ICRR 14198 Report Number : ICRR14198 IEG ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 10/07/2013 Country : Guinea Project ID : P113268 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Emergency US$M ): Project Costs (US$M): 5.00 3.85 Agricultural Productivity Support Project L/C Number : Loan /Credit (US$M): Loan/ US$M ): 5.00 3.85 Sector Board : Agriculture and Rural US$M): Cofinancing (US$M ): Development Cofinanciers : Board Approval Date : 09/19/2008 Closing Date : 06/30/2010 06/30/2012 Sector (s): Crops (100%) Theme (s): Global food crisis response (100% - P) Prepared by : Reviewed by : ICR Review Group : Coordinator : Ebru Karamete Robert Mark Lacey Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1 2. Project Objectives and Components: a. Objectives: The project was the third part of a three -pronged food emergency response program for Guinea that focused on measures to address both the short and medium -to-long term implications of the global food crisis . The program was financed by grants from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund . The objective of the program was to support the Government of Guinea’s national strategy to maintain and enhance food security, which included : (i) customs duty reduction on rice imports (a basic staple for the poor); (ii) increasing access to food for the poorest and most vulnerable; and (iii) expediting a supply response of agricultural production through the implementation of measures to raise yields, and consequently the production, of staples . The project development objective stated in the Development Grant Agreement (p. 6) was “to increase small-holder rice productivity on 35,000 hectares of rain fed rice through the timely provision of improved inputs (seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) and technical advisory services ." The project development objective as stated in the Emergency Project Paper (p. x) was" to increase rain-fed rice productivity of beneficiaries by 30% on 40,000 hectares through use of improved seed and fertilizer ." This Review uses the Development Grant Agreement version . b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? No c. Components: There were three components: 1. Support for the production of 2000 tons of improved and certified seed during the 2008-09 cropping season through a scaling up of the existing farmer seed multiplication network and the purchase, treatment, and stocking of the seed for distribution during the 2009-10 cropping season. After the extension of the closing date (see Section 2d below), the cropping season of 2011-12 was also included. (Appraisal Estimate US$ 0.6 million, Actual US$ 1.0 million). 2. Procurement of 2,000 tons of fertilizer and 20,000 liters of herbicides and pesticides . (Appraisal Estimate US$ 3.0 million, Actual US$ 1.65 million). 3. Distribution of input packets (seed, fertilizer, herbicide/pesticide) though the existing farmer organization networks and support for advisory services as necessary . (Appraisal Estimate US$ 1.4 million, Actual US$ 1.2 million). d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Project Costs Total project cost estimated at appraisal was US$ 5.00 million and US$ 3.85 million at closure. Due to delays, a final fertilizer procurement was not completed before the closing date leaving an undisbursed balance of US$ 1.15 million. Financing : The Project was financed by a US$ 5.0 million grant from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund as part of a three-pronged food emergency response program . The total amount of the whole program was $ 10 million. At project closure, US$1.15 million remained undisbursed from the grant as approved and was canceled . Borrower Contribution : There was no Borrower contribution . Dates : On February 11, 2011, the original closing date of March 31, 2010 was extended to June 30, 2012. The reason for the extension was that implementation was delayed for more than 2 years following a military coup in December 2008, after which the Bank suspended all operations by triggering Operational Policy 7.30 on de facto governments. 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: a. Relevance of Objectives: High. High Guinea is a low-income, food-deficit country, which ranked 160 out of 175 countries in the 2007 UNDP Human Development Indicators. Food insecurity is a chronic phenomenon in Guinea . In spite of a strong agricultural potential, the country imports approximately one third of its rice needs . The World Food Program estimates that 6 percent of households are severely food insecure and acute malnutrition affected 9 percent of Guinean children. Food insecurity is linked to poverty, which affects 54 percent of the population. In January and February 2007, strikes and confrontations between security forces and demonstrators in urban areas were partly caused by high food and fuel prices. As a result of the 2008 global food crisis, consumer prices for food rapidly rose even further in Guinea . There was concern that higher prices could lead to a decline in the quantity and quality of food consumption, and hence to higher rates of acute malnutrition, especially when exacerbated by seasonal shortages . The Government formulated a strategy for responding to the food price crisis, which had two