WOWRBLD BANOK O PESRATIAONAS EVA LUATIOIN DDEEPARTMVIEETNT 22066 April 2001 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK , -S WORLLDD BBAANNK OKPOEPREARTAIOIONSS E VEA L UAATUIOTON D ENPDAERPTAMREN T NCTD The Drive to Partnership Aid Coordination and the World Bank John Eriksson 2001 The World Bank www.worldbank.org/html/oed Washington, D.C. Copyright © 2001 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing April 2001 1234 04030201 The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank or its member governments. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. 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For permission to reprint individual articles or chapters, please fax your request with complete information to the Republication Department, Copyright Clearance Center, fax 978-750-4470. All other queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, World Bank, at the address above, or faxed to 202-522-2422. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for. *4 Printed on recycled paper. Contents v Acknowledgments vii Foreword, Prefacio, Preface xiii Executive Summary, Resumen, Resume Analytique xxxi Acronyms and Abbreviations 1 1. Introduction 1 The Strategic Importance of Aid Coordination 2 The Changing Landscape of Aid Coordination 3 Some Basic Concepts and Definitions from the Literature 3 International Support for Aid Coordination 5 2. Results-Based Conceptual Frameworks 5 Evaluation Criteria and Levels 5 Key Policy Benchmarks 6 Determinants of Effective Country-Led Aid Coordination 7 Mutual Responsibility and Distinct Accountabilities under Country Leadership 9 3. Stakeholder Views and Related Findings 9 Relevance: Broadening Commitment, Participation, and Agendas 9 Commitment and Role of the Recipient Government 13 Efficacy: Assertiveness Is Not Effectiveness 20 Efficiency: The Benefits and Costs of Aid Coordination 21 Sustainability: From Information Sharing to Strategic Cocirdination 21 Institutional Development: Can Capacity Building Be Demand-Led? 22 Bank Processes and Instruments 25 4. Country Context and Measuring Aid Coordination Quality 25 Selected Country Experiences 26 Measuring the Quality of Aid Coordination 27 5. Conclusions and Recommendations 27 Main Findings and Conclusions 28 Recommendations 31 Annexes 31 Annex 1. Criteria for the Transfer of Leadership to Countries 35 Annex 2. Notes on Methods and Sources 37 Annex 3. Aid Dependency, Transaction Costs, and Coordination Costs 45 Annex 4. Analysis of Bank CAS Documents 53 Annex 5. Evaluative Levels and Criteria for Aid Coordination 55 Annex 6. Informational Interviews 57 Annex 7. Management Response 63 Annex 8. Report from the Committee on Development Effectiveness 65 Endnotes 73 Bibliography iii THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLI BANK Boxes 4 Box 1.1 Aid Coordination in Post-Conflict Settings 11 Box 3.1 Civil Society and Private Sector Participation in Three CDF Pilot Countries 14 Box 3.2 Additional Advantages and Disadvantages of In-Country CGs 16 Box 3.3 The Impact of Stand-Alone Projects on Institutional Capacity in Africa 16 Box 3.4 The Cost of Poor Aid Coordination 17 Box 3.5 Approaches to Aid Coordination in the Health Sector in Mozambique 17 Box 3.6 Do Sector Programs Result in Donor Concentration? 18 Box 3.7 Ethiopia ESDP: Achievements and Issues 22 Box 3.8 Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa 23 Box 3.9 Tracking Support for Sector Programs 25 Box 4.1 Country-Led Aid Coordination: Botswana 26 Box 4.2 The CG in Ghana: From Event to Process 33 Box A1.1 Building Aid Management Capacity in Kazakhstan and Vietnam 53 Box A5.1 Aid Coordination (AC) Evaluative Levels Hierarchy 54 Box A5.2 Evaluative Criteria for Aid Coordination Figures 6 Figure 2.1 Country Characteristics and Aid Coordination 6 Figure 2.2 Development Assistance Characteristics and the Aid Coordination Environment 9 Figure 3.1 Relevance of Aid Coordination Activities 10 Figure 3.2 Role of Partner Government in Aid Coordination 10 Figure 3.3 In-Country Aid Coordination 10 Figure 3.4 Effectiveness of Bank Coordination Support 12 Figure 3.5 Objectives of Aid Coordination 13 Figure 3.6 Advantages and Disadvantages of In-Country CG Meetings 13 Figure 3.7 Impact of Aid Coordination 14 Figure 3.8 Impact of Poverty Reduction for Aid Coordination 14 Figure 3.9 Outcomes of Aid Coordination 15 Figure 3.10 Outputs of Aid Coordination 16 Figure 3.11 Integration of Aid Resources 19 Figure 3.12 Relative Benefits and Costs of Aid Coordination 20 Figure 3.13 Recurrent Costs 37 Figure A3.1 ODA as a Percentage of GDP and per Capita GNP, 116 Countries, 1996-97 43 Figure A3.2 World Bank Aid Coordination Support: Direct Cost 44 Figure A3.3 World Bank Aid Coordination Support: Cost Per Event 44 Figure A3.4 Efficiency Tables 32 Table A1.1 Groupings of CG Countries by Official Development Assistance (ODA) as Percentage of GNP 38 Table A3.1 Aid Dependency and GNP per Capita, 116 Countries, 1996-97 Averages 39 Table A3.2 ODA Disbursements per Capita (US dollar, adjusted by 1997 IBRD/ IDA loan commitment deflator) 40 Table A3.3 Ghana, 1984-86, Commitments by Sector and Donor (annual averages, US dollars '000) 41 Table A3.4 Ghana, 1990-92, Commitments by Sector and Donor (annual averages, US dollars '000) 42 Table A3.5 Ghana, 1991-96, Commitments by Sector and Donor (annual averages, US dollars '000) iv Acknowledgments this report was prepared by a team in the Cor- the expertise of Marco Rossi of SDC, during his T porate Evaluation and Methods Group of the Op- secondment to OED in the falli of 1998. erations Evaluation Department (OEDCM), past group Staff support throughout the review was provided manager, Wendy Jarvie. The drafting team included John by Annisa Cline Thomas and Julia Ooro. Remaining Eriksson, task manager, Nimrod Raphaeli, and Claudia deficiencies are the responsibility of the task manager. Fumo. This study was published by the Partnerships and A grant from the Partnership Trust Fund between Knowledge Group (OEDPK) by the Dissemination and OED and the Swiss Agency for Development and Outreach Unit. The unit is directed by Elizabeth Cooperation (SDC) enabled participation by senior Campbell-Page, task manager. and includes Caroline recipient country representatives in two workshops McEuen (editor) and Juicy Qureishi-Huq (administra- held as part of the review: (1) From Aid Coordination tive assistant). to Partnership, Washington, February 1999, and (2) Director-General, Operations Evraluation: Robert Picciotto OECD/DAC Development Partnership Forum, Paris, December 1999. Both workshops benefited from the Director, Operations Evaluation Department: Gregory Ingram facilitation of Marc Lindenberg, University of Wash- Manager, Corporate Evaluation and Methods:Victoria Elliott ington-Seattle, and Azedine Ouerghi, WBI, and from Task Manager: John Eriksson v FOREWORD PREFACIO PREFACE This report, prepared by the En este informe, preparado por Ce rapport, pr6pare par le Operations Evaluation De- - el Departamento de Evaluaci6n Departement de l'Evaluation partment (OED), presents de Operaciones (DEO), se - des Operations (OED), presente findings and recommenda- presentan las conclusiones y les cor[clusions et recom- tions emerging from a review recomendaciones surgidas de mandations d'une revue de of the World Bank's experi- un estudio sobre la experiencia l'experience de la Banque ence with aid coordination. del Banco Mundial con la Mondiale en matiere de coordination Aid coordination ties at the inter- coordinaci6n de la ayuda. de l'aide. section of several development effec- La coordinaci6n de la ayuda La coordination de l'aide se situe tiveness challenges. Globalization has resulta crucial para la eficacia de las au point de rencontre de plusieurs brought new opportunities for devel- diversas actividades de desarrollo. La d6fis du developpement. La opment rewards but also new risks of globalizaci6n ha traido aparejadas mondialisation apporte avec elle de instability and increased inequalities. nuevas oportunidades de obtener nouvelles opportunites de Public concern with the efficacy of aid I .. Puli rownc Povernth the effincracye aid beneficios del desarrollo, pero tambi6n developpement mais aussi de hancssigown. Plove haveshincreasednd ha venido acompafiada de los peligros nouveaux risques d'instabilit6 et codemancssi flo hffiavreshuruk even de la inestabilidad y el agravamiento d'augmentation des in6galit&s. Les asltipdiemands-forwofic respectourcep h de las desigualdades. La preocupaci6n opinions publiques sont de plus en humulitaripi h criespThet torcompex de la opini6n piblica por la eficacia de plus preoccupees par les problemes humanitariaoundly cr res thes cntren la ayuda se ha acentuado. Al tiempo d'efficacit& de I'aide. La pauvrete inwhave the po oundl Balte thertext que la pobreza aumenta, han augmente et les flux de fonds in which the World Bank operates.. In 1995, under new leadership, menguado las corrientes de fondos en concessionnels diminuent, alors meme a strategic renewal of the World condiciones concesionarias, incluso a que de graves crises humanitaires Bank Group was launched, focused pesar de que la demanda de recursos multiplient la demande d'aide on enhanced development effective- oficiales se ha multiplicado, frente a las publique. Ces evolutions ont ness and improved linkages with the complejas crisis humanitarias. Estas profondement modifie development community. In his Oc- tendencias han alterado l'environnernent dans lequel opere la tober, 1998 speech to the Annual profundamente el contexto en el que Banque Mondiale. Meetings of the World Bank and se desenvuelve el Banco Mundial. En 1995, sous l'impulsion d'une International Monetary Fund, the En 1995, con una nueva nouvelle direction, le Groupe de la Bank's President articulated "a new conducci6n, se inici6 una renovaci6n Banque Morndiale a lance une reforme approach to development partner- estrategica del Grupo del Banco strategique, dont le principal objectif ship . . . a ed by governments and Mundial, dirigida en especial a etait d'accroitre l'efficacit6 de l'aide et encliamed tsby f the civ iet , those mejorar la eficacia en terminos de d'am6liorer les relations avec la nc res wythereivil woiety in theonor desarrollo y los vinculos con los communaute des institutions de community must learn to cooperate crculos que se ocupan del desarrollo. developpernent. Dans son discours with each othei must learn to be En el discurso pronunciado en octubre d'octobre 1998 aux Assemblees better team players capable of let- de 1998 en las Reuniones Anuales del Annuelles de la Banque Mondiale et ting go." Partnership (along with Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario du Fonds Monetaire International, le ownership and results orientation) is Internacional, el Presidente del Banco Pr6sident de la Banque a defini les embedded in the Comprehensive present6 "un nuevo enfoque de la elements d'ain < nouveau modele de Development Framework (CDF), colaboraci6n para el desarrollo.. partenaria pour le drnveloppement initiated in January 1999 and cur- encabezada por los gobiernos y los anime par les gouvernements et les rently being piloted in 12 countries. 6rganos legislativos de los pafses, con parlements des pays, sous l'influence The conclusions of this report participaci6n de la sociedad civil ... en de la soci&t6 civile ... en vertu duquel are based on evaluative research la que nosotros, la comunidad de nous, les bailleurs de fonds, devons undertaken in 1998 and 1999. Since then development assistance donantes, debemos aprender ... a ser apprendre a cooperer et devons agencies, including the Bretton mejores compafieros de equipo, apprendre a travailler en equipes, vii TH E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Woods institutions, have in- capaces de ceder". La capables de deleguer '. Le tensified their attention to is- colaboraci6n (asi como la partenariat (au meme titre que sues of aid coordination and - identificaci6n con los les concepts d'appropriation et partnership. A salient manifes- programas y la orientaci6n de priorit6 aux resultats) est tation of this increased atten- hacia la obtenci6n de une composante du Cadre de tion is the Poverty Reduction resultados) forma parte del Degveloppement Inteigre (CDI), tive introduced by the Devel- Marco Integral de Desarrollo initie en janvier 1999, que 12 opment Committee in the fall of (MID), puesto en marcha en pays sont en train de piloter. 1999. All low-income country mem- enero de 1999 y aplicado actualmente, Les conclusions du present bers of the World Bank and IMF are a titulo experimental, en 12 paises. rapport sont basees sur une recherche in the process of preparing PRSPs, Las conclusiones de este informe entreprise en 1998 et 1999. Depuis which are to be based on the CDF se basan en las investigaciones cette date, les institutions d'aide au principles. There have been other realizadas, con fines de evaluaci6n, en developpement, y compris les recent promising efforts to bring 1998 y 1999. Desde entonces, los institutions de Bretton Woods, about greater procedural harmoni- organismos de asistencia para el accordent une plus haute priorite aux zation among development agencies, desarrollo, entre ellos las instituciones problemes de coordination de l'aide et including by multilateral develop- de Bretton Woods, dedican mayor de partenariat. Une manifestation ment banks, the U.N. system, and . bilteral d, n throUgh te, and atenci6n a la coordinaci6n de la ayuda spectaculaire de cette tendance est le Develdopmen Assista e Om E. y a la colaboraci6n. Expresi6n lancement par le Comite du Notwithstanding this progress, sobresaliente de esa atenci6n es la Developpement des Documents de the sober findings of this report iniciativa relacionada con el Strategie de Lutte contre la Pauvrete convey many of the challenges that documento de estrategia de lucha (PRSP) au cours de l'automne 1999. must still be met by the develop- contra la pobreza (DELP, por sus Tous les pays a faible revenu qui sont ment community if the goal of siglas en ingles), presentada por el membres de la Banque et du FMI sont recipient country-led partnerships Comite para el Desarrollo en el otofio en train de preparer des PRSP, qui is to be achieved. Over 130 ques- de 1999. Todos los paises de ingreso doivent etre bases sur les principes du tionnaires were completed by Bank bajo miembros del Banco Mundial y el CDI. Recemment d'autres initiatives staff, recipient government officials, FMI estan preparando el DELP, que prometteuses ont et lancees, par and donor agencies and their in- debe fundarse en los principios del l'intermediaire du Comit6 d'Aide au country representatives. These find- Marco Integral de Desarrollo. Developpement de l'OCDE, pour ings were supplemented by insights ings were ,suppmnt b ins ight Ultimamente, se han realizado otras harmoniser les procedures des agences from workshops involving Bank staff and a worldwide group of 20 actividades prometedoras a fin de de developpement, y compris les senior country officials with aid armonizar mejor los procedimientos banques multilaterales de coordination responsibilities, three entre los organismos de desarrollo; los developpement, le systrme des Nations country visits, Bank staff inter- bancos multilaterales de desarrollo, el Unies et les bailleurs de fonds views, and a literature review. sistema de las Naciones Unidas y bilateraux. The review concludes that the donantes bilaterales, por medio del Malgre ces progres, les development community has been Comite de Asistencia para el conclusions r6alistes du present well-served by the leadership of the Desarrollo, de la OCDE, han lievado a rapport decrivent les nombreux defis Bank in managing aid coordination cabo algunas de ellas. que la communaute des institutions de processes. Yet the long-standing A pesar de estos progresos, las developpement doit encore relever goal of country leadership of the atinadas conclusiones de este informe pour atteindre son objectif de process remains elusive. The review.. identifies a number of barriers to be ponen de manifiesto muchas de las partenariats animms par les pays overcomie-oanuther pfbartieof both te dificultades que aun debe superar la ben6ficiaires. Plus de 130 overcome-on the part of both the comunidad dedicada al desarrollo questionnaires ont ete remplis par le reclpient country and the undouess Many countries lack the com- para lograr que los paises receptores personnel de la Banque, les mitment and institutional capacity asuman la iniciativa en materia de fonctionnaires des gouvernements to make resource allocation choices colaboraci6n. Funcionarios del Banco, beneficiaires, les bailleurs de fonds et to make resource allocation choices, de los gobiernos receptores y de leurs repr6sentants dans les pays. Les viii FOREWORD in conformance with national organismos donantes, asi como resultats de cette enquete ont development strategy and representantes de estos uiltimos e t complkt6s par les transparent standards and en distintos paises, conclusions d'ateliers reunissant processes of accountability. respondieron mas de 130 le personnel de la Banque et un Most donors and inter- cuestionarios. Las conclusiones groupe de 20 hauts national agencies, including the se complementaron con fonctionnaires nationaux Bank, continue to impose such informaci6n recogida en impliques dans la coordination barriers to country leadership seminarios en los que de l'aide, par trois missions dans les as weak development orientation in participaron funcionarios del Banco y pays, par des interviews de their aid programs, proliferation un grupo de 20 altos funcionarios de fonctionnaires de la Banque et par une Of projects, divergent and complex d ofprojcdurl rveqireent, stand-plnex distintos paises del mundo, revue des etudes et documents project management structures encargados de la coordinaci6n de disponibles. that undermine capacity building, ayuda; tres visitas a sendos paises; L'etude conclut que la Banque, en expensive supply-driven assistance entrevistas del personal del Banco; y sa qualite de leader du processus de for capacity building, and staff un examen de las publicaciones sobre coordination de l'aide, a bien servi la attitudes inimical to ownership and el tema. communautn des institutions de partnership-reinforced by input- En el estudio se llega a la developpement. Cependant l'objectif oriented incentive systems. conclusi6n de que el Banco, a traves de ancien d'un leadership des pays eux- The OED review recommends su gesti6n de los procesos de memes est loin d'etre atteint. La revue that: coordinaci6n de la ayuda, ha prestado identifie un certain nombre d'obstacles un buen servicio a quienes se dedican qui doivent etre surmontes a la fois nation policies and practices with a la tarea del desarrollo. Sin embargo, dans les pays beneficiaires et chez les the CDF principles of ownership, el antiguo objetivo de que cada pais bailleurs de fonds. partnership, and results orienta- tome las riendas de dichos procesos Nombreux sont les pays qui tion sigue siendo dificil de alcanzar. En el n'ont ni la volont6 politique, ni les 2) Each Bank country team that estudio se enumeran diversos capacites institutionnelles necessaires supports a CG or similar mecha- obstaculos que el pais receptor y los pour faire des choix d'allocations de nism work with the government donantes deben superar. ressources conformes aux strategies and other development partners Muchos paises carecen del nationales cle developpement, sur la to formulate a strategy for mov- compromiso y la capacidad base de crit, res transparents et de ing to country leadership. institucional para asignar recursos de proc6dures inspirees par le principe de Each strategy would demon- acuerdo con una estrategia de responsabilite. strate how the Bank and other donors desarrollo nacional, normas Le leadership des pays se heurte will help the govemment nurture transparentes y procedimientos de aussi aux obstacles crees par de policy reform, strengthen aid rendici6n de cuentas. nombreux bailleurs de fonds et coordination capacity, and reach Por otra parte, la mayoria de los institutions internationales, y compris partnership agreements with donors donantes y los organismos la Banque: la faible influence des that delineate mutual responsibility internacionales, incluido el Banco, objectifs de developpement sur for development outcomes and the contimuan poniendo obstaculos al l'orientation des programmes d'aide, distinct account-abilities of each partiner Highunt-prioitieshould beac gi liderazgo del pais, entre ellos, la escasa la proliferation des projets, des to implementing these recommend- orientaci6n hacia el desarrollo procedures complexes et divergentes, ations through the PRSPs. observada en los programas de ayuda; des structures autonomes de gestion Successful implementation of la proliferaci6n de proyectos; la des projets qui nuisent au these recommendations will require compleiidad y divergencia de las developpernent des capacites, des consensus and collaboration among formalidades exigidas; la formes couiteuses de promotion des donors at the global level. Close independencia de las estructuras de capacit6s, bas6es sur ce que les cooperation with the U.N. system; gesti6n de los proyectos, que hace bailleurs de fonds peuvent offrir, DAC members, including the EU; dificil mejorar la capacidad; la costosa enfin des reactions hostiles a other donors (such as the Saudi asistencia, basada en la oferta, para el I'appropriation des programmes et ix T H E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Fund and the Kuwait Fund); fortalecimiento de la capacidad; aux partenariats; ces deficiences and the Regional Develop- - y las actitudes del personal sont aggravees par un systeme ment Banks (RDBs) is impera- contrarias a la colaboraci6n y la d'incitations qui r&ompense ]es tive if a common commitment identificaci6n con los proyectos, produits et non les resultats. to building effective develop- agravadas por los sistemas de Les recommandations de ment partnerships at the incentivos orientados a los 1'etude de l'OED sont les country level is to be _ achieved. insumos. suivantes: En el estudio del DEO se 1) La Banque doit baser ses recomienda que: politiques et ses pratiques en 1)EI Banco armonice las politicas y matiere de coordination de l'aide practicas relativas a la sur les principes du CDI coordinaci6n de la ayuda con los d'appropriation, de partenariat principios, establecidos en el et de recherche du resultat Marco integral de desarrollo, de 2) Toutes les equipes de pays identificaci6n con los proyectos, appuyant des groupes colaboraci6n y orientaci6n hacia consultatifs ou des mecanismes la obtenci6n de resultados. similaires doivent cooperer avec 2)Cada grupo del Banco a cargo de le gouvernement et les autres un pais que preste su apoyo a un partenaires du developpement grupo consultivo o un pour formuler une strartgie mecanismo similar colabore con visant a promouvoir le leadership el gobierno y otros asociados du pays. para el desarrollo a fin de Chacune de ces strartgies devra formular una estrategia que indiquer comment la Banque et les permita at pais ir asumiendo la autres bailleurs de fonds aideront le conducci6n del proceso. gouvernement a preparer des reformes Cada estrategia demostraria de de politique, a renforcer ses capacites que manera el Banco y otros donantes de coordination de l'aide et a conclure pueden ayudar a un gobierno a des accords de partenariat avec les favorecer la reforma de las politicas, baitleurs de fonds qui definiront fortalecer la capacidad de coordinar la clairement des objectifs de ayuda y celebrar acuerdos de developpement communs et les colaboraci6n con los donantes donde responsabilites specifiques de chaque se establezca la responsabilidad partenaire. Une haute priorite devra com6n frente a los resultados de las etre accordee a une mise en ceuvre de actividades de desarrollo y la ces recommandations dans le cadre responsabilidad precisa de cada uno des PRSP. de los asociados. Se debe otorgar un Une application satisfaisante de alto grado de prioridad a la aplicaci6n ces recommandations necessitera de estas recomendaciones mediante los I'accord et la collaboration des documentos de estrategia de lucha bailleurs de fonds a l'echelle mondiale. contra la pobreza. Une cooperation etroite avec le El consenso y la colaboraci6n systeme des Nations Unies, les entre los donantes de todo el mundo membres du CAD, y compris l'Union son requisitos para poder llevar a la Europeenne, d'autres bailleurs de practica satisfactoriamente esras fonds (tels que les Fonds Saoudiens et recomendaciones. Para que exista una Koweitiens) et les Banques Regionales firme voluntad com6n de lograr que de D6veloppement est imperative pour en cada pais se forjen relaciones de un engagement commun au service de x FOREWORD colaboraci6n eficaces con miras partenariats efficaces au niveau al desarrollo, es imprescindible des pays. establecer una estrecha cooperaci6n con el sistema de las Naciones Unidas; los miembros del Comite de Asistencia para el Desarrollo e, incluso, con la Uni6n Europea; otros donantes (como el Fondo de Arabia Saudita y el Fondo de Kuwait); y los bancos regionales de desarrollo. Robert Picciotto Director-General, Operations Evaluation Department xi EXECUTIVE RESUMEN RESUME SUMMARY ANALYTILQE The development com- Desde hace largo tiempo, La communaut6 des institutions munity has long recognized the quienes se ocupan del desarrollo de developpement a depuis longtemps contribution that aid coordination reconocen que la coordinaci6n de la reconnu le role que pouvait jouer la could make to development effec- ayuda podria contribuir a mejorar la coordination de l'aide dans l'efficacite tiveness, and recent trends have eficacia de las actividades de du processus de developpement; reinforced its importance and po- desarrollo; las 6ltimas tendencias han 1'evolution recente confirme tential. Official Development As- reforzado su importancia y potencial. I'importance presente et potentielle de sistance (ODA) flows have Las corrientes de asistencia oficial para cette coordin-ation. L'Aide Publique au stagnated, development perfor- el desarrollo (AOD) se mantienen en Developpernent (APD) stagne, la mance has been disappointing, and niveles estacionarios; los resultados en performance des programmes de donor countries are increasing terminos de desarrollo han sido develop-pemnent est decevante et, de their demands for accountability decepcionantes; y en los paises plus en plus, les pays donateurs and results. At the same time, low- donantes aumenta la exigencia de una demandent des comptes et exigent des income countries remain highly de- mejor rendici6n de cuentas y r6sultats. Pourtant, dans le meme pendent on ODA. resultados satisfactorios. Al mismo temps, les pays a faible revenu Against this background, the tiempo, los paises de ingreso bajo continuent de dependre de l'APD de Executive Directors of the World siguen dependiendo en gran medida facon considerable. Bank asked the Operations Evalua- de la AOD. C'est dans ce contexte que les tion Department (OED) to review En este marco, los Directores Administrateurs de la Banque the role and experience of the Bank Ejecutivos del Banco Mundial Mondiale ont demande au in aid coordination. This report pidieron al Departamento de Departement de l'Evaluation des presents the findings and recom- Evaluaci6n de Operaciones (DEO) Operations (OED) d'etudier le r6le et mendations of OED's review. A key que examinara la funci6n y la la performance de la Banque en objective was to examine both the experiencia del Banco en materia de matiere de coordination de l'aide. Ce constraints involved and the coordinaci6n de la ayuda. En este rapport pr6sente les conclusions et progress made in helping countries informe se presentan las conclusiones recommandations de l'etude d'OED. to assume more responsibility for y recomendaciones del estudio llevado L'un des principaux objectifs etait aid coordination. Another objec- a cabo por el DEO, uno de cuyos d'examiner les problemes et les tive was to determine the effect of objetivos principales consistia en resultats des efforts faits pour que les the Bank's policies and procedures examinar los progresos logrados en la pays assunient un r6le grandissant on government ownership of aid tarea de ayudar a los paises a asumir dans la coordination de l'aide. Un coordination processes in recipient una mayor responsabilidad en la autre objectif etait de determiner countries and the development of coordinaci6n de asistencia y en l'impact des politiques et procedures their capacity to carry out the ac- analizar los factores que obstaculizan de la Banque sur la volonte des companying responsibilities. dicha tarea. Otro objetivo era gouvernements des pays beneficiaires The review deals with an im- determinar los efectos de las politicas de s'approprier la coordination de portant dimension of the Compre- y los procedimientos del Banco en la I'aide et sur leur capacite d'assumer hensive Development Framework identificaci6n de los gobiernos de los cette responsabilite. (CDF). The CDF includes partner- paises receptores con los procesos de L'etude aborde un aspect ship as one of its major principles, coordinaci6n de la ayuda y en el important du Cadre de and aid coordination is closely desarrollo de la capacidad de estos Developpement Integre (CDI). L'un des xiii TH E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK linked with partnership. This para cumplir las responsabil- grands principes du CDI est le link derives from the require- idades concomitantes. partenariat; or, des liens etroits ment of any partnership that En el estudio se aborda un unissent la coordination de all partners jointly develop importante aspecto del Marco l'aide et la notion de and agree on their objectives, Integral de Desarrollo (MID), partenariat. Dans tout as well as on their respective uno de cuyos principios partenariat, tous les partenaires accountabilities in realizing fundamentales es la doivent definir ensemble des these objectives. It is also impor- colaboraci6n, a la cual esta objectifs communs, ainsi que les tant that they support capacity de- estrechamente vinculada ta responsabilites respectives de chacun velopment, which must take place coordinaci6n de la ayuda. Este d'eux dans l'accomplissement de ces if weaker members are to partici- vinculo surge de la necesidad, objectifs. Une importante obligation pate fully. A mid-1999 joint state- presente en toda actividad de des partenaires est aussi de favoriser le ment of four European Ministers colaboraci6n, de que todas las partes developpement des capacites, of Development Cooperation is a formulen conjuntamente y acuerden condition indispensable d'une recent high-level expression of sus objetivos, asi como la participation totale des plus faibles. these concerns: it calls for better responsabilidad que le cabe a cada L'expression la plus recente, au plus coordination among donors and a una de ellas en la consecuci6n de haut niveau, d'une telle ambition est la desire to see recipient countries in dichos objetivos. Tambien es declaration commune de quatre the "driver's seat. importante que los asociados Ministres europeens du contribuyan al desarrollo de la Developpement et de la Cooperation Results-Based Frameworks for capacidad, requisito indispensable au milieu de 1999: ils demandent une Assessing Aid Coordination para que los miembros mas meilleure coordination entre bailleurs Activities vulnerables puedan tener una de fonds et forment le vreu que la This review draws on several participaci6n cabal. La declaraci6n direction du processus soit confi6e sources of evidence. To assess the conjunta formulada a mediados de aux pays b6neficiaires.' historical performance of aid coor- 1999 por cuatro ministros europeos dination activities, it refers both to de cooperaci6n para el desarrollo Un Cadre d'Evaluation de la standard evaluation criteria and to constituye la expresi6n mas reciente, a Coordination de I'Aide Axe sur key policy benchmarks. Implicit in alto nivel, de esas preocupaciones: en les Resultats this approach is that aid coordina- ella se pide una mejor coordinaci6n L'etude est basee sur plusieurs sources tion, like other aid instruments, entre los donantes y se expresa el d'information. Pour evaluer la should be regularly assessed for its deseo de que sean los paises performance anterieure de la contribution to development re- receptores quienes dirijan el proceso.' coordination de I'aide, elle combine sults. Drawing on responses to l'emploi des criteres d'evaluation questionnaires, interviews, and Marcos basados en los resultados habituels avec l'analyse d'indicateurs workshops, the review explores the para evaluar las actividades de de politiques. Le sens implicite de cette relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coordinacion de la ayuda methode est que la coordination, and sustainability of aid coordina- Para realizar este estudio se ha comme les autres instruments de tion and its contribution to institu- recurrido a distintas fuentes. A fin de I'aide, doit faire l'objet d'evaluations tional development. The main evaluar el desempefio hist6rico de las periodiques de son impact sur le elements of aid coordination actividades de coordinaci6n de la developpement. Sur la base de policy, issued by the Bank and the ayuda, se han utilizado criterios reponses a des questionnaires, Development Assistance Committee estandar de evaluaci6n y parametros d'interviews et des conclusions of the Organization for Economic de referencia clave sobre politicas. En d'ateliers, l'etude examine la Cooperation and Development este enfoque esta implicita la idea de pertinence, l'efficacite, 1'efficience et la (OECD/DAC) in the 1980s, also que la coordinaci6n de la ayuda, al durabilite de la coordination de I'aide provide benchmarks for assessing igual que otros instrumentos, deberia et sa contribution au d6veloppement the Bank's experience. The evaluarse peri6dicamente para des institutions. Dans les annees 1980, overarching principles of the policy, determinar su aporte a los resultados la Banque et le Comite d'Aide au xiv EXECUTIVE SUMMARRY which translate to criteria de las actividades de desarrollo. Develcppement de that permit assessment of the - A partir de la informaci6n l'Organisation de Cooperation Bank's effectiveness in sup- recogida en cuestionarios, et de LDeveloppement porting aid coordination, in- entrevistas y seminarios, en el Economique (OCDE/CAD) ont clude: estudio se analiza la defini les principaux elements * The purpose of aid coordi- pertinencia, eficacia, eficiencia d'une politique de coordination nation should be to integrate y viabilidad de la coordinaci6n de l'aide, qui fournissent de external assistance with the de- de la ayuda y su contribuci6n al bons indicateurs pour l'evaluation de velopment priorities of the re- desarrollo institucional. Los 1'experience de la Banque. Cette cipient country. principales elementos de la politica de politique comprend notamment les * Responsibility for aid coordina- coordinaci6n de la ayuda, dados a principes fondamentaux suivants qui tion should reside primarily with conocer por el Banco y el Comite de peuvent servir de criteres pour 6valuer the recipient government. Asistencia para el Desarrollo, de la l'efficacite de la contribution de la * Both recipients and donors should Organizaci6n de Cooperaci6n y Banque a la coordination de l'aide: adhere to strategic objectives and Desarrollo Econ6micos (OCDE) en el * L'objectif de la coordination doit investment programs. decenio de 1980, tambien sirven de etre d'integrer I'aide exterieure Two key elements of the devel- referencia para evaluar la experiencia dans les priorit6s du opment enabling environment in a del Banco. Entre los principios developpement des pays country are policy performance and fundamentales de dicha politica, que ben6ficiaires. institutional quality; closely related se pueden traducir en criterios que * Les gouvernements b6neficiaires variables are country commitment permiten evaluar la eficacia de la doivent assumer 1'essentiel des (ownership of sound development contribuci6n del Banco a la responsabilites dans la priorities and policies) and the insti- coordinaci6n de la ayuda, se cuentan coordination de l'aide. tutional capacity to manage and los siguientes: * Les pays beneficiaires et les coordinat capacidt(aysubsetof t i . * La coordinaci6n de la ayuda debe bailleurs de fonds doivent coodional quality). Figure subs nstis tener por objeto integrar la adherer a des strategies et a des tional quality). Figure 2.1 suggests asistencia externa en las programmes d'investisssement a pattern of relationships between prioridades de desarrollo del pais communs. these variables and aid coordina- receptor Des politiques efficaces et des tion arrangements. Strong countryveetr e oiiusefccse e iommitrangementsand hirog i tuntin * La responsabilidad de