Effective Cooperation
on Transboundary Waters:
Photo: Mattias Granberg
A Practical Perspective
By David Grey, Claudia Sadoff and Genevieve Connors1
Building effective cooperation on transboundary wa- Uses of International Watercourses was 27 years in
ters is always a lengthy and complex journey. Embrac- preparation prior to its adoption by the UN General
ing cooperation is no simple task for a nation state, Assembly in 1997. Now, 12 years later, only 16 states
not least because of the perceived costs of the erosion have ratified the Convention and it has not entered
of sovereignty, however small that erosion might be. into force. As a consequence, despite the irreplaceable
While there are many examples of where cooperation is role of water in lives, livelihoods and production,
non-existent or weak, there are also examples – across there is no universal treaty in force to regulate the
countries and across time – of effective cooperation. use and protection of shared waters (Salman, 2007).
This essay examines these issues through a practi- The absence of this kind of universal treaty has not
tioner’s lens to draw a few lessons from experience on precluded cooperation between sovereign states, nor
why countries cooperate and how cooperation can does it imply that the principles are not broadly ac-
be achieved. cepted, but clearly most states are not ready to commit
themselves to a binding legal obligation.
Why do countries cooperate? The record to date suggests, quite simply, that
Why do countries cooperate on transboundary waters? countries do not cooperate in the management of
At first glance, the obvious answer is that coopera- transboundary waters because they are compelled
tion is by definition good and is, therefore, the right by an ethic of cooperation. They cooperate when the
course of action. This is asserted time and again as a net benefits of cooperation are perceived to be greater
first principle in countless international meetings and than the net benefits of non-cooperation, and when
proclamations. Yet the reality is more nuanced. The the distribution of these net benefits is perceived to be
UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational fair. In other words, states work together when doing
1
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in this paper are entirely the authors’. They do not necessarily represent the views of the
World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.
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so offers special economic and political advantages The scale of benefits derived and the perceived fairness
over unilateral development, and when these larger of the benefit sharing arrangement together with the
benefits are shared. political ideal of solidarity between the three coun-
Perceptions are pivotal. States must believe that tries have sustained substantive cooperation and a
greater economic benefits will be gained and distribut- strong river basin organisation on the Senegal River
ed equitably. Indeed, the role of perceptions in a coun- (Yu, 2008).
try’s cooperation calculus underscores the importance It is our view that an increasingly important and
of shared, trusted information. Perceptions are often compelling driver toward effective cooperation is the
distorted by inaccurate or mistrusted information, management of water-related risks (e.g. of floods) com-
but might be tempered by more credible information. mon to some or all riparian states within a basin. This
Perceptions can also be influenced by historical ten- is an example of the third type of benefit described
sions and suspicions, which might be lessened through above. This can also be seen as a growing focus on
sustained dialogue. We will return later to these central managing the destructive impacts of water, relative
themes of knowledge and dialogue. to capturing the productive potential of water – both
Benefits themselves go beyond the obvious, and of which are key aspects of achieving water security.2
take different forms (Sadoff and Grey, 2002). This In recent years, there have been growing concerns
describes four types of benefits: environmental benefits globally regarding the uncertainties of our climate
to the “river” (e.g. improved water quality, conserved future and, in particular, the impact of a changing
biodiversity); economic benefits from the “river” (e.g. climate on water resources. Taken together with other
increased food and energy production); reduction of changing “climates” – changes to demographic, fi-
costs because of the “river” (e.g. reduced geo-political nancial, economic and political climates – the future
tensions, enhanced flood management); and benefits challenges in managing the world’s water resources
beyond the “river” (catalysing wider cooperation and look daunting and the risks great.
economic integration). Any one of these four benefit Co-riparian states can manage these risks that they
types can promote cooperation. The broader the basket face by pooling their resources to enhance informa-
of benefits, the greater is the scope for structuring tion and early warning systems on their changing
mutually beneficial cooperation. hydrologic variability and by fostering system-wide
If these kinds of enhanced benefits are to be gen- river basin management. Climate change raises the
erated, they also must be shared – in a manner that stakes of non-cooperation, encouraging nation states
is perceived to be fair. This can mean the separation not only to capture additional economic benefits, but
of the physical location of river development where also to manage better their growing common risks. In
benefits are derived, from the physical location where transboundary river basins, existing risks are likely to
benefits are distributed. For example, in the Senegal be intensified by climate change. Effective cooperation
River Basin, the three countries of Mali, Mauritania in transboundary basin management could become a
and Senegal – through the OMVS (the Senegal River singularly effective risk management strategy.
