Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00005547 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT D042-ZR ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR36.9 MILLION (US$52 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE Democratic Republic of Congo FOR A Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project June 15, 2022 Transport Global Practice Africa East Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective {Apr 28, 2021}) Currency Unit = Congolese Franc (FC) FC 1,991= US$1 US$ 1.434 = SDR 1 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Jean-Christophe Carret Regional Director: Ashish Khanna Practice Manager: Almud Weitz Task Team Leader(s): Tojoarofenitra Ramanankirahina, Bertram Boie ICR Main Contributor: Ibrahim Kabore ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AAC Autorité de l’Aviation Civile - Civil Aviation Authority AF Additional Financing BCA Benefit-Cost Analysis CAS Country Assistance Strategy CEPTM Cellule d’Exécution du Projet de Transport Multimodal - Multimodal Transport Project Implementation Unit CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment DRC The Democratic Republic of Congo ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan FM Financial Management GBV Gender-Based Violence GDP Gross Domestic Product GRS Grievance Redress Service IATA International Air Transport Association ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IDA International Development Association IFR Interim Financial Report IPF Investment Project Financing M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MONUSCO United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC MOT Ministry of Transport MTP Multimodal Transport Project (supported by the World Bank) MTR Midterm Review NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPV Net Present Value OHADA Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires - Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa OVG Observatoire Volcanologique de Goma - Goma Volcanic Observatory PAD Project Appraisal Document PAP Project-Affected Person PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit RAP Resettlement Action Plan RF Result Framework RESA Runway End Safety Area RVA Régie des Voies Aériennes - Airport Authority RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SARP International Standards and Recommended Practices SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic SEA/SH Sexual Exploitation and Abuse/Sexual Harassment SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SNEL Société Nationale d’Electricité - National Electricity Company TA Technical Assistance ToR Terms of Reference UN United Nations UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service WB World Bank TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 6 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................6 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) .....................................10 II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 12 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................12 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ......................................................................................12 C. EFFICIENCY ...........................................................................................................................19 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ....................................................................22 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)............................................................................23 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME. ............................... 24 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ...................................................................................24 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................................25 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 28 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................28 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE .....................................................29 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ...........................................................................................................31 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .......................................................................................32 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 32 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 34 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 40 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 43 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 44 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 47 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ..................................................................... 48 ANNEX 7. AIRPORT CERTIFICATION ACTIVITIES FINANCED BY THE BANK IN DRC ................... 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name P153085 DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project Country Financing Instrument Congo, Democratic Republic of Investment Project Financing Original EA Category Revised EA Category Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B) Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Democratic Republic of Congo, represented by the Ministry of Transport, Régie des Voies Aériennes (RVA) Ministry of Finance Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO The Project Development Objective is to improve the safety, security, and operations of Goma International Airport. Page 1 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing 52,000,000 51,822,743 50,974,449 IDA-D0420 1,800,000 1,775,594 1,775,594 TF-A1623 Total 53,800,000 53,598,337 52,750,043 Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0 Borrower/Recipient 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 Total Project Cost 53,800,000 53,598,337 52,750,043 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 13-Mar-2015 30-Sep-2015 19-Nov-2018 31-Dec-2020 30-Sep-2021 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 04-Jun-2020 40.09 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Implementation Schedule 17-Dec-2020 46.15 Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Implementation Schedule 23-Dec-2020 46.29 KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Satisfactory Satisfactory Modest Page 2 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 30-Jun-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0 02 03-Jun-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.29 03 03-Feb-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.48 04 15-Oct-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.71 05 09-May-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 14.30 06 29-Jan-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 15.49 07 18-Apr-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 18.36 08 25-Oct-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 24.35 09 01-May-2020 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 38.17 10 20-Jan-2021 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.20 11 28-Jun-2021 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 50.37 SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Transportation 100 Aviation 87 Other Transportation 13 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Economic Policy 32 Trade 32 Trade Facilitation 32 Page 3 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Private Sector Development 11 Jobs 11 Job Creation 11 Finance 1 Finance for Development 1 Disaster Risk Finance 1 Social Development and Protection 34 Fragility, Conflict and Violence 34 Conflict Prevention 17 Post-conflict reconstruction 17 Urban and Rural Development 25 Urban Development 11 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 11 Rural Development 11 Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 11 Disaster Risk Management 3 Disaster Response and Recovery 1 Disaster Risk Reduction 1 Disaster Preparedness 1 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye Jean-Christophe Carret Director: Ashish Khanna Practice Manager: Almud Weitz Tojoarofenitra Task Team Leader(s): Mohammed Dalil Essakali Ramanankirahina, Bertram Boie ICR Contributing Author: Ibrahim Kabore Page 4 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Page 5 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Context 1. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa with a land surface area of 2.3 million square km and shares borders with nine countries. The country is endowed with rich natural resources—mineral deposits, forests, water, and arable land—a strategic location, and a young population. At the time of appraisal in 2015, despite this wealth, DRC remained one of the poorest countries in the world with a gross national Income per capita at about US$400. At that time, more than 63.7 percent of the population lived below the US$1.25 per day poverty line, and 14 percent of the poor in Sub-Saharan Africa lived in DRC. All DRC’s human development indicators were low, and the United Nations Human Development Index ranked DRC 186th among 187 countries. DRC was emerging from more than four decades of conflicts and mismanagement that have devastated the economy and the people. 2. About a decade before project appraisal, DRC had been at peace everywhere except in some areas in the Eastern provinces. While most of the country has returned to peace since the end of the war1 in 2002, Eastern DRC remained unstable. The crisis involving the M23 2 armed group with the invasion 3 of Goma, the capital city of North Kivu on DRC’s eastern border with Rwanda, in November 2012 for eleven days had plunged the Eastern region into another cycle of violence. Decades of conflict had led to the near collapse of state authority and services in Eastern DRC, allowing armed groups and criminal elements to operate with impunity. The ensuing absence of government, lawlessness, and lack of infrastructure had caused a breakdown in the social contract and reinforced the isolation of many parts of the Eastern provinces, creating a haven for armed groups to operate and holding back the economic and social development for long term stability of DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole. The geographic isolation of the landlocked Eastern DRC and the virtual collapse of transport infrastructure during decades of conflict was posing a significant risk to the peace consolidation efforts. 3. Eastern DRC’s main international gateway – Goma International Airport – was critical to addressing the geographic isolation of that region, but it was in dire condition. The most significant damage of the airport’s key infrastructure (sole runway and taxiway) had resulted from the volcanic eruption in 2002 of Mount Nyiragongo. The lava flow from the nearby volcano buried 1,150 meters, which represents more than one third of the 3,000- meter runway, and isolated the terminal and apron. The short remaining section of the runway rendered it operational only for small or very short takeoff landing type aircraft. Humanitarian aid flows, UN operations, passenger and cargo transport had been constrained by the limited capacity of the damaged airport and the non- compliance of the airport with basic safety and security standards. With the support from the German Government, lava had been removed on about 700 meters of the Goma International Airport runway, and 500 meters of the damaged runway had been reconstructed. Furthermore, DRC Government funds were also used to 1 The Second Congo War began in the DRC in August 1998, little more than a year after the First Congo War. The war officially ended in July 2003. Although a peace agreement was signed in 2002, violence has continued in many regions of the country, especially in the east. 2 In April 2012, former National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) soldiers mutinied against the DRC government. Mutineers formed a rebel group called the March 23 Movement (M23). 3 The M23 rebellion was an armed conflict in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC), that occurred between the March 23 Movement and government forces. On 20 November 2012, M23 rebels took control of Goma. In early December, the M23 agreed to withdraw from Goma on their own and left the city. Page 6 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) reconstruct 165 meters and to strengthen the close to 2,000 meters which were not damaged. These various interventions delivered a reconstructed runway with a length of 2,665 meters. 4. The transport sector in DRC had suffered from the decades of conflict, poor management, neglect, and underinvestment. The transport network was suffering from major connectivity gaps and bottlenecks. Interregional transportation was a major challenge in DRC due to the country’s vast landmass, low population density and poor condition of the existing road network. Connecting DRC’s various region was impossible without a multimodal approach covering waterways, roads, railways, and air transport. DRC had 54 airports, including five classified as international airports, but all of them were poorly maintained. The Ministry of Transport oversaw air transport with the regulation managed by the Civil Aviation Authority (AAC), the airports and air traffic were managed by the National Airways Management Agency (RVA). 5. The project was well aligned with the FY2013-FY2016 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the Government’s development strategy in the Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-2) (2011-2015). Indeed, the fourth objective of the CAS was to address the development deficits contributing to fragility and conflicts in DRC's Eastern provinces. The World Bank engaged by supporting the fourth strategic objective through an economic empowerment program by increasing economic opportunities in Eastern DRC and by addressing some of the drivers of conflicts. The focus on conflict and fragility in Eastern DRC was fully supported by the World Bank Regional Strategy for supporting peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region. 6. The project was designed and prepared as an emergency project and was approved to proceed under paragraph 12 of OP. 10.00 as per World Bank’s guidelines given the situation of conflict and the classification of DRC as a fragile state in the 2012 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Theory of Change (Results Chain) 7. The project was designed with the objective to improve the safety, security, and operations of Goma International Airport. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) did not include a project-specific Theory of Change. However, the PAD did set out certain core components and indicators, and as such a Theory of Change was (re-)constructed for the purpose of this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR). 