Document of The World Bank FOR OrnCLAL usE oNLY Rejpwt No 12007 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER FOURTH HIGHMY PROECT (CREDIT 1394-NIR) JUNE 23, 1993 MICROFICHE COPY Report No.:12007 NIR Type: (PCR) Title: FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT (CR1394 Author: WATKINS, HELEN Ext.:31708 Room:T9102 Dept.:OEDD2 Infrastructure Operations Division Country Department v Africa Region Thi document has a restricted distribution and may be usd by reipients only in the perfomance of hir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ELENCY EGUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) US$ 1.0 (1983) = CFAF 340* US$ 1.0 (1984) = CFAF 437 US$ 1.0 (1985) = CFAF 449 US$ 1.0 (1986) = CFAF 346 US$ 1.0 (1987) = CFAF 301 US$ 1.0 (1988) = CFAF 298 US$ 1.0 (1989) = CFAF 319 USS 1.0 (1990) = CFAF 272 USS 1.0 (1991) = CFAF 303 * rate used in the SAR E1L YEAR October 1 - September 30 (up to 1989) January 1 - December 31 (from 1990 on) A_EsmAR RfMi AfDB African Development Bank CPTP Centre de Perfectionnement des Travax Publics DIP Direction des Travaux Public (Directorate of Public Works) EDF European Development Fund EEC European Economic Community ERR Economic Rate of Retum FAC Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation FNI Fonds National d'Investissement (Naonal Investment Flund) LNTP Laboratoire Natior,al des Travaux Publics (Niger) MTPU Ministre des Travaux Publics, et de l'Urbanisme (Ministry of Public Works and Hc, -ing) OPEC Org&anization of Petroleum Exporing Countries RMU Road Management Unit RRP Report and Recommendon of the President SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDR Special Drawing Rights TA Technical Assistance FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washingoo. D.C. 20433 U.S.A Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation June 23, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO TEE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Niger Fourth Hithwav Proiect (Credit 1394-NIR) Attache' i8 the "Project Completion Report on Niger-- Fourth Highway Project (Credit 1394-NIR)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part 1I contains the Borrower's comments. The Credit (SDR21.9 million of June 1983) was to assist implementation of a road maintenance program and to create a staff training establishment in the Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism. The project was identified in December 1977 and became effective in February 1984, more than six years later. Cofinancing Was not sought and the credit amount was reduced at the last minute. The PCR gives a candid, meticulous and elegant account of how the project unfolded. Particular attention is focussed on weaknesses of IDA's performance; specifically in preparation (economic justification and financing of the Zinder-Agadez Road), and In lack of coordination with other potential lenders. Apparently, the lessons have been useful in the design of subsequent projects. The addition of road works, slow procurement, and local fund shortages caused delays and the project was completed in June 1991, two and half years behind schedule. However, all project objectives were fully realized. Both a road maintenance capacity and a training center were successfully established. Nevertheless, both institutions have deteriorated due to staff turnover and insufficient financial support by the Goyernment. Overall, the project is rated as satisfactory, its sustainability as uncertain, and its institutional impact as substantial. No audit is planned. This dcbK>let has a restricted distributfon and may be used by rec,ipfents only fn the performzrae of thefr offfefal dutfes. Its contents may not otherwfse be dfsc(osed wfthout Wortd Bank authorization. FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY PR.EF'AC * C1 RDURT D BWM MyXP EQMRIC CONEA92 LRPOR PREFACE ...................................................... i EVALUATRiN SUMIMARY ........................................... H PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S 9T.CTVE .................. 1 A. P ro j ete1ty .........................................nt i t y 1 B. Project Background 1....................................... C. ProjectObjcdvesanud Descrption ............................. 2 D. Projects D erani gton ...............................an organ zation 3 E. Project l aon ..................................... 4 P. Mjor ResultsoftheProject ................................. 6 G. Icje Sustainability.. 9 R. AssocationPformnc ............. . ...................... 9 1. Borrower Performance. .................................... 11 J. Project Rationship . ...................................... 11 K, Consuling andContat Serices ............................. 12 L. ProjeDc u n ....................................... 12 PART IL PROJECT RE F3NW FROM BORROWR'S .............. 12 PART ML SfATINTCAL PIN RMALTION .................... ........... is A. Reatd Bank Loans d, Credis . ................................ 15 B. PojeaTieable ........................................... 16 C. Creit Data . .............................................. 17 Oi Credi. . ............... 17 (ii)Allocation f CreditProc ees .............................. 18 D. ProjetCosts .............................................. 19 E. Compliatce hCdkCovenn ........ithCrdit........................ 20 F. UseofBankReources ....................................... 21 (l Staff lnpusbyStageof ProjecCydceinStaff Wees ..... .......... 21 i MissionDat ................... ..................... 22 G. E nomic Revation of the Paved Road Maln ana nPtm .... ....... 23 This document has a restricted distdibution and may be ued by recipients only in the performance of their ofcial duties. its contents may not othemwie be disclosed without World Bank authoization. PROJECT COMPLEnON REPORT REPUBUC OF MGER FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT CREDT 1394-NMR 1. This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Fourth Highway Project for which Credit 1394-NIR In the amount of SDR 21.9 million or US$23.6 milliov equivalet was approved on June 28, 1983. Ibo Credit was closed oL June 30, 1991, two year behind scheue. k was fully disbursed, wit te last disbursement on Apri 26, 1991. 2. The PCR was prepared by the Infaucture patio Dision of the Sahelian Deatmet, Africa Regio 3. Preparion of the PCR is based on the m and of the Presient, the Staff Appraisal Report, the Credit Ae n supervsion report, the correspondence files and nevie with Bank staff. Part II, requested in a letter dated June 25, 1991, was evtintuaily sbmittd on May 20, 1992. 