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Report No: ICR00005742

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

IBRD-91150, IDA-66700, IDA-66710

ON A LOAN AND TWO CREDITS

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$200 MILLION, US\$21 MILLION AND US\$33.3 MILLION

TO THE

PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA

FOR THE

COVID-19 CRISIS EMERGENCY SOCIAL SAFETY NETS PROJECT

January 28, 2022

Social Protection & Jobs Global Practice  
Latin America And Caribbean Region

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective November 11, 2021)

Currency Unit = Bolivian (Bs)

Bs 6.91= US\$1

US\$0.58 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGETIC	National Agency of Electronic Government and Technology of Information ( <i>Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y tecnología de Información y Comunicación</i> )
ASFI	Supervision Authority of the Financial System ( <i>Autoridad de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero</i> )
BJAP	<i>Bono Juana Azurduy de Padilla</i>
BJP	<i>Bono Juancito Pinto</i>
BC	<i>Bono para Ciegos</i>
BCF	<i>Bono Canasta Familiar</i>
BD	<i>Bono para Discapacitados</i>
BF	<i>Bono Familia</i>
BU	<i>Bono Universal</i>
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
DGAA	General Directorate of Administrative Issues ( <i>Dirección General de Asuntos Administrativos</i> )
DGP	General Directorate of Planning ( <i>Dirección General de Planificación</i> )
DGPOT	General Directorate of Treasury Planning and Operations ( <i>Dirección General de Programación y Operaciones del Tesoro</i> )
ESCP	Environmental and Social Commitment Plan
ESF	Environmental and Social Framework
GESTORA	Public Management Entity of Long-term Social Security ( <i>Gestora Pública de la Seguridad Social a Largo Plazo</i> )
GoB	Government of Bolivia
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
GRS	Grievance Redress System
GRUS	Group of Development Partners of Bolivia
IADB	InterAmerican Development Plan
IRI	Intermediate Results Indicator
ISR	Implementation Status Report
LMP	Labor Management Procedures

MDP	Ministry of Development Planning <i>(Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo)</i>
MDPEP	Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy <i>(Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo y Economía Plural)</i>
ME	Ministry of Education
MEFP	Ministry of Economy and Public Finance <i>(Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas)</i>
MPA	Multiphase Programmatic Approach
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
POM	Project Operational Manual
RD	<i>Renta Dignidad</i>
SEGIP	Bolivian General Identification Service <i>(Servicio General de Identificación Personal)</i>
SEP	Stakeholder Engagement Plan
WBG	World Bank Group

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**DATA SHEET**

**BASIC INFORMATION**

**Product Information**

Project ID	Project Name
P173984	COVID-19 Crisis Emergency Social Safety Nets Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Bolivia	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category

**Organizations**

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Ministry of Development Planning	Ministry of Economy and Public Finance

**Project Development Objective (PDO)**

Original PDO

The objective of the Project is to provide temporary economic support to poor and vulnerable households impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic

**FINANCING**

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
<b>World Bank Financing</b>			
IBRD-91150	200,000,000	200,000,000	200,000,000
IDA-66700	21,000,000	21,000,000	21,000,000
IDA-66710	33,300,000	33,298,845	33,298,845
<b>Total</b>	<b>254,300,000</b>	<b>254,298,845</b>	<b>254,298,845</b>
<b>Non-World Bank Financing</b>			
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	<b>254,300,000</b>	<b>254,298,845</b>	<b>254,298,845</b>

**KEY DATES**

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
14-May-2020	20-Nov-2020	15-Mar-2021	30-Apr-2021	30-Jul-2021

**RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING**

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
29-Apr-2021	250.65	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Institutional Arrangements Change in Implementation Schedule

**KEY RATINGS**

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	High



**RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs**

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	21-Aug-2020	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0
02	21-Apr-2021	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	250.65

**SECTORS AND THEMES**

**Sectors**

Major Sector/Sector (%)

**Financial Sector 1**

Public Administration - Financial Sector 1

**Social Protection 99**

Public Administration - Social Protection 99

**Themes**

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)

**Finance 1**

Finance for Development 1

Disaster Risk Finance 1

**Public Sector Management 99**

Data Development and Capacity Building 99

**Social Development and Protection 100**

Social Protection 100

Social Safety Nets 100

Disability 39



<b>Human Development and Gender</b>	<b>100</b>
Gender	39
Disease Control	100
Pandemic Response	100
<b>Environment and Natural Resource Management</b>	<b>6</b>
Climate change	6
Adaptation	6

**ADM STAFF**

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## I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

### A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

#### Emergency and Country Context

- 1. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) spread rapidly across the world since December 2019, following the diagnosis of initial cases in China.** In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic as the cases multiplied across the globe. Bolivia was not spared from the COVID-19 outbreak, causing the Government of Bolivia (GoB) to impose stringent social distancing measures. On March 17, 2020, the GoB declared a national health emergency (Decreto Supremo 4196/20). Individuals were allowed to leave their homes one day a week, identified by their IDs.
- 2. COVID-19 and the measures adopted by the Government caused substantial impacts on the welfare and the economy of the country, especially on the poor and vulnerable.** The transmission channels for this economic shock included the direct and indirect cost of the illness, the direct and indirect cost of prevention measures, and the economic effect of the global downturn. In a country of Bolivia's income level, with some 80 percent of private sector workers in the informal sector, with most of the population vulnerable to income shocks, an urgent ramping up of social assistance was essential to enable the implementation of lockdown measures. The impacts of COVID-19 mitigation measures were affecting not only poor and vulnerable households but also large sections of the middle class that operated as self-employed in the informal economy. Those segments of the population were highly vulnerable to the loss of income from the impact of COVID-19 and the lack of access to social protection measures or protection after losing jobs.
- 3. COVID-19 arrived at a time of decelerating growth and deteriorating fiscal accounts, which compounded COVID-19's economic impacts.** Bolivia experienced brisk economic growth averaging 4.9 percent per year during the 2014-2016 period, due to oil and gas exports and public investment. In the same period, the income of the bottom percentile grew at an annualized 7.2 percent (compared to 2.8 percent for the whole population). The national poverty rate decreased from 63 percent in 2002 to 39 percent in 2014. Extreme poverty fell from 39 percent to 17 percent during that period<sup>1</sup>. However, in recent years before the pandemic, growth decelerated as the Bolivian economy had been hit by external shocks, in particular a reduction of gas exports. Growth decelerated from 6.8 percent in 2013 to 2.2 percent in 2019 and poverty reduction slowed. The fiscal deficit grew to 7.2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2019, reflecting the measures implemented by the GoB to cushion the slowdown since 2015.
- 4. Bolivia experienced political turmoil just before the COVID-19 pandemic.** The challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic had to be dealt with-in a complex political context. Bolivia experienced social unrest following the contested October 2019 election. A transition government took office on November 12, 2019, to lead the country until the next elections. Initially scheduled for May 2020, the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: PAD Report No: PAD3900. May 6, 2020.



elections were postponed and took place in October 2020. This transition government had to respond to this unprecedented global crisis in a challenging socio-economic context.

### Sectoral and Institutional Context

5. **Bolivia’s social assistance programs, which include conditional cash transfers, social pensions, and disability benefits, were not designed to respond to sudden income shocks.** The main programs were: *Renta Dignidad* (RD) – a universal social pension - and two categorically targeted conditional cash transfers - (a) *Bono Juancito Pinto* (BJP) focused on the school-age population attending public schools and (b) *Bono Juan Azurduy Padilla* (BJAP) focused on pregnant women and mothers of children below two years without social health insurance.

6. **The delivery system for social assistance was characterized by institutional fragmentation, multiple beneficiary registries, and different cash payment systems.** Bolivia did not have a unique coordinating institution for social assistance. The Ministries of Education, Health, and the Public Management Entity of Long-Term Social Security (*Gestora Publica de la Seguridad Social de Largo Plazo*, GESTORA) implemented social safety net programs. Each institution managed its own beneficiary registry, limiting the effectiveness of social policy and the ability of the social safety net to respond to shocks. Payment systems were fragmented as well. The BJP delivered the payments through the school principals or the army. The RD and BJAP used SINTESIS, a private payment platform that enabled beneficiaries to cash out the benefits in any bank of the country. Before the COVID-19 crisis, SINTESIS operated a network of more than 50 financial and commercial institutions with more than 1,300 payment sites throughout Bolivia, providing biometric controls to reduce fraud.

7. **To respond to the pandemic-created crisis, the GoB took swift action to soften the impact of the restrictions on economic activity.** After the initiation of the lockdown in March 2020, the GoB’s initial emergency response was the creation of three new temporary cash transfer programs—*Bono Familia* (BF), *Bono Canasta Familiar* (BCF), and *Bono Universal* (BU)—that together provided economic support for households affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Bolivia combined scaling up existing programs and creating new temporary programs to avoid excluding households in need of assistance. The combination of the three transfers was to ensure that all households in the bottom 60 percent of the population would receive some social assistance. The GoB reached the objective of providing temporary economic support to poor and vulnerable households affected by the COVID-19 pandemic completing payments of temporary cash transfers to more than 7.6 million individuals (see Table 1 for the final number of beneficiaries for each program).