main pillars : (i) supporting access to food for the most vulnerable populations; and (ii) supporting increases in agricultural production. The project objective was particularly relevant to the second pillar . The development objective was also relevant to the Transitional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, an extension of the full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper formulated in 2007, which provided a framework for action towards poverty reduction in 2011/12. The Poverty Reduction Strategy was based on three main pillars : (i) to sustain faster economic growth and create income-earning and employment opportunities, particularly for the rural poor; (ii) to improve and extend access to basic services; and (iii) to improve governance and strengthen institutional and human capacity . In agriculture, the objectives were to make better use of the large potential for expanding rice production, enhance food security through diversification and better extension services for small -holders, and foster agribusiness to increase processing and exportation of agricultural products (including non-traditional exports). The development objective was aligned with the Bank Group's Interim Strategy Note for Guinea (FY 11-FY12), which supports the government priorities of making agriculture a key engine of job creation and growth . b. Relevance of Design: Substantial . The statement of objectives was clear and measurable . Overall, the results framework presented a logical causal chain between project activities and expected attainment of the objective . The objective of increasing small -holder rice productivity of rain fed rice was to be supported through the timely provision of improved inputs (seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) and technical advisory services . Component 1 helped to finance production of 2000 tons of improved and certified seed; component 2 aimed to purchase of 2000 tons of fertilizer and 20,000 liters of herbicides and pesticides and Component 3 aimed to distribute input packets (seed, fertilizer, herbicide/pesticide) though the existing farmer organization networks and provide support through necessary advisory services . The design also included setting up a revolving fund with the aim of establishing a sustainable input distribution system . 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): The degree of achievement of the development objective -- to increase small-holder rice productivity on 35,000 hectares of rain fed rice through the timely provision of improved inputs (seeds, fertilizers and pesticides ) and technical advisory services -- is rated substantial . Outputs : 110,000 producers received input packages and advisory services, exceeding the target of 90,250 producers. About 250 producers received training on seed multiplication, in accordance with the target . 2,600 tons of improved seed were produced against a target of 2,300 tons during the 2009/10 and 2011/12 cropping seasons. 1,400 tons of fertilizer were purchased to be distributed to producers against a target of 2,000 tons. The government provided 1,000 tons from its own stocks, so that 2,400 tons were available for the project . 45 tons of foundation seed were produced by research stations against a target of 60 tons. The ICR (p. 12) reports that the Koba research station could not function during the 2008/09 season due to floods that hampered seed production. During the 2011/12 cropping season, the government allocated funding from its own budget to support the Research Institution for Seed Production, so that the project had more than the 45 tons of seed that was financed by the grant (the full quantity is not specified ). Outcomes : The ICR (p.11-12) reports that "across agro-ecological zones," the rice yield increase "for targeted small holders" was 96 % against a target of 50 %. Yield increases of 138 % were recorded in Lower Guinea (from 1.3 to 2.8 tons per hectare), 60 % in Upper Guinea (from 1.5 to 2.4 tons per hectare), and 92 % in Forest Guinea (from 1.3 to 2.5 tons per hectare) "for producers using the recommended technologies ." Although, the ICR does not provide any information on the reliability of these estimates, such as the sample size, method of data collection, and whether there was a control group comparison, the project team subsequently sent additional information . The project did not have any baseline data (as it was an emergency project, no baseline survey was carried out during preparation ), and the data on rice productivity recorded for the three areas of Guinea (Lower, Upper, and Forest) were based mainly on the agricultural statistics produced by the National Directorate of Agriculture . According to the additional information sent by the team, the outcome data reported in the ICR is based on information drawn from project implementation progress reports and confirmed by the results of another project, the West African Agricultural Productivity Project, baseline surveys conducted in 2012. The production data were summarized in the progress reports in order to calculate the percentage increase in yields .The data were collected during the 2009/10 and 2011/12 cropping season from a random sample of beneficiaries in each of the three agro ecological regions where the