8. The Theory of Change presented in Figure 1 illustrates how the project’s activities and their outputs aimed at achieving the expected project development objective (PDO). The project’s Theory of Change is underpinned by the assumptions that: (i) the capacity building of the key stakeholders combined with the rehabilitation and improvement of airport Infrastructure via the rehabilitation of the existing runway, the rehabilitation and extension of the existing apron, the construction of the airport’s security fence and the rehabilitation of the airport’s electrical systems, and the rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal will enable the airport to meet national and international safety and security standards and will improve operations at Goma International Airport; (ii) the volcanic activities in the area will remain under control; and (iii) the security situation in the North Kivu will not escalate and political and governance situation will be stable in Eastern DRC. Through activities aimed at (i) improving the capacity of the runway infrastructure at Goma International Airport to accommodate the originally designated type of aircraft, (ii) bringing the airport in compliance with international Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), the project will help improve the safety, security, and operations of Goma International Airport. Page 7 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Figure 1: Theory of Change COMPONENTS ACTIVITIES OUTPUTS SHORT TERMS OUTCOME PDO/ OUTCOMES LONG TERM IMPACT • Rehabilitation and extension of • 335 meters of runway reconstructed to Goma Airport meets the runway restore the runway’s total length to international safety and • Rehabilitation and extension of 3000m security standards the existing apron • The 220mx80m existing apron • Rehabilitation of the airport’s rehabilitated and extended to electrical system 200mx130m Improved • Construction of the Eastern and • airport’s electrical distribution network Infrastructure of the airport safety and Western side of the airport rehabilitated are restored as prior to the security: security fence • the Eastern and Western side of the volcanic eruption 1 Regulatory • Setting up of a new mobile airport security fence covering 7500m control tower of the 9600m airport constructed and certification of Improved Socio Component A: Airport Infrastructure • Construction of an urban the internal security road rehabilitated safety and Economic Investment drainage linking the airport and • A new control tower is supplied and security at Development of the city drainage system installed The runway infrastructure Goma Airport Eastern DRC • Rehabilitation of the existing • 2,592 square meter passenger terminal is capable to accommodate particularly the passenger terminal rehabilitated the original design aircraft province of North • Laying out of a cargo area • A cargo shed 50mx30m laid out Kivu by • Support to airport rescue and • The airport rescue and firefighting firefighting services services provided with necessary tools, reconnecting this • Supply and installation of parts, supplies, vehicles as well as Improved region long equipment to upgrade air training for fire and rescue personal operations at isolated from the navigation aids • air navigation aids upgraded, and Annual aeronautical rest of the the Goma equipment supplied and installed revenues of Goma International country International Airport improved Airport: Capacity of the runway infrastructure • Volcano risks is monitored, at Goma • Equipment of Goma Volcanic • OVG is equipped, its staff is trained, and and the preparedness of International Observatory (OVG) technical assistance is provided to monitor the airport and Component B: • Training of OVG’s staff and the volcano Airport to surrounding communities Capacity Building and Technical Assistance (TA) to • a priority airport rehabilitation program is accommodate is strengthened Project monitor the volcano prepared the original Implementation • Preparation of a priority airport • A study of the feasibility of labor-intensive design aircraft Support rehabilitation program activities is carried out, operational • the economic and social • TA to strengthen the economic procedures are developed, and fabric of the communities and social fabric of the partnerships and collaboration are sought around the airport are communities around the airport strengthened Assumptions: 1: Institutional strengthening activities aimed at ensuring the necessary capacity within the Civil Aviation Authority (AAC) and the Airports Authority (RVA) to undertake the certification process financed under the DRC Multimodal Transport project were completed and a detailed assessment of the airport is done by AAC at the end of the project Page 8 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Project Development Objectives (PDO) 9. The development objective of this project, as stated in the PAD and the Financing Agreement, was to improve the safety, security, and operations of Goma International Airport. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 10. The PDO remained the same throughout the project, but the outcome indicators were changed with the project restructuring. At appraisal, the PDO was measured by two indicators: i) regulatory certification of safety and security at Goma International Airport; and ii) capacity of the runway infrastructure at Goma International Airport to accommodate the original design aircraft. PDO indicator 1 was revised and replaced by “conformity of the improved infrastructure at Goma International Airport with aeronautical regulations”. Please refer to annex 1 (Results Framework) for more details on outcomes and indicators. Components 11. The project was organized into two components: • Component A: Airport Infrastructure Investments • Component B: Capacity Building and Project Implementation Support 12. The cost of the project was estimated to be US$52 million equivalent. Table 1 below presents the original project components 4: Table 1: Project Components and Description Amount % of total Component Description allocated at costs appraisal Investments necessary to urgently enable the airport to meet international safety and security standards, and to bring its capacity back to the level prior to the volcanic eruption. The component includes: A1. Rehabilitation of the Existing runway A2. Rehabilitation and extension of existing apron A3. Rehabilitation of the airport’s electrical systems Component A: A4. Supply and installation of a new mobile control tower Airport A5. Supply and installation of equipment to upgrade air US$40 76.92 Infrastructure navigation aids million Investments A6. Construction of the airport’s security fence and rehabilitation of the internal service road A.7. support to airport rescue and firefighting services A.8. Rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal A.9. Laying-out of a cargo area A.10. Implementation of the mitigation measures of the environmental and social impacts 4Some activities have been changed during the implementation (for example the mobile control tower has been replaced by a fixed control tower) and new activities have been added. See paragraph 16 for more details Page 9 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Amount % of total Component Description allocated at costs appraisal Component B: To support the institutional development of Goma International Capacity Airport, share lessons learned with other key airport in DRC, Building and mitigate the risks associated with the volcanic activities in the Project area, promote interventions to provide social dividends to Implementation surrounding communities in this conflict-affected area, and Support ensure proper project implementation US$6 11.54 B.1. Preparation of a priority airport rehabilitation program million B.2. Monitoring of volcano risks and strengthening the preparedness of the airport and surrounding communities B.3. Technical assistance to strengthen the economic and social fabric of the communities around the airport B.4 Project implementation support US$6 Contingencies 11.54 million US$52 TOTAL 100 million B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 13. There were no changes to the project’s development objective and the PDO remained the same throughout implementation. The project underwent a level-2 restructuring on December 17, 2020, to extend the project closing date by 9 months, from December 31,2020 to September 30, 2021, and to change indicators in the result framework. Revised PDO Indicators 14. The PDO indicator on airport certification was revised during restructuring since the project did not finance any certification activities. Some airport certification activities were financed by another IDA project (P092537 DRC Transport Multimodal Project) and so its results could not be attributed to this project. The PDO indicator on improving the airport’s safety and security at approval was: “Regulatory certification of safety and security at Goma International Airport”, replaced by “Conformity of the improved infrastructure at Goma International Airport with aeronautical regulations. (Yes/No)” Revised Components 15. There were no changes to the projects’ components which remained the same throughout the project. Other Changes 16. Throughout the implementation, some activities were modified and/or new activities were added to the project without a restructuring. The main changes were: • Adding of new civil works for drainage water system outside the airport: The evacuation of drainage water from the airport to Lake Kivu had been planned by the Government through a stormwater collector line of about 1,7 km length. However, only 400 meters had been built with Government financing and no further Government funds were available at the time to complete the stormwater collector. As water coming from the airport was considered by the surrounding community to be the Page 10 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) cause of flooding in the neighborhoods bordering the airport, the World Bank agreed to take over the resolution of the flooding problems, and it was decided that the project would fund the remaining works on the collector which were expected to cost about US$3 million. Consequently, a new intermediate result indicator linked to the urban drainage was introduced. This urban drainage outside the airport perimeter was not part of the initial project design but has been added during implementation to mitigate the flooding issue in and around the airport. • Changing the type of air traffic tower: The project included US$2 million for the supply and installation of a mobile air traffic control tower. During project preparation, a mobile tower was included because the construction and equipment of a permanent control tower might not have been possible in less than 2 to 3 years, which was at the time not considered compatible with the urgency of bringing the airport in compliance with international safety and security standards. However, at the early stage of project implementation, it was determined that a permanent airport tower was more suitable for the long term needs of the airport and it could be constructed at a similar price following a standardized design which was available at this time. The necessary design and engineering work for the new tower was included into the contract for the runway re-design. The permanent air traffic tower ended up costing US$3.5 million which was US$1.5 million higher than the planned budget for the mobile tower. Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 17. The revision of PDO indicator is mainly due to the fact that the original indicator could not be achieved within the project since the project did not finance any certification activities so there were no activities in the project for airport certification. This change had no impact on the PDO. 18. The addition of new activities not planned in the PAD was mainly necessary to (i) improve the socio-economic benefits of the project for the surrounding community, and to (ii) mitigate the impact of the project towards the surrounding community (i.e., reduce flooding in the neighborhoods near the airport due to water coming from the airport and the upcoming watershed). These changes had an impact on the project implementation but not a significant impact on the PDO. Indeed, the cost of the new activities and the cost overrun of planned activities led to a shortage in funding for other key activities that had to be dropped due to unavailability of funds. These dropped activities include the supply and installation of equipment to upgrade air navigation aids (A5), the rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal (A8), and the laying out of a cargo area (A9), all of which could have contributed to improve the safety and security at Goma International Airport. Suggestions for an additional financing by the team to cover these activities (in an amount of US$10-20 million) were not approved, as these will be included in the new DRC Transport and Connectivity Support Project (P161877, FY22 approval). The new activities added to the project contributed to improve the safety of the airport, to improve the sustainability of the investments,and to provide social dividend to the local communities around the airport. As the project could not finance any airport terminal activities, the intermediate result indicator on airport terminal rehabilitation was adjusted to reflect the existing activities. Page 11 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs 19. The PDO is well aligned with the CAS FY13-FY16 program that focuses on four strategic objectives: (i) increase the effectiveness of the state at the center and at decentralized levels and improve good governance while strengthening the development impact of World Bank operations; (ii) boost the competitiveness of the economy by accelerating private-sector-led growth that will create jobs; (iii) improve social service delivery to raise human development (HD) indicators, and (iv) address the development deficits contributing to fragility and conflicts in DRC's Eastern provinces. The project was relevant to objective (ii) under outcome 2.2: improved connectivity and access to transport infrastructure. 