Basin Development Authority) – developed a clear History suggests that a perception of common risks
methodology and framework to first quantify and can be particularly compelling motivation to manage
then allocate the benefits and costs of multi-purpose and share these risks through cooperation. Coopera-
investments across the entire basin. The Manantali tion between Canada and the Unites States on the
Dam, for example, which is located entirely inside Columbia River, for example, was catalysed in large
western Mali, was constructed through the OMVS in part by recurring and sometimes devastating floods.
the 1980s for hydropower, irrigation and navigation This is true even though – and this is important – the
benefits to be distributed across all three countries. perceived economic benefits of flood control were
2
Water security can be defined as the “availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and
production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and economies”. See D. Grey and C. W. Sadoff,
“Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and Development” in Water Policy Vol. 9, No. 6. pp 545- 571. 2007.
16
considerably less than those of other benefits from
the Treaty. Energy was the other key driver of the 1961
Columbia River Treaty and the new storage dams,
constructed under the Treaty and cooperatively op-
erated, enabled significantly more power generation
than could otherwise have been produced by unilateral
action (Yu, 2008).
Today, similar processes may play out in the im-
mense Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin,
which is shared by Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India,
and Nepal. The GBM is characterised by the world’s
highest mountains (including Mount Everest), greatest
floodplains, and largest basin population, with over
500 million people, many of whom are very poor.
Added to these superlatives are: a unique monsoonal
climate, with 50 percent of precipitation in 15 days and
90 percent of runoff in 4 months; very little hydraulic
infrastructure, with only 30 days of flow in artificial
storage (compared to the 900 days of storage in the
Colorado and Murray-Darling basins (Briscoe and
Malik, 2006); extreme pollution (with consequent
ecosystem damage and biodiversity loss); and very
limited existing transboundary cooperation. Climate
models suggest that monsoon intensity could increase
and glaciers retreat, while populations, cities, indus-
tries and economies continue to grow rapidly. The
risks faced by the basin’s populations today are already
high: 70 million people in India and Bangladesh were
seriously affected by the 2007 monsoon, 4,500 were
killed, and crops across 75,000 km2 were destroyed.
Although the dynamics are complex and causality
is difficult to determine, it is possible that there are
already large numbers of “climate migrants” leaving
the basin, temporally or even permanently.
Future risks are undoubtedly high and could poten-
tially be mitigated through cooperation. Joint institu-
tions for information sharing could help predict and
monitor the basin’s changing hydrology and underpin
early warning systems, thus enhancing both agricul-
tural productivity and disaster preparedness. Coop-
erative infrastructure development and/or operation
Photo: Arne Hoel/World Bank
could help regulate river flows, to mitigate floods and
droughts, generate power and irrigate fields. Coopera-
tive environmental management could enhance water
quality and ensure environmental flows for ecosystem
health. And all of this cooperative engagement could
improve regional relationships “beyond the river”.
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How is effective cooperation achieved? (investing in natural and man-made infrastructure) and
There are no blueprints for achieving cooperation – managing (investing in institutions, information and ca-
indeed it is often unclear what is meant by the term pacity) basin-wide transboundary river flows. While the
cooperation itself. The debate tends to be cast as an latter remains an aspiration probably not yet achieved in
all-or-nothing proposition implying that “cooperation” any transboundary basin, there are increasing examples
is an absolute, in direct opposition to “water wars”. of effective transboundary cooperation.
In reality there are innumerable practical avenues of Different modes of cooperation must be considered
cooperation that states can undertake to their mutual in response to different circumstances, and will de-
advantage, each with different potential benefits and dif- pend on many factors. A continuum can be conceived
ferent associated costs. Effective cooperation can range from unilateral action (independent, non-transparent
from simple information sharing and hazard warning national planning and management), to coordination
protocols, to a fully integrated approach to developing (sharing information regarding national planning and
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Effective cooperation on an international watercourse
is any action or set of actions by riparian states that leads
to enhanced management or development of the water-
course to their mutual satisfaction.
While the reasons and the mechanisms for coop-
eration may be increasing, and increasingly apparent,
getting there remains a difficult journey and typically
requires a conscious, multi-year effort by all parties.