project intervened; the sample size was 25% of the total number of beneficiaries who had received the complete technology package. These data were not available in a detailed, tabular and computerized form at the time the ICR was prepared, but became available under the follow -up project. In addition, an ex-post impact assessment was also carried out in October 2012 by a consultant hired by the government as part of the preparation of the government ’s completion report. Although, the survey did not use any control group methodology, and was, in essence, a rapidly conducted exercise to determine how farmers generally felt about project -generated benefits, it provides information on the profile of beneficiaries. The ICR does not provide any information on whether productivity increases were achieved on 35,000 hectares of rain-fed rice. Nor is there any indication in the discussion of the achievement of project objectives as to whether small-holders ultimately benefited from rice productivity increases, though this is implied in other parts of the ICR . However, based on additional information sent by the project team, the number of hectares covered under the project was indirectly estimated using either quantities of seeds or quantities of fertilizers distributed each cropping season . The project distributed 2,400 tons of fertilizer - approximately 400 tons for irrigated rice and 2,000 tons for rain fed rice. The dose for rain fed rice was 50kg/ha, so the total number of rain fed hectares covered (about 40,000) exceeded the area specified in the development objective . In terms of accessing small farmers, the team presented additional evidence that small farmers in general were reached . The impact assessment that was based on a sample of 1,800 producers in 18 prefectures where the project intervened, included a profile of beneficiary farmers in each region. The results showed that the average farm size among project beneficiaries during the 2011/2012 cropping season was relatively small, ranging from 1.2 to 3.1 ha depending on the geographical zone and the production system (compared with the average farm size in Guinea of 9.8 ha, with half of farms less than 2 ha). 5. Efficiency: Modest . Given the emergency nature of the operation and the short preparation period, no cost -benefit analysis was conducted during appraisal . The ICR carried out an ex-post financial analysis based on "farm survey data" (ICR, p. 14). The analysis compared with and without project scenarios . In the absence of the project, the average yields were estimated to range from 1 to 4 tons per ha and the average net income per ha was GNF 8.5 million. With the project inputs, average yields ranged from 2 to 5 tons per ha and average net income was GNF 11 million. According to the ICR, these results showed that incremental benefits derived from yield increases outweighed additional costs incurred by producers. However, fertilizer and pesticides were provided to farmers at heavily subsidized prices . Although no economic analysis was carried out at closure, when these inputs are valued at market rather than subsidized prices, the net income for rice producers remained positive only for the best performers and became negative for most producers. In terms of operational and administrative efficiencies, the project closing date was extended for 2 years, due to political instability. Although procurement was envisaged to be completed quickly, the process took more time than necessary and deliveries of inputs to beneficiaries were delayed . For example, the target dates for procuring 3,000 liters of herbicide and 2,000 liters of insecticide were delayed by 3 months; and the target date for procuring 1,000 tons of fertilizer was delayed by more than 4 months. Moreover, due to ineffective procurement arrangements, the last fertilizer procurement was not completed before project closure, leaving an un -disbursed balance from the grant of US$1.15 million. In addition, a manual that spelled out how the proceeds from sales of subsidized inputs would be managed and used efficiently, was not completed before project closure; this jeopardized effective and efficient use of the revolving fund. According to the stakeholder workshop and beneficiary survey results, beneficiaries were not satisfied with project procurement due to slowness and administrative hindrances, and stressed the need for better coordination among implementing agencies to ensure timely delivery of farm inputs . ERR )/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) FRR ) at appraisal and the re -estimated value at evaluation : re- Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope* Appraisal No ICR estimate No * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome: Relevance of objectives is rated high and that of design substantial . Efficacy was rated substantial . Efficiency is rated modest. Overall outcome is assessed as moderately satisfactory . a. Outcome Rating : Moderately Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Economic and financial risk : Significant . High fertilizer subsidies impose a growing fiscal burden . The major risks relate to uncertainty concerning the government ’s ability to: (i) pursue a food security policy that empowers producers and gives the private sector a