4. No co-donrs wee involved in fiancing the Project il PROJECT COMPLITION REPORr REPUBC OF NIGER FOUH HIGHWAY PROJECT CREDIT 1394NIR ALUAflQK&aXu i. The objecdves of the Project woe to: a) bstiute and begin implen of pram of planned prevenive and to sat up a Road Management Uni (MWU) in tho Miistre des Travau Publics at de L'Urbaciwe (MTPU); and b) to esutblish the trng of fTPU employees on a permanetm basis (para. 7). ii. Execution of dte Project got off to a fast starL However, the adlition of extrroad work to the Project scope, dlow pmro ent and a shortage of loca fig over the latter years of the Projea delayed competon (pas. 17-19). Il. Mhe objecte of th Projec were fiy reaizd. Addiiona roatd wor we cied out over d thatfor atappl. Two Impoa InIttutdos, the RMU ad the training center (CPTP), were succesiy establishe ',aras. 23-25). IV. A study of a large in the Zlw-Apdez road which the Govermen had undertaken to bouild wi fei financing, wa added to the ProjcL TI study showed a low to natie ra of retun, but despit the son objections of the Association, th Govme.t we ahead with the conucdion of hs road (paws. 27-36). V. Te re d economic re of retur islowe thn estied at appraisal (32% compad to 43%) but still high eough to fimly establish the econoic justification of the Project (pa 37). vi. TIh emphas pacd an Institution buling unde the Proect led tD the succoisl estblismnt of the RMU d CPTP. Unfotunay, both have nrw ove h Ias two yes and will hv t be sotregthd If they are to pla y roles In the exacto of th on-going and prposed project (p 38). vU. ITh Project dtd d a mti-co ponen project an be successy mecuted by a coopeatve Borowe, If th project is wel prepared, closy onhored by IDA and spevised by compt consultants (pam. 41). iii viii. The Asociadon should avoid long delays in the preparation of its projects (pi. 42). ,x. lho Associ4tion was remiss in not ensurng more extensive inquiries in the donor community which might have avoided the failure to obtain needed co-financing or the Project (Par. 43). x. Ihe lack of cooper-ion among divisions responsible for project doumentauon which was evident during the preparation of this Project should not be encounted in the future, as the Bank re- organiion in 1987 placed responsibility for Project management under a single unit (paras. 43 and 44). xi. The Association should not make last minte reductions in the amount of a creit which Is about to be negoiated, without jstfiable caus (parw. 45 and 46). xii. The Bak's beatd response to the fiaing of the 74ider-Agadez road sem to indicate that the Association might have coordinated more closdy with other donors (parn. 47). MUBLC OF NIE FOURTH }IGHWAY PROJECT CREDIT 1394-NEL PROJECT COMPLErION REPORT PART I. EBW= REE FM BNK fi A. frUdontUt Project Name: Fourth Highway Project Credit No.: Credit 1394-NIR RVP Unit: Africa, Sahelian Deptmet Inrastructure Operations Division Country: Ropublic of Niger Sector: Transportaion - h<2Sec Bacsemdlr 1. Niger is a landlocked country with a resultant high cost of transport. Most of the population I cnentated along its soutiern border where the rainfall is generaly sufficit for some agricutural producton and livestock, although a severe and long drout took place from 1970-75. A uraim boom started in the mid 1970's but eased during the early 1980's. Uranihm proved windfall reves which were largely uned over to the Fonds National d'nvesissemet (FNI) for the development of the agricultural sector, and improvement of basic infastucture and soal development. 2. While the Govenment's pa ansport policy was aimed mainly at expanding and upgrading the major trunk roads in the south of the country, its goas by mid 1970's were broadened. Ihey inced: (a) completion of linking the major urbn centes and mining areas to the main paved road network; (b) consolidation of th exitng fce account capability of the Ministre des Travaux Publics et de l'Urbanisme (MIPU) for the mantena of the earth roads network; (c) esblishment of an adequate capability witin the MTPU for e preparation, suprvision and execution of periodic maintenance works on the paved road network; (d) extension of the feeder roads system in a where nrul deveopmet projet are being (e) nizaon of the fleet of Air Niger, the domestic air line; (M deveopment of the training cacity of the MTPU; and (g) support of the development of a local constction industry trugh highway ptojec. Sou.: RRP sad SAR dor Pow* Hghuy Proct 2 3. The Bank supported the Govenment In the realization of thes goals. The Third Highway Project and the Feeder Road Project addressed goals (b), (d), (f) and (g), while the Fourth Highway Ptoject chiefly addressed goals (c) and (f). As reards (a), Air Niger was eventuaily liquidated under the Public Enterprise Sector Adjusnt Ptogram. 4. IDA lending for highways in Niger began over 25 years ago. The First Highway Project provided for the cxnstucdon of 60 km of lateit roads in grWodu producing areas. Ihe Highway Mantenance Project provided for a phased re-organzaon of the road maintenan and equipment serices, aning and dimination of the bacidog of ddered maintenne. The Second Highway Project financed the construction of 140 km of roads prqeared under the previous ptojec. S. Te Third Highway Projet (Credit612-NIR, US$6million, 1976) with co-fincing from othes, included equipmet technical assitance and training of to DirAon des Tra=axu Publics (DTP) in the MTPU for regaveling and routine maintenance; road constuction; and a suvey of the domesti; consruBon industy. The Feeder Road Project (Crdit 886-NIR, US$10 million 1979) consIed of a three year program of improvement, consucon a4 sequmnt of about 1000 miles of feeder roads. This project included the creation of a feeder road techical secdon in th DTP, as well as training and technical assistan. 6. Ths Fourth Highway Project wasentay a n of the road works taning and tech asdsi which had boee succflly initiated under the two earlier projects descrid in para 5. he Fourth Highway Project ws prepd in part ud eo t Ir Highway Project trugh an exteion of the scope of wodr to cover prepatoy sdies. Protous leng for highway is giva in Table A of Part M. C. EJL Iran d 7. P;oject Objecdves. The objectives of th project were: (a) to isdtto and begin i"I lotadn of a progm of planed preventive peiodic and to M up a Road M_gem Unit MU) in DTP; and (b) to establish tho atr of DTP eaployees an a prmane bais. 8. Projec Decription. Mm project fianced the followi ites: (a) strengthenig andlor resurfacg of 374 km of the eisting bimino netwaoi by conftract (b) die estlishmet and oqupping of the Road Mnagement Unit; (c) construedon and equippig of a atr cent (Centr de Pert des Tra Publics, (C!P?) for DTP employee, and the opa of the centr over a three yea period and 3 (d) cical assia for th supervision of works in items (a), (b) and (c) and the provision of Uafflc coonting, pavement roughnes measuring, line markng and road maintenance equipment, and veicles for items (b) and (c). D. etWo Degi anhaIu 9. An attWmpt was made in Decembr 1977 to idenfy the Fourth Highway Ptoject but the mission concluded wiat on-going sudies for taning, maintnance, road works and tranart be completed f-st bd;oi9 the scope of the prwposed project could be detemined. These studies were being finnced by other donors aceve in the Nigeren Tasport Sector. As noted in para. 6, ddiond studies were also carried out under the Tird Highway Project o prepar oCponets for the next Project. he most important study was a survey of the entire network with the peparion of a master plan from which a proga of perioc maitnce would be developed. A study of the domesdt construction idustry was also carried out under the Tlird Highway Project. 