196.2 9.5 8.4 Housing 144.1 308.2 9.8 13.2 Other /1 100.3 232.1 6.9 10.1 Total 1,464.7 2,327.1 100.0 100.0 (As percentage of GDP) (15.6) (17.8) /1 hiealtlh, E.ducation and otlier public services. Sourcc: Table 2-12 and 2-21, Statistícal Appendix. 107. The principal development objective of the country cannot be achieved unless enough jobs are provided to improve the serious unemployment situation. This employment objective is consistent with the output and productivity of investment targets underlying the investment projections above. If investment resources are channeled properly the unemployment tions above. If investment resources are channeled properly the unemployment rate is likely to be reduced from 17 percent in 1971 to 14 percent in 1977. Tile services sector should absorb some 36 percent of the total increase in emnployment, while the balance is likely to be absorbed by agriculture (46 percent), manufacturing (11 percent) and energy and construction (7 percent). 108. In order to achieve the overall income growth target and the em- ployment target, the increasing investnent resources will have to be chan- neled toward the goods-producing sectors and the economic infrastructure. - 39 - While increases in investnent nust be made in all branches of economic ac- tivity, the largest relative increases should go to sectors wlth high export potential (mining) and to sectors which can achieve economically efficient import substitution and employment absorption (agriculture and industry). The implementation of a system of incentives conducive to such an allocation of resources should result in annual growth rates of 7 percent for mining, 5 percent for agriculture and would allow the country to make substantial pro- gress in reducing the existing deficiencies in the social sectors. lrívate Investmnent 109. Private investment prospects for the 1972-77 period appear to be bri;ht. Although some of the changes toward greater public sector partici- pation in the economy introduced by previous governnents are likely to be irreversible, the present government has taken steps to define the future role of the private sector in the country's development effort and reassure private investors that their future activities will be free from undue public sector interference. In December 1971 the governrnent promulgated a new in- vestment law covering all sectors of economic activity with the exception of petroleum. Tite law reserves the steel and petrochemical sector to joint ventures which must have majority government participation within a period of 25 years. It offers guarantees for private investment and supplies a wide-ranging system of investment incentives, including duty exemptions on all imported inputs and equipment, income tax reduction on profits used for financial investment, exemption from real estate taxes and accelerated depre- ciation allowances enabling the investors to write off machinery and equip- ment within four years and buildings within ten years. Incentives are graded according to the Governnent's sectoral priorities. The investment law has been followed by a special petroleum law, approved in March, 1972, which permits joint ventures between private and Dublic enterprises for exploration and extraction of petroleum resources. The authorities are also preparing a code on Companv Law designed to promote the adoption of the corporate form of private oxnership. With these laws, the Government expects to redefine thie role of private enterprise in the country's development and to foster a climate favorable to increased private investment. 110. While these measures constitute a definite step forward to induce greater private investment, their effectiveness will depend on the country's ability to further develop a climate of confidence, the first pre-requisite of which as past experience I-las proved, depends on maintaining political stability. The effects of this climate of confidence would have to be re- inforced by the adoption of policy measures removing the obstacles to sectoral development outlined above. If these conditions are fulfilled, private invest- mnent is bound to increase its contribution to the development effort. The quantification of this contribution is difficult. However, the results ob- tained so far by the investment law indicate that an upturn in private invest- mnent has already begun to take place. In tite six months following the promul- gation of the law, 44 applications have been received by the Instituto Na- cional de Inversiones (INI) for a total investment of $b356 millions. - 40 - 111. Despite the difficulty of arriving at -ieaningful private investment projections, it ls possible, however, to project the minimum levels of private investnent consistent with the outPut and employment targets proposed in this report. 'Cese projections are shoum in Table 11. Private investment would nave to double between 1971 and 1973 and grow thereafter at a rate slightly hiíher than the overall GDP growth rate in order to regain its 1967 share in overall investnent by the end of thle decade. In absolute amounts, private investment would have to increase froin an annual average of $b660 million in 1965-71 to an annual average of $b1,100 in 1972-77, (in constant 1970 prices). Table 11: GROSS FIXED INVESTMEWT, 1965-71 AND PROJECTIONS, 1972-77 (In millions of 1970 Bolivian Pesos) Private as Percentage Total Private of Total 1965 1,234 705 57 1966 1,094 543 50 1967 1,256 660 52 1968 1,871 932 50 1969 1,668 726 44 1970 1,580 581 37 1971 1,569 465 30 1972 1,681 726 43 1973 2,152 926 43 1974 2,292 1,043 46 1975 2,440 1,147 47 1976 2,599 1,261 48 1977 2,768 1,342 49 112. While the above projections represent substantial increases in pri- vate investment during the next quinquennium in relation to the levels at- tained in the last seven years, there are enough investnent possibilities in Bolivia to absorb them. Agriculture and mining offer opportunities for at least trebling past levels of private investment in these fields, while in- vestment opportunitíes in industry, transport and housing would warrant with- out difficulty investments doubling in 1972-77 the annual averages attained in 1965-1971. Public Investment 113. If the economy is to come out of the relative stagnation experi- enced in the last three years and achieve an annual GDP growth rate of 6 to 7 percent in 1972-77, the public sector will have to make a very substantial investment effort. While during the 1965-71 period public investment averaged over 55 percent of the country's investment effort, the share of the public sector has been increasing ín recent years. As mentioned ín the preceding paragraphs, this tendency is expected to be reversed in the next quinquennium. However, in coming years the public sector will have to fulfill three very - 41 - important roles entailing a renewal rather than a slackening in íts invest- ment activities: to achieve substantial production increases in its principal export enterprises -- COMIBOL and YPFB -- in order to increase the country's import capacity; to provide an ever increasing infrastructural support to compleraent the anticipated expansion in private investment; and to adequately respond to the aspirations of the Bolivian people for increased employment opportunities and the provision of social services, the meeting of which is fundamental if the country is to break the vicious circle of social unrest and political instability. 114. Tne Governnient's 5-year Development Plan for 1972-76 is in the pro- cess of elaboration. In the absence of a public sector investment program, the mission has produced some estimates of public investment requirements for 1973-77. These estimates have been based on the overall investment require- ments of the economy as well as on the investment intentions of the principal public enterprises and agencies. It is estinated that in order to fulfill t;he tasks outlined in the preceeding paragraph, public sector investment will liave to increase at a minimum rate of 5.3 per annum between 1969-71 and 1973-77. This growth rate underestimates, however, the magnitude of the ef- fort required; once the extraordinarily large Santa Cruz -- Yacuiba gas pipe- line project is excluded from the public investment level attained in 1969-71, the required rate of growth of public investment over the next six years in- creases to 8.4 percent per annum. Table 12: PUBLIC INVESTMENT 1965-71 AND PROJECTIONS, 1973-77 (In millions of 1970 Bolivian Pesos) Annual Averages 1965-1968 1969-1971 1973-1977 Goods producing sectors 199.9 481.7 613.4 Agriculture 19.6 25.5 94.0 Mining 55.7 85.5 184.0 Petroleum 109.8 350.7 258.8 Manufacturing 14.8 20.0 76.6 Economic Infrastructure 333.1 365.3 401.0 Power 76.7 95.3 123.0 Transportation and Communication 256.4 270.0 278.0 Social sectors 125.4 173.0 292.6 Housing 28.9 67.4 47.6 Others 96.5 105.6 245.0 TOTAL 658.4 1,020.0 1,307.0 . . ~ ==2 - 42 - 115. In order to achieve these targets, the process of project identifi- cation, selection and execution will have to be improved considerably. Proj- ect identification has been carried out in a haphazard manner and, as a re- sult, the total value of projects which have been identified at the ministe- rial level for possible implementation during 1973-77 barely amounts to $b900 million, i.e. about one-eighth of public investment requirements for the pe- riod. A factor which contributes to delay project preparation once identifí- cation has taken place, is the widespread overlapping of functions among pub- lic sector agencies, whether ministries, state enterprises or decentralized agencies. The jurisdictional disputes which arise due to overlapping of re- sponsibilities are often aggravated by the lack of a single agency strong enough to determine the importance of the project at an early atage. 116. The Bolivian Governnent is conscious of these administrative short- comings. To improve and centralize the functíons of project identification and execution, the Government plans to create an Economic and Planning Coun- cil, attached to the Presidency of the Republic, which would substitute the existing Development Council and Planning Ministry. The Economic and Planning Council would have a Technical Secretariat supervising and coordinating proj- ect identification, financing and execution. This is a promising development and if it materializes, should remove one of the main administrative obstacles to carrying out a sound public investment program. - 43 - IV. FINANCING OF DEVELOPMENT 117. The financing of development duríng the past seven years (1965-71) depended heavily on the course of public policy. Between 1965 and 1968 gross savings rose from 10.4 to 17.4 percent of GDP and made it possible to attain a gross investment level of 20 percent of GDP. With the emergence of polit- ¡cal uncertainties in 1969 and as a consequence of the new Government's poli- cies favoring consumption, savings declined to 14.4 percent of GDP in 1971 and investment dropped to 17.4 percent of GDP. External resources played an important role in financing development throughout the period. This role was much greater than is indicated by the shrinking resource gap in the table below, because increasing proportions of external capital inflows were used to cover rapidly rising external debt amortizations and factor income pay- ments. The large volume of external capital inflows covered these payments as well as contributed about one-fifth to the financing of gross investment. Table 13: SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT, 1965-71 (Percentages of GDP in constant 1970 prices) Domestic Resource Investment/ Savings/GDP Gap/GDP GDP 1965 10.4 7.6 18.0 1966 11.3 6.0 17.3 1967 12.9 2.4 15.3 1968 17.4 2.8 20.2 1969 16.7 1.9 18.6 1'770 17.0 0.4 17.4 1i71 14.4 3.0 17.4 A. Private Sector Financing Monetary and Credit Policies 118. Private investment, which accounted for one-half of gross invest- ment during 1965-69, dropped to less than one-third in 1970-71. The finan- cing of private investment relied heavily on domestic resources although foreign private capital played an important role in míning and petroleum prior to 1969 when Gulf Oil was nationalized. Domestic savings were chan- neled into private investment through autofinancing, the banking system and unorganized intermediaries. External resources, before they began to dry up in 1969 were largely in the form of direct private investment supplemented by some selective foreign bank credits. - 44 - 119. The financial system of Bolivia consists of banks and other finan- cial intermediaries. The banking system includes the Central Bank, the State Bank, 4 specialized banks and 14 private commercial and savings banks. The non-bank financial intermediaries include savings and loan associatíons, ex- change houses, insurance companies and public sector entities engaged in lend- ing activities, of whích the most prominent 1s the Bolivian Development Cor- poration (CBF). The Central Bank is at the apex of Bolivia's financial sys- ten. It formulates monetary policy and enforces it through its power to fix interest rates, rediscount policies, reserve ratios and portfolio controls, as well as its powers to supervise and reaulate non-bank financial inter- mnediaries. Late in 1970, the Central Bank absorbed the former Superintend- ency of Banks (renamed Controller's Department) which was in charge of super- vising interest rates charged, reserve requirements and the composition of loan portfolios of the commercíal banks. The Central Bank's Banking Depart- ment, which functioned as a commercial bank, has been reorganized as a sep- arate entity -- the State Bank -- with more than 40 branches and accounts for one-third of the total commercial banks' liabilities to the private sector. 120. The specialized banks -- agricultural, mining, industrial and mortgage -- provide development funds to the respective sectors of activity. The commercial banks have access to development credit at 12 percent interest through rediscounting facilities on three development funds administered by the Central Bank. Most commercial bank lending, however, takes place at a nominal interest rate of 15 percent. Loans for commercial purposes, i.e. for activities which do not result in production of goods, bear an addi- tional 9 percent tax. The nominal bank lending rate, therefore, is 15 or 24 percent depending on its purpose. However, other hidden charges -- guarantees, mínimum deposit requirements -- considerably raise the cost of borrowlig. Selective credit controls are reinforced by quantitative re- strictions by the Central Bank; thc volumtle of credit for commercíal purposes is restrieted to 30 percent of the comniorci;l banks' portfolios. Commercial bhanks aIre required by law to pay a iutli.linuii inlterest rate of 10 percent per anullum un their timiie and savings deposits. 121. Mlonetary policy has been, on the whole, prudent as a result of the discipline imposed by changes in the level of international reserves. Ade- quate credit availabilities appear to have been forthcoming to the private sector during the second half of the 1960's. The deviations from this policy were imposed by the deteriorating financial performance of the public sector. New credit to the public sector increased duríng 1969-71 and provoked a drastic reduction in the rate of growth sf private sector liabilities to the banking system. The private sector share of new credit declined from 86 percent in 1968 to 35 percent in 1971. Moreover, the excessive credit expansion spilled over into the balance of payments and adversely affected foreign exchange reserves. - 45 - Table 14. FACTORS OF MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM- - ANNUAL VARIATIONS (In millions of Bolivían Pesos) Net Credit Credit Currency Money Foreign to the to the Other in Demand Supply exchange public private Quasi- Contraction Year circulation deposíts (1)+(2) reserves sector sector money factors 12 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 1968 44.1 44.1 85.2 -6.4 23.1 134.3 61.4 4.4 1969 92.7 16.2 108.9 6.5 73.9 152.2 96.6 27.1 1970 111.3 58.6 169.9 36.5 138.9 190.2 102.9 92.8 1971 126.3 50.8 177.1 -61.5 197.0 107.2 100.4 -34.8 /1 Equilibrium condition: (3) + (7) + (8) = (4) + (5) + (6) ¡2 Counterpart funds, development funds, change in other liabilities. 122. The rapid overall credit expansion has been facilitated by the public's high propensity to hold liquid assets. This propensity has been increasing over time (as indicated by the gradual fall in income velocity of circulation) due to the increasing monetization of the economy and the policy of monetary stability followed during the last decade. Within this high propensity to hold liquid assets, there has been a welcome trend to íncrease the volume of funds channeled through the banking system. This is shown by the decline in the share of cash balances in the hands of the public as a proportion of money and quasi-money 1/ and by the fact that the savings accounts of the population mlore than trebled during 1967-71. 1/ Currency in circulation, demand deposits, time deposits in commercial banks. - 46 - Table 15: MONETARY VARIABLES AND LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE Money Supply (=100) Central Bank Liabilities Income (In $b millions) Cash Balances/ Velocity Demand Note Bankers' money and quasi- of Currency deposits issue deposits Total money ratio circulation 1968 77.0 23.0 968.1 -179.6 788.5 0.643 6.3 1969 77.6 22.4 1,061.3 -205.9 855.4 0.620 5.9 1970 76.3 23.7 1,171.1 -242.6 928.5 0.590 5.3 1971 75.3 24.2 1,301.9 -354.3 947.6 0.573 4.9 Iedium-term Outlook 123. The efficiency with which the financial system will carry out its function of channeling resources from savers to investors in future years will also depend on the systen's ability to adapt itself to changing condi- tions. This implies that reforms will have to be instituted in the realm of overall credit policy, in the financial structure of the country, and in the organization and procedures of the financial institutions themselves. While credit policy has been selective, it has barely touched some sectors of activity. The definition of development activities has not been suffi- ciently clear. While a low-interest refinancing of the development loans exists in Bolivia, a cursory analysis of its use shows that it has been mainly implemnented to finance exports of coffee, sugar and timber. Only one-fifth of development funds has beecn used for financing fixed invest- inent. Moreover, the definition of developmient is too narrow and needs to be extended to thie financing of feasibility studies for which credit has been both scarce and expensive. Financing for small labor-intensive proj- ects in ntiaufacturiig, construction, agriculture and handicrafts should be given special consideration; however, this activity may have to be concen- trated in a specialized bank dealing exclusively with small enterprises. This would permit the highly trained and scarce personnel in principal banks to focus on larger projects and become involved in the following up of larger loans. While analytical methods used to determine the creditworthiness of small loans could be limited to the flow-of-funds calculation, for larger projects the cost-benefit and discounted cash flow analyses, very infrequently used at present, should be increasinglv introduced. 124. The financial structure of the country is in urgent need of a com- prehensive law to rationalize the maze of existing regulations. The present system has evolved haphazardly and while some loopholes have been closed re- cently -- many obstacles to its orderlv functioning remain. The authorities are in the process of studying a general law covering the whole financial system. This law should settle the issue of financial institutions acting - 47 - sirmultaneously as a financial intermediary and as a user of funds. The Hining Bank, which combines banking and marketing activities, and the CBF, which is a development finance company and also directly operates a number of industrial ventures, have both experienced difficulties in carrying out these dual functions. 125. Finally, the financial institutions should continue striving toward the modernization of their methods to increase efficiency, Loan approval procedure is overly lengthy, but this is not a result of any thorough screen- ing of applications. In the absence of such thorough screening, payments arrears and defaults are frequent, and this despite the fact that collateral required by the banks sometimes covers one and a half times the amount of the loan. The part of the portfolio in default or arrears has reached 28 percent of the total portfolio of the Banco Agricola, 56 percent of the total portfolio of the Banco Minero and 11 percent of the total portfolio of the Banco del Estado. As a result, profitability of the banking system is un- impressive. Despite the wide margin between the cost of money to the banks (7 to 8 percent) and the average interest on outstanding loans (about 14 percent), the returns on portfolios have been very small - barely 1.3 per- cent in 1971. Even this low return has been due mainly to the high profit- ability of foreign banks. Foreign banks are responsible for 40 percent of the loan portfolio but earned as much as 75 percent of the profits of the banking system in 1971. Their rate of return on portfolio investments was 2.4 percent, compared with only 0.5 percent of Bolivian-owned banks. 126. IJhether the banks will be able to make important contributions to the development process will depend largely on decisions taken outsíde their sphere of action. The capacity to increase overall credit is likely to exist, but the actual volume directed to the private sector, which is needed to sus- tain its anticipated large increases in investments, might be constrained by the financial position of the public sector. During 1970-71 the public sec- tor absorbed some 75 percent of credít expansion. Should this situation con- tinue, the objectives set for growth of private sector investment discuased in Chapter III would be untenable. A gradual increase in credit allocation to the private sector would be necessary so that its share reaches some 75 percent in 1977. Although this would require a major turnabout in policy, it will still leave credit to the private sector somewhat below the 80 per- cent share which prevailed in 1968. 127. The credit capacity of the banking system during 1973-77 is estí- mated at $b390 million annually on the average. This is predicated on a 6.5 percent growth in real GDP and takes into consideration the increasing mone- tization of the economy, a declining liquidity preference and the need to replenish international reserves of the banking system. The increase in quasi-money is projected at 25 percent per annum in line with the trend of the past few years, while net foreign exchange reserves are assumed to grow by about US$25 million over their present level during the next five years. Domestic credit will grow at the rate of 8.8 percent in constant prices. If some three-fourths of this credit expansion is made available to the private sector, some $b110 million annually would be left for the public sector. - 48 - B. Public Sector Financing 128. Bolivia has probably the largest public sector in relative terms in South America. It consists of the Central Government, local prefectures and municipalities, 12 public corporations, 42 decentralized institutions and 3 government-owned specialized banks. Its direct responsibility for economic development is considerable and has been growing over time. It contributes about 40 percent of GDP and one-half of the country's export earnings. Public sector investment has been representing an increasing pro- portion of GDP and of total gross fixed investment. It rose from 7.3 percent of GDP in 1965-68 (or half of gross fixed investment) to 9.9 percent of GDP in 1969-71 (or two-thirds of gross fixed investment). 129. The growing importance of the public sector has not been paralleled by any improvement in its saving performance. While in the second half of the 1960's public sector savings were responsible for an increasing part of public investment, covering one-half of total investment by 1969, in recent years this share declined precipitously, falling to one-fourth of public investment in 1971. Moreover, the Central Government, which made only negligible contribution (prior to transfers) to public savings throughout the period, became a net dissaver in 1971. 130. The savings rate of the public sector correlated positively with exports and inversely with wage increases. While public enterprises in min- ing and petroleum should have been the principal generators of public savings, these savings were severely limited, on and off, by wage increases. During 1965-68, when export earnings were expanding and the wages bíll was kept within reasonable limits, savings grew at an impressive rate. In the years following, export earnings fell while wages escalated which had a markedly negative effect on the savings rate. -L9- Table 16: FUBLIC SECTOR INVESDITET ANI) ITS FINANCING (MEllions of current pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Pub-ic Sector Investnent 548.6 888.0 917.1 999.0 1,111.7 S;-lR, ni s 144X3 383.8 467.5 351.6 285.4 (a) rreasury 1.2 20.6 19.5 42.3 -122.0 (b) txport enterprises - IYFB and Comibol 161.6 302.7 355.6 283.5 348.5 (c) Other enterprises and agencies -18.5 60.5 92.4 25.8 58.9 3xielr'ai Borrowing (net) 185.5 538.4 324.8 357.6 469.8 External drawings 401.5 774.2 551.8 666.2 817.0 Amortization 216.0 235.8 227.0 308.6 347.2 Internal Borrowing and Other Revenues (net) 218.8 -34.2 124.8 289.8 355.5 (ratios - in percent) uiLli.c Sectk.or, InvesLment /GDP 6.3 9.7 9.4 9.9 10.5 Grues"; xLt,erull Driwings/ Investnie¡it 73.2 t37.2 60.2 66.7 73.8 rJet kxternal Borrowing/ Investment 33-. 60.6 35.4 35.6 42.3 Savings/Investment 26.3 43.2 51.0 35.2 25.7 - 50 - Table 17: SAVINGS PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Annual increases in percent) /1 1965-68 1969-71 Gross Domestic Savings 26.3 Public 17.8 -9.5 Private 30.0 -1.0 Wages bill of the Public Sector /2 3.6 8.0 Exports (total) 13.0 2.1 /1 In constant prices. /2 Central Government, including military expenditure. Central Government Finances Current Account Savings 131. The operations of the Central Government consist of the budgetary operations of the Treasury and extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures which are classified in this report as "other accounts". Operations of these "other accounts" consist almost entirely of fixed capital formation financed through external loans. A small amount in fees collected by ministries is also in- cluded as current revenues of these "other accounts". 132. Although the financial position of the Treasury was weak in each of the last five years, with current expenditures (after transfers - see Table 5-16) always exceeding current revenues, the size of the current ac- count deficit declined in 1968 and again in 1969. Recently, however, this llprovenient has been reversed wíth a deterioration in the current account position of the Treasury in 1970 and an almost three-fold increase in def- icit in 1971 to a level of about $b120 million compared to only some $b40 million in 1969. 133. Tlie decline in the deficit during 1967-69 can be attributed to the maintenance of the revenue-to-GDP-ratio at 9.0 percent, while current expend- itures declined in relation to GDP from 9.9 to 9.4 percent. In 1970, however, current revenues increased sharply -- by about 23 percent compared with a previous average annual growth rate of 6.4 percent -- owing to the signifi- cant increase in export duties on minerals with the upsurge in world metal prices. Despite this marked increase in revenues there was a slight dete- rioration in the current account deficit because current expenditures were permitted to increase by 24 percent. The further serious deterioration in the Treasury deficit in 1971 is attributable to continued pressures to in- crease current expenditures in the face of a very slight increase in reve- nues. The revenue out-turn reflected a steep decline in revenues from ex- port duties as metal prices fell, decreased revenues from import duties - 51 - resulting from a deterioration in customs administration, and the failure of the Government to introduce major portions of its proposed tax package which was to have yielded an additional $bl20 million. These shortfalls were only partially compensated by increased receipts from YPFB, from the extension of the tax amnesty introduced in 1970, and from the adoption of a "'pay-as-you-go" basis for the business profits tax. 134. The recent financial performance of the Treasury clearly pinpoints the major issues facing the fiscal authorities, namely, the underlying struc- tural weaknesses of the tax system, the basic deficiencies in tax administra- tion, and the even more urgent problem of restraining the growth of current expenditures. The fundamental structural weakness in the Bolivian tax system is its dependence for over 40 percent of its revenues on taxes on foreign trade, a highly unstable and vulnerable source of funds. Import duties alone account for about 35 percent of total revenues and are largely re- sponsible for the low buílt-in elasticity of the tax system. While GDP in current prices increased by 5.6 percent per annum over the last four years, import duties increased by only 1.6 percent on average, and total taxes on foreign trade, including export duties and the 1.6 percent tax on exchange sales, by only 3.4 percent. As a result the built-in elasticity of the tax system, was below unity (0.92). This clearly has implications for the future problem of investment financing as will be discussed later in this chapter. Over the past few years it has only been through frequent adjustments of the rates of existing taxes and large transfers from YPFB in 1971 that the buoy- ancy of government revenues had been maintained. In spite of the sluggish growth of the major source of revenues, current revenues as a whole increased annually by 9.2 percent, producing an overall revenue-income buoyancy of 1.39. This strange overall performance was achieved through periodic ad hoc intro- duction of new sources of revenue. Current Revenue 135. Iniport duties, tlhe single most lmportant source of tax revenue, lave drifted downward as a proportion of current revenues from 46.6 percent in 1967 to 34.9 percent in 1971 asd as a proportion of GDP from 4.2 to 3.6 percent. This behavior is partially explained by the adoption in 1968 of a new list of import prohibitions and the introduction of a system of mínimum permissible values for import tax declarations as well as a 10 percent im- port surcharge, which affected the distribution of imports between official channels and contraband. In spite of the high nominal level of the duty rates, the average rate collected has only been about 18 to 19 percent, which is attributable to the generous application of exemptions for manu- facturing in general, for public corporations and agencies, and for the enterprises under the former Investment Promotion Law. It has been estí- mated that foregone revenue due to these exemptions, if collected, would have increased revenues from import duties by as much as 40 percent. In January 1970, the authorities eliminated import duty exemptions and the exemption from the exchange taxes for the public sector entities. They also suspended granting further exemptions under the old Investment Pro- motion Law. As a consequence of these changes and also because of the in- creases in imports of intermediate and consumer goods, the average duty - 52 - rate increased from 17.5 percent in 1969 to 21.1 percent in 1970 but dropped back to 17.9 percent in 1971, as a result of a deterioration in customs ad- ministration and the reintroduction of exemptions. 