**Table 1. Temporary Cash Transfer Programs for COVID-19 crisis<sup>(a)</sup>**

Program	Eligibility Criteria	Direct Beneficiaries			Amount Temporary Support		Total Cost	
		Total	Reimbursed by this project	Financed by GoB or other donors	Bs	US\$	Bs, millions	US\$, millions
<i>Bono Familia</i> (BF)	Children enrolled in public and private schools for 2020 in pre-primary, primary, and secondary education	2,907,048	42,847	2,864,201	500	72	1,435	206
<i>Bono Canasta Familia</i> (BCF)	Current beneficiaries of social assistance programs who are not formal workers	1,050,867	0	1,050,867	400	57	420	60
<i>Bono Universal</i> (BU)	Bolivians between 18 and 59 years old with more than two years of residency, who are (a) not formal workers in the public or private sectors, (b) not receiving pensions (including elderly and disability), (c) not eligible for BCF, and (d) not a parent of a child eligible for BF.	3,658,905	3,459,574	199,331	500	72	1,829	262
<b>Total</b>		<b>7,616,820</b>	<b>3,502,421</b>	<b>4,114,399</b>			<b>3,684</b>	<b>528</b>

Note: (a) Direct beneficiaries and total cost of the three programs in this Table reflect the final results, which differed from the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) estimates at preparation. Annex 1 includes the table with the original estimates included in the PAD.

### Theory of Change (Results Chain)

8. The PAD included an explicit Theory of Change. The project focused on the rapid delivery of cash transfers to a broad set of the population, likely affected by the COVID-19 economic shock. With this focus, the project aimed at mitigating in part the short-term socioeconomic losses faced by households and enabling compliance of the poor and vulnerable population with Government-imposed social distance measures and confinement. The project objective was to provide financial resources to implement temporary cash transfers nationally and expand the use of an effective payment system. The PAD pointed out that the amount of money provided through these cash transfers would cover basic consumption for a limited period, and it would not be enough to weather an extended crisis.

9. There were several assumptions underlying the outcomes: (a) the availability of information on IDs to build a registry of beneficiaries of the BU, (b) the capacity of the National Agency of Electronic



Government and Technology of Information (AGETIC) to conduct database cross-checks for eligibility verification, (c) good coordination among the different institutions involved, and (d) robust communication about eligibility.

Figure 1. Theory of Change in the PAD

Activities	Outputs	Outcome
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide financing for the three temporary cash transfer programs</li> <li>• Contract services of the single payment platform via Banking system</li> <li>• Conduct beneficiary eligibility verification with cross-check of other databases</li> <li>• Implement the Communication strategy</li> <li>• Implement the Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beneficiary lists are verified</li> <li>• Cash transfers are paid to 3.576 million eligible beneficiaries via bank tellers</li> <li>• Applicants' complaints and questions are addressed</li> <li>• Citizens have clarity of eligibility to each one of the benefits</li> </ul>	<p>Shortfall in income during COVID-19 crisis is partially mitigated in beneficiary households</p>

**Project Development Objectives (PDOs)**

10. The objective of the Project was to provide temporary economic support to poor and vulnerable households impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

**Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators**

11. The progress towards the achievement of the PDO was to be measured by the following PDO indicators:

- Direct beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs receiving temporary economic support financed by the project
- Percentage of direct beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs receiving temporary economic support financed by the project
- Direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project, who are not beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs
- Percentage of direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project
- Direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project<sup>8</sup>
- Direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project - Female<sup>9</sup>

**Components**

12. The project supported the ability of the population to abide by the stringent quarantine measures that were a central part of the GoB's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and to weather the impact of the economic crisis through the provision of income support over a limited period of time.



The project had three components: (a) temporary cash transfers to vulnerable households, (b) support to the temporary expansion of the safety net to informal workers, and (c) support to the payment system for cash transfers and to project implementation.

13. **Component 1. Temporary cash transfers to vulnerable households** (US\$99.72 million). This component aimed to address the significant impacts of COVID-19 on the income of poor and vulnerable households thereby reducing financial barriers to health-seeking behavior, such as social distancing. It was going to finance temporary payments to beneficiaries of existing safety nets programs. This component included two subcomponents.

- **Subcomponent 1.1. Temporary cash transfers to vulnerable households with children enrolled in schools** (US\$74.72 million). This subcomponent contributed to the GoB's strategy to provide resources to families with children between 3 and 18 years to cover the extra spending on health, transport, and/or food that occurred because of the COVID-19 pandemic through the implementation of the BF. The implementing agency of this subcomponent was the Ministry of Education, with support from GESTORA and in coordination with the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) of the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance (*Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas*, MEFP).
- **Subcomponent 1.2. Temporary cash transfer to vulnerable households with pregnant women, children below 2 years old, or disabled and elderly individuals** (US\$25 million). This subcomponent contributed to the GoB's strategy of partially compensating the loss of income among vulnerable households that were not eligible for the BF, through the implementation of the BCF. This subcomponent had two implementing agencies. Part A of Subcomponent 1.2 was to support those BCF-eligible beneficiaries who were in the beneficiary registry of BJAP, *Bono para Discapacitados* (BD), and *Bono para Ciegos* (BC). For Part A of the subcomponent, the implementing agency was the PCU. The PCU relied on National Agency of Electronic Government and Technology of Information AGETIC for applying the eligibility criteria through database cross-checks and GESTORA for payment delivery. Part B of Subcomponent 1.2 was to support those BCF-eligible beneficiaries who were in the beneficiary registry of the RD. The Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy (*Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo y Economía Plural* MDPEP) was the implementing agency supported by GESTORA for the definition of the beneficiary list and payment delivery.

14. **Component 2. Support the transitory expansion of the safety net to informal workers** (US\$150.93 million). This component was to support the GoB's effort to extend the safety net to households with informal workers not eligible for the BF and BCF, through the implementation of the BU. The implementing agency of this component was the PCU, with AGETIC responsible for applying the eligibility criteria through database cross-checks and GESTORA through payment delivery.

15. **Component 3. Support to the payment system for cash transfers during the COVID-19 emergency and the project implementation arrangements** (US\$3.1 million). In addition to supporting the financial audit of the project, this component was aimed to support the expansion of payments by the banking system to all beneficiaries of temporary cash transfers during the COVID-19 emergency. The GoB



was to use SINTESIS for the three temporary cash transfer programs, BF, BCF, and BU. The decision to use SINTESIS was based on an adequate fiduciary assessment of the firm, the fact that it is currently used for two existing social assistance programs (BJAP and RD), and its unique ability to reach across the banking sector. Additionally, the GoB, through the Central Bank and the Supervision Financial Institutions Authority, requested (through Decreto Supremo 4200/20) that all financial institutions in Bolivia connect to the SINTESIS payment platform to expand the number of payment sites, thereby reducing the risk of crowds at payment sites during payment days and minimizing the areas in the country without a close-by payment site. The GoB also negotiated with the payment platform provider a significant reduction (40 percent) of the normal transfer fee. The implementing agency of this component was the PCU of the MEFP. The component was also aimed to finance non-consulting and consulting services to guarantee an efficient and transparent delivery of the temporary cash transfer programs.

**B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)**

16. Following the Government’s request on April 14, 2021, the project was restructured on April 29, 2021, to introduce the following changes:

- An extension of the project’s closing date
- A revision of the PDO indicators, intermediate indicators, and targets in the Results Framework
- Changes in Components 1, 2, and 3 and their costs
- A reallocation of funds across disbursement categories
- A revision of the institutional arrangements.

17. While the project was prepared in short time (six weeks) and approved by the Board on May 14, 2020, it was not declared effective until November 20, 2020. In the meantime, the GoB had completed the payments to the beneficiaries of the three emergency cash transfer programs (end of September 2020). A Level II Restructuring was necessary to accommodate the GoB’s decision to use project resources to finance mostly beneficiaries of the BU and a small number of beneficiaries of the BF.

**Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets**

18. The PDO was not changed.

19. Changes in the Results Framework included the: (a) deletion of indicators that were no longer relevant due to the change in the scope of the financed activities, (b) revision of existing indicators’ target values to better capture the contribution of the project to the PDO, and (c) deletion of intermediate indicators due to reallocation of financing among components. The PDO indicators were modified as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2. PDO Indicators Before and After Restructuring**

Indicators	Original Target	Revised Target
1. Direct beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs receiving	1,285,134	Dropped



temporary economic support financed by the project (Number)		
2. Percentage of direct beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs receiving temporary economic support financed by the project (Percentage)	32.50	Dropped
3. Direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project, who are not beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs (Number)	2,290,880	3,459,574
4. Percentage of direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project (Percentage)	51	46
5. Beneficiaries of social safety net programs (Number)	3,576,013	3,502,421
5. Beneficiaries of social safety net programs - Female (Number)	1,827,291	1,789,686

20. The PDO Indicators 1 and 2 were dropped to reflect the decision of the GoB to apply almost all of the project resources to finance the BU under Component 2. Beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs were covered either by the BF or the BCF.