10. The identification mision of May 1980 made good progres in identifying a Fourth Hgway Project. ITe scope of the project and the related issues were dearly spelled out in a ProJect Brie dated August 29, 1980. The mission polnted out that prvious projects had concentrated on latedie road rebilittion and biminou road constucdon, and noted that in the light of trffic gowth I was w time to plan the approach to periodic , and upgrding and s trenof the 1800 km paved networ. To complemntm the pgmam,. the msion al80 posibl tecid a and fnanWal auistace to the domesdc contcon industy, and a e fdft to epand Waining of DTP personnel Initiad under earlier projects. 11. In Octobr 1980, a preparon mission fd tat a first draft of the paved road study had just been completed but that a contract for the stdy of the domestic consructn industry had only just been signed. Accding to the pre-p mission of May 1981, the latter study ro ed massive ehn assistanc to a contactor's advisory bureau, and the establishmet of eight new specaized compani for surface _Qabnnt, emulsion produo and eartworks. Tli study faied to gal the conide, and hence ifomain, from the largest d healthiet privaht conacor in Niger. Futeme, the Govem which had been involved in the ownehip of a lag 'Soci Mixte company, but had d withdrawn, was rductat to discu the repot or Is policy towards the domestic constuctio dusre. In view o£f th Governmens attiud to the study, MDA did noDing *aru under the Project to assist th loea iWd&y othert incorrate measur to eue the maximum of local co tacr participation'. 12. The Projec Brif also noted hat in view of t congestion in urb areas, and hgher speeds in rural ae, the was a nod to esablish a naonal road safty oncil for the education of the motoring and pedestio public, and to set up a uni within DTIP to be resposible fr line making and safty sigs. Th Bdr poind out ta a posible road saft compont had been dicusd with the Director of Land Tport (DTI) in the MTPTU and his suggesto we awaited. If no response wa 2 Pwoet ef dae4d July 6, 191, pm.. 16-17. ' SA hr do Fowuk Higway Phojst, pm 2-17. 4 received, the componen would be dropped. The component was presumably dropped as there was no mention of the safety issue in the SAR. 13. Tem pre-appraisal mission of October 1981 was designated an appraisa on the Msion's reu to headquarters becase of the advanced stage of preparation which enabled the staff to proed with the drafting of a Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). Tbe Issues had been wenl identfied earlier in the Projen Brief so that the Issues Paper covfred fol w-up matter such as retoactive financing for the proposed training center to expedite Its completion and thus provide more time for training during project execution5. The Decision Memorandum noted that Ge ernmiet had just advised M1A that it did not want WechnicsI assistance CTA) to assist the DTP to stregLs its capability'. Senior Management later made acceptance of TA by the Governmn a condition for going ahead widi the Project'. 14. At the Yellow Cover Review stage, Ceral Project staff who had been involved in project preparation, wte that they fully ported this exceptionally well prepared and well justified projecL Niger provides one of the most succwssfil examples of Bank involvement in highway mantenae instiion building, and tils project si^ould culmiae in a highly professional management systm fousing on timely preventative maintenanoe with a major expansion of paved road periodic activities executed dtrough ors6. 15. At the time the project was appraised in> October 1981, the staff xpected to negodate the Credit In August 1982. HoweveR, negotations were repeatedy postponed to Apri 1983. Four main plem appear to have accounted for thds delay. First, at th recomm a of tie Education Division, th desig of the CPTP was modified to reduce cost and to mae it usable for trainn Goverment peonne outside of MTPU. Seoondly, the preparation of the Rlo and Reom of the Psident RP) was held up for reaons not given in the fles. Thirdly. the amount of the IDA allocation for the project was reduced ffom US$35 million to US$24 million bwcase of a shortae of DA funds, accorting to what th Nigeriens were told at the 1983 AnnualMeetoe. Fouthly, there was uncinty a to whether any co-dont fincing would be vailable which vould of course affect the size of tle Credit, as well as concen over a slow down in economic acivity IA Ngw and in Goveament revenues. Despie last mine effort, MDA was unable to identify a co-donr. E. _ 16. Credit Effacvenes. Th Credit was apprved on June 28, 1983, siged on September 1, and became effective on February 8, 1984. ' Project Bd? ed J*ul6. 1961, pum. 20 and 28. ' MauonrwAun to Pils daed Doomber 1, 198. * Deci Memoadum ded Decemb_ 23, 198. Memorndum dted Jauy 28, 1982. Mmoiadum dted July 12, 1982. 9Memnadm dtd October 1, 1913. S 17. -. Project execution got off to a fast start because the process of selecting conraors and consultan to carry out the Project was started during the long delay in negodations. Thus by the end of 1983, ten4ers bad been ealled for the resurfacing works, and proposs for supervision of these works bad been received; TOR had been drafted for the RMU consultant and Goverment had asked for Bank assistance in drawing up a short list of consultans; and the Government was prequalifying firms to build the CPTP, and had selected training consultants. 18. By the fail of 1984, resurfacing works were proceeding satisfactorily under competent and tight control of the consultants, a contract had been signed with a consultant for the RMU and the team mobilized, and a local contractor had been selected to build the CPTP. By the fall of 1985, the resurfacing works had been successfully completed and thb remaining works were progressing well. By the end of 1987, the training center had been completed and training consultants had been fully mobilized. A year later, the agreed program of planned proventaive periodic maintence had been completed. The main problems during the later stage of the project was the provision of less then agreed on anmal allocaions for road maitenance provided by the Government. By mid 1990, the project was noted as "basicatly completed' but with some minor wo:ks stfill underway. These were completed by mid 1991. The planned and actua project timetable is shown in Table B of Part m. 19. PE= . Procurement under the Project which involved conactng of works and services, and tie purchase of equipment, was generally satisfactory and in line with Bank guidelines, although it was slow in the later stages of execution. 