136. ExDort taxes on medium and small mining have been an even more volatile and unreliable source of revenues than import duties. Tax rates are graduated according to the unit value of exports, based on world market price quotations. Revenues from this source fluctuated from 4.2 percent of current revenues in 1967 to 16.3 percent in 1970 (owing to the high level of metal prices, particularly for antimony) and back to 4.2 percent in 1971. 137. Revenue from taxes on income and property and from taxes on the consumptíon of ¿oods and services did not increase sufficiently to compen- sate for the relative decline in customs duties. The level of income taxes in 1971 increased as a result of a general tax amnesty decreed in mid-1970 freeing taxpayers who liquidated 50 percent of their overdue income and sales tax liabilities from penalties and further auditing. liowever, if the effect of the amnesty is eliminated, taxes on income and property and taxes on con- sumption accounted for about 17 percent of current revenues in 1971 as they did in 1967. Even this percentage is somewhat overstated as business profits taxes in 1971 include additional revenues due to the change in the calendar of pay¡nents. 138. In order to increase the íncome elasticity of the personal income tax, the authorities increased the tax base in 1968, making it applicable to all forms of remuneration, including bonuses and participation in profits, wliereas formerly only the basic salary was taxed. However, because exemp- tions were raísed and the rates were reduced, the net effect was to decrease the rate of growth of revenues from this tax. Another major tax reform be- came effective on June 1, 1971, when the former turnover tax, levied at 2 percent on most goods and services, at 3 percent for specific services, and at 10 percent on entertainment and luxuries, was replaced by a single-stage 5 percent sales tax on ordinary goods and 10 percent on luxuries. These taxes are applied to sales of registered firms in manufacturing, wholesale, or retail trade with a turnover in excess of $b200,000 per annum. The new tax reduces the number of taxpayers in La Paz alone from several thousand to about 500, thereby greatly easing the administrative burden and eliminat- ing inefficiencies of a multi-stage tax. As a result of this reform revenue from this tax is expected to increase by 28 percent in 1972 as compared with an increase of 19 percent in 1971. 139. Analysis of per capita tax collections by major districts in rela- tíon to per capita income su-gests that revenues derived from the domestic tax base are substantially below their potential level outside of La Paz. The table below vividly illustrates the imbalance beteen La Paz and the other two major districts. WJhile per capita income in Santa Cruz is double that in La Paz, per capita tax revenue (excluding import and export taxes) is onlv about one-third of thiat of La Paz. Tlie substantial imbalance is largely attributable to the absence of an efficient tax administration in - 53 - the interior of the country where regional tax offices are responsible for the collection of taxes on three-fourths of income produced within the coun- try. Despite this, in August 1971 the new Government dismissed a large group of auditors and tax collectors who liad been trained by the Office of Internal Revenue specifically for work in the interior. A new group is now being trained. Table 18: REGIONAL PATTERN OF TAX COLLECTION Total Collections - Tax Revenue Income /2 (Million $b) per capita per capita - 1969 La Paz 223.5 146.2 1,963 Cochabamba 36.8 47.2 2,050 Santa Cruz 23.7 TOTAL 284.0 1970 La Paz 245.5 158.5 1,963 Cochabamba 43.3 54.0 2,087 Santa Cruz 20.1 43.0 3,741 TOTAL 308.9 /1 Collections from taxes on income and profits; sales and services; property and transfers; excise and others. ¡2 In 1968 prices. Sources: Office of Internal Revenue and Ministry of Planning. 140. By improving tax administration Bolivia could add some $b160 mil- lion annually to its current revenue. One alternative might be to increase taxes on petroleum products; other increases could be obtained by enlarging the tax base. Prices of gasoline have not changed since 1959 and are now considerably lower than in other oil-producing Latin American countries: about 40 percent below Brazilian prices and 20 percent below Colombian prices. 11 As a result, the contribution of YPFB to current revenue of the Central Government and municipalities is well below potential. Bolivia 1/ 40 percent after taking into consideration the 1971 adjustment of petroleum prices in Colombia. - 54 - annually consumes about 230 million gallons of petroleum products and, at the averag,e weighted price of some $bl.8 per gallon, a 10 percent increase in Bolivian petroleum prices should add $b40 míllion to Government current revenue. Table 19: PETROLEUM PRICES (In US cents per US gallon) - 1970 Bolivia Colombia-/ Brazíl U.S.A. _ (La Paz) (Bogota) (Rio) (average) Gasoline (regular) Retail price 23.0 26.2 37.0 35.3 Tax 5.0 12.2 15.3 12.2 Tax as , of price 21.7 46.6 39.3 34.6 Gasoline (premium) Retail price 35.0 32.6 45.1 40.3 Tax 7.0 15.9 17.7 17.7 Tax as % of price 20.0 48.8 39.3 43.9 Household Kerosene Retail price 8.0 17.2 32.9 25.8 Tax 0.0 4.9 6.3 0.2 Tax as % of price 0.0 28.5 19.2 1.0 /1 Prior to the 45 percent increase in June 1971. Current Expenditures 141. Current expenditures increased precipitously over the 1967-71 period. Almost all of the íncrease occurred in 1970 and 1971 when expend- itures increased by 24 and 12 percent, respectively. Over three-fifths of this increment ís attributable to the wages bill, including social security contributions for civilian employees, which accounts for about 60 percent of total current expenditures. While the wages bill grew proportionally to increased employment during 1967-69, in 1970-71 it increased by 17 per- cent while employment grew by only 4 percent. Other rapídly growing ex- penditures were interest payments on domestic and external debt which be- tween 1967 and 1971 increased their share in the total from 3.2 to 6.6 percent. Current transfer payments, while not increasíng as rapidly as other items in the budget, nevertheless represented about 12 percent of current expenditures during 1971. Most of these transfers were made to the National Road Service (SNC) which received 58 percent of current trans- fers and to State Railways (ENFE), which received about 37 percent. By - 55 - contrast, expenditures on purchases of non-military goods and services amounted to only about 8 percent of cuzrent expenditures in 1971 and were most inadequate to allow full utilizatíon of equipment and personnel. 142. A functional distribution of current expenditures is unfortunately not available. However, data on expenditures by Ministries including both current and capital expenditures cl1eazrly indicate that education absorbs the largest proportion of the budget and accounts for about one-third of total budgetary outlays. The second and third largest items are public debt, in- cluding both amortization and interest, and defense expenditures, which were responsible for 16 and 12 percent of total expenditure, rpspectively, in 1971. 143. The above analysis of Central Government finances emphasizes that the heavy reliance on unstable and inelastl.c sources of revenue combined with the unrestrained growth of current expenditures, particularly of wages and salaries, have led to a chronically weak budgetary situation. There have been current account deficits in each of the past five years and a partic- ularly serious deterioration in 1971. Between 1967 and 1971, the budget deficit increased from $b73.4 millíon to $b122.2 million or by about 70 percent. Rest of the Public Sector 144. The deterioration in Central Government finances was paralleled by a deterioration in the finances of state economic enterprises. The state export enterpríses, the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) and the State Petroleum Enterprise (YPFB), which are the major savers in the public sector and whose savings more than doubled during 1967-69 -- from $b162 mil- lion to $b356 million (enough to finance over one-third of total public in- vestment) -- experienced a decline to $b283 million in 1970. This occurred in spite of higher metal prices and was entirely attributable to the escala- tion in operating expenses. 145. The State Petroleum Enterprise (YPFB) has generated substantially larger savings than any other institution in the public sector. In 1971 they exceeded total public sector savings and were equal to about one-half of total public sector invesiment. YPFB pays a tax of 19 percent on the gross value oE lts production to the Central Government and a royalty of 11 percent on the same tax base to the provincial administration. In 1971 it contributed $b53.5 million to the Central Government or about 5 percent of Treasury cur- rent revenues. 146. Nevertheless, YPFB has been prevented from substantially strength- ening its financial position by the burden of an inflated wages and salaries bill. Despite a considerable increase in its volume of sales, the proportion of total revenues spent on wages remained unchanged at 25 percent throughout the 1965-71 period. This is attributable to the superflous number of em- ployees, the increasing proportion of office employees (who are paid 3 times as much as unskilled workers and 2.5 times as much as skilled workers), and steep general wage and salary increases. - 56 - Table 20: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES OF YPFB, 1966-71 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Employment Total (number of persons) 4,541 4,740 4,716 4,906 4,889 4,341 Office employees (2,805) (2,883) (3,102) (3.124) (3.305) n.a. Office employees/ Total (in percent) 62 61 66 64 68 n.a. Total employment (1965=100) 108 112 112 116 116 103 Wages and Salaries Total (million pesos) 65 71 103 113 130 172 Wage per person (thousand pesos) 14.3 15.0 21.8 23.0 26.6 39.6 Wage per person (1965=100) 95 100 144 152 176 262 147. The financial situation of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) deteriorated in 1970 and 1971. While the corporation had current account surpluses of over $bIO0 million in 1968 and 1969, these dropped to $b78 mil- lion in 1970 and to a deficit of $b28.5 million in 1971. Its financial dif- ficulties over the last two years are attributable to a slower growth in operating revenues combíned with a steep increase in current expenditures. In 1970 current expenditures increased by 14 percent owing to back wage and salary payments to the 1,500 miners who had been laid off in 1965 and rehired in 1970, increased expenditures on education, health and housing for COMIBOL workers, and increased tax payments. With the fall in world metal prices in 1971, decreasing revenues and a further increase of 11 percent in current expenditures, the Corporation experienced a current account deficít which was financed out of revenues from the liquidatlon of the Third International Tin Agreement. The inadequate financial management of COMIBOL, including excessive employment estimated at 20 percent of its 23,000 employees, leaves almost no financial resources for expansion. 148. The remaining state enterprises have generally been dissavers and a drain on Treasury resources, requiring large transfer payments to finance- both operating losses and investment expenditures. The National Railways (ENFE), and the National Airlines (LAB) have both had current account and capital transfers from the Treasury. The banking operations of the State Development Corporation (CBF) in many years have not been sufficient to - 57 - cover losses incurred by its economic enterprises and it too has received current account transfers from the Treasury. The State Smelting Company (ENAF) also incurred a large deficit in 1970, while it was still being constructed, but in 1971 it began operating and generated a small cash sur- plus. However, its future operations are expected to be marginally profit- able at best. The National Electricity Company is the only enterprise in this group that has generated small current account surpluses. 149. The decentralized public agencies have been making small and de- clining contributions to public sector savings. In 1971 they contributed only 3 percent of total savings and accounted for about 8 percent of public investment whereas in 1970 these were 8 and 10 percent, respectively. This deterioration is largely due to increased current expenditures, particularly on wages and salaries of the National Road Service (SNC) whose revenues de- clined. Of these agencies, only the National Housing Authority (CONAVI) has had substantial surpluses with which to finance its investment expenditures. The Social Security Fund has had small current deficits due to its obligation to furnish benefits to noncontributors. Municipalities generate sufficient resources to finance both current and investment expenditures. Outlook for 1972 150. The slow rate of economic growth in the last three years has ac- centuated the political and social tensions in the country. On coming to power, the new Government faced the urgent need to reactivate the economy. Immediate measures were taken to stimulate investment and thus help alleviate the serious unemployment situation. These measures included the provision of incentives aiming to check the declining trend in private investment and the implementation of a crash program of public works for employment creation. 151. An emergency plan, financed by a US$12 million loan and a US$2 million grant from USAID, was launched late in 1971 to create jobs on public works, to accelerate drawings on external loans (which had slowed down con- siderably because of insufficient matching funds), and to provide funds for purchases of essential goods for the Central Government. A similar US$20 million program to be disbursed over an 18-month period was negotiated in July/August 1972. 152. The most serious immediate economic problem facing the authorities is the impending heavy deficit of the Treasury for 1972. When the Mission visited Bolivia early this year, the Treasury's current account deficit was estimated at $b395 million in 1972 and its overall deficit, including fixed investment and public debt amortization, was expected to reach $b630 million. According to the official budget approved in May 1972, the authorities es- timated a deficit on current account of $b322 million and an overall deficit of $b649 million. The current deficit was allegedly further reduced to $b214 million, after the Bolivian authorities decided in July 1972 that they could raise $b62 million of additional revenue and save $b46 million in expendi- tures. Consequently, the overall deficit is now estimated at $b539 million. Table 21: FISCAL SITUATION (In million current pesos) Annual Budgets Execution of the Budget IBRD pro ection 1971 1972 1 1972/1971 Jan-May Jan-May 1972(1971 1972 1972/1971 Actual Targets. % change 1971 1972 % change % change Current Revenue 1,090 1,286 18 459 455 -1 1,163 7 Internal Revenue 512 589 15 227 230 1 542 6 Custom Duties 377 443 17 160 173 8 410 9 Mining Royalties 47 46 -2 23 18 -22 37 -21 Petroleum Tax 53 100 87 6 3 -50 90 70 Foreign Exchange Sales 39 43 10 15 16 7 42 8 Commercial Credit Tax 21 22 5 8 6 -25 20 -5 Other 41 43 5 20 9 -55 22 -46 Current Expenditures 1.212 1,500 24 406 489 20 1.524 26 Wages and Salaries 730 869 19 254 293 15 895 23 Goods and Non-personal Services 108 109 1 26 29 11 110 2 Interest on Public Debt 83 70 -16 34 31 -8 70 -16 Internal (19) (13) (-32) (12) (13) (8) (13) (-32) External (64) (57) (-11) (22) (18) (-19) (57) (-11) Defense 170 274 61 67 93 39 274 61 Current Transfers 120 173 44 25 41 64 173 44 International Organizations 1 5 400 - 2 2 Current Balance -122 -214 +75 +53 -34 -361 195 Capital Expenditures 93 87 -7 21 12 -43 87 -7 (Transfera) (45) (10) (-78) (15) (1) (10) (-78) Public Debt Amortlzation 142 238 68 89 149 67 238 68 Internal 92 111 20 60 108 80 111 20 External 50 127 154 29 41 41 127 154 Total Deficit 357 539 51 57 195 242 686 92 Financing 357 539 51 57 195 242 686 92 Central Bank 245 248 1 57 195 242 200 -18 Program Loan 63 81 28 - - - 81 28 Counterpart Funds 18 60 233 - - - 60 233 Rollover of I'ublic Debt - 150 - - - - 111 Other/2 31 - - - - - - Unfinanced - - 234 L/ Including adjustments for new tax revenue and economy on expenditures, introduced by the Bolivian delegation to CIAP (July 24-28, 1972) /2 In 1971 - revenue from liquidation of the buffer stock. Source: Official budget (May 9, 1972), data on budget execution, obtained June 16, 1972, in La Paz, budget adjustments, submitted to the CIAP on June 28, 1972 and nmission estimates. - 59 - 153. The lagging fiscal performance in the first five months of the year does not indicate any improvement in tax administration. The expected revenue measures and expenditure cuts, which are supposed to contribute an additional $b110 million toward the financing of the deficit have not yet materialized and an impending overall fiscal deficit of some $b685 million appears rmost likely. Although counterpart accounts could contribute some $b60 millíon, the U.S. program loan an additional $b80 million and rollover and/or postponement of internal debt amortization $b110 million, a deficit -f some $b435 million is likely to remain. It is unlikely that the Central Bank could prudently finance more than $b200 million of this deficit, leaving an unfinanced gap of about $b235 million. If this gap is financed by the Central Bank while at the same time provides the necessary credit to the private sector, the already precarious foreign exchange reserves are likely to deteriorate further. 154. There are several ways in which the Government could raise the additional $b235 million needed. First, it could intensify its revenue collecting efforts by improving tax administration and enforcement. Sec- ond, it could raise the level of existing internal and external taxes or introduce new sources of revenue. Third, it could tap a greater amount of resources from the state economic enterprises. Fourth, the Government could couple a devaluation of the peso with the introduction of new export taxes. Finally, the Government could adopt a package of measures combining the above alternatives. 155. There appear to be substantial possibilities to increase revenues by improving tax administration and enforcement. It is estimated that, if measures eliminating tax arrears, improving the auditing of tax returns, and reducing exemption in custom duties had been introduced timely, these could have resulted in collection of an additional $b120 million from in- come and sales taxes and $b80 million from custons duties. 156. The Government could raise the rates on existing taxes. By rais- ing the sales tax on luxury goods from 10 to 30 percent, revenues could be increased by $b150 million on an annual basis. Import duties offer some additional good opportunities for increased revenue collections. A 20 per- cent import surcharge on goods purchased by upper income groups -- consumer durables, intermediate goods for industry, transport equipment and construc- tion materials - could yield about $b240 million per annum. 157. Another source which could be tapped to cover part of the Central Government's fiscal gap is the expected surplus from certain state enter- prises and agencies. YPFB's surplus is projected at $b190 million in excess of programmed investments of $b300 million and combined payments to the Treasury and to municipal authorities of about $150 million in taxes and royalties. 1/ The Treasury does not now have access to this surplus and re- 1/ Thís figure includes about $b1OO million in unutilized depreciation allowance and $b90 million in net cash surplus. YPFB-Plan Quinquenal 1972-76, table IV-2-2. - 60 - sistance of the state enterprise would make its preemption by the Treasury difficult, especially since YPFB intends to undertake energetic investment activity in 1973 and therefore would like to keep this year's surplus in the form of cash balances to be utilized in 1973. However, utilization of part of the surplus by the Central Government after adjustment of the tax rate on petroleum products need not be ruled out. 158. Another possibility for covering the deficit would be through de- valuation of the peso and the simultaneous imposition of export taxes. This combination could substantially increase revenues of both the Treasury and the principal export enterprises. The magnitude of the devaluation required to finance the uncovered deficit depends on tlie level of export taxes accom- panying it; the policy followed with respect to public sector wages; and the extent to which other revenue measures contribute to reduce the deficit. If the authorities fail to take any other measures to raise revenue, a large- scale devaluation of the peso would be required. Public Investment Financing After 1972 159. The single most important economic obstacle to the acceleration of the development process in Bolivia has been the poor financial perform- ance of the public sector. Its inability to generate an adequate volume of savings limited absorption of external development funds (which were not made use of due to the scarcity of domestically-generated counterpart funds) necessitating reliance on Central Bank credits at the expense of private investment, both of wliich constrained economic growth. This situa- tion must be altered if the public investment program outlined in Chapter III is carried out while the private investment performs its developmental role. The key to this lies in a very rapid increase in public sector savíngs -- at an average rate of 20 percent per annum. Such a growth rate would permit public sector savings to rise from 3.7 percent of GDP in 1969- 71 to 6 percent in 1973-77. 1/ 160. To achieve this increase in publíc savings, the Government should aim at increasing the ratio of internal revenue to GDP from 5.0 percent in 1/ Bolivia is and for some time will remain a mining country, which should make mobilization of savings somewhat easier. Practically all develop- ing mining countries with export structure similar to that of Bolivia (Zambia, Zaire, Thaíland and Malaysia) have an observed savings rate above the "normal" estimated by regression (S.K. Singh "The Determinants of aggregate savings" IBRD Economic Staff Working Paper No. 127, p. 15). - 61 - 1972 to 8.5 percent in 1973-77. 1/ While export prospects are favorable and imports will have to increase in order to maintain the projected high GDP growth rate, the yield from import duties is expected to increase at the rate of growth of GDP in line with imports of consumer and intermediate goods, after allowances are made for adjustments in import tariffs. It is assumed that, should the authorities decide to devalue the peso, import tariffs will have to be reduced so as to d.scourage any increase in con- traband. Export taxes are expected to grow at a faster rate reflecting increased shipments of metals and improved prices. The growth in the yield of the tax on sales of foreign exchange wíll decline in the mid- seventies and the burden of increasing revenues, therefore, will have to be carried by internal taxes, which will have to grow at an average rate of 22 percent annually during the períod. While a fair proportion of the required increase is likely to come from the built-in elasticity of the tax system, the Government will nevertheless have to make a substantial fiscal effort in order to achieve this high growth rate. 2/ This effort could be focussed on improving collections of existing taxes or on introducing new taxes and modifying rates of these in existence. While the introduction of new sources of revenue is to be recommended in order to widen the very narrow tax base as well as to make the tax system more equitable, revenue targets can be fully achieved by considerably improving enforcement on existíng taxes. (Table 5-21, Statistical Appendix.) 161. The growth rate of current expenditures between 1972 and 1976 could be held down to the growth rate of GDP without unfavorable effects on development prospects or unreasonable pressures on the incomes of gov- ernment employees. A policy based on firm restraint on non-developmental expenditures would release funds needed to finance essential services which have failed to reach adequate levels in the past. This would entail a re- versal of the declining trend in purchases of goods and services (which should grow at an average rate of 20 percent per annum between 1972 and 1977); selective restraint in the hiríng of new personnel; and a policy of containing military expenditures and current transfers to the rest of public sector. (Table 5-22, Statistical Appendix.) 1/ Bolivia's tax effort is ranked at present as one of the lowest in the world. In a group of 49 developing countries, for which tax effort was studied, Bolivia's efforts to utilize its taxable capabity have been given a coefficient of 0.51 and ranked as second from the bottom, aboye Nepal. (Roy W. Bahl "A regression approach to tax effort and tax ratio analysis", INF Staff Papers, Nov. 1971, p. 596). 2/ The Mission used the internal revenue-to-GDP ratio of 8.5 percent as an average between a minimum goal of 5 percent, which would be achieved if no improvement of tax administration takes place, and a maximum target of 13 percent, which could be attained if all available measures to increase internal revenue were utilized fully. - 62 - 162. The state export enterprises YPFB and COMIBOL need to make sub- stantial contributions to public sector savings in 1973-77 (Table 5-24, Statistical Appendix). Our projections assume that current plans to in- troduce much needed reforms are successfully carried out, including the upgrading of management through the introduction of modern control methods and gradual efforts to reduce redundant personnel. The introduction of similar efficiency measures in the decentralized agencies, although not likely to result in large current surpluses would allow them to increase the volume of their operations without greatly increasing their burden on the Treasury (Table 5-24, Statistical Appendix). 163. Provided measures are taken along the lines outlined above a real- istic financing plan for the public investment program can be envisaged. Public sector savings would increase from their abnormally low annual aver- age of $b368 million in 1969-71 to $b923 million in 1973-77. This level of savings would cover on the average some 70 percent of public sector invest- ment. It is estimated that internal borrowing could provide on the average some $blOO million annually. Thus, domestic savings would cover somewhat under four-fifths of public sector investment. If external lenders would make available about US$50 million annually in financial assistance, about US$24 million annually could be used in support of the public investment program and would cover the savings-investment gap of the publíc sector. The renainder would be preempted by external debt amortization. 164. It is estimated that of an average annual public investment pro- gram of $b1.3 billion, some 57 percent is projectizable. The foreign ex- change component of projectizable public investment is estimated at some 62 percent annually, equivalent to US$39 million. If external lenders limited their financing to the foreign exchange component of the projectiz- able portion of public investment, they could only transfer approximately 80 percent of the gross external capital requirements of the public sector. To fill the remaining gap, it would be necessary for external lenders to cover in addition to the foreign exchange component some 20 percent on the average of project costs in the form of local currency financing. Thus, it will be necessary for external lenders to cover on the average some 80 percent of project costs. As will be seen in the next chapter, an annual capital inflow of US$50 million to the public sector will be consistent with the balance of payments requirements. - 63 - Table 22: FINANCING OF PUBLIC OECTOR INTESTMENT PROGRAM, 1969-1977 (In $ millions) Annual Averages Annual Projected Amounts 1969-71 1973-77 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 (Actual) (Projected) 1. Public Investment i. Total 1,008 1,306 1,226 1,249 1,293 1,338 1l,26 Ui. Projectizable with external financing 845 742 696 709 73h 760 810 2. Financing i. Public savings 3 923 660 773 1,020 1,013 1,151 - Central Governnent 8 123 -117 -h 127 219 363 - Export enterprises (YPFB & COMIBOL) 329 633 645 630 725 577 587 - Other 31 167 102 139 168 187 201 ii. Net externaLborrowing 384 282 300 280 239 321 271 - Groas borrowing 67 79 602 - Amortization 29> 312 309 322 304 315 309 iii. Internal borrowing and other revenues 256 101 266 196 34 4 4 3. Ratios (in %) i. Inport conponent of projectizable investraent (%) 70 62 62 62 62 62 62 i. xtoLa; fIsnmong component of pro,jectizable investment (%) 80 80 87 85 74 84 72 iii. External financing of domestic currency component - in % of projectizable invest- ment. 10 18 25 23 12 22 10 iv. Pablic savings coverage of capital expenditures (%) Fixed investment 36 71 54 62 79 76 61 Amort.of ext.debt -8 -14 -11 -13 -15 -14 -15 Total 28 57 43 49 64 62 66 - 64 - V. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND CREDITWORTHINESS A. Recent Trends 165. Bolivia's external sector is the key to its economic development. With no capital goods industry of its own, Bolivia's capital formation de- pends heavíly on its overall import capacity. At the same time the export sector coincides by and large with the "modernr" portions of the economy and has been the propelling force in economic growth. It has largely shaped the economic infrastructure of the country and provides most of the public sec- tor s resources -- state economic enterprises are responsible for about one- half of total exports and the same proportion of the Central Government's current revenues is generated by taxes on foreign trade. 166. GDP growth during the past decade has been associated with increased availability of foreign exchange. Export prices rose by some 50 percent be- tween 1963 and 1965 and remained at relatively high levels during the late 60's and early 70's. The volume of traditional exports increased appreciably and new products were added to the array of Bolivian exports. This alone in- creased the import capacity which was further bolstered by growlng net capi- tal inflows from abroad. As a result, the country was able to reverse the low and occasionally negative GDP growth rates experíenced in the 1950's. Exports 167. A large proportion of Bolivia's exports consists of unrefined min- erals. During the period 1965-71, exports of tin accounted for about 55 per- cent of total exports while other metallic minerals accounted for an additional 30 percent. High dependence on tin and other non-ferrous metala made Bolivia very vulnerable to fluctuations in world metal prices which are highly un- stable and tend to move in response to demand conditions in industrialized countries. 168. Most Bolivian minerals are exported to the U.K. and U.S.A. for re- fining and fabrication. While these two countries absorbed 82 percent of Bolivian exports during 1965-71, their share has been declining slowly in recent years as a consequence of export diversification. This trend has been paralleled by a slow but steady increase in the share of Bolivian ex- ports to Latin America, particularly to neighboring Argentina, Chile and Peru. 169. During the past decade considerable progress was achieved in lessen- ing Bolivia's reliance on world metal markets in general and on the world tin market in particular. The share of mineral exports declined from an average of 95 percent of export earnings in 1963-65 to 85 percent in 1969-71, while the share of tin exports fell from 70 to 40 percent in the same period. This trend reflects the increasing importance of the private mining sector -- less dependent on tin than COMIBOL -- and the addition of new products to the list of Bolivia's exports. - 65 - 170. Bolivian exports performed on the whole satísfactoríly during the period 1965-71 and provided the main impetus to GDP growth. Export values increased rapidly during the period, at an average rate of 8 percent per annum. Year to year fluctuations were important, however, with exports increasing slowly in 1968 and declining by some 9 percent in 1971. Table 23: EXPORT VALUES, 1965-71 (millions of US$) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Total Exports/ 131.3 149.7 165.8 174.1 198.2 228.3 206.8 Minerals 125.0 131.5 131.3 139.0 167.2 204.7 166.7 (Tin) (93.0) (93.0) (90.9) (92.5) (102.5) (101.9) (100.3) (Other) (32.0) (38.5) (40.4) (46.5) (64.7) (102.8) (66.4) Hydrocarbons 0.7 6.6 22.9 24.3 23.0 10.2 24.7 Other Exports 5.6 11.6 11.6 10.8 8.0 13.4 15.4 (Cotton) (-) (-) (-) (0.6) (1.2) (3.0) (6.0) (Growth rate of Exports) (15.9) (14.0) (10.8) (5.0) (13.8) (15.2) (-9.4) /1 Customs statistics. Source: Table 3-2, Statistical Appendix. 171. Although high metal prices were primarily responsible for the in- creasing export earnings during 1965-71, growth in export volume of minerals was far from negligible. Shipments of zinc, copper and tungsten increased at rates considerably above that of GDP growth; only shipments of silver and tin lagged behind. Private mines contributed most of the increases in zinc and copper production and exports. - 66 - Table 24: QUANTUtM INDICES FOR METAL EXPORTS (1963 = 100) Growth Rates 1963-65 to 1969-71 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 % Tin 100 106 105 113 119 127 129 120 129 3.3 Antimony 100 126 116 141 151 147 174 153 149- 5.7 Copper 100 157 157 190 210 230 267 297 247 11.9 Lead 100 88 87 105 100 110 125 128 117 5.1 Zinc 100 213 298 363 363 257 576 1011 1017 27.5 Silver 100 99 85 105 93 107 130 123 113 4.3 Tungsten 100 86 79 114 143 164 164 171 157 10.9 Source: Table 3-2, Statistical Appendix. 172. Earnings from metal exports increased very rapidly during 1969-70 -- in excess of 20 percent annually -- mainly as a result of favorable movements in metal prices. In 1971, however, export earnings fell sharply following a decline in prices of all major minerals other than zinc. This decline in prices induced reduction in output except in the case of tin. Fluctuations in metal export earnings were only partially offset by increased earnings from exports of hydrocarbons. The earnings regained their 1969 level in 1971, followed the compensation agreement, after dropping by some 50 per- cent in 1970 as a consequence of the nationalization of Bolivian Gulf. The combined effect of these changes resulted in a rapid increase in toatal ex- ports in 1969-70 -- 13 and 9 percent, respectively -- and a severe decline of over 9 percent in 1971. 173. An encouraging development in the Bolivian export picture during the last six years has been the introduction of two new export producto -- petroleum and cotton. Petroleum exports rose appreciably in 1966 after the Caranda and Colpa oilfields were connected to the Pacific port of Aríca. Cotton production was introduced in Bolivia in 1952 but no sizable quantí- ties were exported until 1968. Since then, exports of cotton have doubled every year as land previously under sugar in the Santa Cruz area was switched to cotton growing. Some progress was also made in exporting small quantities of a relatively large number of agricultural products (Table 3-3 Statistical Appendix). Among these, timber and lumber have been steadily gaining in im- portance. Exports of cattle and beef practically disappeared in recent years as a result of the Government's pricing and export policies. Exports of a - 67 - number of other products, including coffee, have remained stationary while production and exports of some products from the tropical rainforests of the northeastern frontiers (rubber, brazil nuts) have fluctuated widely in response to world market prices and relative price and exchange rate move- ments in neighboring countries. Imports 174. According to official figures (Table 3-1), imports of goods in- creased considerably faster than GDP -- at 6 percent annually on the aver- age -- as compared to an average GDP growth of 4.6 percent during 1965-71. These figures include, however, an adjustment factor for contraband trade which changed from 15 percent of officially registered imports before 1967 to 20 percent since then. Although contraband trade represents a serious problem, no concerted efforts have been made to establish even approximately its magnitude. Under the circumstances, the "adjustments" constitute little more than a means for reducing the size of the "errors and omissions" item in the official balance of payment records, which also includes unrecorded capital transactions. In the opinion of well-informed Bolivians, the "ad- justment" for contraband includes indeterminate but increasing amounts of capital flíght due to the political instability which has characterized the country in recent years and the periodic resurgence of rumors about exchange rate changes. Thus, official estimates appear to have exaggerated import growth and the import elasticity of goods with respect to GDP is believed to have been closer to 1.0 or 1.2 rather than the 1.3 indicated by the of- ficial figures. This opinion is confirmed by the trend in registered im- ports on a c.i.f. basis, as recorded by the Customs Office (Table 23), which appears to have moved at approximately the growth rate of GDP. Table 25: IMPORTS, 1965-71 (millions of US$) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Total Imports/ 133.9 138.4 150.9 152.7 165.1 158.1 171.3 Consumer Goods 33.5 34.6 35.5 31.2 32.5 26.5 36.3 Intermediate Goods 45.7 47.4 56.0 48.9 49.3 50.9 56.3 Capital Goods 54.4 55.9 58.7 71.8 82.7 79.9 77.0 (Growth rate) (-) (3.4) (9.0) (1.2) (8.1) (-4.2) (8.3) /1 Customs statistics. Source: Table 3-8, Statistical Appendix. - 68 - 175. The composition of Bolivia's imports in the recent past has largely reflected the production and consumption patterns of the country. The low level of income and its skewed distribution, as well as the virtual self- sufficiency in the production of food staples, have contained heavy pres- sures for imports of consumer durables and foodstuffs excluding wheat flour, edible oila and milk. According to official figures on imports of consumer goods, a decline in the imported component of consumption is indicated but in the absence of direct estimates of the volume of contraband trade, it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion regarding the role played by import substitution. Imports of intermediate goods and raw materials remained more or less constant, mainly as a result of the slow growth of imports of inter- mediate goods for industry, their major component, which performed in line with the relatively stagnant manufacturing sector in the second lialf of the 1960's. Capital goods were, by far, the most dynamic component of imnport demand. Imports of capital goods increased very rapidly -- at an average annual rate of 11 percent between 1964/66 and 1969/71. The main impetus to this growth was generated by the renewal of the transportation fleet which had been run down very seriously in the post-revolutionary period. Imports of transport equipment -- including large purchases of civilian aircraft and trucks, as well as the purchase of railway locomotives -- increased at 14 percent annually during the period. Imports of mining and petroleum machinery increased very rapidly between 1964 and 1968 but re- mained stable for the next three years reflecting the downturn in private investment. Trade Balance 176. The combination of the above trends in visible trade resulted in a small overall surplus for the trade balance during the period 1965-71 (Table 3-1). The magnitude of the surplus, moreover, was probably some- what underestimated because of an over-statement (see paragraph 177) of imports in recent years and the capital flight which took place in the form of underinvoicing of exports. The trade balance fluctuated considerably from year to year, the fluctuation in 1971 being particularly sharp when a nega- tive swing equivalent to 15 percent of exports took place largely as a result of the drop in metal prices. Services Account 177. The past seven years witnes¿ed a serious continuous deterioration in the balance on servíces. The deficit on invisibles more than doubled during the pernod -- from US$26 million in 1965 to US$57 million in 1971. Most of the increase was due to the rapidly increasing outflows in the form of interest payments on medium and long-term loans and of profit remittances. Largely because of the success of the authorities in stabilizing the economy in the late 1950's, the country was able to contract increasíng amounts of foreign loans beginning in the early 1960's. This success, however, was accompanied by the substitution of long-term loans for grants. The adverse effects of the changes in the volume and composition of loans on interest payments were further accentuated by greater reliance on relatively expen- sive suppliers' credits in the late 1960's. Profit remittances experienced - 69 - a sudden increase in 1967 following the beginning of petroleum exports by the Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporatíon. While the overall increase in factor income payments abroad is to a large extent the result of the particular circumstances surrounding Bolivia's economic reconstruction in the early 1960's, its impact on the balance of payments clearly indicates the need to keep constant vigilance on the volume and the terms of external capital inflows, especially on expensive supplíers' credits. Current Account Balance 178. The unfavorable trend in factor income payments during recent years was accompanied by increasing defícits in non-factor services. The increased volume of trade discussed in the preceding paragraph, was largely responsible for the growing deficit in non-factor services. As a consequence, the deficit on current account demonstrated a tendency to grow during the period of 1965- 1968, while in the past three years it has oscillated between US$30 and US$50 million depending on export performance. Capital Account 179. Bolivia was able to attract increasing amounts of foreign capital during the 1960's. In the second half of the decade, however, the behavior of the capital account in 1967-68 contrasted sharply with that of the 1969- 71 period. While in the earlier years the increasing inflow of public capi- tal was accompanied by some direct private foreign investment and private long-term loans, in the later years not only the drawings on public external loans dwindled, but the inflow of direct private capital was also inter- rupted. This trend can be attributed to the new direction given to Bolivian economic policy after the death of President Barrientos in early 1969. Capi- tal inflow resumed once more in 1971, but it was due mainly to the large disbursements on the Santa Cruz-Yacuiba gas pipeline project. 180. Disbursements by international organizations (IDB and IBRD) were not very significant during 1965-70 and accounted for only one-fifth of gross capital inflows to the public sector. A sharp increase in disbursements by international organizations occurred in 1971, however, as a result of their large contribution to the financing of the gas pipeline. Bilateral credits and commercial loans became an increasingly important source of external capital ín the late 1960's and this could be held at least partly respon- sible for the quadrupling of interest and the trebling of amortization pay- ments on external debt. As a result, the debt service ratio increased ap- preciably and reached 18 percent of exports of goods and non-factor services. This produced an adverse effect on net foreign exchange reserves, and mainte- nance of their absolute level during the past two years was only made possible by windfalls such as the SDR allocations. Moreover, since imports increased, foreign exchange reserves declined in relative terms from 15 weeks of imports in 1965 to 9 weeks in 1971, allowing for less flexibility in the management of the balance of payments. - 70 - B. Balance of Payments in 1972 181. Balance of payments prospects for 1972 appear to be reasonably favorable provided the fiscal deficit is reduced to manageable proportions. Exports of goods and non-factor services are projected to increase by 15 per- cent to US$223 million this year. Higher proceeds from the sales of mineral products account for 50 percent of the increase, with about two-thirds of this coming from increased output and the rest from higher metal prices. The projected trebling of cotton exports in 1972 is expected to contribute some 30 percent of the increase in export earnings, while the remaining 20 percent is estimated to come from increased hydrocarbon exports consisting mainly of new exports of natural gas. Overall import growth is projected at 7.0 percent during Che year and is expected to reach US$248 million. On balance, the resource gap is estimated to decline from US$38 million in 1971 to US$25 million in 1972 or by some US$13 million. The favorable change in the resource balance is likely to be only partially offset by the continua- tion of the less favorable trend in the balance of factor services. The deficit on investment income is expected to increase from US$22 million in 1971 to US$25 million in 1972 as a result of higher profit remittances and interest payments while no changes are anticipated in the net inflow of un- requited transfers. On the assumption that these estimates materialize, the deficit on current account is projected at some US$45 míllion -- an im- provement of US$10 million with respect to 1971. 182. The capital account in 1972, however, gives some cause for conce:n. Disbursements on existing loans are likely to fall by some US$24 million, tith respect to the previous year, to US$42 míllion. The decline is due to the completion of the Santa Cruz-Yacuiba gas pipeline project and the reduc- tion of new commitments by multilateral and bilateral agencies duting the recent past. This shortfall is expected te be reduced to US$15 ilílion by disbursements from new multilateral and bilateral loans of some US$9 million. IWith the much improved climate for private investment, the inflow of long- term private capital may be expected to resume slowly but is not likely to exceed US$3 million in 1972. Since debt service payments are to increase by some US$2 million this year, to achieve balance of payments equilibrium in 1972 and avoid loss of foreign exchange reserves, an additional inflow of some US$15 míllion will have to be arranged. It seems reasonable to assume that a considerable proportion of the additional financing will be forthcom- ing in the form of suppliers' credits with the rest possibly being obtained through short-term capital movements. 183. The above projection of the balance of payments for 1972 assumes that the authorities will follow a reasonably prudent monetary polícy. How- ever, as indicated in paragraph 154, if the Central Bank has to finance an overall budgetary deficit of $b400 to $b450 million while supplying the necessary volume of credit to the private sector, the total volume of credit expansion would unavoidably generate excess demand which ls likely to spill over into the balance of payments through an increase in imports and/or an increase in capital flight. In these circumstances, the level of net for- eígn exchange reserves may be expected to decline by some US$15 million in - 71 - Table 26: SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1971 and 1972 (In millions of US Dollars) Estimate Projection 1971 1972 Resource Gap -38.4 -25.3 Exports of Goods and NF Services 192.7 222.6 Imports of Godds and NF Services 231.1 247.9 Investment Income, net -21.6 -25.2 Profits and Dividends, net -12.2 .,14.4 Interest payments, net -9.4 -10.8 Transfers, net 5.0 5.0 Balance on Current Account -55.0 -45.5 Private Capital, L. & M. Term, net - 2.9 Public Capital, net 41.7 38.6 Drawings on Existing Loans 66.1 42.0 Drawings on New Loana - 8.6 Amortization /1 -24.4 -26.8 Commercial Credits - 14.8 Balance on Capital Account 41.7 41.5 Other Capital, netá 8.1 14.0 Change in reserves 5.2 _ Total - Capital Account 55.0 45.5 /1 Residual gap to be filled with commercial credits. ¿2 Includes errors and omissions, SDR's and liquidation of profits from the International Tin Agreement. Source: Table 3-14, Statistical Appendix. - 72 - 1972 to the equivalent of about six weeks of imports. It has already dropped by US$6.5 million during the first five months although this drop has been mitigated by new allocations of SDRTs, the revaluation of the price of gold and a temporary increase in foreign exchange deposits of public enterprises. C. Future Prospects Export Projections 184. Provided appropriate policies are followed and the necessary in- vestments are carried out along the línes discussed in Chapter III above, opportunities to increase exports of all minerals, and particularly of zinc, copper and lead, appear to be favorable. Export earnings from minerals are also expected to benefit from higher prices, especially for zinc and silver and to a lesser extent for copper and tín. Although projected declines in the prices of antimony and tungsten will somewhat reduce earnings from min- eral exports, on balance it seems reasonable to expect an average annual growth somewhat in excess of 8 percent. 185. Export earnings from non-metal products could treble between 1971 and 1977 provided that the necessary measures are taken to avoid problems in cotton production and to improve the mechanism of promotion of non- traditional exports. Most of the increase in non-metal exports is projected to take place in 1972-75 as a result of a moderate increase in exports of oil and gas and of the continuation of the boom in cotton production. Both hydrocarbon and cotton exports are likely to stabilize after 1975, however, and this would result in a decline in the rate of growth of exports in the last two years of the period unless some not now foreseeable exports are developed. 186. The insufficiency of hydrocarbon reserves and the exhaustion of reasonable possibilities to expand cotton cultivation after 1975 are at the root of the anticipated deceleration in the growth in export earnings. Tle first obstacle could be eased provided that YPFB's exploration plans are successfully carried out and advantage is taken of the new Hydrocarbons Law, which opens exploration and extraction to foreign investors through the mechanism of "operation and servíces" contracts. In the case of cotton, prices are projected to decline fromn USSO.37/lb in early 1972 to US$d.25/lb in 1975 and to remain at that level through 1977. It is most unlikely that the trend in prices would encourage production increases beyond 1975 without a substantial change in the exchange rate. Consequently, export earnings from cotton may at best remain stable at some US$77 million annually between 1975 and 1977. 187. The above products by no means exhaust Bolivia's future export possibilities. There are a number of other products, particularly livestock, timber and lumber, which offer considerable opportunities for development. At the present time, however, Bolivia lacks a comprehensive Governnent- sponsored program for the promotion of non-traditional exports. Tle Bolivian - 73 - Institute for the Promotion of Exports (IMBOLPEX) lacks working capital, an adequately trained staff and an environment receptive to its operations. Export permits and other bureaucratic requirements are complex, time- consuming and quite expensive. They tend to effectively discourage small entrepreneurs from attempting export operations. No less than 16 differ- ent government agencies are involved in the administration of non-mineral exports. Even in the case of products whose export potential has already been demonstrated, processing often involves trips to the capital city and an inordinate volume of paper work --- more than 100 documents for exports of timber and lumber and almost 90 documents for cotton. The only existing fiscal incentive -- the drawback 1/ -- is ineffective while internal taxes, and in some instances export taxes constitute a clear disincentive at the present exchange rate. Export credit, maainly from the Fondo Especial and the Fondo Adicional of the Central Bank, is scarce and narrowly concentrated on a small number of products. Other credit facilities lack flexibility and require high collateral. Considerable deficiencies also exist in the field of export insurance. 188. While solutions to these problems appear to be difficult in the absence of an organization designing and implementing commercial policy, efforts could be made to streamline procedures and increase incentives. Procedures could be considerably simplified for obtaining certificates of origin, notes of embarkation, commercial invoices. export policies and ex- port declarations. It is believed that some obstacles will be removed once the new system of export duties, now undergoing revision in the Ministry of Finance, is approved. Moreover, credit facilities to exporters need to be given greater flexibility and special credits should be extended to finance studies of possible foreign markets. Substantially enlarged credit facil- íties should be made avaílable to exporters of minor non-traditional exports with collateral requirements well below present levels which sometimes reach 300 percent of the credit. Export insurance needs to be strengthened and coverage of risks expanded through an official credit institution, possibly with Government support. Finally, IMBOLPEX should be given access to the financial resources necessary for the development of its operations. Import Projections 189. The behavior of imports in the recent past suggests that a GDP growth target of 6.5 percent per annum would be consistent with an average growth of imports (f.o.b. basis) of about 7.9 percent per annum. Impo-ts of capital goods would have to grow slightly faster -- at an estimated d.2 percent annual growth rate during 1971-77 -- while imports of intermediate and consumer goods (including contraband) could increase at an average rate of 7.7 percent per annum in the same period. The import projections were formulated on the basis of estímates of the parameters underlying the recent 1/ Reimbursement of duties paid on imported inputs. - 74 - performance of the Bolivian economy and by taking into account the projected trends in sectoral development implicit in the investment program discussed in Chapter III. 190. On the assumption that the trends in visible trade described above materialize, Bolivia's balance of trade should continue to ímprove after 1972, when a US$14 míllion favorable balance is anticipated, and reach a surplus of about US$30 million by 1977. The trade surpluses are likely to be more than offset, however, by the continuation of unfavorable trends in other items of the current account. The deficíts on the current account balance are, therefore, projected to remain as in recent years at a level of between US$30 and US$50 million per annum. Exchange Rate 191. It is difficult to assess the extent to which maintenance of the present exchange rate will serve as an obstacle to the realization of the above export and import targets. There is little doubt, however, that a more realistic rate would have substantial favorable effects on the balance of payments over the medium term. An increasing number of small mines pro- ducing for export is being shut down because of losses incurred in exporting of minerals at the present exchange rate, and devaluation of the peso should reverse this process by making the small-scale míning activity profitable again. Devaluation should also lead to increased investment in medium- and large-scale mining which will over the longer term result in increased ex- ports. Increased cost of imports should encourage substitutions by domestic production of some agricultural and simple industrial goods, e.g., edible olls, milk, livestock feed, cotton fiber and yarn. Increased peso value of exports may stimulate exports of such non-traditional goods as timber, wood products, hides, leather, leather products and tropical fruits. Given these considerations as well as the previously discussed (see Chapter IV) progressive decapitalization of the major state export enterprises, COMIBOL and YPFB, it would appear that a change in the parity of the Bolivian peso would have overall salutary effects. - 75 - Table 27: SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1965-77 (In millions of US Dollars) Average Average 1965-70 1971 1972 1973-77 USES Imports of Goods 153.0 180.1 192.9 238.9 Imports of N.F. Services 39.7 51.0 55.0 66.0 Imports of Factor Services 15.4 22.8 26.4 30.6 Profits and Dividends, net (10.3) (12.2) (14.4) (16.0) Interest Payments (5.1) (10.6) (12.0) (14.6) External Debt Amortization 12.6 24.4 26.8 26.7 International Reserves (increase) 3.8 - - 5.2 TOTAL USES 224.5 278.3 301.1 367.4 SOURCES Exports of Goods 153.9 177.6 206.9 274.7 Exports of N.F. Services 12.4 15.1 15.7 17.5 Interest Receipts 2.0 1.2 1.2 1.5 Transfers, net 11.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 Private Capital 5.1 - 2.9 9.2 Public Capital 38.1 66.1 65.4 59.2 From existing "pipeline" of loans (29.2) (57.6) (41.7) (9.6) New Loans (-) (-) (8.6) (41.7) Commercial Credits (8.9) (8.5) (15.1) (7.9) Other Capital 0.8 8.1 4.0 International Reserves (decrease) 0.7 5.2 - _ TOTAL SOURCES 224.5 278.3 301.1 367.4 Capital Account 192. To cover the current account deficits, meet amortization payments and allow for some accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, gross capital inflows will have to average some US$68 million annually during 1973-77 as compared with average inflows of US$46 million annually during 1965-71. On the basis of the "pipeline" of undisbursed loans and the existing lending programs of the principal multilateral and bilateral agencies, Bolivia may reasonably expect to obtain an annual average of US$51 million from these sources during 1973-77. Drawings on commercial credits of around US$7 to 8 million per annum could materialize, considering the expected improvement in the external creditworthiness of the country. Moreover, the balance -- an average annual amount of about US$9 million -- may be expected to come into the country in the form of direct private investment provided the pri- vate investment climate generated by recent legislation continues to be favorable. - 76 - 193. The above projections have been made on the assumption that new loans to Bolivia by IDA, IDB and USAID will carry a grant element of 85, 100 and 50 percent respectively when discounted at a 10 percent interest rate. It was further assumed that the grant element in loans from other governments would be 20 percent and that commercial credits would be con- tracted on the basis of average terms of 10 years maturity, 1 year grace and an interest rate of 8 percent, i.e., a 9 percent grant element. If Bolivia were able to obtain its external capital requirements along the línes described above, ita external debt structure would improve signif1- cantly -- from a grant element of 30 percent in 1972 to 60 percent in 1977. This would also permit an increase in foreign exchange reserves to the equiv- alent of 11 weeks of imports. 