21. A change to the end-of-project target value of PDO Indicator 4 was done to reflect the changes adopted by the GoB during implementation. The GoB reached a large number of BU beneficiaries than estimated at the time of project design, situation that increased the total number of beneficiaries reached by the three temporary cash transfers and reduced the proportion of beneficiaries financed by the project. The denominator changed based on the total number of beneficiaries of the BF, BCF, and the BU paid (from 6,985,249 to 7,616,820).

22. Targets of PDO Indicators 3, 5, and 6 were revised to be better aligned with the projected number of beneficiaries financed by the project.

23. The intermediate results indicators (IRIs) were modified as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3. IRIs before and after Restructuring**

Indicators	Original Target	Revised Target
1.1 Direct beneficiaries of Bono Canasta Familiar financed by the project (Number)	435,000	Dropped
1.2 Direct beneficiaries of Bono Canasta Familiar financed by the project - Female (Number)	225,379	Dropped
1.3 Direct beneficiaries of Bono Familia financed by the project (Number)	1,040,102	42,847
1.4 Direct beneficiaries of Bono Familia financed by the project - Female (Number)	534,677	22,026
2.1 Direct beneficiaries of Bono Universal financed by the project (Number)	2,100,911	3,458,574
2.2 Direct beneficiaries of Bono Universal financed by the project - Female (Number)	1,079,998	1,778,434
3.1 Payment platform to deliver the payments of the temporary economic support contracted (Yes/No)	Yes	Dropped
3.2 Percentage of inquiries or grievances that are submitted to the grievance redress mechanism that are addressed during the course of the project (Percentage)	75	75





24. The IRIs under Component 1 (IRIs 1.1 and 1.2) were dropped. IRIs 1.3, 1.4, 2.1 and 2.2 were revised to be better aligned with the projected number of beneficiaries financed by the project. IRI 3.1 was dropped to reflect the decision of the GoB to not finance the cost of payment of the temporary cash transfers with project’s resources. Finally, IRI 3.2 remained as originally stated in the PAD.

### Revised Components

25. **Changes to the project’s components.** All three components were modified to reflect the changes to the project activities:

- **Changes to Component 1.** This component was changed to reflect the decision of the GoB to finance the BF and the BCF with other sources.<sup>2</sup> Subcomponent 1.1 remained to reflect the GoB’s decision to allocate US\$3.085 million to reimburse the payments to 42,847 beneficiaries of the BF. Subcomponent 1.2 (Temporary cash transfers to vulnerable households with pregnant women, children below 2 years of age, or disabled or elderly individuals) was dropped, as no project resources were used to fund transfers of the BCF.
- **Changes to Component 2.** This component was expanded to support the GoB’s efforts to temporarily extend monetary support to informal workers who were not eligible for the BF and BCF, through the implementation of the BU, during the COVID-19 emergency crisis. The execution of this component had surpassed the original target by 66 percent. Resources from Components 1 and 3 were reallocated to this component.
- **Changes to Component 3.** The name of this component was modified as ‘Support project implementation arrangements’ to reflect the activities supported after restructuring. This component was aimed to support the financial audit of the project. The activity to support the expansion of payments through the banking system to all beneficiaries of temporary cash transfers during COVID-19 emergency was not financed with the project’s resources and instead it was financed by the GoB. The GoB decided to extend an existing contract with SINTESIS to pay the three temporary cash transfers. Despite the GoB agreed during preparation to amend that contract to make it eligible for project financing, the new administration found it administratively costly and preferred to avoid any additional change in the contract with SINTESIS.

**Table 4. Changes in Project’s Components and Costs**

Components	Cost before Restructuring (US\$ million)	Cost after Restructuring (US\$ million)
1. Temporary cash transfers to vulnerable households	99.72	3.08
2. Support the transitory expansion of the safety net to informal workers	150.93	250.65
3. Support the payment system of cash transfers during COVID-19 emergency and the implementing arrangements of the Project	3.10	0.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>253.75</b>	<b>253.75</b>

<sup>2</sup> The InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) and the French Cooperation Agency provided support to finance the BF and BCF.





## Other Changes

26. **Changes in institutional arrangements.** There were changes to the unit within the MEFP responsible for the implementation of Component 2. The General Directorate of Treasury Planning and Operation (*Dirección General de Programación y Operaciones del Tesoro – DGPOT*) became the unit responsible for the implementation of Component 2, replacing the PCU. The PCU remained responsible for the administrative and financial implementation of the project. The rationale for this change was that the implementation of the temporary cash transfer programs under the MEFP took place before the PCU became operational with project effectiveness.

27. **Extension of the project’s closing date.** The project’s closing date was extended 90 days, from April 30, 2021, to July 31, 2021. The reason was to allow the documentation of payments to beneficiaries of temporary cash transfers under Component 1 and to complete the request for reimbursement of the remaining credit funds.

## Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

28. There were no changes to the Theory of Change. The project’s restructuring sought to adapt the allocation of loan and credits’ resources to the GoB’s choice of available resources to finance the three *Bonos* under the emergency response to the pandemic.

## II. OUTCOME

### A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

#### Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

**Rating:** High

29. The project was highly relevant at the time of appraisal and remained highly relevant at completion. The project was in line with the World Bank Group (WBG) Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the Plurinational State of Bolivia for FY2016–2020 and its Performance and Learning Review presented in 2018. It contributed to the first pillar of the CPF to promote broad-based and inclusive growth. The project contributed, as intended, to Objective 2 ‘Increase access to selected basic services for the poorest communities’ by expanding temporary safety net coverage beyond the groups already covered by existing social protection programs, to cover informal workers unemployed due to the pandemic, among others.

30. The project was in line with the WBG’s strategic priorities and mission to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity in a sustainable way. The project’s PDO was also in line with Pillar 2 of the 2020 World Bank’s COVID-19 Crisis Response Approach Paper. The project directly supported in mitigating the economic effects of COVID-19 in increases of extreme poverty and inequality.



## **B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)**

### **Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome**

**Rating:** Substantial

31. The PDO was successfully achieved, as measured by the proposed indicators in the PAD and the revised Results Framework, meeting most of the original targets and those revised during the Level II Restructuring. Given the fact that almost 100 percent of the loan and credits were disbursed by the time of the restructuring, this ICR will not include a split rating, but will rather evaluate the achievement of the objective against the original targets, while highlighting further achievements through the restructured indicators.

32. The project included only one objective: to provide temporary economic support to poor and vulnerable households impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which was measured by all the PDO Indicators. By project completion, temporary economic support had successfully been provided to all project-targeted poor and vulnerable households affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. As explained in section I, the Government successfully implemented a vertical and horizontal expansion of temporary cash transfers to mitigate the adverse effects of the pandemic. While the project was initially meant to support the three temporary cash transfers, it was the Government's decision to apply the project's resources to mainly support the horizontal expansion through the BU. The original targets for the PDO indicators regarding the BF and BCF were reached with support from other international financial partners. The project exceeded the original target for the PDO indicator regarding the number of BU beneficiaries financed by the project, as it was anticipated during restructuring.

33. The project fell slightly short in reaching the overall number of beneficiaries and the percentage of direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support programs covered with the project resources because the amount of the BU benefit was higher than the other temporary cash transfers.

34. The target for women beneficiaries was partially achieved. While the target that was adjusted in the restructuring was fully met, the original target at preparation was not. The target for women beneficiaries was partially achieved because the percentage of female direct beneficiaries of BU was lower than the BF or BCF and the project financed a large proportion of BU beneficiaries after restructuring. The adjusted target was also partially achieved because the final percentage of women beneficiaries of BU was lower than estimated at the time of restructuring.



Table 5. PDO Indicators

Original PDO Indicator	Baseline	Revised Baseline	Original End Target	Revised End Target	Actual
Direct beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs receiving temporary economic support financed by the Project	0	n.a.	1,285,134	Dropped	42,847
Percentage of direct beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs receiving temporary economic support financed by the Project	0	n.a.	32.50	Dropped	1.08
Direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project, who are not beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs (Number)	0	0	2,290,880	3,459,574	3,459,574 (target exceeded)
Percentage of direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project (Percentage)	0	0	51.00	46.00	46.00 (partially achieved)
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs (Number)	0	0	3,576,013	3,502,421	3,502,421 (almost fully achieved)
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs – Female (Number)	0	0	1,827,291	1,789,686	1,516,005 (partially achieved)

35. Additionally, by project completion, the social protection system had been strengthened, as shown by the following achievements: (i) the successful vertical and horizontal expansion of cash transfers implemented by the GoB to mitigate the adverse effects of the pandemic created the conditions for an adaptive social protection system; (ii) the creation of a registry for BU beneficiaries (in a context of and the lack a social registry) through the use of primary information from the ID database and other administrative databases, such formal job and pension registries, has equipped the country to reach the population not covered by existing social assistance programs in future crises; and (iii) the successful use of a single payment platform with access to a country-wide network of bank offices for all temporary cash transfer payments during the crisis showed how to improve efficiency in delivering the regular cash transfer programs.

**Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating**

36. The overall efficacy rating is **substantial**, based on overachievement of one PDO Indicator with project resources, the full achievement of another PDO Indicator with government resources, the almost full achievement of one of the PDO Indicators and the partial achievement of one of the PDO Indicators, as well as the additional achievements in strengthening the social protection system’s ability to provide temporary economic support in future crises.