prominent role as an engine of growth, including in the supply of farm inputs; (ii) design and implementation of a consistent input subsidy policy; and (iii) conduct key structural reforms in the agricultural sector . The key challenge is to move gradually toward a more sustainable, market-based approach for delivering inputs to food crop producers . A proposed follow-on operation would build on the input supply mechanism pioneered under this project, broaden its outreach, and also undertake initiatives (analytical studies and policy dialogue ) to promote the shift toward a sustainable, market -driven mechanism. Institutional risk : Significant . Capacity building under the project improved the government ’s readiness to deal with emergency food security issues and its capacity to rely on producer organizations to deliver services that were hitherto the government’s prerogative. The input subsidy model and implementation arrangements developed under the project were adopted by the government for its own program . However, failure to produce an implementation manual on the revolving fund has hampered progress toward a sustainable input distribution system, which increases the institutional risk . Social risk : Moderate . Any project outcomes in the form of increased rice production would be jeopardized by renewed surges in food prices on international markets, which would increase the vulnerability of farm households lacking diversified sources of income . Low . Project activities had few environmental effects . No cases of environmental damage Environmental risk : Low. or injuries to producers arising from inadequate or improper use of fertilizer and pesticide were reported in the project area. a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Significant 8. Assessment of Bank Performance: a. Quality at entry: Emergency procedures under OP 8.0 were used and preparation of the project from initiation to effectiveness took three months . The appraisal mission held extensive discussions with representatives of the government and of the European Commission, France, and key United Nations agencies . A rapid food assessment that had been completed by the World Food Program on May 12-23, 2008, identifying priority sectors for response, was also considered . The result was a “family response� from United Nations agencies, including the World Food Program, the United Nations Children ’s Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization, and the United Nations Population Fund . Based on lessons learned from similar interventions, three strategic choices were made . First, the project would have a strong focus on immediate investments in improved inputs and better cropping practices, as these investments offered a substantial payoff in the short run, particularly for small -holders. Second, the project would aim to lay the foundation for a more sustainable input distribution system, and thus its implementation arrangements and design would rely on sustainable institutional structures . Third, in the absence of a functioning private sector input distribution system and limited access to rural finance, and in the presence of weak and non-transparent public distribution channels, a decision was made to focus on organized small -holders (about 40 percent of small-holders are members of producer organizations ) as the entry point for building a sustainable and transparent input distribution system . To ensure that support reached the intended beneficiaries, the project was designed to rely on the Coordination Unit for the then ongoing Bank–funded Village Communities Support Program for all aspects of fiduciary management. According to the ICR, that unit had a strong track record in overall project and financial management. Coordination and technical responsibility for the project rested with the National Directorate of Agricultural Advisory Services, which had already managed a seed multiplication system financed previously by the Bank and other donors. Implementation was carried out by the technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Confederation of Farmer Organizations in Guinea (CNOP-G), which benefited from funding and technical assistance from other donors active in the sector . The government ultimately modeled its own subsidy program on this approach. The risks identified and mitigation measures proposed under the project were adequate . For example, to mitigate the risk that inputs would not be available on time because of low domestic stocks, the operation targeted the 2009/10 cropping season and the 2008/09 dry season to allow sufficient time for inputs to be produced and procured. To mitigate the risk that achievements would not be sustained after the project closed, the project was structured to rely on, and build the capacity of, existing government structures and producer organizations . The risk that beneficiaries would not be targeted in a transparent manner was partially mitigated by fully involving CNOP-G and its members in implementation. However, M&E design was weak. The National Confederation of Farmer Organizations and regional staff of the National Directorate of Agriculture were to have the responsibility of tracking actual input use and output results on farmers’ fields. Those data were to be transmitted