20. Improving or upgrading airports which have been highly affected by conflicts like Goma International Airport, continues to be highly relevant for achieving the objectives of the new DRC Country Partnership Framework (CPF) FY22-FY26 – as reflected in Focus Area 1: strengthen stabilization efforts for reduced risk of conflict and violence through the objective 1.2: Improve interconnectedness between and within communities and Objective 1.3: Strengthen regional integration and cross-border trade in the Great Lakes Region 5. By contributing to improving the safety and security at Goma International Airport, the project contributed to addressing development deficits contributing to fragility and conflicts in DRC's Eastern provinces, improving the connectivity between DRC’s Eastern provinces with the rest of the country, and strengthening regional integration between DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Assessment of Relevance of PDO and Rating 21. The PDO was relevant to the World Bank and country strategies throughout the project implementation and is still very relevant and aligned with the World Bank and borrower’s current strategies. The rating for relevance of PDO is thus deemed High. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 22. As stated above, the Project’s development objective was to improve the safety, security, and operations of Goma International Airport. The PDO has been split into two objectives: (a) to improve the safety and security of Goma International Airport and (b) to improve the operations of Goma International Airport. However, it should be noted that several activities and investments contributed to both safety and operations. A split rating was not considered because there were no changes to the PDO, no changes to the scope of the project, and changing PDO indicators through the restructuring did not lower or change the project’s ambitions. For the changes in the result framework, as stated in the ICR guidelines, a split rating is not mandatory since the purpose of changing indicators was to better reflect measures of the project’s achievements rather than raising or lowering ambitions. PDO (i): improve the safety and security of Goma International Airport 23. Safety and security of Goma International Airport have been improved through project investments and capacity building undertaken through the project. The most significant safety and security improvements are improving safety at the runway, securing the airport by enclosure, having a more safe and adequate air traffic control, securing the electricity supply, improving the drainage network inside the airport, improving the capacity of rescue and firefighting services, and improving the monitoring of volcano risks. 5 The Great Lakes region consists of riparian countries: Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, , Uganda. Page 12 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 24. Improving safety at the runway: According to aeronautical regulations and the Standards And Recommended Practices a Runway End Safety Area (RESA) 6 must be established when the runway code number is 3 or 4 7. The RESA must give sufficient length for incidents where aircraft overshoot or undershoot the runway. Two RESAs were constructed under the project, one at each end of the runway to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft, improve aircraft deceleration, and facilitate the movement of rescue and fire vehicles. Furthermore, before the project, the lava flowed at the end of the runway created an obstacle endangering safety operations. The project allowed the removing of lava rock in the northern end of the runway over an area 150 meters wide and 425 meters long contributing to have a safer runway. Figure 2: Runway After Removal of Lava and Rehabilitation 25. Having a more safe and adequate air traffic control: Before the project implementation, the existing control tower was too low, insufficiently equipped, and inadequate, not allowing safe and efficient air traffic control. With a low height of 6 meters, it did not allow for a full view of the aprons, taxiways, and runway thresholds. The height of the new control tower (25 meters) will allow controllers to have a better view and visibility of the entire airport and runway and improve data transmission via new equipment. At the project closing date of September 30, 2021, the tower was not yet fully completed, and the equipment was delivered but not installed. As of 30 November 2021, the new control tower is fully operational. Figure 3: The Old and New Airport Control Towers Former control tower (6m) New control tower (25m) 6 Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) are a formal means to limit the consequences when aeroplanes overrun the end of a runway during a landing or a rejected take off, or undershoot the intended landing runway. They are constructed to provide a cleared and graded area which is, as far as practicable, clear of all but frangible objects. It should have a surface which will enhance the deceleration of aircraft in the overrun case but should not be such as to hinder the movement of rescue and fire fighting vehicles or any other aspect of emergency response activity. 7 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards And Recommended Practices (SARPs) relating to runways are determined according to runway length using the standard Runway Code categories. Code 1 runways are less than 800 meters long, Code 2 runways are 800-1199 meters long, Code 3 runways are 1200-1799 meters long and Code 4 runways are 1800 meters or more in length. The current Requirement of RESA SARPs is that Code 3 and 4 runways have a RESA which extends a minimum of 90 meters beyond the runway strip and be a minimum of twice the width of the defined runway width. The additional Recommended Practice for these runway codes is that the RESA length is 240 meters or as near to this length as is practicable at a width equal to that of the graded strip. Page 13 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 26. Securing the airport by enclosure: The construction of the fence totaling 5,450 meters surrounding the airport ensures the protection of restricted areas and the runway strip. The fence made it possible to delimit the airport area and access is now controlled. The fences prevent access to the maneuvering area by unauthorized persons and/or animals which could present a danger to aircraft. Before the project, the fence was not closed or secured, which caused a security problem due to the presence of the local populations who regularly crossed the runway for their various needs, as well as the presence of agricultural activities inside airport grounds. After completion of the fence works, the number of people crossing the runway dropped from 2,000 people per day before the project to none. The number of complaints related to the theft of property in the compound has decreased from around 40 complaints per month to none. Figure 4: Airport Enclosure Before and After the Construction of the Fence 27. Securing the electricity supply: Before the project, the airport’s existing powerplant constructed in 1977 was unreliable with a short capacity. It had an out-of-date 21 kVA generator and was connected to the National Electricity Company (SNEL) but with frequent power outages. Electricity supply was therefore unreliable, with a limited capacity to meet the needs of the airport. Furthermore, the power supply for navigation aid equipment and control tower was provided from MONUSCO 8’s camp. The project allowed to rehabilitate the building and to provide new and modern equipment. Currently, the electricity is securely provided 24/7 and the electricity for the new control tower is supplied from the airport powerplant. Figure 5: Airport Powerplant Before and After the Project 8 MONUSCO is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC. MONUSCO’s camp was located inside the airport Page 14 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 28. Improving the capacity of rescue and firefighting services: The rescue and firefighting services have been equipped with tools, parts, supplies to enhance their capacity of intervention and improve the safety of the airport. 29. Improving the monitoring of volcano risks: Combined with a funding of US$2 million from a Japanese Grant, the project allowed to support the Goma Volcanic Observatory (OVG) to monitor the volcano risks and to strengthen the preparedness of the airport and surroundings communities by: (i) developing knowledge and tools for a better monitoring of Nyiragongo volcano (geospatial information dataset), (ii) developing, updating and distribution of risks management plans (a contingency plan, an evacuation plan and a lava flow risk map for the city of Goma in the event of an eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano),(iii) training for OVG researchers and technicians and North Kivu Civil Protection agents, (iv) acquisition of materials and equipment for civil protection, (v) awareness campaigns on volcanic risks, and (vi) establishing focal points for volcanic crisis management. 30. Based on above, the project’s objective of improving the safety and security was substantially achieved. However, it is worth mentioning that if the activities A5: Supply and installation of equipment to upgrade air navigation aids and A8: “Rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal” had been done, it would have increased the safety of the operations at Goma International Airport. Indeed, the dropped activity A5 would have improved the safety of the airport by upgrading the existing VOR/DME 9, which is an important equipment to improve safe navigation of aircrafts. The dropped activity A8 would have allowed an improvement in the security of the passenger terminal by its rehabilitation, including the optimization of the passenger flows and controls, as well as the overhaul of the outdated mechanical and electrical systems and by the supply and installation of X-ray equipment for passengers and luggage. These activities have been replaced mainly by the improvement of the drainage system outside the airport. This activity allowed the construction of a stormwater collector that collect the stormwater from the airport which originates from the upstream watershed to Lake Kivu. The main purpose of this new activity was to reduce flooding on the neighborhoods near the airport and to evacuate the water coming from the airport and the upstream watershed. This activity has a greater impact on the social side for the communities surrounding the airport. The activity to improve the drainage inside the airport which was planned in the PAD and realized during the implementation of the project was limited in scope given the water volume transiting through the airport due to the expansion of urban settlement around the airport. The dropped activities including any missing drainage system will be carried out under the DRC Transport and Connectivity Support Project which is under preparation. 31. The corresponding PDO indicator was changed by a project restructuring. The current PDO indicator states “Conformity of the improved infrastructure at Goma International Airport with aeronautical regulations”. The restructuring and the result framework did not explain how this indicator should be measured. There is no track record and no evidence that the target of this indicator was reached. Although there is no official report from the Aviation Authority stated that the improvement of the infrastructures is compliant with aeronautical regulation, AAC was associated to the design and the supervision of the works and technical specifications was added in the works’ contracts and in the supervision engineer's ToR that said that infrastructure or equipment must meet international or national standards. PDO (ii): improve the operations of Goma International Airport 9In radio navigation, a VOR/DME is a radio beacon that combines a VHF omnidirectional range (VOR) with a distance measuring equipment (DME). The VOR allows the receiver to measure its bearing to or from the beacon, while the DME provides the slant distance between the receiver and the station. Together, the two measurements allow the receiver to compute a position fix. Page 15 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 32. The project’s objective of improving the operations was substantially achieved. The corresponding PDO indicator “Capacity of the runway infrastructure at Goma International Airport to accommodate the original design aircraft” was achieved. Operations at Goma International Airport have been improved through project investments. 33. Airport operations are commonly classified into 4 different areas. These areas are ground operations, airside operations, billing and invoicing, and information management. The project’s interventions focused on the physical aspects and in those two areas namely ground operations and airside operations, the project has substantially improved the operations of Goma International Airport. 34. The ground operations are the operations taking place when passengers and airplanes are on the ground. One of the main achievements of the project for improving ground operations is to have brought back the capacity of the airport to the level prior to the volcanic eruption. The rehabilitation of the existing runway including the reconstruction of the 335 meters needed to restore the runway’s total length to the original 3,000 meters and the rehabilitation and extension of the existing apron allowed the capacity of the runway infrastructure to accommodate the originally designated type of aircraft. Before the implementation of the project and after the volcanic eruption, the originally designated type of aircraft, a Boeing 767, could no longer land at Goma International Airport. At closing of the project Boeing 767, 777 and 787 can safely take off and land at the airport. 35. The works have allowed increasing in capacity. Upgrading, reinforcement of pavements, lengthening of the runway and improvement of drainage have increased the capacity of operations, among other things by lifting takeoff or landing weight restrictions, thus enabling more efficient use of devices and / or use of larger capacity aircraft. The rehabilitation of the runway, the taxiway and the apron has increased the number of airlines companies that can perform at least one flight per week from 20 companies before the project to 34 companies after the project. In addition, the installation of runway and taxiway lights allowed night operations resulting in an increase of aircraft movement by night on an annual basis from 0 before the project to 178 by the project closure. 36. Before the project, the apron had a capacity to accommodate three originally designated type of aircraft (Boeing 767/Airbus A320) and after the project the capacity increased to five. Figure 6: Airport Apron Before and After Rehabilitation and Extension Figure 7: New Equipment delivered for Air Traffic Control 37. Airside operations generally refers to operations under the direct supervision of the airfield and the airspace. For these operations, there are basically two major groups working: Ground crew (responding to airfield Page 16 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) incidents, accidents, and emergencies) and air traffic control. With the construction and equipment of the new air traffic tower, controllers have a better view and visibility of the entire airport and have the tools for better data transmission via new and modern equipment delivered by the project. This allows air traffic controllers to improve (i) the management of airspace safety and the controlling of air traffic flows, (ii) communications with pilots to pass critical information for the flight like weather conditions and runway usage, and (iii) the takeoff and landing permissions. 