### C. EFFICIENCY

Rating: Substantial

37. **Operational efficiency.** Project preparation was intense and efficient and done in a very short period of time. The teams moved forward with undeterred commitment. The project approval process was fast and efficient, which was crucial to meet the timelines of the Government in a context of crisis.

38. Several elements contributed to a substantial operational efficiency rating of this project during implementation: (i) high levels of transparency; (ii) low administrative costs of implementation; and (iii) fast preparation and implementation, with the project fully disbursing and closing in less than a year after approval.

39. One element that contributed to substantial efficiency during design and implementation was the clear and transparent mechanism to identify beneficiaries, which contributed to sound targeting, avoiding duplications, while simultaneously ensuring that there was universal coverage of the poor and vulnerable households impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

40. Another element contributing to substantial efficiency during implementation was the choice to process the cash transfers through the financial system. The use of an existing single payment platform, SINTESIS, to deliver the temporary cash transfers (BU, BCF and BF) contributed to efficiency of delivery, improving transparency and speeding the time of payment to beneficiaries.

41. Finally, the PCU was staffed with civil servants from MEFP, which contributed to administrative efficiency, as there was no onboarding required to begin implementation.

42. Some shortcomings regarding efficiency were: (i) the delay in project effectiveness; (ii) the three-month project extension; and (iii) the slight shortfall in reaching the overall number of beneficiaries of the project given BU's higher benefit amount.

43. **Economic efficiency.** An ex-post economic analysis was carried out taking into consideration final coverage associated with the implementation of the three temporary cash transfer programs and the poverty impact (see Annex 4) as was estimated in the original economic analysis at appraisal. Results are in line with those of the original economic analysis. Together, the three temporary cash transfers covered 96 percent of the Bolivian population, only 1.9 percentage points lower than the original coverage estimate. Additionally, programs helped to mitigate the adverse effects of the COVID-19 crisis by reducing poverty in 1.74 percentage points in 2020.

44. The ex-post economic analysis showed that BU, supported by this project, reached almost 80 percent of the poor, implying very high targeting efficiency. It covered 75.2 percent of the population, reaching 79 percent of the poor, and with coverage of the first fourth quintiles of the income distribution above 75 percent. Geographically, BU reached 76.8 percent of the population living in urban areas and 71.6 percent of those living in rural areas. It reached 74.1 percent of women of the country, 76.4 percent of men and 76.3 percent of indigenous population. Finally, it reached 79.6 percent of the population younger than 65 years of age, while only 33 percent of the elderly (mainly because the BCF covered the beneficiaries of the regular social pension program RD, not eligible for BU).



## **Assessment of Efficiency and Rating**

### **D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING**

**Rating:** Satisfactory

45. The overall outcome rating is deemed Satisfactory, given High Relevance, Substantial Efficacy and Substantial Efficiency.

### **E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)**

#### **Indigenous People**

46. The project interventions were designed to prioritize inclusiveness. The design and implementation of BU, reaching poor and vulnerable population previously uncovered by any social program, allowed to increase the coverage of indigenous population from 77 percent, with only BF and BCF, to 98 percent.

#### **Gender**

47. The PAD included a core indicator to measure the number of direct beneficiaries of the social safety net programs, financed by the project. By completion, the number of female beneficiaries of the social safety net programs supported by the project reached 1,516,005. As mentioned above, the reason for not meeting the target of 1,800,470 of female beneficiaries was the use of the same percentage estimated at appraisal at the time of restructuring, because data on female beneficiaries were not available. In the case of the BU, the number of female beneficiaries reached by the project was 1,486,882 while the target at restructuring was 1,778,434. In the case of BF, the number of female beneficiaries reached by the project was 29,123, surpassing the target at restructuring by 7,087.

#### **Institutional Strengthening**

48. The temporary cash transfers, co-designed with the World Bank team, contributed to innovations in policy. In support to the GoB's policy decisions, the project innovated by leveraging the ID registry and public administrative databases, to deliver an emergency response in short time to individuals never reached by cash transfer programs before. This happened before other well-known examples in Brazil, Thailand, and Indonesia introduced similar programs. The capacity developed under this project will remain, and it can be redeployed to respond to natural disasters in specific geographic locations, for instance, floods, to which Bolivia is prone. The project thereby strengthened the adaptive capacity of the GoB to respond to future climate impacts or health crisis.

49. Another key achievement was the innovations in the payment of the cash transfers using a single payment system, the national payment platform SINTESIS, to pay the temporary cash transfers, ensuring transparency and celerity in the payments to beneficiaries. The single payment system allowed the following achievements: (a) reach almost all branches of private and public banks of the Bolivian financial system; and (b) achieve an unprecedented level of transparency in the execution of the payment of the temporary cash transfers, as banks had the chance to verify identity of beneficiaries connecting the



payment platform with the GoB's ID database to avoid errors and poor practices. As part of the expansion of an existing contract with SINTESIS, the GoB negotiated a reduction of 40% in the transaction fee for the temporary cash transfers to US\$ 0.42, comparing with the transaction fee previously negotiated for the other cash transfer programs. Before the COVID-19 crisis, the GoB only used SINTESIS to pay BJAP and RD, managing payments of the other traditional social assistance programs in cash through school principals, the army, or personal checks. The choice of payment under this project helped harmonize the tools used by the GoB to pay cash transfers programs.

### Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

50. The project was a key piece to respond to the crisis generated by COVID-19. The BU was a fundamental instrument to reach 96 percent of the Bolivian population in combination with the BF and BCF. The BU was able to reach all those households with informal workers who became unemployed as a result of the social distancing measures imposed by the pandemic.

51. As shown in the Efficiency section, the project was estimated to have contributed to mitigate the poverty level at national level by almost two percent, based on the simulations carried out using the 2020 national household survey. The Project successfully complemented the country's efforts, with the support of other international donors, to achieve universal coverage of the poor and vulnerable households impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with temporary cash transfers.

## III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

### A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

52. **Rapid expansion of the COVID-19 pandemic.** Since surging in the Chinese Wuhan region in December 2019, COVID-19 quickly spread around the world. The speed of the spread and the serious health consequences of the disease triggered governments across the world to impose lockdowns and social distancing measures. This, in turn, caused economic activity to significantly slow down, business closures, and rising unemployment. Bolivia adopted mitigation measures of the pandemic in March 2020, as explained in section I. This context required fast preparation and the team worked under pressure. Despite the tight timeline, the project did not simply scale up existing programs but managed, in two weeks, to inform the design and simulate ex-ante the impact of a new temporary transfers for informal workers and their families (BU), among the first of this kind in the developing world.

53. **Definition of the temporary cash transfers in a challenging context.** The transitional government assumed office in November 2019 under a complex social landscape. Bolivia was facing multiple compounded challenges, which were considered in defining the emergency response to the crisis: (a) the high level of informality in the Bolivian economy; (b) the number of registries of beneficiaries to be coordinated, since Bolivia does not have a social registry; and (c) the distribution of the cash transfers across the national territory. The Government displayed openness to consider the suggestions and technical assistance on how to tackle the economic effects of the crisis with considerations in the efficiency and transparency in the distribution.



54. **Commitment and institutional capacity of the GoB's team.** Within the Government, the MEFP led the efforts in defining the measures to mitigate the emergency crisis, creating the legal framework (through the approval of several decrees, as mentioned in section I) and regulations that outlined the operation of the temporary transfers. The GoB was able to gather a solid team of civil servants, technically qualified and committed, who joined these efforts.

55. **Timely technical collaboration of the World Bank.** The World Bank teams provided timely and relevant technical assistance to the Government during the project's preparation. At the height of the pandemic, the World Bank played a key role in sharing the measures other countries around the world were taking to tackle the crisis. The World Bank ran simulations to help the GoB fine-tune the response and ensure that the poor and vulnerable would be reached and to capture those workers who would foreseeably find themselves out of work. For instance, owing to the simulations, the BCF was expanded beyond beneficiaries in the public education sphere to incorporate schools in the private sector with low-income students, which the Government also wanted to reach.

56. **Flexibility by all teams during preparation.** This flexibility was critical to ensure the level of support the GoB needed on time. To ensure that the WBG funds could be used to reimburse the national treasury for the temporary cash transfers, it was crucial to prepare the project and have it approved by the World Bank board by May 14, 2020. This was a critical step to guarantee expenditures under this project would be eligible, as the project needed to be signed before most transfers were distributed due to the limited percentage of retroactive financing. There was a deep level of commitment from both the country/Government and the World Bank. This allowed the Central Bank of Bolivia to advance the funds to provide the temporary cash transfers, against the guarantee that the World Bank would approve the funds to support the national budget.

57. **Willingness to innovate.** The crisis was an opportunity to implement changes that could improve the outreach to the population in need and increase transparency and efficiency. Examples were the choice of payment systems for the cash transfers and the management of the registries. The Bank reacted fast, was flexible and innovative in the use of emergency procedures and raising the retroactive financing ceiling, as discussed further below in section IV.