194. Based on the above assumptions, Bolivia's external debt repayable in foreign exchange would increase slowly from US$532 million at the end of 1971 to US$628 million at the end of 1977. The external debt-service ratio would revert to íts level of the 1960's of 12.6 percent of exports of goods and non-factor services from the height of 18.2 percent it reached in 1971. Creditworthiness 195. Bolivia possesses considerable resources for development and ex- perience shows that the economy responds favorably to sound economic poli- cies and measures. However, the recent history of political instability and zigzagging economic policies has frustrated economic growth and per- petuated poverty. Periodic upheavals have undermined public finances, in- hibited the establishment of strong developmental institutions and led to inordinate preoccupation with short-term improvísations. The resulting patchwork seldom addressed itself to fundamental issues and rarely viewed remedial measures within the context of a longer-term horizon. If Bolivia's developmental potential is to be realized, a new orientation toward problem- solving will be necessary -- one that combines the extinguishing of `brush fires" with the recognition of the basic principles of fire prevention. 196. The most pressing economic problem is that of a very serious dis- equilibrium in public finances. The repercussions of this disequilibrium are manifold. It prevents the public sector from implementing investments in economic and social infrastructure aud from rendering essential financial assistance to the commodity producing sectors with adverse repercussions on economic growth. The fiscal disequilibríum also leads to the public sector's excessively high reliance on domestic credit resources and constitutes an ever-present danger to balance of payments viability. Whenever domestic credit expansion is held within reasonable limits, a very large proportion becomes absorbed by the public sector and the legitimate credit requirements of the private sector are neglected to the serious detriment of the comno- dity producing sectors. Whenever credit expansion is pushed beyond tolera- ble limits, it spills over into the balance of payments. A vivid case in point is the utilization of US$14 million of foreign exchange in 1971. The impending fiscal disequilibrium for 1972 places in danger the balance of payments outlook and development prospects. Taking all these elements into consideration, it is obvious that strengthening of public finances in the manner outlined in Chapter IV is of the highest priority. - 77 - Table 28: EXTERNAL DEBT, 1972-1977 - (In millions of US Dollars) Pipeline of Undisbursed Loans 1972 1973 197L 1975 1976 1977 Comnitments 53.5 42.0 83.0 62.0 62. 60.0 International Organizations 21. 27.0 2 737 r Bilateral Lenders 32.0 15.0 15.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 Drawings 2 2 2 59.8 7L.3 From Existing Loans, as of December 31, 1971 89.8 h7.0 20.2 3.2 _ International Organizations 53.7 2L.6 12.6 9.L 5.0 2.1 - IBRD .(5.0) (5.0) _ _ _ _ _ IDA (11.2) (3.2) (3.6) (2.0) (1.b) (1.0) (-) IDB - Ordinary Capital (4.9) (L.9) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) IDB-FSO (37.6) (11.5) (9.0) (7.L) (3.6) (1.1) (-) Bilateral Lenders 35.8 17.1 7.6 6.5 3.5 1.1 _ USA (27.9) (12.5) (6.2) (5.3) (2.8) (1.1) (-) Other Governments (7.9) (L.6) (1.L> (1.2) (0.7) (-) () Commercial Credits 0.3 0.3 - - - From New Loans 23. 3.6 38.3 83.7 56.6 78.3 International Organizatíons 3.6 10.7 18.0 2L.8 31.7 35.3 IDA (1.2) (3.8) (6.8) (10.8) (13.8) (15-5) IDB-FSO (2.L) (7 3) (11.2) (íL.0) (17.9) (19.8) Bilateral Lenders 5.0 9.9 17.0 18.9 22.0 19.6 USA (-.2) (7.7) (12.9) (13.8) (15.8) (13.3) Other Governments (0.81) (2.2) (L.1) (5.1) (6.2) (6.3) Commercial Credits 2/ 1L.E ll.0 3.3 - 2.9 19.o Debt Service 38.8 L0.o 82.1 0o.6 kl.9 81.6 Interest 12.0 13.7 1.5 1L 1 Amnortization 26.8 26.3 27.6 25-.8 27.0 26.6 External Public Debt 557.0 569.2 577.2 586.0 599.8 627.7 (Exports of Goods and NF Services) (222.6) (2u .u) (269.5) (301.2) (315.5) (330.0) (Debt Service Ratio) (17.8) (16.2) (15.6) (13.5) (13.3) (12.6) Disbursed and Repayable in foreign currency. 2/ Residual needed to mneet GDP growth and foreian exehange reserve targets. - 78 - 197. While it may take some time to generate private sector confidence and to stimulate an adequate level of domestic and foreign investment to bolster exports, a satisfactory resolution of the fiscal disequilibrium would be a major step in instilling confidence and dispelling doubts regarding the future. It would clearly indicate the authorities' determination to cope with the most pressing problem and to remove the single largest stumbling block to development. In these circumstances, prospects for growth over the medium-term under conditions of balance-of-payments viability appear to be reasonably promising. 198. Long-term growth prospects should also be quite favorable provided measures are taken to improve the organization and coordination of public sector investment and to the preparation of a sound public sector investment program and financing plan. Bolivia's public sector is the dominant factor in exports and its efficient functioning is essential for economic growtli. With the strengthening of the state economic enterprises, both the fiscal and balance-of-payments prospects would greatly improve. These improvements would play a major role in enabling the authorities to mobilize and utilize external capital. 199. Bolivia is a very poor country and the harshness of the environ- ment renders economic development costly. External capital requirements for development are quite high, but with the recently enacted measures, especially those increasing public sector savings, the prospective improve- ments in project preparation and the strengthening of development institutions, it is reasonable to expect that they will be forthcoming. Given the poverty of the country, the outlook for satisfactory performance stemming from the recently adopted reforms, and the present lack of creditworthiness for Bank lending, Bolivia may be considered to be IDA worthy. In time Bo1¡via's creditworthiness for limited amounts of Bank loans of a non-enclave variety may emerge provided sound debt management policies are pursued. Even if this occurs, however, most of the external assistance will have to be pro- vided on "soft" terms during the next several years. If the external capital requirements are mobilized in this manner, the service burden on the external debt should be held within manageable proportions and amount to about 12 percent of foreign exchange earnings by 1977. -STATISTICAL APPENDIX -Table of Contents 1. POPULATION 1.1 Urban and Rural Population, Estimnates and Projections, 1950-1980 1.2 1971, Population by Sex and Age Groun 1.3 Population Estimates and projecti.ons, by Region and Department, 1950-1972 1.4 Population, labor Force, and km1oyment by Region and Department 2. NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2.1 Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin, 1965-1971 (Current Bolivian Pesos) 2.2 Gross Dormestic Product by Sector of Origin, 1965-1972 (1970 Bolivian Pesos) 2.3 InDlicit Dkflators of GDP by Sector of Origin, 1965-1971 2.b Structure of Gross Dornestic Product by Sector of erigin, 1965-1972 2.5 Index of Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin 2.6 Exoenditure on Gross Doriestic Product, 1965-1971 (Current Bolivian Pesos) 2.7 Ex-penditiire on Gross Domestic Product., 1965-1971, (1970 Bolivian Pesos) 2.8 Innlicit Deflators of Zxnendíture on Gross Domestie, 1965-1.971 2.9 Structure o. F;penditure on Gross Dorie-stic Product, 1965-1972 (1970 Bolívian Pesos) 2.10 Index of Real Resources and Uses, 1965-1972 2.11 Gross Fixed Capital Fori-ation, 1°ó5-1971 (Current Bolivian Pesos) 2.12 Gross Fixed Capi.tal Formation, 1°65-1971 (1970 Bolivian Pesos) 2.13 Strructure of Gross Fixed Capiítal Fornation, 1965-1971 2.11i Gross Fixed Capital Formation of the Piblic Sector (Current Bolivian Pesos 2.15 Gross Fixed Capital Formation - Publi.c Sector, 1965-1972 (1970 Bolivian Pesos) 2.16 Structure of Gross Fixed Capital Formation - Public Sector, 1965-1972 2.17 GDP by Sector of Origin, by Region and Departm'ent 2.18 Product per 'Yorlcer, by Region and Department 2.19 Structure and Develonment of GDP, Gross Fixed Investment anid Employment by Branch (1970 Bolivian pesos) 2.20 Projections of Expenditures on Gross Domestic Product, 1972-1977 2.21 Projection of Gross Fixed Investment by Branch - 1972-1977 2.22 Projections of GDP by Sectors, 1972-1977 (1970 Bolivian Pesos) 2.23 Projections oí Employment by Sectors, 1972-1977 2.24 Projections of GDP, Eiployment and Productivity by Sectors, 1972-1977 - ii - 3. BALANCE OF PAMIMENTS 3.1 Balance of Payments, 1965-1970 and Estimnate, 1971 3.2 Exports, 1963-1970 and Estirnate, 1971 3.3 Export Values 1963-1970 and Estimate, 1971 3.4 Structure of Excports, 1963-1970 and Estimate, 1971 3,5 Geographic Distribution of EScorts, 1963-1970 and Estimates, 1971, Dollars 3.6 Geographic Distribution of EZxPorts, 1963-1970 and Estimates, 1971, Percentage 3.7 Value and Structure of Inmnorts, by Products 1967-1970 and Estimates, 1971 3.8 Imports, 1962-1969 and Estimates, 1970 and 1971 3.9 Import Structure, 1962-1969 and Estimnates, 1970 and 1971 3.10 Value and Structure of ITDorts by Origin, 1967-1970 and Estimates, 1971 3.11 Resource Gap, 1965-1970 and Estimnate, 1971 3.12 International Reserves, 1965-1970 and Estimate, 1971 3.13 Internatiional Reserves of the Central Bank, 1965-1970 and Estirnate, 1971 3.14 Balance of Payments, 1970 Estirnate, 1971 and Projections, 1972-1977 3.15 Exports 1970; Estinate, 1971 and Projections, 1972-1977 3.16 Growth in Exnorts, 1965-1971 and Projections to 1977 >. DEXTERNIAL DEBT 4.1 External Public Debt Oustanding as of Decemrber 31, 1971 4.2 Estimated Future Service Payrents on Fxternal Public Debt Outstanding Including Undisbursed as of December 31, 1971 5. PUBLIC SECTOR FA.LUCES 5.1 Public Sector Resources for Investment, 1967-1972 (Current Bolivian Pesos) 5.2 Public Sector Resources for Investment, 1967-1972 (percentages) 5.3 Public Sector Resources for Investrnent, 1967-1972 (percentage year-to-year change) 5.! Public Sector Resources for Investment, 1967-1972 (Percent of GDP) 5.5 Analysis of Public Sector Finances, 1967-1972 (current Bolivian Pesos) 5.6 Analysis of Public Sector Finances, 1967-1972 (Percent of GDF) 5.7 Central Government ODerations, 1967-1972 (current Bolivian Pesos) 5.8 Decentralized Agencies, 1967-1972 5.9 Export rnterprises, YPFB and CONIBOL, 1967-1972 5.10 Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Boliv.;ios (YPFB), 1967-1972 5.11 Corporacion Minera de Boliíia (CO=i.01), 1967-1972 5.12 Other State Enterprises, 1967-1972 5.13 Ibnicipalities of La Paz and Santa Cruz, 1967-1972 - lii - 5.Ib Treasury Current Revenues, 1967-1972 5.15 Treasury Current Revenues, 1967-1972 5.16 Treasury Operations, 1967-1972 5.17 Treasury Current Expenditures, 1967-1972 ~.1z Analysis of Tax Burden, 1967-1972 5.19 Public Sector Resolurces and Uses, 1973-1977 5.20 Projected Public Sector Finances, 1973-1977 5.21 Projections of Treasury Current PRevenues, 1972-1977 5.22 Projections of Treasury Current Expenditures, 1972-1977 5.23 Decentralized Agencies, 1973-1977 5.2L Export anterprises, YPFB and COMIBOL, 1973-1977 5.25 Revised Pu.blic Investnent Progran, 1972 5.26 Public Investment, 1965-1968 and Tentative Projections, 1972-1977 6. BANKIIG SYSTEM 6.1 Sunmary of Accounts of the Banking System, 1965-1970 and Estimates, 1971 6.2 Sumnary Accounts of the Central Bank, 1965-1970, and Estimates, 1971 6.3 wimmna Accounts of the Commerical Banks, 1965-1970 and Estinates, 1971 6.4 Amma'ry Accounts of the Specialized Banks 1965-1970 and Estimates, 1971 6.5 Banking System Financing by Institutions and Sector, 1965-1970 and Estíznates, 1971 6.6 Comnposition of Money Supply, 1965-1970 and Estimates, 1971 6.7 Pric, Indexes 1965-1971 6.8 Projections of Accounts of the Benking System, .-972-77 7. AGRICULTURE 7.1 Suppl;r of Selected Crops, 1967-1970; Estimates 1971 and Projected for 1972 and 1975 7.? Area, Yields and Production of other Crops, 1967-1971 7.3 Livestock Indicators, 1971 - 7.1¿ Credit Outstanding to Agricultural Sector, 1967-1971 7.5 Central Governmaent Expenditure in Agriculture and Related Programs and Structure, 1963-1972 7.6 . Total Budget of Agriculture Sector Agencies, 1971 7.7 Estimates Net Returns per Hectare for Selected Products in Santa Cruz Area 8. INDUSTRY 8.1 Value Added by Industry, 1966-1970 - iv _ 9. TRANSPORT 9.1 Transport and Communications Indicators, 1965-1971 9.2 Freight and Passenger Movements, 1968 10. EDUCATION 10.1 Population and School Enrollment, 1960-1971 10.2 School EnroRlnent by Grades, 1957-68 10.3 Primary Edúcations, Urb¿mw and Rural Number of Students Enrollment and Obtaining Passing Grades - 196b-1969 10.4 Enrollmiient in Medium Ievel Education, 1967-1971 10.5 University Enroliment, 1065-1968 10.6 Financing of Public Education, 1960-1971 Table 3-1: URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION, ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, 1950-1980 Total Urban Rural Years (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) % Urban 1950 3,019.0 772.6 2,246.4 25.6 1955 3,388.6 894.2 2,494.4 26.4 1960 3,824.5 1,039.9 2,784.6 27.2 1565 4,334.0 1,213.5 3,120.5 28.0 1970 4,931.2 1,444.8 3,486.4 29.3 1971 5,o62.5 1,496.5 3,566.0 29.6 1972 5,194.9 1,549.1 3,645.8 29.8 1973 5,330.7 1,603.5 3,727.2 30.1 1974 5,470.1 1,659.6 3,810.5 30.3 1975 5,663.8 1,723.9 3,909.9 30.4 1980 6,455.7 2,065.8 4,389.9 32.0 Average Annual Rates of Growth Total Urban Rural Period (% (%) (%) 1950-1960 2.4 3.0 2.2 1960-1970 2.6 3.3 2.3 1970-1980 2.7 3.6 2.3 Source: Ministry of Planning. Table 1-2: 1971, POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE GROUP Age Group Total Male Female % Distribution (1,000) (1,000) (1,000) By Age Group Total 5,o62.5 2,527.6 2,534.9 0-4 822.0 417.0 405.0 ) 5,9 686.5 348.8 337.7 ) 41.6 10-14 598.4 303.3 295.1 ) 15-19 526.5 267.9 258.6 ) 20-24 459.2 235.0 224.2 ) 25-29 385.8 194.6 191.2 ) 30-34 318.4 161.7 156.7 ) 35-39 267.3 133.9 133.4 ) 55.0 40-44 228.8 108.7 120.1 ) 45-49 195.4 90.9 104.5 ) 50-5I 164.0 75.8 88.2 ) 55-59 133.7 61.0 72.7 ) 60-64 102.3 45.5 56.8 ) 65-69 75.9 35.0 I0.9 ) 70-74 58.4 28.5 29.9' 3.4 75 and over 39.9 20.0 19.9 ) Percentage Distribution of Population by Age Group-Selected Years Age Group 1960 1965 1970 1980 0-14 42.4 41.9 41.6 41.6 15-64 54.0 54.6 55.0 54.8 65 and over 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.6 Source: Ministry of Planning. Table 1-3 : POPULATICN ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, BY REGION AND DEPARTMENT, 1950-1972 (in thousands) Regíon and Department 1950 1960 -1965 1970 1971 1972 Total - Bolivia 3,09.0 3824.5 4.334.0 4,931.2 5 5 Altiplano 1,693.1 2'1h4.8 2,430.6 2,765.5 2,839.1 2,913.2 La Paz 948.I4 1,201.4 1,361.5 ,59.1 1,590.4 1,631.7 Oruro 210.3 266.4 301.9 343.5 352.6 361.9 Potosi 534.4 677.0 767.2 872,9 896.1 919.6 Valle 900.2 1,140.4 1,292.3 1 470.4 1,509.5 1,549.2 Chuquisaca 282.9 5 - 40 ' 74 486. Cochabamba 490.5 621.4 704.2 801.2 822.5 844.2 Tarija 126.8 160.6 182.0 207.1 212.6 218.2 Llanos 425.7 539.3 611.1 695.3 713.9 732.5 Santa Cruz 26.1 362.4 410.7 46773 479B 492-.3 Beni 119.8 151.8 172.0 195.7 200.9 206.1 Pando 19.8 25.1 28.4 32.3 33.2 34.1 General Note: Most of the departments fall under more than one reglon; each one has been placed under the region where the majority of its population concentrates. Source: Ministry of Planning. Tablel-4: POPUIATION, LABOR FORCP, AlPD W>T J3~T 8Y REOION AND DEPARTW1M (thousandz) - otal Labor Uoe~aploy- T_tal hpl2f7Ioyfent 5oaU Siectora aEp1. Total Labor Unerploy- Total Mining & Manufae- Construc- Serdiees legion and Department Population Force ment b'iployn nt Total Alri ú1 ture Quarrying turing tion Sectcra Total - Bolivia 1965 1431111.0 2,011.2 292.3 1,718.9 1 4'5 0 1 169,2 63.2 138.6 34.0 333.9 .~-~~-~ 1970 4,941.2 377 fl'9 77> ' 4_-16 13781434 Annual Growth rate 1965-70(%)Y *-I==r:!2.6 5.2 2.1 2.1 .9 1.2 3.9 2. 5 Altiplano 1965 2,430.6 1,136.4 150.7 985.7 797.2 . 648.1 56.2 78.1 14.8 188.5 1970 217b.5 5 1,?9.a " í. 7 1 687,97 711.14 90.3 Ti8 Annual Orowth rata 1965-7O((Y) 2.T -Y.T -.4 2.0 i.3 í1.9 -30 r- La Paz 1965 1,361.5 636.5 64.2 572.3 W45.8 3h5.5 14.7 62.1. 9.5 120.5 1970 1.549.1 72b.1 1)1.1 623.' 489.8 389.q i5.8 74.3 10.7 133.2 Oruro 1965 301.9 141.2 18.1 123.1 1ot4.6 Bl.6 11.9 9.2 1.9 18.5 1970 343.5 160.6 21.7 138.9 116.4 92.8 11.7 8.2 3.7 22.5 Potosi 1965 767.2 358.7 68.4 290.3 240.8 201.1 29.6 6.8 3.4 49.5 1970 872.9 h08.1 82.7 325.4 272.5 229.6 31.4 7.8 3.7 52.9 Valle 1965 1 292.3 60i.4 102.7 L98.7 1412.2 370.9 4.9 27.6 8.8 86.5 1970 gwtD u 7! 5¶d37 1457.1 ' b40639.1 1-577 lUIC Annual Growth rato 1965-70(N) . -2 -'.T 2.3 z,l1 --11 ,,.3 Chuqutiaca 1965 406.1 189.9 38.6 151.3 121.4 113.3 0.3 6.6 1.2 29.9 1970 462.1 216.0 44.6 171.1, 139.6 122.9 o.B 13.7 2.2 31.8 Cochab4mba 1965 7C4.2 329.2 49.3 279.9 235.9 2n7.3 3.9 19.1 5.6_ 44.o 1970 801.2 374.6 (4.3 310.3 255.2 220.7 4.2 23.3 7.0 55.1 Taríja 1-965 182.0 82.3 114. 67.5 514.9 50.3 0.7 1.9 2.0 . 12.6 TariJ 8 1207.1 93.2 16 .2 77.0 62.3 50.0 0.7 2.1 1.5 1i4. Llanos 1965 611.1 293.4 38.9 254.5 19S.6 150.2 2.1 32.9 10.4 a 1970 "- 331.3 17 l7' Annual Orw th rato 1965 -70(S) 2-7 -zr, T7 i.9 -r78 Santa Cnru 1965 L10.7 192.0 20.1. l71. 127.7 87.0 2.1 29.0 9.6 44.2 1970 167.3 72.8.5 24.1 194.1 146.3 t13.3 2, 31.9 8.9 h7.8 Dfen 1965 172.0 e6.9 17.6 69.3 57.i 54.5 -- 2.2 0.7 11.9 1970 195.1 98.9 22.0 76,9 63.4 59.0 . 3.8 0.6 13.5 1andu ¡965 28.1 14.5 1.2 13.3 10.5 b.- 1.7 0.1 2.8 970 32.3 15.9 0.3 15,6 12.b 10.2 2.3 0.1 3.0 our>el bdatrty of PlanMlih. 1Á /r--,ff X J IP t4 .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ /.r- 5 ,r- Z~ .1 . . 2 Table2-1 : GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN, 1965-1971 (in minllions of Bolivian pesos - at current m,p.) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971E/ Goods Sector 3,973. 4>141.3 4y472.2 4,770.1 5,019.5 5,128.1 5,314.8 #grículture 1,725.3 1,796.4 1,811.2 1,921.1 1,926.1 2,024.9 2,122.2 Mining and Quarying 963.2 1,002.2 1,245.9 1,320.0 1,482.8 1,378.1 1,481.1 lfinn ( 891.6) ( 873.0) ( 876.2) ( 951.7) (1,120.5) (1,161,6) (1,154.9) Petroleum (ext.) ( 71.6) ( 129.2) ( 369.7) ( 368.3) ( 362.3) ( 216.5) ( 326.2) Manufacturing 981.4 1,027.3 1,073.3 1,145.8 1,177.4 1,254.4 1,302.2 Food ( 203.8) ( 214.5) ( 224.6) ( 235.3) ( 247.9) ( 257.9) ( 272.5) Other Consump. Goods ( 572.9) ( 592.3) ( 612.5) ( 644,7) ( 677.5) ( 698.9) ( 725.0) Yeta]Lurgy ( 52.1) ( 57.0) ( 51,0) ( 59.3) ( 27,8) ( 55.3) ( 56.3) Petroleum (ref.) ( 152.6) ( 163.5) ( 185.2) ( 206.5) ( 224.2) ( 242.3) ( 248.4) Construction 303.1 315.4 341.8 383.2 433,2 470,7 409.3 Services Sector 37196.0 3a758 8 4,059.5 4,377.6 42693,2 4,994,9 5.285.8 Energy 90.1 114.8 128.4 149.7 161,6 167,1 168,9 Transportation and Comm. 519.3 575,5 657.0 700.2 763.0 815.1 855,6 Commerce 850.0 985.0 j1,054.4 1,133.0 1,200,2 1,267,4 1,338.8 Banking 86.3 102.6 114.7 134.8 157.5 181,1 186.9 General Government 619.0 723.0 761.5 796.3 832.0 868,1 946.5 Ownership of Dwellings 550,6 684.5 708.5 762.6 826.5 871.9 916.1 nther Services 480.7 573.4 635.0 701.0 752,4 824.2 873.0 GDP at m.p. 7,169.0 7,900l1 8 _53 1.7_ 99712,7 10,123.0 10,600,6 EJ Estimate Source: Ministry of Planning and IBRD. Table2-2: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN, 1965-1972 (in millions of Bolivian pesos-at constant m.p. of 1970) Contribution to 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 E/ 1972 P/ Growth (%) 1965-68 1968-71 roods Sector 4,?74.5 4,384.3 46693.7 4,991.1 5,007.2 5,128.1 5,260.7 5,680.3 43.5 33.4 Agriculture 1,816.3 1,891.3 1,864.9 1,996.6 1,927.7 2,024.9 2,120.1 2,232.5 10.9 15.3 Mining & Quarrying 1,069.9 1,061.9 1,322.2 1,411.4 1,454.2 1,378.1 1,452.9 1,649.9 20.7 5.1 Mining ( 998.3) ( 932.7) ( 952.5) (1,043.1) (1,091.9) (1,161.6) (1,126.7) (1,258.5) ( 2.7) (10.3) Petroleurn (ext.) ( 71.6) ( 129.2) ( 369.7) ( 36S.3) ( 362.3) ( 216.5) ( 326.2) ( 391.4) (18.0) (-5.2) Manufacturing 1,054.1 1,085.6 1,134.7 1,181.6 1,185.7 1,254.4 1,284.8 1,327.2 7.8 12.8 Food ( 220.8) ( 229.5) ( 240.4) ( 2h5.3) ( 249.1) ( 257.9) ( 268.2) ( 279.0) ( 1.5) ( 2.8) Other Consumpt. Goods ( 621.3) ( 633.2) ( 654 .9) ( 666.8) ( 684.2) ( 698.9) ( 712.9) ( 726.9) ( 2.8) ( 5.3) Metal1urgy ( 59.4) ( 59.4) ( 54.2) ( 63.0) ( 28.2) ( 55.3) ( 55.3) ( 55.3) ( 0.2) (-1.0) Petroleun (ref.) ( 152.6) ( 163.5) ( 165.2) ( 206.5) ( 224.2) ( 242.3) ( 248.4) ( 266.0) ( 3.3) ( 5.2) Construction 334.2 345.5 371.9 401.5 439.6 470.7 402.9 470.7 4.1 0.2 3ervices Sector 3,686.7 4 ,192.5 4,399.4 4,620.1 40 499h.9 5,158.0 5,420.0 56-5 66.6 Biergy 105.3 131.3 141.7 156.1 163.1 167.1 167.1 170.9 3.1 1.4 Transportation 599.1 652.1 700.2 737.7 785.8 815.1 836.0 901.0 8.4 12.2 Commerce 1,000.0 1,135.6 1,163.5 1,201.5 1,234.4 1,267.4 1,300.0 1,400.9 12.2 12.2 Banking 92.9 110.5 122.6 142.9 158.3 181.1 185.8 200.2 3.0 5.3 General aovernraent 656.3 766.5 790.0 813.4 843.8 868.1 928.9 961.0 9.5 14.3 Ownership of Dwellings 634.7 743.7 759.4 814.4 839.6 871.9 894.6 918.1 10.9 9.9 Other Services 598.4 652.8 722.0 754.1 783.0 824.2 845.6 867.9 9.4 11.3 _DP at m.p. 7,961.2 8,576.8 9,093.1 2,61¿ 9,815.2 10,123.0 10,418.7 11,1003 100.0 100.0 / - Es tínated f - Projected Source: Ministry of Planning, Central Bank and mission estimates. Table2-3 s IMPLICIT DEFLATORS OF GI)P 3 SEMM, OF ORMGIW, 1965-1971 - 970 100) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 G~odi se~or 92.9 9h.5 95.3 95 100.2 100.0 -Ir.0 Agrrnlture 95.o 95.0 97.1 9i.2 99.9 100.0 .100.1 i4ning & Quarryíng 90.0 94.4 9h.2 93.5 102.0 100.0 11.9 lining 89.3 93.6 92.0 91.2 102.6 (100.0) 102.5 Petroleumn (ext.) 100.0 10 - 100.0 1CO.0 100.0 (100.0) 100.0 Manulacturíng 93.1 9l4.6 94X.6 97.0 99.3 100.0 101.2 Food 92.3 93.5 93.4 95.9 99.5 (100.0) 101.6 Other Consumption Goods 92.2 93.5 93.5 96.7 99.0 (100.0) 101.7 Metallurgy 37.7 96,0 941 i 94.1 98.6 (100.0) 101.8 Petroleum (refS 100.0 100.9 1(0.0 100.0 100.0 (100.0) 100.0 Construction 90.7 91.2 91.9 95. 98.5 100.0 101.6 Services Sector 86.7 89.7 92.3 L4-7 97.6 100.0 102.5 Energy 83.6 87.4 90.6 95.9 99.1 100.0 101.1 Transportation & Communications 86.7 88.3 93.8 9!i.^ 97.1 10.0.0 102.3 Commerce 85.0 86.7 90.6 94.3 97.2 100.0 103.0 Banking 92.9 92.9 93.6 9h.3 99.5 100.0 100.6 General Governrent 9h.3 9h.3 96.4 97.9 98.6 100.0 101.9 Ownership of Dwellings 86.7 92.0 93.3 9346 98.4 100.0 102.L Other Services 80.3 87.8 88.0 93.0 96.1 100.0 103.2 GDP at m.p. 90.0 92.1 93.8 95SZ 99.0 100.0 101.7 Source: Tables 2-1 and 2-2 Táblé 2-4: STRUCTURE OF GROSS DOIESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN, 1965-1972 (% of GDP in constant 1970 prices) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971E' 1972Z/ Goods Sect* i*" 53.7 51.1 51.6 51.9 51.0 50.7 50.5- 51.2 AgricultuPe 22.9 22.0 20.5 20.8 19.6 20.0 20.4 20.1 Mining and Quarrying 13.4 12.4 14.5 14.6 14.8 13.7 13.9 14.9 Mining (12.5) (10.9) (10.4) (10.8) (11.1) (11.6) (10.8) (11.4) Petroleum (ext.) t 0.9) ( 1.5) ( 4.1) ( 3.8) ( 3.7) ( 2.1) ( 3.1) ( 3.5) Manufacturing 13.2 12.7 12.5 12.3 12.1 12.4 12.3 12.0 Food (2.8) ( 2.7) ( 2.6) (2.6) ( 2.5) (2.5) ( 2.6) ( 2.5) Other Consumption Goods ( 7.8) ( 7.4) ( 7.3) ( 6.9) ( 7.0) ( 7.0) ( 6.8) ( 6.6) Metallurgy ( 0.7) ( 0.7) ( 0.6) ( 0.7) ( 0.3) ( 0.5) ( 0.5) ( 0.5) Petroleum (ref.) ( 1.9) ( 1.9) ( 2.0) ( 2.1) ( 2.3) ( 2.4) ( 2.4) ( 2.4) Construction 4.2 4.0 o;4 4.2 4.5 4.6 3.9 4.2 Services Sector 46.3 48.9 48.4 48.1 49.0 49.3 49.5 48.8 Energy 1.3 1 - l 1.7 1T6 1 6 Transportation 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.1 Commerce 12.6 13.3 12.8 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.6 12.6 Bankir g 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.8 General Government 8.2 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.9 8.7 Ownershíp of Dwellings 8.0 8.7 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.3 Other Services 7.5 7.6 7.9 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.1 7.8 Total GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 E/- Estimated. P/- Projected. Source: Table 2-2 Table 2-§ INDEX OF REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUWCT BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN (1965=100) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 EJ 1972 Pf Annual Rate of Growt 1965-68 1968-71 1971- )ods Sector 100.0 102.6 109.8 116.8 117.2 120.0 123.1 132.9 5.3 1.8 8.0 Agricclture 100.0 104.1 102.7 109.9 106.1 111.5 116.7 122.9 3.2 2.0 5.3 Minino & Quarrying 100.0 99.3 123.6 131.9 135.9 128.8 135.6 154.2 9.7 1.0 13.5 Mining (100.0) ( 93.4) ( 95.4) (104.5) (109.4) (116.4) (112.9) (126.1) 1.5 2.6 11.7 Petroleum (ext.) (100.0) (180.4) (516.3) (514.4) (506.1) (302.4) (455.6) (546.6) 72.6 -4.0 20.0 Manufacturing 100.0 103.0 107.6 112.1 112.5 119.0 121.9 125.9 3.9 2.8 3.3 Food (100.0) (103.9) (108.9) (111.1) (112.8) (116.8) (121.5) (126.4) 3.6 3.0 4.C Other Consumption Goods (100.0) (101.9) (105.4) (107.3) (110.1) (112.5) (114.7) (117.0) 2.4 2.3 2.C Metallurgy (100.0) (100.0) ( 91.2) (106.1) ( 47.5) ( 93.1) ( 93.1) ( 93.1) 2.0 -4.3 O.C Petroleum (ref.) (100.0) (107.1) (121.4) (135.3) (146.9) (158.8) (162.8) (174.3) 10.6 6.4 7.1 Construction 100.0 103.3 111.3 120.1 131.5 140.8 120.6 140.8 6.3 0.1 16.7 ?rvices Sector 100.0 113.7 119.3 125.3 130.4 135.5 139.9 147.0 7.8 8 5 Energy 100.0 124.7 134.6 148.2 154.9 158.7 158.7 162.3 14.0 2.3 2., Transportation 100.0 108.8 116.9 123.1 131.2 136.0 139.5 150.3 7.2 4.3 7.7 Conmierce 100.0 113.6 116.4 120.2 123.4 126.7 130.0 140.1 6.3 2.7 7.8 Banking 100.0 118.9 132.0 153.8 170.4 194.9 200.0 215.5 15.4 9.2 7.8 General Goverment 100.0 116.8 120.4 123.9 128.6 132.3 1141.5 1146.4 7.4 4.5 3.5 Ownership of Dwellngs 100.0 117.2 119.6 128.3 132.3 137.4 140.9 144.7 8.7 3.2 2.7 Other Services 100.0 109.1 120.7 126.0 130.8 137.7 1141.3 145.0 8.0 3.9 2.6 >tal GD? 1000 107.7 114.2 120.7 123.3 127.2 130.9 139.4 6. 2.8 6 /- Estimated '- Projected )urce: Table 2-4 Table 2-6 : EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1965-1971 (in miíllions of Bolívian pesos - at current m.p.) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 19713] GDP at mn.p. 7,169.0 7,900.1 8,331.7 9,147.7 9,712.7 10,123.0 10,600.6 Nyet factor income from abroad - 13.1 9.5 - 171,0 - 258.9 - 250.5 - 250.5 - 256M5 GNP at m.p. 7,155.9 7,909.6 8,360.7 8,888.8 9,462.2 9,872,5 10,344.1 Expcrts of goods & n.f. Services 1,489,1 1,660.. 1,983.1 2,002.1 2,25856 2, U58.1 2,288.3 Tmports cf goods & n.f. Serjñces 1,920.2 2,068,6 2,291.9 2,405.9 2,555,5 2,502,1 2,744.3 Yet Exports - 431.1 - 408.i - 308.8 - 403.8 - 296.9 - 44.0 - 456.0 Avaílable Pesources 7,600.1 8,308.6 8,840,5 9,551.5 lO,Q09.6 10,167.0 11,056.6 Total Consinxtíon 6,382.3 7,017.5 7,555.8 7,715.5 8,196.9 8,405.8 9,227.7 Privatc 5,543.7 6,080.6 6,565.5 6,624.2 7,091.2 7,078.8 7,819,4 Genru-ral Covern-ment 838.6 936.9 990.3 1,091.3 1,105.7 1I327.0 1,408.3 TotP.l Investment 1,217*8 1,291.1 1,284.7 1,836.0 1,812.7 1,761.2 1,828.9 Fixed Ir.vestr.ent 1,050.8 99,1 1,155.7 1,770.0 1,640.1 1,580.3 1,578.5 T'T7Ivat.e /i 599.7 470.3 607.1 882.0 723.0 581.3 467.8 '_blic 7_ 451.1 478.3 548.6 888.0 917.1 999.0 1,110*7 (2hange in Stocks 167.0 342.0 129.0 66.0 172.6 180,9 250,4 Gross Doniestic Saving 786.7 882.6 975.9 1,432.2 1,515.8 1l717.2 1,372.9 Cross National Saving 773.6 892.1 804.9 1y173,3 1,265.3 1,466.7 1,116.4 S = Estimate Source: Ministry of Planning, other Governnent Agencies and IBRD. /1 includcs private investmrent fin,ncoe fror. public rescurces /2 IncI.,wlu ,-he hdirect fixed investr.en of the 7hoIe public sector Table 2-7: EXPEtIDITTJRE ON GROSS DOIMSTIC PFCDUCT, 1965-1972 Tiñ-i'lions of Boilvian pesos - at constant m.p. of 1970) 1965 19¿6 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971l/ 197?-P/ GDP at m.p. 7,961.2 8,576.8 9,093.1 9,611.2 9,815.2 10,123.0 10,418.7 11,100.3 Net Factor Income from Abroad -14.9 - 10.8 -184.8 -275.7 -248.9 -250.5 -250.4 _993.3 GNP at m.p. 7,946., 8,587.6 8,908.3 9,335.5 9,566.3 9,872.5 10,163.3 10,807.0 Exports of goods & n.f. 'services 1,578.9 1,816.5 2,252.5 2,285.5 2,3b9.5 2,1458.1 2,431.8 2,750.4 Imports of goods & n.f. ser'vices 2,183.8 2,335;6 2,476.7 2,561.6 2,539.0 2,502.1 2,743.8 - Net Exports -604.9 -519.1 -224,2 -276.1 -189.5 -ldj.O -312.0 -13 Available Resources 8,566.1 9,095.9 9,31'~ .3 9,887.3 10,004.7 10,167.0 10,730.7 11,235.4 Total ConsimLption 7,136.8 7,609.5 7,.21.1 7,946.7 8,182.4 8,o05.8 8,915.6 9,382.0 Private 6,150.8 6,590.4 6,863.8 ó,804.2 7,033.2 7,078.8 7,562.1 7,980.7 General Government 986.0 1,019.1 1,052.3 1,142.5 1,149.2 1,327.0 1,353.5 1,401.3 Total Investment 1,429.3 1,486.4 1,396.2 1,940.6 1,822.3 1,761.2 1,815.1 1,853.4 Fixed Investment 1,234.1 1,094.0 1,256.5 1,871.1 1,647.7 1,580.3 1,569.1 1,681.0 Private /1 704.7 542.6 659.7 931.8 726.3 581.3 465.0 726.3 Public _2 529.4 551.4 596.8 939.3 921.4 999.0 1,104.1 954.7 Char.ge in Stocks 195.2 392.4 139.7 69.5 174.6 180.9 246.0 172.4 Gross Domestic Saving 824.4 967.3 1,172.0 1,664.5 1,632.8 1,717.2 1,503.1 1,718.3 Gross National Saving 809.5 978.1 987.2 1,388.8 1,383.9 1,466.7 1,252.7 1,425.0 Terzms of Trade Adj. 114.6 57.8 -1(09.5 -153.8 -105.5 - -144.0 -1-9.3 Groes National Income (GNY) 8,060.9 8,645.4 8,798.8 9,181.7 9,460.8 9,872.5 10,0214.3 10,647.7 E/ - Estirated. P/ - Projected. Source: Ministry of Planning, other Governrnent Agencies. and IBRD. /1 Includes private investnent finpnce from public resources /2 Includes the direct fixed investnent of the whole public sector. Table2-f : IMP LCIT DEFLATORS OF EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1965-1971 (1970 100) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 19719J GDP at m,p, 90.0 92.1 93.8 95.2 99,0 100.0 101.7 Net factor income from abroad 87.9 88.0 92.5 93.9 100.6 100.0 100.0 GNP at m.p. 90.0 92.1 93.8 95.2 98.9 100.0 101.7 Exporta of goods & n.f. Servíces 94.3 91.4 88.0 87.6 96.1 100.0 94.1 Imports of goods & n.f, Servíces 87.9 88.6 92.5 93.9 100.6 100.0 100.0 Net Exports 71.3 78,7 137.7 146.3 156.7 100.0 146.2 Avaílable Resources 88.7 91.3 94.9 96.6 100.1 100,0 103.0 Total Consumptlon 96.4 92.2 95.4 97.1 100.2 100.0 103,5 Private 90.) 92.3 95.6 97.4 100.8 100.0 103.4 General Governnent 85.1 91.9 94.1 95.5 96.2 100.0 104.0 Total Investment 85.2 8609 92.0 94.6 99.5 100.0 100.8 Fixed Tnvestment 85.1 86.8 92.0 94.6 99.5 100.0 100.6 Private 85.1 86.8 92.0 94.6 99.5 100.0 100.6 Publie 85.1 86.8 92.0 94.6 99.5 100.0 100.6 Change in Stocks 85.5 87.2 92.3 95.0 98.9 100.0 101.8 Gross Domestic Saving 95.4 91.2 83.3 86.0 92.