coordinar institutions performantes sont deux capacity tend to be associated la ayuda compete principalmente conditions essentielles d'un al gobierno receptor. environnement favorable au with country-driven arrangements, * Tanto los receptores como los developpement d'un pays; deux autres promoting ghouldberea devfelmeint edonantes deben suscribir los facteurs connexes sont l'engagement fectiveness than arrangements objetivos estrategicos y los du pays (c'est a dire l'appropriation driven predominately by donors. programas de inversi6n. par le pays de saines priorites et Conversely, the weaker the country Dos elementos esenciales para politiques cle developpement) et la commitment and the institutional crear las condiciones que favorezcan el politiques cle developpement) et la capacity,ntand the more ikeldonos desarrollo de un pais son el coordonner l'aide (une sous-categorie will be to insist on donor-driven cumplimiento de las normas y la de la qualite des institutions). Le aid coordination in terests of calidad de las instituciones; otras Graphique 2.1 fait apparaitre un variables estrechamente relacionadas certain nornbre de correlations entre development effectiveness. con ellos son el compromiso del pais ces differents facteurs et les intowthe canuntrycoordinatiadrant? (es decir, la identificaci6n con mecanismes de coordination de l'aide. into the country-driven quadrant? prioridades y politicas de desarrollo Il semble que la force de l'engagement Depending on the current quadrant acertadas) y la capacidad institucional et des capacites institutionnelles ait to strengthen country commitment, para administrar y coordinar la ayuda pour corollaire des mecanismes bases strengthen capacity, or do both. But (factor que depende de la calidad de sur le leadership du pays, mieux the characteristics of the donors and las instituciones). En el Grafico 2.1 se capables que les mecanismes diriges xv TH E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK international agencies also presenta el modo en que estas par les bailleurs de fonds de influence the relative ease - variables se relacionan con los promouvoir un developpement or difficulty of moving to mecanismos de coordinaci6n de efficace. En sens inverse, plus effective, country-led aid l la ayuda. Un alto grado de faibles sont l'engagement et la coordination. Figure 2.2 compromiso del pais y una capacite institutionnelle du illustrates the influence of buena capacidad institucional pays, plus les bailleurs de fonds development assistance suelen asociarse a mecanismos seront tentes d'imposer une characteristics. impulsados por el pais, que deberian coordination de I'aide dominee par When donors and agencies promover mayor eficacia en t6rminos eux, au nom de l'efficacite du have a high development orienta- de desarrollo que aquellos processus de developpement. tion and are relatively few in num- mecanismos propuestos Comment peut-on deplacer la ber, the conditions for achieving principalmente por los donantes. A la coordination de l'aide vers la case country-led aid coordination are inversa, cuanto menor sea el d'une gestion animee par le pays? favorable. As the number of donors compromiso de un pais y mris Selon la categorie dans laquelle se situe (and projects) increases, however, deficiente sea su capacidad deja le pays, il s'agit soit de renforcer the environment becomes more institucional, habra mayores son engagement, soit d'am6liorer ses challenging. Moreover, as non- probabilidades de que, a fin de capacites institutionnelles, soit les development motives for aid mejorar la eficacia de las actividades deux. N6anmoins. les caracteristiques provision-such as the commercial de desarrollo, los donantes insistan en des bailleurs de fonds et des interests of donors-become domi- aplicar los mecanismos de institutions internationales ont elles nant, effective, country-led coordi- coordinaci6n de la ayuda que ellos aussi une influence sur le passage, nation becomes problematic. propongan. facile ou difficile, a des coordinations While the end of the Cold War cC6mo se puede desplazar la de l'aide efficaces, anim6es par le pays. reduced the dominance of the ideo- coordinaci6n de la ayuda hacia el Le Graphique 2.2 montre comment la logical approach to providing aid, sector "impulsada por el pais"? Seg6n structure de l'aide au developpement geopolitical considerations are still el sector en el que se halle un pais influence les modes de coordination. at work. dado, la respuesta puede ser: Quand les bailleurs de fonds et les Effective aid coordination in- fortaleciendo el grado de compromiso agences d'aide donnent la priorite aux volves a process that guides the del pais, fortaleciendo la capacidad o objectifs de developpement, quand recipient country and the donors haciendo ambas cosas. Pero las leur nombre est relativement modeste, toward agreement that all partners caracteristicas de los donantes y los les conditions sont favorables a une will accept mutual responsibility for organismos internacionales tambien coordination animee par le pays. achieving development outcomes, inciden en la facilidad o la dificultad Quand le nombre de donateurs (et de as well as distinct accountabilities. relativas para lograr que la projets) augmente, la situation devient For the country, these include a coordinaci6n de la ayuda resulte plus complexe. Enfin quand dominent commitment to developing sound efectiva y tenga origen en el pais. En des objectifs qui ne sont pas le policies and effective institutions, el Grafico 2.2 se puede observar la developpement, par exemple les while donors and agencies should influencia de las caracteristicas de la interets commerciaux des bailleurs de agree to adopt a development orn- asistencia para el desarrollo. fonds, il devient plus difficile entation; achieve coherence with Cuando los donantes y los d'organiser une coordination de l'aide country development priorities; ex- organismos son relativamente pocos y dirigee par le pays. Meme si la fin de la ercise selectivity in keeping with tienen como principal objetivo el Guerre Froide a reduit l'influence des comparative advantage, thus ad- desarrollo, las condiciones son ideologies, les considerations geo- dressing the "numbers" issue; har- favorables para que el propio pais politiques jouent encore un r6le monize procedures so as to reduce coordine la ayuda. Sin embargo, a important. aid delivery transaction costs; pro- medida que el numero de donantes (y La coordination de l'aide est vide effective assistance in capacity proyectos) aumenta, la situaci6n se efficace quand le processus aboutit a building to create a level playing complica. Ademas, si comienzan a un accord entre bailleurs de fonds et field among partners; and support cobrar mayor importancia los moviles pays beneficiaire sur des objectifs de xvi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY country-led efforts to achieve ajenos al desarrollo - como el developpement communs a tous these objectives. interes comercial de los les partenaires et sur les donantes - resulta mas responsabilit6s particulieres de Main Findings and problematico que el pais chacune des parties. Dans le cas Recommendations impulse una coordinaci6n du pay s, il s'agit d'un The overarching conclusion eficaz. Si bien con el fin de la engagement pour la promotion of the review is that the de- Guerra Fria se redujo el peso de de sairies politiques et velopment community has been las consideraciones ideol6gicas d'institutions efficaces; dans le cas des well-served by the Bank's support en la distribuci6n de la ayuda, no han bailleurs de fonds et des agences of aid coordination, but much re- perdido vigencia las razones d'aide, il s'agit d'adherer a des mains to be done to achieve the geopoliticas. objectifs de developpement, de long-standing goal of country lead- La coordinaci6n eficaz de la respecter les priorites du pays, ership of the process. ayuda supone un proceso mediante el d'operer de facon selective en fonction cual el pais receptor y los donantes des avantages comparatifs de chacun In Context: The Bank's Role acuerdan que todos los asociados (solution possible au probleme du in Aid Coordination aceptaran tanto la responsabilidad < nombre > d'institutions), d'appuyer World Bank-led aid coordination comun de alcanzar buenos resultados efficacement: le developpement des mechanisms and processes at the en terminos de desarrollo como capacites, de creer un environnement apex level (consortia and Consulta- responsabilidades individuales. Para el propice a l'egalite des chances entre tive Groups) have expanded sub- pais, tales obligaciones incluyen el differents partenaires et de soutenir les stantially over the past four compromiso de crear politicas efforts du pays au service de ces decades. They cover a wide gamut atinadas e instituciones eficientes, objectifs. of development issues and partici- mientras que los donantes y los pants, and include some 60 recipi- organismos deben convenir en Principales Conclusions et ent countries and 50 official donors. orientarse al desarrollo; lograr Recommandations In a context of declining per capita coherencia con las prioridades del pais La conclusion dominante de l'etude est aid disbursements for most coun- en materia de desarrollo; aplicar que les activit6s de la Banque en tries, the Bank's support for aid selectividad de acuerdo con las matiere de coordination de l'aide ont coordination has helped to protect ventajas comparativas, ocupandose asi bien servi la communaute des the level of resources mobilized for de la cuesti6n de los "nimeros"; institutions de developpement; individual countries and to achieve proporcionar una asistencia eficaz neanmoins beaucoup reste a faire a greater aid focus on development para fortalecer la capacidad que pour atteindlre l'objectif ancien d'un priorities. permita imponer reglas de juego leadership cles pays dans la gestion du uniformes entre los distintos procesus. A Strategy for Country Leadership asociados; y respaldar los esfuerzos with Mutual Responsibility Among del pais por alcanzar estos objetivos. L'Environnement - Le R61e de la Partners for Development Outcomes Banque en Matiere de and Distinct Accountabilities Principales conclusiones y Coordination de l'Aide Prospects for successful implemen- recomendaciones Les systemes et mecanismes de tation of the principles of owner- La conclusi6n fundamental del estudio coordination de l'aide au plus haut ship and partnership embodied in es que el Banco, mediante su respaldo niveau (consortia et Groupes the Comprehensive Development a la coordinaci6n de la ayuda, ha Consultatif,) animes par la Banque Framework can be enhanced if the prestado un buen servicio a quienes se ont connu uine forte expansion tout Bank undertakes several concrete dedican a la tarea del desarrollo. Sin au long des quatre dernieres actions. These include measures in embargo, es mucho lo que queda por d6cennies. Ils abordaient un vaste the policy, strategic, and opera- hacer para alcanzar el objetivo, echantillon de problmes de tional realms, some at the global largamente deseado, de que cada pais developpenient et rassemblaient un level and others at the country level. tome las riendas del proceso de grand nombre de participants, dont Effectiveness at both levels will re- coordinaci6n de la ayuda. 60 pays beneficiaires et 50 bailleurs de xvii T H E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK quire close consultation with El contexto: La funci6n del fonds publics. Dans un other partners, including bor- - Banco en la coordinaci6n de environnement domine par le rower countries. The Bank's la ayuda declin des flux d'aide par tete, chief role would be to sup- Los mecanismos y procesos l'intervention de la Banque a port movement toward re- centrales de coordinaci6n de la - contribue a stabiliser les cipient country leadership in ayuda impulsados por el Banco ressources accessibles a certains the management and coordi- Mundial (consorcios y grupos pays et a permis d'accroitre la nation of aid resources and to pro- consultivos) se han ampliado part de ces ressources mise au service mote the needed capacity building considerablemente en los cuatro des objectifs de developpement. required to effectively exercise that ultimos decenios. Abarcan una amplia leadership. gama de temas de desarrollo y de Une Strategie de Promotion du participantes, e incluyen unos 60 Leadership des Pays, avec Bank Policy for Country-Led paises receptores y 50 donantes Definition d'Objectifs Communs et Partnership oficiales. En momentos en que el Repartition des Responsabilites Bank policy on aid coordination is desembolso de ayuda per capita esta entre les Differents Partenaires contained in Operational Directive disminuyendo en la mayoria de los Par des mesures concretes, la Banque 14.30 on "Aid Coordination paises, el apoyo del Banco para peut faciliter l'application reussie des Groups." This directive was issued in coordinar dicha ayuda ha contribuido principes d'appropriation et de 1989 and does not reflect the major a mantener el nivel de recursos partenariat definis dans le Cadre de innovations of recent years, particu- movilizados para cada pais y a D6veloppement Int6gre. Il s'agit larly the emphasis of the CDF on concentrar mejor esa asistencia en las notamment de politiques, de strategies partnership, ownership, and results prioridades de desarrollo. et de mesures operationnelles tant au orientation, as well as the Bank's niveau mondial qu'a celui de chaque expanded presence in the field. Estrategia para que los paises pays. Des interventions efficaces aux The involvement of civil society asuman la conducci6n del proceso, deux niveaux n6cessiteront des and the private sector in con responsabilidades individuales consultations avec les autres the aid coordination process remains y responsabilidades comunes de los partenaires, y compris les pays controversial. Most donors strongly asociados frente a los resultados de emprunteurs. Le principal role de la favor greater involve-ment, while las actividades de desarrollo Banque sera de promouvoir le recipient governments express a Las probabilidades de aplicar con leadership des pays dans la gestion et variety of views, ranging from exito los principios de identificaci6n la coordination de l'aide et de cautiously positive to skeptical, or y colaboraci6n consagrados en el favoriser le d6veloppement des even antagonistic. To address this Marco Integral de Desarrollo pueden capacites necessaires a un exercice ambivalence, experimentation with aumentar si el Banco adopta diversas efficace de cette fonction. alternative approaches to involving medidas concretas, por ejemplo, other stakeholders in different phases normativas, estrategicas y operativas, La Politique de la Banque en faveur of aid coordination is warranted. algunas en el plano mundial y otras d'un Partenariat Dirige par les Pays Recommendations en los distintos paises. Para que La politique de la Banque en matiere New statements of Operational tanto unas como otras resulten de coordination de l'aide est definie Policy (OP), updated Bank eficaces sera necesario consultar dans la Directive Operationnelle Procedures (BP), and examples of permanentemente a los demas 14.30 aur <" les Groupes de Good Practices (GP), aligned with asociados, incluidos los paises Coordination de l'Aide >>. Cette the principles of the CDF and re- prestatarios. Las principales directive, qui a et publi6e en 1989, flecting leading-edge thinking, funciones del Banco serian contribuir ne reflete pas les grandes innovations would result in greater clarity and a que los paises receptores fueran des dernieres ann6es, notamment help staff adjust accordingly. asumiendo la iniciativa en la gesti6n I'importance accordee par le Cadre de To accompany these objec- y la coordinaci6n de la ayuda y Developpement Integre aux principes tives, the new Operational Policy promover el fortalecimiento de la de partenariat, d'appropriation et de would: capacidad necesaria para ello. priorite aux resultats, ainsi que le xviii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY * Declare that country lead- Politica del Banco developpement d'une presence ership of the management encaminada a lograr que los plus forte de la Banque sur le and coordination of aid re- paises se encarguen de la terrain. sources is Bank policy. - coordinaci6n de la ayuda La participation de la * Emphasize partnership La politica del Banco sobre societe civile et du secteur prive and collaboration among coordinaci6n de la ayuda se au processus de coordination de governmental and nongov- detalla en la Directriz l'aide est controversee. La ernmental actors at the country Operacional 14.30, "Aid plupart des bailleurs de fonds level. Coordination Groups". Publicada en soutiennent fortement cette * Use proven ability to collaborate 1989, esta directriz no recoge las participation, mais les reactions des with other partners as a criterion principales innovaciones de los pays beneficiaires sont diverses, for the appointment and perfor- ultimos anios, en especial la prudemmenr. favorables, sceptiques ou mance asessment of operations importancia que atribuye el MID a la tres hostiles selon les cas. L'ambivalence managers. colaboraci6n, la identificaci6n con de ces reactions justifie une approche * Use Project Implementation los procesos y el interes en la experimentale permettant de tester Units (PIUs) only in exceptional obtenci6n de resultados, asi como plusieurs mrthodes de participation de circumstance or when there is no tampoco refleja el aumento de la la societe civile et du secteur prive aux feasible alternative and commit presencia del Banco en el terreno. differentes etapes de la coordination de to a monitorable phase-out plan. La participaci6n de la sociedad l'aide. Bank Procedures could include civil y el sector privado en el proceso de coordinaci6n de la ayuda continua Recommanaattons revised CAS guidelines that ask descordncontderLa a a De nouvelles d6clarations de Politique how the Bank will work with its desprtando ontesias.tL Op6rationnelle, la mise a jour des partners to (i) increase the coher- mayo ena de los donantes esta Procedures (le la Banque et des ence, selectivity, and efficiency of decididenmenafv due as exemples de Bonnes Pratiques a la fois donor support; (ii) build govern- opaiion, miernt s qeclas novatrices er conformes aux principes ment capacity for aid management opdiiones de los gobiernos receptores du CDI, clarifieront le debat et and coordination; and (iii) enhance difieren y van desde la anuencia faciliteront l'assimilation des nouveaux participation of civil society and cautelosa al escepticismo o, incluso, la principes par le personnel de la Banque. the private sector in aid coordina- opoicien. Ain de secionar Dans le cadre de tels objectifs, les tion processes. The procedures ambvasencia es precomensaya nouvelles Politiques Op6rationnelles: could also emphasize the use of nuevos metodos que comprendan la * Rapelleront que la Banque a programmatic lending approaches diferentes etapas de la coordinaci6n pour politique de confier aux and instruments, such as Sector de la ayuda. pays le leadership de la gestion et Programs and Poverty Reduction de la ayuda. de la coordination de l'aide. Support Credits that facilitate Recomendaciones * Souligneront l'importance d'un transfer of aid coordination leader- La preparaci6n de nuevos partenariat et d'une ship to recipient countries. For documentos de Politica Operacional, collaboration avec les countries where the Poverty Re- la actualizaci6n de Normas de institutions gouvernementales et duction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is to Procedimiento del Banco y los non-gouvernementales au niveau be prepared, these elements could ejemplos de Practicas Recomendadas, des pays. be incorporated in the PRSP. en consonancia con los principios del * Incluront l'aptitude a collaborer The Good Practices statement Marco Integral de Desarrollo e ideas avec les partenaires parmi les would provide examples of strong de vanguardia, brindarian mayor criteres du choix et de country commitment; effective and claridad y contribuirian a orientar la l'evaluation des responsables efficient donor support, including actuaci6n del personal. operationnels de la Banque. support for capacity building; Para acompafiar estos objetivos, en * Limiteront l'emploi des Unit6s involvement of civil society and the la nueva Politica Operacional se deberia: d'Execution des Projets a des cas private sector; partnership agree- * Enunciar que, segun la politica exceptionnels, quand aucune ments that delineate mutual del Banco, los paises deben autre solution n'est possible, et xix THE DR IvE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK responsibility and distinct ac- ocuparse de la gesti6n y la imposeront des plans, countabilities; and the use of - coordinaci6n de la ayuda. contr6lables, pour 1'elimination lending instruments that * Hacer hincapie en la de ces pratiques. support country leadership. asociaci6n y la colaboraci6n entre los participantes del Les Procedures de la Strategies for Country sector publico y del sector no Banque pourront prevoir une Leadership gubernamental en cada pais. revision des directives sur les Although the donor commu- * Utilizar la capacidad Strategies d'Assistance aux Pays; les nity has long been concerned with comprobada para colaborar con nouvelles directives demanderont des country leadership of aid coordina- otros asociados como criterio precisions sur les modalites d'une tion, only recently have signs of para designar a los gerentes de collaboration avec les partenaires de change begun to emerge in the operaciones y evaluar su la Banque (i) pour accroitre la management of aid coordination at desempeno. coherence, la selectivite et l'efficacite the country level. Barriers to coun- * Recurrir a las Unidades de de l'aide, (ii) pour developper les try-led aid coordination imposed Ejecuci6n de Proyectos s6lo en capacites du gouvernement en matiere by donors and international agen- circunstancias excepcionales o de gestion et de coordination de l'aide cles, including the Bank, include cuando no hubiera otra soluci6n et (iii) pour encourager la often onerous and divergent ad- posible, y comprometerse a Ilevar participation de la socete civile et du ministrative procedures and the adelante un plan verificable de secteur priv6 dans les processus de numerous visiting missions that re- eliminacion progresiva de su coordination. Les proc6dures cipient countries must accommo- participaci6n. pourront egalement souligner date. This burden can add up to Entre las Normas de l'importance des pr&ts-programmes, quarterly reports and visiting mis- Procedimiento del Banco se podrian tels que les Programmes Sectoriels et sions numbering in the thousands incluir, en las estrategias de asistencia les Cr6dits/Prets-Programmes each year for highly aid-dependent a los paises, nuevas pautas a fin de d'Ajustement Structurel, pour faciliter countries. determinar de que manera el Banco le transfert aux pays beneficiaires du Although a number of countries podria colaborar con sus asociados leadership de la coordination de have expressed a strong desire to I'aide. Les memes indications managethe pocess onlya few para i) aumentar la coherencia, manage the process, only a few selectividad y eficiencia del apoyo de pourront egalement etre introduites former Consultative Group coun- los donantes; ii) fortalecer la dans les Documents de Strategie de tries (such as Korea, Malaysia, and capacidad de los gobiernos para Lutte contre la Pauvrete pour les pays Thailand) have fully assumed the administrar y coordinar la ayuda; y appeles a preparer de tels documents. role. Many countries lack the ca- iii) aumentar la participaci6n de la L'6tat des Bonnes Pratiques donnera pacity to take on a lead role. Some sociedad civil y el sector privado en des exemples de pays fortement engages, lack the commitment and resolve los procesos de coordinaci6n de la d'aide efficace des bailleurs de fonds, to do so. The time has come for a ayuda. Los procedimientos tambien notamment pour le developpement des real change-rapid, but deliberate podrian subrayar el uso de capacites, de participation de la societe and finely executed. A logical and instrumentos crediticios civile et du secteur prive, d'accords de critical step in this direction is for programaticos, como los programas partenariat definissant les objectifs the Bank, in consultation with sectoriales y los prestamos/creditos communs et les responsabilites other partners and the affected programaticos para ajuste estructural, particulieres des participants, et enfin de countries, to give meaning to the que facilitan el traspaso de la 1'emploi d'instruments financiers qui concept of country responsibility. coordinaci6n de la ayuda a los paises favorisent le leadership des pays. The Bank's chief role should be to receptores. Aquellos paises que deban support recipient country leader- preparar documentos de estrategia de Strategies pour la Promotion du ship, and to promote the capacity lucha contra la pobreza podrian Leadership des Pays building needed to effectively exer- incorporar a ellos estos elementos. La communaute des bailleurs de fonds cise that leadership. This does not Los documentos de Practicas a depuis longtemps demand6 que le mean that the Bank should disen- Recomendadas podrian proporcionar leadership de la coordination de l'aide xx EXECUTIVE SUMMARY gage itself from either the ejemplos de paises con alto soit canfi6 aux pays, mais c'est aid coordination process or - grado de compromiso; de seulemnent a une date r6cente from maintaining and apoyo eficaz y eficiente de los qu'ont commence a apparaitre strengthening its country donantes, incluido el apoyo des signes de changements dans programs. But by giving the para fortalecimiento de la la coordination de l'aide au country a chance to exert capacidad; de participaci6n de niveau des pays. La promotion leadership, the Bank will be la sociedad civil y el sector du leadership des pays in a better position to assist in privado; de acuerdos de rencontre de nombreux obstacles, building long-term capacity, in line colaboraci6n donde se definan la crees par les bailleurs de fonds et les with CDF and OECD/DAC prin- responsabilidad comun y la institutions internationales, y ciples. responsabilidad individual; y del uso compris la Banque; citons notamment Some donors see little or no de instrumentos crediticios para les proc6dures administratives, link between more effective aid fomentar el liderazgo del pais. souvent lou-des et divergentes, et le coordination and higher global aid nombre des missions que doivent levels. But by linking the two, Estrategias para que los paises accueillir les pays beneficiaires. Le donors would encourage recipient asuman su funci6n de fardeau est pesant pour les pays les governments to institute the politi- conducci6n plus dependants de l'aide: cally difficult reforms that may be Si bien desde hace tiempo los multiplication des rapports needed to make better use of aid donantes se preocupan por que los trimestriels et accueil tous les ans de and strengthen capacity. paises se encarguen de coordinar la milliers de missions. Recommendations ayuda, s6lo ultimamente se perciben Plusieurs pays ont souhaite Development results are achieved cambios en tal sentido dentro de los prendre en mnains la gestion du or not achieved at the country level. paises. Entre las trabas que los processus, mais peu nombreux sont Therefore it is critical that the man- donantes y los organismos ceux qui ont en fait assume ce r6le; il agement and coordination of aid internacionales, incluido el Banco, s'agit de pays comme la Coree, la resources be effectively owned and ponen a la coordinaci6n de la ayuda Malaisie et la Thailande qui faisaient led by the country. This process propuesta por los paises se encuentran autrefois l'objet de Groupes would be accelerated if each Bank los procedimientos administrativos Consultatifs. En fait, beaucoup de country team or department that costosos y divergentes y las pays n'ont pas la capacite d'assumer supported a CG (or similar mecha- numerosas misiones de visita que los cette responsabilite; d'autres n'ont pas nism) were to work with the govern- paises receptores deben acoger. En el la volonte politique. Le moment est ment and other development caso de los paises que dependen en venu d'un veritable changement - partners to formulate a strategy gran medida de la ayuda, esta carga rapide, mais reflechi et soigneusement explicitly intended to help the se suma a los informes trimestrales y execute. Logiquement, une etape country move toward aid coordi- las misiones, que llegan a miles al importante de ce changement serait nation leadership. Factors such as ano. que la Banque consulte ses partenaires the extent of institutional capacity, Si bien varios paises han et les pays interesses et tente de donner transparent processes, standards of manifestado su firme voluntad de un sens au terme < responsabilite du accountability, and commitment to conducir el proceso pertinente, s6lo pays >>. Le r6le principal de la Banque sound policies would need to be algunos, para los cuales existian doit etre de promouvoir le leadership taken into account in developing an antiguamente Grupos Consultivos des pays et de favoriser le appropriate strategy and timeframe (como Corea, Malasia y Tailandia), developpement des capacites for each country (see Annex I for han asumido plenamente dicha necessaires. Ceci ne signifie pas que la further discussion). Each strategy funci6n. Muchos paises carecen de la Banque doit se degager du processus would demonstrate how the Bank capacidad necesaria para cumplir un de coordination de l'aide et cesser les and other partners would help the papel preponderante. Algunos no efforts entrepris pour developper et government: tienen el empeino ni la determinaci6n renforcer ses programmes de pays. Strengthen its aid management para ello. Ha Ilegado el momento de Mais si la Banque donne aux pays and coordination capacity. un cambio real: rapido, pero l'occasion d'exercer leur leadership, xxi T H E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Reach partnership agree- deliberado y ejecutado con elle sera mieux placee pour ments with donors that delin- precisi6n. El Banco, tras faciliter le developpement a eate mutual responsibility for H consultar a sus asociados y a long terme de leurs capacites, development outcomes and - los paises afectados, debe dar conformement aux principes du distinct accountabilities of - un paso 16gico y decisivo en esa CDI et de l'OCDE/DAC. each partner. direcci6n, y dotar de contenido Certains bailleurs de fonds * Design agreed coordination al concepto de responsabilidad considerent qu'il n'y a guere de principles and procedures (such del pais. La principal funci6n lien entre l'efficacite de la as adhering to country-led efforts del Banco deberia consistir en coordination de l'aide et le volume to bring about greater coherence respaldar el liderazgo del pais des flux d'assistance. En fait un lien and selectivity in the application receptor y contribuir al entre ces deux variables encouragerait of aid resources). fortalecimiento de la capacidad les gouvernements des pays * Present a plan for carrying out necesaria para que el pais pueda beneficiaires a lancer des reformes, joint monitoring and evaluation ejercerlo eficazmente, lo que no difficiles politiquement, qui sont missions with donors in order to significa que el Banco deba necessaires pour optimiser l'emploi de reduce barriers to country leader- desentenderse del proceso de I'aide et renforcer leurs capacites. ship and promote country assess- coordinaci6n de la ayuda o del Recommandations ment of donor performance.2 mantenimiento y la consolidaci6n de C'est au niveau des pays qu'il est sus programas en el pafs. Pero, al dar possible ou impossible d'obtenir des Global Engagement with Donors for al pafs la posibilidad de asumir el resultats en matrire de developpernent. Country Partnership control, el Banco estarI en mejor II est donc essentiel que le pays The record of World Bank support situaci6n para ayudar a desarrollar s'approprie veritablement et gere lui- of country-led aid coordination has capacidad a largo plazo, en meme la coordination de l'aide. Deux been mixed. Actions by the Bank consonancia con los principios del facteurs permettront d'accelerer le that have contributed to developing Marco Integral de Desarrollo y el processus: d'une part, chaque equipe country capacity, and have generally Comit6 de Asistencia para el de pays ou departement appuyant un been seen as positive steps by gov- Desarrollo de la OCDE. Groupe Consultatif ou un mecanisme ernments and other donors, include: Algunos donantes no creen que similaire, cooperera avec le * Encouraging countries to play an exista relaci6n alguna entre una gouvernement et d'autres partenaires active role in planning a pre- coordinaci6n mas eficaz de la ayuda y du developpement a la formulation pactivegroleinfplanningaand pre- a el aumento del volumen mundial de d'une strategie dont le but explicite coordination asistencia, o consideran que, si la hay, sera d'aider le pays a atteindre un es remota. Sin embargo, al establecer . . le p * Supporting sector development niveau de responsabilit6 conforme programs and donor selectivity un vinculo entre estos dos elementos, aux standards de la communaute BOX 1. COUNTRY MANAGEMENT OF AID GROUP MEETINGS International develop- partners, an important ings, the Bank has helped also given impetus to the ment goals spanning the goal for the Bank should to bring bilateral donors private sector, both local first 15 years of the be the transfer of the man- into the aid coordination and international, as a twenty-first century have agement of all formerly process, mobilize vast critical partner in the de- received widespread en- Bank-managed aid group amounts of aid money, put velopment process. Now dorsement. Strong coun- meetings to countries over new issues on national and is the time for the Bank try ownership, a core the same timeframe. This international agendas, and to demonstrate its com- principle of the CDF, has will bring to conclusion ap- assist many countries in mitment to the notion been identified as essen- proximately 50 years of prioritizing their national that ultimate responsibil- tial for achieving these constructive and fruitful goals, strengthening gov- ity for a country's affairs goals (Wolfensohn efforts by the Bank to ini- ernment institutions, and rests with the country 1999:9-10; OECD/DAC tiate, organize, convene, introducing proper pro- itself. 