58. **Lessons learned were incorporated into the project's design.** During preparation, the following lessons were considered: the importance of protecting the most vulnerable in the face of a crisis to prevent further harm; the role of cash transfers in protecting human capital; the difficulty of accurately targeting in a context of crisis; and the importance of speed in a context of crisis when trying to balance a well-targeted versus a timely response.

## B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

59. **Complex political context.** As mentioned in section I, there was great social unrest after the October 2019 election. A transitional government took office on November 12, 2019, to lead the country until the next elections. Initially scheduled for May 2020, the elections were postponed and took place in October 2020. While the project was prepared in short time and approved by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors immediately after in mid-May 2020, the National Legislative Assembly did not approve any loans during the transition government period. The incoming government and new National





Legislative Assembly took office in November 2020, and the project was passed and declared effective immediately after, almost six months after Bank approval. The Bolivian civil service displayed its capability to respond to a crisis of this magnitude in a context of political turmoil and a decelerating economy.

60. **Change in Government preference for financing sources of the temporary cash transfers.** After project effectiveness, the GoB requested the retroactive financing and a reimbursement. By December 9, 2020, a total of US\$251.2 million had been disbursed, reaching a disbursement ratio of 99 percent, mainly to finance BU. After the midterm review mission was completed in mid-March 2021, the GoB formally requested a project restructuring to adjust the project to the GoB's decision to finance mainly the BU (the project only reimbursed the BF for 42,000 beneficiaries), as it was the only project from bilateral and multilateral donors that included BU as a reimbursable expenditure. The GoB decided to finance the other Bonos with resources from the Inter-American Development Bank and the French Development Agency (*Agence Française de Développement*).

61. **Institutional arrangements worked in supporting a successful implementation.** The PCU under the MEFP was responsible for the administrative and financial management of the project. The PCU was competent and formed by civil servants not dedicated full time to the project's management. MEFP completed the implementation of the three temporary cash transfer programs before the project became effective. When the PCU was created, it began to manage the reimbursements from the project, the reporting and monitoring requirements, and the contracting of the financial audit.

#### IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

##### A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

###### M&E Design

62. The PAD foresaw that the implementing agencies (ME, MEFP, and MDPEP) would produce administrative and financial reports to monitor the project's results. The PCU would consolidate these to generate one consolidated monitoring report given the short implementation time. The PAD included the steps regarding the flow of information for each of the temporary cash transfer. The diagrams included monitoring reports from the payment platform SINTESIS to GESTORA, the implementing agencies and the PCU. During preparation, an ex-ante impact analysis was carried out through simulations, using the 2018 Household Survey. Data on the regular existing cash transfer programs were used to prepare the emergency response.

63. The PDO was defined in a simple and clear way: to provide temporary economic support to poor and vulnerable households impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, in a context of emergency created by the sanitary crisis the measures imposed by the Government, required to minimize the spread of the virus. The design of the project, as a reimbursement to the GoB for the distribution of the transfers to the poor and vulnerable population, in a swift manner, was clear and highly relevant as well. This clarity in PDO and design contributed to a sound design of the M&E in the PAD.





## M&E Implementation

64. Data for M&E were collected during implementation. SINTESIS prepared consolidated payment reports for GESTORA, which tracked the payment process and informed the PCU. One project quarterly report (October–December 2020) and one report that covered the last 7 months of project implementation (January–July 2021) was prepared by the PCU. The quarterly report was sent within 30 days after the end of 2020. The second and final report was delayed, it was delivered in October 2021. The quality of the reports was good.

## M&E Utilization

65. The flow of information among participating institutions allowed sound day-to-day monitoring of the program implementation by financial institution, type of temporary cash transfer, and geographical location. This was possible given that SINTESIS automatically generated a report on payments to beneficiaries that was sent to GESTORA. The data gathered on beneficiaries of the three temporary cash transfer were managed in line with the best international practices on personal data privacy and protection: data minimization, accuracy, limited use, and retention. Overall, the project sought to apply these principles to existing or newly collected personal data, in line with new standards and data governance protocols.

## Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

66. **Justification of overall rating for M&E quality.** The quality of the M&E is overall rated High.

## B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

67. **Financial management.** There were no issues regarding financial management during implementation. The GoB decided that the MEFP would manage the project, and its staff were trained in World Bank financial management practices, as they did not have that type of experience but had a lot of experience within the MEFP. GESTORA centralized the registries and the information on beneficiaries. While some PCU team members changed in November 2020, the PCU worked efficiently, managing the project effectiveness and the first disbursement.

68. The World Bank granted an exception to sign the project audit contract after the project closing date, thus allowing the audit to be financed with loan proceeds. The PCU had to wait till the project amendment was approved and became effective to initiate the hiring process of the audit firm. Despite the contract was awarded on July 26, 2021, before the project closing date, the audit firm requested a couple of weeks to complete its internal procedures, which required an exception request. The contract was signed on September 17, 2021. The carrying out and payment of activity were completed by the end of November 2021.

69. **Procurement.** The only procurement activity under the project was the contracting of the project's audit. Procurement for the project was carried out in accordance with the provisions stipulated in the legal agreements and the World Bank's Procurement Regulations for IPF Borrowers for Goods, Works, Non-Consulting and Consulting Services, dated July 1, 2016 (and revised in November 2017 and



August 2018). The Procurement Plan and Project Operational Manual (POM) were publicly available. Core procurement principles were considered in the POM. The procurement regulatory system as defined on paper was applied consistently in practice. The PCU had a clear system of accountability included in the POM, defining responsibilities and delegation of activities and the contracting processes. The Procurement Plan in the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP) system was up to date. The World Bank supported the PCU in the implementation of the project including supervision and training activities.

70. **Environmental and social.** The project had a moderate environmental and social risk classification at appraisal. This was the first project prepared under the new Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) in Bolivia. During project preparation, five virtual consultation workshops took place to share the analysis carried out during preparation, to ensure that most vulnerable and disadvantaged populations would be covered by the project. The virtual workshops served to inform the Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP). While the project finally financed mainly the BU, ESF was implemented as it was agreed during preparation, covering all three temporary cash transfers.

71. The Borrower prepared all key documents required under the new ESF: (a) the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP) (*Plan de Compromiso Social y Ambiental*); (b) the Stakeholder Engagement Plan SEP (*Plan de Participación de Partes Interesadas*); and (c) the Labor Management Procedures LMP (*Procedimientos de Gestión Laboral*). There were waivers to publishing the ESF required documents after the implementation of the project, as the project was processed under emergency procedures.

72. The ESCP was initially prepared on April 29, 2020, and then revised after the project restructuring in July 2021. The World Bank gave its no-objection to the ESCP on August 16, 2021.

73. The SEP received the no-objection on June 14, 2021. It was published in the MEFP on June 25, 2021. The PCU and the World Bank collaborated to complete the third and final version of the SEP, including suggestions during the midterm review mission. The SEP included the communication strategy implemented to disseminate information on the temporary cash transfers support package. The SEP spelled out the tools and techniques to reach the stakeholders, identifying their specific needs. The SEP included a summary of the actual communication activities carried out as part of the project implementation. The SEP included details on the channels to report gender violence, which were put in place by the participating financial entities in Bolivia (see Annex 7 for details). The Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) was in place, effective, and accessible to beneficiaries through a toll-free number, social media, email, and a web page of GESTORA. The mechanism to access the GRM was announced on the web pages of the MEFP, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Health (see Annex 7 for details).

74. **The document of the LMP was sent to the World Bank on December 18, 2020 and approved by the World Bank on December 19, 2020.** It was shortly after published on the web page of the MEFP. In May 2021, the LMP was revised to incorporate suggestions by the World Bank, and its final version published on June 25, 2021.<sup>3</sup> The LMP captured the work carried out by the personnel in the Bolivian

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<sup>3</sup> It is important to highlight that the project did not hire workers using project funds, per se. Under this context, the LMP was used to ensure that civil servants and beneficiaries of the project could access to secure COVID-19 biosecurity procedures and



financial institutions to pay the temporary cash transfers (around 6,000 professionals). The report included information on the modalities of payment, mentioned in section II Outcomes.

75. The LMP included information on the protocols issued by the Ministry of Labor to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in May 2020. The LMP reported on the implementation of those measures by the financial entities, complied with by all of them.

76. While the PCU was committed and followed the implementation of the ESCP, one of the constraints was the lack of a specialist on the Government team. Many aspects were well implemented: the BU was well explained to the population, along with the eligibility criteria, also in indigenous languages, on TV, radio, and other communication tools. Efforts were applied to adequately document the implementation of the ESF until project completion. The change in government was challenging as effective communication and the handing over of proper documentation during the transition were deficient.

## **C. BANK PERFORMANCE**

### **Quality at Entry**

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

77. There were strong reasons for the World Bank's involvement and support for this operation. The World Bank had experience in designing a rapid response to mitigate the socioeconomic effects of previous crises around the world. The World Bank was well positioned to support Bolivia's response to the COVID-19 crisis as it had been working with Bolivia on social protection programs for many years on the Investing in Children and Youth Project (P101084) and the Improving Employability and Labor Income of Youth Project (P143995). Under both projects, the World Bank supported employment opportunities for disadvantaged youth, the strengthening of the conditional cash transfer program BJAP, and the use of an online registration platform to collect applications and target more beneficiaries, among other aspects of the design and service delivery of social protection programs. The World Bank also provided financial support to mitigate the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. The World Bank had a solid analytical expertise in the design of benefits to support the poorest and more vulnerable households. The World Bank was closely coordinating with other bilateral and multilateral donors, through the Group of Development Partners of Bolivia (GRUS), which the World Bank was chairing at the time of preparation.