@ 100.0 91.3 Cross National Saving 95.6 91.2 81.5 84.5 91.b 100.0 89.1 S = Estímate Source: Tables 2-6 and 2-7 Table 2-9: STRUCTURE OF EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1<65-1972 (% of GDP in constant 1970 prices) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971!¡ 1972- GDP at m.p. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Net Factor Income from Abroad -0.2 0.1 -2.0 -2.9 -2.5 -2.5 -2.4 -2.6 GNP at m.p. 99.8 100. 98.0 97.1 97.5 97.5 97.6 97.4 Exports of Goods & n.f. Svcs. 19.8 21.2 24.8 23.8 24.o 24.3 23.3 24.8 Inports of Goods & n.f. SYCS. 27.4 27.2 27.2 26.6 25.9 24.7 26.3 26.0 Net Exports -7.6 -6.0 -2.4 -2.8 -1.9 -0.4 -3.0 -1.2 Available Resources 107.6 106.0 102.4 102.8 101.9 100.1 103.0 101.2 Total Consumption 89.6 88.7 87.1 82.6 83.3 83.0 85.6 84.5 Private 77.2 76.8 75.5 70.7 71.6 69.9 72.6 71.9 General Government 12.4 11.9 11.6 11.9 11.7 13.1 13.0 12.6 Total Investment 18.0 17.3 15.3 20.2 18.6 17.4 17.4 16.7 Fixed Investment 15.5 12.7 13.8 19.5 16.8 15.6 15.0 15.2 Private 8.9 6.3 7.2 9.7 7.4 5.7 4.4 6.5 Public 6.6 6.4 6.6 9.8 9.4 9.9 10.6 8.7 Change in Stocks 2.5 4.6 1.5 0.7 1.8 1.8 2.4 1.5 Gross Domestic Saving 10.4 11.3 12.9 17.4 16.7 17.0 14.4 15.5 Groas National Saving 10.2 11.4 10.9 14.5 14.2 14.5 12.0 12.9 Terma of Trade Adjustnent 1.4 0.7 -1.2 -1.6 -1.1 - -1.4 -1.4 Gross National Income (GMY) 101.2 100.8 96.8 95.5 96.4 97.5 96.2 96.0 E/-_Estimated. p/_ProJected. Source: Table 2-7 Table 2-10: INDEX OF REAL RESOURCES AND USES, 1965-1972 (1965 - 100) Amiual Rate of Growth 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971-/ 1972/ 1965-68 1968-71 1971-72 GDP 100.0 107.7 114.2 120.7 123.3 127.2 130.9 139.4 6.5 2.8 6.5 GNP 100.0 108.1 112.1 117.5 120.3 124.2 127.9 136.0 5.5 2.9 6.3 Exporte 100.0 115.0 142.7 144.7 148.8 155.7 154.0 174.2 13.1 2.1 13.1 Imports 100.0 106.9 113.4 117.3 116.3 114.6 125.6 132.1 5.5 2.5 5.2 Available Resources 100.0 106.2 108.8 115.4 116.8 118.7 125.3 131.2 4.9 2.8 4.7 Total Consumption 100.0 106.6 111.0 111.3 114.6 117.8 124.9 131.5 3.6 3.9 5.3 Private 100.0 107.1 111.7 110.6 114.3 115.7 122.9 129.8 3.4 3.6 5.6 General Government 100.0 103.4 106.7 115.9 116.6 134.6 137.3 142.1 5.0 5.8 3.5 Total Investmnent 100.0 104.0 97.7 135.8 127.5 123.2 127.0 129.7 10.7 -2.2 2.1 Fixed Investment 100.0 88.6 101.8 151.6 133.5 128.1 127.1 136.2 14.9 -5.7 7.2 Private 100.0 77.0 93.6 132.2 103.1 82.5 66.0 103.1 9.8 -20.6 56.2 Public 100.0 104.2 112.7 177.4 174.0 188.7 208.6 180.3 21.1 5.5 -13.6 Change in Stocks 100.0 201.0 71.6 35.6 89.4 92.7 126.0 88.3 -29.1 52.4 -29.9 Gross Domestic Saving 100.0 117.3 142.2 201.9 198.1 208.3 '82.3 208.4 28.2 -3.3 14.3 Gross National Saving 100.0 120.8 121.9 171.6 17 0.9 181.2 154.7 176.0 19.7 -3.4. 13.8 Gross National Income (GNY) 100.0 107.3 109.2 113.9 117.4 122.5 124.3 132.1 4.4 2.9 6.3 E/ - Estimated. P/ - Projected. Source: Table 2-7 Table2-1]: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, 1965-1971 (in rmillions of Bolivian pesos) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Agriculture 39.6 28.4 62.7 79.3 73.9 73.9 65.3 Mining 95.9 74.8 97.3 314.1 174.9 172.2 88.7 Petroleum 401.3 167.8 212.6 255.2 318.6 317.5 566.o Industry 59.6 49.9 62.1 105.8 84.3 88.0 67.3 Transportation and Coemmunications 268.0 274.9 410.5 604.2 513.1 519.9 391.5 Power 84.8 208.1 89.9 82.0 133.9 178.7 134.6 Health 2.3 1.8 12.5 13.0 9.7 10.0 12.0 Education 13.2 20.4 32.7 16.3 22.0 10.0 10.6 Housing 59.1 92.9 116.8 175.2 184.0 186.2 149.5 Public Services and Other 27.0 30.1 58.6 124.9 125.7 23.9 93.0 Total 1,050.8 949.1 1,155.7 1,770.0 1,640.1 1,580.3 1,578.5 Source: Ministry of Planning, other Government Agencies, and IBRD. Table2-12.: GfiOSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATIJN., 1965-71 millions of 1970 Bolíivian pesos) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Agriculture 46.5 32.7 68.2 83.8 74.2 73.9 64.9 Mining 112.6 86.2 105.8 332.0 175.7 172.2 88.2 Petroleum 471.4 193.4 231.1 269.8 320.1 317.5 562.7 Indastry 70.0 57.5 67.5 111.8 84.7 88.0 66.9 Transportation & Communication 314.7 316.9 446.3 638.8 515.5 519.9 389.2 Power 99.6 239.9 97.7 86.7 134.5 178.7 133.8 Health 2.7 2.1 13.6 13.7 9.7 10.0 11.9 Education 15.5 23.5 35.6 17.2 22.1 10.0 10.5 Housing 69.4 107.1 127.0 185.2 184.9 186.2 148.6 Public Services, Other 31.7 34.7 63.7 132.1 126.3 23.9 92.4 Total 13 1,094.0 1,256.5 1,871.1 1,647.7 1,580.3 1,569.1 Source: Ministry of Plannlng, other Governinent Agencies and IBIO. Table e2--'3: STRUCTURE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, 1965-1971 (% of total investrnment in constant 1970 prices) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Agriculture 3.8 3.0 5.4 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.1 Mining 9.1 7.9 8.4 17.7 10.7 10.9 5.6 Petroleum 38.2 17.7 18.4 14.4 19.4 20.1 35.8 Industry 5.7 5.2 5.4 6.o 5.1 5.6 4.3 Transportation and Commlunications 25.5 29.0 35.5 34.2 31.3 32.9 24.8 Power 8.1 21.9 7.8 4.6 8.2 11.3 8.5 Health 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 Education 1.2 2.1 2.8 0.9 1.3 0.6 0.7 Housing 5.6 9.8 10.1 9.9 11.2 11.8 9.5 Public Services 2.6 3.2 5.1 7.1 7.7 1.5 5.9 Total Fixed Investment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Table 2-12 Table 2-1!u GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (in millions of Bolivian pesos) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972P/ Agriculture and Irrigation 21.1 8.3 20.2 21.1 25.5 25.0 26.0 60.5 Mining 60.3 20.3 30.5 90.1 111.3 108.0 37.0 66.7 Petroleum 106.4 82.3 81.5 123.8 171.1 317.5 566.0 253.6 (of which pipeline) (394.0) ( 96.0) Industry 18.4 3.3 3.8 28.2 20.7 23.8 15.6 54.8 Transportation and Communications 134.7 138.6 240.5 h21.6 295.4 300.0 214.5 238.3 Power 51.0 161.9 38.3 17.6 76.8 121.0 88.2 82.3 Health 2.3 1.8 12.5 13.0 9.7 10.0 12.0 37.0 Education 11.0 7.8 32.7 16.3 22.0 10.0 10.6 43.3 Housing 18.9 23.9 30.0 31.4 58.9 59.8 47.8 36.0 Public Services and Other 27.0 30.1 58.6 124.9 125.7 23.9 93.0 87.9 Total 451.1 478.3 548.6 888.o 917.1 999.0 1,110.7 960.4 P/ - Projection, 1971 prices. Source: Ministry of Planning, other Government Agencies, and IBRD. Table2-15: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL F01MATION - PUBLIC SECTOR, 1965-1972 (in millions of 1970 Bolivian pesos) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 EJ 1972 Pi Agriculture and Irrigation 24.8 9.6 21.9 22.3 25.6 25.0 25.8 60.0 mining 70.8 23.4 33.2 95.3 111.8 108.0 36.8 66.3 Petroleum 124.8 94.9 88.7 131.0 171.9 317.5 562.6 252.1 (of which pipeline) (391.7) ( 95.4) Tndustry 21.6 3.8 4.1 29.8 20.8 23.8 15.5 54.4 Transportation and Communications 158.0 159.8 261.7 446.0 296.8 300.0 213.2 237.2 Power 59.9 186e5 41.7 18.6 77.2 121.0 87.7 81,8 Health 2.7 2.1 13.6 13.8 9.7 10.0 11.9 36.7 Education 12.9 9.0 35.6 17.2 22.1 10.0 10.5 42.9 Housing 22,2 27.6 32.6 33.2 59.2 59.8 47.5 35.8 Public Services and Other 31.7 34.7 63.7 132.1 126.3 23.9 92.6 87.5 Total 529.4 551.4 596.8 939.3 921.4 999.0 1,104.1 954.7 =Estímate 3p = Projection Source: Ministry of Planning, other Government Agencies and IBRD. Table 2-16: STRUCTURE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION - PUBLIC SECTOR, 1965-1972 (Zo of total fixed investment in constant prices of 1970) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Agriculture and Irrigation 4.7 1.7 3.7 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.3 6.3 Miníng 13.4 4.2 5.6 10.1 12.1 10.8 3.3 6.9 Petroleun 23.6 17.2 14.8 13.9 18.6 31.8 51.0 26.s (of which gas pipeline) ( 35.5) ( 10.0) Industry 4.1 0.7 0,7 3.2 2.3 2.4 1.4 5.7 Transportation and Couununication3 29.8 29.0 43.8 47,5 32.2 30.0 19.3 24.8 Power 11.3 33.9 7.0 2.0 8.4 12.1 7.9 8.6 Health 0.5 0.4 2.3 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.1 3.8 Education 2.4 1.6 6.0 1.8 2.4 1.0 1.0 4.5 Housing 4.2 5.0 5.4 3.5 6.4 6.0 4.3 3.7 Public Services and Other 6.0 6.3 10.7 14.1 13.7 2.4 8e4 9.2 Total Fixed Investment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 Source: Table 2-15 Table 2-17: (B T( s-:or ny onrr,Tw nmxorl AlD 0EPART1Cl (in Boltviu¿ pesos Of 1970) Totnal _Olip G00 i_ Sec _ors T total OP uuh-Tno-tl (loot13 Zn-t'.A i,¡1' :rp Mlning Manufacturíng Constructlonrevieiecoi Total Total . a Total Total Total Total Re',ton and Departnent (millions) Per canita (mil).ions) Per cni ta (mtllo a. Per , aplta (million5) (millIons) 5millions) Per capita 1965 Total - B3olivia 7,161.2 1,816.9 , 9861,í816.t I19.1l L1.9 i,05II.1 331i.2 3,696.7 850.6 Al tiplno 4,5147.1 1,870.8 . 2,1,11.1 99?.0 .50,7 271.4 961.8 613.6 173.0 2 1 .O B78.B TU1 paz 7 I T12So. 3 7 7 30 ). U 27-17 913 49 1713. 1I, o 871.7 Oruro 705.7 2,337.5 395.3 1,31'9.1 53.' 1u5.6 21J.3 106.0 22.0 310.4 1,028.2 Potosi 1,255.3 1,636.2 759.5 990.0 22';.9 291,.4 512.5 11.7 9.4 495.8 645.2 Valle 2 o6 2 1 ',?7' 6 1V'08.2 81,°0.8 715.1 553.4 46.5 252.1 84.5 938.0 o 2 Chuluisaca 7 . 1, . 2L1.9 37n -T 1W. 43. ti 37.T C7 i.9 . Cochabamba 1,38B.6 1,963.4 74i45 1,047,2 441.2 626.5 33.5 202.3 67.5 638.1 906.1 TariJa 217.8 1,196.7 118.8 652.7 89.7 402.9 5.0 12.7 11.4 99.0 544O0 _____ 7I 7.l9 2 251 8 _ I 1I,I2 2 72 2, 5 5 8, 6 188.4 76.7 612.7 1.002.6 Santa Cruz 1,1 3.6 2,7 4.5 638.4 .4 339 826.6 58.6 168.5 71.8 - 505.2 1,230.1 9eni 196.8 1,144.2 106.8 620.9 91.5 532.0 . 11,4 3.9 90.0 523.3 Pando 37.5 1,320.4 20.0 704.2 10.5 369.7 -- I.5 1.0 17.5 616.2 1970 Total - Polivia l O, l ?l,o 2,052.8 l?8.1 1,039.9 2,0214.9 4100.6 178.1 1,254.4 470.7 4j994.9 1,012.9 Altiplano 5 1491 5 1 987 2 701.3 795.8 86 .9 248.14 1 118,2 671.9 224.3 2 790 2 1 008 9 La paz 3^219,9 2,0lo,6 1 416.8 9~~~~~~~~~~~~-54.ó ; M7 257.2 35.855.976 i 1 Oruro 816.2 2,43414 418,5 1,218.3 56.5 168.l4 224.2 104.7 33.1 417.7 1,216.0 Potosi 1,1435.14 1,6U4.4 8014.0 921.1 231.9 265.7 543.2 14.3 1lM.6 631.4 723.3 Valle 2 675 6 1 819 6 1 3118.8 917.3 795.S 5141.o 82.7 346.7 123.9 1 326 8 902.3 Ctiuquisaca ó L, lSH---. l 5 T* 2 71.17 i 2 4.4'1.7 ) 14.4 ' 0157 Cochabamba 1,745.6 2,178.7 897.8 1,120.6 -9l.14 613.3 43.2 269.3 93.9 847,B 1,058.2 Tarn Ja 314.9 1,520.5 150.8 728.2 100.0 482.9 15.1 21.5 14.2 164.1 792.,4 L1m5 1.955.9 2,813.0 1.078.0 1 550L . 12. 780.2 177.2 235.8 122.5 8 1 262 6 Santa Cruz 1,650.8 3,532.6 930.1 4,9. [¿27.9 915.7 177.2 210.0 115.0 720.7 1242.3 Bent 218.2 1,268.3 121.3 619.8 99.2 5o6.9 _ 16.3 5.8 126.9 648.4 pando 56.9 1,761.6 26.6 823.5 1i.1 1476.8 -- 9.5 1.7 30.3 938.1 Annual Growth of Total GDP and GDP Per Capita, 1965-70 (Percentagen) Total - Bolivi- 4.9 2.3 3.8 1.1 2.2 -0.1 5.2 3.5 7.1 6.3 3.5 Altíplano 3.9 1.2 2.3 -4.2 0.8 -1.7 3.0 1.9 5.4 5.5 2.8 Valle 5.6 2.9 4.2 1.6 2.2 -0.1 12.2 6.6 8.0 7.2 4.5 Uanos 7.3 4.6 7.1 4,4 4.2 1.6 24.5 4.6 9.9 7.5 4.7 So,urce: MIndatry of Planning and 1BRD. Table2-18: PRODUCT PER WORKER, BY REGION AND DEPARTIENT (in Bolivian pesos of 1970) Goods Agri- Manufac- Cons- Services Total Sectors culture Mining turing truction Sectors Region and GDP Per GDP Per GDP Per GDP Per GDP Per GDP Per GDP Per Department Worker Worker Worker Worker Worker Worker Worker 1965 Total-Bolivia 45 3,0142. 1,553.5 l 7,605.3 9,829..4 11,011.3 Altiplano 4,613.1 3,024.5 1,017.9 17 167.3 7 856.6 11 689.2 11,331.6 La Paz- - a 2,780.7 1-,041.9 16,l907 1 4 i, 95.3 li;O3D.3 Oruro 5,732.7 3,779.2 6149.5 18,008.4 11,521.7 11,578.9 16, 773.4 Potosi 4,324.1 3,154.1 1,123.9 17,3114.2 1,720.6 2,764.7 10,016.2 Valle 4 083.0 2,664.2 1 9?2.8 9,L89.8 9 1314.1 96 3.3 1i0.8 1c. Chuquisaca 2 1,939iTi 1,6 B 2,666.7 5 6 '1.2 7 Cochabamba 4,939.6 3,156.0 2,128.3 8,589.7 10,591.6 12,053.6 114, 02. 3 Tarija 3,226.7 2,163.9 1,783.3 7,142.9 6,684.2 5,700.0 7,857.1 Llanos 5,414.1 3,912.1 2,939.1 27 0 -8 5,726.1 7 -3750 10 1402.L Santa Cruz 6.77 4,999.2 3,902.3 27, 9-075,E10.3 7,L9.2 l11'99.9 Beni 2,839.8 1,860.6 1,678.9 -- 5,181.8 5,571.4 7,563.0 Pando 2,819.5 1,904.8 1,206.9 -- 5,000.0 10,000.0 6,250.0 1970 Total-Bolivia 5,238.0 3,291.3 1,575.2 20,630.2 7,2h93.14 12257.8 1- 337.5 Altiplano 5 050o 6 .074.2 965.6 18,984.7 7 440.8 12,392.3 13,375.8 La Paz 3,019.2 1,024.4 22,202.b 7, . 16,901iT.7 13,071.3 Oruro 6,020.2 3,595.4 608.8 19,162.4 12,768.3 8,914.9 18,564.4 Potosi h,411.2 2,950.5 1,010.0 17,299.4 1,333.3 3,945.9 11,935.7 Valle 4,789.0 2,950.8 1 980.8 1>,508.8 8,867.0 1J,579.4 13,059.1 Chuquisaca 35T7 241 460.7 , 400.0 4 7,03i7 9,G2. Cochabamba 5,625.5 3,518.0 2,226.6 10,285.7 11,557.9 13,414.3 15,386.6 Tarija 4,089.6 2,420.5 1,724.1 21,571.4 10,238.1 9,466.7 11,163.3 Llanos 6,824.5 4 8493 31144.9 80,5155 6 205.3 12 160. 13,ó53.2 Santa Cruz 4,? 3-3 W1723 0,54 53. 12,92 1 5,0773 Beni 3,227.6 1,913.2 1,681.4 -- 4,289.5 9,666.7 9,400.0 Pando 3,647.4 2,111.1 1,509.8 -- 4,130.4 17,000.0 10,100.0 AMNIUAL GROITH OF GDP PER 70ORKW, 1965-1970 (Percentages) Total-Bolivia .2.7 1.6 0.3 4.1 -0.4 4.6 3.9 Altiplano 1.8 0.3 -1.0 2.0 -1.0 1.2 3. Valle 3.3 2.1 0.6 8.9 -0.5 3.8 3.8 Llanos L.7 U i.1 21.0 1.6 11.6 5.6 Source: Ministry of Planning and IBRD. Table 2-19: STRUCTURE AND DEVELIPMEN$ OF GIP, GROSSFED INVESTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT BY BRANCH (GDP and GFI in oonstant 1970 prices) Gross FTxed oymen t Aggregate Gross Increase in_ GDP Investment by Branch Fixed Ihvestment Increase in GDP Erployment ICIR 1(L) % )1965-70 1965-71 1965-~71 ICOR (1965-70) 5 970 1965 1970 1965 1970 (in mlln $b) (in million $b) (in 1000) (1965-70) (in 1000 $b) (1) (2) (3) (4)_ (5) ( ) (8) (9) (10)-(7):(8) (11)-(7):(9) Total - Bolivia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 8,683.7 2,457.5 236.4 3.5 36.7 Agriculture 22.8 20.0 3.8 4.7 67.2 66.5 379.3 303.8 132.9 1.2 2.9 Mining (excluding petrolenm extraction) 12.5 11.5 9.1 10.9 3.5 3.3 984.5 128.4 4.8 7.7 205.1 Petroleun (extraction and refining) 2.8 4.5 38.2 20.1 0.3 0.2 1,803.3 350.4 0.2 5.1 9,016.5 Manufacturing (exc. pet. refining), Con- 1 struction 15.5 14.6 5.7 5.6 9.8 10.6 479.5 203.6 42.2 2.4 11.4 Transportation and Conniuncations 7.5 8.1 25.5 32.9 2.8 2.8 2,752.1 236.9 8.9 11.6 309.2 Other Services (incl. energy) 38.9 41.3 17.7 25.8 16.4 16.6 2,285.0 1,234.4 47.4 1.9 48.2 Source: Ministry of Planning and IBRD. TABIE 2-20: PROJECTIONS OF EXPENDITUR3S OlN GROSS DOYESTIC PRODUCT, 1972-1977 (In millions of Bolivian pesos - at constant mn.p. of 1970) 1972 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 GDP at m.p. 11,100.3 11,822.0 12,591.0 13,409.0 14,281.0 15,209.0 Net Factor Incomne from Abroad -293.3 -307.0 -313.0 -311.0 -315.0 -317.0 C-1P at m.p. 10,807.0 11,515.0 12,278.0 13,098.0 13,966.0 14,892.0 Exports of goods and n.f. services 2,750.1 2,759.o 2,957.0 3,239.0 3,326.0 3,411.0 Imports of goods and n.f. services 2,885.5 2,883.0 3,031.0 3,244.o 3,W72.0 3,716.0 Net exports -135.1 -124.0 -174.0 -5.0 -146.0 -305.0 Available Resources 11,235.4 11,9h6.0 12,665.0 13,41b.0 14,427.0 15,514.0 Total Consuiption 9,382.0 9,679.0 10,251.0 10,843.0 11,689.0 12,598.0 Total Investrent 1,853.14 2,267.0 2,41.4.0 2,571.0 2,738.0 2,916.0 Fixed Investrnent 1,681.0 2,152.0 2,292.0 2,440.0 2,599.0 2,768.0 Private 726.3 926.0 1,043.0 1,147.0 1,261.0 1,342.0 Public 954.7 1,226.0 1,249.0 1,293.0 1,338.0 1,426.0 Change in Stocks 172.4 115.0 122.0 131.0 139.0 148.O Gross Domestic Savings 1,718.3 2,113.0 2,340.0 2,566.0 2,592.0 2,611.0 Gross Xational Savings 1,425.0 1,836.0 2,027.0 2,255.0 2,277.0 2,294.0 Source: Ilssion Estimates Table 9-21: Projections of Gross Fixed Investment by Branch - 1972-77 (in millions of $B, at 1970 prices) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Private 80.0 100.0 135.0 140.0 150.0 160.0 Agriculture Public 60.0 85.0 85.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 Total 140.0 185.0 220.0 230.0 250.0 270.0 Private 81.7 150.0 230.0 280.0 350.0 380.0 Mini.ng Public 66.3 100.0 150.0 190.0 210.0 270.0 Total 148.0 250.0 380.0 470.0 560.0 650.0 Private - - - - - Petroleun Public 252.1 303.9 300.0 290.0 200.0 200.0 Total 252.1 303.9 300.0 290.0 200.0 200.0 Private 83.6 100.0 110.0 130.0 125.0 125.0 Manufacturin5 Publíc 54.4 70.0 70.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 Total 138.0 170.0 180.0 200.0 205.0 215.0 Private 75.2 115.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 50.0 Power Public 81.8 115.0 140.0 120.0 110.0 130.0 Total 157.0 230.0 230.0 200.0 180.0 1io.o Transport & Private 269.8 250.0 250.0 250.0 230.0 230.0 Cornunication Public 237.2 270.0 270.0 270.0 290.0 290.0 Total 507.0 520.0 520.0 520.0 520.0 520.0 Private 136.0 211.0 228.0 267.0 336.0 397.0 Housing Public 35.5 49.0 34.2 33.0 54.0 68.o Total 171.8 260.0 262.2 300.0 390.0 465.0 Health Private - - - - - Education & Public 167.1 233.1 199.8 230.0 294.0 268.0 Other publi.c Total 167.1 233.1 199.8 230.0 294.0 268.0 servioes Private 726.3 926.0 1,043.0 1,147.0 1,261.0 1,342.0 Total Public 954.7 1,226.0 1,21h9.0 1,293.0 1,338.0 1,4260o Total 1,681.0 2,152.0 2,292.0 2,440.0 2,599.0 2,768.0 Source: Mission projections. TABIE 2-22: PROJECTIONS OF GDP BY SECTORS, 1972-1977 (In millions of 1970 Bolivian Pesos) 1972 1973 197h 1975 1976 1977 Agriculture 2,232.5 2,344.0 2,h61.0 2,55b.0 2,71b.O 2,8b9.O Y[ning and Quarrying 1,258.5 1,31b.0 1,369.0 1,b39.0 1,498.o 1,567.0 Petroleumn (ref. and ext.) 657.4 697.0 721.0 753.0 799.0 849.o M4anufacturing 1,061.2 1,135.0 1,215.0 1,300.0 1,391.0 1,h88.O Construction b70.7 508.0 5U9.0 593.0 6b0.o 692.0 Energy 170.9 178.0 186.0 19b.0 203.0 212.0 Services 5,249.1 5,6L6.0 6,090.0 6,5b6.0 7,036.0 7,552.0 Total GDP 11,100.3 11,822.0 12,591.0 13,h09.0 14,281.0 15,209.0 Source: Mlssion Estimates TABIE 2-23: PROJECTIOYTS OF E12P10YTENT BY SECTORS, 1972-1977 (In thousands) 1972 1973 197U 1975 1976 1977 Agriculture 1,333.0 1,364.0 1,395.0 1,I427.0 1,460.0 1,494.0 Míning and Quarrying 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 Petroleum (ref. and ext.) 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 Minufacturing 176.0 185.0 194.0 203.0 213.0 224.0 Construction 12.0 U4.0 47.0 50.0 53.0 56.0 Energy Services 396.0 119.0 u.0 169.0 495.0 523.0 Total Employznent 2,022.0 2,087.0 2,155.0 2,224.0 2,296.0 2,372.0 Unemployment 412.0 410.0 407.0 405.0 401.0 395.0 Total Labor Force 2,434.0 2,497.0 2,562.0 2,629.0 2,697.0 2,767.0 Unemnployment Rate 16.9 16.4 15.9 15.4 11.9 14.3 Source: Mission Estinates TABIE 2-2),: PROJECTIOIS OF GDP, M1dPLOYNT AND PRODUCTIVITY BY S-CTORS, 1972-1977 (GDP in millions of $b - O-DP per worker in $b - Eloynent in thousands) Annual Average Rate of Growth 1972 1973 19714 1975 1976 1977 1972-77 Total - Bolivia GDP 11,t100.3 11,822.0 12,591 .0 13,1409.0 14.,281 .0 15,209.0 6.5 E=1. 2,022.0 2,087.0 2,1 55.0 2,2214.0 2,296.0 2,371.0 3.2 GnPiAorker 5,490.0 5,665.0 5,8413.0 6,029.0 6,220.0 6,,4t5.o 3.1 Labor Force 2,1431U.0 2,1497.0 2,562.0 2,629.0 2,697.0 2,767.0 2.6 Unemployed 412.0 410.0 407.0 405.0 401.0 396.0 -0.8 Unernp. rate (%) 1 6.9 1 6.14 15.9 175-4 114.9 14.3 Agriculture GDP 2,232.5 2,3l4---0 2,1461 .0 2,584.0 2,7114.0 2,849.0 5.0 Empl. 1,333.0 1 ,314.0 1,395.0 1,427.0 1,1460.0 1,14914.0 2.3 GDP/Worker 1,675.0 1,71 8.0 1,7614.0 1,811.0 1,859.0 1,907.0 2.6 Mizning & Quarying GDP 1 ,258.5 1 ,31 4.0 1,369.0 1,1439.0 1,1498.0 1 ,567.0 4.5 Empl. 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 0.0 GDP/Worker 17,979.0 1-8,771.0 19,557.0 20,557.0 21,1400.0 22,386.0 4.5 Petroleum (ext.&ref.) GDP 657.4 697.0 721.0 753.0 799.0 849.0 5.2 Enmpl. 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 GJJP/WJorker 131,480.0 139,1400.0 1444,200.0 150,600.0 159,800.0 169,800.0 5.2 Maniufacturing CDP 1,061 .2 1 ,135.0 1 ,215.0 1,300.0 1,391.0 1,4188.0 7.0 'lpl. 176.t 1 85.0 1914.0 203.0 21 3.0 22h.0 4.9 GDr/Worker 6,030.0 6,135.0 6,263.0 6,M44-o 6,531.0 6,363.0 2.0 Constrction GDP 1470.7 508.0 5149.0 593.0 6140.0 692.0 8.0 Empl. 42.0 I4l.O 147.0 50.0 53.0 56.0 5.9 GDP/Worker 11,207.0 11,5145.0 11,681 .0 11,860.0 12,075.0 12,357.0 2.0 Bergy GDP 170.9 178.0 186.0 194.0 203.0 212.0 4.4 Other Services GDP 5,2149.1 5,6116.o 6,o90.0 6,5146.0 7,036.0 7,552.0 7.5 Empl. 396.0 119,0 444.0 1469.0 1495.0 522.0 5.7 GDP/Worker 13,255.0 13,1475.0 13,716.0 13,957.0 14,214.0 114,467.0 1.8 Source: Mission Estinv4ates TABIE 3-L1 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1965-70 AND ESTI?ATE, 1971 (In millions of US dollara) 1965 1966 1967 196G 1969 1970 1971 Trade Dal,rre -11.5 -7.9 1.4 -6.0 26.-2. LaXerl° fs b :53:li 15F 15'3-.I2 1 176.3 192.5 177.6 -Imc,pr z s , f_b -126.6 -138.8 -151.8 -161.5 -173.4 -166.2 -180.1 (CcŽnSv.er g,ods) (-39.7) (-49.6) (-53.2) (-52-8) (-59.3) (-57.7) (-65.O) lIntnerre X!iate gocdt;) (_39.7) (-40.9) (-48.1) (-4h.0) (-h2.6) (-42.3) (-41.9) oJS o ) (-47.2) (-4-.3) (-50-5 (-64.7) (-71.5) (-66.2) (-73.2) Nor.-F.:ct~or Servic~.i-. net -24.8 -26.5 -27.4 -28.0 -27.9 -30.0 -35.9 De-bit -35.1 -35.4 -41.2 -41.1 -41.8 -44.5 -51.0 (Freight ancl lin-rance on .erchandiae) (-19.-) (-20.4) (-22.2) (-22.4) (-24.3) (-23.8) (-27.0) (Ú-.,er Plrn-'actor St?rviceg, net) (-5-8) (-6.1) (-5.2) (-5.,) (-3.6) (-6.2) (-8.9) Reaource Balance (- - Inflow) -36.3 -3h.4 -26.0 -30.0 -25.0 -3.7 -3B.4 Investrnent Income, net -1.1 0.8 -14.4 -21.8 -21.1 -21.1 -21.6 = fofits an-d Dividenda, net 0.7 - -15.3L -14.7 -12.2 Interest, net -1.8 - -3.0 -3-4 -4.8 -6.4 -9.h (On long-tern credits) (-2.6) (-3.7) (-4.4) (-0.9) (-6.5) (-8.5) (-10.6) (Other Interest, net) (0.8) (3.7) (1.4) (1.5) (1.7) (2.1) (1.2) Balance of Services -25.9 -25.7 -41.8 -49.8 -49.0 5ii ..57.5 Ttansfers net 16.o 21.3 12.9 6.7 7.9 4.0 5.0 Balance on Current Account -21.4 -12.3 -27.5 -49.1 -38.2 -20.8 -55.0 _Private Capital. Long- and '.edium-Term, net 13.6 1.1 7.8 4.1 0.4 _ DirecS, lnevtnent 12.4 7.o 0.1 .8 y.-, Long-term credita 1.2 1.7 1.0 1.7 - - - Public Capital, Long- and Mediwu-Term, net 12.4 16.9 19.3 39.1 33.9 26.8 46.2 Dravings 20.7 2d. V.-o 27 WE1 (International Organizations) (( (Bilateral Lenders) 97*31 (9.3 (16.4 (51(51 ( 3. ( 17 1 (C. GcJ.rodita) 61.) (.) (d.d) (10.d) (11.6) (9.9) Gi- 5 Amort. .cn -8.3 -11.6 -12.7 -9.5 -14.7 -18.5 -24.4 Ct'er net - - - -0.1 - 4.5 Balance on Capital Account 26.0 20.4 20. 4L6.9 38.0 27.2 46.2 1Error: and Omissions 9.7 -3.5 3.5 1.7 0.7 -8.2 -o.4 IMF SDROs - - - - - 4.9 4.0 Change in Feserves -14.3 -4.6 3.6 0.5 -0.5 -3.1 5.2 Total, Capital Account 21.4 12.3 27.5 49.1 38.2 20.8 55.0 Source: IIF Balance of Papenta Yearbook; Central Bank; Niaeion Eatimates TABLE 3--, EXPORTS. 3163 - 19'0 AND ESTIFATE. 1971 (Volume in tho/u,¡nds of metric tone and value in rri'ions of Us$) 2/ 1963 1964 1965 1966 196? 1968 1g69 1970 1971 Tin Valae 57.3 80.9 93.0 9,.0 90.- 92.5 102.5 1o0.9 100. 3 Volume 23.1 2h.4 2h.2 26.2 27.4 29.J4 29.9 27.8 29.7 Unit Price 2,480 3,315 3,840 3,555 3,315 3;,146 3,428 3,597 3,505 (US$ per lb) 1.13 1.51 1.75 1.62 1.51 1.43 1.55 1.63 1.59 Anticny Value 2.5 5.5 5.9 5.3 6.4 6.o 11.0 31.0 9.3 Volume 7.6 9.6 a.8 10.7 11.5 11.1 13.2 11.6 11.3 Unit Price 335 567 674 496 559 541 833 2672 823 (Us$ per lb) 0.15 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.25 0-38 1.21 0-37 Coppcr Value 1.8 3.2 3.5 6.2 6.4 7.7 11.0 12.5 7.8 Volume 3.0 ° . 7 - .7 5.7 6.3 6.9 8.o 8.9 7. l Unit Price 617 673 744 1085 1009 :l6 1375 1404 1,05h (US$ per ib) 0.28 0.31 0.3h 0.50 o.46 0.51 0.62 0.64 o.48 Lead Value 4.2 4.9 5.7 6.4 4.9 5.1 6.8 7.8 6.6 Volume 20.2 17.7 17.5 21.3 20.3 '22.3 25.2 25.8 23.7 Unit Price 210 278 323 299 213 229 270 302 287 (US$ per lb) 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.13 Zinc Value 1.2 3.1 4.2 5.0 4.4 3.0 7.8 14.3 114.5 Volume 4.6 9.8 13.7 16.7 16.7 11.8 26.5 L6.5 14.8 Unit Price 1256 315 310 298 2é( 25>4 294 308 310 (Us$ per lb) 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.1l 0.lh Silver I Value 5.9 6.2 5-3 6.6 6.7 11.2 7o.e 10.5 7.9 Volumre (tons) 151 150 128 159 141 161 197 186 170 (JS$ perlroy Ounce) 1.21 1.28 1.29 1.29 1.47 2.16 1.70 1.75 14 u:sten Value 1.2 1.4 2.2 5.1 8.o 9.7 131.1 17.6 13.2 Volume 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.2 Unit. Price 8h9 1,141 2,005 3,231 4,08B 4,217 4,826 7,333 6,111 tUS$ per lb) 0.38 0.52 0.91 1.46 1.85 1.91 2.19 3.33 2.77 Gold Value 5-4 1.7 2.9 0.6 - -- 1.5 0.2 ^ub-Total 79.5 106.9 122.7 128.2 '27.7 135.2 162.5 195.8 159.8 Other ninerals 1.0 1.1 2.3 3 3 3.6 3-8 4.7 8.9 6.9 Total Minerals 80.5 108.0 125.0 131.5 131.3 13. 167.2 ?04.1 166.7 H.-.ocarbons 1.8 0.7 0.7 6.6 22.9 24.3 10.2 24.7 Otl-er~ ~ ~ ~ __, __ otI-.er E~pt_rt _.5 4.6 5.6 11.6 11.6 10.8 1.2 136.o Cotto¡n - - ---12 ~ . . Other 3.5 4.6 5.6 11.6 11.6 10.2 6.o 10.1 cIa Q.oIa ?lpozts_tcifú B5.8 113fi.3 111.3 ;h92, 161.8 17L---l. 12L.Z 22.1 2. balance of Payznents 1. 1. i. 2. 3- 2. Adjustment -13.9 -13.2 -16..2 -18.8 -12.6 -18.6 -21.9 -35.8 -29.2 aa Exp 7 _ 100.1 10.9- 153-2 í55.5 173 5 l7.o 1/ Unless otherwise ,pecified ource: Central Bank; Hinistry of PlanninR; Mission !stia.ates TABLE 3-3: EXPORT VALUES lc"3-1970 ANO ESTIMATE, 1971 ( It !WiLc , rt f 1 1T5$) 1963 1964 '965 1966 1967 1965 1969 1970 197 1 M1inera1ls 50. 108.0 1o 11.2 131. 3 139.0 167.2 201i.7 1 66.7 Tin 57 3 80.9 93.0 93.3 90. 9 92.5 102. 5 10J. 9 100.3 Antimony 2.5 5.5 5.9 5.3 6.4 6.0 11.0 31.0 9-3 Copper 1.8 3.2 3.5 6.2 6.4 7.7 11.0 12.5 7.b Lead 4.2 4.9 5.7 6.4 4.9 5.1 6.8 7.8 6.5 Zinc 1.2 3.1 4.2 5.0 4.4 3.0 7.8 14.3 14.5 Slver 5.9 6.2 5.3 6.6 6.7 11.2 10.8 10.5 7.9 Tuungsten 1.2 1.4 2.2 5.1 8.o 9.7 11.1 17.6 13.2 Gold 5.4 1.7 2.9 o.6 - - 1.5 0.2 - Other 1.0 1.1 2.3 .3 3.6 3.8 4.7 8.9 6.9 Hyd&ocaxbons 1.8 0.7 0.7 6.6 22.9 24.3 23- 10.2 24. 7 Agriculture and Livestock 3.5 4.6 5.6 i1.6 ll.6 10.8 8.o 13.4 15. 4 Cozton - - - - - 0.6 1.2 3.0 6.5 N¿.tuxral Rubber 0.6 o.6 0.8 o.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 Tirrmber and Lurmber 0.2 - 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.9 Hides and Skins 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 o.5 0.5 0.5 o.6 Coffee 0.9 2.2 1.2 4.9 4.5 2.7 2.9 3.6 4.8 Cattle and Beef 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 - - - 0.1 - Sugax - - 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 _ Almronds and Nuts o.6 0.4 0.5 1.1 2.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 Qlinine Bark - - O.8 1. t 1.i 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Other 0.1 0.1 0.4 C O2 3.5 - 1.6 - TOTAL, CUSTOMS STATISTIvS 85. 8 113.3 131.3 149.7 165.8 174.1 198.2 228.3 206.8 Sources: Table 3-2 and Statistical office TABLE 3h: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS. 1963-19(0 AN1D ESTII.ATE, 1971 (Percentages) 1963 1964 l(J65 1S66 1967 1966 1969 19710 1 971 Minerals 93.b 95.3 95.2 o¡. t 79.2 79.8 84.4 859. 80.6 Tin 66.d~ (L4 70. ¿S 62. 54 78 53 1 77 446.5 Antimony 2.9 4.9 4.5 3.5 3.9 3.5 5.6 13. 6 4.5 Copper 2.1 2.8 2.: i.2 3.9 4.4 5.6 5.5 3. 6 Lead 4.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.0 2. 9 3.4 3.-4 3. 3 Zinc 1.4 2.7 3.2 3.3 2.6 1. / 3.9 6.3 1.0 Silver 6.9 5.5 4.0 4.4 4.o 6.4 5.5 4. 6 3. 5 Tungsten 1.4 1.2 1.7 3.4 4.5 5.6 5.6 7. 6.4 Gold 6.3 1.5 2.2 0.4 - 0.7 0.1 - Other 1.1 1,O 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 3.9 3.3 Hydrocarbons 2.1 0.6 0.5 4.4 13.8 14.0 11.6 4.4 11.9 Agriculture and Live- stock 4.1 4.1 4.3 '.5 7.0 6.2 4.0 5.9 7.5 Cotton - - - -- 0.3 1.3 2.9 NatuTal Rubber 0.7 0.5 o.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 Timber and Lumber 0.2 - 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 O. í 0.9 Hides and Skins 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 Coffee 1.] 1.9 0.9 3.3 2.7 i.6 1.4 1.6 2.3 Cattle and Beef 0.2 0.2 0.2 0. 1 - - - 0.1 - Sugar - 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 o.4 - Almonds and Nuts 0.7 0,4 0.4 0.7 1.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 Quinine - 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Other 0.1 0.1 0.3 o.a8 o. 2.2 - 0.7 - Total, Customs - _________ s 100.0 1oo.o 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Table 3.3 TABLE 3-5: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS, 1963-70 AND ESTIMATES, 1971 (In Millions of US.$) 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 I. Latín America 2.9 2.2 3.4 7.7 9.9 13.9 17.5 17.5 15.3 1. Andean Group 0.2 0.h 1.2 3.1 2.8 3.7 4h.9 4.8 4.2 Chile 0.1 0.2 07 1.0 5.7 17 1.6 1.6 1 . Colombia - - - - - Ecuador - - -- - - - - - Peru 0.1 0.2 o.6 2.1 2.0 2.3 3.3 3.2 2.8 2. River Plate Basin 2.7 1.8 2.2 4.6 6.8 9.0 11.5 11.6 10.2 Argentina 2.1 1.0 0.9 3.3 3 d.2 10.6 10.2 9.0 Brazil 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.1 Paraguay - - - - - - - - Uruguay - - - - 0.3 - - 0.1 0.1 3. Other LAPTA - - - - 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.9 II. Other Countries 82.9 111.1 127.9 142.0 155.9 160.2 180.7 210.8 191.5 United Kingdom 40.5 55.° 58.8 68.4 67.5 76.6 90.8 99.9 88.2 United States 27.9 40.6 56.2 59.0 72.2 60.3 60.8 84.1 73.6 Japan 1.5 2.8 2.7 2.7 4.0 5.3 12.0 8.8 7.8 Federal Republic of Germany 4.1 5.3 6.7 7.9 8.2 5.7 5.2 8.3 7.3 Netherlands 4.1 5.2 2.1 3.5 2.8 5.1 6.2 5.9 5.2 Spain - - - - 0.2 2.8 3.5 2.7 2.4 Other 4.8 2.2 1.4 0.5 1.0 h4. 2.2 1.1 7.0 TOTAL, CUSIOMS STATISTICS 85.8 113.3 131.3 1h9.7 165.8 17h.1 198.2 228.3 206.8 Source: Central Bank; Statistical Office; Mission Estimates TABLE 3-6: GEDGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS, 1963-1973 AND ESTIEATES, 1971 (Per centage) 1963 1964 1965 1)66 196( 196e 1969 19lO 19il I. Latin America 3.h 2.0 2.6 5.2 6.o b.o 8.8 7.7 7.b 1. Andean Group 0.2 o.4 0.9 2.1 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.0 Chile 0.1 0.2 0.§ 0.j {5 5 07 0.' 0.7 Colombia - - - - - - - Ecuador - - - - - - - - Peru 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 2. River Plate Basin 3.2 1. 6 1.7 3.1 4_i 5.2 5.8 5.1 4.9 Argentina 270 0.9 0. , 2.2 3.2 U. I - 70 Brazil 0.d 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 o.6 0.5 Paraguay - - - - - - - Uruguay - - - - 0.2 - - - - 3. Other LAFTA _ - - - 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 II. Other Countries 98.0 94 2 91.2 2 6 United Kingdom 47.2 hb 75 M44 t45.7. b44.0 45.ó 43-.b United States 32.5 35.8 42.8 39.4 43.6 34.7 30. ( 36.8 35.6 Japan 1.7 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.4 3.0 6.1 3.8 3.8 Federal Republic of Germany 4.8 4.7 5.1 5.3 4.9 3.3 2.6 3.6 3.5 Netherlands 4.5 4.6 1.6 2.3 1. - 2.9 3.1 2.6 2.5 Spain - - - - 0.1 1.6 1.8 1.2 1.2 Other 5.6 1.9 1.1 0.3 0.6 2.5 1.1 0.5 3.4 TOTAL CUSTOM)S STATISTICS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Table 3.5 TABLE 3-7 VALUE AfD STRJCT7URE OF 12'.PoRTS, BV PRO,JCTS 1967- 1970 N,'D ESTI¡VIATES ], (In millions of US$ and percentageb7 IALUE STRU CTURE 1967 1,» 1',<, 19 ) 1971 196/i 1968 i69 1910 1'711 Wheat and Flour 1h.1 10.I1 9.9 11.7/ 12.3 9.3 6.8 6.o 4 (.2 Oils and Fats 5.5 1.6 6-3 5.5 5.8 3.7 3.0 3.8 3.5 3.4 Pharmaceuticals 3.,` 4.1 4 3 4.1 4h3 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 Rubber and its Manufactures 3.3 4.1 3.5 3.7 3.9 2.2 2.7 2.1 2.4 2.3 Iron and Steel 12.1 15.0 18.8 15.5 16.3 8.0 9.8 1].4 9.8 9.5 Mechanical Implements and Equipment 22.0 29.9 27.1 26.1 28.1 1h.6 19.6 16.4 16.5 16.4 Electrical Implements and Equipment 9.7 8.2 9.2 9.2 9.6 6.4 5m4 5.6 5.8 5.6 Automotives 21.6 19.7 1ó.9 20.4 21.5 14.3 12.9 11.5 12.9 12.5 Railway Equipment 0.5 1.5 9.2 3.7 3.9 0.3 1.0 5.6 2.3 2.3 Airplanes and Helicopters 1.0 1.5 4.2 2.2 2.4 0.7 1.0 2.5 1.4 1.4 Other Products 57.4 53.7 53.7 56.0 63.2 38.0 35.1 32.5 35.b 36.9 TOTAL, CUSTOYIS STATISTICS 150.9 152.7 165.1 15b.1 171.