1996:13-17). Working and chair aid group meet- curement and accounting with its development ings. Through these meet- practices. The Bank has xxii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and harmonization in se- los donantes alentarian a los interrationale; d'autre part, lected countries and through - gobiernos receptores a instituir cette strat6gie et le calendrier de the Special Program of Assis- las reformas, dificiles de aplicar son execution tiendra compte tance for Africa (SPA) por motivos politicos, que de l'e:ngagement du pays a o Strengthening resident pueden ser necesarias para mettre en oeuvre de saines missions and giving them aprovechar mejor la ayuda y politiques (voir les more authority aumentar la capacidad. commentaires de l'Annexe 1). Supporting (in some countries) an Recomendaciones Chacune de ces strategies indiquera expansion of in-country aid coor- Las actividades de desarrollo surten comment la Banque et ses partenaires dination forums and, at least on efecto o fracasan en los paises. Por lo aideront le g,ouvernement: an alternating basis, in-country tanto, es fundamental que cada pais * a renforcer sa capacit6 de gestion Consultative Group meetings. dirija y asuma como propias la et de coordination de ['aide. Offsetting these positive ac- gesti6n y la coordinaci6n de la ayuda. * a conclure des accords de complishments are the following Este proceso se aceleraria si cada partenariat avec les bailleurs de findings: grupo o departamento geografico del fonds c[ui d6finiront des * A number of local donor Banco que prestaba su apoyo a un responsabilit6s communes et les representatives, and to a lesser, grupo consultivo (o a otro mecanismo responsabilit6s particulieres de but still significant, degree, bor- similar) colaborara con el gobierno y chaque partenaire pour rower country respondents, find los demas asociados en la tarea del I'accomplissement des objectifs that Bank headquarters staff ex- desarrollo a fin de formular una e eveloppement. hibit arrogant attitudes and estrategia expticitamente concebida * a definir d'un commun accord des principes et des proc6dures ENCADRE 1. GESTION PAR LE PAYS DES REUNIONS DES GROUPES DE BAILLEURS DE FONDS Les objectifs collaborer avec ses d'integrer les bailleurs de services et leurs > internationaux du partenaires du fonds bilateraux dans le procedures comptables. developpement pour les developpement pour processus de coordination La Banque a egalement i quinze premieres annees transferer aux pays, sur la de l'aide, ont mobilise des donne une impulsion a la du vingt et unieme siecle base d'un calendrier volumes importants participation du secteur ont requ un accueil tres identique, la gestion de d'assistance financiere, ont prive, local et l favorable. Une forte toutes les reunions des mis a l'ordre du jour des international, au j appropriation par les groupes de donateurs reunions nationales et processus de pays, l'un des principes autrefois g6res par la internationales de developpement. fondamentaux du CDI, Banque. Cette decision nouveaux problemes de Aujourd'hui, le moment est consid6ree comme mettra fin a environ 50 d6veloppement et ont aide est venu pour la Banque une condition essentielle annees d'efforts de nombreux pays a d6finir de demontrer son appui z de 1'accomplissement de constructifs et profitables leurs priorites nationales, a au principe selon lequel ces objectifs de la Banque pour initier, renforcer leurs institutions ce sont les pays qui t (Wolfensohn, 1999: 9-10 preparer, organiser et publiques et a assainir doivent assumer la et OCDE/CAD 1996: 13- presider des reunions de leurs methodes responsabilite finale de la 7). Une tache importante groupes de donateurs. Ces d'acquisition de biens et gestion de leurs affaires. S de la Banque sera de reunions ont permis ~~~7 461 b,:YWO t7fl' m' 7'-a»7A fl¶9Ft7t/'^'S. t fl > =4tA7,y V77t f~ _ .v< 4.M - , 9t2'V/ . nonconsultative behavior during para ayudar at pais a mejorar la their visits. rendici6n de cuentas en relaci6n con la efortionteps que la * About 60 percent of local donors ayuda; al elaborar una estrategia directiot des pays, pour who responded to the study sur- apropiada y definir los plazos para am6horer la coherence et la vey were neutral or negative cada pais deberia tomarse en cuenta samectivitr de 1'emploi des fonds about the responsiveness of the el grado de compromiso con politicas d'aide). xxiii T H E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Bank to donor views in the acertadas (para mayores * a presenter un plan de consultations preceding aid - detalles, vease el Anexo 1). En missions conjointes de suivi et coordination meetings. cada estrategia se indicaria la d'evaluation de la Banque et o Among agencies with manera en que el Banco y otros des bailleurs de fonds, dont le whom the Bank shares aid asociados podrian ayudar al but sera de reduire les obstacles coordination support roles, gobierno a alcanzar los au leadership du pays et de the closest parallel is with the siguientes objetivos: faciliter l'evaluation de la UNDP. Despite examples of good * Mejorar su capacidad para performance des donateurs par practice, however, donor respon- administrar y coordinar la les pays eux-memes.2 dents note tensions that need to ayuda; be addressed.3 * Celebrar acuerdos de Un Engagement Global avec les * Donors find that the financial man- colaboraci6n con los donantes, Bailleurs de Fonds pour un agement capacity of recipients is donde se establezca la Partenariat de Pays often weak. This makes donors responsabilidad com6n frente a Les efforts de la Banque Mondiale cautious about assuming the costs los resultados de las actividades pour promouvoir la coordination de and risks of harmonizing the proce- de desarrollo y la I'aide par les pays ont donne des dures that would enable them to be responsabilidad precisa de cada resultats inegaux. Les gouvernements more flexible in contributing to uno de los asociados; et les bailleurs de fonds ont commente broad sector development and pub- . Formular principios y favorablement sur certaines des lic expenditure reform programs. procedimientos de coordinaci6n mesures prises par la Banque pour Recipient governments, however, consensuados (por ejemplo, d6velopper les capacit6s des pays: single out harmonization of donor respaldar los esfuerzos * Elle a encourage les pays a jouer policies and procedures as the first emprendidos por los paises para un r6le important dans la thing donors should do to improve lograr mayor coherencia y planification et la preparation aid coordination. selectividad en la aplicaci6n de los d'activites importantes pour la * There are few examples of aid recursos de ayuda). coordination de l'aide coordination efforts that have led * Presentar un plan para llevar a * Elle a appuye des programmes de to greater donor selectivity. cabo, junto con los donantes, developpement sectoriel et • Years of debate among donors have misiones de evaluaci6n y favorise la selectivit6 et yielded little action to reduce bur- seguimiento, con el prop6sito de I'harmonisation de l'aide dans densome aid delivery transactions reducir los obstaculos que certains pays, ainsi que par costs. Such a reduction would help impiden al pais asumir la l'intermediaire du Programme countries to assume leadership in conducci6n del proceso, y Special d'Assistance a l'Afrique aid coordination. promover la evaluaci6n, por . Elle a renforce ses missions * Overall, donor efforts to parte del pais, del desempefio de residentes et leur a donne plus strengthen country aid manage- los donantes.2 d'autorite. ment and coordination capacity * Elle a appuye (dans certains pays) have been expensive, supply- le developpement de forums driven, and ultimately ineffective. Actividades globales emprendidas nationaux de coordination de Aid coordination activities are junto con los donantes para I'aide, ainsi que la reunion dans le seen by both recipient countries colaborar con los paises pays de certaines reunions des and donors as doing little or noth- El apoyo prestado por el Banco Groupes Consultatifs, parfois en ing to improve country capacity. Mundial a los paises para que alternance avec des r6unions a asumieran la conducci6n del proceso l'6tranger. Recommendations de coordinaci6n de la ayuda ha tenido A c6te de ces commentaires Successful implementation of this resultados dispares. Las siguientes son positifs, notons cependant les report's recommendations will re- algunas de las medidas del Banco que critiques suivantes: quire consensus and collaboration han contribuido a mejorar la * Un certain nombre de among donors at the global level. capacidad de los paises en desarrollo, representants locaux des xxiv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A joint statement issued by y que gobiernos y donantes han bailleurs de fonds critiquent the OECD/DAC, the UNDP, - considerado positivas: I'attitude arrogante de certains and the World Bank at the * Alentar a los paises a fonctionnaires du siege et leur conclusion of the December desempefiar un papel dinamico comportement peu cooperatif 1999 Development Partner- en la planificaci6n y - pendant leurs missions; les ship Forum called for a preparaci6n de actividades memes commentaires ont ete "joint partnership group" to vinculadas a la coordinaci6n de faits par les representants des take stock of existing work, with a la ayuda; pays, d'une facon moins nette view to accelerating progress. The * Apoyar los programas de mais tout de meme significative. elements to receive attention in- desarrollo del sector privado y la . Environ 60 pourcent des RECUADRO 1. Los PAiSES DEBERiAN OCUPARSE DE DIRIGIR LAS REUNIONES DE LOS GRUPOS DE AYUDA Los objetivos colaborar con sus los grupos de ayuda. introduciendo practicas internacionales de asociados para el Mediante estas reuniones, adecuadas en materia de desarrollo para los desarrollo, el Banco deberia el Banco ha contribuido a adquisiciones y primeros 15 afios del procurar, como objetivo integrar a los donantes contabilidad. El Banco z siglo XXI han recibido importante, transferir a los bilaterales en el proceso de tambien ha dado impulso g un apoyo generalizado. paises, dentro del mismo coordinaci6n de la ayuda, al sector privado, sea i Para poder alcanzarlos, plazo, la gesti6n de todas movilizar ingentes sumas local o internacional, f es esencial que los paises las reuniones de los grupos de dinero en concepto de colaborador crucial en el se identifiquen de ayuda, anteriormente a ayuda, incluir nuevos proceso de desarroll e. profundamente con ellos, cargo del Banco. De este temas en los programas Ahora ha llegado, para el y esta condici6n es uno modo llegarian a su nacionales e Banco, el momento de de los principios bisicos t6rmino 50 afnos de labor internacionales, y ayudar a demostrar en los hechos del Marco Integral de constructiva y provechosa muchos paises a otorgar sll convicci6n de que, en i Desarrollo (Wolfensohn del Banco para concebir, prioridad a sus objetivos definitiva, un pais es 0 1999:9-10; OCDEICAD organizar, convocar y nacionales, fortaleciendo responsable de sus 1i 996:13-17). Al presidir las reuniones de las instituciones publicas e propios asuntos. _t .#.Sff~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~41A.S_4__ cluded harmonization of donors' selectividad y armonizaci6n de representants locaux des operational policies and proce- los donantes en paises escogidos bailleurs de fonds ayant repondu dures, capacity building for man- y por medio del Programa a lVenqu&te ont fait des aging development resources by Especial de Asistencia para commentaires negatifs ou neutres the recipient countries, joint moni- Africa; sur les r6actions de la Banque toring and evaluation based on * Reorganizar las misiones aux vues exprimees par eux lors jointly agreed indicators of devel- residentes y darles mayor des consultations precedant les opment progress, and improved in- autoridad; reunions de coordination de formation sharing on promising * Fomentar (dentro de algunos l'aide. and innovative approaches to part- paises) la expansi6n de los foros . Parmi les agences avec lesquelles nership.4 While a new "joint part- de coordinaci6n de la ayuda y, al la Banque partage un role nership group," as such, has not menos en forma alternada, d'appuii a la coordination de been established, the ongoing In- reuniones de los Grupos l'aide, le PNUD est l'institution la formal Group of Multilateral Sec- Consultivos. plus proche. Neanmoins, malgre retariats, convened by the DAC Las siguientes conclusiones, sin quelques exemples de bonnes chair, and composed of the heads of embargo, contrarrestan esos hechos pratiques, les representants des the main multilateral financial in- positivos: bailleurs de fonds ont note des stitutions, has decided to focus on * Varios representantes locales de tensions entre la Banque et le several of these elements.5 The los donantes y un numero PNUL) qui doivent etre apaisees.3 Bank continues to be an active menor, aunque significativo, de * Les bailleurs de fonds estiment xxv T H E DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK participant in harmonization encuestados en los paises que la gestion financiere des efforts among the major mul- - prestatarios, sefialaron que los pays ben6ficiaires est souvent tilateral development banks funcionarios de la sede del faible. Ils sont donc trrs (MDBs) and through the - Banco exhibian, en sus visitas, prudents quand il s'agit SPA. It has recently broad- actitudes arrogantes e d'accepter les couts et les ened the dialogue to include inconsultas. risques d'une harmonisation a much broader group of * Alrededor del 60% de los des procedures qui leur multilateral financial institutions donantes locales que permettrait d'assouplir leur and has established a close linkage respondieron el cuestionario position en ce qui concerne des with a newly formed OECD/DAC expresaron un juicio neutral o contributions a de vastes task force on harmonization of bi- negativo acerca de la respuesta programmes de developpement lateral donor procedures.6 As part del Banco ante las opiniones sectoriel et de reformes des of these initiatives or in parallel manifestadas por los donantes en depenses publiques. Au with them, the Bank should pursue las consultas previas a las contraire, les representants des the following complementary ef- reuniones sobre coordinaci6n de gouvernements estiment que forts: la ayuda. I'harmonisation des politiques et * Work closely with the U.N. sys- * Entre los organismos con los procedures des bailleurs de fonds tem (in particular the UNDP); cuales el Banco comparte est la plus importante des DAC members, including the EU; actividades de coordinaci6n de la mesures que doivent prendre les and the RDBs to establish a com- ayuda, el mas similar es el bailleurs de fonds pour ameliorer mon understanding and commit- PNUD. No obstante, a pesar de la coordination de l'aide. ment to building partnerships at algunos casos de practicas * Rarement la coordination de the country level. acertadas, los donantes I'aide a rendu l'aide des bailleurs * In view of the central importance observaron cierta tirantez que de fonds plus selective. of capacity building to the devel- debe solucionarse.3 * Des annees de discussions entre opment of effective country lead- * Los donantes consideran que, bailleurs de fonds ont donne peu ership, the Bank should work with muchas veces, la capacidad de de resultats en ce qui concerne la other partners with experience in gesti6n financiera de los reduction du cout et de la this area to formulate a coordi- receptores es deficiente. Por ello, complexite des procedures nated approach to capacity devel- son algo reacios a asumir los gouvernant l'utilisation des fonds opment. costos y riesgos de armonizar los d'aide. Des progres dans cc * Continue to support harmoniza- procedimientos que les domaine aideraient les pays a tion of donor procedures and poli- permitirian ser mds flexibles en assumer le leadership de la cies among MDBs and in the SPA, sus contribuciones al desarrollo coordination de l'aide. as well as closely coordinating del sector y a los programas de * Dans l'ensemble, les efforts des with the new OECD/DAC harmo- reforma del gasto publico. Sin bailleurs de fonds pour renforcer nization task force. embargo, los gobiernos la gestion et la coordination de receptores sefialan que lo I'aide par les pays sont cofuteux, Monitoring Progress primero que los donantes sont bases sur l'offre des services Monitoring is essential, both to deberian hacer para mejorar la disponibles et manquent report on progress and to identify coordinaci6n de la ayuda es d'efficacite. Les pays constraints to achieving that armonizar sus politicas y beneficiaires et les bailleurs de progress. procedimientos. fonds estiment que les exercices Recommendation * Son pocas las actividades de de coordination de I'aide n'ont The Bank should develop a limited coordinaci6n de la ayuda que guere renforce les capacit6s des number of indicators to bench- han dado como fruto una mayor pays. mark and monitor the progress of selectividad de los donantes. Recommandations recipient countries toward assum- * Tras anos de debates entre los Le succes de l'application des donantes, se ha hecho muy poco recommandations de ce rapport xxvi EXEC UTIVE SUMMARY ing a leadership role in man- por reducir los gravosos costos dependra d'un accord et d'une aging and coordinating the de las transacciones de entrega collaboration entre les bailleurs use of aid resources. de ayuda. Una reducci6n de de fonds a 'echelle mondiale. esta indole contribuiria a que Une de claration conjointe de Training and Development los paises pudieran ocuparse de l'OCDE/CAD, du PNUD et de When donors and recipients la coordinaci6n de la ayuda. la Banque Mondiale en were asked during the study * En resumidas cuentas, los decembre 1999 a la fin du survey to identify the three main esfuerzos de los donantes por Forum pour le Partenariat du weaknesses of the Bank's role in mejorar la capacidad de los Developpement demandait la creation aid coordination, by far the most paises para administrar y d'un < groupe conjoint du common criticism voiced by local coordinar la ayuda han sido partenariat > qui ferait le point des donor representatives was a lack of costosos, impulsados por la progres realises avec pour objectif consultation by visiting Bank mis- oferta y, en definitiva, ineficaces. l'acceleration du processus. Parmi les sions. A notable conclusion emerg- Tanto los paises receptores como elements a 6rudier, citons notamment ing from the February 1999 los donantes consideran que las l'harmonisation des politiques et workshop of senior government of- actividades de coordinaci6n de la procedures operationnelles des ficials was that more attention ayuda han hecho poco o nada bailleurs de fonds, le developpement should be given to developing the por mejorar la capacidad del des capacites de gestion des depenses skills that government and donor pais. de developpement par les pays staff need to coordinate aid effec- Recomendaciones beneficiaires, des operations tively, including negotiation, facili- Para que las recomendaciones de este conjointes de suivi et d'evaluation tation, communication, economic informe se puedan Ilevar a la practica basees sur uin accord sur les and social analysis, information e a indicateurs clu progr&s du technology and diplomaccon exito se requerira consenso y r e technology, and diplomacy. colaboraci6n entre los donantes de developpement, enfin un meilleur If donors want recipient coun- todo el mundo. En una declaraci6n systeme de partage de l'information tries to assume a leadership position conjunta emitida en diciembre de au sujet d'experiences novatrices et in aid coordination, they should 1999 pot el Comiti de Asistencia prometteuses de partenariat.4 Ce note that more than half of Bank para el Desarrollo de la OCDE, el groupe conjoint du partenariat - n'a staff and local donors who re- PNUD y el Banco Mundial con pas et cree en tant que tel, mais le sponded to the survey were neutral- ocasi6n de la clausura del Foro de Groupe Informel des Secretariats to-negative about the need for Asociaci6n por el Desarrollo, se Multilateraux qui se reunit a la recipient governments to take the pidi6 que un "grupo conjunto de demande du president du CAD et lead for in-country aid coordina- fomento de la colaboraci6n" sacara comprend les dirigeants des tion. partido de la labor realizada, a fin de principales institutions financieres Recommendation acelerar el progreso. Los elementos a multilaterales a decid de s'interesser The World Bank Institute (WBI), in los que debia prestarse atenci6n a plusieurs (le ces questions.5 La consultation with the Regions, incluian la armonizaci6n de las Banque continue de participer should review training and develop- politicas y los procedimientos activement aux travaux ment programs for staff and clients operacionales de los donantes, el d'harmonisation entrepris par les to ensure that they cover negotia- fortalecimiento de la capacidad de principales banques multilaterales de tion and facilitation skills, sensitiv- los paises receptores para administrar developpement et par l'intermediaire ity training, and other knowledge los recursos para el desarrollo, el du Programme Special pour I'Afrique. and skills needed to foster effective seguimiento y la evaluaci6n Elle a recemment elargi son dialogue partnership and collaboration. conjuntos basados en indicadores del a un groupe plus vaste d'institutions desarrollo establecidos de com6n financieres multilaterales et collabore acuerdo, y un mejor intercambio de etroitement avec un groupe de travail informaci6n sobre las modalidades de l'OCDE/DAC, recemment cr6e de colaboraci6n novedosas y pour harmoniser les procedures des prometedoras.4 Si bien nunca se cre6 bailleurs de fonds bilat6raux.6 Soit xx~vii THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK un "grupo conjunto de dans le cadre de ces initiatives, fomento de la colaboraci6n" soit en dehors, la Banque semejante, el Grupo informal devrait poursuivre les efforts de secretarias multilaterales compl6mentaires suivants: convocado por la presidencia * Collaborer etroitement avec del Comite de Asistencia para le systeme des Nations Unies el Desarrollo y compuesto por (en particulier le PNUD), les los jefes de las principales membres du CAD, y compris instituciones financieras l'Union Europeenne, et les multilaterales, ha decidido ocuparse Banques Regionales de de varios de esos elementos.5 El D6veloppement pour un accord Banco sigue teniendo una et un engagement communs pour participaci6n destacada en las I'etablissement de partenariats au actividades de coordinaci6n entre los niveau des pays. principales bancos multilaterales de * Compte tenu de l'importance desarrollo y en el marco del centrale du developpement des Programa Especial de Asistencia para capacites pour la creation d'un Africa. Ultimamente, ha ampliado el leadership efficace des pays, la dialogo a fin de incluir a un grupo Banque devrait collaborer avec mucho mas numeroso de d'autres partenaires ayant acquis instituciones financieras de l'experience dans ce domaine multilaterales y ha establecido un pour definir une conception estrecho vinculo con un grupo de commune du developpement des estudio sobre la armonizaci6n de los capacites. procedimientos de los donantes * Continuer d'appuyer bilaterales, creado recientemente por I'harmonisation des politiques et el Comite de Asistencia para el des procedures dans son Desarrollo de la OCDE.6 Como parte dialogue avec les banques de estas iniciativas o paralelamente multilaterales de developpement con ellas, el Banco deberia tomar las et par l'intermediaire du siguientes medidas complementarias: Programme Special pour * Colaborar estrechamente con el I'Afrique, et poursuivre sa sistema de las Naciones Unidas cooperation avec le nouveau (en particular con el PNUD); con groupe de travail de l'OCDE/ los miembros del Comite de CAD. Asistencia para el Desarrollo, incluida la Uni6n Europea; y con Suivi des Progres Realises los bancos regionales de Le suivi est essentiel pour evaluer les desarrollo, a fin de liegar a un progres realises et pour identifier les acuerdo y un compromiso obstacles a ce progres. comun para crear relaciones de coaorc. en ditno pse. lRecommandation colaboraci6n en distintos paises. La Banque devrait mettre au point un * Habida cuenta de la importancia nombre .mite d'indicateurs de fundamental del fortalecimiento resultats et suivre les progres de la capacidad para que un pais accomplis par les pays beneficiaires pueda asurnir eficazmente la vers l'exercice du r6le de leader dans conducci6n de los procesos, la gestion et la coordination de colaborar con otros asociados I'emploi des fonds d'aide. con experiencia en esta esfera a xxviii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY fin de disefiar un metodo Formation et Developpement - coordinado para el desarrollo L'enquilte a demande aux de la capacidad. bailleurs de fonds et aux - Continuar apoyando la beneficiaires d'identifier les armonizaci6n de los trois principales faiblesses de la procedimientos y las politicas de Banque dans son action pour la los donantes entre los bancos coordination de l'aide; la multilaterales de desarrollo y en critique la plus frequente de la part el Programa Especial de des representants locaux des bailleurs Asistencia para Africa, asi como de fonds etait le fait que les missions coordinar actividades con el de la Banque ne les consultaient nuevo grupo de estudio del guere. Une conclusion importante de Comite de Asistencia para el I'atelier de fevrier 1999 reunissant de Desarrollo de la OCDE. hauts fonctionnaires nationaux etait qu'il fallait accorder une place plus Seguimiento de los progresos grande au developpement des El seguimiento es esencial, tanto para capacit6s don,t les gouvernements et obtener informaci6n sobre los les bailleurs de fonds ont besoin pour progresos realizados, como para une coordination efficace de l'aide, determinar cuales son los obstaculos notamment 1 aptitude a la que impiden avanzar. negociation, [e role de facilitateur, la Recomendac.6n communication, l'analyse economique El Banco deberia crear un n6mero et sociale, les techniques de limitado de indicadores para l'information et la diplomatie. comparar y vigilar el avance que Si les bailleurs de fonds veulent registran los paises receptores en sus que les pays assument le leadership de esfuerzos por asumir la direcci6n y la la coordination de l'aide, il doivent coordinaci6n del uso de los recursos tenir compte du fait que plus de la de ayuda. moiti6 du personnel de la Banque et des bailleurs de fonds locaux Capacitaci6n V desarrollo interroges paraissent hostiles ou Cuando se pidi6 a donantes y indiff6rents ~ l'id6e que les receptores, como parte de las gouvernemernts beneficiaires doivent encuestas para el estudio, que assurmer la direction de la mencionaran los tres puntos ma s coordination de l'aide dans le pays. d6biles de las actividades de Recommandation coordinaci6n de la ayuda realizadas L'Institut de la Banque Mondiale por el Banco, lo que mas criticaron devrait, en accord avec les Regions, los representantes locales de los examiner les programmes de donantes fue, por un gran margen, formation et de developpement pour le que las misiones de visita del Banco personnel de la Banque et les pays no los consultaran. De un seminario clients pour v6rifier qu'ils couvrent les celebrado en febrero de 1999 surgi6 talents de negociateur et de facilitateur, una conclusi6n notable: debe le developpernent d'une sensibilite aux prestarse mayor atenci6n a] desarrollo preoccupations des autres, et d'autres de las habilidades que los savoirs et qualit6s necessaires pour funcionarios p6blicos y el personal de favoriser des partenariats et des los donantes necesitan para coordinar collaborations efficaces. xxix THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK eficazmente la ayuda; esa tarea n debe incluir materias como negociaci6n, facilitaci6n, - comunicaci6n, analisis econ6mico y social, tecnologia de la informaci6n y diplomacia. Si los donantes desean que los paises receptores asuman un papel preponderante en la coordinaci6n de la ayuda, deben tomar en cuenta que mas de la mitad del personal del Banco y los donantes locales que respondieron el cuestionario tenian opiniones que oscilaban entre neutrales y negativas frente a la necesidad de que los gobiernos receptores tomaran la iniciativa de coordinar la ayuda dentro de su pais. Recomendaci6n El Instituto del Banco Mundial, junto con las Regiones, deberia volver a examinar los programas de capacitaci6n y desarrollo para el personaL y los clientes a fin de asegurarse de que incluyan conocimientos sobre negociaci6n y facilitaci6n, educaci6n de la sensibilidad, y otras disciplinas y habilidades necesarias para fomentar relaciones de colaboraci6n y asociaciones eficaces. xx Acronyms and Abbreviations ACBF African Capacity Building Foundation LCR Latin America and Caribbean Region ADB Asian Development Bank (World Bank) AfDB African Development Bank MDB Multilateral Development Bank AFR Africa Region (World Bank) MNA Middle East and North Africa Region BP Bank Procedures (World Bank) CAE Country Assistance Evaluation MFDP Ministry of Finance and Development CAR Country Assistance Review Planning (Botswana) CAS Country Assistance Strategy MFI Multilateral Financial Institution CDF Comprehensive Development Framework MOP Memorandum of the President CEM Country Economic Memorandum MTEF Mid-term Expenditure Framework CG Consultative Group NAFI National Agency for Foreign Investment CGCED Caribbean Group for Cooperation (Kazakhstan) in Economic Development NatCAP National Technical Cooperation Assessment CIAP Committee for the Alliance for Progress and Programs CIDA Canadian International Development Agency NEX National Execution Program CODE Committee on Development Effectiveness NGO Nongovernmental Organization CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment NNGO National NGO DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD) NLS Nonlending Services Danida Danish International Development Assistance OCS Operational Core Services (World Bank) Program OD Operational Directive DFID U.K. Department for International Develop- ODA Official Development Assistance ment OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation EAP East Asia and Pacific Region (World Bank) and Development ECA UN Economic Commission for Africa; OED Operations Evaluation Department Europe and Central Asia Region (World Bank) OEDCM Corporate Evaluation and Methods Group ESW Economic and Sector Work OP Operational Policy EXT External Affairs (World Bank) OPS Operations Policy and Strategy (World Bank) EU European Union OPCS Operational Policy and Country Services FERD Foreign Economic Relations Department (World Bank) (Kazakhstan) PACT Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa FY Fiscal Year PER Public Expenditure Review GDP Gross Domestic Product PERC Public Expenditure Reform Credit GNP Gross National Product PERL Public Expenditure Loan GP Good Practice PHRD Policy and Human Resource Development HRS Human Resource Services (World Bank) Trust Fund IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction PIU Project Implementation Unit and Development PMU Project Management Unit IDA International Development Association PPP Purchasing Power Parity IDB Inter-American Development Bank PR Progress Report IDF Institutional Development Fund PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper IFC International Finance Corporation RBM Results-Based Management IMF International Monetary Fund RDB Regional Development Bank INGO International Nongovernmental Organization RM Resident Mission JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency RT Round Table JSA Joint Staff Assessment SAR South Asia Region (World Bank) xxxi THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WO RLD BANK SDC Swiss Agency for Development Assistance SPA Special Program of Assistance for Af- and Cooperation rica/Strategic Partnership with Africa SDP Sector Development Program UNDAF United Nations Development Assis- Sida Swedish International Development tance Framework Cooperation Agency UNDP United Nations Development Program SIL Sector Investment Loan USAID United States Agency for International SIP Sector Investment Program Development SP Sector Program Approach WBI World Bank Institute xxxii Chapter 1 Introduction At best, the supply of assistance is limited, and those who provide it have a proper interest in the economic performance of those who receive it. The receiving country has an equally legitimate need for an assurance that the aid available to it will be appropriate to its development requirements. The interests of both call for coordi- nation at each end of the flow of assistance. World Bank Annual Report 1965/1966, p. 7. The Strategic Importance of Aid Coordination The development community has long recognized how aid coordination can contribute to development effectiveness, and recent trends have reinforced its importance and potential. Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows have stagnated, development performance has been disappointing, and donor countries are increasing their demands for accountability and results. At the same time, low-income countries remain highly dependent on ODA.' Against this background, the Executive Directors of the World Bank asked the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) to review the role and experience of the Bank in aid coordina- tion. This report presents the findings and recommendations of OED's review. A key objective was to examine both the constraints involved and the progress made in helping the countries to assume more responsibility for aid coordination. Another objective was to determine the effect of the Bank's policies and procedures on government ownership of aid coordination processes in recipient countries and the development of their capacity to carry out the accom- panying responsibilities. The review deals with an important dimension of the Comprehensive Development Frame- work (CDF). The CDF includes partnership as one of its major principles, and aid coordina- tion is closely linked with partnership.2 This link derives from the requirement of any partnership that all partners jointly develop and agree on their objectives, as well as on their respective accountabilities in realizing these objectives. It is also important that they support capacity development, which must take place if weaker members are to participate fully. Most of these elements were laid out three decades ago in the widely disseminated (in 9 languages) Pearson Commission report, Partners in Development (Pearson and others 1969: 127-28).3 A mid-1999 joint statement by four European Ministers of Development Coop- eration is a recent high-level expression of these concerns: it calls for better coordination among donors and a desire to see recipient countries in the "driver's seat."4 Scope The Bibliography includes a list of papers and documents prepared for the review, and meth- ods and sources are described in Annex 2. Sources include more than 130 responses to ques- tionnaire surveys of Bank staff, government officials, donors, and international NGOs; two action-learning workshops; three country visits; literature and document reviews; and several concurrent OED Country Assistance Evaluations. The review has received valuable intellec- tual and financial assistance from the Swiss Agency for Development Assistance and Coop- eration (SDC), which included support for a February 1999 workshop involving 19 senior aid coordination officials from recipient countries. In conjunction with an evaluation of the Round Table (RT) mechanism conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), a joint survey of other donor agencies was carried out by the Bank (OED) and the UNDP. The Bank and UNDP reviews and OECD/DAC 1 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK experience formed the basis for discussion at a Development Partnership Forum, held at the OECD, December 6-8, 1999. Although this review has focused on aid coordination at the country level, country-focused aid coordination occurs within important regional and global contexts. A recent interpreta- tion of trends in development assistance indicates that a new development cooperation para- digm has emerged. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, a shift from geopolitics to globalization is seen as leading to greater attention to transnational problems. A related shift in agencies' approach to country aid is also observed-from one of entitlement, to one that places importance on effectiveness. The corollary is also drawn that "improved delivery is dependent on far greater coordination among donors than exists today" (Gwin 1999:2). As the attention of donors has shifted from geopolitics, it has also moved to governance and related issues, including human rights and corruption, which neither the Bank nor any of its donor partners would have been inclined to raise in aid coordination discussions even a few years ago. The Changing Landscape of Aid Coordination The Bank's experience in coordinating aid began in 1958, when it chaired a consortium of governments and institutions assembled in Washington to avert a foreign exchange crisis in India.5 The success of this approach for India and Pakistan triggered requests for similar fora. In response, Consultative Groups (CGs) were initiated in the mid-1960s for a number of coun- tries. These consortia and CGs began as "donors' clubs"-recipient countries were not full- fledged members. Meetings were private, and recipient countries were invited to state their case and answer questions. The distinction between "member" and "recipient" was gradually and quietly dropped, and recipients became full participants.' The number of participants in aid coordination fora for any given recipient country has increased markedly since the first aid consortia. Typically, six or seven donor countries, the Bank, and the recipient government (with the IMF as observer) attended these early meetings. Of about 160 borrower-member countries, the Bank currently convenes and chairs CG mecha- nisms for approximately 60 countries (for a number of East European countries, CGs are jointly chaired with the EU). In addition, the UNDP and partner countries currently convene and chair RT mechanisms for about 20 countries, and Regional Development Banks (RDBs) chair CGs for another 4 or 5 countries. The number of official bilateral and multilateral donors can range up to 50 or more for some recipient countries. Paralleling, but far exceeding, this growth has been a mushrooming of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the development arena: * The number of international NGOs registered in OECD countries grew from 1,600 in 1980 to 2,970 in 1993.7 * The growth of registered NGOs (international and local) in borrower countries has been even more dramatic. For example, in Bolivia the figure grew from 100 in 1980 to 530 in 1992, and in Nepal, from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993. As organizer and chair of many aid groups, the Bank has played the role of middleman, which was often difficult, because the Bank was seeking more aid and better terms for recipi- ents. The Bank often served as a counselor and a pacesetter in performance standards, and its power and influence could be enhanced by its representation of donors. But the reverse was also true: it could become a lightning rod for recipient resentment if the Bank was perceived as exercising pressure for reform. Forty years after the first consortium, these concerns have receded as donors and recipients have sought a spirit of partnership as a substitute for the previous hierarchical order. 