38. Based on above, the project has substantially improved ground and airside operations at Goma International Airport. In addition, these improvements have contributed to an increase of volume of air freight and annual aeronautical revenue as shown below. 39. Before the project, total passenger air traffic grew steadily with an annual average growth rate of 19.5% between 2004 and 2012, resulting from 34,123 passengers in 2004 to 163,769 passengers in 2014. This was reached despite the negative effects caused by the conflicts in the region and the consequences of the volcanic eruptions in Goma. With the implementation of the project, over the period 2015 to 2021, total passenger air traffic experienced a much lower average annual growth of around 7.6%, from 196,433 to 272,944 passengers. This period includes the period of COVID-19 with border closures from the year 2020. However, outside the COVID- 19 period, from 2015 to 2019, the total passenger air traffic increased from 196,433 to 280,739, which corresponds to an average growth of around 11.3%, i.e., lower than the pre-project period. COVID-19 and the restrictions on travel since 2020 had an impact on this indicator for the years 2020 and 2021 with a down peak of passenger number in 2020. The target for the indicator “Goma International Airport Passengers” (200,000 passengers by the end of 2020) was achieved 10 before the start of the runway rehabilitation’s civil works. These statistics and the fact that the runway and tarmac civil works were finalized in 2019 and the COVID 19 pandemic make it difficult to ascertain whether the project led to an increase in passenger traffic at Goma International Airport. In fact, it will take time—possibly years—to determine the airport’s rehabilitation impact on traffic. At the same time, the counterfactual could have been a continuous dilapidation of the airport and the ultimate halt to traffic and closure of the airport. Figure 8: Number of Passengers from 2004 to 2021 10 See para 74 in design of M&E for more information Page 17 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Number of passenger at Goma Airport (Number) 300,000.00 250,000.00 Before Project Target at the end of project 200,000.00 Implementation 150,000.00 100,000.00 During Project 50,000.00 Implementation 0.00 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 40. The volume of air freight, for its part, seemed to show a downward trend before the implementation of the project from 2008 to 2015. In fact, air freight peaked in 2007 with 45,710 tons and then gradually declined with an average decrease of -3.75%. When the project was implemented from 2016, freight grew from 14,941 tons in 2015 to 28,000 tons in 2021, i.e., an average growth of 11%. Without any apparent knowing other factors which occurred in 2015, one can assume that the project contributed to increase the freight volume in Goma International Airport. Figure 9: Freight Evolution from 2004 to 2021 Freight (kilogrammes) 50,000,000.00 40,000,000.00 During Project Implementation 30,000,000.00 20,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 Before Project Implementation 0.00 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 41. Before implementation of the project, the number of aircraft movements experienced a sustained growth between 2004 and 2009, but gradually decreased until 2015. This results in an average growth of 4% for this period. From 2015 and the implementation of the project, the number of aircraft movement grew from 17,625 to 23,047, a growth of 6.93% above the average observed before the project. In terms of annual aeronautical revenue, a gradual increase up to 2019 was noted. After 2019, the observed decrease can be attributed to the effects of the COVID19 pandemic. Figure 10: Aircraft Movement and Annual Revenue Page 18 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Aircraft Movement Annual aeronautical revenue from Goma 30,000.00 International Airport (US$)) 25,000.00 6,000,000.00 20,000.00 5,000,000.00Target at the end of project 15,000.00 4,000,000.00 10,000.00 Project 3,000,000.00 Before Project Implementa 2,000,000.00 5,000.00 Implementation tion 1,000,000.00 0.00 0.00 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 42. Based on above, the overall efficacy rating is Substantial. The project’s objective 1 of improving the safety and security was substantially achieved. However, had the supply and installation of equipment to upgrade air navigation aids and the supply and installation of X-ray equipment for passengers and luggage been done, it would have further increased security of operations. For PDO2, as described above, operations have been improved substantially both on the ground and airside aspects at Goma International Airport with the PDO-level indicator achieved. At the same time, there is no evidence that the project contributed to increase number of passengers, or aircraft movement. C. EFFICIENCY 43. An ex-post economic analysis was conducted using a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) approach to evaluate the economic internal rates of return (EIRR) of the activities completed at project closure. It follows the same methodology used at the appraisal stage and focuses on the economic appraisal of Component A, for which investments amounted to 77 percent of project costs at appraisal. 44. The EIRR at completion is estimated at 13.4 percent and net present value (NPV) of US$6.78 million using the same 12 percent discount rate that was used at appraisal. The project’s EIRR is lower than the level envisioned at appraisal (15.1 percent) but the project is still economically viable. Because the comparison involves counterfactual scenarios, a sensitivity analysis was also conducted for different timing of the potential disruption, as well as the size of disruption (i.e., percentage of demand loss), to test the robustness of the result. Details of the economic analysis and related sensitivity analysis are presented in Annex 4. Table 2: EIRR and NPV from the Economic Analysis At Appraisal At Completion Net Present Value Economic Internal Net Present Value Economic Internal in US$ @ 12% Rate of Return in US$ @ 12% Rate of Return Base Case scenario 9.8 million 15.1% 6.78 million 13.4% Traffic 20 % Lower 2.0 million 12.2% 1.77 million 11.9% 45. The economic benefits remained the same as the ex-ante study, namely: time savings for air travelers (passengers) and a reduction in aircraft operating costs for cargo carriers, resulting from increased efficiency, use of larger aircraft, and lifting or reducing restrictions on aircraft take-off and landing weights. Page 19 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 46. A synthesis of the results on the discounted benefits and costs for the ex-post and ex-ante scenarios are presented, thus allowing to identify the sources of the differences between the ex-post and ex-ante analyses. These differences relate to the differences between the passenger, freight, and movement forecasts and consequently to the present values and relative weights of the main cost and benefit variables. The first observation concerns the air traffic forecasts. The differences between the two situations ex post and ex ante are explained by the updating of actual traffic data between 2013 and 2019. Thus, since the growth rates of passenger, cargo, and movement traffic remained constant in both situations, the differences are explained by the evolution of traffic between 2013 and 2019. The actual data reported a higher passenger volume in 2019 than estimated in the initial ex ante forecast. For cargo, the initial forecast overestimated the observed volumes between 2013 and 2019, resulting in a lower forecast for the ex-post analysis for the period 2020 to 2035. These variations in traffic projections directly influenced the economic benefit. 47. Qualitative economic benefits can also be considered for the project. The project contributed to economic benefits through safety and security improvement as well as the upgrade of the drainage system. Indeed, the improvement of safety and security will reduce accident risks and potential economic losses by accidents. The drainage system upgrade will also contribute to the reduction of flood risk in neighboring communities. This would generate economic benefits to the local community as potential economic losses (both asset and human losses) by future floods can be greatly mitigated. The economic benefits arising from these works are non- quantified and/or non-quantifiable benefits, due to the absence of any data available to measure the economic benefits at the level of the local population. The evaluation of such socio-economic benefits, based on the damage avoided, would have required a prior study of the human environment identifying parameters such as, for example, the population impacted, the identification of their socio-economic characteristics (income from households), data on the costs associated with health impacts, as well as the costs of relocation and/or expropriation not included in this investment program. 48. The project’s efficiency was challenged by several factors: cost overrun mainly due to failure of companies to realize civil works, change in the type of works, higher actual costs, procurement delays, volcanic eruption and COVID-19 pandemic. The main challenges were: • Time overrun: The poor performance of civil works companies, the termination and rebidding of contracts led to time overrun on key activities (figure 11). For example, the termination of contract of the company in charge of the stormwater collector led to 266% of time overrun. This impacted the activity cost and completion. As a result, the contract of consulting firms in charge of control and supervision of works was extended for several months with increase of cost. At the project level, the overall time overrun is 9 months. Compared to similar projects in the DRC and other FCV environments, the time overrun is considered as not significant. Figure 11: Time Overrun on Key Activities Page 20 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Time overrun on project key activities 2000 266% 1500 34% 338 1288 1000 10% 246% 69 500 995 443 484 700 0 180 A1. Rehabilitation of Construction A6. Construction Construction the Runway Stormwater Airport Fence Stormwater collector/1st collector/2nd contractor contractor contratual deadline (days) Time overrun (days) • Cost overrun: The actual components costs are higher than the estimated components cost at appraisal. However, the size of the funding shortfall for Component A was not too large – approximately US$6 million which the contingency included in the project financing and the savings on component B were able to largely cover. The termination dispute with the company in charge of the runway and stormwater collector works resulted in an unplanned payment from project’s funds of a significant amount of US$3.2 million for dispute settlement. The cost overrun for all the project activities are estimated to an amount of US$5 million and this represents an increase of 10 percent compared to the estimated budget of activities without contingencies. Furthermore, actual administrative costs are US$1.3 million higher than expected , representing a 43.33 percent of cost overrun. Estimated costs at appraisal and actual costs by component are compared in Table 4 below. It is important to notice that at project level, there is no cost overrun since the project has been implemented and closed within the budget. The contingencies and savings from dropped activities allowed to compensate the cost overrun of key activities. Table 3: Actual cost and Cost overrun Original Estimated Actual Cost Difference % cost Components Cost (US$m) (US$m) (US$) overrun Component A: Airport Infrastructure Investments 40 46.2 6.2 15.5% A1. Rehabilitation of the existing runway 20.2 25.9 5.7 28.22% A2. Rehabilitation and extension of existing apron 3.3 4.4 1.1 33.33% A3. Rehabilitation of the airport’s electrical system 3.5 3.9 0.4 11.42% A4. Supply and installation of a new mobile control tower 2.0 3.5 1.5 75.00% A5. Supply and installation of equipment to upgrade air 0.4 0 -0.4 - navigation aids A6. Construction of the airport’s security fence and 1.9 2.6 0.7 36.84% rehabilitation of the internal service road A7. Support to airport rescue and firefighting services 0.2 0.2 - - A8. Rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal 5.0 0 -5 - A9. Laying out of a cargo area 1.0 0 -1 - A10. Implementation of the mitigation measures of the 2.5 1.5 -1 -40.00% environmental and social impacts Page 21 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Original Estimated Actual Cost Difference % cost Components Cost (US$m) (US$m) (US$) overrun Construction of the collector of the city of GOMA 0 4.2 4.2 Component B: Capacity Building and Project 6 4.8 -1.2 -20.00% Implementation Support B1. Preparation of a priority airport rehabilitation program 1.5 0 -1.5 - B2. Monitoring of volcano risks and strengthening the 0.5 0.5 - - preparedness of the airport and surrounding communities B3. Technical assistance to strengthen the economic and 1.0 0 -1 - social fabric of the communities around the airport B4. Project implementation support 3.0 4.3 1.3 43.33% Total 46 51 5 10.86% Figure 12: Cost Overrun on Key Activities Cost overrun on key project activities 30 28% 25 5.7 20 15 10 20.2 33% 43% 5 75% 1.1 1.5 1.3 3.3 2 3 0 A1. Rehabilitation of the A2. Rehabilitation of the A4. Supply of a new B4. Project Runway apron control tower Implementation Support Original estimated cost (US$ million) Cost overrun (US$ million) Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 49. The Efficiency Rating is Substantial. The project is still viable even though the delays and increased costs slightly brought down the EIRR. The actual values of the NPV and EIRR are not much below of what was expected at appraisal stage (the actual NPV is 30% below and the actual EIRR is 1.5 points below). The time and cost overrun were significant for key activities although they were not significant at project level. Overall, there was just nine months of time overrun for the project and no cost overrun at the project level since the contingencies and savings from dropped activities allowed to compensate the cost overrun on key activities. Furthermore, despite being in a such fragile environment with other adverse factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the eruption of Nyiragongo volcano, and compared to other projects in FCV settings and in DRC, it is remarkable that the project was completed with only nine months extension of the original completion date. D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 50. Based on the above, the overall outcome rating is Satisfactory since there were minor shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its objectives and its efficiency. It is important to notice that in a such fragile and Page 22 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) conflict-affected country, and especially in Eastern DRC where there are serious security and governance problems, the project in this context achieved a lot. E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) Gender 51. At the time of appraisal, DRC was ranked 148 of 157 countries in the Gender-Related Development Index. As part of the project design, the technical assistance sub-component of the project related to the valorization of lava rock 11 aimed to target vulnerable groups, with a specific focus on women. Unfortunately, this activity was dropped. On the other hand, through sensitization on Gender Based Violence (GBV) in the seven neighborhoods bordering the airport and the setting up of a gender sensitive GRM, the project raised awareness of the population and strengthened the capacity of the community on GBV. Forty-two members of the community were trained on the early mechanism, the referencing system and management of complains on GBV. 31 women out of 584 employees worked directly on the project which represents 5.30 percent of staff working on the project. Institutional Strengthening 52. As outlined above, Components B included activities to support the institutional development of Goma International Airport. The most significant achievements were the support to Goma Volcanic Observatory (OVG) to monitor the volcano risks and the strengthening12 of the preparedness of the airport and surroundings communities as explained in para 30. This activity was implemented through a US$2 million Japanese Grant. Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 53. While mobilization of private financing was not an objective, the fact that the rehabilitation of the airport has enabled private airlines to offer regular passenger and freight services is an important achievement of the project. Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 54. While the project was not explicitly designed to have a distributional impact on the poor, the investments made under the project support the Government’s strategic objective of achieving sustainable GDP growth. The project contributed to reduce poverty and to share prosperity by reducing flooding in the airport surrounding communities and by providing drinking water supply to those communities. 55. The evacuation of stormwater from the airport's drainage system and from the larger drainage basin of that area of Goma to Lake Kivu was an issue that came to light once the airport’s own drainage system was being upgraded. The absence of a connection between the existing drainage of the airport and the drainage system of the city of Goma was the cause of the flooding after heavy rains of neighborhoods downstream of the airport. The project was restructured to cover the construction of a stormwater collector for the city of Goma linking that area of the city to lake Kivu. This infrastructure was initially not part of the project as it was supposed to be carried out by the Government, but its completion was facing challenges due to financial constraints on the part of Government. At project closing, the works were not yet fully completed. However, the completion works – which started on 11 The removal of the lava rock from the airport have made available a large quantity of lava rock (basalt) that has an economic value if processed. In the context of high unemployment in the Goma area, it was planned in the PAD to help provide social dividends to the local communities, with a gender and vulnerable groups focus. 12 this activity made it possible to mobilize technical assistance from a volcanology expert to the OVG as part of the revision of the protocol to support the OVG in the development of deliverables and budget monitoring (expenses). This activity also made it possible to acquire equipment for seismology, geodesy and geochemistry. part of the construction work for the OVG building two vehicles, technical assistance and equipment for the benefit of the OVG Page 23 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) October 4, 2021, and were carried out by the “Office des Voiries et Drainage” (OVD) – have been completed in March 2022 with the funding of North Kivu province. Figure 13: Drainage Works Outside the Airport Enclosure 56. As part of the stormwater sub-component, the project provided additional benefits to the surrounding population by improving access to drinking water supply for the populations around the airport with the construction of 14 standpipes in 5 neighborhood districts near the airport (Murara, Majengo, Bujuvo, Virunga and Kahembe). Furthermore, the project reduced the vulnerability of the population of Murara to flooding through the construction of eight sump pums. These works were not originally planned but was added to mitigate the impact of the project on the airport surrounding communities. Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 57. None III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME. A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 58. Project preparation was swift. The rapid preparation of the project allowed the client with support of the World Bank to respond to an urgent need in a fragile environment. Following paragraph 12 of OP 10.00 the project was prepared in five months, with AIS signed off on October 08,2014, Decision Review on January 15,2015, and Board approval on March 13, 2015. The short time of preparation impacted on the discussion with the clients – in particular about the type of air control tower that was needed for Goma - the design of the M&E plan and the results framework. These issues were resolved during project implementation. 59. The project design was straightforward. Indeed, based on lessons learned in other projects in similar fragile environments, the project design was kept simple with two components: one large component for investment and the second one for capacity building and implementation support. This allowed the project to quickly achieve solid results on the ground and to substantially achieve its objective. 60. The decision to use direct contracting for runway rehabilitation works ultimately failed due to poor contractor performance. As an emergency project, the original procurement strategy for the runway reconstruction envisaged direct contracting with the same construction company that had already been mobilized to do similar work with funding from the German Government. This was assessed by the World Bank at the time of project preparation as the most suitable contracting option given the FCV situation in Goma at that time and the risk of delays that an Page 24 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) open competition would cause compounded with the risk of lack of interest of contractors with the necessary technical and financial capacity in this part of DRC. Unfortunately, the company failed to perform mainly due to its workload which resulted in the contract being terminated with a cost to the project of US$3.2 million for dispute settlement. One reason for this failure could be the different implementation modalities between the German Development Agency and the World Bank this company worked with, with the German agency disbursing strictly against progress achieved while the World Bank project allowed for advances. B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION (a) Factors subject to the control government and/or implementing entities 61. The decision to change the type of air traffic control tower created both cost overrun of approximatively US$1.5 million and time overrun. At appraisal, the project included US$2 million for the supply and installation of a mobile air traffic control tower. However, during the early phases of implementation and after a request from the government, it was decided to build a permanent airport tower. This redesign led to an extra cost and delays in civil works. The new air traffic tower cost US$3.5 million. While at the time of project closing, the construction works were yet to be fully completed, the Government financed the completion of the control tower as a retroactive financing under the PACT, and it has been operational since November 30,2021(two months after project closure). Additional offices as part of the control tower will be finalized during the implementation of PACT. 62. The termination of the largest financed contract due to the default of the contractor led to time overrun in the implementation and cost overrun with US$3.2 million paid for dispute settlement. During the implementation, one major contract (rehabilitation and extension of the existing runway, see para. 60 above) and five others totaling US$22.8 million were terminated. That led to delays and cost overruns. After termination of contracts, rebidding turned the project around allowed for successful completion of the works. 63. The relocation of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) from Kinshasa to Goma enabled better oversight and monitoring of the project, and it helped to recover the time lost due to delays in procurement and in implementation. The Multimodal Transport Project Implementation Unit (CEPTM) was transferred to Goma as of November 2018, resulting in noticeable progress in procurement and implementation of activities. However, some of the experienced key CEPTM staff (FM Specialist, Procurement Specialist, M&E Specialist, and Accountant) left the PIU in October 2018 due to the relocation and new staff was hired. The recruitment didn’t take time and had no adverse impact on achievement of project objectives. The difference of vision and priorities between national and local level in a project can undermine efforts of a PIU to implement a project. Fortunately, that was not the case for this project. After the relocation of the PIU, there were no major issues coming from the Goma Provincial Government or from the central level. These two stakeholders were most of the time well aligned about the project and its main goals. This experience represented the precursor to the decentralization strategy for the CMU, which subsequently opened two offices outside Kinshasa, namely in Goma and Kananga. 64. The redesign of the runway works to remain within the available budget at the beginning of the project led to delays in implementation. The first design of the rehabilitation works for the runway was made to comply with all ICAO recommendations. However, this resulted in a large volume of works, much beyond the works envisaged during project preparation and described in the PAD. The price offered by the selected contractor for its first offer (US$35 million) was double the available budget (US$17.5 million). It was impossible to award the contract at this price. The Government with the support of the World Bank team decided to redesign the runway to remain within Page 25 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) the budget. After the redesign, the selected contractor revised its financial offer which remained within the available budget. As a result, the runway rehabilitation works were delayed of several months waiting for completion of the design study. 65. The discovery of unexploded ordnances led to setting up of a new procedure and served as a case study for World Bank future operations in such FCV context: During the excavation phase for the rehabilitation of the airport powerplant, unexploded ordnances were discovered. The discovery of such ordnances did not have a significant impact on the project implementation since it haltered the works on the site just for a couple of days waiting for the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) site approval after a screening. However, this event had a positive impact as it raised awareness on the risks of such unexpected discovery in an FCV context. It helped to build the capacity and to develop standard operating procedures for managing this risk in DRC. 66. Not all of the planned project activities could be implemented because of cost overrun of major activities and introduction of new additional activities. Cost overrun in the amount of US$10.67 million for key activities under component A and B (see table 4) and new additional activities (see table 5 below) of US$4.79 million led to the cancellation of activities including those described earlier (A5, A8 and A9) as well as B1: preparation of a priority airport rehabilitation program and B3: provision of technical assistance to strengthen the economic and social fabric of the communities around the airport for a total amount of US$8.9 million. Dropping these activities may have led to reduce project impacts and did not allow to optimize the passenger flows and controls, as well as the overhaul of the outdated mechanical and electrical systems in the terminal. A part of the security of the airport through the supply and installation of X-Ray equipment for passengers and luggage screening has not been achieved as well. These activities could have been completed with the highly performing contractors already on site and a small additional financing (at the level of US$10-15million) but the decision was to rather include these remaining activities in the upcoming DRC Transport and Connectivity Support Project. Table 4: Cost Overrun on Key Activities Code Designation Amount(US$) in Amount(US$) Difference(US$) PAD PAD of commitment Component A: Airport Infrastructure Investments A.1. Rehabilitation of the existing runway 20,200,000.00 25,867,156.13 5,667,156.13 A.2. Rehabilitation and extension of existing 3,300,000.00 4,382,632.91 1,082,632.91 apron A.3. Rehabilitation of the airport’s electrical 3,500,000.00 3,869,166.52 369,166.52 system A.4. Supply and installation of a new mobile 2,000,000.00 3,508,902.54 1,508,902.54 control tower A.6. Construction of the airport’s security 1,900,000.00 2,631,910.46 1,731,910.46 fence and rehabilitation of the interna l service road Total component A 30,900,000.00 40,259,768.56 9,359,768.56 Component B: Capacity Building and Project Implementation Support B.4. Project implementation support 3,000,000.00 4,295,625.92 1,295,625.92 total component B 3,000,000.00 4,295,625.92 1,295,625.92 TOTAL 33,900,000.00 44,555,394.48 10,665,394.48 Table 5: New Activities and Their Cost Page 26 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Code