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 103.0 100.0 Source: Statistical Office; Mission Estimates TABLE 3-8 : IERORTS. 1',62-1969 AND ESTIMUATES, 19i0 AND 1971 (In mIillions of US$) 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 196? 1968 1969 1' /0 19,)1 Consurner Goods 27.3 2(.0 2i.I 33.5 3h-6 35.- 31.2 32.5 26.5 36. 3 Drable 9 5 9 5 9.) 7 7 1,7. 12.3 11.2 10.1 13. Non-Durable 17.8 10.5 17.5 20.1 20.1 21.2 18.9 21.3 164 22.5 Intermediate Goods 40.9 40.7 42. h 45.7 47.4 56.o hÓ8.y 49.3 50.9 56.3 Fuel and Lubricants 3. 1 1.3 1.2 ,6 1. 2 .- 4 6 *.6 Intermediate Goods for Agriculture o0.6 0.4 0.- o.9 1.1 1.9 1.6 1.9 3.9 4.0 Intermediate Goods for Industry 37.2 36-.9 40.4 43.6 44.7 52.9 45.7 46.o 47.6 50.7 Capital Goods 28.5 33.7 32-3 54.4 55.9 58.7 71.8 82.7 79.9 7 !. 9 Const,uction Materials -0 ~-3 11.2 b.j 12.0 13.1 1T2. Capital Goods for Agriculture 0. 0.6 1.1 3.1 1.5 2. 4.6 3.4 4-0 3.9 Capital Goods for Industry 15.8 15.8 15.1 24.1 2 '.2 26.8 3L.1 32.0 35.0 3h.1 Transport Equipment &.3 13.0 11.2 16.0 18.5 20,5 21.1 32.9 27.b 2(.1 Other 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.7 o.8 0.6 0.8 0,8 TOTAL, CUSTOMS STATISTICS 96.9 103.3 102.7 133.9 136.4 150.9 152. 165.1 158.1 171.3 Source: Central Bank; Statistical Office; Mission Estimates TABIE 3-9 :.MPOR-,T RITUCTjEE 1912 2-l9269 Wi*fDES 1970 MID '971 l-Per c entage 3 1962 i'63 J$~L.4f l,X65 19(í5 1j7 g S 963 1969 19 0C 1971 COY_ULI~.T $i.ods 2. 2_27 2 o 25.c 2c, 19.7 16. 8 21.2 Dur abi* g.b9 770.0 10 .0 -371 NnDurable Y. y, - yTO1 Y ;> 12 1 21 2 Non Dar akle l8.L4 1 / . 9 11 i L,. o 15.0 14.0 12.h 1209 1:.4 13.1 Intetr.ediate Goods 2, .2 39. -4 41.3 34.2 3L. 2 37. 1 32.0 29. 9 32. 2 32. 9 Fuel and Lubricants 3.2 1.4 1.3 0.9 oB1 1.0 0.9 0.9 Interrmediate Goods for Agriculture 0.6 G.4 0. 0. 1 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.4 Interrediate Goods for Industry 38.4 3'7. 6 39.3 32.6 32.3 35.0 29. 9 2 l. 9 30.1 29.6 Capi,tal Goods 2,9. 4 32.6 31.4 40.6 4o.4 3b.9 47.0 50.0 50.5 Construction Materials .4.9 S,7 ó.3 Capital Goods for Agriculture 0.4 o.6 1.6 2.-3 1.1 1.8 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.3 Capital Goods for Industry 16.3 15-3 14.7 18.0 19.6 17.8 22.3 19.4 22.1 19.9 Transport Equipment 8.6 12.6 10.9 11.9 13.4 13.6 13.8 19.9 17.6 15.8 Other 0.2 0.9 o.6 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 (.5 0.4 TOTAL. CUSTO1IS STATISTICS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1]00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 l.00.0 Source: Table 3-8 TABLE 3-10: VALUE AND STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS BY ORIGIN, 196'-1970 AND ESTIMATES, 1971 (In millions of US$ and percentages) VALUE STRU CTURE 1967 196ó 1969 1970 1971 1967 1968 196(9 1970 1971 I. Latin Axrerica 1 .7 18.8 26.0 21.9 29.3 1,.'i 12.3 15.7 13.9 17.1 1. Andean Group 4.2 4.5 4.d 5.5 5.9 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.5 3.4 Chile 2.1 2.0 2.( 2.0 2.2 1 ].3 11.2 1.3 1.3 Colombia 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 Ecuador 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0. ? Peru 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.1 1. h 1.3 1.3 1.2 2. River Plate Basin 12.8 13.8 20.2 15. ; 22.6 8.5 9.0 12.2 9.9 13.2 Argentina 90 -° 1.T 16.v9 12. 13.2 s 7 10.2 7.9 7. Brazil 3.0 2.4 3.1 2.9 9.J 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.8 5.2 Paraguay 0.7 - - 0.2 0.3 0.4 - - 0.1 0.2 Uruguay 0.1 - 0.2 0.1 0.- - 0.1 0.1 0.1 3. Other LAFTA o.'( 0.5 1.0 0.° 0.Ó oh 0.3 o.6 0. 5 0.5 II. Other Countries 133.2 133.9 . 139.1 136.2 1h2. 0 88.3 87.7 8L.3 86.] 82.9 United Kingdom 5-9 7.2 8.3 6.6 i 9 4.6 4.7 5.0 4.8 .6 United States 62.1 66.3 51.3 61..1 6h. 3 hl. 2 h3.4 31.1 38.6 37. 5 Jaoan ld.3 17.0 2t. 1 21.0 22.1 12.1 11.1 i6.4 13.3 12.9 Federal Republic of Germany 11.6 1b.1 20.5 19.0 20.0 11.7 11.9 12.4 12.0 11.7 Netherlands 3.6 4.7 5. 4.7 5.0 2.4 3.1 3.5 3.0 2.9 Spain 2.0 1. !7 1.& 1. 2.0 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 Other 22.7( 1.9 2b.1l 20..9 20.7 15.0 12.4 14.8 13.2 12.1 TOTAL CUS1)S STATISTICS 150.9 152.71 165.1. 15d.1 171.3 ioo.o 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Central Bank; Statistical Office; Mission Estimates TABIE 3-11: RESOURIGE GAP. 1'96Y-1970, AND ESTIMATE, 1971 (US$ millions) 1965 1966 1961 is65 1969 1970 1971 Exports of Goods and Services 126.9 14h.3 16b-4 170.1 191.9 209.1 193.9 Less: Exports of Factor Services 1.5 4.5 1.4 1.5 1. ¡ 2.1 1.2 Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services 125.4 139.d 167.0 16b.6 190.2 20¡(. 192.7 Imports of Goods and Services 164.3 171.9 208.d 225.9 238.0 233--' 253.9 Less: Imports of Factor Services 2.6 3.1 15.d 23.3 22.8 23.2 22.& Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services 161.7 174.2 193.0 202.6 215.2 210.7 231.1 Resource Gap - US$ Millions 36.3 3h.4 26.0 34.0 25.0 3.7 38.4 - $b Millions 431-1 4o0.5 308. 3 h03,B 296.9 4 .,o 456.o GNP - $b Millions 7,155.9 7,90o.6 85,360.7 8,d8d.8 9,h62.2 9,8!2.5 10,34h.1 Resource Gap as Percentage of GNP 6.o 5.2 3.7 4.5 3.1 0.4 4.4 Source: IMF's Balance of Payments Yearbook; Central Bank; Ministry of Planning and Mission Estimates TABIE 3-12: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, 1'65-1970 AND EST IATE, 19-71 (US$ millions; end of period) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 19(0 1971 Banking System Assets 43.o 43.4 40.2 48.i 50.9 6o.8 61.4 Liabilities 5,5 2,3 6.8 15.1 17.4 21.7 30 D Net Reserves 37. 42.1 3330 33 5 39.1 -3 . Central Bank Assets 4O.d 41.6 3d.2 46.8 49.4 5.4h 57.2 Liabilities 4.7 0.6 5.6 14.3 16.4 18.6 23.2 Net Reserves 37--1 41kJ : 32 32.5 33.0 4-.0 ComGnercial Banks As sets 2.0 1.l 1.8 1.1 1.3 2.9 3.9 Liabilities 0.2 0.l 1.1 0.d 1.0 3.1 6.5 Net Reserves ___ 1.0 0. 0.3 0,3 -0.2 - 2.9 Specialized Banks As.sets 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 Liabilities 0.6 - 0.1 - - - - Net Reserves 0.1 0._1 _ 0.2 __ 0.3 Source: Central Bank TABIE -13: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES OF THE CENTRAL BANK, 1965-1970 AND ESTIMATE, 19l1 ,US$ millions; end of period) 1'v65 1966 1967 196d 1969 1970 197 Isssets 40. h 41.6 38.2 46.8 49.4 57.4 57. Gold 6.7 7,3 9.2 10.9 11.8 12.7 13. Foreign Currency 28.5 26.0 19.9 25.8 27.3 26.6 28. IFY Gold Tranche 5.6 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 9.2 9. SDR - - - - - 2.' 2. Other Assets _ 1.0 1.8 2.8 3.0 6.2 3. ,iabilities 4.7 0.6 5.6 1h.3 16.4 18.6 23. Foreign Banks 0.92 0.1 5.1 1.4 0.1 1. 5. IMF Credit Position 4-5 0 5 0.5 12.4 15.4 15.4 16. Other Liabilities - - - 0.5 0.9 1.7 Jet International Reserves 36.1 410. 32.6 32.5 33.0 38.8 34.' >ource: Central Bank TABIE 3-14: BAILNCE OF PAYHENTS, 1970 ESTIMATE, 1971 AND PROJECTIONS, 1972-77 (In Mdlliona of US dollars) 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Trade Balance 26.3 -2.5 i4.O 29.7 36.d 47.2 30.2 ¿7.2 Fxports, fob 192. 177.6 2069 230.2 252.T 283.4 2Y7.0 310.7 Importe, fob -166.2 -180.1 -192.9 -200.5 -21S.6 -236.2 -25S.8 -28~ 5 (Consuaer and Intermediate Goods) (-100.0) (-1C6.9) (-314.2) (-120.3) (-127.L) (-139.2) (-152.1> (-l 65. (Capital Goods) (-66.2) (-73.2) (-78.7) (L 80.2) (- 88.2) (- 97.0) (-106.7) (-117.3> Non-Factor Services, net 30 z 3 -40.8 -43.6 -47.6 -S2.0 -5o.7 Credit 11.5 15 . 1 15.7 16.4 17.1 197 'TI'? í.3 Debit -44-5 -51.0 -55.0 -57.2 -60.7 -65.l1 -70.1 -76.u Resource Balance -3.7 -38l4 -95.3 -11.1 - 6.8 - 0.14 -1 .8 -9?9. Inve`tnent Income net -21.1 -21.6 -25.2 -27.4 -28.5 -29.0 -?i. -S0.7 Profita and Dividenta, net - -12.2 -174. 71-119 -i15 -16.0 7_ -1. Interest, net -6.4 -9.4 -10.8 -12.5 -13.1 -13.0 -13.:1 -i l.5 (On Existing Debt) (-8.5) <-10.6) (-12.0) (-12.4) (-11.9) (-11.6) (-11.3) (-10.7) (On New Debt) (-) (-) (-) (- 1.3) (- 2.6) (- 3.2) (- 3.6) (- l,. ) (Other, net) (2.1) (1.2) (1.2) ( 1.2) (1-.4) (1.8) (1.S) ( (-) (2.0> (lyA) (Other, net) A- 45 ~ ~ ~ - -1 ) Amortization -18.5 -24.4 -26.8 26.3 -27.6 -25.5 -27.0 -"6.6 (On Existing Debt) (-18.5) (-24-.4) (-26.8) (-24.8} (-24.7) -22.5 -23.5 -22.2 (On New Debt) (_) () (-) (- 1.5 (- 2.9) ( 3.3) ( 3.5) ( 1.--) Balance on Capital Account 27.2 46.2 41.5 j 33.7 35.6 44.1 61.1 Errors and Owiasions -8.2 -0.4 - _ _ _ _ _ IMF SDR's 4.9 4.0 4.0 Change in Reserves -3.1 5.2 - - -3.4 -11.2 - 5.4 - 5.9 Total, Capital Account 20.8 55.0 45.5 33.5 30.3 24.14 38.7 5S.2 Source: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook; Central Bank; Mission Estimates TABLE 3-15: EXPORTS 1970; E'ST11ATE, 1'71 AND PR0JZTIOíNlS. (Volume in thousands of metrxic tono ana value in ni31ions oTSiT ) 19(0 1971 1972 1913 19714 1975 1976 1977 Tin ¡alue 101.9 100.3 11L1.6 120.1 125.2 131.? 136.2 J12.9 Volh:rne 2'.h 29. 7 31.9 32. 8 33.6 34. 5 35. 5 36.14 Unit Price 3,597 3,505 3,594 3,660 3,726 3,793 3,837 3,925 (US$ per lb) 1.63 1.59 1.63 1.66 1.69 1. 72 1.74 1.7B Antimony Value 31.0 9.3 7.8 6-4 7.8 8.o 9.4 9.7 Volume 11.6 11.3 10. 3 10. 7 11.0 11.- 11. 8 12.2 Unit Price 2672 823 772 595 706 706 794 794 (U3$ par lb) 1.21 0.37 0.35 0.27 0.32 D 32 0.36 0.36 Copper Value 12.5 7.B 8.8 9.6 10.6 11.7 13-3 15.1 Voluime 8.9 7.4 8.0 8.5 9.4 10.2 11.2 12.2 Unit Prica 11404 1,0514 1,102 1,125 1,125 1,1147 1,191 1,235 (US$ per lb) 0.614 0.48 0.50 0.51 0. 51 C.52 0.514 0.56 Le.ad Value 7.8 6.8 7.9 7.9 8.5 9.9 10.7 10.7 Volune 25.8 23.7 25-5 27.5 29.7 32.1 34.7 37.5 Unit Price 302 287 309 287 287 309 309 287 (US$ per lb) 0.]i4 0-13 o.114 0,13 0.13 0. 14 0.114 0.13 Value I14.3 14.5 19.5 22.5 2h.6 28.3 32-5 37.2 Vlo.ume 40.5 146.6 52.0 56.7 61.9 67.5 73.7 80.4 !Thnt Pr ice lb 310 375 397 397 1419 Li 1463 177 40#487 1973 566#403 26#429 14»115 40>544 1974 539*974 26,327 13,521 39#848 1975 513>647 24,167 13>159 37,325 1976 489#482 25,129 12>741 37>869 1977 464P353 23>855 12>145 36#000 1978 440#498 22>166 11>470 33#635 1979 418>333 22J032 110019 33>051 1980 396>301 20#689 10>422 31#111 1981 375>612 20>504 9,944 30>448 1982 355,108 20#385 9*473 29>858 1983 334>722 19>987 8>916 28>903 1984 314>736 19>681 8>367 28>o 048 1985 295>055 19,527 7>700 27>226 Table 4-2: BOLIVIA - ESTEATED FUTURE SERVICE PMEU, JTS OIZ ETETNIAL PLIC DEBT OUTSTMID1hG IECLUDIIG I1DUSBUQED hS OF DECH2ER 31, 1971 Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency (In thousands of U.S. Dollars) Page 2 Debt Ou,st (Begin of Period) Payments Luring Períod Including Ainorti- Year Undisbursed zation Interest Total LOANS FROM INTL. ORGAN!ZATIONS 19172 79.107 1I431 688 2>319 1973 77.676 1930 3.356 5.266 1974 75.746 1 f 955 3. 268 5. 224 1975 73,791 1944 3>191 5.135 1976 71.847 2.547 3.051 5.597 1977 69.300 2.567 2.883 5.450 1978 66.133 2.*567 2J708 5.275 1979 64. 166 2.641 2.533 5.1174 t'80 61.525 2.655 2,357 5.012 - e,31 58.871 2.689 2P181 4.870 1982 56.182 2.o 723 2#005 4.728 1y83 53,459 2>723 1.829 4.552 1984 750.36 3.023 * 1652 4.675 1985 47.714 3.023 1.473 4.496 Table 1!-2: BOLIVIA. - EST`TED FUJTU-RE SERVICE P^Yl-lTS ON EXTER.NL ITBLIC DEBT OUTSTAI-Dh1G ILiCLUDINIG ILMUSBURED LS OF DECELBER 31, 1971 Debt Repayable in Foreign Ourrency (In thousands of U.S. Do11ars) Page 3 Debt Cutst (Begin ofr Period) Payments During Period Including Pimorti- Year Undisbursed zation Interest Total LOANS FROM INTL. ORGANIZATIONS IDA 1 w77 32p600 , 161 161 1 73 32J,600 184 184 1i74 32P600 150 211 361 1975 32,*450 150 225 375 1t?7,A 32.o.100 150 234 364 1977 32,150 170 241 411 t itd 31>980 170 240 410 1979 31,810 244 238 482 1i;'30 31>566 258 236 494 1831 31>308 292 234 526 31>016 326 232 558 1w , . 330>690 326 230 556 1 i,51' 30P 364 626 227 853 1-O5 29.738 626 222 848 LOANS FROM INtL* ORGANIZATIONS I tRD 1 #72 23*250 - 593 593 1¡3 23>250 596 1>511 2>107 1974 22>654 1J192 1>453 2>645 1 9,7 5 21>462 1>192 1J376 2>568 1976 20,270 1*192 1J298 2J490 19r7 19*078 1J192 1J221 2J413 1.47 17>886 1t192 1>143 2J335 1Y79 16P694 1, 192 1>f066 2>258 1980 15> 502 1>9192 988 2J>180 1431 14>31' I192 911 2#103 132 13>115 1*192 833 2J025 1933 11,926 #1>92 756 1#948 1 9 9 4 10>734 1J192 678 1t870 19A, 9.542 1>192 601 1*793 Teble 4-2: BOLIVI - ESTJ3ATED FUTURE SERVICE PAM-2MM OIl WTERT565 1973 21>826 1>334 1>661 2>995 1974 20#492 613 1.>604 2#217 1975 19>879 602 1>590 2o193 1976 19,27? 1>205 1>516 2#723 1977 18>072 1,205 1422 2>626 197a 16>867 1,205 1I325 2>530 ,979 159662 1>205 1>229 2>434 1980) 14,457 1>205 1>133 2*337 IV61 13.253 1>205 1>036 2>241 19PI? 12>048 1>205 940 2*145 1983 10>*43 1I205 843 2>048 1984 9.638 1>205 747 1>952 1985 8>434 1,205 651 1>855 Table L-2: BOLIVIA - ES'TIIEAT`1;D UTJU?E SETVICE P^YI1J2TS 01 ETENA-IL PUBLIC DEBT OUTDSTA!IDrG =CLUDING I1DUSBURZSD hS OF DECHBER 31, 1971 Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency (In thousands of U.S. Dollars) Page 5 Debt Outst (Begin of Period) Payments During Period Including Amorti- Year Undisbursed zation Interest Total LOANS FROM GOVERNMENTS 1972 291#259 6.529 5,427 11>956 1973 284P730 7*481 5,588 13.069 1974 277,249 7.681 5.550 13J231 1975 269,568 8p320 5f736 14.057 1976 261*248 9.311 5.840 15#151 1977 251.938 9,i599 5,759 15>358 1978 242,339 9#044 5>560 14>605 1979 233,295 9>693 5#528 15P221 1980 223.602 9.790 5.328 15>i119 1981 213.812 10.166 5>199 15>364 1982 203>646 10>595 5S046 15.642 19t3 193,050 10.#484 4.#799 15.283 1984 182.566 10.*207 4.560 14.767 1985 172*359 10>481 4>205 14.686 LOANS FROM GOVERNMENTS USA 1972 182.176 3>799 2>782 6.581 1973 178>377 4.331 2>879 7>210 1974 174.046 4#543 2J836 7>f380 1975 169,503 5.122 3>014 00136 1976 164.381 6.080 3.157 'D,237 1977 158.301 6>258 3>133 9J391 1978 152*043 5>703 3>018 0.721 1979 146#340 6.352 3>069 9>421 1980 139.988 6PA49 2>952 9.402 í,yuí 133.539 6>804 2>906 9.710 (1C; ~r12t735 7s396 2.039 10.235 iS 3 1 9 19,338 7.469 2.658 10.127 1984 111>869 7>391 2,477 9.868 1985 104*479 ?7665 2.*170 9>835 Table I.-2: BOLIVIA - EST'HD TED FUTURE SERVICE P,YKyTDIS OI E'1XTfL FUELIC DEBT OUTS3TMDjIIG IECLUDIIUG IiOLUSBUR2ED IlS OF DECUhBER 31, 1971 Debt Repayable in Foreign Ourrency (In thousands of U.S. Dollars) Page 6 Debt Outst (Begin of Period) Payments Luring Period Including Amorti- Year Undisbursed zation Interest Total LOANS FROM GOVERNMENTS OTHER 1 972 109 083 2 730 2 £/;5 1 973 106 353 3 150 2 70 1 9714 103 293 3 1 32 2 714 r 2 1 975 3 133 2 1 97G 9rG 7 231 ^ 1 19 -~ 7 °3 1 3 -7 - 4r 7 1 978 9O 29C .3 1 2 5L2 r 1 797. %t CCS 3 ',41 2 45? 9 1 9C0 ¡3 S14 3 -1 2 37C- 1 £3gJ 1 80 273 3 ?72 2 293 t 98 2 7 C ?91 1 3 127 - Á07 1 . 73 773 7 12 3 015 9. 1'- 1 984 7 n , °7 2 2 2 0.3 2 * o3r; C7 fl&C ^ 2 3 5 C1 Table 4-2: BOLIVIA. - ESTllfATED 1UJTURE SERVICE PPYITi2S 011 META?IIAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTIDMIIG IIECLUDIEG ILTDUSBURSED AS OF DECILBER 31, 1971 Debt Pepayable in Foreign Currency (In thousands of U.S. Dollars) Page 7 Debt Ou.st (Begin of Period) Payments During Period Including Anorti- Year Undisbursed zation Interest Total PUBLICLY ISSUED BONOS 1972 66,157 904 1J829 2.733 1973 65,254 911 1,810 2p722 1974 6 4.364J342 919 1#791 2>711 1975 63>423 928 1,772 2>#699 19-@6 62*495 936 1.752 2>688 - Y77 61>560 944 1,732 2>676 I7s 60#616 952 1>712 2J664 197Y 59>663 961 1>692 2*653 19qu 58>7cZ 969 1,671 2.641 19P] 57.733 978 1*650 2J628 1 ¡ç, 2 56,J 755 987 1>629 2#616 I 903 55.768 996 1*608 2J603 1v -54 ii54>772 1>005 1#586 2>591 1;55 53#767 1,014 t>564 2*578 PRIVATE BANKS 10,267 277 103544 1972 10>800 267 33 300 1903 266 266 927 1974 6 7 Table IL-2: BOLIVI. - EST .IATD FUTURE SERVICE PM9,2=TS OI# MTE1T1AL FUBLIC DEBT OUTSTAIDI IG IIWCLUDIING II1USBURSED S OF DECEL-ER 31, 1971 Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency (In thousands of U.S. Dollars) Page 8 Debt Outst (Begin of Period) Payments During Period Includin- Ainorti- Year Undisbursed zation Interest Total OTHER PRIVATE FINANCIAL INST* 1,02 4.9431 387 73 459 1973 4»051 440 147 587 1974 3*611 616 211 826 1J75 2?996 592 112 764 1976 2>403 380 138 518 1977 2J023 403 115 518 1q7í¡ 901o620 428 90 518 1979 1>192 454 64 518 1970 7 38 481 37 51S 1931 257 252 8 260- 1 9 92 1 - 10S3 1 1 94 3 - I1985 2 1 1 NATIONALIZATION lP'2 102*404 1#318 1>590 2#908 1973 101>0565 8J509 1>501 10>010 1q?¡4 92>571 8J339 1>411 9*750 1975 84'238 A>073 1#322 9>395 197.5 76>165 7,801 1233 9>034 197r 68..364 7,140 1*144 A8284 197h 61.224 6>769 1>054 7>823 1979 54>455 6>609 965 7>574 1 i -9 1) 447>846 6>049 876 6>925 1931 41,798 5792 787 6J579 1932 36.JOO6 5J520 697 6J217 1Y33 30>4d6 5>224 608 5>832 I Y),34 25#262 4>886 519 S5405 1985 20>o376 4J449 430 4>879 Table Lt-2: BOLIVIA. - ESTMAD FUTURE SERVICE PzM-221TS ON EXTIRNAL PFUBLIC DEBT OUTST tJDIIG LNCLUDIIIG I1¡USBURSEED AS OF DECE -ER 31, 1971 Debt Repayable in Foreign Currency (In thousands of U.S. Dollars) Page 9 Debt Cutst (Begin of Period) Payments IDuring Period Including Amorti- Year Undisbursed zation Interest Total SUPPLIERS 1972 40,550 7,476 2#093 9,569 1973 33,074 6,891 1,680 6>571 1974 26#183 6,551 1,280 7>831 1975 19o632 4,309 965 5*274 1976 15>323 4,154 727 4#881 1977 11,168 3,202 512 3o714 1978 7#967 2,405 344 2>750 1979 5>561 1,674 237 1>911 1980 3J887 745 153 897 1981 3>142 627 120 747 1982 2>515 559 95 654 1983 1>956 559 73 632 1984 1>397 559 50 609 1985 838 S59 28 587 Table 5.1: PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCES FOR INVESTMHET, 1967-1972 (In millions of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1. SOURCES A. Current Account Surplus/ 144.3 383.8 467.5 351.6 285.4 412.1 1. Central Government 1.2 20.6 39.7 91.E - i -340.3 Treasury (1.2) (20.6) (19.5) (42.3) (-122.0) (-361.0) Other accounts ( - > ( - ) (20.2) (49.3) (13.7) (20.7) 2. Decentralized Agencies -29.7 42.8 30.6 26.4 8.9 1.2 3. State Enterprises 148.1 291.9 368.9 204.4 363.1 678.0 YPFB and COMIBOL (161.6) (302.7) (355.6) (283.5) (348.5) (632.8) of which: depreciation f/94.77 /112.07 /To5.-7 /8.27 /177.47 /222.97 Other enterprises (-13.1) T-lo.u) (13.3) (:79.1) (14.Z) (45.2) 4. Municipalities 24.7 28.5 28.3 29.2 21.7 (67.2) B. Other Revenues2/ 89.7 69.1 18.8 94.5 81.0 141.0 C. Borrowinp 554.8 685.2 706.4 906.2 1.093.1 865.6 1. Internal (net)1/ 153.3 9o15. 2140.0 276.1 132.9 2. External (gros>) 401.5 774.2 551.8 666.2 817.0 732.7 of which: gas pipeline loan (220.3) (61.0) Total 788.8 1,138.1 1.192.7 1,352.3 1,159.5 1,418.7 Il. USES A. Gross Fixed Investment 548.6 888.o 917.1 999.0 1,110.7 .960.4 1. Central Government 27 W99.3 h 5 . 3;. 279.0 7T.9 Treasury (32.3) (68.5) (42.0) (23.1) (48.0) (77.0) Other aecounts (323.5) (430.8) (417.14) (343.5) (231.0) (201.9) 2. Decentralized Agencies 45.3 74.2 100.2 99.1 86.0 84.2 3. State Enterprises 128.7 287.7 329.2 510.1 725.0 549.9 YPFB and COMIBOL (119.8) (191.3) (166.5) (337.7) (571.9) (339.1) Other enterprises (8.9) (96.4) (162.7) (172.4) (153.1) (210.8) 4. Municipalities 18.8 26.8 28.3 23.2 20.7 47.4 B. Amortization of External Debt 216.0 235.8 227.0 308.6 347.2 457.1 C. Financial Investmnent 24.2 14.3 48.6 44.7 1.6 1.2 Total 788.8 1,138.1 1,192.7 1,352.3 1,459.5 1,418.7 / Revenues and expenditures are presented net of public sector transfers to and from the Treasury 2 Capital Account revenues and grantg to the Central Government. Includes the disbursement under the USAID Program Loan. 2/ Balancing item Sources: llinistry of Finance and accounts received from decentralized agencies, state enterprises, and munlcipalities. Table 5.21 PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCES FOR INVESTMENT, 1967-1972 (percentage distribution) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 I. SOURCES A. Current Account Surplus 18.3 33.7 39.2 26.0 19.6 29.1 1. Central Government 0.2 18 3.3-7 - Treasury (0.2) (1.8) (1.6) (3.1) (-fi.3 (-24,7) Other accounte ( - ) ( - ) (1.7) (3.7) (0.9) (l.4) 2. Decentralized Agencies -3.8 3.8 2.6 1.9 0.6 0.1 3. State Enterprises 18.8 25.6 30.9 15.1 24.9 46.4 YPFB and COMIBOL (20.5) (26.6) (29.8) (20.9) (23.9) (4h.6) of which: depreciation /T2.07 fi.87 /T.87 /7.37 /12.27 /i5.77 Other enterprises (-1.7) (-1.0) (1.1) (-5.8) (1.0) (1.8) 4. Municipalities 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.5 5.9 B. Other Revenues 11.4 6.1 1.6 7.0 11.4 4.7 C. Borrowing 70.3 60.2 59.2 67.0 69.0 66.2 1. Internal (net) -19. -T--7-.B 13.0 17{.7 13.1 14 2. External (gross) 50.9 68.0 46.2 49.3 55.9 51.6 of which: gas pipeline loan - - - - (15.1) (4.3) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 II. USES A. Grose Fixed Investm,ent 69.5 78.0 76.9 73.9 76.1 67.7 1. Central Government WI-1 73 37.5 27.1 19.1 i-7 Treasury (4.1) (6.0) (3.5) (1.7) (1.0) (3.5) Other accounts (41.0) (37.9) (35.0) (25.-4) (18.1) (16.2) 2. Decentralized Agencies 5.7 6.5 8.4 7.3 5.9 5,9 3. State Enterprises 16.3 25.3 27.6 37.8 49.7 38.8 YPFB and COMIBOL (15.2) (16.8) (114.0) (25.0) (39.2) (23.9) Other enterprises (1.1) (8.5) (13.6) (12.8) (10.5) (14-9) -4. Municipalities 2.4 2.3 2.4 1.7 1.4 3.3 B. Amortization of External Debt 27.4 20.7 19.0 22.8 23.8 32.2 C. Financial Investment 3.1 1.3 4.1 3.3 0.1 0.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Sources; Ministry of Finance, decentralized agencies, state enterprises, and municipalities. e 5.3: P9BLIC SECTOR R 0URCBS FOR I'VES 'T, 1967-1972 (Percentage - year- tv-year char.ge) 196 7/68 1 &9' 9 1969/70 1970/7.1 1971/72 I. SOIJRCES A. Current Aceount 1:-,.s .1f6.0 21.8 -Pl.8 -18.8 IJI.11 1. Gtru i' Uv,vr:;:1 c,;f7: 92.7 13j.7 1 217i.2 Treas ury (1,617.0) (-5.3) (116.9) ' ' (195.2) Other acco;n',s ( _ ) ( - ) (Uil.1) (-35.3) (-35.1) 2. Dezeptralizcd Aencrcesi 2Zin.1 -28.5 -13.7 -66.3 -86.5 3. State Enterprzc.s 9,7.1 26.4 -44.6 77.6 86.7 YPr3 and CG ,BMIs (87.3) (17.5} (-20.3. (22.9} _s1. 6 cf w;iztil: Od:l,-C¿t.stion ¡. V /-5., 1-.9 ¡ L -77 /222.9/ Othe: i'terprisis (2;v.C) (223.1) (-69!i7) (116.5) (209.6) 4. Municipalities 15.1, -0.7 3.2 -25.7 209. 7 B. Other Rüvc!inus -23.I -72.8 4;02.7 -14.7 74.0 C. F2Borro¿wir.Q 21.5 23.3 2. 6 -20.8 1. Inter.a1 (ne) -l1il.l 2-i3.? 5.0 -519 2. Exterr.al (gross) 92.8 -25.i 20.7 22.6 -10.3 o.' wl.iizh: gas ,,oains loan (-) (72.3) Total L -3 L.8 13.1i 7.9 -2.8 II. USFS A. Gros3 Fixed Inv.ztzzent 61.9 3.3 8.9 11.1 -13.5 1. Ccitr ..J. l -e.t r(r. _ -?5o -20.2 -23.9 0.0 Tr-e sru.ry (112.') (-3-5.7) (-i5.0) (107.7) ( 60.4) Othor acr tu (33.2) (-3.) (-17.7) (-32.8) (-17.0) 2. ':r . i . - gncies 63.8 35.^ -1.1 -13.2 -2.1 3. State 'nterises 123.5 1L:.4 55.0 L12.1 -21; .2 OO.e F; -ri : ........ k.7 (-1 )f &. - C) (-h.2;) -;. ¿'t! e~~~~- ¡1h f>8^,- ..........(;,3z ). ( G" 1 ( tt (3]I,2 7 7) 4. e íiijp l í L2.¿ 5.6 -18.0 -10.8 129.0 B. A'iort.izotion or -x'tcral Debt 9.2 -,¡.7 35.9 12.5 31.7 C. Finan 1iil Invp-.tr,en t -LI,.o -B? -8.0 -96.lh -25.0 Total LY".3 .8 . 13.li 7.9 -2.8 Sources: Ministry of Finarn;e, decent,ralizíed agencíet, state entrprisfe3, aned rnunicipallties. ff Change froni C le pOsi'ciVie sig3 (surplus) to the nezative sian (defiit) Table 5.4s PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCES FOR INVESTMENT, 1967-1972 (Percent of GDP) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 I. SOURCES A. Current Account Surplus 1.7 4.2 4.8 3.5 2.7 3.6 1. Central Government _ 0.2 0.4 0.9 -l.0 -3.0 Treasury ( _ ) (0.2) (0.2) (c.L) (-1.20 (-3.0 Other accounts ( - ) ( - ) (0.2) (0.5) (o12 (0. 2. Decentralized Agencies -0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 - 3. State Enterprises 1.7 3.2 3.8 2.0 3.4 5.9 YPFB and COMIBOL (1.9) (3.3) (3.7) (2.8) (3.3) (5.6) of vThich: depreciation /-1.17 /17.27 I.í7 /17.o7 J177 _.07 Other enterprises (-0.2) (-0.1) (0.1) (-0.8) (o.1) ( 0.3 14. Municípalities 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.7 B. Other Revenues 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.9 o 8 1.2 C. Borrowing 6.5 7.5 7.3 8.9 104! 7.7 1. Internal (net) 10 7 2.6 7. 2. External (gross) 14.7 8.5 5.7 6.5 2.6 of which: gas pipeline loan /2.17 5 57 Total 9.2 12.4 12.3 13.3 13.8 12.5 II. USES A, Gross Fixed Investment 6.4 9.7 9.4 9.9 10.5 8.5 1. Central Government 2 7 Treasury <(0.4) (0.8) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1) (o.4) Other accounts (3.8) (4.7) (4.3) (3.4) (2.5) (2.1) 2. Decentralized Agencies 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 3. State Enterprises 1.5 3.1 3.4 5.0 6.8 4.9 YPFB and COMIBOL (1.4) (2.1) (1.7) (3.3) (5.4) (3.0) Other enterprises (0.1) (1.0) (1.7) (1.7) (1.4) (1.9) 4. Municipalities 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 B. Amortization of ExternAl Debt 2.5 2.5 2.4 3.0 3.3 4.0 C. Financial Investnent 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 - Total 9.2 12.4 12.3 13.3 13.8 12.5 Sources: Ministry of Finance, decentralized agencies, state enterprises, and municipalities. Table 5.5s ANALYSIS Or JUBLIc SECTOR FINANCES, 1967-1972 (In millions of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 CENTRAL GOVEI.'ENT Current revenues 770.3 833.0 910.1 1,128.7 1,124.9 1,198.0 Current expenditures 769.1 812.4 870.4 1,037.1 1,233.2 1,538.3 Current account surplus/deficit 1.2 20.6 39.7 91.6 -108.3 -340.3 Savings ratio 0.2 2.5 4.4 8.1 -10.0 -28.4 Investment 355.8 499.3 459.4 366.6 324.0 288.9 Savings as percent of investment 0.3 4.1 8.6 25.0 - - DECENTRALIZED AGENCIES Current revenues 164.4 251.6 263.7 278.3 281.0 287.4 Current expenditures 194.1 208.8 233.1 251.9 272.1 286.2 Current account surplus/deficit -29.7 42.8 30.6 26.4 8.9 1.2 Savings ratio -18.1 17.0 11.6 9.5 3.2 o.4 Investr.ent 45.3 74.2 100.2 99.1 86.0 B4.2 Savings as percent of investment -65.6 57.7 30.5 26.6 10.3 1.4 EXPORT ENTERPRISES (YPFB and COMlBOL) Current revenues 1,158.7 1,307.6 1,430.8 1,568.4 1,712.1 1,989.5 Current expenditures 997.1 1,004.9 1,075.2 1,284.9 1,363.6 1,356.7 Current account surplus/deficit 161.6 302.7 355.6 283.5 348.5 632.8 Savings ratio 13.9 23.1 24.9 18.1 20.4 31.8 Investment 119.8 191.3 166.5 337.7 571.9 339.1 Savings as percent of investment 134.9 158.2 213.6 84.0 60.9 186.6 OTIER STATE ENTERPRISES Current revenues 284.6 315.2 361.4 391.6 708.8 76c.8 Current expenditures 298.1 326.0 348.1 470.7 694.2 753.6 Current account surplus/deficit -13.5 -10.8 13.3 -79.1 16.6 7.s Savings ratio -4.7 -3.4 3.7 -20.2 2.1 0.? Investm2ent 8.9 96.4 162.7 172.4 153.1 210.3 -avings as percent of investment -151.7 -11.2 8.2 -45.9 9.5 1.j, :MUICIPALITIES Current revenues 82.7 91.1 95.8 100.6 98.9 14.5 Current expenditures 58.0 62.6 67.5 71.4 77.2 81.8 Current account surplus/deficit 24.7 28.5 28.3 29.2 21.7 62.7 Savings ratio 29.9 31.3 29.5 29.0 21.9 43.h Investaent 18.8 26.8 28.3 23.2 20.7 47.4 Savings as percent of investment 131.4 106.3 100.0 125.9 104.8 132.3 PIJBLIC SECTOR 1. Total savings lh4.3 383.8 467.5 351.6 285.4 412.1 2. Total revenues 2,460.7 2,798.5 3,061.8 3,467.6 3,879.3 L,37!.7 3. Savings ratio 1/ 5.9 13.7 15.3 10.2 7.4 9.L 6. Gross fixed investment 548.6 888.0 917.1 999.0 1,110.7 960.!. 5. Savings as percent of investmnent 2/ 26.3 43.2 51.0 35.2 25.7 42.9 6. Savings as percent of GOP 1.7 4.2 4.8 3.5 2.7 3.7 7. Other revenues 89.7 69.1 18.8 94.5 166.4 67.0 8. Financial investment 24.2 lh.3 48.6 44.7 1.6 1.2 9. Funds available for fixed investment 3/ 209.8 438.6 437.7 401.4 450.2 477.9 10. Funds available as percent of fixed investmnent 4/ 38.2 49.4 47.7 40.2 40.5 49.8 11. Financing gap before borrowing 5/ 338.8 449.4 h79.4 597.6 660.5 682.5 12. Gross external borrowing 401.5 776.2 551.8 666.2 817.0 732.7 13. hmortization 216.0 235.8 227.0 30B.6 347.2 657.1 14. Net external borrowing 185.5 538.4 324.8 357.6 469.8 275.6 15.Net internal borrowing 153.3 -89.0 154.6 240.0 190.7 206.9 MEMJRAND1JM IrE13 uruss orles lnvestinent 1,155.7 1,770.0 1,640.1 1,580.3 1,578.5 1,681.1 Oross domestic savings 975.9 1,432.2 1,532.5 1,755.2 1,372.9 Resource balance (- - inflow) -308.8 -I,03.8 -296.9 -66.0 -656.0 Factor income payments -171.0 -258.9 -250.5 -250.5 -256.5 -299.3 Balance in current account Net public inflow Net private inflow * Revenues and expenditures are presented net of public sector transfera to and from the Treasury. 1/ 3 equals ¿ diviaed oy 1 3/ 1 plus 7 minus o 2/ 5 equals 1 divided by 4 / 10 equals 9 divided by 4 5/ 11 equals 1 plus 7 minus (4+8). Source: Ministry of Finance, decentralized agencies, state enterprises, and municipalities. Table 5.6¡ AALUySIS OF PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCES, 1967-72 (Percent of GDP) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Central Government Current revenues 9.0 9.1 9.4 11.1 10.2 9.8 Current expenditures 9.0 8.9 9.0 10.2 11.2 13,0 Current account surplua/deficit - 0.2 0.4 0.9 -1.0 -3.2 Investment 4.2 5.4 4.7 3.6 2.6 2.4 Decentralized Aeencies Current r-eenue6 1.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 Current expenditures 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 Current account surplua/deficit -0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 - Inveatment o.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 Rxport Entegrises (YPFB and COIBOL) Current revenues 13.5 14.2 14.8 15.4 16.2 17.5 Current expenditures 11.6 10.9 11.1 12.6 12.9 12.0 Current account surplus/deficit 1.9 3.3 3.7 2.8 3.3 S.S Investment 1.4 2.1 1.7 3.3 5.4 3.0 Other State Eteprises uiirrent renues 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.9 6.7 6.7 Current expenditures 3.5 3.5 3.6 h.6 6.6 6.6 Current account surplus/deficit -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.7 0.1 0.1 Investment 0.1 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.9 nunicin ties Cuirentirevenues 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 Current expenditures 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 Current account surplus/deficit 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 Investment 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 Public Sector Current revenues 28.7 30.5 31.6 34.1 36.7 38.5 Current expenditures 27.0 26.3 26.8 30.6 34.0 34.9 Current accout surplus/deficit 1.7 4.2 4.8 3.5 2.7 M- Gross fixed investment 6.h 9.7 9.4 9.8 10.5 .5 Other revenues 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.9 1.6 o.6 Financial investment 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 - - Funde arailable for fixed investment 2.5 4.8 14.5 4-° 4.3 ¡.2 Financing gap before borrowing 3.9 4.9 ¡.9 5.8 6.2 4.3 Groas external borroving 4.7 8.4 5.6 6.5 7.7 6.5 Amortization 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.0 3.3 4.o Net external borrowing 2.2 5.8 3.3 3.5 4.4 2.4 Net internal borrowing 1.8 -1.0 1.6 2.4 1.8 1.8 Resource balance (- * inflow) Factor income payaente Balance in current account Net public inflow Net private inflow SAurce_a Ministry of Finance, decentralized agencies, atate enterprises, and municípalities. Table 5.7: CENTRAL COVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 1967-1972 (In millions of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1. Currert Revenues 777.8 844.8 920.0 1 131 4 L1a 24. 