2 IN T RO D U C T I O N Some Basic Concepts and Definitions from the Literature Notwithstanding the long history of aid coordination efforts and use of the term aid coordina- tion, there is little consensus in the development community on its meaning. Part of the prob- lem has been that the objectives and goals of coordination, the means of coordination, and who takes the lead in coordinating tend to become intertwined.8 This report adopts the fol- lowing definition: Aid coordination comprises activities of two or more development partners that are intended to mobilize aid resources or to harmonize their policies, programs, proce- dures, and practices so as to maximize the development effectiveness of aid resources.9 This definition focuses on the two long-standing goals of aid coordination: resource mobi- lization and increased development effectiveness. This review will focus largely on the second goal. The term harmonize means bringing the policies, programs, and practices or procedures of development partners into alignment to reduce or eliminate waste and inconsistency. The literature distinguishes several levels of aid coordination: * Information sharing and consultation, to understand the activities, plans, and perspectives of other actors * Strategic coordination, to reach a consensus on policies, strategic objectives, and key pro- cedures and practices * Operational coordination, to reach agreement on a common program or project to be carried out and financed jointly.10 While level one-information sharing and consultation-can be viewed as the precursor to aid coordination, it lacks the active harmonization element embodied in the definition adopted above. A key distinction between the second and third levels of aid coordination-the strategic and the operational-is that under strategic coordination, projects continue to be financed by separate donors (although in a manner better integrated with national priorities), while under the latter, donors and the recipient country pool resources to carry out a joint set of activities or programs. Not surprisingly, the literature indicates that aid coordination becomes more difficult for partici- pants as they try to move from one level to the next. Instances of strategic and operational coordination appear to have been most common during periods of crisis (see box 1.1), brought about by severe economic deterioration, food shortage, war, and prolonged violent conflict, rather than in "normal" times (Petesch 1996: 4, 1997: 12). Emerging case study evidence indicates that in some countries, sectoral aid coordination has, even in normal times, moved to the strategic and operational coordination stages.3 International Support for Aid Coordination A number of international institutions provide support for aid coordination efforts. World Bank. The most visible role of the Bank in aid coordination has been to organize and chair about 25 CG meetings a year; over a two-to-three-year period, these involve more than 60 recipient countries.'2 During the past decade, the Bank has become increasingly involved in aid coordination efforts at the sectoral level. It has long been active in coordination at the project level, particularly in setting up co-financing arrangements. A number of countries- including Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Thailand, and Tunisia-have opted out of World Bank-convened CG mechanisms, concluding that it is possible to obtain and manage external resources on their own-from both official and private sources. Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, and China are among the Bank borrower countries that have rejected participa- tion in a CG mechanism (or RT mechanism in the case of Botswana). 3 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Box 1.1 Aid Coordination in Post-Conflict Settings Effective aid coordina- post-conflict settings are including civil society, the * Multi-donor use of tion is particularly criti- the following: private sector, and gov- special mechanisms cal in a post-conflict * The earlier that coordi- ernment, are critical. and procedures that reconstruction setting. nated action occurs, * An umbrella mechanism expedite implementa- Typically, many donors- such as a joint damage that brings together the tion of reconstruction each with its own and needs assessment, economic and political efforts is also a posi- agenda-are present, and the more likely it is dimensions (such as the tive step (such as the the financial resources that subsequent aid co- Ad Hoc Liaison Com- Tripartite Under- they contribute far out- ordination will be ef- mittee in West Bank and standings of the Pales- weigh what the recipient fective. Gaza) is very useful. tinians, Israelis, and country is able to con- * The earlier the Bank es- * Providing aid within the international donors tribute. In such a setting, tablishes a resident field recipient government's for West Bank and institutional capacity is presence in a post-conflict budget, while always de- Gaza; the Bank-ad- often weakened, which setting, the more effective sirable, is particularly ministered multilat- makes it essential that its subsequent aid coordi- important in post-con- eral Holst Peace another country or exter- nation role will be. flict settings, where off- Fund, which has pro- nal agency coordinate * Early consultation and in- budget, bilateral "deals" vided recurrent bud- aid. Among the findings volvement with a wide typically lead to corrup- get support for the of recent country studies range of domestic and in- tion and misuse of re- new Palestinian Au- of aid coordination in ternational stakeholders, sources. thority). Source: Kreimer and others 1998: 24-25; Balaj and Wallich 1999. UNDP. The UNDP's sponsorship of Round Tables (RTs) parallels, with some differences, the World Bank's role in CGs.'3 The first RT was held in 1973, and during the 1990s at least one RT has been held in each of 27 countries. (See Chapter 3 for further discussion of World Bank- UNDP aid coordination relationships.) IMF The IMF is a mandated participant in every CG (and chaired the first CG for Ghana in 1965). The Bank and the IMF collaborate closely on all economic documents submitted to CGs. Regional Experience and the RDBs. During the 1960s, the World Bank provided staff support for country reviews in Latin America that were organized and chaired by the Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP). During the same period, Guyana and Honduras organized and chaired their own aid group meetings. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) chaired a CG for Ecuador in 1965 and has chaired CGs in Central America since 1995. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) chairs CGs for Papua New Guinea (and has done so on occasion elsewhere in Asia). Recent agreement on a Standard Bidding Document by a Work- ing Group on Procurement is a key step toward procedural harmonization among RDBs and with the World Bank. European Union (EU). The EU and the World Bank jointly convene and chair CGs for several Eastern European countries. The EU has adopted guidelines on in-country opera- tional coordination with EU member states, consistent with the DAC principles (OECD/ DAC 1986). Major Bilateral Donors. A major bilateral donor may convene a sectoral coordination group or a CG (as with the Netherlands in Indonesia before 1992). OECD Development Assistance Committee (DA C). The DAC also supports aid coordination efforts in its role as secretariat to OECD-member bilateral donors. The DAC has long been con- cerned with issues closely related to aid coordination, such as procurement untying. DAC is in- vited as an observer to CG meetings, as are the Bank and UNDP to DAC meetings."4 4 Chapter 2 Results-Based Conceptual Frameworks The review uses standard evaluation criteria and key policy benchmarks in assess- ing historical performance. A framework relating country and donor characteristics to aid coordination arrangements is employed to draw implications for the future. Evaluation Criteria and Levels The Bank's contribution to aid coordination is one of several nonlending services it provides to client members and other partners. Aid coordination, like other aid instruments, should be regularly assessed to determine its contribution to development results. The following qlues- tions are framed to reflect the five evaluation criteria employed by OED: relevance, efficacy, efficiency, sustainability, and institutional development: * How relevant have aid coordination efforts been in addressing the country's development priorities? * Have the expected development results been achieved (efficacy)? * How efficiently have they been achieved? * How sustainable have such efforts been and to what extent have they focused participants on issues of development sustainability? * How have the approaches to aid coordination affected institutional development? Aid coordination can also be assessed against a hierarchy of evaluative levels. At the output level, aid coordination should be assessed by its contribution to the coherence, selectiv- ity, harmonization, and volume of aid. At higher levels, aid coordination should be assessed in terms of its contribution to sound policy and institutional outcomes that, in turn, yield sustained development impacts. Key Policy Benchmarks Four documents issued in the 1980s-one by the OECD/DAC and three by the Bank-have been the main sources of policy guidance on aid coordination; they offer a set of benchmarks for the assessment of the Bank's experience.2 Three overarching principles flow from these documents: (1) the purpose of aid coordination should be to integrate external assistance with the development priorities of the recipient country; (2) aid coordination should be prima- rily the recipient government's responsibility; and (3) both recipients and donors should ad- here to strategic objectives and investment programs. One or more of the four documents also refers to the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of recipient countries; to emphasize in-country aid coordination activities; and for collaboration between the Bank and the UNDP in support of the CG ancd RT processes. Correspondence between these principles and the record of the Bank, other donors, and recipient countries over the last decade has been mixed, particularly for the central tenets of recipient government responsibility and participant discipline. It is also clear that the follow- ing two Bank operational recommendations have not been implemented (World Bank 1984 and 1989b): * Establish a focal point within the Bank for monitoring and overseeing the CG process. * Promulgate a strategy for transferring leadership for aid coordination to recipient governments. 5 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIiP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Determinants of Effective Country-Led Aid Coordination Characteristics of the Recipient Country The literature identifies two key elements of a country's development enabling environment: policy performance and institutional quality. Two closely related variables are country com- mitment (ownership of sound development priorities and policies) and the institutional capac- ity to manage and coordinate aid (a subset of institutional quality). Experience suggests that these two variables may relate to aid coordination arrangements and to development effec- tiveness. High institutional capacity and a firm country commitment are likely to be associ- ated with country-driven arrangements that should promote greater development effectiveness than would occur under more donor-driven arrangements. Conversely, the weaker the country commitment and institutional capacity, the more likely it will be that donors will insist on donor-driven aid coordination arrangements in the interests of development effectiveness. The hypothesized relationships are illustrated in figure 2.1.3 Where capacity is high, but commitment is low, the matrix implies that donors will be intensely engaged with the government in order to minimize the potential for misallocation of resources in countries in which policy commitment is flagging or lacking. This arrangement is referred to as joint sponsorship. Another intermediate case is the reverse: high commitment, but low capacity. Country-driven coordination is possible under these conditions, but strengthening of institutional capacity should accompany it. Institutional capacity includes organizational capability and the rules and incentive structures that affect individual and institutional performance in policy forma- tion, implementation, and the allocation of resources.4 Development Assistance Characteristics How can a country move to the country-driven quadrant? Depending on the current quadrant, the answer may be to strengthen country commitment, strengthen capacity, or do both. But the characteristics of donors and international agencies also have a bearing on the relative ease or difficulty of moving to effective country-led aid coordination. Figure 2.2 illustrates the influence of development assistance characteristics. Figure 2.1: Country Characteristics and Aid Coordination Institutional capacity Country commitment High Low High Country-driven Joint-sponsorship 0 .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- - - -- - -- - - ---- --- --- . . . _...__ . .. ....... . .... . ..... - - - -- - - _--------......... Low Country-driven Donor-driven (with institutional strengthening) Figure 2.2: Development Assistance Characteristics and the Aid Coordination Environment Number of donors and agencies Development orientation High Low Low Favorable Relatively difficult High Challenging Very difficult 6 RESULTS-BASED CONCEPTrUAL FRAMEWORKS When donors and agencies have a high development orientation and are relatively fewv in number, the conditions for achieving country-led aid coordination are favorable. As the number of donors (and projects) increases, however, the environment for aid coordination becomes more challenging. Moreover, as non-development motives for providing aid-such as the commercial interests of donors-become dominant, effective country-led coordination becomes problematic. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the dominance of the ideological motive for providiing aid, geopolitical considerations are still at work.5 Mutual Responsibility and Distinct Accountabilities under Country Leadership Effective aid coordination involves a process leading to agreement by the recipient country, donors, and international agencies that all partners will accept mutual responsibility for achiiev- ing development outcomes. Each set of partners-country, donors, and agencies-also ac- cepts distinct accountabilities. The accountabilities for the country include a commitment to develop sound policies and effective institutions. Those for the donors include adopting a development orientation, achieving coherence with country development priorities and selec- tivity along lines of comparative advantage (thus addressing the "numbers" issue), harmoniz- ing procedures so as to reduce aid delivery transaction costs, providing effective assistance in capacity building in order to create a level playing field for all partners, and supporting country-led efforts to achieve these objectives.6 7 Chapter 3 Stakeholder Views and Related Findings This chapter synthesizes the views of 133 respondents to a survey completed by Bank staff, government officials, and local donor representatives. The survey in- cluded multiple-choice questions, which asked for a rating from 1 to S (lowest to highest). These questions were supplemented by narrative questions. The findings of other components of the review, including two workshops, three country vtisits, and reviews of the literature and statistical data sources, are also woven into the discussion. The material is organized by the five evaluation criteria: relevance, effi- cacy, efficiency, sustainability, and institutional development. (Survey methods atnd other data sources are discussed in more detail in Annex 2.) Relevance: Broadening Commitment, Participation, and Agendas The survey asked respondents to assess the relevance of aid coordination activities with re- gard to four widely accepted development goals. As figure 3.1 illustrates, poverty reduction consistently rated higher than the other goals. Three factors have a potential bearing on the relevance of aid coordination efforts: (1 ) the commitment and role of the recipient government; (2) the extent of participation by couantry stakeholders; and (3) the agendas and venues for aid coordination fora. Commitment and Role of the Recipient Government As suggested in Chapter 1, the role of the recipient government in aid coordination has ex- panded substantially since the first consortia-recipients now see a major role for themselves. Participants in the February 1999 workshop unanimously subscribed to the proposition that their governments should be seen as "managers of aid rather than recipients." A strong gov- ernment commitment to a lead role can also be inferred from figures 3.2 and 3.3, which depict the views of survey respondents on the role of the recipients in aid coordination-both in general and with respect to in-country coordination. The Bank's Experience In contrast to the views of government and local donors, Bank staff survey respondents were, on average, neutral about the extent to which government should assume responsibility (see figure 3.2). However, among respondents who were neu- Figure 3.1: Relevance of Aid Coordination tral or negative about government assumption of respon- Activities sibility, figure 3.2 indicates that government preference for the Bank to play a leading role and lack of govern- ment capacity were selected as relatively important rea- Poverty reduction sons for their view. As figure 3.3 indicates, Bank staff and local donor representatives were also ambivalent Sustainable human about whether an active recipient role is a prerequisite development for in-country aid coordination efforts, or even whether Financial & private government should always chair in-country coordination sector development meetings. Between half and two-thirds of these respon- dents indicated neutral-to-negative ratings on these ques- Environmental tions. development .. . . ~~~~~1.00 .. 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Several governments have participated actively in re- Notrelvan Very rlvn cent years in convening and chairing local meetings, set- Not relevant Very relevant * Staff 10 Government El Donors 9 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COOR-DINATION ANI) THE WORLD BANK Figure 3.2: Role of Partner Government in Aid ting the agendas, and preparing for the annual or bian- Coordination nual apex CG meeting (whether held within or outside the country). They are also participating more intensively in Extent government should carrying out the preparatory analytical work that con- assume responsibility tribtesprepratry.aalyica assume responsibility tributes directly and indirectly to aid coordination. Among Reasons for Disagreeing the countries where signs of such participation have ap- Government preference peared are Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, for Bank to organize and Vietnam.' The Bank has played a supportive role in Lack of government these cases. In other countries, however, much of the ini- capacity to organize tiative and preparation for the CG process still rests with Donors likelihood the Bank, which also remains the sole convener and chair Donors likelihood_m to respond of most CG meetings. to Bank invitation Although these developments demonstrate that Bank reluctance dvlpet to relinquish progress has been made, the Bank still tends to be seen E as dominating the aid coordination process, and a num- 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 ber of donors and recipient countries continue to wel- Not important Very important come the Bank's role. As shown in figure 3.4, survey * Staff [r Government 0 Donors respondents rated the Bank relatively highly on the ef- Figure 3.3: In-Country Aid Coordination fectiveness of its coordination with the government in preparing and conducting the most recent aid coordina- Active government tion meeting. At the same time, donor representatives role a prerequisite criticize CGs as excessively formalistic, marked by lengthy "set speeches" and posturing, rather than genu- Bank should ine dialogue.2 encourage government I111111111111 11111 to convene meetings Breadth of Stakeholder Participation Government should The participation of nongovernmental stakeholders-civil alwavs chair meetings l rMMM society and the private sector-in aid coordination pro- Major donor should cesses has been the subject of increased attention and chair or co-chair debate.3 Of the myriad entities within civil society, NGOs meetings _ have been the focus of the most attention. In addition to 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 providing services for development and humanitarian Strongly disagree Strongly agree work at the grassroots level, many NGOs can-and do- M = 3.00 * Staff 0m Government 0 Donors engage in advocacy with governments and donors on matters affecting their interests. Private sector participa- Figure 3.4: Effectiveness of Bank Coordination tion in aid coordination generally occurs through inter- Support mediary organizations that represent private sector interests, such as chambers of commerce and industry Skills of chairperson and other business associations. Coordination Nongovernmental stakeholders are participating in withgovernenati aid coordination in some form in a number of countries, with government al 1 but the extent and the nature of their participation are in Responsiveness a flux. In most cases they participate on the margins of to donors : formal aid coordination activity, largely before and af- Usefulness & timeliness ter CG meetings. In some countries, the involvement of of documents 1111111 nongovernment entities in aid coordination, particularly Pre-meeting in CG meetings, is controversial and not fully accepted. consultations I A continuing issue is the difficulty of selecting a few with civil society representative spokespersons, especially in view of the 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 great diversity within civil society. Very ineffective Very effective ill Government * Staff 0 Donors 10 STAKEHOLDE R VIEWS AND RELATED FINDINGS Differences among groups of aid coordination participants about the relative importance of aid coordination objectives reveal ambivalence over the role of nongovernmental sectors. Figure 3.5 suggests that engaging these sectors is a more important objective for the local donors who responded to the questionnaire than it is for either Bank staff or government respondents. The differences between government and donor responses are apparent in their frequency distributions. While about half of donor representatives thought engagement of these sectors was important or very important, less than 20 percent thought it unimportant. Government respondents were about equally divided in viewing this objective as important or unimportant.4 After considerable debate, most government participants in the February 1999 workshop came to the following conclusions about involving civil society in aid coordination: * In spite of differences in the relative size, composition, and traditions of civil society in different countries, governments should be encouraged to experiment with a variety of means of involving civil society in priority setting and aid coordination. * Involving civil society in the process involves both risks and opportunities. Risks include the potential for international manipulation and the effect of prolonged consultations on the timeliness of decisionmaking and implementation. Opportunities include consensus building that creates societal support for needed reforms, strengthened commitment to implementation, and increased transparency. * Donor engagement with local civil society should occur with the concurrence, presence, and participation of government (both politicians and civil servants), and not indepenclently of it. The Bank's Experience The Bank has given substantially more attention to cooperation with civil society (particu- larly NGOs) and the private sector in recent years, but is still in a tentative, experimental mode when it comes to actively seeking their increased involvement in aid coordination processes. This was clearly the case in the three countries visited for the review. Consistent with this finding, the results of the questionnaire surveys indicate that respondents rate the Bank's effectiveness in pre-meeting consultations with civil society lowest among five aspects of the Bank's support for aid coordination (see figure 3.4). About 70 percent of each of the three respondent groups rated the Bank's effectiveness in this respect as nil or ineffective. One reason for this may be that in a number of countries, the government's attitude is ambivalent, if not indifferent, toward civil society. Ambivalence toward engaging civil society and the private sector in aid coordination pro- cesses was most evident in three CDF pilot countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, and Vietnam. Views on this issue, elicited from representatives of these sectors and from government and donor officials in each country, are summarized in box 3.1. Box 3.1 Civil Society and Private Sector Participation in Three CDF Pilot Countries In view of the re- dination mechanisms tends been closed to NGOs. if they are engaged in sources they bring, inter- to be greater at the local Civil society and the pri- advocacy. national NGOs (INGOs) and implementation levels, vate sector are invited to In each country, civil are generally accepted as rather than at the planning in-country, "mid-term society and the private donors by recipient gov- anid national levels. With CGs" in one country. sector have major con- ernments, although two exceptions-an INGO- National NGOs cerns about the gover- grudgingly or with suspi- selected observer at the (NNGOs) tend to be nance environment. cion in some instances, last four CGs and a private fragile and their relation-- When it occurs, INGO sector observer at the most ships with government ? participation in aid coor- recent CG-full CGs have problematic, particularly ~~~~~~~~. af.4. ' . ?- - . - X . >a'4 r-4.->+a. b4 -a 4'4f4-.4'444t'rf tsr4, 444'4C-.444''4X4.t7bS5 4t44-4fr444,.#44"44S .1' wab7D 11 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Figure 3.5: Objectives of Aid Coordination Rank 1.0 2.0- 3.0- 4.0- 5.0- 6.0- Mobilize Reach Review economic Raise Engage civil Capacity resources consensus on performance governance society and building development issues private sector strategy * Staff h Government a Donors Agendas and Venues As noted, the focus of early aid coordination fora on aid mobilization has broadened. It now includes harmonizing donor policies and practices; negotiating economic policy reforms at the macro and sectoral levels; and, more recently, dialogue on a wide range of development- related issues. As shown in figure 3.5, however, participants are less than unanimous regard- ing aid coordination objectives and agendas. While reaching a consensus on development strategy and reviewing economic performance are consistently ranked high, there are sharp differences among respondents with respect to other objectives. Donors rank resource mobili- zation lowest, but governments rank it highest. Donors rank governance first, but it is among the less important objectives for governments. Bank respondents ranked both objectives in the middle, after consensus on development strategy and review of economic performance. A recent Bank paper envisions apex-level aid coordination meetings, such as CGs, being convened and chaired by the recipient country, which has made the question of venue for such meetings a significant issue (World Bank 1998e: 2). While most CG meetings chaired by the World Bank are still held in donor capitals-the majority in Paris-16 CGs were held in the borrower country from 1996 through 1999.5 Views among participants on this issue vary widely, although on balance they favor at least some shift toward an in-country venue. Figure 3.6 shows how survey respondents ranked the potential advantages and disadvantages of holding in-country CG meetings. In almost every case, they emphasized the advantages of an in-country venue over the disadvantages. All three groups of respondents see the strengthening of government commitment and owner- ship as a main advantage of in-country CGs, but greater public scrutiny and collaboration with civil society and the private sector are also ranked relatively high. These meetings do tend to be heavily attended by government officials. For example, more than 100 officials attended the 1997 Aid Group Meeting in Bangladesh, and a high-level 70-member delegation accompanied the President of Tanzania in opening the 1997 in-country CG meeting. These potential advantages of in-country meetings were reinforced in interviews with rep- resentatives of government, donors, and civil society during country visits. Box 3.2 summa- rizes several other advantages and disadvantages noted in the survey responses, workshops, and country visits. Reflecting these considerations, several Bank staff and other donor repre- sentatives favored alternating CG meetings between Paris (or some other donor country city) and the recipient country. Some countries (Indonesia, for example) have initiated this prac- tice. Government participants at the February 1999 workshop cautioned against the simple 12 STAKEHOLDER VIEWS AND R.ELATED FINDINGS Figure 3.6: Advantages and Disadvantages of In-Country CG Meetings Rank 1.0 2.0- 3.0- 4.0- 5.0 6.0- 7.0- 8.0 9.0 1 Strengthen Greater Government Stimulate Reduce Logistical Media presence Difficult government collaboration policy under debate perception problems might provoke to be commitment with private greater on local of donor strong selective and ownership sector and scrutiny issues domination government civil society reaction to external criticism * Staff B Government 0 Donors conclusion that holding aid coordination meetings either inside or outside the country is in her- ently desirable. Progress toward strengthening government ownership of the coordination process, however, could lead to more in-country CG meetings. Efficacy: Assertiveness Is Not Effectiveness Poverty Reduction and Other Impacts The ultimate test of the efficacy of any aid instrument, including aid coordination, is the results it produces on the ground. Clearly it is difficult to attribute development results to aid coordination when there are so many other potential intervening influences. But this diffi- culty does not diminish the importance of the attribution question. Survey respondents an- swered questions on the impact of aid coordination as it relates to the broad developiment goals discussed earlier (see the section entitled Relevance: Broadening Commitment, Partici- pation, and Agendas).6 The results shown in figure 3.7 are somewhat similar to those for relevance (see figure 3.1), in that poverty reduction received the highest average score arnong the three groups of respondents. The differences among the four goals, however, are not as clear-cut as they were for relevance. Furthermore, the average scores, while generally above the mid-point, are in most cases less than they were for relevance. More revealing is the distribution of responses by score. Figure 3.8 shows that even for the poverty-reduction goal, about half of the Figure 3.7: Impact of Aid Coordination responses from the Bank and government, and three- quarters of responses from local donors, rated the im- pact of aid coordination activities as neutral or-as in Poverty reduction the case of one government and 11 donor responses- negative. Financial & private sector development Outcomes Sustainable Outcomes are the enabling conditions for achieving de- development velopment impacts. The results shown in figure 3.9 in- Environmental dicate that survey respondents assessed aid coordination development as having a positive effect on outcomes related to policy reform and resource mobilization. Influence on institu- 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 tional capacity was seen by governments as less, and by Very negative Very positise * Staff 1II Government 0 Donors 13 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLI) BANK Figure 3.8: Impact of Poverty Reduction for Aid Coordination Bank staff as much less, than on policy reform Frequency distribution (percent) and resource mobiliza- 60.0 tion. The distribution of scores demonstrates that 50.0 while about a third of 40.0 government responses indicated no influence 30.0 or negative influence on 20.0 institutional capacity, almost half of local do- 10.0 nor respondents and 0.0o El7 over 80 percent of Bank I 2 3 4 5 staff responses were in Very negative Vr Staff Government [ Donors y positive this category.7 Averages: Staff - 3.52; Government - 3.53; Donors - 3.06 Outputs Figure 3.9: Outcomes of Aid Coordination While it maybe difficult to trace the effect of aid coordination efforts at the im- pact, and even at the outcome, levels, results at the out- put level should be clear. These outputs can be viewed in effects on the amount of aid and the strategies, policies, Policy reform procedures, and practices of donors. Figure 3.10 presents the results from a series of questions about the ability of aid coordination to focus the attention of donors on de- Resource mobilization velopment priorities and to maintain adequate aid vol- ume. Views diverged more sharply for questions regarding the ability of aid coordination to produce more coherent Institutional capacity donor support for national development priorities, with government responses slightly negative on average. Re- 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 spondents were very close to neutral in their views of the Very negative Very poive ve effect of aid coordination on selectivity-that is, on the U Staff [B Governmenr El Donors pursuit of comparative advantage by donors. Box 3.2: Additional Advantages and Disadvantages of In-Country CGs Advantages: for recipient country na- either did not think that * Donor representatives * Broader participation tionals. donor representation might be less objective by the recipient gov- Disadvantages: would be downgraded, in their decisions in an ernment-line minis- * A shift to the recipient or were not concerned in-country setting. tries and local country could lead to a by the prospect. * Paris is a desirable venue government. downgrading of the level * Government officials because of its central lo- * Affords donor head- of donor representation have been known to ex- cation in Europe, and t quarters officials a at CGs. But all those in- press a preference for the Bank's facilities there first-hand view of the terviewed in country vis- meeting outside the were expressly designed partner country. its, including local country, owing to the to accommodate CG * Greater transparency donor representatives, sensitivity of CG issues. meetings. 