78. The WB team ensured that the GoB's emergency response followed emerging experience in international response to COVID-19 crisis. Given the speed of preparation, there were many risks around quality at entry. The team inherited the design of the first two temporary cash transfer programs (BF and BCF) but did work closely with the MEFP to design the third program (BU) to expand coverage to poor and informal workers and ensure it was well designed. As part of the preparation work, the Social Protection and Jobs and Poverty teams worked on different sets of simulations to help the GoB assesses how to define the programs, eligibility, and other parameters.

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preventive measures, ensure an accessible GRM for civil servants during the project life including SEA- SH prevention measures and ensure the adequate management of the delivery of the cash transfers in distant rural areas.



79. **Process.** In light of this challenging context, the urgency of the required response and the swift action taken by the GoB, the Bank expedited the preparation and approval of an investment project to finance the temporary cash transfers. The GoB request was received on March 20, 2020, the team’s first meeting was on April 2, Activity Initiation Note (AIN) was launched on April 3, and the Board date was May 14. This rapid delivery was possible using emergency provisions (IPF Policy Section III Paragraph 12, for Projects in Situations of Urgent Need of Assistance). This was justified by the need for immediate financial assistance to mitigate the economic and social consequences of COVID-19, resulting from one of the strictest lockdown regimes in Latin America in a context of high informality. In addition, the project incorporated the reduced lead timeline adopted for the Phase 1 COVID-19 MPA for some ESF requirements, as well as Board lead times. Typical emergency projects are processed in 2.8–4.4 months whereas this one was processed in under six weeks.

#### **Quality of Supervision**

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

80. Supervision missions were foreseen in the PAD, and considering the COVID-19 restrictions, they were carried out virtually. The World Bank remained agile during supervision and it was capable to adapt the project to address the challenges in a demanding emergency context. The World Bank was diligent in working with the borrower to prepare and approve the project’s restructuring in a timely manner.

81. The World Bank supported the PCU consistently, which was highlighted during the ICR interviews with the borrower. This support was crucial to the quality of implementation and greatly valued by the borrower.

#### **Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance**

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

82. The overall World Bank performance is deemed Highly Satisfactory based on the flexibility and rapid reaction during preparation; the collaboration with the GoB and other donors; and the collaboration between the WB teams.

#### **D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME**

Rating: Modest

83. The project succeeded in providing temporary economic support to poor and vulnerable households affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The PDO was achieved fast and on time. The outcome was realized, and the support was provided.

84. As the PAD highlighted, the main risks arise from the continuation of the pandemic, with the limitations on social contact and the adverse socioeconomic effects it has brought, which continue to linger.

85. There are several elements that contribute to the sustainability of the project outcomes:

- The use of existing databases to cross-check information and verify beneficiary eligibility



- The use of a single payment platform to deliver the temporary cash transfer package, improving efficiency in delivery and ample outreach to beneficiaries
- The capacity to adapt the existing social protection system to unexpected shocks, with support from international financial partners

## V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

86. **Openness in dialogue is key to prepare a project under a short timeframe and discuss the challenges of the country.** This was an unprecedented project, both for the preparation process and for the design itself. There was an open and constructive technical dialogue between the GoB and the World Bank team. The existing relationships with long-standing public servants were key to overcome obstacles and facilitate the fast project preparation and the restructuring later. The dialogue and collaboration with other financiers allowed the GoB to prepare similar projects, ensuring complementarity and guaranteeing the financing to reach a universal coverage of the poor and vulnerable affected by the pandemic.

87. **Innovation is feasible when facing a crisis and pressing needs exist.** When there is a crisis and pressing needs are to be met, there is an opportunity to design and implement new approaches to tackle development challenges. The temporary cash transfer programs, including a new one designed with the support of Bank team, innovated in leveraging the banking system, the public databases, and ID registry, to deliver an emergency response in a short timeframe to individuals never reached by a government cash transfer before. On the World Bank team side, this project was able to innovate in terms of internal procedures and in the use of microsimulation tools to design an intervention.

88. **A clear project objective is crucial for an operation.** In the case of this project, the objective was simple and clear: to support the country to temporarily transfer financial resources to a significant number of citizens who were poor or became vulnerable due to the measures adopted and enforced by the country to minimize the spread of the COVID-19 virus in its early stage. This clear and simple objective guided all efforts during preparation and implementation to make sure the resources would be made available on time. It guided both the MEFP and the World Bank in overcoming obstacles faced along the way.

89. **A solid institution with a recognized mandate is key to successful preparation and implementation.** The MEFP in Bolivia is composed of competent and committed civil servants. MEFP led the efforts to mitigate the adverse economic consequences of the pandemic in areas of data gathering, Management Information System, and beneficiary registries. This was key to achieve the PDO. It was not simple to have such a coordinated effort in Bolivia, given the status of information systems that were not fully functioning. The coordinated effort behind the leadership of the MEFP contributed to minimize duplicate payments to beneficiaries and share norms and best practices with GESTORA and SINTESIS.

90. **The flexibility in project design and implementation facilitated the ability to respond to changes in Government priorities.** The Bank exhibited significant flexibility at the different stages of the project life: during preparation, waiving requirements to move preparation swiftly, and during implementation, restructuring the project to incorporate comprehensive changes (e.g., revision of components/activities,



indicators, costs, institutional arrangements, and reallocation of resources). This type of flexibility is key in the implementation of crisis response projects.



ANNEX 1: RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: To provide temporary economic support to poor and vulnerable households impacted by COVID-19

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project, who are not beneficiaries of existing social assistance programs	Number	0.00 01-Apr-2020	2290880.00 30-Jul-2021	3,459,574.00 14-May-2021	3,459,574.00 30-Jul-2021

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of direct	Percentage	0.00	51.00	46.00	46.00



beneficiaries of temporary economic support financed by the project		01-Apr-2020	30-Jul-2021	14-May-2021	30-Jul-2021
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs	Number	0.00	3576013.00	3,502,421.00	3,505,421.00
		01-Apr-2020	30-Jul-2021	14-May-2021	30-Jul-2021
Beneficiaries of social safety net programs - Female	Number	0.00	1827291.00	1,789,686.00	1,516,005.00
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

## A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

**Component:** Component 1. Temporary cash transfers to vulnerable households

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct Beneficiaries of Bono	Number	0.00	1040102.00	42,847.00	42,847.00





Familia financed by the project		01-Apr-2020	30-Jul-2021	14-May-2021	30-Jul-2021
Direct beneficiaries of Bono Familia financed by the project (FEMALE)	Number	0.00	524677.00	22,036.00	29,123.00
		01-Apr-2020	30-Jul-2021	14-May-2021	30-Jul-2021
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

**Component:** Component 2: Support the transitory expansion of the safety net to informal workers

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct Beneficiaries of Bono Universal financed by the project	Number	0.00	2100911.00	3,454,574.00	3,459,574.00
		01-Apr-2020	30-Jul-2021	14-May-2021	30-Jul-2021
Direct Beneficiaries of Bono Universal financed by the project (FEMALE)	Number	0.00	1079998.00	1,778,434.00	1,486,882.00
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

**Component:** Component 3. Support the payment system and the implementing arrangements

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at Completion
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				Target	
Percentage of inquiries or grievances that are submitted to the grievance redress mechanism that are addressed during the course of the project.	Percentage	0.00 01-Apr-2020	75.00 30-Jul-2021		97.80 30-Jul-2021
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					



**ANNEX 2: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION**

**A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
<b>Preparation</b>	
Gaston Mariano Blanco, Matteo Morgandi	Task Team Leader(s)
Julio Sanjines Gonzales	Procurement Specialist(s)
Tatiana Perez Guerra	Financial Management Specialist
Malin Linnea Sofia Ed	Team Member
Prem Jai Vidaurre De La Riva	Environmental Specialist
Francisco Javier Romero Haaker	Team Member
Angela Maria Caballero Espinoza	Social Specialist
Maria Eugenia Davalos	Team Member
Briana N. Wilson	Team Member
Enrique Antonio Roman	Team Member
Maria Virginia Hormazabal	Team Member
Patricia O. Orna	Team Member
Patricia Alvarez	Team Member
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>	
Gaston Mariano Blanco	Task Team Leader(s)
Julio Sanjines Gonzales	Procurement Specialist(s)
Enrique Antonio Roman	Financial Management Specialist
Tatiana Perez Guerra	Financial Management Specialist
Malin Linnea Sofia Ed	Team Member
Prem Jai Vidaurre De La Riva	Environmental Specialist
Francisco Javier Romero Haaker	Team Member