20. Bbu. The estimated and actual dim shown in Table C (i) in Pan m. The finul disbuement was made on April 26, 1991, when the Credit was fully disbursed. Disbursements were roughly on or ahead of schedule during the first 3 yeas of project execution but fell behind .a the later yeas because of slow proment and the additional works (par 22). The closing date was xtended twice to June 30, 1991. A problem, still unresolved, is the uncoveed balace in the specW account wNIch amounts to some CFAF 100 million (about SDR 250,000). ITese finds are frozen at the National Development Bank of Niger, currently under liquidation, and it seems unlikdy that they will be released in the near fuAture. 21. C411ot Alloodg IThe original and atual allocations of credit proceeds are shown in Table C (ii) of Part m. Allocstion were mended from dme to tie as wok and conslting services w added to the project scope. 22. ItWea Cou T Ihe project was completed widin the appraisa cost of US$32.1 million. In CFAF te, it exceeded the appais es by about 8%, whereas in US dollar terms, it remained 6% below the etmate. Appraised and actu costs are shown in Table D. Actually, the cost of the Projewt as originally desroibed In the project documen was considerably les due to a large appriation of the US dollar duig the fist half of project impli on (25% over the appraisa e ge rat on averag). It then became possible to make up fr urgen repairs or consucdon of draina stmuctr on the major highway link between Namey and the Malian border, and paria fng of dte Dosso- Gray road. Those addional road and bridge work repesented a 21% incroase over the road nework length originally coved by the Project. Also, addtionl studies were carried out (a doed inveory of road s ture hbilitation needed on the same Niamey-Mali road), and exr equipment ad facilities wer provided to the RMU and the CPTP. Th Project was jointy financed by IDA and the Governmet; the Goveent's share was reduced to 5% acr the board for contra signed after m' uary 1986 by an amendment to the Development Credit Agreement dated March 31, 1986. beU !!*iji 0: li . ii EIS I E I dA ' 7 29. The Bank recommended that dhe Government should therefore call a meeting of the donors to seek their ageemen to financing a redesigned project and to use evental savings to hep meet the maintenace bill. The Bank offered to help prepare for such a meeti and to pardcipat in it. As a reult of the discussions it was agreed ta i) The President would stop bid evaluation and inform the donors that alternative designs of the road would be examined; Ui) the MTPU would undertake a study of the road with a view to lowering its desip standards, dte Bank would asist the TPU and if necsary, would fina the study under the Fourth Highway Project; and fii) when the study was finished the Govermnment would call a meeting of the donors, in which tho Bank would participat and discuss the conclusion of the st.Jll. 30. On January 18, 198S, the European Economic Community (EEC) telexed the Banlk tha after lengy appraisal and fiacial negotiaions with the European Development Fund (EI)F), the Afican Development Bank (AfDB) and certain Arab Funds, tedn arnments had been completed and works were about to begin. The EEC noted that the Bank's position on the projeca had not been raised with it, and tha the mater constiued a concret example of the necesity to improve coordination between the two insttions. In a mendum to the RVP dated Jany 24, 198S, the staf set out the backgound to the Bank's position. Six different financing agencies had appraised the projecL All agreed that it was eownomically fasible and loans had been neoited and dped with all six. For everyoe to admit that ts was a mitae would be difficult. Furthermore, Nigr did not warn to lose the financing it had secured. Bids had been received for the first lots and they were about 20% below the engines estmate. The staff pointed out that the trafic figures on which the feasibilit had been based did not appear credible but that a case could be made for the fist secon from Zinder to Taout 31. The Bank replied to the EEC on January 2S, that it had Just become aware of the deg standards of the Zinder-Agadez road as a reut of analysis carried out by a public iwn ezmn review mssion in October 1984. The situaton posed difficult questions for the Bank, but it de d t the best thinj to do was to advise all conerned of its preliminary findings. The review was undetake a part of an adjustent progrm for Niger, the need for whi drived from ngng cirn . As a conseqnce, odwse reviews sometmes i projects which, while suitable when started, are no long consistent with chnged resource availability and priarites. Th Bank had Immediately informed the Govrnme of its views, and at a meedng with the Preiden of Niger in December, had agreed tha Niger would organize a confece of the co-facers fot mutual consuations on the ies conceing the road. 32. Despite the aretmet between the Bak and the Government to defer the start of work until a study was avalble, (para. 29), tb* Govment shorly thereaf reconsidered its poio_ In late January 1985 a tntatve agment was reach In Nmay bewen the Govement and the Bank to allow the Government to pZoceed with te construcdon of the first se of the Zinder-Aadez road, as well a t need to undertake firther studies to establish, firs, the vibi of any ubsen sections, and second, the requirements of the count's totoad netWOk2. 33. Shody thereatr, the proposed dono mooetg was canceled foUowing a rues from th donors to prepare a document on which a meting could be held. During the vist of the RVP, the Govermen Metouond datd rVabt 21, 1954. s Tel= daed J_nu 30, 1985. 8 conceded that the Zinder-Agadez road may not be the right thing to do under present eircumsta of the country. However, the Government h&d made a strong political com _itmt to the project over the past few years, and it had s6licited a number of donors to support the project. Now the Govement found itself in the awkward position of having to go back to tell them that the project Was no longer In the pipeline. Under the circumstances, it was agreed that the Bank would not object to the construction of the 140 bn Zinder-Tanout road. Bids for the remaning sections would be called with a disclaimer that they may not be built. The Government would launch an economic stdy of the Tanout-Agadez sections. The Bank would prepare the TOR and a short list of consultants. When the study was completed, the Government and the Bank would seek a common position to present to the donors at a subsequent donors meeting. 