11,2 1. Treasury cperations 771.7 370 110703 1,090.0 1,163.0 2. Owier accounts 6.1 7.8 47.6 61.1 346Y 35.0 II. Current xnenditures 851.2 906.8 938.3 1.1>43.1 1,538.3 1. Tressury operations 8>45.1 699.0 910.9 1,131.3 1,212.0 1,524.0 2. Other accounts 6.1 7.8 27,4 11.8 21.2 i*3 III. Current Account Surplus/Deficit -73.>4 -62.0 -18.3 -11.7 -108.3 -340.3 IV. Other RevenuF's 26.9 10.3 1.0 29.2 36.4 30.0 1. Treasury operations - - - 3.7 6.7-/ 2. Other accounts 1/ 26.9 10.3 1.0 25.5 29.7 30.0 Y. Investment Expendit.ures 362.7 499.6 >468.2 376.8 324.0 288.9 1. Treasury cperations 39.2 7T.T 50- 33.3 93.0 ~ 87. a. Cnpital transfers (35.4) (57.2) (32.8) (15,0) (45.0) (10.0) b. 02ptnl fornation (3.8) (11.6) (18.0) (18.3) (48.0) (77.0) 2. 0ther accounts 323.5 >430.8 417-4 3>43-5 231.0 201.9 (Capital formation) VI. Overa1l Surplus/Deficit ->409.2 -551.3 -485.5 -359.3 -432.3 -629.2 VJII. Financing >409.2 551.3 485.5 359.3 -432.3 -629.2 1. EDcternal 2>46.7 396.6 3r2-.0 ' 20>.0 a. Drawings (286.8) (4:69.7) (399.9) (298.8) (240.1) (201.9) Treasury operationa r- 7 A9.67 ¡7.37 E-- 7 /24.67 ¡ - / Other accounts 2- 86.7 g /'20.i7 /392. i7 /29887 1/15. 7 /201-o. b. Arortization (-40.1) T-71.T1) T-57.7) T-944. } (:106.3) (127.O) Treasury operations 40.1/ r-71.17 /137-77 1:72.67 /P74-67 1127.0! Other accounts r-_7 -- 7 T20.U 7-22.2 7731.77 1l e. Changes in long-term foreign assets (Treasury) (-) (._) (_) ( _ ) (30.7) ( -) 2. Internal 162.5 152.7 143.5 155.3 267.8 554.3 a. Central Bank (net) (162.0< (51.3) (95.9) (48.2) (243.1) (200.0) Treasury operations /147.0/ /121.9/ [97.s7 /127.57 /150.77 1_ Other accoInts /.i5.-7 T770.7 Ti1.Z7 T 79.37 -/7.Z7 7_ ¡ b. Loans fron¡ Bolivian-owned counterpart funds X9.8) (c>.4) (55.8) (37,2) (37.3) (óO 0) Treasury oprations -7 [ 7 /j2.o7 /18.07 /18.57 60.0 Qther accounts iona -/U>47 ,03.87 /19.27 /18.97 -7 c. Amortization (Treasury) (-27.) (-5.J) (718.Z) (C1l.E) (725.1) (-111.0) d. Other 2/ 18.5 116.9 10.4 81.5 17.3 (81.0)2/ e. Uncovered deficít - - - - - 324.3 1J Grants from Bolivian-ot.1 208.8 233.1 251.9 272.1 286.2 1. Wages and salaries 75.2 TUI.2 97.4 106.1 116.3 121.> 2. Purchases of goods and services 1.0 3.4 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.8 3. Transfers to other public enter- prises 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 4. Transfers to Central Government 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 5. Interest 0.8 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 a. Internal (0.1) (0.5) ( - ) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) b. External (0.7) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.3) (1.3) 6. Other 116.4 116.6 131.6 141.1 151.5 160.3 III. Current Surplus/Deficit 27.7 112.2 94.3 98.3 67.6 128.8 IV. Other Revenue 0.9 1.9 2.1 3.1 223 .-3 V. Investment _Expenditures 45.3 7h.4 100.9 99.6 86.3 84.5 VI. Overall Surplus/Deficit -16.7 39.7 -4.5 1.8 -16.4 46.6 VII. Financip& 16.7 -39.7 4.5 -1.8 16.4 -46.6 1. External (net) 3907 -E -0 12.2 a. Borrowing ( - ) (60.0) ( - ) ( - ) (31.5) (18.2) b. Amortization (-0.5) (-005) (-0.5) (-1.5) (-1.5) (-6.0) 2. Internal (net) 17.2 -99.2 5.0 -0,3 -13.6 -58.8 Sources: Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social, Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda, and Servicio Nacional de Caminos. Table 5.9. EXPORT ENTERPRISES, YPFB AND COMIBOL, 1967-1972 (In millions of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 I. Current Revenues 1 158.7 1,307.6 1,l30.8 1,568.4 1 712-1 2 007 5 1. Sale of goods and services 1,233.9 1,3-4.4 1 31 . a. Exports (1,460.4) b. Other (450.0) 2. Transfers received from Central Govern- ment and other public entities 34.4 40.h 47.5 60.6 55.8 70.3 3. Other 142.2 33.3 34.9 36.8 143.1 26.8 II. Current end itures 1.004.6 1,016.7 1,085.1 1,287.6 1,417.1 U.464 I.- Wages and salaries 215.0 254.9 2F3.0 93" 370.8 359.3 2. Goods and services 436,24 3514.9 403.1 460.3 1451h.1 14142.14 3. Transfera to Central Government 36.2 5.2 614.2 101.3 107.0 143.1 4. Royalties 7.7 9.3 12.4 25.5 41.8 63.5 S. Transfers to other public enterprises 23.8 17.8 24.9 53.lJ 2a7.5 38.0 6. Transfers to private sector 137,8 162.7 137.8 168.6 1148.1 1140.1 7. Payments to Social Se¢urity Systea 100.7 112.3 107.1 112.6 131.0 137.6 8. Interest payments 43.8 46.0 47.5 11.1 1s8.2 83.8 a. Internal (7.1) (6.0) (6.0) (h.9) (3.7) (3.7) b. External (36.7) (40.0) (41.5) (36.2) (44.5) (80.1) 9. Other 3.2 4.6 5.1 5.9 68.3 8.6 III. Current Surplue/Deficit 15U.1 290.9 345.7 280.B 295.0 561.1 rV. Other Revenue 8.5 1.0 o.8 1.14 72.3 1.0 V. Investment Expenditure 119.8 191.3 166.5 337.7 571.9 339,1 VI. Overall Surp1us/Deficit L2.8 100.6 180.0 -55.5 -204.6 223.0 of whíic: depreciation VII. Financ in 1i-nternal (net) 214.2 -51.8 -94.5 -5.7 -92.0 -169.5 a. Borrowing (23.8) (20.3) (11.9) (29.8) (17.7) (21.5) b. Amortization (-19.0) (-27.14) (-16.3) (-18.7) (-18.7) (-18.7) c. Other (19.4) (-44.7) (-90.1) (-16.8) (.91.0) (-175.3) 2. External (net) -67.0 -148.8 -85.5 61.2 296.6 -53.5 a. Borrowing (83e0) (86.2) (51.4) (210.9) (1W58.1) (1714.2) b. Anmortization (-150.0) (-135.0) (-136.9) (-149.7) (-161.5) (-227.7) Sources: Corporacion Minera de Bolivia and Yacinmientos Petronlteros Fiscales Bolivianos. Table5.10: YACIMIENTOS PETROLIFEROS FISCALES BOLIVIANOS (YPFB), 1967-1972 (In milliona of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 I. Current Revenues 356.0 411.0 472.5 538.8 683.7 970.6 1. Sale of goods and serviles 338.7 399.1 59-o 95.2 a. Exporte (515.2) b. Other (450o.) 2. Other 17.3 11.9 13.5 9.5 5.1 4 II. Current Expenditures 201.9 223.4 251.5 336.4 360.2 483.3 1. Wages and salaries 71.3 102.9 113.2 130.1 172.5 2. Family allowances 3.2 4.6 5.1 5.9 7.8 8.6 3. Purchases of goods and services 94.5 63.9 74.2 101.7 39.6 38.6 4. Royalties 7.7 9.3 12.4 25.5 41.8 63.5 5. Direct taxes 1.8 13.8 16.7 4o.7 51.2 89.7 6. Payments to Social Security System 12.8 18.5 20.4 23.5 31.2 34.3 7. Interest payments 10.6 10.4 9.5 9.0 16.1 58.8 a. Internal ( - ) <0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) b. External (10.6) (10.3) (9.4) (8.9) (16.0) (58.7) III. Current Surplus/Deficit 154.1 187.6 221.0 202.4 323.5 487.3 of which: depreciation (72.1) (93.0) (85.3) (78.0) (152.5) (195.6) IV. Other Revenues 8.5 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.0 V. Investment Expenditures 113.9 183.0 162.9 317.5 566.0 298.7 VI. Overall Surplus/Deficit 48.7 5.6 58.9 -113.7 -241.5 189.6 VII. Financing -48.7 -5.6 -58.9 113.7 241.5 -189.6 1. Internal (net) -23.3 -952.1 9 --37-.8 -T 3-7. 4 a. Borrowing ( _ ) (20.3) ( - ) (13.2) (2.3) (12.6) b. Amortization ( - ) <-10.8) (-2.0) (-4.4) (-4.4) c. Other (-23.3) (-18.6) (-50.9) (-h6.6) (-137.3) (-182.3) 2. External (net) -25.4 3.5 -6.o 151.5 380.9 -15.5 a. Borrowing (47.4) (48.2) (47.8) (210.9) (458.1) (íh>5) b. Amortization (-72.8) (-44.7) (-53.8) (-59.4) (-77-2) (-160.5) 3. Capital transfers from Central Govern- ment - - - - - Source: Yacimientos Petroliferos. Table 5. : CO.RPORACION MINERA DE BOLIVIA (COHIBOL), 1967-1972 (In milUions of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1. Current Revenne 802.7 896.6 958.3 1,029 6 1,028 , 7Y 36.9 1. Sale of geods and services 7 3m 7. U -7-1 941:7 934 ó - 2. Transfers roceived fromi Central lovernnient 3L.4 40.h 47.5 60.6 55.8 52.3 3. Transfers received from other 18 public entities _ _ _18._ 4.. Other 24.9 21.4 21.4 27.3 38.0 21,4 II. Cnrrent Expenditures 802.7 793.3 833.6 951.2 1,056,9 963.1 1. Wages ar,d salaries '143.7 1512.0 U6978 lu". 190.3 T1,9. 2. Ooods and services 341.9 291.0 328.9 358.6 414.5 403.8 3. Transfers to other public enter- prises 23.8 17.8 24.9 53.4 47.5 38.0 4. TrDnsfers to Central Govermnent 34.4 4o.4 47.5 60.6 55.8 53.4 5. Transfers to private sector 137.8 162.7 137.8 168.6 148.4 140.1 6. Payments to Social Security Syetem 87.9 93.8 86.7 89.1 99.8 103.3 7. Interest Payments 33.2 35.6 38.0 32.1 32.1 25.0 a. Interrial (7.1) (5.9) (5-9) (4.8) (3.6) (3.6) b. External (26.1) (29.7) (32.1) (27.3) (28.5) (21.4) 8. Gther 60.5 - 9. Operation of MJna Matilde - _ - - _ III. Curr-nt Surn]us/Beficit - 103.3 124.7 78.4 -28.5 73,8 of which: depreciation (22.6) (19.0) (20.2) (20.2) (24.9) (27,3) IV. Other Revenue .1L/ _ Y. Investmnent Expenditure g.9 8.3 3.6 20.2 5.9 __0_ VI. Overall Surxlus/Deficit -_.9 95-0 121.1 C8.2 36.9 33.1 VII. Financin -95.0 -121.1 -58.2 -36.9 -3 1.Internal (net) 475-27 -1. óó4. 8.3ó 419 -Z2.- 7M 3~2 .1 t7*f S a. Borrowing (23.8) ( - ) (11.9) (16.6) (15.1) (11.9) b. Amortization (-19.0) (-16.6) (-14.3) (-14.3) (-1h.3) (-1L.3) c. Other (42.7) (-26.1) (-39.2) (29.8) (46.3) C.0) 2. External (net) -11.6 -52.3 -79.5 -90.3 -84.3 -38.0 a. Borrowing (35.6) (38.0) (3.6) ( - ) - ) (29.7) b. Amortization (-77.2) (-90.3) (-83.1) (-90.3) (-84.3) (-67.7) 1/ Buffer stock. Source: Corporacion Minera de Bolivia. Table 512: OTHE0 R STA.TE MTERPRISES, 1967-1972 (In millions of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 19721/ I. Current Revenmes 308.1 3)40.2 365.6 h25.7 731.3 787.0 1. S-ale of goods and services 2277.2 2 h7 T 334.3 779 r70b 717.5 2. Transfers fromn Central Governnent 23.5 25.0 h.2 34.1 22.5 / 26.2 / 3. 0ther 18.F 17.8 27.1 33.7 38.h h3.3 II. Current Ernenditures 298.1 326.0 3hI8.1 470.7 69h.2 753.6 1. Interest payments 10.2 2 -3 .133 - a . 29.7 -33.B a. Interuial (1.6) (0.7) (0.5) (1.9) (5.5) (6.h) b. External (8.6) (13.8) (17.8) (21.4) (2k.2) (27.h) 2. O-ther 287.9 311.5 329.8 b47.4 664.5 719.8 III. Current Surolus/Deficit 10.0 14.2 17.5 -h5.0 37.1 33.4 IV. Ot _r Revenues 53. 4 55.9 1L.9 60.8 23.h 28,5 V. Investment ExPendítures 33.1 110.5 210.6 216.6 154h4 211.5 1. Gross fixed investmnlnt 1-2. S1 Z727 172.4 15-31 2LOr 2. Financial investment 2h.2 1h.1 h7.9 44.2 1.3 0.7 VI. Overa1l Surplus/Deficit 30.3 -o0.4 -173.2 -200.8 -S3.9 -149.6 VII. Financin!g -30.3 LG. U 178.2 200.8 93.9 149.6 1. Capital transfers from Central Govornrent 6.9 0.3 8.8 10.2 36.4 55.0 2. Internval (r.et) -h3.5 -89.0 100.6 96.7 h8.1 33,7 a. Borr.jing ( _ ) (1.8) (5.9) (58.9) (39.6) (7.2) b. Aaiortization (-0.3) (-1.1) (-1.1) (-¿9) (-20.7) (-29.7) c. Other (-L3.2) (-59X7) (96.5) (U2.7) (29.2) (56.2) 3. Exter-al (net) 6.3 129.1 63.8 9309 9g. 60.9 a. Borrowini (31.7) (158.3) (100.5) (156.5) (87.3) (154.6) b. Au-,ortizatioi (-25.4) (-29.2) (-31.7) (-62.6) (-77.9) (-93.7) 7/ 1971 Figjures for EPAP 2/ TExcllling C01BOi o0urces: Corporacion Boliviano de Fornento, LmDresa Placional de r1mdJ^ DreS, Ermresa NIacional de Ferrocarriles, Ixr.'.ros a ciou.ai dle B,iic~d .. ar-' 7 oyd Aere- -- 1.v½no. Table 5.13: MTUJICIPALITIES OF LA PAZ AND SANTA CRUZ, 1967-1972 (In millions of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 I. Current Revenues 83.9 91.1 95.8 100.6 98.9 144.5 1. Sale of goods and services 10.8 12.7 14.7 16. ) 2. Tax income 49.0 53.6 59.6 62.7 ) 77.0 99.0 3. Transfers from public sector 1.4 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.4 2.6 4. Other 22.7 24.5 21.2 20.1 20.5 42.9 II. Current Expenditures 58.0 62.6 67.5 71.4 77.2 81.8 1. Wages and salaries 2.8 29.0 32.5 342.1 42.0 2. Goods and services 13.7 13.6 13.8 13.0 14.6 15.4 3. Transfers to public sector 15.0 15.8 .16.8 16.7 16.9 18.1 4. Other 3.5 4.2 4.4 3.4 3.6 6.3 III. Current Surplus/Deficit 25.9 28.5 28.3 29.2 21.7 62.7 IV. Other Revenue - - - 1.3 5.2 V. Investment Expenditures 18.8 26.8 28.3 23.2 20.7 >7.6 1. Gross fixed investment 19.7 26.8 23.2 20.7 2. Financial investment - - - - 0.2 VI. Overall Surplus/Deficit 7.1 1.7 6 6.0 2.3 20.3 VII. Financing -7.1 -1.7 - -6.0 -2.3 -20.3 1. Internal (net) -7.1 -1.7 6.0 -2.3 -20.3 2. External (net) - - - - - Source: Municipalities of La Paz and Santa Cruz Table S.14: TREASURY CURRRNT REVENUES, 1967-1972 (In milliona of Bolivian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1. Internal Revenue 330.6 355.5 S65.7 3993 511.7 -420Q A. Taxes on income and property 3.O 150.2 159-76 161.9 232.3 216-5 1. Rusinese profits 61. ti 63.0 63.0 107.0 81.0 a.- Tax Amnesty (-) t-) (_) (8.5) (31.0) (_) b. Other (54.9) (61.8) (63.0) (54.5) (76.0) (81.0) 2. Personal lncome 35.1 43.0 45.1 44.1 59.0 6M.o 3. Global coaplementary incoime 20.2 17.2 24.1 22.4 23.0 23.0 4. Property taxes 13.8 15.2 16.5 20.0 29.0 36.0 5. Other 10.0 13.0 10.9 12.1 1b.3 12.5 B. Taxes on consumption of goods and services 136.4 lh3.1 152.5 183.9 192.7 231.5 1. Goods and services -M.i '9.6 53. 63Iz3 76. -y" 2. Alcoholíc beverages 47.9 48.8 53.2 68.2 64.o 72.0 3. Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes 33.3 36.5 36.8 42.4 43.0 49.0 k.. Other 7.1 8.2 8.8 9.0 9.4 12.5 C. Stamp taxes 29.5 36.2 39 h3. 47.0 51.7 D. Other taxes 30.7 26.0 14.2 10.5 39.7 39.3 II. Taxes on foreipn trade 412.1 400.7 h17.4 631.3 h71.4 A92.Q A. Taxes on importe g35.O -M. 3W2-o UM.2 382.o 410,0 T. Taxes on exporte 35.0 35.1 63.5 176.0 h9.4 40.0 1. Medium and small mining (32.5) (33.2) (61.9) (174.2) (46.6) (37.0) 2. Agricultural exports (2.5) (1.9) (1.6) (1.8) (2.8) (3.0) C. 1.6% tax on exchange sales 18.1 18.8 23.9 39.1 39.4 42.0 III. Other Revenue 29.0 Bo.8 59.3 39.7 1i.0 129.0 1. 9% tax on commercial credita - - 0.9 1569 21.5 20.0 2. Conrunications fees 11.0 10.1 7.5 8.4 8.h 5.0 3. Consular Lees 8.1 6.9 h.3 6.8 6.4 7.5 h. Transfers from public sector 7.5 13.5 11.0 3.2 53.8 90.7 5. Oulf oil tax payments - 39.4 25.7 - -_ - 6. Other 2.4 10.9 9.9 4.h 23.9 5.8 TOTAL 771.7 837.0 B72.4 1.070.3 1,097.1 1,163.0 Source: Ministry of Finance - ~ ~ ~- Table 1.I5 TREASURY CURRP.IT ---Ur ES, 1967-1972 (percentage distribu,ion) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 I. Internal Reveriue b2.9 42.4 41.9 37.3 46.5 L4.9 A. Taxes on income ard property 17.9 Y7T9 2 1.3 Ti S7T 1. Business profits 7.1 7. 7.2 5.9 9.7 6.5 a. Tax amnesty (-) (-) ( -) (0.5) (2.8) b. Other (7.1) (7.h) (7.2) (5.1) ($.9) (6.5) 2. Personal income 4.6 5.1 5.2 4.1 5.4 5.1 3. Global complementary income 2.6 2.1 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.6 4. Property taxes 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.6 2.9 5. Other 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.7 B. Taxes on consumption or goodz-aud 17.7 17.1 17.5 17.2 17.6 18.5 1. Goods and services services -E.2 -.2 E7i - -7.7 2. Alcoholic beverages 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.h 5.8 5.8 3. Tobacco, cigars and cigarettes 4.h 4.4 h.2 4.0 3.9 3.9 4. Other 0.9 1.0 1.0 0o8 0.9 1.0 C. Stamp taxes 3.8 4.3 4c5 4.0 4.3 4h4 D. Other taxes h.o 3.1 1.6 1.0 3.6 3.2 II. Taxes on foreign trade 53.4 L7.9 51.3 59.0 43.0 Lb.2 A. Taxes on imports 174 -13 38*9 34°9 36.ó B. Taxes on exports 4.5 4.2 7.3 16.4 4.5 4.2 1 Medium and small mining (4.2) (4.0) (7.1) (16.3) (h.2) (3.9) 2. Agricultural exports (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3) C. 1.6% tax on exchange sales 2.4 2.3 2.7 3.7 3.6 3.1 III. Other revenue 3.7 9.7 6.8 3.7 10.4 10.9 1.~ 9% tax on commercial credits - - 0.1 1.9 2. Communications fees 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 0,8 0.4 3. Consular fees 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 4. Transfers from public sector 1.0 1.6 1,3 0.3 4.9 7.3 5. Guilf oil tax payments - 4.7 2.9 - - - 6. Other 0,3 1.3 1.1 0.4 2.2 o.8 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Ministry of Fina¡ice Table 516; TREASUJRY OPERATIONS, 1967-1972 (In mfillions of Bolívian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1. Cu-rrent Revenues 771.? 837.0 872.4, 1,070.3 1 089 -, 1,1U3.0 L.Internlevenue 330.6 ST -3 b,5.7 _399.-3 iS'7 542.0 2. Customs duties 361.5 3U,.7 361.6 1418.0 377.1 410.0 3. - xport duties (regalias) 32.5 33.2 61.9 174.2 41-1 37.0 1,. 1.6% ta- Qn exchange sales 18.1 18.8 23.9 39.1 39.4 42.0 5. 9% tax on comnercial credits - - 0.9 16.9 21.5 22.0 6. Commnunications fees 11.0 l0.i 7.5 8.4, 8.4 5.0 7. Consular fees 8.1 6.9 h.3 6.8 6.4 7.5 8. Transfera fromn public sector 7.5 13.5 11.0 3.2 53.8 90.7 b. YPFB(-) (11.8) (9.9) (2.7) (53.5) (89.7) e. Match Factory(-) (1.7> (1.1) (0.5) (0.3)(1) 9 . Gulf oil tax payments - 39.4, 25.7 - -- 10. Other revenue 2.4 10. 9 9.9 4,.1 23.9 6.8 II. C2urrent _FYpenditures 84,5.1 899.0 910.9 1- 1 3,1.3 1,212.0 1520 1. Personal services 1 *1r7.~7 895.7 a. Wages and salaries (1478.6) (521.1) (537.5) (623.4,) (700.9) (853.7) b. Contributions to CNSS and CONAVI (28.3) (29.5) (20.1) (29,3) (28.8) (42.0) 2. Military outlays 156.4, 150.0 14o0.9 19i.7 169.8 274.0 a. Wages and salaries (84,.8) (91,.5) (89.0) <112.6) ~ 102.3) (148.4) b. Goods and services (71.6) (55.5) (51.9) (79.1) (67.5) (125.6) 3. Other goods and services 50.0 73.7 4,7.2 83.6 107.3 110.0 1,. Current transfers 104,.8 102.3 130 ,1 147.1 121.7 175.0 a. To private sector (4,0.2) (1,5.1) (0,.0) (45.7) (83.5) (106.0) b. To public sector (62.4,) (56.6) (86.o) (98.6) (37.0) (67.0) e. To international organiza- tions <2.2) (o.6) (1.1) (2,8) (1.3) (2.0) 5. Interest payments 27.0 22.4, 35.1 56.2 83.5 70.7 a. Internal debt (1.6) (2.7) (16.7) (l14.7) (19.0) (13.3) b. External debt (25.1,) (19,7) (18.4,) (4,1.5) (64.5) (57.4) 1. Central Goveniment /r.8 ib5 /16.37/8h ii. Qn behalf of public 7 JS - ent,er-prises /67/l. 27 /-2.i7 f,17 _- _7 III. Current Account Surplus/Deficit -73.4, -62.0 -38.5 -61.0 -122.3 -361.0 IV. Other Revenue - - 3.? 6.7 - 1. Grants fromn Bolivian-owned- _ counterpart funds -.. 6.' 2. Other grants . 3.7 -- Y. Investment Expenditure 39268.8 50.8 93087.0 1. Capital transfers T23. 15. 501. 2. Capital formnation 3.8 11.6 18.0 18.3 48.0 77.0 VI. Overall Surplus/Def'icit -112.6 -130.8 -89.3 -90.6 -222.0 -448.0 VII. Financing 112.6 130.8 89.3 90.6 222.0 448.0 a. Drawinga (L9.6) (7.3)(-) (24.6)(- b. Am2ortization (-111-7. -7.0 -4.)12. 1.. Central government J-391138) 372.27 (725.67 C756.3fr /127.0 ii. On behalf of public 82 =9~ =02 -62 /191 ent.erpríses /,Cí.27 r-33.27 r-8.57 í,C2.67 L--18.31 L-'17..27 c. Changes in long-terni foreign asaete (-)(-)(-)(-) (30.7) 2. Internal 152.7 152.3 119.7 163.2 241.3 a. Central Bank (net) (1h7 .0} <121.9) (97.51 (127.5>. (2~50.7) 200.0 1. Credit rl 5O. 8/1 /92.57 /T14h7 /122.41,507 ii.- Deposi.ta (increase-> /:,3. 779.U7 7716.97 - .L25017 b. Loana froin Boliv'ian-owned - -- - - --- ' counterpart fundaes-) - (32.0) (18.0) (1.5 o.o c. Amnortization (-27.9> (-15.9) <-18.6) <-11.6) (-25.1) (-111.0) d. Other (33.6) (b6.3) (8.8) (29.3> (-2.8) 8 ) e. Unfinanced gap L.' '1,e Ministry of Finance 1/ USAID Prograni Loan 2/ Includes Internal Debt of $b111 miliíon Table 5.17: TREASURY CURRENT EXPENDITURES, 1967-1972 (Percentage Distribution) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Budget Personal services 60.0 61.2 61.2 57.7 60.4 54.5 Wages and salaries (56.6) (57.9) (59.0) (55.1) (58.1) (52.0) Contributions to CNSS and CONAVI (3.4) (3.3) (2.2) (2.6) (2.3) (2.5) Military outlays 18.5 16.7 15.5 16.9 14.1 17.9 Wages and salaries (10.0) (10.5) (9.8) (9.9) (8.1) (9.7) Goods and services (8.5) (6.2) (5.7) (7.0) (6.0) (8.2) Other goods and services 5.9 8.2 5.2 7.4 7.9 7.3 Current transfers 12.4 11.4 14.3 13.0 11.0 15.2 To private sector (4.8) (5.0) (4.7) (4.0) (6.8) (7.3) To public sector (7.4) (6.3) (9.5) (8.7) (4.1) (7.6) To international organizations (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) Interest paynents 3.2 2.5 3,8 5.0 6.6 5.1 Internal debt (0.2) (0.3) (1.8) (1.3) (1.5) (0.9) External debt (3.0) (2.2) (2.0) (3.7) (5.1) (4.2) TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Ministry of Finance Table 5.18: ANALYSIS OF TAX BURDEN, 1967-1972 (In millions of Bolívian pesos) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total Taxes 937.7 972.1 1,053.4 1,306.1 1,269.1 1,436.3 Wational Ta-xes W27 7-5.2 -814. 1,047.5 1,004.6 1, 13140 As Percent of GDP -9.5 103 10.0 Rate of Growth _ 1.8 7.6 28.7 -4.1 12.9 As Percent of Total Taxes 79.2 77.8 77.3 80.2 79.2 79.0 1. Internal Revenue 330.6 355.5 365-7 399.3 511.7 542.0 As Percent of GDP 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.8 4.0 Rate of Growth - 7.5 2.9 9.2 28.1 9.4 As Percent of Total Taxes 35.3 36.6 34.7 30.6 40.3 39.0 2. Taxes on Imports 359.0 346.8 360.0 416.2 382.6 410.0 As Percent of GDP --12 3.8 3.7 4.1 3.6 4.0 Rate of Growth - -3.4 3.8 15.6 -8.1 19.4 As Percent of Total Taxes 38.3 35.7 34.2 31.9 30.1 31.8 3. Taxes on Exports 35.0 35.1 63.5 176.0 49.4 52.0 As Percent of GDP 07 -O .4 0.7 1.7 0.0 -y.5 Rate of Growth _ 0.3 80.9 177.2 -71.9 5.3 As Percent of Total Taxes 3.7 3.6 6.0 13.5 3.9 3.6 Municipal Taxes 49.o 53.6 59.6 62.7 59.81/ 78.11/ As Percent of GDP 0.6 - 0.6 0.6 o.6 0.T --07 Rate of Growth - 9.1 11.2 5.2 -4.6 30.6 As Percent of Total Taxes 5.2 5.5 5.7 4.8 4.7 5.4 Social Security Contributíons 146.0 162.3 179.8 195.9 204.7 224.2 As Percent of GIDP 1.7 l. 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 Rate of Growth - 11.2 10.8 9.0 4.5 9.5 As Percent of Total Taxes 15.6 16.7 17.1 15.0 16.1 15.6 Total Taxes as Percent of GDP at Market Prlces 11.0 10.6 10.8 12.9 12.0 12.7 1/ Estimated. Source: Ministry of Finance, Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social, and Municipalities of La Paz and Santa Cruz, Table 5- 19: PUBIIC SECTOR RESOURCES AN>D USES, 1973-1977 (In níllions of 1971 Bolivian Pesos) 1973 197h 1975 1976 1977 1. SOURCES A. Current Account Surplus 659.7 772.6 1,020.1 1,013.L 1,151.5 1. Central Governnent -117.0 -4.3 196.8 248.8 362.7 Treasury (-117.0) (-4.3) (126.8) (248.8) (36?.7) Other Accounts ( -) (-) (-) (-) (-) 2. Decentralized Agencies 27.6 2h.7 18.8 14.3 5.9 3. State Enterprises 681.0 681.8 801.6 674.8 705.3 YPFB and COMEBOL (64M.8) (630.0) (725.5) (577.5) (587.1) of which : depreciation (232.5) (245.6) (254.0) (263. 6 (272.6) Other enterprises (36.2) (51.8) (76.1) (97.3) (118.2) 4. Mhnicipalities 68.1 70. . 72.9 75.5 77.6 B. Other Revenues 61.4 57.6 41.9 11.0 11.3 C. Borrowing 821.7 708.0 54?.8 636., 580.A 1. Internal (net)I 212.4 146.0 - - _ 2. External (gross) 609.3 602.0 5h2.8 636.4 580.b TOTAL 1,542.8 1,578.2 1,601b.8 1,660.8 1,743.2 II. USES A. Gross Fixed Investment 1,233-4 1,?56.5 1,300.8 1,3b6.0 1,L3h.6 1. Central Government 519.4 504.8 513.6 586.2 604.0 2. YPF Bond COMIOL 406.3 452.7 482.9 412.5 472.8 3. Others 307.7 299.0 30b.3 247.3 357.8 B. Amortization of External Debt 309.4 321.7 304.0 314.8 308.6 TOTAL 1,542.8 1,578.2 1,604.8 1,660.8 1,748.2 1/ Balancing ítem Source: Public Sector Agencies and Mission Estimates Table 5S PROJECTED PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCES, 1973-1977 (In millions of 1971 Bolivian Pesos) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Central Governmnent Current revenues 1,446.6 1,6b9.b 1,880.6 2,1l1.6 2,352.8 Current expenditures 1,561.9 1,65b.2 1,757.5 1,873.8 2,005.5 Current account surplus -115.3 193.1 qbOA. 3b7-3 Decentralized Agencies Current revenues 327M8 3b1.7 3'ó6.6 37b.- -30)i: Current expenditures 301.6 316.5 33h.1 352.6 372.8 Current account surplus 26.2 25.2 22.5 22.3 91.3 Export Fnterprises Current revenues 2,310.5 2,235.3 2,396.3 2,292.3 2,366.5 Current expenditures 1,665.7 1,605.3 1,670.8 1,71h.8 1,779.4 Current account surplus 644.8 630.0 725.5 577.5 587.1 Other State Enterprises Current revenues 545.5 626.5 686.9 751.0 817.7 Current expenditures 509.6 574.7 610.8 653.7 699.5 Current account surplus 36.2 51.8 76.1 97.3 118.2 Municipalities Current revenues 151.0 158.0 165.8 174.4 183.4 Current expenditures 82.9 87.6 92.9 98.9 105.8 Current account surplus 68.1 70.4 72.9 75.5 77.6 Public Sector Current revenues M,781.b 5,0o1.9 5,)b36.2 5,707.2 6,11 i.5 Current expenditures b,19).7 b,238.3 h,bI,.1 b,693 .8 n Current account surplus 659.7 772.6 1,020.1 1,013.1 1411 5 souzce: Mission estimates Table 5-21: PROJECTIONS OF TREt¿;rIY C ERRNT REVENUES, 1972-1977 (In rillions of 1971 Bolivian pesos) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1. Internal revenue 542.0 810.6 971.7 1,158.6 1,346.5 1,534.h 2. -Customs duties 2/ 410.0 489.9 521.7 555.6 591.7 630.1 a. Import duties - (407.0) (486.7) (518.3) (552.0) (587.9) (626.1) b. Agricultural exporte (3.0) (3.2) (3.4) (3.6) (3.8) (14.0 3. Export duties 37.0 53.7 59.4 65.2 70.2 76.6 4. 1.6% tax on exchange sales 42.0 46.9 51.1 55.7 60.7 66.2 5. 9% tax on commercial credits 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 6. Communications fees 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 7. Consular fees 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 8. Transfers from public sector 90.7 102.2 70.4 71.9 48.6 50.4 a. COMIBOL (-) (-) (_) (_) (_) () b. YPFB (89.7) (101.2) (69.4) (70.9) (47.6) (49.4) c. Match Factory (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) 1.0 1.0 (1.0) 9. Other 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 Total 1,163.0 1,5h7.8 1,718.8 1i951.5 2,162,2 2,402.2 Current Expenditures 1,524.0 1,712.8 1,814.8 1,908.9 2,037.1 2,183.4 Current Account Surplus/Deficit -361.0 -165.0 -96.0 42.6 125.1 218.8 1/ Residual fixed balance in current account 2J GDP growth ratue Source: e Mission estimnates Table 5-22: PROJECTIONS OF TREASURY CURRENT EXPELTITURES, 1972-1977 (In millions of 1971 Bolivian pesos) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1. Personal Services 895.7 9W7.9 1,001.2 1,056.5 1,113.7 1,172.8 a. Wages and salaries (853.7) (894.2) (935.7) (978.2) (1,021.7) (1,066.2) b. Contributions to CNSS and CONAVI (?9.0) (53.7) (ó5.5) (78.3) (M2.0) (106.6) 2. Xilitary Outlays 274.0 295.7 298.1 300.6 303.1 305.6 a. lIages and salaries (148.4) (161.3) (163.7) (166.2) (168.7) (171.2) b. Goods and services (125.6) (13).)) (134.4) (134.0) (13U.4) (13U.4) 3. Other Goods and Services 110.0 143.3 172.0 206. 2)47.7 297,2 4. CCurrent Transfers 175.0 2?5.) ?23.3 201.3 199.5 199.5 a. To private sector (106.0) (120.0) (120.0) (190.0) (120.0) (120.0) b. To public sector (67.0) (100.2) (98.1) (76.1) (7).3) (74.3) c. To international organizations (2.0) (5.2) (5.2) (5.2) (5.2) (5.2) 5. Interest Payments 70.7 100.5 120.2 14)4.1 173.1 208.3 a. Internal debt (13.3) (15.6) (16.6) (17.7) (18.9) (20.2) b. External debt (57.4) (8).9) (103.6) (126.0) (15).2) (188.1) TOTAL 1,525.4 1,712.8 1,81L.8 1,908.9 2,037.1 2,183.) Source: Ifission Estimates TableS.23 . DECENTRALIZED AGENCIES, 1973-1977 (In millions of Bolivian pesos) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 I. Current Revenues 443.0 471.1 501.0 5353 571.5 1. Sales of goods and services -12.0 125 13.7 14.6 15.5 2. Transfers from Central Government 113.8 129.9 148.1 168.4 192.8 3. Transfers from other public enterprises 58.1 63.5 69.5 76.2 82.1 4. Other 259.1 264.9 269.7 276.1 281.1 II. Current Expenditures 301.6 316.5 334.1 352.6 372.8 1. Wages and salaries 2. Purchases of goods and services 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 3. Transfers to other public enterprises 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 4. Transfers to Central Government 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 5. Interest 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 (a) Internal (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (b) External (1.4) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) 6. Other 170.0 178.9 190.1 202.0 215.4 III. Current Surplus/Deficit 141.4 154.6 166.9 182.7 198.7 IV. Other Revenue 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 V. Investment ExDenditure .4 128.4 136.3 68.7 75.8 1. Gross fixed investment 121.1 25 135 68.1 75.1 2. Financíal investment 0.3 0.-4 0.5 0.6 0.7 VI. Over-all Surplus/Deficit 22.4 28.7 33.3 116.8 125.8 VII. Financing -22.4 -28.7 -33.3 -116.8 1. External (net) 56.3 58. 60.4 n.a. n.a. (a) Borrowing (56.3) (58.4) (60.4) (b) Amortization (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) 2. Internal (net) -78.7 -87.1 -93.7 -1.16.8 -125.8 Sources: Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social, Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda, and Servicio Nacional de Caminos. Table 5-24. EXPORT ENTERPRISES, YPFB AND COMIBOL, 1973-1977 (In millions of 1971 Bolivian Pesos) 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 I. Current Revenues 2 3285 2,253.3 2,396.3 2,292.3 2,3665 1. Sale of goods and services 2,21 . 2,135.3 2,291.1 2,1U.W 2, a. Exports (1,736.l (1,624.9) (1,717.5 (1,605.5) b. Other (479.2) (510.4) (543.6) (578.9) 2. Transfers received from Central Government 85.7 90.4 77.2 79.5 81.9 3. Other 27.2 27.6 28.0 28.h 28.8 II. Current Expenditures 1,766.9 1,674.7 1,741.7 1,7621. 1,828.8 1. Wages and salaries 418.9 -Z49.2 4bQ.6 512.9 5bi7.9 2. Goods and services 558.0 478.6 '492.2 50L.7 521.1 3. Transfers to Central Government 168.9 141.8 118.1 127.2 131.3 4.. Royalties 70.3 47.3 48.1 31.5 32.8 5. Transfers to other public enter- prises 39.2 41.6 43.9 45.1 6-.3 6. Transfers to private sector 147.3 154.. 161.5 166.3 168.6 7. Payments to Social Security System 137.6 143.6 150.2 157.2 164.6 8. Interest payments 80.7 79.5 74.8 70.7 65.5 a. Internal (4.2) (4.9) (3.6) (3.1) (2.1) b. External (76.5) (7M.6) (71.2) (67.3) (63.4) 9. Other 146.0 138.7 142.0 116.8 150.4 III. Current Surplus/Deficit 561.6 578.6 654.6 529.9 537.7 of which: depreciation (232.5) (w7) (C2370) C263. ) (272.6) IV. Other Revenue 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 V. Investment Expenditure 406.3 452.7 482.9 412.5 47?.8 VI. Overall Surplus/Deficit 156.3 126.9 172.7 118.3 65.9 VII. Financin. --16.3 -126.9 -172.7 -119. -65. ° 1. Internal (net) -75.0 131.Q i h.: 1 573. -13Í '6 2. -External (net) -117.0O -2h .h -ó .7 -17.0 58.2 a. Borrowing (173.0) (171.0) (162.U) (182.3) (218.0) b. Amnortization (-290.0) (-195.1.) (-169.1) (-165.3) (-160.2) 3. Capital transfers from Central Governnent 21.7 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 Source: YPFB and COMIBOL T.ble 5 25: REVISED1 PUBLIO I7'STO:NT P^NjRA. 1972 ( 96 n.i ¡'onB) SECTOR AlD PFROJECT SoíOntIo FinancinR Foternal Fn.ncinng ToCal CosIt Sbl-Totaí .reasur-y vno Funda SubSoTtr suopl-er. Concee .ionary Exíernal tnrettnz Aoencv Cost 1972 Fín.ncn Aten y FIn.nhl.n, I. AGCRICULTLRE fOngoin0 1'olnOíS 1. Eq.íp-ent fo E.t..n. ion .nd Rn..rD e.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 AID lini-try of Ag"e..lt.- 2. ALsal He-lth Pr-g- 21.6 5.4 2.2 2.2 3.2 3.2 UNDP mini.try of Agri-lelr- 3. S-n bIltan CnlnnOn.íLn PrOject 11.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 Nton Co..n.i± 1itn Intítut. 4 Ab.-:.nnnf 34.5 P.9 3.8 3.8 5.1 5*1 AlD-0fl NOnI.Ltíy of Agt eltue 5. Co- cnity Dvnlop ..nt 8.5 4.7 4.7 3.8 3 AID M1n0.hry nf Agr"-u-fure 6. Agrin-ltu-- DSevnlp.nt oo AltiPlao 5.2 5.2 1.1 1.1 4.1 4.1 UIID Ntnit.ty of Ag"eLnlt.