14 STAKEHOLDER VIEWS AND R,ELATED FINDINGS As shown in figure 3.10, with respect to harmonizing Figure 3.10: Outputs of Aid Coordination donor procedures and practices, all three groups of re- spondents were, on average, moderately negative in their Focus on development assessment of the effect of aid coordination. The distri- priorities bution of scores indicates that 42 percent of all respon- dents rated the effect of aid coordination on donor Adequateaidvoume procedures and practices as negative or very negative. Coherence of donor There was little variation among the three groups of re- activities spondents here-Bank responses were slightly above the overall average, and government responses slightly be- Selectivity low. Fifteen of 20 responses from government were neu- _ tral to negative on this issue, and participants in the February workshop singled out harmonization of donor TA for capacity policies and procedures as the first thing donors should building do to improve aid coordination. Reduction of inefficient procedures These results are generally consistent with findings from _ = other data sources. Greater coherence is claimed as a result Consistency of aid coordination efforts, but there is little systematic evi- in procedures dence to support the claims. It is seldom asserted that selec- Employment of local tivity in comparative advantage is being tackled by aid staff coordination groups-even at the sectoral level. Unfortu- 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 nately, the more common situation in countries that depend Very positive heavily on aid is what might be characterized as the aid- e neative bombardment syndrome. * Staff 2 Government D Donors The Aid-Bombardment Syndrome This syndrome (an unintended consequence of poor aid coordination) is apparent in countries where the sheer volume of resources and numbers of donors, activities, and complex and inconsistent procedural requirements overwhelm the government's capacity to plan, budget, manage, monitor, and evaluate. Countries that have experienced aid bombardment include Kenya and Zambia in the mid-1980s, which had about 600 projects supported by 60-70 donors. Similarly, Tanzania in the early 1990s had more than 2,000 projects supported by some 40 donors (van de Walle and Johnston 1996: 49). OECD/DAC data on donor funding commitments illustrate the problem in a larger group of countries. Annual commitments to 25 low-income, aid-dependent countries averaged close to 400 per country between 1994 and 1996.8 The results of another DAC exercise suggest, but probably underestimate, the magnitude of the problem by sector (OECD/DAC 1999b)." The data reveal that ten of the poorest and most aid-dependent countries had, on average, more than eight active official donors in the education and health sectors alone. Mozambique was in the top of all three sectors, with 19 reported donors in education, 16 in health, and 14 in agriculture. Tanzania and Ethiopia followed with 14 donors each in health; 14 in education for Tanzania, and 13 for Ethiopia. Wasteful Competition-the Costs of Poor Aid Coordination The literature is replete with descriptions of donors who compete with each other for scarce host country talent to design and implement their own projects. These projects are carried out on an ad hoc basis in so-called Project Implementation or Management Units (PIUs/PMUs). These units are separate from the line ministries that have the mandate-but lack the capac- ity-to do the job. They often drain government capacity and bring in highly paid expaltriate consultants to fill technical and managerial positions.'° In these circumstances, poor aid coor- dination tends to weaken institutional capacity and reduce development effectiveness (see box 3.3). 15 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Box 3.3 The Impact of Stand-Alone Projects on Institutional Capacity in Africa Reliance on independent resources and given over erable disparity develop be- ministration becomes a local structures can de- entirely to patronage and tween the parts of the state self-fulfilling prophecy, stroy local institutional rent-seeking, with predict- apparatus that have ad- because they have never capacity. Because many able effects on morale and equate resources from aid gained the experience in routine ministerial func- institutional capabilities. support and the parts that implementation necessary tions have devolved to The projects often hire the cannot perform basic func- to improve performance. various projects, the cen- government's most quali- tions for want of resources. tral administration is fied or the most ambitious In the long run, the decay starved of attention and staff. Situations of consid- of parts of the central ad- Source: van de Walle and Johnston 1996: 67-68. Figure 3.11: Integration of Aid Resources Survey questionnaires asked respondents to indicate the prevalence of stand-alone projects in the country, as Aid flows bypass well as the extent and effectiveness with which this issue regular government was treated in aid coordination meetings. While respon- structures dents perceived this approach as only moderately preva- lent, they rated as "ineffective" the attempts of aid Treatment of issue in coordination fora to address the problem (figure 3.11). aid coordination About one-third of government and one-half of Bank staff/ management and other donor respondents rated aid coor- How effective in dination as ineffective to very ineffective on this issue. addressing issue _______ =______ _______ ________ Poor aid coordination can add substantial costs to the 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 delivery of aid for both recipient and donors, but the bur- Not effective Very effective den on a low-income country can be particularly heavy. * Staff DI Government C Donors In a setting with multiple donors and a country with frag- ile institutional capacity, poor coordination can impose a significant burden on the government. This burden is an accumulation of factors, including onerous reporting requirements, each with its own detailed specifications, and numerous, uncoordinated visiting missions. For example, in one country visited during this review, each of the two largest donors sends from 20 to 30 visiting missions each month to the country for strategy formulation, operations design and appraisal, supervision, or evaluation. Available evidence, while not systematic, indicates that the Bank is not immune from imposing such burdens.' Box 3.4 suggests the magnitude of the problem in Africa. It is well-known that donors reduce the value Box 3.4 The Cost of Poor Aid Coordination of aid by requiring do- nor-financed goods and A conservative estimate and more than 1,000 an- most common complaint services to be purchased for a typical African nual missions to appraise, voiced by officials inter- from the donor country. country is that 600 monitor, and evaluate. viewed for seven case This practice, known as projects translates into Each mission asks to meet studies of aid manage- tying, is estimated to 2,400 quarterly reports a with key officials, and each ment in Africa was that reduce the value of such year submitted to differ- will ask the government to aid "imposes too many aid by about 25 percent ent oversight entities, comment on its report. The administrative burdens." (World Bank 1998a: 6). Source: van de Walle and Johnston 1996: 50. If aid coordination ef- forts could significantly reduce tying, they would clearly be cost-effective. 16 STAKEHOLDEPR VIEWS AND) ]R ELATED FINDINGS A recent evaluation concluded that the Special Program of Assistance for Africa (SPA) had made the most progress in harmonizing donor procedures to untie and streamline procure- ment practices for import support aid programs, but that "procedural difficulties" remained (World Bank 1998h: 8). The OECD/DAC has spent decades attempting to reach an agreement among its members on untying, but progress remains elusive."2 The Sector Program Approach-Good Practice in Aid Coordination? Some sector program approaches (SPs) supported by the Bank and other donors are taking incremental steps in the direction of more effective aid coordination, but few of these efforts have fully realized their potential benefits. Analysis and experience indicate that to be suc- cessfully implemented, SPs require two main pre- - conditions:astablemac- Box 3.5 Approaches to Aid Coordination in the Health Sector roeconomic environment in Mozambique and a comprehensive budget process that ad- P A recent analysis of aid 1997). The analysis found concluded that critical heres to a sound mid- coordination in the that incremental ap- factors have included term expenditure health sector in proaches, where objectives widely shared informa- Mozambique suggests are set lower at the begin- tion, committed leader- framework (Jones 1997, ! several factors that affect ning and progressively ship, frankness, 1999). Other precondi- j its contribution to effec- raised as the system is risk-taking, and a long- tions considered to be tive development. strengthened, have been term perspective. important prerequisites (Pavignani and Durao crucial to progress. It also for effective sector ap- i d proaches include: • An approach that is truly sectorwide in nature, covering all relevant public expen-cliture and policies. * A clearly articulated sector strategy, accepted by all participants * An agreement among all main donors to participate * Transparent sharing of relevant information by all participants * Implementation arrangements made in common by all donors to the extent possible * Minimization of long-term technical assistance * Acceptance by partners of joint accountability for program success * The willingness of donors to co-finance the program by contributing to a common budget." Box 3.6 Do Sector Programs Result in Donor Concentration? Some concentration the early 1990s, but so increase in donor con- diffusion and lack of might be expected in did aid committed. centration, with donor donor concentration Ghana, where sector * In the 1990s the number numbers declining from over the most recent groups have been active of donors declined 15 to 13, while aid con- decade. in agriculture, education, slightly in agriculture tinued to grow. * While other factors health, and transporta- and health, but aid fell * Overall, the average undoubtedly affect the ; tion (roads) for at least a much more steeply, number of sectors per number of donors, it decade. However, OECD/ while the number of do- donor in Ghana in- seems reasonable to DAC data reveal a mixed nors increased from 15 creased from 20 to 27 expect that sector - picture: to 19 in education, from 1984-86 to 1994- program efforts to which experienced a de- 96. achieve greater * Donor numbers re- cline in commitments of * Findings from a forth- coherence and ported in each sector about 50 percent. coming OED Tanzania selectivity will lead to expanded sharply * Only transportation Country Assistance greater concentration. from the mid-1980s to shows an unambiguous Evaluation find a similar 17 THE DkIvE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK g Box 3.7 Ethiopia ESDP: Achievements and Issues 0 A recent review of the employed that is respon- and harmonization agement procedures g preparation phase of the sive to the Regions. issues. detayed funding or re- Ethiopia Education Sector * Stronger GOE planning Unresolved Issues: sulted in the use of Development Program capacity has been built * There was little policy different GOE funding B (ESDP) comes to the fol- through "learning by dialogue between GOE channels, which made lowing conclusions. doing." and donors, with the it difficult to set up A high degree of coordi- exception of the Bank, accountability sys- Positive Achievements: nation among donors has in earlier phases. tems. * The Government of been created by GOE * Differences in donor * There were widely dif- Ethiopia (GOE) has insistence on joint mis- procedural and docu- fering perceptions of , demonstrated strong sions. mentation require- capacity needs, with W and determined owner- * The entire sector was ments delayed some sharp disagreements g ship and commitment. covered. donor participation. over technical assis- g * A decentralized ap- * Good analysis was con- * Donor concern about tance (TA) needs and proach has been ducted of procedures weak financial man- modalities. 4 Source: N4artin and others 1 999: 39-42. Taken together, these are stringent conditions to satisfy. The last item, in particular, contri- butions to a common budget, has been realized in only a few instances. Health SPs in Bang- ladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mozambique include this feature, but all donors do not contribute through the common fund. A key factor in the Ghana experience is the investment that donors made over a period of several years to strengthen the financial management systems of the Ministry of Health. This helped build donor trust in the ministry and was a key prerequisite for obtaining donor agreement (Peters and Chao 1997: 184-85). Even in this case, however, only one-third of all donor resources for the health sector flow through the common fund, and no donor provides completely unearmarked resources. The intensive Sector Development Pro- gram (SDP) efforts in education and health in Ethiopia are noteworthy for the unusually high degree of country commitment in their design. Implementation is proving to be difficult, however, with donor concerns about financial management capacity surfacing as a key ob- stacle to contributions to the sectorwide budget, particularly in the form of unearmarked funds (see box 3.7). There is potential for tension between the sector program approach, which presumes a degree of central planning, and government decentralization. Decentralization could adversely affect aid coordination and development effectiveness if each donor had to deal independently with a different local jurisdiction in a decentralized environment. Another potential weakness is that SPs might exclude other development actors, such as NGOs, which may be quite active in a given sector and be able to contribute significantly to both the design process and imple- mentation. Experience to date indicates relatively widespread involvement of these organiza- tions at the implementation stage, but much less at the design stage. Aid Coordination Effectiveness and Aid Volume As illustrated in figure 3.10, government respondents viewed aid coordination as having a modest influence on aid volume at the country level, while local donor representatives saw it as having a neutral influence. Figure 3.5 suggests that resource mobilization is the highest priority objective of aid coordination for governments; for donors, such objectives as gover- nance and economic performance rank higher in importance. However, several survey re- sponses from donor headquarters note little connection between more effective aid coordination and higher global ODA levels. If such a connection existed, it could send a message from donors that would reinforce decisions by recipient governments to institute the politically 18 STAKEHOLDER VIEWS AND RELATED FINDINGS difficult reforms that might be needed to strengthen capacity.'4 For example, strengthening the coordination role of a finance ministry could meet strong resistance from politically powerful line ministries. Ministers may resist giving up control over resources, particularly where their control is linked to corruption (Disch 1999:3). The Bank as Donor-Partner As suggested by the survey results shown in figure 3.4, with the exception of pre-meeting consultations with civil society, the three groups of respondents ranked the Bank's support for aid coordination as relatively effective. Bank respondents, however, rated this support co nsis- tently higher than did government officials or local donor representatives. Several donors who responded to the survey noted Bank-UNDP tensions. Some ascribe these tensions to a lack of clarity in their roles in aid coordination. Three agreements between the two institutions between 1986 and 1996 have sought to clarify these roles. The 1996 agreement states that the country's preferences are to be respected with regard to choice of consultative arrangement, and that "neither the CG, the RT, nor other coordination mecha- nism should be regarded a priori as the preferred mechanism." Furthermore, if a governmient indicates that it wishes to change from a CG to an RT or vice versa, the Bank, UNDP, and the government will consult on the request at an early stage.'5 Despite this attempt to spell out an orderly process, actual experience has been uneven. Some transitions have occured with mutual agreement. For example, after initial UND]P aid coordination leadership, Vietnam became a CG country. The government and the resident representatives of both the Bank and the UNDP recognized that a CG was more appropriate than an RT, in view of the major capital financing requirements projected for the country."6 Figure 3.12: Relative Benefits and Costs of Aid Coordination Costs to donors Benefits to recipients Low High High * Untying for projects * Untying for import aid . Unearmarked contributions to Common Fund * Common procurement and disbursement procedures Low * Better information exchange * Increased selectivity (comparative advantage) * Earmarked Common Fund contributions * Common reporting procedures * Increased coherence with country priorities * Common budget cycles 19 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK However, there are other cases where interest expressed by the government for a change of aid coordination mechanisms has led to misunderstandings and tension between the Bank and the UNDP. An example of positive collaboration has been coordination of this review with a parallel evaluation of the Round Table mechanism conducted by the UNDP. There have been periodic consultations and a joint survey of other donor agencies. The two reviews and OECD/DAC experience formed the basis for discussion by the Development Partnership Forum at the OECD, December 6-8, 1999. When donors and recipients were asked in the survey questionnaire to identify the three main weaknesses of the Bank's role in aid coordination, by far the most common criticism was a perception, particularly by local donor representatives, of arrogance and insensitivity on the part of visiting Bank missions.17 Several also faulted the Bank's lack of transparency and timeliness in consultation and the sharing of relevant information. They also cited a lack of openness to their participation in processes that relate to more effective coordination (for example, the strategy-development process). One particularly damaging instance reported to an OED Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) team occurred when a visiting Bank mission ignored policy agreements that had been reached between the government and other donor representatives, thereby setting back the policy reform process." Efficiency: The Benefits and Costs of Aid Coordination The potential benefits of improved aid coordination include more positive outcomes and longer-term development impacts. As suggested earlier, they could also lower the cost of delivering aid, which in effect would release more aid resources directly to development. Aid coordination activities themselves incur costs-for example, the costs of participants' time, publications, travel, meeting facilities, and the like."9 While not trivial, the direct cost to the World Bank of providing aid coordination services is relatively small; a generous estimate is less than 3 percent of the Bank's Core Development Services budget, which totaled about US$900 million in FY95 (see Annex 3 for further discus- sion). As perceived by participants (particularly donors), however, the more important costs of aid coordination retate to measures associated with harmonizing procedures and bringing about greater integration of assistance. The benefits arise from the reduced burdens and in- creased value of aid that would flow to recipient countries from undertaking such measures. While few quantitative estimates of these costs and benefits are available, it is possible to give an indication of the relative significance of the various integration and harmonization efforts that have been attempted in aid coordination fora. Fig- Figure 3.13: Recurrent Costs ure 3.12 lists costs to donors and benefits to recipients from low to high on the vertical and horizontal axes, Issue of recurrent respectively. cost in country The placement of measures among and within the quadrants of figure 3.12 reflects a sense of their relative Extent of dealing benefits and costs, as indicated by the information col- with issue in aid coordination lected for this review. Their exact placement can, of course, be debated. It will also vary among some coun- Effectiveness of tries and sectors. The purpose of the exercise is to sug- meetings to dealwith gest that aid coordination entails certain costs and benefits issuegetcrancssadbnfs that must be acknowledged.20 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Not effective Very effective * Staff m0 Government El Donors 20 STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ANI RELATED FINDINGS Sustainability: From Information Sharing to Strategic Coordination There are two aspects to the issue of sustainability and aid coordination: the sustainability of the aid coordination efforts themselves and whether and how effectively aid coordination fora deal with issues relating to the sustainability of development. A basic prerequisite for success- ful and sustained aid coordination at the sector level is open information sharing among partners. The visiting OED team heard complaints from government representatives about the difficulty of obtaining information on planned and ongoing donor activities. Donors com- plained about a lack of information on the government budget and accounts. Another com- plaint was that some aid coordination meetings were limited to information sharing. T he concern was that the sustainability of these meetings would be problematic unless they pro- gressed to strategic coordination and dealt with policy and program issues. Some suggested that there were more efficient ways of sharing information, such as the Internet.2' A common issue in project assistance in many low-income countries has been the failure to adequately address the recurrent costs of projects. This typically has serious if not fatal conse- quences for sustainability. Survey questionnaires asked respondents to indicate the magnitude of the recurrent cost issue in their country of responsibility, as well as how well the issue was dealt with in aid coordination meetings. The results, shown in figure 3.13, indicate that while respondents perceived the recurrent costs issue as only moderately prevalent, they generally rated aid coordination meetings as ineffective in addressing the problem. Almost half of all respondents (and almost 60 percent of donor respondents) rated aid coordination as ineffective to very ineffective in dealing with this issue. Institutional Development: Can Capacity Building Be Demand-Led? The overall record of donor assistance to strengthen capacity for aid management and coordi- nation has been mediocre, if not poor. The UNDP has critically evaluated its own extensive experience in providing assistance for capacity building in Africa.22 Capacity building was still a major issue in the countries visited for the OED review. Both donors and government complained of poor quality and supply-driven TA. The better experiences included bringing outstanding experts (with UNDP funding) to Vietnam for a series of short-term visits and the UNDP-funded National Execution (NEX) Program in Ethiopia, where the government has had the flexibility to identify experts and their country of origin.23 The discussion of institutional capacity in Chapter 2 emphasized the need to unbundle, or separate, the concept into three major components: organizational capability, internal and external rules, and incentives. These components need to be examined separately. For ex- ample, merely providing training and technical assistance will not be effective if the real problem is inadequate or perverse rules and incentive structures (that is, non-transparent, not results-based). The Bank's Experience Three central Asian countries are among the few where the Bank has provided financial support explicitly to build aid coordination capacity. Three grants, each in the range of US$300,000, were made from the Institutional Development Fund (IDF), to be employed in establishing aid coordination units. The effort to establish a Kazak aid coordination lnit, later supported by the UNDP, has been generally effective. It has a staff of 15-20 people, manages an annual aid inflow of about US$0.5 billion, and organizes monthly in-county aid coordination meetings chaired by the finance minister. To the extent that the Bank invites client countries to participate meaningfully in its analytical processes, such as economic and sector work (ESW) and Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) development, experience suggests that aid management and coordination capacity are bolstered.24 21 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Box 3.8 Capacity Building in Sub-Saharan Africa At the 1996 Annual long-term technical assis- They proposed a * Capacity building that Meetings, the African tance; African governments Partnership for Capacity relies on consultation Governors of the World and international donors Building in Africa with a range of local i Bank determined that the do not pay enough atten- (PACT), based on the stakeholders g Bank and other donors tion to fostering effective following principles: . True partnership with g g had contributed to erod- institutions; and capacity . Demand-driven, Afri- Africa's international E ing capacity, especially problems diminish the per- can-led and -owned development partners. ( through excessive use of formance of all sectors. solutions Source: World Bank 1999f. The Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa (PACT), initiated bv the African Gover- nors of the World Bank, is designed to enable learning from the lessons of past experience in the region.25 It is likely that the mixed record of capacity building efforts reported in box 3.8 stems in part from a failure to diagnose adequately the reasons for low institutional capacity, or a failure to take adequate measures in response to the diagnosis. Bank Processes and Instruments Country Assistance Strategies Review of the two most recent sets of CAS documents for 15 selected countries (see Annex 4 for details) showed a modest trend toward sharper analysis of aid coordination issues. CASs appear to be increasingly linking development effectiveness to aid coordination and more clearly delineating the Bank's comparative advantage and selectivity compared with other donors (CASs for Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania, and Yemen are cited in Annex 4 as containing elements of good practice). But most of the reviewed CASs remain weak in addressing country capacity for aid coordination and the efforts of donors to build such capacity. The CASs were weakest with respect to the efforts of donors to harmonize procedures. CASs that discussed the role of the resident mission in aid coordination unanimously judged it as a positive one, and many suggested that a stronger field presence with more authority would be an asset to the Bank's overall partnership agenda. Lending and Analytical Instruments The Public Expenditure Review (PER) has become a major Bank-supported analytical instru- ment and touchstone for public policy dialogue between donors and recipient governments. But few PERs have reviewed the extent of integration of donor resources intended for the public sector into the government budget. Such integration is one litmus test for measuring the commitment of governments to managing and coordinating aid effectively.26 Bank-funded projects in Bangladesh, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Pakistan, Tanza- nia, Uganda, and Zambia have typically contributed to sector programs through Sector In- vestment Credits or Loans (SILs).27 As suggested in the earlier discussion of the SP (paragraphs 3.28-3.30), experience varies considerably among and within countries. This variation re- flects varying economic and institutional environments, as well as differences in SP design and coverage.21 One key issue in this connection is whether the government really leads the SP or whether it is a blueprint designed and orchestrated by the Bank and/or other donors. Another issue is the degree of confidence donors have in the government's financial manage- ment systems. Nonetheless, SP and related initiatives constitute important "learning labora- 22 STAKEHOLDER VIEWS AND RELATEI) FINDINGS Box 3.9 Tracking Support for Sector Programs t In a recent a recent ini- objectives are to accom- * See if SPs deliver the * Determine whether tiative, the SPA Working plish the following: benefits ascribed to systematic tracking of Group on Economic * Monitor donor shifts to- them-that is, better SPs can provide an 2 Management established ward SPs, in line with predictability of donor early warning that a Task Group to explore their stated objectives. commitments, higher corrective action is practical options for * Follow the evolution of flexibility, and greater needed. ttracking support for SPs implementation proce- ownership on the part * Try to establish best in Africa. The primary dures under SPs. of countries. practice guidelines. Source: World Bank 1999e. tories" that have been associated with more effective country-driven approaches to aid coor- dination in several cases. Decentralization of Bank Operations The decentralization of Bank operations is implicit in the placement of the country director in the field. Although this practice has been universally acclaimed in Ghana and Vietnarm, a lack of delegated authority and inadequate field presence were noted in survey questionnaire responses by several local donors in countries where the Bank's field office is still headed by a resident representative.29 Some observers suggest that pressures on donors to demonstrate results have made it more attractive to support projects, as opposed to sectors or programs. Immediate project outputs, such as miles of road constructed, for example, will be seen as more within the control of a single donor (van de Walle and Johnston 1996: 79). It has also been suggested that decentrali- zation of donor operations and authority to the country level could lead to even greater preference for, or focus on, projects. This might lead to the conclusion that results-based management is incompatible with effective aid coordination. The problem in this case, how- ever, is not results-based management, but rather that the results focus is at too low a level. The achievement of sustained results at higher levels-incomes and employment, health sta- tus, and the like-is more likely when development partners are working in concert, rather than independently. Client and Staff Training and Development A notable conclusion of the February 1999 workshop of senior government officials was that more attention needed to be given to the skills required to coordinate aid effectively. Partici- pants noted that staff needed more training in the skills of negotiation, facilitation, communi- cation, economic and social analysis, information technology, and diplomacy. Such skills must be developed to enable governments to design and carry out key economic and social studies and to analyze donor studies. Participants also suggested that aid coordination eff:orts would be more effective if donor staff had a better grounding in both the skill areas noted above and of the country where they propose to work.30 That more than half of Bank staff and local donor survey respondents were neutral or negative about an active government role in aid coordination suggests that there is a significant bias to be overcome. 23 Chapter 4 Country Context and Measuring Aid Coordination Quality Case studies, country evaluations, interviews, and workshops generally validate the relationships depicted in figure 2.1-that countries with relatively high commit- ment and institutional capacity tend to have country-driven aid coordination ar- rangements, and countries weak in both categories tend to have donor-driven aidl coordination arrangements. Selected Country Experiences The experience of Botswana clearly fits the matrix in figure 2.1. Both case study literature and ratings of institutional quality, policy performance, and the quality of aid coordination have consistently given it high marks-in effect, placing it in the "high-high" quadrant of the figure. Botswana also represents a case of strong country-driven aid coordination (box 4.1). While other countries in the "high-high" quadrant, such as Colombia and Thailand, have exited or graduated from CGs, Botswana, even when it was much poorer and aid-depen- dent, rejected any arrangement that might be construed as donor-driven. A 1984 Bank paper noted that given Botswana's track record and its ability to stand by its own national priori- ties, donors appeared to make "every possible effort to harmonize their preferences with those of the country."' Case study evidence for several other countries-Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Viet- nam-suggests developments that have led (or should lead) to more effective aid coordina- tion. The evidence includes recent OED Country Assistance Evaluations for Bangladesh and Ethiopia (World Bank 1998b, 1999d), as well as the OED missions to Ethiopia, Ghana, and Vietnam carried out for this review (see list of papers in the Bibliography). But the experience of these countries also shows that country commitment, institutional capacity, the quality of aid coordination, and country leadership of aid coordination do not all progress smoothly together. Bangladesh represents one of the few reported instances in which donor efforts have resulted in greater coherence and selectivity (World Bank 1998b: 38). Yet the 1995 OED CAR for Bangladesh also cites serious institutional capacity problems, complaints about burdensome procedures required by donors, and weak borrower ownership and commitment (World Bank 1998b: 16,22). Box 4.1 Country-Led Aid Coordination: Botswana Key features of the insti- * External aid resources in line ministry planning * The government in- tutional framework that were entirely integrated units in order to inte- sisted on its own made for country-driven into the national public grate aid resources, but procurement proce- aid coordination in expenditure budget. were also rotated to ac- dures, both for Botswana included the * The MFDP had effective quire government-wide equipment and exter- following: budget planning, execu- experience. nal consultants. Aid management and tion, monitoring, and ac- * The MFDP and line minis- * Expatriate experts coordination was a counting capacities, tries were known for being were placed into line core function of the maintaining tight control tough negotiators with do- positions in the gov- Ministry of Finance over intersectoral nors, but once agreements ernment while na- and Development allocations. were concluded, they were tionals were being Planning (MFDP). * MFDP staff were placed observed. trained. 25 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION ANI) THE WORLD BANK In the case of Ghana, the 1995 CAR was sharply critical of aid coordination processes (World Bank 1995: 64-68). The OED mission of April 1999, however, identified signs that these processes have become more effective (box 4.2). Measuring the Quality of Aid Coordination The characteristics of countries and donors directly affect countries' ability to assume leader- ship in aid management and coordination. Several of these characteristics or factors could be combined to constitute a measure or index of the quality of aid coordination. A paper pre- pared for the review identified eight such factors: (1) Government is in the center of the process. (2) Aid coordination is concerned with key development issues. (3) Good information is readily available on the development plans and activities of participants. (4) Donors provide focused, coherent support to the national development strategy. (5) Donors provide assistance efficiently, thus minimizing transaction costs. (6) Donors have confidence in the quality and transparency of the government's financial management. (7) Donors contribute effectively to improving the government's institutional capacity for aid management and coordination. (8) The concerns of civil society and the private sector are addressed in aid coordination processes and outcomes. Key measurable indicators can be identified for each of these factors. For example, the degree of donor concentration by sector could be one indicator for factor 4 (focus and coher- ence of aid); the extent of harmonization of donor missions, for factor 5 (efficient aid); and timeliness and quality of audits, for factor 6 (donor confidence in government financial man- agement). These and other indicators could be measured through surveys and other evi- dence.2 They would provide benchmarks for monitoring progress toward more effective aid coordination and partnership. Taken together, they would provide an index of aid coordina- tion quality. Box 4.2 The CG in Ghana: From Event to Process * Quarterly, in-country * Building on almost a * The first full CG meet- "mini-CG meetings," decade of capacity build- ing, held in Ghana in # initiated in April ing in the health sector, November 1999, was 1998, are viewed as a the mini-CG recently en- another step toward full useful complement to dorsed 14 government- country-led aid coordi- the biannual CG led, donor-supported nation. meeting. Partner Groups. 