PAD Designation Amount (US$) Component A: Airport Infrastructure Investments A.10.1.2. Construction of sumps in Murara to mitigate the effects of flooding 79,989.89 A.10.1.4. Securing the collector in the city of Goma 157,455.19 A.10.2.2. Supervision of the construction works of sumps in Murara 9,000.00 A.10.2.6. Elaboration of RAP for drainage system 46,775.00 A.10.2.9. RAP implementation for drainage works 18,536.00 A.10.2.11 Audit of RAP for drainage works 19,970.00 A.11. Drainage works 4,257,357.57 A.1950 Standpipes construction 156,929.36 A.1951 Environmental Supervision of standpipes works 18,162.02 A.1951 Technical Supervision of standpipes works 23,777.60 Total 4,787,952.63 (b) Factors subject to World Bank control 67. Adequacy of supervision: Implementation support was adequate for supervision of activities. Implementation support missions were carried out on a regular basis. When the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded, supervision missions continued albeit virtually. However, the project restructuring occurred a bit late in the project implementation timeline. The midterm review’s aide memoire recommended in December 2018 a project restructuring with a deadline in March 2019. The restructuring was completed in December 2020. Since it was agreed that no extension or additional financing could have been provided under the project (a follow-on project was foreseen to continue activities dropped out), a project restructuring was not deemed necessary at this time. A restructuring was finally accepted to extend the project due to the exceptional occurrence of COVID 19 pandemic and its impact on the project implementation. (c) Factors outside the control of government and/or implementing entities 68. By January 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic started slowing down project activities and then completely halted the progress of the works between March and August 2020 due to the various travel restrictions and lockdowns. resulting in delays. The construction of the power plant has been delayed because some of the equipment could not be installed as the contractor’s technicians could not travel from China to DRC. For the construction of the control tower, some of the control tower equipment could not be shipped to DRC from the contractor’s headquarters in Spain since the Goma International Airport authority had to travel to check and test them physically. Lastly, some of the necessary equipment and materials were stuck outside of DRC and some key experts and technical staff were not able to reach Goma. 69. The eruption of Nyiragongo volcano on May 23, 2021, interrupted the project implementation for 16 days: The Nyiragongo volcano near Goma erupted on May 22, 2021 and resulted in 32 fatalities, 40 adults missing, and about 415,700 persons evacuated including the PIU staff and their dependents. Goma airport was closed from May 22 until June 5, 2021. Airport operations resumed on June 6, and PIU staff returned to their duty station on June 7 resulting in the suspension of works on the site for 16 days. No damages resulted from the eruption on Goma International Airport and the infrastructure financed by the project. Page 27 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 70. Frequent Ebola epidemics and civil unrest impacted the city of Goma throughout the project implementation. Fortunately, with sanitary measures early set in place at the worksites by the PIU and the civil work companies, Ebola epidemics did not affect the project. Civil unrest was frequent in Goma during the project implementation period but did not affect the project either. IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 71. At appraisal, the operation did not have a theory of change as it was not mandatory at that time. The M&E was based on the results framework. Indicators identified in the result framework to monitor progress toward the PDOs were not all achievable, clear, or well defined. 72.The first PDO indicator at appraisal “regulatory certification of safety and security at Goma International Airport” was not achievable. It was planned that the DRC Civil Aviation Authority (AAC) would complete a detailed assessment of Goma International Airport and, if compliance achieved, issued certification of the aerodrome to the operator of the airport, the RVA. Institutional strengthening activities aimed at ensuring the necessary capacity within AAC and RVA to undertake the certification process were financed under the DRC Multimodal Transport Project. No activities to undertake the certification process were foreseen to be financed by the project. The project was not designed with the objective to have the airport certified by the end of implementation. Airport certification is not only about improvement of infrastructure but also improvement of processes and procedures which were not planned in the project. As a result, this indicator was not achievable by the project and had to be changed during project restructuring. While the actual certification activity was not conducted, the infrastructure, equipment, and training provided under the project were in compliance with international and national standards, and they will help achieve certification in the future. However, it is important to notice that the certification of an airport has a more sustainable impact on safety and security than just the conformity of the airport to aeronautical regulation. The new DRC Transport and Connectivity Support project (P161877) will support the DRC Government in the process for the certification of Goma International Airport. 73. The replacement PDO indicator “Conformity of the improved infrastructure at Goma International Airport with aeronautical regulations” lacked clarity. This indicator was not well described in the result framework from the restructuring paper particularly about the entity which should give the conformity of the airport and what is the process and methodology to assess it. At the project closure, the PIU said that this indicator was achieved based on the fact that tender dossier for works and supply had incorporated technical specifications that are in accordance with international and national standards. The works and the equipment provided were deemed conform to those specifications by the acceptance committee. Unfortunately, the AAC was not part of the acceptance committee and there is no report or evidence that AAC confirms the improved infrastructure is compliant with the aeronautical regulations. 74. Slight disconnect between the wording of PDO and the indicator chosen for its measurement: The second PDO indicator “Capacity of the runway infrastructure at Goma International Airport to accommodate the original design aircraft” was intended to measure the improvement of the operations at Goma International Airport. However, this Page 28 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) indicator could have been better worded as it does not clearly capture the improvement of operations in the airport, which cover both infrastructure (runway) and operations (processes) at the airport. 75. Inadequate targets for indicators: For the intermediate indicator related to “Number of Goma International Airport passengers”, the target was achieved before the implementation of the activities. In the result framework, the baseline for this indicator was 140,000 passengers for the year 2014 and the target was 200,000 passengers by the end of the project (2020). In 2016, the number of passengers was already reached 251,132. This inadequate target is due to two factors: (i) the wrong baseline at project preparation with 140,000 passengers in the PAD while it was actually 163,769 13 passengers, and (ii) the 8 percent prevision of traffic growth in the PAD being lower than the actual 11.3 percent passenger traffic growth during the period 2015-2020. 76. Overall, the project intermediate indicators were measurable, achievable with baseline data available. The M&E provided clear guidance on what to collect, how and when to collect it, and the responsible party. M&E Implementation 77. The CEPTM was responsible to review the results based on various progress reports and to take appropriate corrective actions as needed. The CEPTM coordinated with RVA in collecting data required for monitoring progress and evaluation of outcomes. The CEPTM was also responsible for reporting on the Results Framework to IDA, for monitoring and reviewing the technical performance, and the oversight of the implementation of the components and sub-components of the project. 78. The data collection was not straightforward, often taking a lot of time to collect the required data by RVA. This is one of the issues that will be addressed in the aviation component of the upcoming transport project (P161877). M&E Utilization 79. The project’s results framework was used to monitor implementation progress, allowing the project team a way to formally discuss progress of outputs. Through the project restructuring, the Task Team adjusted the indicators to better reflect implementation progress and project objectives. 80. The intermediate indicators, in particular the indicator on runway physical progress, helped the CEPTM and the World Bank team to take decision to improve the implementation of the project on the ground. It also supported the World Bank team in recommending the relocation of the PIU from Kinshasa to Goma to further improve supervision and implementation of civil works. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 81. Based on the above, the overall rating of Quality of M&E is Modest. There were significant shortcomings in the M&E system’s design making it difficult to assess the achievement of the stated objectives. B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE 82. Environmental and Social Safeguards: The project's performance at closing on environmental and social safeguards is Moderately Satisfactory. The project was rated with an Environmental Assessment of Category B and triggered three safeguard policies: (i) Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), (ii) Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11), and (iii) Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). The project was processed under the exceptional deferral paragraph 12 (a) of OP 10.00 and a safeguards action plan was adopted, as referred to in paragraph 53 of World Bank’s BP 10.0, 13 Statistics from RVA Page 29 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) and a draft environmental and social screening report was prepared in December 2014. A “ Notice d’impact environmental et social” was prepared, cleared in January 2016, and disclosed on the World Bank external website on Feb 5, 2017. Subsequently to develop mitigation measures, seven Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) were developed and implemented to avoid, minimize, mitigate, or offset potential adverse impacts. Under these requirements and the terms of each works or activity, contractors were mandated to prepare the relevant safeguard plans for the purpose of the works and other activities defined in their respective contract. The project had an effective and operational Grievance Redress Mechanism at the level of each district concerned by the project works (Murara, Kahembe, Majengo, Bujovu, Mikeno and Virunga) and at the level of the city of Goma chaired by the mayor. These committees have been trained in the management and processing of complaints. As part of the implementation of the SEA/SH aspects, there were strategies for GBV issues within the GRM. The project signed a contract with the “Maison de la Femme”, a structure within the Division of Social Welfare, Women and Children in charge of GBV issues. The “Maison de la Femme” trained workers on the sites and project staff. A Code of Conduct was signed by the workers of the subcontractors and by the project staff. The surrounding communities were sensitized on SEA/SH aspects. In total, about 260 PAPs were compensated for the construction activities of the fence wall and the collector. In terms of complaints at the closure of the project, 815 complaints were received, all considered relevant among which 813 processed and closed and 2 complaints remained. Those two complaints have been transferred to the provincial Government of North Kivu. 83. Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) incidents. The project reported six OHS incidents since the start of works. Of these, one is classified as severe, none were serious, and five as indicative; all incidents are confirmed and accounted through the Environment and Social Incidence Response Toolkit ESIRT and closed. Safeguards Corrective Action Plans (SCAP) were prepared and implemented. Training and information activities have been adjusted to include measures relating to COVID-19 prevention, with guidelines from the World Bank. Specifically, SCAP was updated to include COVID-19 -related activities, preventive measures, and case management to prevent stigmatization. 84. Environmental staff of the PIUs, implementing agency and monitoring consultants supervised mitigation activities. Institutional arrangements have been put in place for the environmental management of the project and the planned prevention instruments have been prepared and implemented. In addition to the direct impact mitigation measures implemented, the project also supported several initiatives designed to build institutional capacity to better manage E&S risks. For example, it successfully developed standard operating procedures for managing unexploded ordnances and landmines risks in infrastructure projects in DRC and organized in January 2021 in collaboration with the UN Mine Action Service-DRC and the World Bank, a training on removal of unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnances in Eastern Congo. 85. Financial Management: FM arrangements in place during project implementation were rated between satisfactory and moderately satisfactory. In June 2016, a supervision mission concluded that FM could be improved and addressed a series of recommendations. However, the FM rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory in Mai 2017, mainly due to (i) the lack of propre budget management that lead to the over-use of project funds leading to no funds being available to continue the main project activities; (ii) weak contract management resulting in some suppliers delivering service after the contract expiring date; and (iii) weak management of advances to suppliers leading to ineligible expenditures at the end of the project. This contributed to the rating to be maintained at Moderately Satisfactory until the end of the project. 