34. In letters sent out in May 1985, the Bank carefully explained its proposals to the various co- donors involved in the project. Nevertheless, despite the above agreemet with the Govenment, the Bank's Resident Mission indicated in a telex dated May 10 tiat the Government was stll committed to the construction of the whole road. In a later telex dated October 18, 1985 the Mission pointed out that the Govenmen obviously wanted to construct the whole road and will do everythng to achieve its objectives. The Mission noted dtt the acrimonious debate over the road would coninue to handicap progress in preparing the Stuctural Adjustment Credit. The Mission also asked how the Bak could convince the Government that the road should remain u ished in the midle of the desert, and wondered if 'we would all look somewhat ludicrous in that sluaton'. 35. At a meezng of the co-donos in ledda held on November 26-27, 1985, the Bank again raised its concern over the very low economic rate of reun (ERR) for the Tanout-Agadez section, and that it could only reach an acceptable level if a new urmnium mine was created. However, dte present market sihuion did not warrt the opening of a new mine unil 1990. The feasiility of this part of the road could be re-examined if firm commitments were obtained to expand uraium production. The Bank therefore suggested that the Arab Funds which were to fince the last section, reallocate their funds towards the road maint ce program. Nevertheless, the co-doors concluded that they would proceed with the completion of the project road. Despite this rejection, the Bank efor did lead to some lowering of desip standards and thus cost savings in constucdng the road as noted below. 36. The Proces Verba of negotiations fr the Structural Adjustment Credit (December 13-19, 1985) included a provision for limitng the size of the Zinder-Agadez project, by which te Govermet committed itself to restrict the width of the road from Tanout to Agadez to 6 m. and t invest no more than CFAF 12 bilLion over FY86-88. Tle Bank aed that the whole road might evenualy be constructed and the excess fnding by donors ove cmst of phaus I could be utilized to start constuction of phas 2, subject to prior constations with those don. By end 1987, all of th road but a 130 km middle stretch had been completed. In 1988, a donors meeting, which the Bank did not atend, was convened to secure the complemntay financing required to complete the remaning 70 km of road. The meedng was succefy concluded. The Bank fount no reason at the time to oppose compleion of his uneconomic project, sice the remaig unpaved portion was the centr secdon, ths an analysis of beneficial traffic diversion from altern Itneraries would have compared most of the beeft calculated for the whole road againt a low marginal nvtmt. With hihdsWt, the Bank did little more tman save face under its lending conditionality; once it conceded the principle that Zinder-Agades could be paved, ullA implementation of the project was inevitable. It might have been better if th Assocdaon U Mamo_adm & Tel=x date Januau 28, 1983. 9 had stayed out of the issue, not only because it harmed relations between the Government and the Association, but also because it encouraged the Government to pursue similarly uneconomical investments on the assumption that the Absociation would eventally give in. 37. Economic Pma . The Project ro'd consttute the backbone of the national network and are among the most heavily travelled. The economic evauation at appraisal had anticipated traffic would continue to grow at a fast pace (in a 5.5 to 8.5% range depending on sections) under the influence of the uranium boom, contributing to fster deterioration of aging roads. Much greater periodic maintece was anticipated for which the Project provided fimding. The economic analysis at appraisal found the threeyear program well justified, with an Economic Rate of Return ( ) of about 43%. Benefit were to come from reduction of vehicle operating costs and avoidance of costy road reconstruction with the Project. The economic revaluation was conducted along similar premises by the RMU under IMA guidance, using this time the HDM IIm model and the road data base developed under the Projec. The revised ERR of about 32% is lower than the apprai ERR but still quite ssfctory. The lower performance may be explained by the lower traffic growth rate (with a few exceptions) reflectig the sharp economic dowurn of the Nigerien economy from 1984 onward. Comparability of ex-ante and ex-post ERRs, however, may not be perfect, since different models were used in their cmputation. Basic assumptions and results are shown in Table G. Gi. hQje StWabilit 38. As noted in para. 25, the two institons were successflly established under the Project but have deawe recenly. Tey wUi have to be strengthe ndthey are to play key roles i the execution of the First Transport Project and participate in the exection of the proposed Second Transport Sector Project. H. AmamRba 39. The files indicate that the issues involving the preparation of the Project were thoroughly reviewed and the Project was carefully formulated by the project staff. Also efrts were made by the staff to obtain sound technical advice from Frech Technical istitom which were closely involved with the Nigerian highway sub-sector. 40. Supevsion of the Project by IMA was very thorough. Project staff made ecepdonal effort to asist the MTPU with advice and assimce on i) the use of the Highway Design Model in the RMUU; ii) the develpment of the tning center; and iil the operation of te worsops and equipmet . IDA also provided frequent financial and economic assistance on budgetary manes and the audits, and in dting and fnacin additiona road works under the Project which wer cad out with splus fuds. The staff recommended many changes in project details thou is life to ensure that project goals wer achieved. 41. Project staff frequedy sought the asistan of he Education Division as regrds the desig of the tinn center. As this field is ute separ fom civil in , the close cooperation between the Transportation oand Education Divisions is to be commended, although it did coibute to some delay in prepaing the project (pa 15). Ihe Project demons tha a multi-compoent project can be su lly excted, if the project is wll prepared, closly moniored by IDA and suevised by competet consuls. 10 42. Tho Projet was idetifiod in October 1979 but not prented until May 1983, a period of about three and a half yes. The m taken to ppare the Project was long and IDA's peromance on this aspect was less than satisfacry. Tbis is particularly so since there was nothng Uns in the Project sCOpO which consted of a contnuation of road works, tecncal assistace and training tha had been initaed under previ project para. 5). There appears to have been sveral fats contuti to the dday. One was the failure to include sufficient funds in the preceding project for the preparation of a follow-on project. Conversely some of the studies such as for the construcdon idustry, might have been defered to a follow-on project. Ihere did not seem to be any utgency on this matter as two domestic finms were already active in the highway field. Tis compont was evenually omitted from tie Project, probably for that reason. 