Federico Antonio Beckley Gonzalez	Team Member
Angela Maria Caballero Espinoza	Social Specialist
Carla Albertina Jerez Abascal	Procurement Team
Maria Eugenia Davalos	Team Member
Matteo Morgandi	Team Member
Briana N. Wilson	Team Member
Maria Virginia Hormazabal	Team Member
Tania Lucia Mitchell	Team Member
Patricia O. Orna	Team Member
Patricia Alvarez	Team Member
Josiane M. S. Luchmun	Team Member

**B. STAFF TIME AND COST**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Preparation</b>		
FY20	23.149	134,353.13
<b>Total</b>	<b>23.15</b>	<b>134,353.13</b>
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>



**ANNEX 3: PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT**

<b>Components</b>	<b>Amount at Approval (US\$, millions)</b>	<b>Actual at Project Closing (US\$, millions)</b>	<b>Percentage of Approval</b>
1. Temporary cash transfers to vulnerable households	99.72	3.08	3.08
2. Support the transitory expansion of the safety net to informal workers	150.93	250.65	166.07
3. Support project implementation arrangements	3.10	0.02	0.64
<b>Total</b>	<b>253.75</b>	<b>253.75</b>	<b>100.00</b>

*Note:* The GoB opted for financing with national budget resources the amount that GESTORA would pay SINTESIS for the payment of the BU, approximately US\$3.00 million. Considering the long relationship between the GoB and SINTESIS and the amounts that SINTESIS handles on behalf of the GoB, it was decided not to amend the existing contract with SINTESIS and pay SINTESIS with budgetary resources rather than with project resources.




ANNEX 4: EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Efficiency Analysis

1. Ex-post estimations conducted by the World Bank team indicate that the temporary cash transfers reached virtually all the poor and the vulnerable. Results are in line with those of the economic analysis conducted at Appraisal. Simulations were carried out based on the 2020 Household Survey,4 which identifies the beneficiaries of all three temporary cash transfer programs. Together, the three temporary cash transfers covered 96 percent of the Bolivian population, only 1.9 percentage point lower that coverage estimated during preparation. First, the BF covered 60 percent of the population, with higher coverage among the poor and lower income quintiles (around 75 percent). Second, the BCF covered 24.7 percent of the population, by design mostly reaching the elderly (78.4 percent of the population 65 years or older), but also pregnant women, mothers of children below two-years old, and people with disabilities accessing subsidies. Finally, the BU covered 75.2 percent of the population, reaching 79 percent of the poor, with coverage above 75 percent for the first four quintiles of the income distribution, respectively. As it was simulated during preparation, the three programs covered all the poor population, and 98.7 percent of indigenous population. (Error! Reference source not found.).

Figure 1: Coverage of Temporary Cash Transfers across relevant subgroups of populations




2. As it was expected during preparation, the limitations of administrative registry information on household composition, and the high rate of informal employment in the economy, explained the significant “leakage” of the temporary benefits to the top quintiles. There was no record of household composition to prevent multiple eligible beneficiaries living together from receiving more than one transfer. Estimates showed that 50.3 percent of the population received two transfers, while 7 percent received all three transfers (Figure 2). Moreover, as many non-poor households had adult members without formal labor income, the BU benefited many households in the upper income quintiles. The ex-

4 Encuesta de Hogares 2020, Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).



post estimations shows that 86.5 percent of the households in the top quintile received at least one of the programs (Figure 1). In this difficult context, where reaching any potentially vulnerable worker was more important than targeting accuracy, excluding wealthier households was not possible without denying support to large swaths of the vulnerable middle class.<sup>5</sup>

Figure 2: Programs' overlap



3. **The three temporary cash transfers had a positive welfare effect by partially mitigating the impact of the pandemic in poverty.** The World Bank used the 2020 Household Survey, available by project completion to estimate poverty with and without the temporary cash transfers implemented by the GoB and supported by the project. Without the cash transfers, the percentage of people living on less than the poverty line of US\$5.5 per day<sup>6</sup> would have increased by 3.6 percentage points, from 19.9 percent in 2019 to 23.5 percent in 2020 (Figure 3 and Graph 1). Instead, due the mitigation power of the three transfers, the poverty headcount for 2020 was estimated at 21.76 percent. Without the three emergency cash transfers, 1.74 additional percentage points of poverty could have been expected in 2020.

<sup>5</sup> Bolivia's poverty line varies across geographic location and ranges from 567.6 to 894.9 bolivianos per capita per month. We use the poverty line applied for the median individual in Bolivia for this calculation (830 Bolivianos).

<sup>6</sup> The World Bank uses US\$5.5 per day to measure the poverty line for Bolivia, in line with international guidelines. The GoB, however, reported the 2020 poverty rate to be 39 percent and the extreme poverty rate 13.7 percent as the use their poverty line set at US\$3.20 per day.



Figure 3: Poverty impact


Poverty (with mitigations) 2020					
	\$1.90/day PPP	\$3.20/day PPP	\$5.50/day PPP	Vulnerable (\$5.50 - \$13/day PPP)	Middle Class (\$13 - \$70/day PPP)
National	4.42%	9.18%	21.76%	42.06%	35.29%
Urban	0.66%	2.93%	12.12%	43.72%	43.03%
Rural	13.22%	23.78%	44.25%	38.20%	17.21%

Poverty (without mitigations) 2020					
	\$1.90/day PPP	\$3.20/day PPP	\$5.50/day PPP	Vulnerable (\$5.50 - \$13/day PPP)	Middle Class (\$13 - \$70/day PPP)
National	5.37%	10.26%	23.50%	41.04%	34.57%
Urban	0.94%	3.48%	13.35%	43.37%	42.15%
Rural	15.72%	26.07%	47.20%	35.60%	16.87%

Poverty 2019					
	\$1.90/day PPP	\$3.20/day PPP	\$5.50/day PPP	Vulnerable (\$5.50 - \$13/day PPP)	Middle Class (\$13 - \$70/day PPP)
National	3.24%	7.82%	19.90%	42.85%	36.48%
Urban	0.70%	2.31%	11.75%	44.11%	43.18%
Rural	9.11%	20.58%	38.77%	39.92%	20.98%

	Without mitigation	With mitigation
2019	19.9%	19.9%
2020	23.5%	21.8%

Graph 1: Poverty impact







## **ANNEX 5: BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS**

### **Executive Summary from the Borrower's Final Letter of Comments**

1. This letter was prepared by the PCU and sent to the World Bank on January 14th, 2022.
2. At the beginning of the letter, the PCU indicates that they have no comments regarding matters related to the preparation of the project because the PCU was not in place during that time.
3. The main lessons learned in the execution of the project are the following:
  - a. As far as possible, this type of project should be managed by a single implementing agency with qualified personnel, exclusively dedicated to project management, with experience to execute projects. A single agency can coordinate with different actors to perform activities, such monitoring and verification, and it can centralize implementation. The existence of multiple implementing agencies in this project resulted in various sources of information and made it difficult to coordinate and consolidate information.
  - b. The preparation and updating of the LMP and SEP were of considerable effort. These documents are valuable when projects are prepared and implemented over a longer time period. However, in the case of this project, with many activities that executed before project effectiveness, these documents do not have any impact on the project. The efforts of the PCU during the first quarter of 2021 have focused on collecting information from the implementing agencies of the temporary cash transfers with the sole purpose of compliance with the Loan Agreement.
  - c. The creation of a single social registry and the implementation of an electronic payment system may be important for future delivery of temporary cash transfer to the Bolivian population in case of an emergency or crisis.
4. The PCU appreciates all the support and collaboration provided by the World Bank during project implementation.



ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE  
**BOLIVIA**

MINISTERIO DE  
ECONOMÍA Y FINANZAS PÚBLICAS

La Paz, 14 de enero de 2022  
**MEFP/VPCF/DGSGIF/Nº 5/2022**

Señor  
Gastón Blanco  
**GERENTE DEL PROYECTO**  
**REDES DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL PARA LA EMERGENCIA EN LA CRISIS DEL COVID-19**  
**BANCO MUNDIAL**  
Presente.-

**Ref.: Cometarios al Informe de Revisión al Informe de Término de Ejecución del Proyecto de Redes de Protección Social para la Emergencia en la Crisis del COVID - 19**

De mi consideración:

Hago referencia a la nota BO/CM/PS/0398/2021 mediante la cual el señor Representante Residente del Banco Mundial remite el Informe de referencia, solicitando comentarios u observaciones al citado documento.

Al respecto, adjunto los comentarios de la Unidad de Coordinación del Proyecto (UCP) a mi cargo sobre el documento remitido, para su consideración, haciendo notar que no se emiten comentarios respecto de los asuntos relativos a preparación del proyecto por cuanto esta UCP no ha participado de dicho proceso.