26 Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations Main Findings and Conclusions The review yields several broad findings based on the information gathered: * World Bank-led aid coordination mechanisms and processes at the apex level (consortia and CGs) have expanded substantially over the last four decades. Agendas cover a wide gamut of development issues, with participation by approximately 60 recipient countries and 50 official donors. * In the context of declining per capita aid disbursements for most countries, these efforts are seen by survey respondents as having helped to protect the level of resources mobilized for individual countries and to achieve a greater aid focus on development priorities. * Governments and donors have long valued the Bank's leadership by virtue of its competent staff, global experience, and the resources it brings to the table. But in spite of this record, and in spite of decades-old policies and pronouncements on the subject by the donor com- munity, only recently have portents of fundamental change in the management of aid coor- dination at the country level been emerging in some countries. e While governments are taking a more active role in aid coordination, particularly at the sector level, and many express a strong desire to manage the entire process, only a few former CG countries (for example, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) have fully assumed such a role. The review identifies several overall constraints to country-managed aid coordination: * Many countries lack the capacity-and some still lack the commitment-to assume a lead role. • Donors find weak recipient financial management capacity a major impediment to taking on the costs and risks of the harmonization of procedures required to contribute flexible resources to sector development programs. Recipient governments, however, single out harmonization of donor policies and procedures as the first thing donors should do to improve aid coordination. * There are few examples of aid coordination efforts that have led to greater donor selectiv- ity (pursuit of comparative advantage), and years of donor debate have resulted in little action to reduce burdensome aid delivery transactions costs (such as those brought about by complex and divergent procedures), which would facilitate country leadership. * Donor efforts to strengthen country aid management and coordination capacity have gen- erally been expensive, supply-driven, and ultimately ineffective, and aid coordination ac- tivities are seen as having little or no positive effect on country capacity. * Some donors see little or no connection between more effective aid coordination and higher global aid levels-a link that, if it existed, could send a message from donors to reinlforce recipient governments in undertaking politically difficult reforms to strengthen capacity. * Finally, if donors want recipient countries to assume aid coordination leadership, a survey result they should not ignore is that over half of Bank staff and local donor respondents were neutral to negative about the need for the recipient government to take the lead for in- country aid coordination. The record of the World Bank in supporting a move to country-led aid coordination is mixed. The Bank's influence is felt through its own operations and interactions with other donors. Actions contributing to country capacity, and generally eliciting positive reactions from governments and other donors, include: 27 THE DRIVE TrO PART NERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK * Promoting active country participation in planning and preparing for aid coordination- related efforts, such as ESW * Support for sector development programs and donor harmonization in selected countries and through the SPA * Strengthened resident missions with greater delegated authority * Supporting an expansion of in-country aid coordination fora in some countries and, at least on an alternating basis, in-country CG meetings. Offsetting these accomplishments are the following findings: * Many local donor representatives still experience, and find counterproductive, arrogant attitudes and non-consultative behavior by Bank headquarters staff when they visit. * Continuing use by the Bank and other donors of PIUs to manage aid-assisted projects has been counterproductive in building institutional capacity. * Among agencies with whom the Bank shares aid coordination support roles, the closest parallel is with the UNDP. Despite examples of good practice in the field, however, donor respondents note tensions that need to be addressed. The involvement of civil society and the private sector in aid coordination processes remains controversial. Most donors strongly favor greater involvement, while recipient governments manifest mixed views, ranging from cautiously positive to skeptical, or even antagonistic. To address this ambivalence, experimentation is warranted with alternative approaches to involving other stake- holders in different phases of aid coordination. The overarching conclusions are that the development community has been well-served by the support for aid coordination provided by the World Bank, but that community has a long way to go to achieve its long-standing goal of country leadership of the process. Recommendations A Strategy for Country Leadership with Mutual Responsibility Among Partners for Development Outcomes and Distinct Accountabilities Prospects for successful implementation of the principles of ownership and partnership em- bodied in the Comprehensive Development Framework can be enhanced if the Bank under- takes several concrete actions. These include measures in the policy, strategic, and operational realms, some at the global level and others at the country level. Effectiveness at both levels will require close consultation with other partners, including borrower countries. The Bank's chief role would be to support movement toward recipient country leadership in the manage- ment and coordination of aid resources and to promote the needed capacity building required to effectively exercise that leadership. Bank Policy for Country-Led Partnership Bank policy on aid coordination is contained Operational Directive 14.30 on "Aid Coordina- tion Groups." This directive was issued in 1989 and does not reflect the major innovations of recent years, particularly the emphasis of the CDF on partnership, ownership, and results orientation, as well as the Bank's expanded presence in the field. New statements of Opera- tional Policy (OP), updated Bank Procedures (BP), and examples of Good Practice (GP), aligned with the principles of the CDF and reflecting leading-edge thinking, would result in greater clarity and help staff adjust their roles accordingly. To accomplish these objectives, the new Operational Policy would: * Declare that country leadership of the management and coordination of aid resources is Bank policy. 28 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS * Emphasize partnership and collaboration among governmental and nongovernmental ac- tors at the country level. * Use proven ability to collaborate with other partners as a criterion for the appointment and performance assessment of operations managers. * Use Project Implementation Units (PIUs) only in exceptional circumstances or when there is no feasible alternative and commit to a monitorable phase-out plan. Bank Procedures could include revised CAS guidelines that ask how the Bank will work with its partners to (i) increase the coherence, selectivity, and efficiency of donor support; (ii) build government capacity for aid management and coordination; and (iii) enhance participa- tion of civil society and the private sector in aid coordination processes. The procedures could also emphasize the use of programmatic lending approaches and instruments, such as Sector Programs and Poverty Reduction Support Credits, that facilitate transfer of aid coordi- nation leadership to recipient countries. For countries where a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is to be prepared, these elements could be incorporated in the PRSP The Good Practice statement would provide examples of strong country commitment; effective and efficient donor support, including support for capacity building; involvement of civil society and the private sector; partnership agreements that delineate mutual responsibil- ity and distinct accountabilities; and the use of lending instruments that support country lead- ership. Strategies for Country Leadership Development results are achieved or not achieved at the country level. Therefore it is critical that the management and coordination of aid resources be effectively owned and led by the country. This process would be accelerated if each Bank country team or department that supported a CG (or similar mechanism) were to work with the government and other develop- ment partners to formulate a strategy explicitly intended to help the country move toward aid coordination leadership. Factors such as extent of institutional capacity, transparent pro- cesses and standards of accountability, and commitment to sound policies would need to be taken into account in developing an appropriate strategy and timeframe for each country (see Annex 1 for further discussion). Each strategy would demonstrate how the Bank and other partners would help the government: (1) Strengthen its aid management and coordination capacity. (2) Reach partnership agreements with donors that delineate mutual mutual responsibility for development outcomes and the distinct accountabilities of each partner. (3) Design agreed coordination principles and procedures (such as adhering to country-led efforts to bring about greater coherence and selectivity in the application of aid resou.rces). (4) Present a plan for carrying out joint monitoring and evaluation missions with donors in order to reduce barriers to country leadership and promote country assessment of donor performance. This does not mean that the Bank would disengage itself from either the aid coordination process or from maintaining and strengthening its country programs. But by giving the country a chance to exert leadership, the Bank would be in a better position to focus on, and assist in the building of, long-term capacity, in line with CDF and OECD/DAC principles. There are risks in implementing the recommended approach that would need to be man- aged. For example, CG meetings have provided the occasion for intimate and candid discus- sions between high-level donor and government officials. However, the experience of countries that have been moving to country-led processes shows that such opportunities need not be lost. 29 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Global Engagement with Donors for Country-Led Partnership Successful implementation of this report's recommendations will require consensus and col- laboration among donors at the global level. A joint statement issued by the OECD/DAC, the UNDP, and the World Bank at the conclusion of the December 1999 Development Partnership Forum called for a "joint partnership group" to take stock of existing work, with a view to accelerating progress. The elements to receive attention included harmonization of donors' operational policies and procedures, capacity building for managing development resources by the recipient countries, joint monitoring and evaluation based on jointly agreed indicators of development progress, and improved information sharing on promising and innovative approaches to partnerships.' While a new "joint partnership group" as such, has not been established, the ongoing Informal Group of Multilateral Secretariats, convened by the DAC chair, composed of the heads of main multilateral financial institutions, has decided to focus on several of these elements.2 The Bank continues to be an active participant in harmoniza- tion efforts among the major multilateral development banks (MDBS) and through the SPA. It has recently broadened the dialogue to include a much broader group of multilateral financial institutions and has established a close linkage with a newly formed OECD/DAC task force on harmonization of bilateral donor procedures.3 As part of these initiatives or in parallel with them, the Bank should pursue the following complementary efforts: (1) Work closely with the U.N. system (in particular the UNDP); DAC members, including the EU; and the RDBs to establish a common understanding and commitment to building part- nerships at the country level. (2) In view of the central importance of capacity building to effective country leadership, the Bank should work with other partners with experience in this area to formulate a coordi- nated approach to capacity development. (3) Continue to support harmonization of donor procedures and policies among MDBs and in the SPA, as well as closely coordinating with the new OECD/DAC harmonization task force. Monitoring Progress Monitoring is essential, both to report on progress and to identify constraints to achieving it. The Bank, working with its partners, should develop a limited number of indicators to bench- mark and monitor progress toward country-led partnership. Training and Development The World Bank Institute (WBI), in consultation with Regions, should review training and development programs for staff and clients to ensure that they cover negotiation and facilita- tion skills; sensitivity training; and other knowledge and skills needed to foster effective part- nerships. 30 Annex 1 Criteria for the Transfer of Leadership to Countries In recent years, many donors, both bilateral and multilateral, have expressed a strong prefer- ence for developing countries to assume responsibility for their affairs. This is certainly the case with aid coordination at the local level. Prominent among the statements in this area are the 1986 OECD/DAC Guiding Principles for Aid Coordination with Developing Countries, which call for recipient governments to be "at the center of the process." The Bank's own OD 14.30, Aid Coordination Groups, issued in 1989, states unequivocally that "the responsibility for aid coordination rests primarily with the recipient government." The more recent Bank paper on partnership (World Bank 1998e) reiterates this point, and the January 1999 C DF document expresses the Bank's desire for the country to be in the "driver's seat" (Wolfensohn 1999:9). A recent statement by the Ministers of Development in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom reaffirms their governments' desire to see the recipient governments in the "driver's seat."I The results of the findings of the main report confirm that recipient governments want to play a major leadership role in aid coordination. Representa- tives of many of these governments subscribe to the proposition that the aid paradigm should be shifted from "recipients of aid" to "managers of aid." Yet 40 years after the first cornsor- tium for India was convened, and 30 years after many of the CGs were established, only recently have portents of fundamental change in the management of aid coordination at the country level been emerging in a few countries. There are still very few developing countries in the proverbial "driver's seat" of aid coordination vehicles. The time has come for a real change-rapid, but deliberate and finely executed. A logical and critical step in this direction is for the Bank, in consultation with other donors and affected countries, to give meaning to the concept of country responsibility. It should work with its development partners to imple- ment measures for the transfer of the leadership role for CG meetings to the recipient govern- ments. This is not to suggest that the Bank should disengage itself either from the aid coordination process or from maintaining and strengthening its country programs. By giving the country a chance to exert leadership in aid coordination, the Bank will be in a better position to sharpen its focus on, and assist in the building of, long-term country capacity, in concert with both CDF and OECD/DAC principles. The Bank currently chairs CG meetings for about 60 countries over the course of 2 or 3 years.2 A number of these meetings relate to countries with relatively high aid dependency and weak institutions. But this group also includes countries where aid dependency is rnini- mal and public sector management is experienced and functioning at a relatively high level of competence. In determining what criteria might be used to guide the timing of the transfer of leadership for CGs and other aid coordination fora to the recipients, one obvious possibility would be the lending classification of a country by the Bank-IBRD, Blend, or International Development Association (IDA). This classification provides a measure of the country's per capita income, but not of its institutional strength. Country Policy and Institutional Assess- ment (CPIA) ratings constitute a potentially more relevant criterion for guiding the transfer process. When per capita income is compared with CPIA ratings, however, some anomalies are apparent. For example, Ethiopia, with a per capita income of $100, scores higher on the CPIA than countries with much higher per capita incomes, such as Bolivia, Romania, and Zimbabwe. Applying the criterion of public sector management, one of the components of the CPIA, as a measure of the country's institutional strength also yields some anomalous ratings. For example, Egypt, with highly educated civil servants, scores lower on public sector man- agement than Eritrea and Mauritania. Ethiopia scores as high as the Philippines, and both countries score highest among countries with CGs. 31 THE DR[VE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Table A1.1 Groupings of CG Countries by Official Development Assistance (ODA) as Percentage of GNP CG 1998 1993-97 Group countries' per capita (US$) IBRD Blend IDA as % GNP (US$ m) ODA group Group I -(1-2 years) Croatia 4,520 X 0.6 ODA as % of GNP (0.0 - 4.9%) India 430 X 0.6 Indonesia 680 X 0.8 Nigeria 300 X 0.8 Philippines 1,050 X 1.5 Guatamala 1,640 X 1.6 Pakistan 480 X 1.7 Belize 2,610 X 3.6 El Salvador 1,850 X 3.7 Vietnam 330 X 4.0 Egypt 1,290 X 4.1 Macedonia 1,290 X 4.4 Sri Lanka 810 X 4.4 Bangladesh 350 X 4.8 Group 2 - (3-5 years) Ukraine 850 X 0.4 Romania 1,390 X 0.7 Bulgaria 1,230 X 1.6 Moldova 410 X 1.8 Azerbaijan 490 X 2.9 Tajikistan 350 X 3.5 Papua New Guinea 890 X 7.1 ODA as % of GNP (5.0 - 9.9%) Zimbabwe 610 X 7.9 Honduras 730 X 9.2 Kyrgyz Republic 350 X 9.3 Kenya 330 X 9.4 Albania 810 X 9.6 Nepal 210 X 9.6 Group 3 - (5-10 years) Ghana 390 X 10.0 ODA as % of GNP (> 10.0%) Guinea 540 X 10.8 Bolivia 1,000 X 11.5 C6te d'lvoire 700 X 12.2 Senegal 530 X 12.4 Madagascar 260 X 13.0 Cambodia 280 X 14.8 Ethiopia 100 X 15.2 Uganda 320 X 15.4 Eritreah 200 X 19.0 Haiti 410 X 21.4 Tanzania 210 X 22.1 Mongolia 400 X 23.3 Guyana 770 X 24.9 Mauritania 410 X 27.6 Malawi 200 X 28.4 Zambia 330 X 29.8 Nicaraugua 390 X 38.0 Rwanda 230 X 51.6 Mozambique 210 X 76.2 Bosnia & Herzegovina n.a. X n.a. CGCED' n.a. n.a. West Bank & Gaza n.a. n.a. a. Countries with Bank-led, apex-level CG meetings, development forums, donors' meetings, or investors' conferences. b. Country with only one apex meeting, 1992-99. c. Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, organized and chaired by the World Bank, with 13 member countries, including Guyana and Haiti (Haiti has irs own CG as well). During 1993-97 the ODA ratios of CGCED countries ranged from 24.9 and 21.4 percent for Guyana and Haiti, respectively (as shown in the table), to 0.4 percent for Trinidad and Tobago. 32 CRITERIA FOR TRANSFER OF LEADERSHIP TO COUNTRIES Box A1.1. Building Aid Management Capacity in Kazakhstan and Vietnam In 1992 the Bank made was significant delay in and for establishing a system to include the line an IDF grant to contracting the long-term foundation for the cur- ministries and the prov- Kazakhstan's aid coordi- adviser, partly because of a rent aid coordination inces. It also sought to nation unit, known as lack of familiarity by NAFI agency. The grant was contribute to a "process" the National Agency for with the Bank's procedures, followed by a technical of improving government Foreign Investment as well as numerous reor- assistance loan (LN3642- aid coordination. (NAFI), in the Ministry ganizations of NAFI, and KZ), which supports aid The evaluation report of Finance, to assist in staff turnover. Once on coordination and man- points out that while the designing and improving board, however, the adviser agement. project was successful in the system of manage- established a strong work- In Vietnam, the UNDP strengthening the capac- ment and coordination of ing relationship with the initiated a three-year ity of FERD, it had not external assistance. The staff of NAFI, created a da- technical assistance achieved all of its origi- grant was designed to fi- tabase of externally fi- project in 1993. The rial, ambitious goals for nance the costs of a long- nanced technical assistance project provided a long- the overall aid manage- term aid coordination and investment projects, term adviser, short-term rnent system. However, adviser on management and worked with NAFI consultants, training, the project helped the of external assistance, a staff to prepare documents study tours, and some government prepare number of short-term for the first and second CG equipment for the For- documentation for the consultants, training and meetings. Interviews with eign Economic Relations first donor meeting and study tours for NAFI former NAFI staff and Department (FERD). Al- subsequent CG meetings. staff, and procurement of management indicate that though stationed at the Source: World Bank data; UNDP equipment and facilities the adviser was appreciated SPC (Central Planning 1996: p. 16. for the aid coordination for his knowledge of the Commission), the project unit. subject, his ability to trans- established ambitious The impact of the fer knowledge and skills in goals for improving the i grant was mixed. There coordinating foreign aid, overall aid management Another possible criterion is ODA as a percentage of GNP. Following this criterion, coun- tries with currently active CGs and other Bank-led apex-level aid coordination meetings, such as development forums, donors' meetings, and investors conferences, were classified into three groups (see table A1.1). * Group one comprises countries with ODA of up to 4.9 percent of their GNP. * Group two comprises countries with ODA of 5-9.9 percent of their GNP. * Group three comprises countries with ODA of 10 percent or more of their GNP. These groupings by ODA ratio represent an attempt to classify countries by their readiness for leadership transfer. This is a crude criterion, however, and it should be tempered by an in- depth analysis of commitment and capacity in each case. Group One: This group comprises such consortia as those for India and Pakistan, which go back 40 years in aid coordination fora chaired by the Bank. The group as a whole scores relatively highly on public sector management and on overall CPIA ratings. Three of the countries in this group also have relatively high levels of GNP per capita, and in all cases ODA as a percentage of GNP is below 5 percent, and in three cases it is below 1 percent. There would appear to be no reason that transfer of leadership to the countries in this group could not occur as soon as possible, and certainly within a two-year period. Group Two: This group is primarily composed of countries in transition from centrally planned economies and some long-standing aid coordination beneficiaries, such as Kenya and Nepal. In four of the countries in this group, ODA as a percentage of GNP is below 2 percent. In only three is it higher than 9 percent, but still below the ceiling of 10 percent for this group. A period no longer than five years is suggested for the transfer of leadership to the countries in this group.3 33 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Group Three: With one exception, countries in this group are IDA countries, and the majority are in Sub-Saharan Africa. They are characterized by the high aid-dependency syndrome-in some instances, ODA exceeds 50 percent of GNP. Surprisingly, the overall CPIA ratings for countries in this group are identical to those in group one, which may indicate that at least some countries in the group have the capacity to assume responsibility for aid group meetings. Transfer of respon- sibility for countries in this group would be completed within a 5-to-10 year period, although some countries, such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, may wish to take on this responsibility much sooner. The implication of the suggested approach is that by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, if not before, all formerly Bank-managed aid group meetings will be managed by the countries themselves. This will bring to conclusion approximately 50 years of constructive and fruitful efforts by the Bank to initiate, organize, convene, and chair aid group meetings. The Bank can take a great pride in its accomplishments over this period. Through the mechanisms of the aid group meetings, it has helped to bring many bilateral donors into the aid coordination process and to mobilize vast amounts of aid money. In the process, it has assisted many countries in establishing the capacity to prioritize their national goals, strengthen government institutions, and introduce proper procurement and accounting practices, to mention but a few achievements. The Bank has also given impetus to the private sector, both local and international, as a critical partner in the development process. Finally, it has put some rather controversial issues, such as gender, environment, governance, and corruption, on both national and international agendas, where the debate on these matters will most likely intensify in the years to come. But it is also the time for the Bank to demon- strate its commitment to the notion that ultimate responsibility for the country's affairs rests with the country itself. It is a critical step toward enhancing ownership, building national capacity, and emphasizing the principle of joint accountability. In order to assist the recipient government in assuming sole responsibility for aid coordina- tion, an adequate enabling environment must prevail. This means: * A flexible technical assistance mechanism should be created to support the government's efforts to identify needs and sources of training and expertise for aid coordination. Since both the Bank and the UNDP are involved in supporting aid coordination mechanisms in different countries, it would be helpful if the two institutions would harmonize their activi- ties by jointly developing a strategy to help individual countries build their capacities for aid coordination. Two case studies on technical assistance provided to countries to build aid management institutions, one in Kazakhstan, provided by the Bank, and the other one in Vietnam, provided by the UNDP, showed considerable similarity in the design of the assis- tance and in the final outcomes (see box A1.1). One option would be to combine a portion of the Institutional Development Fund with similar funding from the UNDP. * Aid coordination fora, particularly CGs, should place on their agendas a review of aid coordination at the local level, which is the most critical aspect of aid coordination. The CGs and the RTs were never meant to be a substitute for local capacity. The weakness of many apex aid fora is the absence of local capacity for follow-up on the ground. The purpose of the review will be to look into the strengths and weaknesses of local aid coordi- nation and measures needed, or technical assistance required, to enhance the government's capacity to coordinate aid more effectively. * In countries where the Bank will be phasing out its role as chair of the CG, consideration should be given to placing a Bank staff member in a central ministry, such as the ministry of finance, for up to one year to assist the government during the leadership transfer and to ensure continuity of the process. 34 Annex 2 Notes on Methods and Sources Literature Review and Staff Interviews The Bibliography includes external and internal literature reviewed and Annex 6 presents a list of Bank staff interviewed. The findings from these sources are reported in more detail in the "Phase 1 Report," which is available from the Corporate Evaluation and Methods Group of the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank (OEDCM). Survey Questionnaires Questionnaire surveys were designed and administered to five sets of aid coordination participants: (1) World Bank staff; (2) recipient government officials; (3) local donor represen- tatives in recipient countries; (4) donor agency headquarters officials; and (5) INGOs. Survey responses were received from a total of 133 respondents: 43 World Bank staff, 20 recipient government officials, 54 local donor representatives, 15 donor headquarters officials (10 bi- lateral and 5 multilateral), and 1 INGO representative.' The respective survey instruments are available from OEDCM. The first three questionnaires were composed primarily of multiple-choice questions, in which the respondent was asked to choose from a 5-point scale. These were supplemented by several questions that requested brief narrative responses. Each questionnaire was structured around the following categories of questions: * Goals for aid coordination * Relevance and efficacy (impacts, outcomes, outputs) of aid coordination * Instruments/inputs for aid coordination * Efficiency or cost-effectiveness of aid coordination * Aid coordination at the country level-aid management issues and resource utilization issues * Role of the government in aid coordination. Respondents were also asked to indicate up to three lessons from experience with aid coordina- tion and up to three strengths and three shortcomings of the World Bank in such work. The survey instrument sent to donor headquarters and INGOs was comprised of seven key issues regarding aid coordination, with narrative sub-questions under each issue. The issues included: * Breadth of stakeholder participation * Substantive agendas * Resource mobilization * CG/RT administrative issues * Barriers to effective aid coordination * Future issues for aid coordination * Prospects for recipient country management of the process. This instrument was jointly designed by OEDCM and the Management Development and Governance Division of the UNDP, which managed the UNDP evaluation of the Round Table mechanism. Workshops The review sponsored two headquarters-based action learning workshops on Aid Coordi- nation in an Era of Partnership. The first workshop, on January 27, 1999, involved Bank staff; the second, on February 10-11, 1999, involved 19 senior recipient government officials from 35 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK as many countries.2 Both workshops discussed the results of questionnaire survey responses and sought to draw from the participants their views concerning the strengths and weaknesses of aid coordination processes and the Bank's role, and what could be improved. The second workshop, conducted over two full days, yielded particularly rich insights generated by inter- action among the participants, most of whom were senior officials with significant opera- tional or oversight responsibilities for aid management and coordination. Two skilled facilitators contributed substantially to workshop effectiveness. The proceedings of this workshop are available from OEDCM. Field Visits and Country Assistance Evaluations Field visits to Ethiopia, Ghana, and Vietnam were conducted during April and May of 1999. These countries were selected because of their relatively high degree of aid dependency and because in recent years they have embarked on a range of aid coordination initiatives. They are also CDF pilot countries. Reports on these country visits are available from OEDCM. The review drew on the findings of Country Assistance Evaluations (CAEs) conducted by OED in 1999 to Burkina Faso, India, Tanzania, and Uganda. These CAEs entailed field visits, which employed question protocols prepared as part of the aid coordination review. Country Assistance Strategy Review To supplement the above sources of information, as well as to provide an indication of the way in which the Bank is incorporating aid coordination and partnership in its own planning and strategy documents, sets of the two most recent CAS documents were reviewed for a sample of 15 countries. This review is summarized in Annex 4. Collaboration with Other Donor Agencies The review benefited from close collaboration with several other donor partners. In addi- tion to the already mentioned UNDP evaluation, periodic discussion and exchange of drafts and comments occurred between OED and the donor agencies of Norway and Switzerland, as well as the Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD. The intellectual and finan- cial assistance from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) made invalu- able contributions to the workshops held in early 1999.3 The OED UNDP reviews and relevant OECD/DAC experience provided the main input to a Development Partnership Forum, held at the OECD, December 6-8, 1999. The implications of the reviews for the development community were discussed by senior donor agency and recipient country officials and civil society representatives. Data on CGs The Bankwide source of information on CGs is the External Affairs Vice-Presidency (EXT), which is responsible for the Bank's Paris office, where a majority of CG meetings are held, as well as liaison with the EU, OECD/DAC, and the U.N. EXT compiles an annual calendar of aid group meetings convened and chaired, or co-chaired, by the Bank.4 Information for the calendar is supplied by Bank Regions to EXT. In the course of the review, some errors and omissions in the calendar were identified. Thus, while the data presented in the main text on CG meetings are believed to be a reasonable representation of orders of magnitude, some errors probably remain.5 36 Annex 3 Aid Dependency, Transaction Costs, and Coordination Costs Aid Dependency Notwithstanding declining ODA, aid dependency in low-income countries remains high. The importance of aid coordination is clearly greatest in these countries because they tend to be the most aid dependent, and donors consequently have a greater impact on the develop- ment process. Data from 116 developing countries for 1996-97 confirm an inverse associa- tion between aid dependency and GNP per capita, as shown in the scatter diagram in figure A3. 1. The logarithmic curve fitted to these points suggests that a 1 percent decline in GNP per capita is associated with a 6 percent increase in aid dependency (defined as the ratio of ODA to recipient Gross Domestic Product, or GDP).' Table A3.1 shows values for selected groupings of countries and individual countries repre- sented in figure A3.1. For example, the 20 mostly highly aid-dependent countries, with an average GNP per capita of US$369, received (on average) ODA equivalent to 26 percent of their GNP, in contrast to the 58 countries with the least aid dependence, with an average ODA to GNP ratio of 1.0 percent and an average GNP per capita of US$2,313. The impor- tance of, and setting for, aid coordination must differ radically for the two groups of countries. Figure A3.1: ODA as a Percentage of GDP and per Capita GNP, 116 Countries, 1996-97 0.7- , 0.6 * o0.5 . 0.4- y = -6.lLn(x) + 49.2 2 R =0.36 ¢ 0.3- 0.2- 0.1 ^ 0 ' :.C i+*±dSdb1?,.t*.+_.*:t & .+* -0.1- 0.00 1,000.00 2,000.00 3,000.00 4,000.00 5,000.00 Average 1996-97 Per Capita GNP Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, electronic database. 