43. However, perhaps the most serious cause of the delays was the lack of cooperaton between the county program and project units of the Bank. The RRP, which was the responsibility of the country program division, was not prepared in time, and no organized effort had been made to idetify co-donors with the result was that no co-donors participated in the Projet (par 15). The fies rather vidy reflect the *ustrations of projec staff with this stae of afir14. 44 Tho repeated delays n negotatons which arose over the design of the CP77, uncainty as to the amount of the prposed credit and availability of co-financing, and the slow preon of project documents (pa. 15) ilustate the problems which can aise when responsibflity for project prepartion is divied among two or mo divisions. This situaon confirms the of at let one aspet Of the r ionof the Banlk caTried out in 1987. One of the purposes of reorganizing dth Bak wa to place responsibility for project prarion and programming under the dire control of a single division, with opeaional responsibiliy delegated to one staff member, the project task manager. 45. A fina factor in causing processing ddays is tha when project praation tk seve yaus, it is likely to be overake by events. Thus in Niger, chann prorites, th dedine in Goverment revenus in the early 1980's, and th reducton in fthe siz of th acrt allocation lasmIinue chaes in the project spe. Thus a key project component, the Niamey-Say Road, was so suddedy rmved from the Project, ta there was apparently nD tme to revis the map in the RIP and the SAR on which this road b cleary shown as part of the Project for upgrding to paved standar. 46. Accring to the Project Brief dated Novembet 1, 1982, the alocation for the Project was retuced folowing the IDA reviw, at about the same dme as g ad were scdieod. lbe cut at that late dato in the project cycle caused u l confsion In the Projea Division whh was left with the problem a to how to du h projct scope. Forthis Iu to be rais at ta st conim s the lack of crpeation noted earir (pa 43). AccordW to a cabi from the Bank's Rasidet Representativo In Niger, MDA's reduction in the size of the Credit ovar what the Government had been promised, croad out on the part of one Seno Govermet offlcial'. 14 Manda ddaed Samq 28, 193 ana MIa 28, 1983. u MWp: D 16335. 1' TeW no. 59, daed Pebnza 16, 1983. 11 47. Ihe Ban's beated response to the financig of the Zinder-Apadz Road (pam. 27-36) seems to indicate a lack of coordinatonwith other donors (para. 43 and 44). Acoording to a notice in the fies from the OPEC Fund dated Mach 12, 1984, it had signed an agreement with the Govenmet to finance the southem part of the Zinder-Agadez road and th Government's inteti to complee the road was clear. Thus, project prepration had been underway for some time. In view of the urgen need for co- donor hands for the Project, the unavafilabsity of which resulted in a cutback in its scope jut before negotias, it would appear the Association had not made a concerte efort to aVoach the donor community, and in fact it did not seem to be awa of the significance of the proposed foreign fiacn by four other donors of such a larp and uneconomic project as the Zinder-Agadez road. To be fair, at the me the Project was being prepared, the Govment's budgetary problem were only just surfacing. I. tw_ P e 48. Overall, the Borrower pefored well In excufting tie civil wors under the Project. As noted (para. 19), procurement was handled in a generaly satisto manner, however, because of severe budgetary constraints, the Government was frequenly in arreas in paying conracts and consultants the local curency component, especially in the later years of project execution. efaill operation of the traning center was considerably delayed becau of the Govarmens failure to legslate the necessary statut which woudd pvide fhndig for supplies and staff (para. 25). Cosiderable pressure had to be mntained on the Govement by IDA to carry out audits of the project accounts as called for under the Credit agreement. his led to supesion of the use of St_ateet of Expenditure (SOE) procedur firom September 1990 until February 1991. However, once received, the audits indcated tha procedures ad control were geneally adequat. The late audit report did point out ta financial collapse of a Governme owned Developmet Bank, whee a specia account had ben opened a May 1987 to fcltate projdct execution, resulted in frozen deposits esmated at CFAP 118 millin equivalnt wih no immediate prospect of reovery. At the beginning of the Project, the Goverment wa unwilling to grant I ta-free status. Laer, however, the Govenment revised its posion and confrred ta-fr status on the Project whh necessited some revisions in the proportions of the work financed by IDA. J. 49. Rlaio between IDA and the Borrowr w geneorly lose and cooperative, although twy were srned by the sudden reduction in the IDA's allocation fot te Projet (pare 46). A seri upst In the raionhip occurd over the Issu of the Zdr-Agadz road on which donor hiading agreem had been signed and the Govemen was about to stat work, when IDA questioned its economic jusification. While th Assocation was obviousy right in ralsing the , its ming could not have been worse. Th Govemens prestg was on the line over this rgion projoct, to which It was heavily ommitted boti dometcaly and abroad. 50. Despite a major effort Involving top Bank and Govement officials, IDA was not able to persuade the Govenmen to revise its poson. It would appea t IDA was most belated in raidsg the issue at a dme when i was almost imposle fr the Gov _ to gracuy wihdraw. IDA's failure to take up this mat at an earlIer stae when It would have beenmuch easier to itvene, must be noted as a blunder, as was its doggd pursuit of the issue when k wa obvioudy a lost camus. Incentaly, the Associaton seemed to ignore the advice of its Resident Mision which rpeatodly tried to persuade m gemnt to sofiten its position on the ismsU. 12. K. _'S 51. Judging from - fiies, the performmce of the severa consltat Involved In design a supervision of the road works, and the TA to RMU and the CPTP, and in the stdies was fully sisfactory. The contr rs for the road works and the building of the CPTP also perfomed satisfctoiy. L. ftWjec DocumenWon 52. The SAR adequaely descibed the project. The Credit Agreement was amen to povide for the addional road works (par 22), and to establish a special acount for the Project to allow tmely finaning of project actes which had been delayed, given the Goverme's fiancial coontrans. The correspondence files contain a mumber of papers which have been misfiled. Some supervsion reports, coveing two or more prwje, do nOt always make it clear which projects ae being discssed. More. use of project names and numbers in aide-mEmoires, leters and telexes would reduce ths problem. PART H. PROJECr REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S IVE 53. The Fourth Highway Project was officially concluded between the Republic of Niger and the Intnatonal Deveopment Association (IDA) on October 1, 1983. t was closed on June 30, 1991 later an dpected. 