86. Procurement. The procurement was strongly influenced by the emergency nature of the project. The first company recruited by direct agreement for the rehabilitation of the runway failed. The second firm hired, following a competitive process, completed the work on time to the satisfaction of the client and the World Bank. The Page 30 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) construction of the control tower was not completed at the close of the project. As of 30 November 2021, the new control tower is now fully operational. The contract for the stormwater collector works was terminated after the works were scaled back to allow for completion. Procurement performance ended Moderately Satisfactory. C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry 87. The project’s preparation was overseen on the World Bank side by an experienced team who had worked on projects in similar challenging contexts. The same team had also managed the preparation and implementation of the Multimodal Transport Project (MTP). The project design was kept simple and the proposed period of implementation of five years was adequate at the time even though the period of implementation was later extended by nine months. The preparation of the project took about 3 months based on paragraph 12 of OP 10.00 guidelines. 88. The World Bank team prepared a comprehensive project with a focus on simplicity in a very fragile environment. The project design with only two components - a large component on investment and a small one on capacity building and implementation support - was adequately simple. The project was strategically relevant to both the Government of DRC and aligned with World Bank guiding documents at the time of preparation. 89. The World Bank set clear implementation and monitoring arrangements to ensure the viability and feasibility of the project. The project was implemented with a reliance on CEPTM which had a proven track record in implementing World Bank supported projects and was the PIU for the MTP at the time of appraisal. The responsibility for technical inputs was with RVA which was the main project beneficiary. Quality of Supervision 90. The World Bank team carried out an average of one formal supervision mission per year throughout the project implementation. These missions were complemented by some fiduciary and safeguards specific missions and by frequent site visits which were combined with the intensive field implementation support of Pro-Routes project. 14 Frequent meetings were held with the implementation team to monitor progress and provide support between missions including close supervision of fiduciary, environmental and social safeguards aspects. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank team continued to support the client through virtual mission and meetings. 91. Overall, the team undertook five official implementation support missions in Goma during the whole project implementation period in addition to two virtual missions during the COVID-19 period. Besides, the team frequently travelled to Eastern DRC before the COVID-19 pandemic to provide implementation support to other World Bank operations (project PRO-ROUTES) and took that opportunity to regularly visit the works site at Goma International Airport. The presence of a safeguard’s specialist and other World Bank staff in Goma also allowed a close monitoring of the project activities. Critical issues that emerged during implementation and for which the World Bank was able to provide and persuade the client to agree were: (i) the relocation of the PIU from Kinshasa to Goma for a close implementation of the project which led to a better implementation of activities and better results on the ground; (ii) closer monitoring of indicators; (iii) improved bidding documents and contract management; and (iv) improved reporting on performance and progress. 14 Due to the Pro-Routes inspection panel case in 2017, the transport team conducted monthly or bimonthly field implementation support in the Kivus (Goma and Bukavu) from 2018 to 2020. Page 31 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 92. Supporting the PIU in design of the runway rehabilitation works: The initial design of the rehabilitation works for the runway was made to comply with all ICAO recommendations. However, this resulted in a large volume of works, much beyond the works envisaged during project preparation and described in the PAD. CEPTM asked an engineering consulting firm to redesign the runway to remain within the available budget while at the same time ensuring safe airport operations. The World Bank team provided support to the PIU with (i) a visit of a World Bank’s team at the office of the Consultant for discussing with them and the PIU about assumption that can be made and guidelines on the design, and (ii) review the technical studies from the consultant. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 93. As describe earlier, the World Bank team was fully engaged during preparation and implementation. The rating for overall World Bank performance is Satisfactory since there were moderate shortcomings both in quality at entry and quality of supervision. These shortcomings did not jeopardize the achieving of efficacy or efficiency of the project. D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 94. Risk of a new volcano eruption on the airport with impact on the infrastructure. The last eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano did not have an impact on the runway or infrastructure of the Goma International Airport. The main risk on the development outcome is that the occurrence of a new eruption could damage again airport infrastructure and jeopardize the operations of the airport. To mitigate this risk, the project provided a technical assistance to OVG to better monitor the volcano risks and strengthened the preparedness of the airport and surroundings communities. Furthermore, it is advisable to develop a backup airport for Goma International Airport. Bukavu airport can play this role. 95. Risk of delays or non-completion of drainage works and its impact on the environment: To reduce the flooding in the communities surrounding the airport, the project financed the evacuation of drainage water from the airport to Lake Kivu through a stormwater collector line of about 1,7 km length of which about 400 meters had already been done with the Government financing. At the project closure, the works were not finished but resumed with funding from the local provincial Government. If the works are not completed, it could not allow a good drainage of the airport outside the site and impacts the occurrence of floods in the airport neighborhood. V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 96. The project provides several lessons on (i) project preparation and M&E design, (ii) procurement, and (ii) project implementation. (i) project preparation and M&E design 97. More flexibility for the scope of activities, and at least 15 percent or more contingencies for unplanned activities and cost overrun is important when designing a project in a fragile and conflict affected environment: During the project, several changes have been requested by the client, including changing to a permanent control tower instead of a mobile control tower and adding water drainage works from the airport to Lake Kivu and the construction of sumps in the Murara district to mitigate the effects of flooding. Flexibility allows to adapt to the environment and to be able to redirect the project in accordance with actual needs on the grounds. Despite the US$6 million (less than Page 32 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 12% of the budget) provisioned as contingencies, the funds were not sufficient to implement both all the activities planned in the PAD and the new ones. 98. It is important to keep objectives within the project’s control. The design of one of the PDO indicators about the airport certification under PASAG relied on institutional strengthening activities financed under the DRC Multimodal Transport Project. Since an airport certification process is important to make sure of compliance on international safety and security standards and to set up a sustainability approach on safety and security, the project could have incorporated both institutional strengthening activities needed to build capacity to establish and manage safety and security processes in the airport and certification activities in order to complete the certification process. Furthermore, all the activities needed to achieve objectives measured by an indicator must be planned in the project. (ii) procurement 99. Constant hands-on support during implementation and a procurement strategy at project preparation phase which provides the basis and justification for procurement through market analysis and risk management is paramount for successful implementation of key project contracts. There is a high risk that project activities can’t be fully completed, and project objectives not been fully achieved because of procurement and recruitment of underperforming companies if the market is not adequately assessed. For the specific case of Goma International Airport project, the failures of companies had led to delays, cost overruns and abandon of key activities. This had an impact on efficacy and efficiency of the project. It is important to notice that with high security and logistics risks that can reduce the attractiveness of international or national qualified contractors, a clear procurement strategy could have mitigated the risk of selected poor performance contractors. Furthermore, a constant hands-on support is key to success of the PIU’s management of procurement and contracts in such fragile environment. (iii) project implementation 100. Having a decentralized approach on project management can improve substantially the implementation on the ground: the relocation of the PIU from Kinshasa to Goma allowed to (i) substantially improve the implementation of the project and the physical progress of civil works on the ground, (ii) improve the dialogue between the local and the central government that helped to incorporate inputs from all the stakeholders, and (iii) improve the social dividend and the acceptance of the project by the local communities surrounding the airport. Thanks to this proximity, the needs from local communities have been incorporated and contributed to reduce poverty and share prosperity as explained in paragraph 55 and 56. As a result, this project was considered as a precursor and contributed to the strategy of decentralization of the CMU. 101. Having a good balance between urgent investments and long-term ones in an emergency project is the key for sustainability: This project was designed and prepared as an emergency project to restore the vital infrastructures of Goma International Airport following the volcanic eruption. During the project preparation, the option was to build a new mobile control tower to allow for faster implementation. As the project started implementation, however, it was finally decided to build a permanent control tower instead (see para. 62). While this took longer to achieve, this decision contributed substantially to the airport now having a much more suitable tower for an international airport and to substantially improve the airside operations in the airport in the long run. While lessons learned from previous World Bank point out that projects providing urgent investments in the context of conflict and fragility have had mixed results when they attempted to address issues of broader institutional and financial sustainability, tackling some key sectoral governance issues could be necessary for sustainable impacts. . Page 33 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: to improve the safety, security, and operations of Goma International Airport. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Conformity of the improved Yes/No No No No infrastructure at Goma international airport with 31-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2019 13-Jan-2021 aeronautical regulations. Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Capacity of the runway Yes/No No Yes Yes infrastructure at Goma International Airport to 31-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2019 13-Jan-2021 accommodate the original design aircraft Page 34 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Goma International Airport Number 140,000.00 200,000.00 277,730.00 Passengers 31-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2019 31-Dec-2019 Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Annual revenues of Goma Amount(USD) 2,500,000.00 4,500,000.00 4,868,491.00 International Airport 31-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2019 31-Dec-2019 Comments (achievements against targets): A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Component A: Airport Infrastructure Investments Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Page 35 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Target Completion Goma International Airport Percentage 0.00 100.00 100.00 Runway reconstruction physical progress 31-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2019 04-Nov-2020 Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Goma International Airport Percentage 0.00 100.00 98.00 infrastructure improvement physical progress 31-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2019 30-Sep-2020 Comments (achievements against targets): Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Length of urbain drainage Meter(m) 0.00 0.00 990.00 constructed 07-Oct-2016 07-Oct-2016 04-Nov-2020 Comments (achievements against targets): Page 36 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Component: Component B: Capacity Building and Project Implementation Support Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Preparedness and Yes/No No Yes Yes contingency plan to mitigate the impacts of the risk of 31-Dec-2014 31-Dec-2019 31-Dec-2019 volcanic activities Comments (achievements against targets): Page 37 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective/Outcome 1 1. Conformity of the improved infrastructure at Goma International Airport with aeronautical regulations. Outcome Indicators 2. Capacity of the runway infrastructure at Goma International Airport to accommodate the original design aircraft 1. Goma International Airport Runway reconstruction physical progress 2. Goma International Airport infrastructure improvement physical Intermediate Results Indicators progress 3. Length of urbain drainage constructed 4. Preparedness and contingency plan to mitigate the impacts of the risk of volcanic activities 1. Rehabilitation of the runway and the taxiway 2. Rehabilitation and extension of the apron (from 16,000 to 24,000 m2 3. Rehabilitation of the airport's electrical systems: power station and lighting of the runway (2665 m over 3000 m) 4. Construction of a new control tower with technical unit (including supply, installation of equipment) Key Outputs by Component(A) 5. Construction of the airport security fence and rehabilitation of the (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) service road existing inside the airport (5464 m executed) 6. Support for the rescue and firefighting service: protective equipment individual and collective provided 7. Construction of a collector in the city of Goma for the evacuation of stormwater from the airport to Lake Kivu Page 38 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) 1. Strengthening of the monitoring of volcanic risks and the state of Key Outputs by Component(B) preparedness of the airport and surrounding communities (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) 2. Technical assistance to strengthen the economic and social fabric of communities living around the airport Page 39 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Mohammed Dalil Essakali Task Team Leader(s) Philippe Mahele Liwoke Procurement Specialist(s) Bella Diallo Financial Management Specialist Laure Deffa Barry Team Member Faly Diallo Team Member Koho Francine Takoy Team Member Nora Weisskopf Team Member Bertrand Murguet Team Member Lanssina Traore Team Member Sidy Diop Team Member Louis Jean Michel Desvaux De Marigny Team Member Noroarisoa Rabefaniraka Team Member Isabella Micali Drossos Counsel Charles E. Schlumberger Team Member Antoine V. Lema Social Specialist Alexandre K. Dossou Team Member Hocine Chalal Social Specialist Fabio Galli Team Member Supervision/ICR Page 40 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) Tojoarofenitra Ramanankirahina, Bertram Boie Task Team Leader(s) Clement Tukeba Lessa Kimpuni, Cheick Traore, Guy Kiaku Procurement Specialist(s) Kindoki Lydie Madjou Financial Management Specialist Francis Tasha Venayen Financial Management Specialist Bertille Gerardine Ngameni Wepanjue Financial Management Specialist Charles E. Schlumberger Team Member Richard Everett Social Specialist Bertrand Murguet Team Member Koho Francine Takoy Procurement Team Claude Lina Lobo Environmental Specialist Julie Luvisa Bazolana Procurement Team Joelle Nkombela Mukungu Environmental Specialist Cyrille Valence Ngouana Kengne Environmental Specialist Shamard Ya Jua Mungu Shamalirwa Social Specialist B. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY15 11.100 76,543.74 FY16 0 0.00 Total 11.10 76,543.74 Supervision/ICR FY15 2.625 25,972.25 FY16 11.940 165,895.21 FY17 15.599 173,223.95 FY18 47.027 338,649.16 Page 41 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) FY19 42.555 282,631.04 FY20 38.180 242,201.71 Total 157.93 1,228,573.32 Page 42 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Amount at Approval Actual at Project Percentage of Approval Components (US$M) Closing (US$M) (US$M) Component A: Airport 0 40.00 0 Infrastructure Investments Component B: Capacity Building and Project 0 6.00 0 Implementation Support Contingencies 0 6.00 0 Total 0.00 52.00 0.00 Page 43 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 1. The objectives of the ex-post economic analysis is to update and repeat the 2015 benefit-cost analysis by taking into account: • The main variations or deviations from the investment program planned in 2015, • actual air traffic data observed between 2013 and 2019 for which forecasts had been developed, in order to establish and compare the differences and probable causes between the two situations (ex ante and ex post). 2. The methodological approach was to: • retain the initial time horizon; of the study, 20 years from 2015 to 2035, • integrate actual air traffic data (passengers, cargo,) with historical data and adjust the required forecasts to these; • keep the life of the new facilities at 25 years, as in the original study; • actual capital costs will replace budgeted costs, and should specify amounts, annual schedule, construction and commissioning periods. As in the original study, these should distinguish between costs associated with safety, capacity, and environmental investments; • operation and maintenance costs will be based on the same assumptions as in the original study; • the nature of the economic benefits will be retained and adjusted based on observed traffic data: benefits to passengers, air operators, and the airport. 3. The initial ex-ante analysis framework provided a 20-year analysis period between 2015 and 2035, based on forecasts using the latest available year, 2012. The ex-post analysis uses the same 20-year period based on : • actual air traffic data up to 2019, and the calibration of traffic forecasts for the period from 2020 to 2035 • the development program carried out between 2016 and 2021 compared to the initial ex- ante program from 2015 to 2035, • the 12% discount rate initially used in the ex-ante study, and renewed ; • sensitivity analyses of minus 10% for economic benefits and +10% for costs, • an annual depreciation of investments remaining at 4% for a residual value calculated at the end of the period, i.e. 2035, • results expressed in terms of NPV, EIRR and A/C ratio. 4. The results of the ex-post analysis (total capex and capex without safety and environment) will be compared to those of the 2015 ex-ante analysis (total capex and capex without safety and environment). The nature of the economic benefits remained the same as the ex-ante study, namely: time savings for air travelers (passengers) and a reduction in aircraft operating costs for cargo carriers, resulting from increased efficiency, use of larger aircraft, lifting or reducing restrictions on aircraft take-off and landing weights. 5. Similar to the 2015 ex ante study, no economic benefits will be quantified for the following variables: • The benefit in terms of reduced airport operating and maintenance costs generated by the new infrastructure. In Goma, as in the majority of national airports in the DRC, annual management, maintenance and operating costs may be sub-optimal. The increased runway and terminal capacity may result in cost increases rather than reductions. This is because the Page 44 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) airport's financial statements take an accounting approach, by line item of expenses and revenues, and do not contain management accounting information for airport assets by cost center (e.g., runway and taxiway maintenance and operations and aircraft parking areas. 6. Airport safety investments (e.g., fencing, control tower, airside drainage, fire station) are usually not typically subject to benefit-cost analyses since they meet international standards that certified airports are required to meet. But our analysis included these investments to be conservative and to comply with the same assumptions as in the ex-ante analysis. 7. The 2016-2021 ex-post investment program also includes a significant amount of environmental work, including city-side work required to address the airport's drainage problems (sewers, standpipes, environmental studies, etc.). The economic benefits resulting from these works will be treated as unquantified and/or non-quantifiable benefits, due to the absence of any available data to measure the economic benefits at the level of the riparian population. The evaluation of such socio-economic benefits, based on avoided damages, would have required a prior human environment study identifying parameters such as, for example, the impacted population, identification of their socio- economic characteristics (household income), data on costs associated with health impacts, as well as relocation and/or expropriation costs not included in this investment program. 8. The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) at completion is estimated at 13.4% with a net present value (NPV) of US$6.78 million. It should be noted that, while the EIRR indicates sufficient economic return on infrastructure investment, the actual return is lower than expected (EIRR of 15.1% at appraisal). Should traffic be 20 percent lower than projected, the NPV at 12 percent drops to US$1.77 million , and the economic internal rate of return drops to 11.9 percent. At Appraisal At Completion Net Present Value Economic Internal Net Present Value Economic Internal in US$ @ 12% Rate of Return in US$ @ 12% Rate of Return Base Case 9.8 million 15.1% 6.78 million 13.4 scenario Traffic 20 % 2.0 million 12.2% 1.77 million 11.9 Lower 9. Given the context, these results appear quite satisfactory and are close to those calculated in the ex- ante study. These results also illustrate that the economic benefits of the airport capacity investments alone are sufficient to economically justify the entire project ex post.A synthesis of the results on the discounted benefits and costs for the ex-post and ex-ante scenarios is presented, thus allowing to identify the sources of the differences between the ex-post and ex-ante analyses. These differences relate in particular to the differences between the passenger, freight and movement forecasts and consequently to the present values and relative weights of the main cost and benefit variables. 10. The first observation concerns the air traffic forecasts. The differences between the two situations ex post and ex ante are explained by the updating of actual traffic data between 2013 and 2019. Thus, since the growth rates of passenger, cargo, and movement traffic remained constant in both situations, the differences are explained by the evolution of traffic between 2013 and 2019. The actual data reported a higher passenger volume in 2019 than estimated in the initial ex ante forecast. For Page 45 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) cargo, the initial forecast overestimated the observed volumes between 2013 and 2019, resulting in a lower forecast for the ex post analysis for the period 2020 to 2035. These variations in traffic projections directly influenced the economic benefit results for the two air traffic components in the sum of the project's economic benefits. The capital costs of the programs also influence the results of the ex post and ex ante analyses. 11. The project’s efficiency had been challenged by several factors: higher actual costs, procurement delays, and natural disasters – which resulted in some funding shortfalls. The implementation period also extended longer than expected. But the size of the funding shortfall for Component A was not too large – approximately US$4 million (or about 15 percent increase) which the contingency included in the project financing covered the majority of, therefore, these challenges had a small impact on the project’s efficiency. Financial Analysis 12. The financial analysis was not performed because actual historical data on aeronautical and non- aeronautical revenues as well as annual maintenance, operating and administrative expenses were not provided by RVA. The airport financial statements provided by RVA have an accounting approach, by line item of expenses and revenues, and do not contain any management accounting information for airport assets by cost center (e.g., maintenance and operation of runways and taxiways and aircraft parking areas). Page 46 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS Page 47 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) World Bank: DRC - Country Assistance Strategy for the period FY2013-2016 (Report No. 66158-ZR) World Bank: DRC - Country Partnership Framework for the period FY2022-2026 (Report No. 168084-ZR) Client completion Report, RVA: Statistics on aircraft movement, freight and passengers, period from 2011 to 2021 Result Framework and monitoring reports World Bank Group. March 2018 Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State (Report No. 112733-ZR) Page 48 of 49 The World Bank DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project (P153085) ANNEX 7. AIRPORT CERTIFICATION ACTIVITIES FINANCED BY THE BANK IN DRC DRC TRANSPORT MULTIMODAL PROJECT (P092537) AND ITS ADDITIONAL FINANCING (P129594) 1. Airport certification activities were essentially undertaken under component 2: Operational performance strengthening and improved governance of the sector. For air transport, this component supported financing of: (i) the acquisition of urgently needed equipment for RVA, (ii) an internal diagnostic of the Ministry of Transport (MoT), (iii) training of MoT’s agents equipment, (iv) the annual audits of RVA procurement and financial activities, and (v) the development of a sector-wide governance plan. 2. The Additional Financing added the Civil Aviation Authority (AAC) as a new beneficiary. New activities (US$5 million) included consultant services for the re-certification of DRC’s passenger airlines crews and aircrafts; twinning of the AAC with a foreign civil aviation authority for a three-year period; technical assistance and training for the implementation of a five-year technical capacity program; strengthening plan for AAC; and office rehabilitation and provision of IT and office equipment. 3. RVA’s capacity to monitor airspace was improved through the financing of an air surveillance system. Staff were trained by the equipment suppliers. In 2016, ICAO initiated a two-year training program for AAC staff with a focus on airport certification. ICAO and AAC only implemented the first 6 months of the training program by the time of project closing. 4. Certification campaign of 5 air companies was completed in 2016 with three companies (FlyCAA, Air Tropique et Kin Avia) out of five passing certification. Certificate of Air Carrier was not issued. 5. To the benefit of RVA, the project provided financing forthe supply and install an air navigation and control system at Kinshasa (Topsky, completed in 2016); and for five Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, Mbandaka, Ilebo, as well as the training of 25 staff. DRC TRANSPORT AND CONNECTIVITY SUPPORT PROJECT (P161877) 6. This project will be approved at the end of FY22. In the draft PAD, airport certification activities are covered under component 1: Sectoral governance for improved connectivity and specially on subcomponent 1.2: Technical assistance to Aviation Sector Governance. This subcomponent will seek to improve the governance, climate resilience, and private financing attractiveness of the aviation sector. This subcomponent will finance the following activities: (i) external and independent financial and organizational audits of RVA and the implementation of a time-bound corrective action plan following these audits; (ii) organizational and technical audits of AAC; (iii) a climate vulnerability assessment for key airports in the project targeted areas and a prioritized work plan to address identified vulnerabilities; (iv) a short-term sustainable strategy for private sector participation in airport investments and the identification of opportunities for financially sustainable PPP in aviation sector; and (v) technical assistance to AAC to reinforce their regulatory function to provide support for airport certification. Page 49 of 49