But practical experience does tell us something about
how to get there. Building the enabling environment
– and in particular knowledge, trust and confidence
among co-riparian states – is usually the first step in
building cooperative transboundary institutions. The
ownership of the cooperation agenda must be entirely
with concerned riparian countries, in order to ensure
commitment and endurance. However, experience
suggests that invited third-party facilitation can be
useful, especially on large international river basins
with tense pasts and complex futures. Third party
facilitation by trusted brokers and conveners can help
generate impartial knowledge and analyses, create a
neutral space for dialogue, and ultimately help secure
financing for cooperative investment. We have learned
that this facilitation must be patient, respectful and
reliable over a long period of time, possibly a decade or
more, and that it must almost invariably be low-profile.
“No-footprint” is a useful rule, unless a footprint has
a specific and strategic value.
Process is almost as important as product, at least
Photo: Xu Jianchu
in the early days, and can be costly. Time spent build-
ing effective communications, working relationships
and a level playing field of knowledge and skill is an
essential investment for reaching sound negotiation
outcomes. The process can be as diverse as neces-
management), to collaboration (adaptation of national sary; shared experience, joint learning, round tables,
plans for mutual benefits), to joint action (joint plan- cooperative assessments can all be part of the process
ning, management or investment). tool box. Starting from a low base might mean nego-
For each international basin the optimal mode of tiating a “shared vision”, which sets a goal of a better
cooperation will depend on a mix of factors including: future, and then builds shared knowledge to provide
hydrologic characteristics, the economics of cooperative the evidence to change the perceptions of benefits and
investments, numbers and relationships of riparians, catalyse cooperation.
and the costs of parties coming together. It may not There are many stories of “how” the path to real
necessarily be the case that “more” cooperation reaps cooperation has been or is being explored – a variety of
“more” benefits in all river basins (Sadoff and Grey, pathways to cooperation. Two evolving examples help
2005). The art is in identifying “effective cooperation”, illuminate this point, one based on informal dialogue,
a term that deserves clear definition. the other rooted in high level institutional structures.
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Photo: Arne Hoel/World Bank
Among the countries that share the Rivers of the cooperative regional assessments and analyses, capacity
Greater Himalayas and where cooperation today is very building and investments in the Nile Basin.
limited, the current “Abu Dhabi Dialogue” (ADD) In both examples, shared knowledge and patient
provides a path of informal consultation. Each year dialogue are the common themes – however different
it brings together senior political, government, and the paths to cooperation might otherwise be. Knowl-
non-government participants from seven countries. edge is essential to identify the common opportunities
Through non-representative, non-formal, and non- and risks of transboundary water management, and to
attributable dialogue around the themes of “common structure equitable benefit sharing arrangements. Sus-
problems seeking common solutions”, participants tained, information-based dialogue is essential to build
build knowledge, relationships and trust. Together a shared understanding, to enable productive negotia-
they have defined a shared vision of “a knowledge-based tions, and to achieve robust cooperative outcomes.
partnership of states fairly managing and developing So, states that are cooperating on international
the Rivers of the Greater Himalayas from the sum- rivers will almost invariably have worked long and
mits to the seas”. To materialise this vision, the ADD hard together to build trust, knowledge and institu-
Knowledge Forum has been launched in parallel to tions – often, but not always, with patient, trusted and
bring together key knowledge institutions and to fi- committed external support. Their analysis, explicit
nance collaborative research. or implicit, individual or collective, will have dem-
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) illustrates a different onstrated that the benefits of cooperation are greater
path. Since 1999 the NBI has been guided by a Council than the benefits of non-cooperation. The choices that
of Ministers and supported by a dedicated NBI Secre- they have made will therefore have been rational. They
tariat in Uganda. More recently, offices were established may still have much work to do to ensure that planned
for two sub-basins in the Nile: the Eastern Nile Techni- benefits are actually being derived and being shared
cal Regional Office in Ethiopia, and the Nile Equatorial fairly. But they have had the courage to change, mov-
Lakes Coordination Unit in Rwanda. These offices, ing from a past of non-cooperation towards a future
working in a coordinated manner, are undertaking of effective cooperation.
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Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into 420-427.
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Sadoff, C. and D. Grey. (2002) Beyond the River: The Columbia River Basin, and the Lesotho Highlands
Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers, Water Project. World Bank AFTWR Working Paper
Water Policy, 4, 389-403. 1, November.
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