54. As most of tie scheduled actions could be exeued at costs lower dm foecast, due i pardtdar to the appreciation of the US Dollar agais the local currey, a decidson was made to use the credi baac to cater to prort needs and as a result the credi closing dte had to be postponed. 55. The projec focused prmarly on: - Peroic w_ of the national network, - optmizatin of road - training of mag l Staff, - Instutional devopment. The project contest have bees jointy approved by the Govermen of Niger and IDA under tms stipuoad in the Cd ie. 56. Red h Iesm, not only did IDA provide f ing but incentives also, hdeping local Authorities in chae of the road network to select a priority progm. Above all, IDA's most positive contibudon was to raise awareness by thod Autoie o£ - the need to gie priority to road mainta (s ) ove road investments for now constrcton at lesser eonomic returns; - tiorn of optim road network mangme to make th most of sometimes scarce resources allocated to the highway sub-sector. 13 S7. Th establisment of the Bureun de Gestion Routies (BGR) and of the Centre de Perfectionnmenlt de; Trva Publics (CP) Is a conete manifestation of this action. S8. Throghoutroject ImplementatDon, DA ensured good functionlng of the two institutions, nowtably by fidding missions at regular itvs which comprised the multi-disciplinary eaptse required. 59. Nlgerien Authorities had wanted a project addesing their main concerns: seection of economically justified investment, and streamliing of road spendinL. 60. All the mateial support needed to successfully cary out project opeations were provided by the ministry in charge of roads. The projec's succe is the result of the expressed commitment and the interest raised dur implemen Promotion of small conractors sdll reluctat to get involved in the road sub-sector was initiated, producing results for which follow up is needed. 61. AccompayIng measu were taken by the Republic of Niger to strengthen its finana and insttional capabilities, especially road user charges (axation of petroleum products was increased, and a larger pordon of proceeds from is stabilization component was alloced to road budges). 62. Shortom were noted in conection with insufficiet participation of local level to concepton and execo of work: ta would have helped local managers o better percevhe utility of planned acto and to collaborate more ac y so their mplm io Pesources allocated to the operatiog budget of local si ae very small and te are too few coordiaton metingp (seldom more than once a yea). IDA ptojects could inlude fimding to allow local mangers to meet more frequedy, th ia the cohesion of the nadona road Adminsta toward abettr integrationof sub-projects and more efficent follow up of heir i mntti 63. Tre, upgrdin works on the part of the priority nwrk allowed for important bonefis in tums of reduced vehicle opeang cos. Nevertheless, dir positive Impas of these invees on the small conat industry are ot very sigificant despite the declated objecdve to seek it prmoton under th project. AU in all, the road small structr constct progrm which had not been envisaged at apprs and was financed out of to unued credit balanc, conotibuted by itself to his objecdve. f mig have been a better Idea to tab m ues at projec nception stae to overcome coradictions of IDA willing to support the small conrcig Industry and the far too restictive procemet pviions of the Development Credt Agreement. 64. ft sbould be noted dtat the Nigerien tpris did not size the oppor s offered by the legislation and the Dvelpment CreditVemet 65. Future proJects should be conceived on reaistic premises so that all might be adhrd t in line with a blueprit whe the soco-economic envirnme of the cotry ar takn i cosderation. 66. Anther questionable apect i the grantiS of specialtakt to BG3 and CPTP. Those bnstuton enjoyed the status of 'Projet d'Appui lnsdonel bearn various advt whikh coud not be stined beyond the duration of reated IDA projects. Two es icoeIe I were feit, mostly in the cas of 1B01 a somewha diffIcult iteation of er activies at local led a others resented not being given tie ame priveg, and the uneasie that folowed completion of the IDA project when the Gorment budget caint made k tposible o matain th salay cntives 14 asodat wih teitr fnctions. Furthemore, the ory way to bh opeating ansd msat a covered under the conac with dhe consultant In charge of developing BG rvealed its shotminp quickly after compledon of till cotract. Ihe issue of BOR fiaial ort need should have been raised from the star. so that durable soludons could be found egafi the partclar constaiced by BGR in the area of supplies, tavel c , and fiancial Inentives rewrding special tenical sil. 67. Both at preparation and implmentaton stag, the rapport betwee the Goveme and D3DA has been permanent, fit, and efecd ve. Frequnt supevision missions by the Bank um in charge of the project allowed for a neary prfect and tdmely execution of acdtons tha ad been oriinaly included In the Developm Credt Agreement. 15 #ART. srATISTCAL ORmANoN A. Relatd Bank I-anm and Creits Year.o oaICfdk TWo -- ram App 1. creft 55441 Eneerlag and construcdon 196 Comd lMm Fast Highway Prect of about 60 km of aeeot. roads usrving g.udn 2. Credit 1N Prepar unde a Bak 1968 Compled HiWay Maimenance Proec mad in 1965 for a rd -Ainteac udy. Project prvidd for a phasod reorgnntioa of do mainumtenanvico,8 uining _ _ _ _ _ ndsuis____ _ __ _ 3. C dit 231- Conruction of 140 km 1971 Comsted Mm Second Higway Pojec prpard unde dh abo - aNd p _einbnet dlec fo 170 bm 4. Credit 612-Ni Connation of th 1976 Complced Mm. Thd Highay Projec mintemn prVa Intae unde Cr& 12844 sad S. Credit 8S6-N Coiphed of .in _un MhmPFa Peedw Road Proe _ t 19i6 of feeder made 16 Dae D0t Date _____ _____ _____ ____Planned Reyhgdt hernAt" Pre4d---usticn 12M Idemtkadon _ 10/79, SW*e ~~~~~~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 10/80 ___, _ sd 10 41SI 1olSI 10lSi PWAppmW NB_ 4/8Z, 283, 3/83 Crf N_gdd Boae Appal 1/82 7/82 6/21/ C t S_ar _H__ 9/01__ Credt =eu __ _ _2S Creda CD I 10/89 10/30090' 6,30 Prject Cm _p 1 1288 691 Source: Poect o hiBf ddotd S_unbe3,19S0 Sourc: Poject Bhdf daed July 6, 1981 Soure: Conepndeefie Surco: Davdopmat Cred A entJ _ of Septmbe 1, 1983 Source: Ltr to MWTU daed Jon 13, 1989 BW1[ I 1s I II1 I Ig 1I1X '[{}~~. frJ1 1:1 -~ -b LlLL. [t~ - - 1 1 -1 -1EW 0g -- s~~~~~~~. 1- tt' - - @ w l iC p stl I: - if - - ----- -- 18 (in SDRs) Original Actual Ailndm _ _ _b 1) Civil works for Part A 13,910,000 16,998,078 of the Project _______ _________ 2) Civii works for Part 790,000 437,330 C.1 of the Project a __ 3) Equipment, irmiture, 83S,000 349,483 vehicles and spare parts for Pars B.2, C.2 and C.3 of the Project_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4) Consultants' serices 1,300;V-0 1,293,977 Air supervision of civil works under Paru A ad C.1 of the Project 5) Consultant's services 2,780,000 2,670,902 for Pat B.1 and C.1 of the P roject_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 6) Unailocaed_ 2,285,000 0 7) Specia Fund ji - 150,230 TOTAL ___ _ Al Set up unde an d to the Credit Ageemet datd wJan , 1987 (s Par 52). 