Señalar que como lecciones aprendidas de la ejecución del proyecto se destacan las siguientes:

1. En lo posible este tipo de proyectos deben ser manejados por una sola entidad ejecutora, que cuente con personal calificado y con experiencia para ejecutar proyectos con dedicación exclusiva, a efectos de realizar un adecuado seguimiento y control del proyecto de inicio a fin, coordinando con los actores relacionados pero centralizando la ejecución. La desagregación en múltiples entidades ejecutoras ha ocasionado la dispersión de la información y ha dificultado el procesamiento de la misma.
2. La elaboración y actualización del PGL y PPPI constituyen un esfuerzo considerable válido en proyectos cuya ejecución se realice considerando las acciones planificadas, sin embargo, en proyectos de reembolso, cuando





ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE  
**BOLIVIA**

MINISTERIO DE  
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las acciones han sido ejecutadas previamente, estos documentos no tienen ningún impacto en el proyecto, constituyéndose únicamente en mecanismos de recopilación de información y no así de planificación. Los esfuerzos de la UCP durante el primer trimestre de 2021 se han enfocado en la recopilación de información a las entidades ejecutoras y unidades organizacionales relacionadas con el pago de los Bonos, a efectos de actualizar el PGL y PPPI y consolidar los informes de cumplimiento de las acciones.

3. La implementación de las tecnologías de información son una alternativa para mejorar la captura de información y entrega de beneficios temporales y permanentes a la población del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. La implementación de un registro centralizado de beneficiarios canalizando pagos electrónicos, es un proyecto de alto impacto que permitiría encarar de manera más efectiva situaciones similares.

Agradeciéndole por todo el apoyo y colaboración a esta UCP durante la ejecución del proyecto, me despido de usted atentamente.

Rocio Wendy Quinteros Villanueva  
Directora General de Sistemas de  
Gestión de Información Fiscal  
Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas

HR 46-13-R  
Rocio Quinteros  
Cc. Archivo  
Cc. UCP  
Adj: lo citado





**ANNEX 6: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)**

- Project Appraisal Document - PAD3900
- Implementation Status and Results Reports - ISRs
- Loan Agreement - IBRD-91150
- Financing Agreement - IDA-66700
- Financing Agreement - IDA- 66710
- Aide Memoire Mid-Term Review Mission May 2021
- Operational Manual
- Progress Reports (January 2021, June 2021)
- Restructuring Paper - Report Number: RES46277
- WBG Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the period FY2016–2020 (Report No. 82173- BO)
- WBG Performance and Learning Review (PLR) of the CPF for the period FY2016–2020 (Report No. 125068-BO).

**Laws and Decrees**

- Decreto Supremo 4197/20 - March 18, 2020
- Decreto Supremo 4200/20 - March 25, 2020
- Decreto Supremo 4215/20 - April 14, 2020

<https://www.inesad.edu.bo/2021/03/22/cepal-pobreza-subio-64-puntos-y-afecta-al-375-de-la-poblacion/>.



**ANNEX 7: SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMS, EXISTING AT APPRAISAL**

Name of the Program	Type of Program	Year of Creation	Target Group and Eligibility Criteria	Number of Direct Beneficiaries	Coverage of Bottom 40% of Population, (direct and indirect beneficiaries)	Managing Institution	Size of Transfer
<b>Bono Juana Azurduy Padilla (BJAP)</b>	Conditional Cash Transfer	2009	Pregnant women and mothers of children below 2 years old without social health insurance (self-declared without cross-checking)	216,619 (2019)	57%	Ministry of Health	<b>Approximately Bs 55 per month.</b> The total support was Bs 1,820 (US\$263) for 33 months. Each prenatal checkup, birth delivery, and child health checkup has its value
<b>Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP)</b>	Conditional Cash Transfer	2006	Students in primary and secondary in public schools, including the special education subsystem. Conditionality: Enrollment and 80% of attendance.	2.3 million (2020)	53%	Ministry of Education	<b>Bs 200 per year (US\$ 29),</b> paid at the end of the school year
<b>Bono para discapacitados (BD)</b>	Cash Transfer	2018	Individuals with severe to very serious disabilities who cannot enter the labor market (based on assessment of disability)	82,623 (2020)		Ministry of Health	<b>Bs 250 per month (US\$36)</b>
<b>Bono para ciegos (BC)</b>	Cash Transfer		Paid to individuals with visual disabilities	6,275 (2020)		Bolivian Blind Institute under the Ministry of Health	<b>Bs 6,800 per year (US\$980)</b>
<b>Renta Dignidad (RD)</b>	Universal Social Pension	2008	Bolivians who are 60 years or older and reside in	1,083,198 (2019)	9 38%	GESTORA	<b>Bs 2,400 per year (US\$343).</b> <i>If the elderly receives</i>



			Bolivia. Beneficiaries must be registered in the <i>Base de Datos de beneficiarios de la Renta Dignidad</i> (BDRD).				<i>another pension, the amount is only 75% or Bs 1,800 (US\$257).</i>
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**ANNEX 8: EVIDENCE OF THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY (AS PART OF THE ESF)**

1. Publication in the official website of the Vice-Ministry of Communication regarding the news of the payment of the temporary cash transfers, during the payment period:

<https://comunicacion.gob.bo/>; <https://comunicacion.gob.bo/?q=20200414/29165>.

<https://comunicacion.gob.bo/?q=20200403/29087>; <https://comunicacion.gob.bo/?q=20200504/29331>

2. Vice-Ministry of Communication publication of informational videos on YouTube on the the payment of the temporary cash transfers, during the payment period:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnoxZfHmu3E&feature=youtu.be>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKoXf-YhHeU>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uTBvy9e1KsQ>

3. Vice-Ministry of Communication publication of information on the Bonos on Instagram:

<https://www.instagram.com/p/B-icrcNICck/>

4. Official website of the GoB regarding COVID-19:

<https://www.boliviasegura.gob.bo/>

Publication of free telephone lines: 800-10-1104 y 800-10-1106 and on the website 'Bolivia Segura'.

[https://comunicacion.gob.bo/sites/default/files/afiche\\_coronavirus\\_20200319.jpg](https://comunicacion.gob.bo/sites/default/files/afiche_coronavirus_20200319.jpg).





# EL GOBIERNO PROTEGE A LAS FAMILIAS BOLIVIANAS EN TIEMPOS DE CORONAVIRUS

- CREACIÓN DEL BONO FAMILIA**  
Se crea el Bono Familia de Bs 500 por hijo que estudie en el nivel primario, en una escuela fiscal.
- PAGO DE CRÉDITO BANCARIO**  
Las familias y pequeñas empresas que tengan créditos en el sistema financiero, no pagarán dos meses el capital de la deuda. El pago se hará a fin del periodo del crédito.
- IMPUESTOS**  
El impuesto a las Utilidades de las Empresas (IUE) no se pagará en abril; sino en mayo y a plazos.
- PROHIBIDO CORTAR SERVICIOS BÁSICOS**  
Queda terminantemente prohibido suspender los servicios de agua, energía eléctrica y gas domiciliario durante la cuarentena y la crisis de salud.

**Nuestra causa es la vida de todos los bolivianos.**

Llama a las líneas gratuitas  
**800-10-1104**  
**800-10-1106**

Visita la página web  
**bolviasegura.gob.bo**

#QUÉDATEENCASA #YOMEQUEDOENCASA





5. Publication on the Ministry of Economy and Finance official website of the document on Economic Measures during Covid-19 (“Medidas económicas el COVID-19”):

[https://www.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/medidas-economicas-ante-el-covid19\\_noticias.html](https://www.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/medidas-economicas-ante-el-covid19_noticias.html)

6. Publication on the Ministry of Economy and Finance official website of the Institutional Memories on Transparency:

<https://www.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/memorias-institucionales-de-transparencia-.html>

8. Publication on the Ministry of Economy and Finance official website of a complaint/reporting in Spanish, Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní:

<https://www.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/formulario-de-denuncia-.html>

9. Publication on the Ministry of Economy and Finance official website of the telephone lines fight against corruption answered by the Unit on Transparency and Fight against Corruption. 800-10- 3777.

10. Publication on the Ministry of Economy and Finance official website of the ‘Reglamento del Bono Canasta Familiar para los hogares bolivianos con menores ingresos’ (regulations on the BCF).

[https://repositorio.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/documentos/Documentos\\_de\\_Interes/2020/RBM\\_MDPyEP\\_1\\_20\\_CANASTA\\_FAMILIAR.pdf](https://repositorio.economiayfinanzas.gob.bo/documentos/Documentos_de_Interes/2020/RBM_MDPyEP_1_20_CANASTA_FAMILIAR.pdf)

11. Communiques on the Ministry of Economy and Finance official Facebook page on the BF, BCF and BU during the payment period:



<https://www.facebook.com/EconomiaBo/photos/2001507416653372>  
<https://www.facebook.com/EconomiaBo/photos/1984592898344824>  
<https://www.facebook.com/EconomiaBo/photos/1984593035011477>  
<https://www.facebook.com/EconomiaBo/photos/1984592941678153>  
<https://www.facebook.com/EconomiaBo/photos/1923079044496210>  
<https://www.facebook.com/EconomiaBo/photos/1919849811485800>

12. Official website for GESTORA:

<https://www.gestora.bo/>

<https://www.gestora.bo/Comunicacion/BoletinInformativo>

13. Communiques on GESTORA's official website on Facebook on the BF, BCF and BU during the payment period:

<https://www.facebook.com/Gestorapublicabolivia/>  
<https://www.facebook.com/Gestorapublicabolivia/photos/1167597756953488>  
<https://www.facebook.com/Gestorapublicabolivia/photos/1175785169468080>