to the National Office for Studies and Planning for consolidation and reporting, which constituted the second level . However, neither data collection nor consolidation of the statistics operated as planned (see Section 10 below) No baseline survey could be carried out due to the emergency nature of the project . at -Entry Rating : Quality -at- Moderately Satisfactory b. Quality of supervision: Given the circumstances prevailing in Guinea (OP 7.30 and suspension of disbursements ), no formal Bank supervision missions were undertaken from December 2008 to January 2011, and the project had no mid-term review. However, regular audio-conferences were held with the government's project team during that time . Following the Bank’s re-engagement in 2011, supervision missions resumed . The missions provided technical support for project implementation, although recommendations from supervision missions were not always carried out as effectively as they might have been (though no examples of this were reported in the ICR ). The team reportedly included experienced safeguards, financial management, and procurement staff . There were some shortcomings in supervision . First, it would appear from the evidence presented in the ICR, that there were issues of compliance with at least one of the safeguards policies triggered (Pest Management, OP 4.09), and there is no indication in the ICR that the other triggered policy (Environmental Assessment, OP 4.01) was complied with (see Section 11 below). Second, the team should have been more proactive in encouraging better management of the revolving fund in order to increase sustainability of input procurement and distribution . Third, it seems from the ICR that the team has done little during implementation to place the M&E framework and its operation on a more robust footing . However, according to information supplied subsequently by the project team, the Bank reminded the Government of its safeguard obligations after re -engagement, and advised the authorities to reference the Pest Management Plan prepared and disclosed in August 2010. The project team also reported that, although there was a delay in disclosure of the Pest Management Plan (mainly due to the suspension of activities), project activities included training of farmers in the use and storage of fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides . Regarding M&E, the team’s subsequent response was that if OP 7.30 had not gone into effect, issues arising with the M&E system (problems with the transmission, consolidation and analysis of data and the lack of a computerized data base ) would have been resolved earlier . The supervision team made note of the problems after missions to Guinea resumed in early 2011. However, due to coordination issues between the government departments involved, the issues only received attention at a late stage . Taking into account the additional evidence provided by the project team, supervision is assessed as moderately satisfactory. Quality of Supervision Rating : Moderately Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: a. Government Performance: The government set up the institutional arrangements necessary to implement the project according to the planned design and mechanisms . The government satisfied the prerequisites for disbursement and released its counterpart contribution with the provision of 1,000 tons of fertilizer to rice producers . Also, the government allocated exceptional funding to support seed production activities, leading to the production of an additional 200 tons of basic seed. However, the government failed to provide swift, effective procurement arrangements . As a result, the last fertilizer procurement was not completed before the project ’s closing date, leaving an undisbursed balance of US$1.15 million. In addition, the government had formally agreed to prepare and adopt a manual that would clearly spell out how the proceeds from sales of subsidized inputs would be managed and used efficiently . This key activity was not completed by project closure . Government Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance: The Project Coordination Unit of the ongoing Village Communities Support Project Phase 2, provided fiduciary oversight for the project, handling all financial, administrative, and accounting arrangements . The ICR reports that the implementing agencies -- the National Directorate of Agricultural Advisory Services (which was responsible for overall project coordination, management, and technical oversight ) and the National Confederation of Farmer Organizations in Guinea -- were not sufficiently proactive in carrying out recommendations of the supervision missions. There was insufficient coordination among implementing agencies and follow up of project activities . Reporting was inadequate: it did not permit reliable measurement of progress towards achievement of the development objective. It was also insufficiently timely to allow for corrective actions, leading, inter alia, to the undisbursed balance of US$1.15 million at project closure. There appear to have been issues with safeguards compliance. According to the ICR, there was satisfactory compliance with the Bank's fiduciary policies (see Section 11 below). Due to coordination issues between National Directorate of Agricultural Advisory Services and National Office for Studies and Planning, M&E system data collection and analysis was not carried out adequately. Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization: a. M&E Design: M&E was to have been carried out at two levels . The first (technical) level involved the National Confederation of Farmer Organizations (CNOP-G) and regional staff of the National Directorate of Agriculture in tracking actual input use and results on farmers ’ fields. Those data were to be transmitted to the National Office for Studies and Planning (Bureau de Stratégie et de Développement, BSD) for consolidation and reporting, which constituted the second level of M&E. CNOP-G were also to collect and maintain data on the distribution of inputs and cost recovery . No baseline survey was carried out due to the emergency nature of the project . M&E output data was not computerized, but kept manually on forms which added to the M&E difficulties . b. M&E Implementation: The ICR reports (p. 8) that the M&E system was not implemented as designed . "Instead, the National Directorate of Agriculture collected, and reported data on yields and area, and the initial objective of involving an independent public institution like BSD, which had previously specialized in project M&E, was unsuccessful ." Major shortcomings were: no baseline data (as this was an emergency operation, no baseline was established during preparation; however, the expectancy would be to accomplish this as soon as possible during implementation ); unreliable outcome data (based on general governmental statistical estimates and farmer statements without actual yield measurements) and a rapidly undertaken impact survey, which was not endowed with an adequate survey methodology. The ICR does not explain in sufficient detail the inadequacies of the M&E system . The project team subsequently explained that data reliability issues were addressed by confirming project data with the survey results of another project (See Section 4). National Statistics were used for baseline data . The two year delay resulting from the suspension of activities came into effect only two months after effectiveness, which hindered attempts to resolve M&E problems. Coordination issues between the two government implementing agencies made the consolidation and analysis of outcome data difficult . According to subsequent statement of project team however, outcome data which was not available in a detailed, tabular and computerized form at the time the ICR was prepared, has now become become available under the follow -up project. c. M&E Utilization: No information was provided by the ICR . M&E Quality Rating : Modest 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards: The project was classified as Category “B� for environmental safeguards purposes and triggered two safeguards policies: Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01) and Pest Management (OP 4.09. The preparation and disclosure of the Pest Management Policy was delayed due to the suspension of project activities following political instability . Until a separate document could be submitted to the Bank for review and disclosure, the project adopted and implemented the already-disclosed Pest Management Policy Action Plan of the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program. This Action Plan recommended four activities : (i) improvement of the institutional and legal framework, including support for preparation of a National Pest and Pesticides Management Plan; (ii) technical measures, including updating the inventory of pests affecting crops and stored farm products; (iii) training and capacity building; and (iv) monitoring and evaluation of the action plan's implementation . The ICR reports that some of the mitigation activities were not carried out until the second stage of implementation (the 2011/12 cropping season). Of the four categories of activities mentioned, mitigation focused mainly on training and capacity building for producers and extension agents. Through the training, participants were meant to gain a better understanding of other mitigation measures included in the Pest Management Policy, but the other three mitigation activities -- improvement of the institutional and legal framework, technical measures, and M&E -- received insufficient attention during implementation (ICR, p. 9). The ICR states (p. 18) that the Bank should have "followed up more aggressively on the finalization and disclosure of the pest management policy for environmental safeguards " Other than a general statement (p. 17) that "no cases of environmental damage or injuries to producers arising from inadequate or improper use of fertilizer and pesticide were reported in the project area, " and another statement (p. 9) that "the implementation of environmental safeguards under the project was rated Moderately Satisfactory, " no information is provided on compliance with OP 4.01. It is not possible to conclude, on the basis of the evidence provided, that either of the triggered Bank safeguards policies (OP 4.01 and OP 4.09) was complied with. b. Fiduciary Compliance: The Project Coordination Unit of the ongoing Village Communities Support Project Phase 2, provided fiduciary oversight for