19 D. Emi= C (in USS million) Appaa eatmW at Ac b/ -________ _ Loal and tax Foeign Total Lo nd tax Forei Total Road __ 3609 4842.00 8451 2179.20 7608.89 9788.08 Road Manamnt Unit 162 180.00 342 S6.21 318.50 374.70 Ts ia z _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .._ _ _ _ _ .... _, ____________________. 326 328 654 177.69 177.69 355.39 Olker cto 750 718 146 87.87 1169.59 1257.46 TOTAL 4847 6068 1091S 2500.97 9274.67 1177S.64 ,,Total uioect ants 1U d____________ Road__________________ 10.6 14.2 24.9 5.42 19.21 24.63 Road MaametUnit 0.S OS 1.0 0.13 0.7S 0.88 -~~~~ -_ Comatnacio 1.0 1.0 1.9 0.42 0.42 .84 Olheractlodm 2.2 2.1 4.3 0.46 3.48 3.94 TOT3L 14.3 17.8 32.1 6.43 23.8S 30.29 __ __s~ - - -_ At Scum SAR, pag 20. kL Summ Erntatd Youn - Audt Pat hr fised year e g Deember31, 1990. 91 Dola amous ar dervd fom CFAF values, un an m* s rawe of US$1 - CFAF 340, hr appm esdina USS1 - CPAP 389. for acal dat t expchanrt is a weihted avc based on th hedul of a CFAF amoun disbed ovr dho perod. The bradon of cos in US doll is an approximaon based an xchaprat, of USS1 -CFAF 424 for ad ca servis complted bore Jun 1987 oad USS1 -CPA? 296 aer June 1987. 20 E. W Section 1 Deciptiof Covennt Sau 3.05 (d) 1 Prpar a p ess copledon met _ _ _ _ _ _ te~~poR _ __ 3.07 (a) Appoint qualified loca met cou1urpa to the pevision I _ ~~~~~~ondwtanlt Ob) Make suitable office spaces met avalable for th RMU 3.08 Transfe equipment to the mat CFPT 3.10 Appoint fu-ti1m Instt to met the CPTP 4.01 (a) Audit the proje accou eac met ualy (see pam 48) fiscad yea 4.02 (b) Maim local Payments widlin 90 payments sometimes delayed days (see pam 48) 4.04 Caus he priory road genraly met to" be dkuy 4.05 (a) Maitain lv of road even maet from road-user cges at least sp totod cost of road (b) Allocate no& less than CFAF met 1.7 milon for FY 1983/84 4.06 Funish to DA itsn ual met _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ hig way Investmen progra _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4.07 Coo dnsions and ade ?? loads of vehces ApbSIN September 24, 1991 21 F. g (i? Sta hi s by cCycle in Stf WS son of e c _____ _ I Through Appraisal 0.0 0.0 70.1 Apprasa to Board 0.0 0.0 3.1 Supervision 2.0 2.0 41.4 Other 12.0 8.0 0.2 TOTAL 14.0 10.0 114.8 Source: Summary of CAM led operations (appras data are incomplet). AFSIN Septmbr 24, 1991 22 (iiD MiSsignData Stage of MouthiYea No. of Days in Spelion Perfonmance Dates of Project Cycle _ Perons Fidd Rqestd RaSing Sus Reot Identification I12M 2 5 HE, IEC - 01/03/78 dentification 2 10/79 1 7 HE - n.s. b/ Idficton 3 05/80 2 5 HE, EC - 0620/80 PrePulton 10=80 1 3 HE - 10123/80 Pte-AppaisaI 05/81 I 5 HE - 06/12/81 Appaa10/81 2 12 HE, EC - 12J01181g Pos-Apprial 1 082 1 4 HE - na.. At Pos- aisal 2 02/83 2 6 HE, EC - n.a. Post-Apaisal3 03/J3 1 5 ED - 031091/83 I Supervson 1 l1083 2 2 2 HE 1,2 01/31/84 SuprvIsion 2 1-31/4 2 2 , PA 1,2 04/1184 SupervioWn 3 0914 4 9 HE, PA, ME, BC 1,2 12/07/84 Supevision 4 03/85 2 4 HE, BC 1,2 05/10/8l Superision S 05/8$ 3 1 HE, 1C, M 1,2,1,1,1 06(285 Sa_viuon6 09/85 2 11 HE, EC 1,1,1,1,1 1107/8 Supeviion 7 02/O6 4 4 HE, EC, M P5 111,1,1, 04/1186 Supevision 8 /86 4 11 HE, IC, ME, FA 1,l,1,l02,01/87 Supevision 9 10/87 2 3 BC, PA 1,1,1,1,1 11/03/87 Supeiion 10 12187 2 11 HE. PA _ 1,1,1,11 01/11/88 Supevision 11 05/88 2 5 HO, PA 1,1,1,1,1 06/14J88 Supevision 12 04/ 2 6 HE, PA 1,1,2,2,1 05/05189 Suevision 13 12m9 1 2 PA 1,1,111 01/09/90 Sups ioa 14 07J90 2 7 PA, CIS 1,1,2,1,1 /30/90 a/ EN = Engime BC - Economist ME - Mecania inee PA - Fancial Analyst HE - Higway Engner BO -Eduato Offie SI Paveme Sytem Specaist CaI - Conuction Induty pit bt WM ion TOR dated Oober 1, 1979 @/ Iossue aper d/ F4pind are listd in tee to DTP dated June 6, 192 d/ TUis epot was beed as a spevision visi but it concened final prparaon wonk APSN, Septmber 24, 1991 G. Ecomlic Revaluation of Payed Road Main RN IW RN 29 R1429 RN IE RNI RIB RIE 8.ceast Ni_ga)v-T lmtDdMy Tnnwm.-Dfs lAbuss-Taaua NY+10, NY+S0 Km bah _ D _goedaM Sind NmAI PX 042 0"1.1 31.-116 tO-S0 210-220 270-320 320-41< cmatsda 193 197 197s 1? ,n77 1974 1974 1.400 61 31.2 84.8 40 10 So 94 TOWl 460 290 290 680 360 305 367 %TIU& 17 23 23 20 30 31 16 T au.Ih 3.5 is 4 3.5 4 5.5 Si TOal 529 507 340 781 422 3SW 45S %1 Tab 17 23 23 20 30 31 16 I1.ffiap-b 3,5 IS 4 3.S 4 5.5 S.5 TOW 617 1020 412 928 S13 494 S9S %Tmak 17 23 23 20 30 31 16 f TeOM pow 3.1 5.1 5.1 4.1 5.1 5.1 S.l Nat...of Web huaghrhg Ramahalo Rmaalqt Raarclq Da.thd CPAP NIio.Ib 4.8 79 7.9 S 5 13.1 19.3 Toll (CPAP 20l* 334.35 422.13 1145.12 408.67 10136 937.33 23S.15 Da2 otem s 1984 194 1984 1 19 198M4 1984 191 Pedodkkyotfml_e 7 7 7 4 4 5 7 Do*atma ao pedodih umalomnoo wab in Wuln saga 1991 1991 1992 1988 3988 1991 1G91 CPAPaalHoarm !S 14 14 I 8 24 28 TOtl CPAF oMI 930 436,8 11872 320 sO 1200 2632 Ecoowmic Revluation RN IW RN 29 RN 29 RN IE RN 1E RN RN e Seethe Niamy-Tfllabey Teun4ua4Dabm Dabw-T&bl NY+10; NY+SO Kom Maim& Dogoodmcb Bhtu WKoami AM hPssengs S.S 62.2 S73 49.7 54.2 62.2 61.3 Pick up - buses 96.4 106.9 101.7 9S.6 99.2 106. 104.8 LUght buckb 180.7 209.9 198.8 178.1 190.9 210.0 208.0 Medum lurk 252.2 289.8 276.4 248.S 265.2 20.0 287.3 Semi tilum 367.4 431.1 406.7 361.2 389.3 431.0 427.0 P _commem 473M.3 49.562.9 47.61SS.9 4SSIS2.8 48.31S7.5 49.4161.A* 49.0159.3 Pick ups - bum 93.71101.7 9S.S/106.1 93.91100.6 91.9199.0 94.5/101.9 9S.4/10S.0 9.2103.3 Lu tabuc 170.61198 177.611.5 171.195.4 163.71186.9 173.81199.4 t77.2 .6 176.30.6 Medim bub 239.3275.4 248.11292.0 240.4/271.0 230.3259.7 243.4/6.2 247.7/28.2 2465/281.6 Sami IPai 346.61406.7 360.61434.7 348.3399.2 332.9/80.0 33.4.0 66 3600428.3 3S8.01417.3 Pa sawom S 150.4.7 62.2174.7 57.3n4.7 49.7n4.7 54.2174.7 62.2t74.7 61.3174.7 Pick up - buses 96.41116.6 105.51116.6 101.7/116.6 95.61116.3 99.V116.6 IO51116h 104.8/I16.6 LIg bucs 180.7237.2 209.9/2372 19.U237.2 178.1236.1 190.9/237.2 210.01237.2 208.0/237.2 Mbe iumb 252.2M3A.6 289.8/325.6 275.4/32.6 248S3/24.7 266.V325.6 290.0f325.6 27.3325.6 S Semi issilmm 367.41489.6 431.11489.6 406.7/489.6 361.2/488.7 389.3/489.6 431.S489.6 427.W/489.6 4 1 _OUondo Of ntm 71.6% 1 66.2% 34.7% 60.8% 50.6% 35.2% 22.1% 1) AppIta 2_ _ _ _ __atp __momic ___vnmic Road e c. Leut& () Com (CPA? a) Il Road s!eth Law& (a) Cost (CyA m) an _ _ Y-_i _wy 62 304 62% NSm.y-Tlllabecy 62 334.35 71.6% Tm a-TahToua 1IS 927 30% Tacau-Dahoo 31.2 422.13 66.2% Nh___M_____so 252 96% Dabnou-Tahous 84.8 1145.12 34.7% D_ __________o so 655 36% Niamoy-Komu LS( 40 408.67 60.8% _ _N_i______ _ __ _ 94_ 1816 49% KXwoMaia (P004/7) 10 101-3M 50.6% Dogandoutchi sction (PKSO47) SO 937.33 35.2% ___________ _______ _________ _ ______ Bim -NlConi 94 2344.1S 22.1% All seioas374 3954 43% ANl sectioso 372 S693.11 32.3%