37 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Table A3.1: Aid Dependency and GNP per Capita, 116 Countries, 1996-97 Averages GNP per capita (US$) Country grouping and selected countries ODAIGDP (%) (GNP via Atlas method) Average for 116 countries 7.9 1,421 Average for top 20 countries (ranked by ODA/GNP in descending order) 26.0 369 Average for top 58 countries 14.7 529 Average for bottom 58 countries 1.0 2,313 Top 20 countries (descending order) 1. Guinea-Bissau 58.70 245 2. Mozambique 49.45 90 3. Rwanda 41.60 200 4. Nicaragua 39.30 405 5. Guyana 30.80 755 6. Cape Verde 27.50 1,090 7. Mauritania 25.15 460 8. Malawi 24.05 200 9. Mongolia 23.25 375 10. Bhutan 23.15 400 11. Chad 20.60 200 12. Congo, Rep. 18.90 640 13. Mali 18.90 250 14. Lao PDR 18.85 390 15. Tanzania 18.25 170 16. Zambia 17.35 405 17. Madagascar 16.70 245 18. Comoros 15.95 430 19. Burkina Faso 15.95 230 20. Niger 15.90 200 Bottom S countries (descending order) 1. Venezuela 0.05 3,220 2. Turkey 0.05 3,010 3. Belize 0.00 2,740 4. Costa Rica -0.05 2,640 5. Malaysia -0.40 4,490 Note: Aid dependency is defined as ODA as a percentage of GDP. While some extreme values (for example, 59 percent aid dependency for Guinea-Bissau and 50 percent aid dependency for Mozambique) undoubtedly reflect underestimation of GNP, the difference in aid dependency between the top 58 countries and the bottom half (14.7 percent vs. 1.0 percent) is dramatic, as are the individual differences between the top 20 countries and the bottom 5. Regional variations are also striking. Of 53 countries with an aid dependency ratio above 5 percent of GNP, 33 are in AFR, 4 in EAP, 6 in ECA, 6 in LCR, 2 in MNA, and 2 in SAR. Of the 63 countries with a ratio below 5 percent, only 8 are in AFR. 38 AID DEPENDENCY, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND COORDINATION COSTS Real Aid Disbursements per Capita While aid dependency remains high in low-income countries, aid disbursements per capita have been declining in real terms in most countries since the early 1990s. Table A3.2 shows this to be the case for low-income countries as a whole and, with the small exception of Nicaragua in 1996, true for the sample of individual countries shown in the table. Table A3.2. ODA Disbursements per Capita (US dollars, adjusted by 1997 IBRD/IDA loan commitment deflator) All least- Other low- developed income Year countries countries Ethiopia Ghana India Nicaragua Philippines Tanzania 1977 22.6 2.9 6.3 17.1 2.9 27.1 7.8 37.8 1978 24.6 3.1 6.3 17.6 2.8 25.5 8.8 38.7 1979 28.9 3.5 8.0 24.7 3.2 65.6 8.8 50.2 1980 32.5 4.6 8.5 26.8 4.8 120.4 9.4 54.7 1981 29.1 4.3 9.4 19.3 4.2 75.3 11.3 53.7 1982 29.0 3.9 7.2 17.6 3.3 58.7 9.4 48.9 1983 25.4 3.7 11.3 12.8 3.4 54.1 10.9 39.2 1984 23.6 3.6 11.1 22.9 2.9 46.6 9.1 33.5 1985 25.0 3.3 20.0 19.0 2.5 38.3 10.1 26.6 1986 26.9 3.8 16.2 31.7 2.9 51.1 18.5 33.3 1987 29.2 3.7 15.0 33.7 2.3 44.3 13.8 41.6 1988 29.3 4.6 21.7 44.1 2.6 65.0 14.6 43.9 1989 29.9 4.8 16.0 52.0 2.2 68.4 14.1 37.5 1990 33.8 4.7 20.4 38.8 1.7 88.9 21.3 49.0 1991 32.0 5.5 20.9 58.1 3.2 213.1 17.0 43.1 1992 31.2 5.7 23.5 38.4 2.8 166.4 27.1 49.5 1993 27.2 4.9 20.5 38.2 1.6 81.0 22.7 34.0 1994 28.7 6.4 19.6 32.8 2.5 141.8 15.8 33.7 1995 28.7 5.9 15.8 38.3 1.9 151.7 12.9 29.8 1996 24.1 5.7 14.7 37.5 2.1 213.7 12.7 29.5 1997 22.1 4.5 10.6 27.4 1.8 90.8 9.4 30.7 Donor Diffusion in Ghana and Aid Transactions Costs Tables A3.3-A3.5 show that the average number of sectors per donor in Ghana increased sharply from 1984-86 to 1990-92, and continued to increase, but by less, over the next four years, to 1994-96. Over the decade, all of the increase was among bilateral donors, for whom the average number of sectors per donor increased from 19 to 26 during the last half of the 1980s and to 29 by 1994-96. But the average number of sectors per multilateral donor de- clined from 22 to 16 over the same period. Donor commitments per sector, after increasing markedly between 1984-86 and 1990-92, declined somewhat over the next four years. The same pattern holds for both bilateral and multilateral donors. Thus, while the picture is ambiguous for multilateral donors, the evidence of deconcentration or diffusion of bilateral donors among sectors is clear, with a continuous increase in sectors per donor, but a decline in commitments per sector in the 1990s. 39 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Table A3.3. Ghana, 1984-86, Commitments by Sector and Donor (annual averages, US dollars '000) Total Sector commitments Commitment per Donors sectors (USD '000) sector (USD '000) AfDF 19 393,571 20,714 All donors, total 88 3,213,913 36,522 Australia 3 3,958 1,319 Canada 46 237,007 5,152 CEC 26 201,981 7,769 DAC countries, total 83 1,013,861 12,215 EU members, total 50 400,592 8,012 France 10 80,230 8,023 G7 total 74 947,182 12,800 Germany 13 94,210 7,247 IDA 24 1,604,500 66,854 Italy 3 120 40 Japan 30 197,824 6,594 Multilateral, total 42 2,200,052 52,382 Netherlands 33 60,201 1,824 Norway 10 2,550 255 United Kingdom 21 165,840 7,897 United States 18 171,960 9,553 Note: Average: sectors per donor, 20; sectors per DAC, 19; sectors per multilateral, 22. Average sector commitmentt: per donor, 247,224; per DAC, 110,531; per multilateral, 999,035. Source: OECD/DAC data. 40 AID DEPENDENCY, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND COCRDINATION COSTS Table A3.4. Ghana, 1990-92, Commitments by Sector and Donor (annual averages, US dollars '000) Total Sector commitments Commitment per Donors sectors (USD '000) sector (USD '000) AfDF 20 515,620 25,781 All donors, total 111 8,062,750 72,637 Australia 5 3,700 740 Austria 6 7,220 1,203 Belgium 7 17,200 2,457 Canada 41 422,640 10,308 CEC 29 198,820 6,856 DAC countries, total 107 3,735,930 34,915 Denmark 24 118,490 4,937 EU members, total 94 2,165,560 23,038 Finland 18 9,570 532 France 30 496,990 16,566 G7 total 99 3,209,090 32,415 Germany 28 466,350 16,655 IDA 43 3,550,050 82,559 IFAD 5 62,350 12,470 Italy 24 78,910 3,288 Japan 40 688,870 17,222 Multilateral, total 60 4,326,840 72,114 Netherlands 42 292,680 6,969 Norway 7 40,780 5,826 Switzerland 16 37,200 2,325 United Kingdom 58 678,080 11,691 United States 37 377,220 10,195 Note: Average: sectors per donor, 25; sectors per DAC, 26; sectors per multilateral, 23. Average sector commitment: per dlonor, 424,355; per DAC, 245,922; per multilateral, 1,376,007. Source: OECD/DAC data. 41 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Table A3.5. Ghana, 1991-96, Commitments by Sector and Donor (annual averages, US dollars '000) Total Sector commitments Commitment per Donors sectors (USD '000) sector (USD '000) AfDF 5 167,900 33,580 All donors, total 125 7,709,120 61,673 Australia 15 2,400 160 Austria 8 100,050 12,506 Belgium 28 990 35 Canada 59 223,530 3,789 CEC 30 800,910 26,697 DAC countries, total 119 3,912,310 32,877 Denmark 38 231,710 6,098 EU members, total 104 1,667,090 16,030 Finland 13 820 63 France 34 128,930 3,792 G7 total 108 3,240,820 30,008 Germany 28 575,540 20,555 IDA 34 2,738,040 80,531 IFAD 9 89,900 9,989 Italy 17 10,970 645 Japan 46 1,629,030 35,414 Multilateral, total 64 3,796,750 59,324 Netherlands 35 299,980 8,571 Norway 22 5,510 250 Spain 5 25,000 5,000 Switzerland 18 4,960 276 United Kingdom 56 293,010 5,232 United States 38 379,820 9,995 Note: Average: sectors per donor, 27; sectors per DAC, 29; sectors per multilateral, 16. Average sector commitment: per donor, 385,456; per DAC, 277,248; per multilateral, 998,613. Source: OECD/DAC data. 42 AID DEPENDENCY, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND COORDINATION COSTS Coordination Costs Aid coordination activities incur costs. There are the direct costs of staff time, publications, travel, meeting facilities, and so forth. In addition, there are the opportunity costs of the partici- pants. Calculation of even the direct costs of aid coordination activities is not a straightforward matter. One attempt estimated the cost to the Bank of providing aid coordination services "for a sample country with a CG and modest field representation" at 2.65 staffyears, including allow- ance for ESW and field office and regional management time (World Bank 1984: 14). Applying the current average "fully loaded" cost of US$200,000 for a Bank staff member to this estimate yields a total cost of $26.5 million a year. However, Bank financial data on the direct costs of its aid coordination services were reported at $2 million in FY98, far lower tha-n the costs implied by the staffyear estimate.2 As shown in figure A3.2, these costs have fluctuated fairly sharply around a modest rising trend over the last nine years. When Bank support for the SPA and for UNDP-sponsored RTs is netted out, however, the yearly fluctuations are reduced considerably, as shown by the solid line in the figure. Figure A3.3, which shows reported cost to the Bank per aid coordination "event," provides some indication of direct unit costs. A modest rising trend is observable, but this is about half as steep in relative terms as the increase shown in figure A3.2. While this observation is not inconsistent with a possible deterioration in aid coordination "efficiency," it could also reflect increased scope and complexity of aid coordination agendas over the decade. The most striking aspect of these data is their relatively modest magnitude when com- pared with total Core Development Services provided by the Bank (services in support of lending operations and nonlending services), which amounted to alnmost US$900 million in FY95. However, there are two sources of underestimation: first, the data undoubtedly underestimate the portion of joint product cost (such as ESW) that could be attributed to aid coordination. But even if these are off by two- or threefold, the magnitudes would still be relatively small. Second, a broad definition of "aid coordination cost" would include at least some portion of the cost of co-financing services. The inclusion of this element would bring the reported direct cost of aid coordination services in FY96 to US$11.1 million. Figure A3.2: World Bank Aid Coordination Support: Direct Cost 6 5 ._ 4 -3 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Fiscal Years Note: dashed line includes support to regional and RT meetings. 43 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHlIP: AID COORIDtNATION AND THE WORLD BANK Figure A3.3: World Bank Aid Coordination Support: Cost Per Event 120 100 / \ , 80 /% 6 60- 20 - 20 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Fiscal Years Note: dashed line includes support to regional and RT meetings. One survey question asked respondents to assess the Bank's efforts to reduce the cost of aid coordination through such measures as keeping meetings outside the country to a mini- mum, employing electronic communications, and utilizing local resources to help prepare for meetings. The results shown in figure A3.4 indicate that respondents see the Bank as being only modestly effective in this role. Other donors were the most critical, with 65 per- cent of respondents either neutral or negative. An issue for in-country participants in aid coordination mechanisms is the opportunity cost of participation. The countries visited as part of the review-Ethiopia, Ghana, and Vietnam- have embarked on a path of increasingly intensive in-country aid coordination efforts. Interviewees were asked if they thought the benefits yielded by these efforts justified the costs. While responses were generally positive, several interlocutors indicated that they had coped with expanding aid coordination activity by becoming selective as to which groups and meet- ings they participated in, and others suggested that it was time to consider some streamlining of mechanisms. Figure A3.4: Efficiency Role of Bank to reduce costs 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Not important Very imporrant * Staff I Government 0 Donors 44 Annex 4 Analysis of Bank CAS Documents Methodology OED undertook a review of the two most recent CASs for 15 selected countries, which are listed at the end of this Annex.' Eight criteria were identified for the review (yes/no answers): * Coherence of CAS with country national strategy. * Aid coordination is an explicit element or objective of the CAS. * Aid coordination is explicitly linked to development effectiveness. * CAS discusses Bank's comparative advantage or selectivity. * CAS discusses role of government in aid coordination and aid management. * CAS discusses government capacity for aid coordination and aid management. * CAS discusses Bank efforts to build government capacity for aid coordination/aid manage- ment. * CAS discusses harmonization of donor procedures. A ninth supplementary criterion-discussion of the role of the resident mission (RM) in aid coordination-was considered in addition to the set of eight principal criteria. CASs were also reviewed for discussion of cooperation with other institutions (required by CAS guidelines) and discussion of specific aid coordination frameworks and activities. All CASs scored positively on both these criteria, so they were not included in the comparative scoring described below. A final criterion examined was the presence of an "other donors" column in the CAS Matrix Annex. However, of the 30 CASs, 9 had no matrix. Of the remaining 21 CASs, more than half (13) did not have a column on activities of other donors. The overall top scorer in these ratings, Nepal, had such a column only in the second CAS. Tanzania, the second-high- est scorer, did not have the column in either CAS. Cote d'Ivoire and Pakistan, among the lowest scorers, each had the matrix only in the second CAS, and neither had a column. Mali and Kenya each had columns in the second CAS only. Results of Review The first set of results shown is for the older set of CASs (positive responses out of total number of criteria). The two columns refer to (a) the eight principal criteria listed in para- graph 1 and (b) including the ninth criterion (role of the resident mission). 45 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Eight criteria/CAS Nine criteria/CAS C6te d'lvoire: 1/8 (13%) C6te d'Ivoire: 2/9 (22%) Kenya: 2/8 (25%) Kenya: 2/9 (22%) Pakistan: 2/8 (25%) Pakistan: 2/9 (22%) Georgia: 3/8 (38%) Georgia: 4/9 (44%) Mali: 4/8 (50%) Mali: 4/9 (44%) Ethiopia: 4/8 (50%) Ethiopia: 4/9 (44%) Malawi: 4/8 (50%) Indonesia: 4/9 (44%) Indonesia: 4/8 (50%) Vietnam: 4/9 (44%) Vietnam: 4/8 (63%) Ghana: 5/9 (56%) Yemen 4/8 (50%) Malawi: 5/9 (56%) Ghana: 5/8 (63%) Yemen: 5/9 (56%) Bangladesh: 5/8 (63%) Bangladesh: 519 (56%) Mauritania: 6/8 (75%) Mauritania: 6/9 (67%) Tanzania: 6/8 (75%) Tanzania: 7/9 (78%) Nepal: 8/8 (100%) Nepal: 8/9 (89%) Score results for latest CAS only (positive responses out of total number of criteria): Eight criteria/CAS Nine criteria/CAS Mali: 3/8 (38%) Mali: 4/9 (44%) Pakistan: 3/8 (38%) Pakistan: 4/9 (44%) C6te d'Ivoire: 4/8 (50%) C6te d'Ivoire: 5/9 (56%) Georgia: 4/8 (50%) Georgia: 5/9 (56%) Ethiopia: 5/8 (63%) Ethiopia 5/9 (56%) Mauritania: 5/8 (63%) Indonesia: 5/9 (56%) Indonesia: 5/8 (63%) Mauritania 6/9 (67%) Vietnam: 5/8 (63%) Vietnam: 6/9 (67%) Bangladesh: 5/8 (63%) Bangladesh: 6/9 (67%) Ghana: 6/8 (75%) Kenya: 6/9 (67%) Kenya: 6/8 (75%) Tanzania 6/9 (67%) Tanzania: 6/8 (75%) Ghana 7/9 (78%) Yemen: 6/8 (75%) Yemen: 7/9 (78%) Malawi: 7/8 (88%) Nepal: 7/9 (78%) Nepal: 7/8 (88%) Malawi: 8/9 (89%) 46 ANALYSIS OF BANK CAS DOCUMENTS Score results (for both CASs): Eight criteria/CAS Nine criteria/CAS Cote d'Ivoire: 5/16 (31%) Cote d'Ivoire: 7/18 (39%) Pakistan: 6/16 (38%) Pakistan: 7/18 (39%) Mali: 7/16 (48%) Mali: 8/18 (44%) Georgia: 7/16 (48%) Kenya: 8/18 (44%) Kenya: 8/16 (50%) Georgia: 9/18 (50%) Ethiopia: 9/16 (56%) Ethiopia: 9/18 (50%) Indonesia: 9/16 (56%) Indonesia: 9/18 (50%) Vietnam: 9/16 (56%) Vietnam: 10/18 (56%) Yemen: 10/16 (63%) Bangladesh: 11/18 (61%) Bangladesh: 10/16 (63%) Yemen: 12/18 (67%) Ghana: 11/16 (69%) Ghana: 12/18 (67%) Malawi: 11/16 (69%) Mauritania: 12/18 (67%) Mauritania: 11/16 (69%) Malawi: 13/18 (72%) Tanzania: 12/16 (75%) Tanzania: 13/18 (72%) Nepal: 15/16 (94%) Nepal: 15/18 (83%) Nepal was the overall highest scorer in the review, except for the case of the latest CAS and using nine criteria, in which it was second to Malawi. Depending on which number of criteria was used and which category (oldest, latest, or both CASs), C6te d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, and Pakistan were among the lowest scorers in one category or other. Trends from older to latest CAS (percent positive scores): Eight criteria/CAS Nine criteria/CAS Africa Region (AFR) 1. Cote d'Ivoire 38% to 50% 22% to 56% 2. Ethiopia 50% to 63% 44% to 56% 3. Ghana 63% to 75% 56% to 78% 4. Kenya 25% to 75% 22% to 67% 5. Malawi 50% to 88% 56% to 89% 6. Mali 50% to 38% 44% to 44% 7. Mauritania 75% to 63% 67% to 67% 8. Tanzania 75% to 75% 78% to 67% East Asia Region (EA) 9. Indonesia 50% to 63% 44% to 64% 10. Vietnam 63% to 44% 44% to 67% Europe and Central Asia Region (ECA) 11. Georgia 38% to 50% 44% to 56% Middle East & North Africa Region (MNA) 12. Yemen 50% to 75% 56% to 78% South Asia Region (SAR) 13. Bangladesh 63% to 63% 56% to 67% 14. Nepal 100% to 88% 89% to 89% 15. Pakistan 25% to 38% 22% to 44% 47 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Using eight criteria only, there is an overall positive movement between the older and most recent CASs of 13 percent. On a regional basis, MNA shows the most improvement (25 percent), although this figure should be qualified because only one MNA country was included in the review. The Africa Region has the next highest percentage rate of improvement (16 percent), while ECA and EA are tied at 13 percent. The SAR average shows no change in either direction. Elements of Good Practice Nepal 1996 CAS * Detailed discussion of selectivity. * Lending criteria include IDA's comparative advantage relative to other donors, which means that in some important sectors in Nepal, IDA will not develop new operations. * Acknowledgment that selectivity will be subject to strong internal and external pressures for the Bank to be involved more broadly. * Potential to achieve more lasting results attributed to selectivity, since resources will be used more effectively. - Detailed discussion of coordination with other institutions, including identification of sec- tors where coordination is achieving positive/less positive results. • Notes increasingly active government leadership role with local donors, including initiative in suggesting to donors where they should concentrate future assistance. * Clear emphasis on importance of maintaining and enhancing government and donor aid coordination efforts, including specific recommendations to government (such as maintain- ing proactive role) and to donors (including considering the financing of recurrent costs in high-priority projects/programs). * One of the points on the agenda for Board consideration is "proposed approach to donor coordination." 1998 CAS * Linkage between aid coordination and effectiveness: Weak absorptive capacity is strained by large number of donors and NGOs operating in a piecemeal and uncoordinated manner in-sector. >> Major lesson learned: donor-aided projects have been poorly coordinated, with donors sometimes competing rather than cooperating in aid allocations. Part of problem is that donors have been slow in developing common insistence on good governance at central level. * CAS strategy therefore includes collective donor action to foster the stronger governance needed to reduce waste and mismanagement. * One of the potential risks is lack of donor coordination. * Analysis of impact of aid on government capacity. * Donor assistance has tended to substitute for creation of national capacity to plan and implement. * Government aware of damaging effect on integrity and sustainability of development pro- cess; wants to ensure it takes greater responsibility for shaping /managing it. * CAS matrix has column on "other donors." Tanzania 1994 CAS * Linkage between aid coordination and effectiveness. * Health services are constrained by, among other things, uncoordinated donor activities that often bypass the ministry. * A group of government project coordinators is working with encouragement of the resident mission (RM) to exchange ideas on project implementation. 48 ANALYSIS OF BANK CAS DOCUMENTS * Integrated sectoral strategy approach already showing very positive results in overall pro- gram implementation and donor coordination in roads sector. In interest of increasing aid effectiveness, IDA is channeling foreign exchange through a market-based allocation mechanism and is urging other donors to do the same (counted as attempt at harmonization of donor procedures). * Selectivity: > Integrated sectoral strategies imply that governments and donors will need to agree on which donor should be responsible for assisting in specific sectors and subsectors. 1997 CAS * Selectivity * One of lessons learned: Bank did not work closely enough with government and other donors to reduce number of overlapping projects in portfolio and focus attention on core activities. * Government capacity, and efforts to build capacity. > Success of Bank program will depend on lead taken by government in setting develop- ment priorities and its ability to coordinate the activities of donors. Bank aims to build needed capacity in areas critical for sound economic management, including building capacity for policy analysis in Ministries of Finance and Planning. MAlawi 1996 CAS * Selectivity • AIDS/HIV activities currently adequately funded by other donors, but Bank would be re- sponsive to request for help should situation change. * No new PSD operations foreseen, but, should funding from other donors not materialize, Bfank may be asked for support of a technical assistance operation to accelerate privatization. - Government capacity * Previous regimes created competing structures representing central ministries. New gov- ernment believes in decentralization and is currently evaluating, with help from donors, the best approach. * Government (GOM) encouraging Bank to seek input from various segments of society in formulating its assistance strategy. * At 1995 CG, GOM announced intent to establish a monitoring capability in the Ministry of Finance to coordinate achievement of deadlines for project policy conditions and iniple- mentation targets. * Cooperation with others * Importance of donor community in Malawi demonstrated by impact of 18-month suspen- sion of aid, starting in 1992, which helped inaugurate democratic reform. * Bank and IMF have aimed to coordinate technical assistance to central ministries (Finance, Customs, Reserve Bank) although currently, "IMF, donors and Bank may together be inad- vertently overloading the central ministries with expatriate advisers, detracting from Local capacity building." * Bank, through CG chairmanship and its RM, has played leading role in donor community. Participates in monthly meetings organized by UNDP for U.N. family in field, as well as weekly coordination meetings organized by UNDP for ambassadors/high-level representa- tives. Meetings are highly productive forums for decisions on issues such as donor response to drought. 1998 CAS * Coordination and selectivity * Following transition to democracy, there was significant increase in number of do- nors, particularly concentrated in agriculture, education, health, and environment sectors. Donor community (with many agencies constrained by HQ mandates) has 49 THE DRLIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK yet to succeed in streamlining interventions to maximize impact and minimize claims on capacity. * Experience of last few years argues for bringing donor community into strategic and in- vestment frameworks, with each donor focusing on areas of comparative advantage. * CAS will pursue "critical cost-cutting themes" including donor coordination. * Need for selectivity in Bank's program has been subject of dialogue with government and other donors in preparing current CAS. Bank efforts will be focused where they have maxi- mum impact, implying no lending interventions where existing projects are not performing well. * Capacity in Malawi, government commitment, donor presence, and Bank capacity will be decisive criteria determining where Bank intervenes. A CAS annex matrix exemplifies Bank's selective approach, showing both Bank and donor contributions to GOM program. * Principle of selectivity will be pursued when responding to GOM in recent request that Bank become involved in funding additional areas. * Bank needs to be catalyst fostering development of cohesive sector strategies and invest- ment programs to provide umbrella for activities of donor community. Longer-term agreed objective is for "a greater streamlining of donor activities." a Government capacity * Due to capacity limitations, lack of adequate strategic frameworks, and desire to maintain aid flows, GOM has not been able to impose coherence on conflicting donor inputs. * Lesson learned: inadequately coordinated donor interventions have strained capacity and delivered sometimes conflicting messages. * GOM is considering strengthening its system of aid management. Donors have decided to reinforce efforts to help GOM develop strategic frameworks and then to work within them. * Linkage of aid coordination with development effectiveness * Donor coordination is very good at one level-CAS provides details of aid coordination frameworks, including various donor groups collaborating toward moving to SIPs in some sectors. * Nevertheless, it is apparent that coordination only partially effective in results. In many sectors, numerous donors are still pursuing individual programs, with great cost to limited Malawi capacity. Yemen 1996 CAS * Aid coordination and selectivity/comparative advantage Donor coordination takes on special meaning in Yemen, where range of problems forces World Bank to be highly selective. >> IDA must not only be catalytic in attracting additional cofinancing, but also must encourage other donors to take lead where they have comparative advantage or special expertise. ,> The Bank is working closely with donors to develop sectoral reform programs. * Linkage between aid coordination and effectiveness: >> Yemen is one of the most water-short countries in world. Addressing serious problems will require well-coordinated effort between government and donors. * Role of resident mission. Opened in January 1995, the resident mission is expected to play key role in aid coordination among local donor representatives. 1999 CAS * Guiding principles for Bank's strategy include selectivity and partnerships. * Lending assistance focused on limited set of priorities makes close collaboration with de- velopment partners essential. * In the CAS areas of emphasis, it is important to move forward in full partnership with both government and all substantial donors in relevant sectors. * In important sectors where there is no Bank lending, Bank will continue to provide TA and 50 ANALYSIS OF BANK CAS DOCUMENTS encourage donors to support sectoral reforms. In some sectors, Bank involvement rnay attract new donors (such as rural access, which has no specific donor support now). * In parallel, resident mission would continue its active role in partnership-building with donor agencies, government representatives, and other relevant organizations through monthly operational discussions and day-to-day liaison. * Major points of contact for Bank donors and government agencies would be on sectoral basis, to make specific plans for coordinated financial and technical support, to harmonize strategy and policy at sector level, and to address sector-specific implementation problems. * Capacity * Bank will provide initial technical support for Ministry of Planning to play leading role in coordination of donor support. * Bank would encourage Ministry of Planning to take part in such meetings and to take lead in general coordination meetings on cross-cutting issues. Countries Selected for CAS Review: Two Most Recent Reviews Africa Region (AFR) 1. Cote d'Ivoire 6/94 and 8/97 2. Ethiopia 5/95 and 8/97 3. Ghana 4/95 and 8/97 4. Kenya 2/96 and 9/98 5. Malawi 3/96 and 8/98 6. Mali 12/94 and 4/98 7. Mauritania 10/94 a and 5/97 8. Tanzania 5/94 b and 5/97 c East Asia Region (EA) 9. Indonesia 2/95 and 6/97 d 10. Vietnam 10/95 and 8/98 Europe and Central Asia Region (ECA) 11. Georgia 3/95 and 9/97 Middle East & North Africa Region (MNA) 12. Yemen 1/96 and 5/99 South Asia Region (SAR) 13. Bangladesh 9/95 and 3/98 14. Nepal 4/96 and 11/98 15. Pakistan 8/94f and 11/95g a. SAR Second Integrated Roads Project. b. There was also a Progress Report in 4/96 (not included in this review). c. There was also a Progress Report in 2/99 (not included in this review). d. MOP Agricultural Services Project. e. SAR Rehabilitation Credit. f. MOP Social Action Project (SAP). g. There was also a Progress Report in 4/97 (not included in this review). 51 Annex 5 Evaluative Levels and Criteria for Aid Coordination Box A5.1: Aid Coordination (AC) Evaluative Levels Hierarchy Impacts: Impacts are the Outputs: Immediate: (i) activities, such as CG and ultimate development re- CG chairperson reports related meetings; multi- sults on the ground. Four contain actionable and party and bilateral sectoral main categories of monitorable recommenda- and project-level meetings; broadly accepted "global tions that require partici- working groups and task goals" at the results-on- pants to follow-up and forces; bilateral meetings; the-ground level are: (1) report back to the next phone calls; mail and elec- poverty reduction; (2) fi- meeting. (ii) Agreements tronic communications; nance and private sector are reached regarding aid document exchange; visit- development; (3) human pledges; macroeconomic ing missions development; and (4) en- policy frameworks; global vironmental sustainability. and sectoral public invest- Evidence: Meeting ment and expenditure pro- announcements and Evidence: Country grams; sectoral policy agendas; question- and donor report- issues; donor procedures naire and interview ing, research and and practices. Higher responses; selected evaluations; inde- Level: (i) Donor strategies OED evaluations; pendent research focus in a more coherent such operational studies; question- manner on the country's documents as CASs, naire and interview key development priorities; as relevant. I responses. (ii) donor-supported activi- ties are more selective, bet- Inputs: Financial re- Outcomes: Outcomes ter reflecting the compar- sources, technical expertise are the enabling condi- ative advantage of each do- and management attention ; tions within the country nor; donor procedures and devoted by participants I for achieving results on practices are more consis- (government, Bank, do- the ground or develop- tent; (iii) an adequate nors) ment impacts. Four ma- quantity of aid resources jor categories of are available to the Evidence: (1) Direct outcomes are: (1) policy country. costs (financial and reform; (2) institutional staff time) to the par- capacity (including gov- Evidence: (1) Aide ticipants; (2) Indirect ernance); (3) resource Memoires; Memo- costs: activities un- mobilization (private and randa of Understand- dertaken in part to public); and (4) the state ing; CG chairperson's contribute to AC, of development coopera- reports and press re- such as economic 3 tion among development leases. (2) Question- analyses; number of t partners in the country.' naire and interview donors and projects > ~~~~~~~~responses; country in sector or country Evidence: Country and donor strategies, (reduced effectiveness strategy and budget donor budget and beyond some level); 4 documents; country evaluation docu- number of donors f and donor report- ments; selected OED with in-country pres- i ing, research, and evaluations (such as ence and delegated evaluation docu- CARs); other second- authority; degree of ments; independent ary sources. donor dominance-for research studies; example, one donor questionnaire and Production Process: accounting for over interview responses. Formal and informal AC 50 percent of ODA. 53 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Box A5.2. Evaluative Criteria for Aid Coordination Relevance: AC fora, including being help prepare for meet- • To what extent are AC responsive to partici- ings, and the like? activities relevant to pants? the global goals of (1) * What was the quality of (3) Bank Input Quality: poverty reduction; (2) press releases and con- * To what extent did the finance and private ferences (and other me- resident mission con- sector development; dia events)? tribute to the effec- (3) human develop- * How willing were par- tiveness of the Bank's ment; and (4) environ- ticipants, including gov- AC role? mental sustainability? ernment and other * How well (in quality * To ensure relevance, donors, to engage in a and timeliness) was it how participatory are constructive dialogue on supported by head- AC processes in economic policy issues? quarters in AC func- involving stakeholders On other germane issues tions? (government, donors, such as governance and representatives of civil corruption? Sustainability: To what society and the private extent have AC activities, sector) in preparing (2) Cost-Effectiveness: particularly those in- for and reporting on While one of the objectives country, been regularized meetings, and in of AC is to lower the cost and sustained, as op- ensuring that stake- of delivering aid (for do- posed to being ad hoc holders or their re- nors and for the recipient and sporadic? To what presentatives have a country), aid coordination extent have they focused voice at meetings? itself has a cost. on issues of development * To what extent have AC sustainability? Efficacy: To what extent mechanisms and initia- have AC activities tives lowered or in- Institutional Develop- achieved results at the creased the transactions ment: Have the Bank or impact, outcome, and costs of delivering aid, other donors helped output levels (as de- or left them about the build the government's scribed in Box A5.1)? same? capacity to manage and * To what extent have coordinate aid? What Efficiency: means been adopted to have been the results? (1) Process Efficiency: minimize AC costs-for Substantial, modest, or * What was the quality example, through keep- negligible? Or have other and timeliness of ing meetings outside the practices to circumvent documentation pre- country to an essential weaknesses (such as pared for AC activi- minimum, making opti- separate project imple- ties? mal use of electronic mentation units) had a * How skillful was the communications, utiliz- counterproductive effect chair in moderating ing local resources to on capacity? 54 Annex 6 Informational Interviews (Conducted primarily for January 1999 "Phase 1 Report") 1. Franz Kaps, Senior Adviser, Aid Coordination and Partnerships, ECAVP, March 31, 1998 2. David Pearce, Anchor for Russia, ECCAI, April 2, 1998 3. Oscar de Bruyn Kops, Anchor for Indonesia, EACIQ, April 7, 1998 4. Haven North, Independent Consultant, April 15, 1998 5. Katherine Marshall, Director, Social Policy and Knowledge Management, EASSD, April 16, 1998 6. James Adams, Director for Tanzania and Uganda, AFCO4, April 17, 1998 7. Shahid Javed Burki, Vice-President, LCRVP, April 23, 1998 8. Heidi Hennrich-Hanson, Anchor for Philippines, EACPQ, April 23, 1998 9. Khalil-Zadeh Shirazi, Regional Manager, Strategy and Partnerships, EAPVP, April 28, 1998 10. Pablo Guerrero and James Funna, Program Coordination, Partnerships, SRMPG, May 6, 1998 11. Phyllis Pomerantz, Director for Mozambique and Zambia, AFCO2, May 7, 1998 12. Roy Morey, Director, Washington Office, UNDP, May 7, 1998 13. Alexander Shakow, Deputy Corporate Secretary, May 11, 1998 14. Sarwar Lateef, Senior Adviser, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM), May 12, 1998 15. Mark Baird, Vice-President, Strategy and Resources Management (SRM), May 15, 1998 16. Paul Evans, Political Science Department, Harvard University, May 18, 1998 17. Michael L.O. Stevens, Public Sector Management, PRMPS, May 19, 1998 18. Jean-Marc Pradelle, Conseiller, Club du Sahel, OECD, Paris, May 25, 1998 19. Nicholas Van Praag, Conference Director, European Office, World Bank (EXT), Paris, May 25, 1998 20. Ramond Toye, Press Officer, May 25, 1998 21. Janine Savaux, Conference Officer, May 26, 1998 22. Bernard Wood, Director, Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD), OECD, Paris, May 27, 1998 23. Richard Carey, Deputy Director, DCD/OECD, Paris, May 27-28, 1998 24. Brian Hammond, Head, Reporting Systems Division, DCD/OECD, May 27-28, 1998 25. Arthur Fell, Principal Administrator, DCD/OECD, May 27, 1998 55 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK 26. James Michel, Chairman, Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Paris, May 28, 1998 27. Ross Paul, Capacity Building Unit, Africa Region, July 9, 1998 28. Etienne Baranshamaje, Senior Projects Officer, Africa Region, July 15, 1998 29. Robert Floyd, Task Manager, African Capacity Building Initiative (ACBI), Africa Region, July 21, 1998. 30. Christine Wallich, Director, Corporate Strategy, SRM, July 31, 1998 31. Patti Petesch, Independent Consultant, April 28, 1998/August 10, 1998 32. Kiochi Miyoshi, Resident Representative; Anne Emig, Program Officer for Research; and Barbara Fillip, Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), USA Office, Washington, Au- gust 11, 1998 33. Alfredo Sfeir-Younis, Special Representative, New York U.N. Office, EXT, August 12, 1998 34. G. Shabbir Cheema, Director, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, New York, and other UNDP officials of the Bureaus for Africa, Asia, and Development Policy, November 23, 1998 35. Bradley Babson, EAP (former Resident Representative in Vietnam), December 3, 1998 36. Theodore Ahlers, Country Director for Benin, Niger, and Togo, AFC13, January 5, 1999 37. Stephen Jones, Oxford Policy Management, July 6, 1999. 