-e Sub-TntAl 81.1 37.3 12.3 12.3 25.2 25.2 N.. P-oí-t. Bcv rrot ets ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1/ 1. RIt Soorg 2Z.4 11.3 3.5 2.3 1.2 7.8 7.8 And... D0t. dni..tey of AgeOnoltren-C8R 2. Lb n C=.nn í1lfn.t0oO 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 .tí.o1 Wn .f l .ntítut* Sub-Totol 25.0 13.9 6.1 2.3 3.8 7.8 7.8 TOTAL 106.5 51.4 18-4 14.6 38 33-0 33.0 1. Ft..Ibi'i.Y yStudy V.f.o. Ind-t. I 21.3 7.1 .7.1 7.1 Anden. D vt. PIonnlnf ninf.tey 2.Nítry Pl PIL-L. P.s 14.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 BoIl n D vln opnMnt Corp Uon (CS 2. rF.t-y 11S 0.3 0 3 0.3 AID Bulivl nnlopeení Cor:.oralion 4. A.Onntn~~~~~~ Planí ~15.3 . 1.3 1.3 .5 2.8571.19?olna eIpenCoortn 4A.b-t.. Pl..t 5 3 9~~~~~~0. 06 0.7 AI D Taln eneno 5. Tounl.t Ho--t- T.eaJ 3.3 0.6 0. AID T.")* ft.f..t-. 5'4.Tot.l 65.5 21.4 4.9 4.9 16.5 2.8 13.7 Oes, Prolect. 1. po. Oil Pl-nt PInt Coh.bb. 10 6 2 0 1627 16.7 2.0 AD-D h ov. Dvelopent Croraron 2. Saa01PIa.~c Oía. Cena 96.0 19.6 2.9 2.9 671. .p ,. 3. ---ratnt Pl..f5. 0.9 0.: 0.9 joOlnPt1pnfC-eP-tlo 4. Tílo pT ntl 17.3 3 7 0.3 0 3 3.4 3.1 0.3 oviiv n D..o1Pt Corpor-tt S. caolín Pl.nt 7.3 2.3 1.1 1.0 0.1 1.2 1.2 ¡oíiíní D v lopenot Crrpor-ti.n S.b-Tot.1 136.3 28.5 5.2 .1 0.1 23.3 21.0 2.3 TOTAL 201.8 '9.9 10.1 10.0 0.1 39 8 23.8 16 0 1/ D-t.tL. Credit SECTOR AND PNO3ET D-nsc vi ....nc1np Enternal Fí-,n1.M Total Cnt ~~~~Sub-T.taI Troasur, Oo Fund. Sub-Tot.1 5Opl,Iie.CnvloaoEtlha xetltAet Coct 2 972 via-_____ OnzinN rí.t 1. Ceol. ..d Mí.t,X Inve.tígdttau 3.3 3.5 3.3 Slivi- brolin &-1-eta.TOB Oo. 2. Hti.tcí .d ltnt.11o*Sío.1 1ounn11Att4ot 3.3 3.5 3.5 '-1.4 I.1.e 9oolnor beerge Coen R...'E 3: . l*O1e T-----tígaef... 3.4 3.4. a.4. 34 BoIlule Ml-le- Co-por.t--- COPY11I 4. C..dto9.I1íe (C.pp.t) 45.0 19.719 17 it -P--i IOSM 3. 5i~~~~~~~~ton 1~~~~~9.6 1.2 0.1 0.1 NI .. Crti. S.bT.Tt.1 75.0 31.3 1LO-i 9.0 1.5 20: ~ 197 03 OllnMne nptt New Funlnct. 1. Antí---Y Onnltor 117.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 t- S- .C.(sr 2. Flotatlon Pl.nt 2. EIneteIleetIne S ,:,..I C..t.r. 34.0 3.7 5.7 1.1 4.6 !L tOnul. lo-Al ElctIfo.f 3. Thersal Pluní "1enr.'~~~~~~~~ 39.9 ~27.4 2.2 2.2 35.2 25.3 0 a¡n 'crcígcp('lF 4. r.nlno Li.. 5.tte-Fu.toe 28.4 2.9 1.2 1.2 1. 1 1.7 208S.t ...nal oCtt tty .orP: i7.%.>> 0. C.,hab = La P.u int.r-c.... rttín sí4y 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 Ni.íln... llno1tretlty C-rP.Q120) 6. eO Creed 11047 4.0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 1D8 BiecíoIn. 81.ctríety cor9. (ENDE> TOTAL 0~~~~~627 2.2 26.6 1.1 75.5 53.4 5. Oí 01.ch 91l.1 MIIln Ono. hn6 n A.*ti.. j/ l.cepul Fund. -3- SECTOR ANtO FROJECT So-ottli, oon otrn 1,nn Tac.l Coet Su4.To.u1l T--yor One Fund. Sub-TeL.1 SPpoltey. conceeslen...y Ltra Otll leo Coen 19U2 Fln--n 4to. FinacI A8-nn VI. TVANSPORT 1. Rauda 1 atn 4 614.4 68.6 9.6 9.1 31.1 36.6 AID 6.11. Ruad S-1oin (S!MACS 2. Ruad S. J-. d. Chiqutcao-0n. ¡¡nacía 29.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 .eY Fn.91 ... a 3. load Suont,T.... d. V.1..c. Haya 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.5 410 AnY oner 4. Road Oturu.Aneald. 19.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 LI .t1. Ruad S-rí.. 3. load Ch.9'---h.c-L. A-ent. 17.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.11. Rt,adSev. 6. Poad Onc..11au1,eey19 7.4 1.2 1.2 6.2 6.2 430-108 tlat. R.ed Servía. 7. RaIwa.y Síu. c---a..ee 322.8 49.4 1/ 49.4 49.4 Arge.t. CavE. 3.1.-AIS. Mtand Cunfe1-1 6. AL,pocí 1.p-------t, 4 .¡ti.. 76.6 39.9 31.6 1.1 30.7 8.1 6.1 Alo Alapolt Ad nt.ttttti- (tASARAS S.b-TutaS 1093.4 175.3 49.1 13.8.0 126.0 126.0 1. load P-rven.. 1-Puerto Rin 23.9 5.8 5.6 5.6 Nenbrth..t D.nt. C-nP. A.Y £n.S. 2.C-antroccon 10 bridge. 8. . .1 6.1 11tl. load oic 3.St.dy Ruad L. P.-Cbi.166 S..6. 1. B-.-CCaYt. latí.RadSrv 4. Stndy Rad La PanSu. RaajaCb.v.aaai24.5 .31.3 1.3 7. 72 5 laí load S.r-ni 5. Laediín S"eip Cabíja 3.3 1.2 1.2 .1.2 larch..t Devt. Corp. S.b-Tot.I 7-6. 42.4 14.4 9.4 7.O2.0 76.0 TOTAL jj~~~~~~* ~~j1JJ 45.9 23.2 42.7 132.0 132.0 Vil. CCRCVNCATIOIIS 1.T-1 .aotato.T-ajelo5 1..t. 26.6 2.0 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.6 UNO? Rotl. T.l.pb... Co.,<~lL 2. 8 P íY.íuu Lo.g Dotínann 41.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 lItE latí. 7.lePh-n C.. L4nOltpol finda 1Of .h.6 J51.4 bther fu4da -5.- SECTOR AND PROJECT D-0e.rlc Fln nn... E.É.rn.l Flomeiní Totl. Co-C Síb-Tnt.t Tr,c-unv Ovn Fund. Suh-Tut.l Irtíínr ConOcttonlSí Ct---Ctnt 40,00, Cost 1972 Fi.itnre Finon ifa A .en.y 1% UOTE. RESOURICU Ongoing P-rofcto 1. Irrítadton Vílle-ont. 2.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 dol Ocnopm.nl Corp. of 9..íth SubrTooal 71.4 23.3 20.6 4.3 16.3 2.7 2.7 Nno PmrI.cto ospítul ímp-ovn-... t Prosg 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 I-tl. SoC. Serumlty Fund 2. Imín . op, Sn.ju.. d. Oto.. ata. e-. 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 AlD ><1n.t.ty of 00.114 3 ea-ro InouleS, Lía. Cd .. 6.3 2.3 0.4 0.4 1.9 1.9 AID Síinoatry of Ho 1th 4. HOalth Contln. La PF. 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 AID milC0try of 9r1lth 5 HospItal Codhab.nb 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 AID MIn.sry ofl H.alth 6. Eint~ínI.OiO LuborFtoOy. 80.1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 AID 1ttn.1try oE OSaICO 7 Inf.nt Care C.st-.. 1.7 17 1.7 1.7 AID 8.10. Csunni for 54i.5.- Sub.Total 17.6 13.6 5.0 1.5 3.5 8.6 8.6 TOTAL 89.0 36.9 25.6 5.8 19.8 1I13 11.3 01 0th 0 1 21 Ofihi.h SbD2 MI -Ot th.ro SECTOR AND flOJEC? T.t.1 Cont 5,,b-Tota1 Trasr- Fnd. Sob-Tot.l S,,tu-41 .ocs.oor ....r l E .otlf Conf 1972 FnoeFnn 04.0? A--nn Xl EDUCATlON Onvotos Proiefl 1. Sehool Constr L tton la 1.. 7.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 La Paz PolfOctor N- Prot..ct 1. Equipn..t for 511 R-al School 3.0 3.0 0.2 0.2 2.8 2.8 AID-UIIICEF Ni.l.ty of ed.antion 2 Iopto- ..ot 7 Norsal Sehool 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 mil.ltty of Edo..tion 3. Eolargoneot of Schooi 3.9 3.9 3.9 2.2 1.7 lltl. DI. School Cooatroetton 4 Schol1 C.o.ntutos 31.4 31.4 19.4 19.4 3/ 12.0 12.0 A1D lat1. D0. Schúol Co..tootiíoo 3. Cmo tr.oclon Raal Seboola 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.3 1.8 II L"etl Coi.v Aetinlty S. Schal Eqfip.ot 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 Xtl. DiL. Snhol Coo.trtotioo Sub-Total 40.9 40.9 26.1 2tl 23.3 1 14.8 TOTAL 4865 43.3 28.5 3.2 23.3 14.6 14.8 GRAYND TOTAL 3974 ; 105 1.3 335.6 74L 215.l 8 6.8 65 1 . OF WUICtl Oll 0 O6XI 82L .62 5. U¡ 15 26.8 5 2.4 N 635.t 283. 6 L23! J1jJ 96.0 3Q 3 1/ Of ohiob Do.tie Cr dlt 3g2.3 iliom ¡1 I6.ol;pal .M.a Table 5:26. PUBLIC INVESTNIT, 1965-1968 AND TENTATIVE PROJECTIONS, 1972-1977 (In millions of 1970 Bolivian Pesos) 1965-1968 1969-1971 1972 1973-1977 Annual Percentage Annual Percentage Annual Percentage Annual Percentage Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Agriculture 19.6 (1.4) 25.5 (1.6) 60.0 (3.6) 94.0 (3.8) Mining 55.7 (4.1) 85.5 (5.3) 66.3 (3.9) - 184.0 (7.5) Petroleum 109.8 (8.0) 350.7 (21.9) 252.1 (15.0) 258.8 (10.6) Manufacturing 14.8 (1.1) 20.0 (1.2) 54.4 (3.2) 76.0 3.1 Power 76.7 (5.6) 95.3 (6.0) 81.8 (4.9) 123.0 5.0 Transport & Commnnication 256.4 (18.8) 270.0 (16.9) 237.2 (14.1) 278.0 11.3 Housing 28.9 (2.1) 55-5 (3.5) 35.8 (2.1) 47.6 1.9 Health Education & Other Public Services 92.3 (6.8) 105.6 (6.7) 167.1 (9.9) 245.0 (10.0) TOTAL 654.2 (48.0) 1,008.2 (63.1) 954.7 (%.8) 1,306.4 ( ) .ource: M±try o. .l ng .nd .ision E.tiriates .nd ..ojec_ tio0.. n5.2. Source: Ministry of Planning and Mission Estimnates and Projections TABLE 6.1: SUMMARY OF ACOOUNTS OF THE BANKING SYSTEv, 1965-1970 AND ESTIMATES, 1971 (Millions of Bolivian Pesos at end of year) 1965 2966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 International Reserves, Net L44. 9 499 3 397.1 390.7 397.2 433.7 372.2 Domestic Credit 1 504.0 l,¡h4.4 1 978.3 2,145 6 2,423.4 2,82?.5 3 232.8 Central Government 8LY.9 9dg.8 1 15d.7 1,205.3 1,32 ..9 1,459-5 1670.7 Other Public Sector 213.8 227.5 237.2 223.6 224.6 308b. 395-. Private Sector 44o.6 524.1 582.4 (16. 1 ó6.9 1,59.1 1,166-.3 Unclassified Assets 141.1 155.2 174.0 197.2 2h1.3 3h3.0 464.6 Assets - Liabilities 2,090.3 2,395-9 2,549-4 2(_33.5 3,6061.9 3,604.2 Money Supply 992.8 1,113.5 1,146.3 1,231.5 1,340.4 1,510-3 1,6b7/-4 Quasi -Money 85.2 136.3 182.2 243.6 340.2 443.1 543.5 Other Liabilities 1,012.0 1,146.1 1,220.9 1,258.4 1,381.3 1,650.8 1,838.7 Money Supply as Percent of GDP 13.8 1t.1 13.4 13.5 13.8 1L.9 15.9 Money and Quasi-Money as Percent of GDP 15.0 15. í15.6 16.1 17.3 19.3 21.0 Domestic Credit as Percent of GDP 21.0 22.0 23.2 23.5 25.0 27.9 30.5 Private Sector Credit as Percent of Domestic Credit 29.3 30.1 29.4 33.4 35.9 31.5 36.1 Annual Change of GDP Deflator - 2.3 1.8 1.5 4.o 1.0 1.7 Source: Central Bank TABLE 6.2: SUMMARY ACCOUNTS OF THE CENTRAL BMJK, 1965-1970, ANlD ESTIMATES, 1971 (Millions of Bolivian Pesos at end of year) 1965 1,ó66 196 1963b 1969 19í0 19'1 International Reserves, Net 42d.d 4d5.6 3d7.5 3d5.¡ 390./ 4 30.5 402.7 Assets 4d5.1 L'J3.1 453-9 555o5.2 651.2 60. 2 Liabilities 56-3 ".5 66.4 169.9 19S..5 220.7 2'Y'.>5 Domestic Credit 1 130.5 1,318.0 1l518.3 1, 5,3.6 1,'726.0 1 984.2 2,336.5 To Public Sector 1 1,21.3 1,395.9 1,42b.9 63 1, 4 2,06.5 Central Government (W49.6) (9d9.0) (1,15.-'() (1,205.3) (1,329.9) (1. 59.5) (1.6 0.7) Other Public Sector (213.8) (22,'.5) (237.2) (223.6) (224.6) (308.9) (395.8) To Banks 67.1 100.7 122.4 144.7 171.5 215.8 2'70.0 Commercial Banks (56.4) (73.4) (71.3) (95.0) (1]4.3) (331.5) (95.3) Other (13.7) (22.3) (51.1) (>29.7) (57.2) (84.3) (1'4.7) Other Assets 49.4 48.7 53. ," 52.9 53.7 74.3 132.2 Assets = Liabilities 1,60o.7 1,352.3 1,956-5 2,O?2. 2.175.4 2,489.0 2,81]4 Currency 813.2 o95.4 919.2 968.1 1,061.3 1,171.1 1,301.9 Bank Deposits 104.8 1!2.3 154.2 179.6 205.9 242.6 354.3 Public Sector Deposits 167.5 2,2.2 279-3 209.2 340.9 415.9 517.0 Development Fund - - 23.2 34-.5 45.0 58.0 65.0 Counterpart Funds 308.0 294.1 27/.0 215.6 170.2 146.9 10b.2 Capital and Reserves 30.3 44.o 58.3 75.3 97-4 125.1 134.2 Other ld4.9 204.3 245.3 249.9 254.7 329.4 390.8 Source: Central Bank TABLE 6. 3: SUMITAPY CAOOUNTSOF T1 C0L2'flRCIAL DA1K3 . -, 1 6t9 1'J, AND EST JÁI7 '' 19 1 7Tftlions of PlivThn ?escc at/ erd c ye r, 19 65, r6160 196 iir6 169 19:0 1Li 1 international Asset. 23. 2 20.2 21.1 12. 15. 2 34-5 L6. 5 Cash 1392. 1V. 1 149. 1 d11.0 203b. 26s.o 362-5 Dornestic Credit to Private Sector 236. 319'.2 3'2.4 468.6 58^. o 6s o.i 782.9 Credit 2 31(.6 3Ñ.5 46i., 7°0 6 Investments 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 3.4 1.Y 2.3 Other Assets 1h6.3 5).4 56.8 63.0 101.5 110.7 1 L2 AsEets = Liabilities hc3.9 52g.9 600.0 725.h 4 5. 1 ii04.3 1.333.1 Deposits 2l, !'.0 332.'7 38'J.6 492.9 599.7 1yé.6 896.3 Current Account 1J6.i 231. 9 2]. b 2¿2.9 299.1 357.7 hi -oo Savings 29.4 59.8 57. d 167.3 241.7 378.4 410.5 Ter m 2.0 7.1 6.9 8.4 9.4 16.o 9.4 Other Local Currency 12.6 12.3 15.3 11.9 11.7 20.0 31.3 Other Foreign Currency 16.9 21.6 27.8 22.4 31.8 36.5 36.9 Liabilities to Banks 59.0 76. 9 72.0 4h.5 106.2 130.8 109.9 Capital and Reserves 65.0 76.5 61. i 92.5 126.1 125.4 176.3 Other 37.9 4l1. 56.7 55.5 73.1 99.5 150.6 1/ Includes state (Banco del Estado) and private commercial banks. Source: Central Bank TABLE 6.4: SUFITARY ACCOUNTS OF THE SPECIALIZED BAJiKS 1/1965_1970, AID ESTIlATES, 1971 (Millions of Bolivian Pesos at end of year) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 19(0 19,71 International Assets 2.5 1.4 2.4 2.1 2.6 5.4 3.2 Cash ]5.5 25.9 1b.5 21.5 23.6 22.1 4o.9 Ibmestic Credit to Private Sector 203.9 204.9 210.0 248.1 280.9 369.o 303.4 Credit 162.0 157.9 16o.1 193.3 231.6 296. 316.0 Mineral Stock 31-. 35.Q 39-3 52-3 54.3 69.5 64.4 Investments 10.1 12.0 2.0 2. J 3.0 2.9 3.0 Buffer Stock 9./ 6.2 6.2 9.d 9.o 9.8 9.d Other Assets 26.1 39.5 54.2 56.1 52.6 94.1 1L3.9 5 Assets = Liabilities 25 .( 215.2 291.'3 3i-9.6 37i.5 500.14 501.2 Liabilities to Private Sector 24.3 35.5 34.4 33.6 39.6 52.2 55.7 Liabilities to Central Bank 5.4 21.6 43.0 51.2 52.7 60.9 148.7 Liabilities to International Organizations 34.1 45.6 59.0 92.5 1i6.6 167.3 216.0 In Local Currency - 4.8 16.5 32.1. 27.2 28.1 29.1 In Foreign Currency 3h.1 40.8 42.5 60.4 89.4 139.2 186.9 Capital and Reserves 114.1 111.5 107.8 116.6 121.8 120.2 112.9 Other Liabilities (9.5 614.0 47.1 1.7 46.8 99.8 47.9 1/ Includes Agricultural Bank, Mining Bank, Industrial Bank, and Mortgage Bank. The first two are government owned. The latter two are privately owned. Source: Central Bank TABLE 6.5: BANKING SYSTEM FINANCING -BY INSTITUTIONS AND SECTOR, 1965-1970 AND ESTIMATES, 1971 (Millíons of Bolivian pesos) End-Year Balances Annual Charges 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 TOTAL4 1,336.5 1469.2 1,699.0 1 , 42,082.5 2,715.8 132.7 229.8 157.4 226.1 329.1 304.2 By Institution Central Bank 895.9 945.1 1,116.6 1,139.7 1,213.6 352.5 1,549.5 49.2 171.5 23.1 73.9 138.9 197.0 Commercial Banks 236.7 319.2 372.4 468.6 580.0 690.1 782.9 82.5 53-2 96.2 111.4 110.1 92.8 (Banco del Estado) (105.0) (122.6) (126.S) (183.9) (,246.6) (292.1) (305.9) (17.6) (3.9) (57.4) (62.7) (45.5) (13.8) (Private Banks) (131.7) (196.6) (245.9) (284.7) (333.4) (398.0) (477.0) (64.9) (49.3) (38.8) (48.7) (64.6) (79.0) Specialized Banks 203.9 204.9 210.0 248.1 288.9 369.0 383.4 1.0 5.1 38.1 40.8 80.1 14.4 By Sector Public Sector 895.9 945.1 1,116.6 1,139.7 1,213.6 1,352.5 1,549.5 49.2 171.5 23.1 73.9 138.9 197.0 Private Sector 440.6 5-24.1 582.4 716.7 868.9 1,059.1 1,166.3 83.5 58.3 134.3 152.2 190.2 107.2 Agriculture 77.6 89.2 100.3 -- 118,4 150.6 218.6 241.1 11.6 11.1 18.1 32.2 68.0 22.5 Industry 139.4 174.6 194.8 252.8 313.1 381.2 433.5 35.2 20.2 58.0 60.3 68.1 52.3 Handicraft 2.1 3.6 7.0 9.1 9.2 13.4 17.7 1.5 3.4 2.1 0.1 4.2 4.3 Mining 60.3 31.4 19.9 27.5 35.5 39.1 42.6 -28.9 -11.5 7.6 8.0 3.6 3.5 Mineral Stocks 31.8 35.0 39.3 52.3 54.3 69.5 64.4 3.2 4.3 13.0 2.0 15.2 -5.1 Construction 6.0 20.5 27.0 34.7 41.2 44.4 48.9 14.5 6.5 7.7 6.5 3.2 4.5 Exports - 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.4 7.0 13.0 0.2 - 1.4 -0.2 5.6 6.0 Comuerce 89.0 127.5 155.0 189.1 221.1 243.0 25S.5 38.5 27.5 34.1 32.0 21.9 12.5 Others 21 34.4 42.1 38.9 31.2 42.5 42.9 49.6 7.7 -3.2 -7.7 11.3 0.4 6.7 1/ Excludes interbank float. 2/ Includes investments Source: Central Bank TABLE 6.6: COMPOSITION OF N1ONEY SUPPLY, 1965-19i0 AND ESTIATES, 1971 (Millions of Bolivian Pesos) 1965 1966 1961 1968 1969 1970 1971 Currency 806.7 8di.6 904.5 94d.6 1,0o41.3 1,152.6 1,278.9 Right Deposits 186.1 231.9 241.8 282.9 299.1 352.7 40&.5 Money Supply 992.8 1,113.5 1,146.3 1,231.5 1,340.4 1.510.3 1,687.4 Currency as Percent of Money Supply 81.3 '79.2 78.9 77.0 77.7 76.3 75.8 Source: Central Bank TABT3 6-7: PRICE INDEXES 1965-1971 Cost of Living Index - La Paz GDP Foreig Trade_ All Implicit Terms Yea_ Items Food n ousing Clothing Other Deflator Exports Inports of Trade 1965 75.1 68.8 74.0 89.1 90.2 90.0 94.3 87.9 107.3 i966 80.3 75.1 79.9 91.6 93.5 92.1 91.4 88.6 103.2 1967 89.3 87.2 89.7 91.9 95.5 93.8 88.0 92.5 95.1 1968 94.2 93.7 94.3 93.4 97.0 95.2 87.6 93.9 93.3 1969 96.3 95.6 96.2 96.4 99.0 99.0 96.1 100.6 95.5 1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1971.J/ 103.7 10o.o 104.4 lo4.6 100.6 101.7 94.1 100.0 94.1 Annual Changes 1965-66 6.9 9.1 8.0 2.8 3.7 2.3 -3.1 0.8 -3.8 1966-67 11.2 16.1 12.3 0.3 2.1 1.8 -3.7 4.4 -7.8 1967-68 5.5 7.5 5.1 1.6 1.6 1.5 -0.5 1.5 -1.9 1968-69 2.2 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.1 4.0 9.7 7.1 2.4 1969-70 3.8 4.6 h.0 3.7 1.0 1.0 4.1 -0.6 4.7 1970-71-/ 3.7 4.0 4.4 4.6 0.6 1.7 -5.9 - -5.9 GrohRth pate Average 1.965-1971 5.5 7.1 5.9 2.7 1.8 2.1 -0.1 2.2 -2.2 E/ - Estimated. Source: Ministry of Planning, IBRD. Table 6-8: PROJECTIONS OF ACCOUNTS OF THF BANKING SYSTEM, 1972-77 (Millions of Bolivian Pesos of 197'. - end of year) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 International Reserves, Net 372 372 412 545 609 679 Domestic Credit 1573 3,900 4,248 4,618 5,013433 Public Sector 2,267 2,381 2,2L89 2,593 2,698 2,808 Private Sector 1,306 1,519 1,759 2,025 2,315 2,625 Unclassified Assets 570 681 81'1 973 1,162 1,389 Assets Liabilities 4,515 4,953 5,474 6,136 6,784 7,501 Money Supply 1,850 1,995 2,149 2,313 2,488 2,647 Quasi-Money 550 670 849 1,145 1,398 1,718 Other Liabilities 2,115 2,288 2,476 2,678 2,898 3,136 Money Supply as Percent of GDP 16.2 16.2 16.4 16.6 16.7 16.7 Money and Quasi-Money as Percent of GDP 21.0 21.7 22.9 24.8 26.2 27.6 Domestic Credit as Percent of GDP 31.2 31.7 32.1h 33.1 33.7 34.3 Private Sector Credit as Percent of Domestic Credit 36.5 38.9 41i 143.8 46.2 48.3 /1 Projected at historical real rate of growth 1965-71. Source: Mission Estimates. TABIE ?-1: sTUP?I,Y OF SI.ECTED CROPS. 1 (Ó-l9 .l: ESTIVIATIS, 1',.1 AND PROJECTF.D POR 1';'2 AND )075 I"ó6 I96t' ¡69o J1 0 973 1i, ?2 ]'?75 Irea _45 75 76 78 dl 83 93 Average Yield o.6 o.6 0.7 O.d O.o 0.8 0.9 Production 3/ 2t 45 53 62 69 70 87 Production Index <62) (104) (122) (143) (159) (161) (200) Imports 3/ 204 183 145 205 n.a. 194 205 Total Domestic Supply 2/ 231 220 190 267 n.a. 264 292 RICE b/ Arli 31 34 49 50 48 50 55 Average Yield 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 Production -/ 40 46 5d 45 54 55 66 Production Index (144) (16o) (2214) (160) (195) (200) (230) Export 2/ - - - 4 n.a. 5 10 Total Dbrestic Supply 2 140 446 58 41 n.a. 50 56 SUOAR CANE Area -/ 28 33 3; 39 33 30 40 Average Yield / 34.4 35.0 38.0 314.0 32.0 31-0 40.0 Production 31 963 1,145 1,412 1 340 1,050 950 1,600 Production Index (152) (181) (223) 1212) (166) (250) (253) SUGAR Production 2/ 96 109 124 123 16jló 100 160 Exports 3/ 8 9 10 1 _ - 10 Imports 2/ - - 15 - Change in Stocke 2/ -2 4 13 2 -42./ -15 - Apparent Consumption 3/ 90 95 101 1114 120 130 150 COTTON Area!" 5 6 7 8 18 46 75 Average Yields J/ (Seed Basis) 1.6 1.8 1.o 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 Production 3/ b 11 13 15 40 93 150 Lint: Production 3/ 3 4 4 5 12 31 50 Exports 2/ (2)! - - - 6 25 42 Domestic Supply 3/ 5 4 4 5 6 6 8 Seed: Production J 4 5 6 8 17 45 180 Processed 2/ 4 4 6 7 15 21 80 Oil Equivalent 2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.5 2.1 8.0 J/ In thousands of hectares 2/ In metric tona 3/ In thousands of metric tons J Nheat and wheat flour in wheat equivalent. MJ illed; ,0 percent extraction rate. 2/ Preliminary Estimate. J imports. Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Commodity and Trade Associationa, and Hission Estimates TABLE 7-2 : AREA, YIELDS AND PRODUCTION OF OTffER CROPS, 1967-71 ANDD PPOJECTIONS, 1972 AND 1975 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1975 POTAT0r -Area- 103 88 92 95 97 95 92 Average yie;q2/ 5.0 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.4 8.0 Production - 520 598 627 655 698 703 736 Index (1961/63 100) 98 113 118 123 131 132 138 CORN Areal/ 210 217 218 219 225 230 250 Average yiel 2/ 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 Production3/ 278 288 289 283 293 300 325 Index (1961/63 = 100) 105 109 109 107 111 114 123 BArLeY _2/86 91 92 93 98 95 95 Average yield- 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 Production - 56 60 61 62 66 65 65 Index (1961/63 - 100) 92 98 100 102 108 107 107 CQUINOA Area2 12 14 14 14 15 15 15 Average yi0 2 o.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 Production - 7 10 10 10 11 11 12 Index (1961/63 - 100) 63 90 90 90 90 100 108 1/ In thousands of hectares 2/ In metric tons 3/ In thousands of metric tons ,<3ource: Ministry of Agriculture and Mission estimates. TABLE '7-3: LIVESTOCK INDICATORS, ]'71 Av. Herd Number Carcas Con.umption Population Birthrate Slaughter Rate Growth Rate Slaughtered 'Wae¡ght Total Per Capita BEEF CATTLE 2,200,000 45A 151 3,5,l 300,090 líO kg 56.100 kg 11.2 kg Milk Production Population Milking Total Per Cow Imports, Milk Equivalent Consurption per Capita MILK COWS AND l ILK 20,000 16,000 27 mill. lts. 1,',0() lts. 34 mili ]ts. 12 lts. Av. Birth- Mortality Slaughter Herd Number Carcas Consumotion Population Ewes Rate Adu1t Lambs Rate Growth Rate Slaughtered Weight Total Per Canita SEEP -/ 7,lh4,000 60% 6og 69 20W 209 2.5% 5,415.000 1 kg. 15, 565 M.T. 3.1 kg Av. Females Birth- .lortality Slaughter Herd Number Carcas Consumption Population Total Bearing Rate Adults Young Rate Growth Rate Slaughtered tVeEght Total Per Capita. LLAliAS l,o96,000 70% 65, 33% 6ó, 2 5 4,9 1.2% 75,360 30 kg. 226 Y1.T. 1.1 kg Av. Herd Number Carcas Consumption Population Slaughter Rate Growth Rate Slaughtered Weight Total Per Capita PIGS 1,000,000 6o< 5% 6oo.000 30 kg. 18,000 M.T. 3.6 kg. Population Slaughter Laying Hens Eggs per Hen/Year Per Capita Consumption Meat Eggs POULTRY 5300o,000 5,000,000 2,000,000 80 1 kg. 32 l/ Wqool production estimated at 1,773 M.T. fromn , of eiues ard ranís annually. Source: Ministry of Agriculture TABLE 7-1X: CREDIT OUTSTANDING TO AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, 1967-71 (millions of $b at end of period) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 a/ Private Commercial Banks - 5.6 8.0 14.1 18.3 Banco del EstadoWb/ - 7.2 19.1 20.7 18.5 Banco Agricola 100.3 105.6 123.5 183.8 210.1l Total Agriculture 100.3 118.4 150.6 218.6 2147.2 Index (1963=100) 213 252 320 465 526 Total Credit to Private _3eetor . 582.14 716.7 868.9 1,059.1 1,137.7 Agriculture as percent of credit to Private Sector 17.2 16.5 17.3 20.6 21.7 Public Credit as percent of total to Agriculture 100.0 95.3 94.7 93.5 92.6 a/ Septenber 30 b/ Banco Central until 1970 Source: Banco Central de Bolivia, Boletin Estadistico, July-September 1971, pp. 27-29 TABLE 7-5: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN AGRICULTURE AND RELATED PROGRAMIS AND STRUCTURE, 1963-1912 EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE / Agriculture Rural Education Total Index Agricumture Rural Education Total 1963 5.9 36.4 45.3 100 1.8 7.2 9.0 1964 10. 2 39.1 49.3 109 1.8 6.b 8.6 1965 15.2 55.2 ,0.4 1g5 2.0 7.2 9.2 1966 15.3 1'6.2 91.5 202 1.d 8.8 10.6 196 1 21.9 54.4 106.3 235 2.4 9.2 11.6 196b 22.9 54.3 107.2 237 2.9 ó. 2 11.1 1969 32.3 9d.1 130.9 2b9 3.2 9.4 12.6 19'13 22.9 99.2 122.1 2/0 1. 8 7.9 9.7 1971 20.7 119.2 139.9 309 1.4 8.5 9.9 1972 24.6 153.1 1 7. 392 1.2 7. b.y As a percentage of total Central Government expenditures Budget Source: Ministry of Finance and Mission Estimates: TABLE 7-6 : TOTAL BUDGETI/ OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AGENCIES, 1971 (In thousands of $b) Ministry of Agri- culture Cornunity and Abapo- Develop- World Agarian Coloni- Coffee Wheat Peasant Izozog ment Food Reform zation Insti- Insti- Expenditure Class Affairs Project Servic e Progran Service Institute tute tute Total Personal Services 19,761 4,824 4,800 949 7,204 5,000 202 866 43,606 Other Services 3,546 1,208 670 1,530 2,743 232 92 450 10,471 supplies 2,973 1,118 774 3h2 1,033 180 73 277 6,770 Fixed and financial assets 6,368 987 6,380 109 49 588 1,761 1,146 17,388 Reserves - - - - - - 45 65 110 Transfers 57 188 - - 1,700 - - 1,9b5 Capital contributions 5,746 - - - - - 139 250 6,135 38,451 8,325 12,624 2,930 12,729 6,000 2,312 3,054 86,425 a/ Includes funds not channeled through the Treasury. Does not include Banco Agricola 2ource: Ministry of Agriculture. TABLE 7-7: ESTIMATED NST REJTUTS PER HECTARE FOR SELECTED PRODUCTS IN SANTA CRUZ AREA Cotten Ric e Beef Lint Seed Wheat (Mechan4ized) Soybeans Sugar Cane (feeding) Assumed price ($b per M.T.) 8,800 110 1,lhh 1,815 1,110 73 2,700 a) No irrigation, no fertilizer Assumed yield per hectare (M. T. ) 0.5 1.5 1.0 0.8 1.5 35 - Net return ($b) l,749 169 277 665 _225 -286 Net return (Us$) 1h6 14 23 55 - 19 - 24 % on investnent 64 19 24 80 - - b) Irrigated, no Fertilizer Assgued yield (M.T.) 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.3 2.2 85 - Net return ( $b ) 3,668 - 19 338 856 -518 -994 ¡Jet return (Us$) 306 -158 28 71 - 43 - 83 % on investnent 81 - 17 55 - - c) Irrigated, fertilized Assuried yield (M.T.) 1.5 3.0 2.25 1.6 3.0 120 Net return ($b) 6,214 218 302 880 -809 -425 Net return (Us$) 518 18 25 73 - 67 - 35 % on investnent 129 10 12 42 - - Source: Adapted and computed from preliminary draft of report on irrigation feasibility in Santa Cruz area of Utah State University Teamn in Bolivia. Table b-I: VAWUE ADDED BY INDUSTRY, 1966-70 (in millions of $b at constant 1970 prices) Ave. Annual 1966 1967 1168 1668 l°7O rate of Value Value Value Val,)Qe Val groith (- Food and Beverages 214.5 20.9 224.6 20.9 235.3 20.5 2h7.9 21.1 257.9 20.6 L.7 Tobacco 24.1 2.3 28.7 2.7 30.8 2.7 31.1 2.6 33.6 2.7 8.7 Textiles 66.5 6.5 75.1 7.0 80.4 7.0 81.3 6.9 87.6 7.0 7.2 Footwear, Glothes 51.7 5.0 44.h 4.1 47.5 h.1 h8.1 4.1 51.9 h.1 0.1 Wood 8.0 0.8 7.7 0.7 8.3 0.7 8.L 0.7 9.0 0.7 3.0 Furníture 2.5 0.2 2.7 0.3 2.9 0.3 2.9 0.3 3.2 0.3 6.4 Paper 3.8 0.h 12.4 1.1 13.3 1.2 13.5 1.2 lh.5 1.2 39.5 Printing 10.2 1.0 11.5 1.1 12.4 1.1 12.5 1.1 13.5 1.1 7.3 Leather 5,1 0.5 6.h 0.6 6.8 0.6 6.9 0.6 7.5 0.6 10.1 Ruboer 4.7 0.5 7.0 0.7 7.5 0.7 7.5 0.6 8.1 0.6 1h.6 Chemicals 25.h 2.5 22.1 2.1 23.6 2.1 23.9 2.0 25.8 2.1 0.4 Non-metals 19.5 1.9 19.7 1.8 21.1 1.8 21.3 1.8 23.0 1.8 4.2 Metal Products (exci. machinery) 8.0 o.8 5.3 0.5 5.7 0.5 5.7 0.5 6.2 0.5 -6.2 Electric Appliances 1.3 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.3 0.1 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.1 3.6 Transportation Eqpt. 1.3 0.1 3.3 0.3 3.5 0.3 3.5 0.3 3.8 0.3 30.6 Other Manufacturing 6.8 0.7 7.6 0.7 8.1 0.7 8,2 0.7 8.9 0.7 7.0 Handicrafts and Other 10.h 39.9 408.4 38.1 430.8 37.6 429.1 36-. 455.9 36.3 2.7 Petrolewum (refining) 163.5 15,9 185.2 17.2 206.5 18.0 22h.2 19.0 2h2.3 19.3 10.3 TOTAL 1,027.3 100.0 12073.3 100.0 1,15.8 100.0 1,177.4 100.0 1,254.4 100.0 5.1 Source: Ministry of Planning and IBRD. TABLE '-1: TRP"IF:ORT A:D CC':^-JJICATIONS INDICATOS, 1965-71 VEH lI E fS 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Passenger Cars 5h32 6198 69140 7782 8729 9771 11003 Trucks 9606 10132 10732 11h00 12129 12947 13854 Buses 1742 1798 1854 1911 1970 2030 2094 Others 12869 lJ4h?7 165?6 18120 20138 22910 26033 Totsl 'Veh i~.....cl e5 ?296U9 32555 35782 39213 13266 47688 52981 Population por Passenger Car 798 717 657 601 550 505 460 Population per Truck 451 h39 425 411 396 381 365 Population per Bus 2488 2473 21460 2449 2439 2429 2418 Population per Vehicle 146 137 127 119 111 103 96 ROADS Nain Roads (1966-68) 3919 Iom Seconda-y Roads (1966-68) 2599 k1c Local Road3 (1966-68) 11760 km Total Roedsi (1966-63) 18278 km Paved 724 km Gravel 4321 km Earth & Gravel 5576 km Earth 7657 km Total Roads (3966-68) 18278 hnl Sources: ILinisterio de Planificacion y Coordinacion Dii?ccion Nacional de Transito TABLE 9-2: FREIGHT AND PASSENGER MOV2-LENTS, 1963 / MODE AND PRODUCT TOPIS-KM AS PERCFNTAGE OF AS PERCrNTAGt PER YEAR SUE-TOT.^, EXCI.UbDING OF PIPE.IIDE TOTAl Mlinerals by Road 46,500 4-Y 1.5 Other freight by Road 5h9,700 5B.1 18.1 Minerals by Rail 84,900 9.0 2.8 Other freight by Rail 208,700 22.1 6.9 River Transportation 11,400 1.2 0.4 Titicaca Lake Transport / 31,400 3.3 1.0 Air Transportation 13,300 1.4 0.4 SUB-TOTAL 945,90° 100.0 31.1 Pipeline, crudo oil 1,923,000 _ 63.2 Pipeline, others 176,000 5.8 TOTAL 3, o0l!, ___ 100.0 MODE PASSENG.ERS/DIf PERCENTAGE OF PER YEAR TOTAL Road 1,834,000 86.79 Rail 181,000 8.56 Air 97,000 4.59 Titicaca Lake 800 0.04 River 400 0.02 TOTAL 2,113,200 100.00 Total ntovernent within the frontier of Bolivia, excluding local urban novements 2/ Based on the distance between Guaqui and Puno, Pexu Source: Estudio Integral de los Transportes en Bolivia Table 10-1: POPULATION AND SCHOOL ENROLLMENT, 1960-1971 School School School Enrollment School Enrollment Population Enrollment Ratio Population Enrollment Ratio 6-14 years 6-14 years 6-14 yrs.. 15-19 years 15-19 yrs. 15-19 yrs. Year (1,000) (1,000) (d) (1,000) (1,000) (%) 1960 892.8 405.5 45.4 395.7 49.2 12.4 1961 904.8 439.1 48.5 405.7 55.0 13.6 1962 927.6 462.2 49.8 415.9 61.2 14.7 1963 950.1 491.7 51.8 426.5 65.3 15.3 196h 975.2 514.2 52.7 437.3 71.2 16.3 1965 987.1 5h8.7 55.6 457.6 78.1 17.1 1966 1,012.4 577.8 57.1 h69.5 85.5 18.2 1967 1,038.9 615.1 59.2 481.7 91.3 19.0 1968 1,065.4 642.3 60.3 494.3 97.0 19.6 1969 1,093.6 661.3 60.5 507.3 109.6 21.6 1970 1,110.4 707.4 63.7 512.8 126.9 24.7 1971 1,139.9 748.1 65.6 526.5 139.6 26.5 Source: Ministry of Education. able 10w-2: SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY GRADES, 1957-68 Number % of ist of Grade Year Grade Students Enrollment 1957 lst 134,647 100.0 1958 2nd 78,953 58.6 1959 3rd 57,778 42.9 1960 4th 42,407 31.5 1961 5th 3h,136 25.4 1962 6th 26,779 19.9 1963 7th 26,318 19.5 1964 8tll 15,264 11.3 1965 9th 13,686 10.2 1966 l0th 10,651 7.9 1967 llth 8,h23 6.3 1968 l2th 7,590 5.6 Source: Ministry of Education. SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY GRADES, 1957-68 No. Students (1000) 140 1st pill1,y Sí ti' - q#Jvs 1 6 Secundijry School: griddes 7--12 120 _ 100 _ ' ' 60 .- 3 40 20- llth 1í 1951 ~1958 1959 i1d u lU152 1 9í3 1964 1965 1 966 1967 196G8 Worfd B.nuk 6*09 Table 10-3: PRIMARY EDUCATION, URBAN AND RU.AL NLUMBER OF STUwD7E?i5rs E LLŽ2NT AND OBTAINING PASSING GRADES - 196h-69 T o TA L U R _ A N R U R A L ole ~ ~En-ro, ed Enrolled Grade and Year Enrolled Passed cEnrolled_PPaseeQ Et&nrolled eP3sp eQ'P,r,w Grade 1 (196>4) 149,6>47 11O,M0O 73.8 68,627 50,871 7>4.1 81,020 59,529 73.5 Grade 2 (1965) 109,138 86,426 57.8 53,524 43,304 63.1 55,614 43,122 53.2 Grade 3 (1966) 85,205 67,758 45.3 50,712 41,425 6o.4 34,493 26,333 32.5 Grade 4 (1967) 65,345 52,078 34.8 46,781 37,897 55.2 18,564 14,181 17.5 Grade 5 (1968) 52,775 48,535 32.4 41,949 38,500 56.1 10,826 10,035 12.4 Grade 6 (1969) 39,107 29,986 20.0 35,345 27,436 40.0 3,762 2,550 3.1 Note: In urban schools "1enrolledn, t'exceed", "passed"?, in the preceding grade due to repetition of the grade and/or students shifts from rural schools. Sourcet Ministry of Education. PRIMARY EDUCATION, URBAN AND RURAL RETENTION PYRAMID, 1964-69 URBAN RURAL . ¡ .. ..- . .. - Giade 6 (1969> 27.13( 1 . - _ _ 2,550 35,345F) 3,762 38,50(. .: X . 10,035 Grade 5 (1968> __ 1-826 41,949 ¡0,826 Grade 4 <1967) 37,8X7 1- , - 14.181 46.J81 L | 18,564 4 1 .425 : -. - : : -.::.:, , ....::: -.::::::26.333 Grade 3 (1966 1,425 1 .. 50,712 134.493 Grade 2 <1965) 4330' 53.51 55,614 Grade 1 <1964> 5)0,871 ..... . 5 9, : : . 9529 68,427 ___ 81,020 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Note 1, ti,b.h g---t.,, th., ¡t Iock ... .... .. - Ib-t---t'I1 itt, tp ll,ock skho,lls iho,., evo t.t. .1 dt-.,, o ve.,1 e,, -lu.ttttttt,ttet Worid Bank-68O 8