the project, handling all financial, administrative, and accounting arrangements . The unit provided the required information to the Bank on financial management through quarterly Interim Financial Reports, which, the ICR reports, were of adequate quality and responsive to Bank recommendations . Taking the recommendations of the financial management assessment into account, the grant financed technical assistance for the Project Coordination Unit in financial management and procurement by developing and adopting a Financial Management Manual, training staff, upgrading the accounting software, and mainstreaming it throughout the financial reporting system to track the use of grant proceeds on a quarterly basis . The audit of the project accounts for 2011 was unqualified. A consultancy firm was selected to conduct an external audit of the project ’s Designated Account for handling grant proceeds. The ICR did not report the results of the audit report as it was to be submitted to the Bank after the ICR, but the project team reported later that the project was in compliance without any qualifications . The final review of project procurement confirmed that the Procurement Plan developed during preparation and updated during implementation was adequate . It also found that the filing of procurement documents was good and allowed procurement to be tracked easily . However, there were important issues in procurement . Although procurement was envisaged to be completed shortly after effectiveness, the process took more time than necessary and deliveries of inputs to beneficiaries were delayed . For example, the target date for procuring 3,000 liters of herbicide and 2,000 liters of insecticide was delayed by 3 months; the target date for procuring 1,000 tons of fertilizer was delayed by more than 4 months and the last fertilizer procurement under the project could not be completed before the closing date, leading to an undisbursed balance of about US$ 1.15 million. There were no reported cases of misprocurement. c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative): d. Other: 12. Ratings : 12. ICR IEG Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome : Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Risk to Development Moderate Significant Existence of two 'significant' risks point Outcome : to 'significant' overall risk. Bank Performance : Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance : Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Quality of ICR : Unsatisfactory NOTES: NOTES - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: The main lessons identified by the ICR with some rewording are as follows : Setting up and implementing an adequate M&E system is a key project requirement . In this case, neither the M&E institutional responsibilities, nor the data collection, consolidation and utilization methods were well thought out or defined. If baseline assessments cannot be made during preparation, then they need to be carried out as early as possible thereafter, and impact evaluations adequately designed and implemented . Capable producer organizations may be a good entry point for a sustainable input distribution mechanism . Where private input distribution systems are ineffective, access to rural finance is limited, and public distribution channels are not robust or transparent, well -organized smallholders can act as an entry point for building a successful, sustainable input distribution system . Strong involvement of producer organizations in project implementation is a key factor for success on the ground . Involvement of the National Confederation of Farmers Organizations of Guinea, including its farmer federations at the regional level and unions at the prefecture level, and village associations in distributing the input packages fostered a sense of ownership at the grassroots level . Sufficiently well -thought -out capacity building is essential for public entities to fully match their capabilities to their responsibilities in project implementation . The National Agency of Agricultural Advisory Services needed capacity building mainly on internal planning and M&E implementation for updating results indicators in a timely way. Also, the operational capacity of research stations and seed multipliers remained weak . 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No Why? To verify the ratings and gather more evidence on productivity impacts . 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: Key sections of the ICR lack important information and analysis . It is difficult to judge the outcome of the project on the basis of the evidence presented . In particular, the assessment of outcomes and outputs in the efficacy discussion lacks crucial details concerning the quality of evidence and the methods used to estimate the project's impact (which were subsequently provided by the project team ). The analysis in the efficiency section is financial and not economic, and lacks information on the main assumptions, the source of the data, and how the cost benefit streams were projected. The discussion of M&E needs more elaboration of the issues which arose with M&E implementation, why they occurred, and how this affected the quality and utilization of data . a.Quality of ICR Rating : Unsatisfactory