38. OED: Helen Abadzi, Jayati Datta-Mitra, Asita De Silva, Linda Dove, Poonam Gupta, Timothy Johnston, Luis Landau, Luis Ramirez, Roger Robinson, Gianni Zanini. 56 Annex 7 Management Response OED Review of Aid Coordination and the Role of the World Bank The 1998/99 review by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), plus a parallel evalu- ation of Round Tables by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), were key inputs to the Development Partnership Forum sponsored by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in December 1999. Forum participants strongly affirmed the current climate for change that exists among donors and multilateral develop- ment banks (MDBs), in spite of past failures of aid coordination documented in the OED and UNDP reports (UNDP 1998). The World Bank Group was recognized as one of the leaders of this change through its articulation of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and its promotion of the country-led Poverty Reduction Strategy Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as part of the operationalization of CDF principles. Following the Forum, OED revised the review and its recommendations; Bank Management generally supports these revisions, albeit with some reservations about timing. Management's response to specific OED recommendations is attached. Management believes that the implementation of the CDF approach at the country level by all development partners is the key to improving in-country aid coordination. It is an ap- proach to development in which countries are the leaders and owners of their own develop- ment actions. It emphasizes partnership among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other development actors. The country is in the lead, fully owning the develop- ment agenda, with the Bank and other partners each defining their support in their respective plans. Implementation in IDA-eligible borrowing countries centers on the PRSP that the country prepares in collaboration with the Bank and the IMF, as well as civil society and other development partners. The PRSP translates the principles of the CDF into practical plans for action, and the country's development program forms the basis for partnership at the country level. In terms of the Bank's activities, management considers that efforts to achieve aid coordi- nation must be fully integrated with the Bank's country programs, as set out in the paper on supporting country development prepared for the Development Committee. The paper out- lines the Bank Group's agenda in low-income countries. The Bank, working in partnership with the country and other donors, promotes sustainable growth and poverty reduction through support for improving policies; strengthening institutional capacity; building social and physical infrastructure; improving governance, particularly in financial accountability; and increas- ingly, helping countries implement a global public goods agenda. In low-income countries, the Bank works closely with the IMF, regional development banks, bilateral donors, and others. Increasingly, as the CDF principles are applied, this work is carried out in the context of country-led development partnership-with the country taking the lead in the donor coordi- nation effort around its development program. In addition, the Bank has a significant role in reducing the transaction costs of aid pro- grams to poor countries by strengthening the work it has started with other development agencies and client countries to bring operational policies and procedures into greater conver- gence. In this respect the recent integration of the Bank's Operational Core Services Group with the Operations Policy and Strategy Group will strengthen the Bank's ability to contribute to the above-mentioned policy and process harmonization efforts. The new Operational Policy and Country Services (OPCS) Vice Presidency and Network is responsible for the Bank's operational policies, processes, and systems. OPCS will be working to make sure these poli- 57 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK cies and tools are compatible with staff efforts to work in partnership, to assist in capacity building, and to, in effect, operationalize the CDF principles. The Bank's CDF Secretariat, a part of OPCS, will continue to monitor implementation progress and provide important and timely feedback on emerging issues for further work. Summary of OED Findings The OED review notes that, while the development community has been well-served by the Bank's management and successes of aid coordination processes, more could have been achieved. The review highlights weaknesses of earlier aid coordination efforts.' But its main message is that aid coordination so far has had little impact on strengthening global levels of develop- ment assistance, increasing donor selectivity, reducing transaction costs of aid delivery, har- monizing donor policies, or strengthening country capacity to manage and coordinate aid. According to the review, this failure is due in part to weak country commitment and capacity, but the primary responsibility rests with donors. Some corrective suggestions are to minimize nondevelopment motives for providing aid, to pursue selectivity through donor comparative advantage, and to promote recipient government leadership of in-country aid coordination by Bank staff and other local donor representatives. Management Perspective As indicated, Management agrees with the thrust of the OED analysis-that past practices have achieved less than anticipated, that donors have not demonstrated the real commitment necessary to make aid coordination work, and that strengthening country capacity to manage and coordinate donor programs is a priority. Indeed, this message underpins the elaboration of the CDF principles. However, although the OED review accurately reflects past efforts at aid coordination and how they fell short, it neither manages to capture the current, more widely shared vision among donors of development partnership nor current Bank practices. These Bank practices merit examination at three levels: * Country Partnership. The Bank actively supports country-led coordination processes and mechanisms, including in-country partnership among the branches and levels of govern- ment and civil society. Building on the CDF principles, the Bank is working with the IMF and other multilateral and bilateral partners to support the preparation of country-led Pov- erty Reduction Strategy Papers. The Bank also intends to work with partners, notably the UNDP, to identify specific actions to increase national ownership of aid mobilization and management processes. The OED review highlights the importance of public expenditure reviews, sector investment programs, and programmatic lending instruments for the owner- ship and partnership agenda. As documented in Supporting Country Development, Man- agement agrees with this assessment, and is promoting these instruments as vehicles to enhance development effectiveness and reduce the cost of donor programs. At the same time, the pace of this process will need to be set on a country-by-country basis, taking into account development priorities and country circumstances. * Global Partnerships. If country-led coordination is to succeed, there must be greater har- mony in donor practices, procedures, and policies-including appraisal, implementation, procurement, monitoring, supervision, reporting, accounting, and evaluation. The Bank favors adopting harmonized procedures among donors that will reduce aid transaction costs. The Bank and the major MDBs have inventoried their operational policies and procedures, and identified potential areas for convergence. In addition, Management has already raised the profile of harmonization, having discussed it in Prague in September 2000 during the meetings of the MDB presidents, the heads of multilateral financial institutions (MFIs), and the Development Committee. On February 1, 2001, the World Bank hosted the Forum on 58 MANAGEMENT RESPONSE Operational Policies and Strategies, at which representatives of 18 multilateral institutions met for the first time to focus exclusively on harmonization. Management also committed to further discussions on harmonization during the MDB presidents' meeting in February 2001 and will submit a progress report to the Development Committee in April2001. Further, the work program is being expanded to include close collaboration with and participaltion in the recently established OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Task Force on the Harmonization of Donor Practices, which held its first meeting early this year. * Bank Culture. Bank staff attitudes and behaviors are evolving toward stronger client and partner orientation. Indeed, for some years, the Bank has been promoting changes to its business culture through training and performance feedback. Human Resource Services (HRS) has reviewed Bank training programs to ensure that learning is better aligned with the new approach to development and to more effectively support the country and global partnership agendas. Management notes that the disappointing results of the OED survey of Bank staff largely reflect the situation as it was three years ago at a much earlier phase of the change process. Also, the Bank's new development paradigm includes important features designed to reinforce the partnership culture, including identification and dissemi- nation of good practice and lessons learned, and investment in monitoring and reporting on progress in development partnerships. * Internal Organization. Country directors will continue to be responsible for promoting aid coordination as part of the broader agenda of encouraging country leadership in strengthen- ing both external and internal partnerships. Notably, in the context of countries preparing Poverty Reduction Strategies, country directors will work in partnership with client-country authorities and other donors in assisting countries in moving toward country-led aid coordi- nation processes. The pace of this process will depend on country-specific conditions. The OPCS Vice Presidency will continue to take the overall responsibility on issues of policy harmonization with other MDBs, bilateral aid agencies, and client countries, with other units taking the lead in their specific areas of accountability. OPCS will be responsible for reporting progress on in-country aid coordination, disseminating best practice among coun- try directors through its country strategy thematic group, and providing support for country directors and their teams for strategy development and capacity building for country lead- ership.2 Within OPCS, the CDF secretariat is drafting a new Operations Memorandum on the CDF, which will cover development partnership and will support its implementation and monitoring. As part of that work, the CDF secretariat will assist country teams that are helping countries take leadership in development partnership, including aid coordination. The work will include formulating strategy for development partnership and government capacity building for country leadership. The CDF secretariat will also promote and dis- seminate best practice on these issues through various channels-directly in its own work with country teams and through the country strategy thematic group. The secretariat will also maintain the Consultative Group (CG) database to track key aspects of CG meetings, plus the extent, responsibilities, and schedules of subgroups established. Conclusion Success in aid coordination has proved elusive in the past, but Management believes that a consensus for change-among the MDBs and bilateral donors, and within countries them- selves-has been building over the last few years. However, change takes time, and on-the- ground results will materialize only if there is genuine partnership among the actors and greater capacity on the part of the countries. The Bank is committed to doing its part. The ongoing work on the CDF, its operationalization through PRSPs, and the harmonization with MDBs, bilaterals, and client countries are efforts that can be expected to facilitate 59 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLI) BANK significant, albeit likely gradual, change toward country leadership of aid coordination. Supporting this effort at the institutional level, the Bank has in place the policies and struc- tures needed to promote effective partnership, implement cultural change, and enhance information dissemination and reporting. 60 MANAGEMENT RESPONSE MANAGEMENT ACTION RECORD Review of Aid Coordination and the Role of the World Bank OED Recommendation Management Response (1) Update operational policy to Agreed. An Operational Memorandum on the CDF is under preparation for issuance before the end of ensure that Bank program and staff FY01. It will cover all aspects of the CDF, including development paitnership, and will replace OD resources are aligned with CDF 14.30, Aid Coordination Groups. principles in support of country leadership of the management and coordination of aid resources, by June 30, 2001. (2) Each Bank country team or Agreed. The Bank is moving in this direction, and it is an important palt of the Joint Staff Assessment department that supports a CG or USA) and Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) development process. However, the pace should be set on a similar mechanism considers (in country-by-country basis after taking into account all development priorities. Specific actions being taken consultation with the government to improve country leadership and enhance Bank guidelines are outlined as follows: and other partners, and in (a) The Bank supports the overall effort toward country leadership of aid coordination, including consideration of capacity and leadership of CG meetings. The pace at which countries assume this responsibility will depend on country commitment) inclusion of an circumstances, but the Bank is fully committed to country leadership as early as feasible. Progress has explicit strategy intended to help been documented, notably in Latin America and in some CDF pilot countries. There are promising the country move toward aid examples in Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Bolivia, The Philippines, and Vietnam. Examples of good practice coordination leadership in the next will be collected and disseminated through the country strategy thematic group. However, success will CAS (or update) and/or PRSP. depend ultimately on the extent to which donors align their support mechanisms and procedures. (b) The PRSP guidelines and sourcebook (http://www.worldbank.ore/noverty/strategies/index.html emphasize the importance of country -led processes even though it is unlikely that the first full PRSPs developed over the next year or so will contain full blown strategies for countries to move to leadership in aid coordination. Nevertheless, the Bank proposes to strengthen its references in the JSA Guidelines and the PRSP sourcebook on the need for aid coordination strategies. For example, in the future, JSAs will be expected to document the actions taken by country leadership to improve coordination. The OPS (now OPCS) Note on Enhancing Board Discussion of Country Assistance Strategies (R99-228/2, May 22, 2000) states that he CAS should discuss the roles of key partners; coordination among them; and implications for the Bank's program, including Bank support for capacity building for local donor coordination efforts. This provision will be monitored through the CAS retrospective. CAS guidelines. currently being updated, will reflect the new Development Partnership guidelines on helping countries move to aid coordination leadership. (3) Submit report to Committee on Agreed. However, the FY01 OPCS workload precludes delivery of a report. OPCS will report to CODE Development Effectiveness (CODE) in FY02 on progress on aid coordination aspects of development partnership. The report will include the for review by June 30, 2001. following: reflecting the following: (a) DACIUND P/Bank Joint (a) The Joint Partnership Group is one of many Bank partnerships that have the capacity to enhance aid Partnership Group coordination. The Bank will continue to pursue partnerships with UNDP, UN Development Group, other UN agencies, OECD/DAC, regional development banks, various MFIs (for public sector lending) and international financial institutions (for private sector activities), and bilateral and regional institutions. By reporting time to CODE, it is likely that the :recently established OECD-DAC Task Force on Harmonization of Donor Practices will have subsumed the activities of the Joint Partnership Group. It would be more appropriate to report on its outcomes. (b) Bank/UNDP coordination on (b) Capacity building for aid nanagement comprises many similar elements required for good public capacity building sector management-financial reporting and management, information technology, clear government responsibilities-where the Bank regularly provides support to client countries. (See Refornirg Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance, A World Bank Strategy, http://www- wbweb.worldbank.org/orem/Urmps/oublicsector/strategypaper.htm.). Additionally, ad management requires negotiation skills, economic and social analysis, and diplomacy. Management is currently working to strengthen country capacity within several partnerships, including the Joint Africa Institute (with the African Development Bank and IMF), PACT, and partnerships with the UNDP, regional development banks, and bilateral agencies. Within the Bank, the World Bank Institute plays a major role and Institutional Development Fund grants are useful tools. Management will report in general on its efforts to promote capacity building for aid management. (c) Monitoring and benchmarking (c) The CDF secretariat will take the lead in monitoring progress in aid coordination aspects of of progress in partnership development partnership. In the context of the CDF/PRSP, other aspects of development partnership are being monitored, and indicators focusing on development results will be selected. (d) Training and development on (d) Working in partnership that aims to support country ownership and leadership of aid coordination partnership. negotiation, calls for a continuation of the ongoing adjustment in Bank culture and upgrading of staff skills. HRS facilitation, and listening skills and other Bank units, in consultation with the Regions, have undertaken a review of training and development to ensure they promote the necessary staff and client skills. An action plan based on this review has been developed and activities are underway to support the rapid growth of CDF/PRSP initiatives. The FY02 report will reflect on progress. 61 Annex 8 Report from the Committee on Development Effectiveness The Committee met on November 10, 1999 to discuss the OED report Review of Aid Coo:rdi- nation and the Role of the World Bank (SecM99-709). In view of the upcoming DAC seminar on Aid Coordination to be held in Paris on December 6, the Committee agreed to take up the report in two stages, with the second stage meeting to be scheduled soon after the DAC seminar. The Committee emphasized the importance of senior level Bank management par- ticipation at the DAC seminar, reflecting the priority that the Bank attaches to improving management of aid. The Committee focused on the members' preliminary reactions to the paper and listened to an oral presentation of Management's Response. It also heard a report from the Chairman of the CODE Subcommittee on the discussion held the previous day on aid coordination with officials of UNDP and DAC. The Committee welcomed the OED report noting that it is the culmination of a request by the Board for a review of the role and experience of the Bank in aid coordination. Committee members appreciated the candor of the report and were pleased that it had been prepared in parallel with UNDP's report on aid coordination. Members endorsed the report's findings and recommendations. Members noted that the report is necessarily a retrospective look at the actual state of coordination, and perceptions of the costs and consequences associated with prevailing practices among bilateral and multilateral development partners, and that officials of developing countries, donor agencies, and Bank staff alike had been able to speak for themselves through surveys, interviews and workshops conducted as part of the study. The Committee agreed that independent, objective assessment is critical to well-informed and thus well-founded reforms and that OED had provided such an assessment through a forthright report. The Committee also noted the positive changes that have taken place as OED has undertaken this work with respect to partnerships, including the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other initiatives. They emphasized the importance of considering the report's findings and recommendations in, this broader context and with an overall focus on poverty reduction. Members indicated that there was now a "window of opportunity" for major improvements in aid coordination. They emphasized a strategic global approach, looking for early wins, and moving on to more complex issues in a concrete and measurable fashion. This needs to be complemented by increased efforts to build country level capacity and partnerships agreements. The Committee focused on a number of major issues including but not limited to: Country Ownership. The Committee recognized the critical importance of country owner- ship and the need to develop a strategy and time frame for partner governments to take over aid coordination. While noting that some countries have overcome the barriers and are exercising leadership in aid coordination, the Committee emphasized that the extent of the barriers should not be underestimated. For example, the tensions between partnerships and ownership, the power imbalance inherent when one party is the benefactor and the other the recipient, and the need to reconcile country ownership with increased donor and citizen de- mands for accountability. Some members also noted both the importance and the complexity of developing country-led processes for involving other stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector, in aid coordination activities. In addition members recognized that there were issues around timing and sequencing and that all too often external deadlines can constrain ownership in partner countries as well as improved coordination among develop- ment partners. In view of all these circumstances, members agreed that it will be important to develop a clear understanding and some practical steps for progressively enhancing country ownership of aid coordination. 63 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Capacity Development. The Committee recognized the critical links between capacity and ownership. In view of the opportunity costs involved, the members agreed that building capacity for aid coordination should be considered in the broader context of overall development management and public sector reform. Most members agreed with OED's recommendation to stop the use of Project Implementation Units (PIUs) except in exceptional circumstances because they undermine national capacity building. But some members asked what should be put in their place when there are local capacity constraints and stressed the need for countries and donor agencies to be more creative in fostering capacity. OED also clarified that the question was not so much to stop the use of PIU's but to find exit strategies for their use. Harmonization of DonorProcesses, Procedures and Instruments. The Committee emphasized the critical importance of harmonizing multilateral and bilateral donor processes and procedures with respect to financial management, procurement, reporting and other issues. Some members noted that harmonization does not mean that all partners should start using World Bank procedures and stressed that the aim should be to develop processes that are managed by national structures and through national procedures and budget cycles. Mem- bers also noted the importance of further harmonizing and consolidating donor business plans and analytical instruments and making greater use of approaches such as the sector program approach. They agreed that such harmonization and consolidation should help to enhance selectivity and reduce the administrative burden of aid coordination for recipient countries. However, concern was expressed that harmonization not occur around the lowest common denominator, and that we not lose sight of the value of diverse approaches. Mechanisms for Aid Coordination. Committee members also agreed on the need to think through the evolution of mechanisms for aid coordination such as the UNDP Round Tables and the Bank Consultative Groups and to encourage country management of such aid group meetings. They also encouraged fresh approaches to aid coordination such as those being used for the Consultative Group to assist the Poorest (CGAP), the Cities Alliance and for some post-conflict situations. Aid coordination at the sub-regional level (e.g. Central Asia, Central America, Southern Africa) and related to economic integration should also be considered. But Committee members also noted that coordination of aid activities is often difficult to achieve within as well as between donors, that donors are driven by their own set of imperatives and accountabilities and that improved aid coordination will require much greater cooperation earlier on in the planning process and improved sharing of information. Organization and Staffing of the Bank. Committee members stressed the importance for effective aid coordination of decentralization of the Bank's organization and activities. They welcomed the recent changes in this regard and noted the need for further decentralization, including of sectoral staff, as well as improved coordination across the Bank Group. Committee members also emphasized that Bank recruitment, training and performance evaluation must take into account the need for people oriented toward working effectively in partnership. In this context members noted that over fifty percent of Bank staff surveyed had indicated that they were not enthusiastic or neutral that an active government role was necessary for effective aid coordination. Members stressed the importance of better understanding the reasons for this skepticism, particularly given similar views held by locally based staff of other donor agencies, and whether views have begun to change as a result of the introduction of the CDE At the same time members noted that the Bank needs to invest more effectively in staff development with respect to attitudes, incentives and approaches to aid coordination. The Committee also agreed that the Bank needs to revise its Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) guidelines to reflect an emphasis on aid coordination and its operational policies and procedures to take account of recent thinking and practices in aid coordination, particularly the CDF emphasis on partnerships and the Bank's expanded presence in the field. Next Steps. Following the DAC seminar CODE will revisit OED's recommendations and Management's Response, both of which are expected to be informed by the DAC discussion. Jan Piercy, Chairperson 64 Endnotes Executive Summary 1. Press statement by the Ministers of Development Cooperation of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Utstein Abbey (Norway), July 26, 1999. 2. In implementing the recommended approach, certain risks must be managed. For example.. Consultative Group meetings have generated candid discussions between high-level donor and government officials. However, the experience of countries that have been moving to country-led processes shows that such contacts need not be lost. 3. The UNDP conducted an evaluation of the Round Table (RT) mechanism during the time of this review. Periodic consulta- tions and a joint survey of other donor agencies have been carried out in a collaborative manner. 4. The Forum, "From Aid Coordination to Development Partnership," was jointly organized by the OECD/DAC, UNDP and World Bank, and held at the OECD, December 7-8, 1999. 5. The thrust of the group's emphasis is described in a note to the heads of multilateral members from Jean-Claude Faure, Chairman of the OECD/DAC, "Strategic Monitoring of Key Changes in Agency Procedures and Behaviour Needed to Implement Country-Led Partnerships," October 30, 2000 (JCF(00)172). 6. A group of 30 representatives of multilateral financial institutions was convened by the Bank's Vice-President for Opera- tions Policy and Strategy (OPS) for a one-day "Forum on Operational Policies, Strategies, and Procedures," February 1, 2001. Resume analytique 1. Declaration de presse publiee par les ministres de la cooperation de l'Allemagne, des Pays-Bas, de la Norvege et du Royaume- Uni, Utstein (Norvege), 26 juillet 1999. 2. Dans la mise en ceuvre de l'approche recommandee, certains risques doivent etre geres. Les reunions des Groupes consultatifs ont donne a lieu a de franches discussions entre les representants de haut niveau des bailleurs cle fonds et des gouvernements. Cependant, l'experience des pays qui se sont orientes vers des processus bases sur le leadership national montre que ces contacts ne sont pas necessairement voues a disparaitre. 3. Le PNUD a effectue une evaluation du mecanisme de la table ronde pendant que le present examen etait realise. Des consultations periodiques et une enquete conjointe aupres des autres organisations de bailleurs de fonds ont et menees en concertation. Resumen 1. Declaraci6n de prensa de los ministros de cooperaci6n para el desarrollo de Alemania, Noruega, Paises Bajos y el Reino Unido. Utstein Abbey (Noruega), 26 de julio de 1999. 2. Al aplicar el enfoque recomendado, conviene tener en cuenta ciertos riesgos. Por ejemplo, las reuniones del Grupo consultivo han generado debates francos entre representantes de alto nivel de los donantes y los gobiernos. No obstante, la experiencia de los paises que han ido aceptando procesos impulsados por los paises revela que no se pueden perder esos contactos. 3. El PNUD realiz6 una evaluaci6n del mecanismo de mesa redonda durante el tiempo de este examen. Se han llevado a cabo, en un contexto de cooperaci6n, consultas peri6dicas y una encuesta conjunta de otros organismos donantes. 4. El Foro, cuyo tema fue "de la coordinaci6n de la ayuda a la asociaci6n por el desarrollo"., fue organizado conjuntamente por el CAD de la OCDE, el PNUD y el Banco Mundial, y se celebr6 en la OCDE el 7 y 8 de diciembre de 1999. 5. La orientaci6n principal del grupo se describe en una nota a los jefes de los miembros rnultilaterales enviada por Jean- Claude Faure, Presidente del CAD de la OCDE, Strategic Monitoring of Key Changes in Agency Procedures and Behaviour Needed to Implement Country-Led Partnerships, 30 de octubre de 2000 (JCF(OO)1 72). 6. El Vicepresidente de Politicas y Estrategia de Operaciones del Banco Mundial convoc6 a un grupo de 30 representantes de instituciones financieras multilaterales en un foro de un dia de duraci6n sobre politicas operacionales, estrategias y procedimientos (1 de febrero de 2001). 65 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Chapter 1 1. See Annex 3 for a discussion of aid dependency measures and their correlation with per capita incomes. 2. The Bank's approach to partnership was embodied in its 1998 Partnership for Development initiative (World Bank 1998e), which built on the seminal report Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation (OECD/DAC 1996). 3. One or more of these attributes is mentioned in OECD/DAC 1996; Pearson and others 1969; Picciotto 1998; and World Bank 1998e. A recent survey characterizes aid coordination as "a key dimension in the operationalization of the partnership concept" (Disch 1999: 1). 4. Press statement by the Ministers of Development Cooperation of Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and the United King- dom. Utstein Abbey (Norway), July 26, 1999. 5. This and portions of other sections of Chapters 1 and 2 are covered in more depth in an earlier, unpublished interim report, "Aid Coordination and the Role of the World Bank. An OED Review (Phase 1)" (World Bank 1999a). This section also draws on Mason and Asher 1973: 510-28. 6. CGs were similar to the consortia, except that they did not involve any pledging to meet estimated foreign exchange needs. The difference between the two has gradually become blurred. 7. International NGOs are often viewed as donors by recipient countries, which is legitimate to the extent that they generate external resources independently of those channeled to them by official donor agencies. 8. Some examples are provided from documents of Japan, the World Bank, the UNDP, Sweden, and Ethiopia, as reported in Miyoshi and Fillip 1998:3; World Bank 1984: 3; UNDP 1996:4; World Bank 1998e: 33; and Fillip 1998: 76, respectively. 9. Drawn in part from Lister and Stevens 1992: 5. 10. Drawn from Miyoshi and Fillip (1998:5-6), who employ the phrase "degrees of 'cooperation' toward full coordination," and label the second level of coordination "concertation" (taken from Barry 1988: 10). 11. See, for example, Carlsson, Somolekae, and van de Walle 1997; Fillip 1998; Pavignani and Durao 1997; and van de Walle and Johnston 1996. Also see further discussion of aid coordination on a sectoral basis in Chapter 3 of this report. 12. This figure includes the 13 borrower countries that are members of the Bank-chaired Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development (CGCED). In addition, the Bank chairs donors' meetings (13 reported in 1999) and investors' conferences (three in 1998, but none in 1999). 13. RTs are usually held in Geneva, and generally occur less frequently than CGs. Governments and the UNDP jointly convene and chair RTs. Their original focus was to be on small, least-developed, land-locked or island countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The projected heavy needs for technical assistance by these countries and the UNDP's concentration on technical, as opposed to capital, assistance was thought to make for a good division of labor between the Bank and the UNDP. But both CG and RT countries in Africa tend to be low-income, highly aid-dependent countries. 14. The OECD organized and chaired aid group meetings for Greece and Turkey. Chapter 2 1. The boxes in Annex 5 provide illustrative examples of evaluative levels and criteria for aid coordination. The most serious methodological issue here is that of attribution. Attributing a development outcome or impact to a given aid coordination activity can be difficult, owing to the influences of other potentially intervening factors. The review relied, to a considerable extent, on the informed judgments of experienced persons, expressed through questionnaires, interviews, and workshops. The case for attribu- tion is then strengthened (or weakened) by comparing the alternative sources of evidence. 2. OECD/DAC 1986a; World Bank 1984,1989a, b. These principles, guidelines, and recommendations have been reiterated and further elaborated in OECD/DAC 1998. Donors have expressed support for such principles for decades. The World Bank Annual Report for 1970 endorses the reported consensus of a DAC meeting calling for the "recipient government to take the responsibility for organizing and chairing local coordination meetings if it is able and willing to do so, with such assistance as it may feel it needs from the Bank, the UNDP, or other agencies." 66 E N D N 0 T E S 3. The 1997 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness (World Bank 1998m) measures policy performance as a project- weighted index of three principal components: inflation, fiscal balance, and openness. For institutional quality, it draws on a measure employed by the World Development Report 1997 (World Bank 1997d), based on a set of responses by foreign investors regarding the extent of red tape, the regulatory environment, and the degree of freedom from political pressure (Evans and Battaile 1998: 15, 20). OED evaluative research (Johnson and Wasty 1993) shows that country commitment and policy performance are closely related. 4. Incentives include the internal incentive structures of a bureaucracy (its values and reward systems) and the external incentives of market competition and the mechanisms for citizen voice or participation (World Bark 1998i: 9-10). Another set of recipient country characteristics that can have a bearing on aid coordination effectiveness includes the size of the country and its strategic orgeopolitical significance. Other things being equal, the larger the country and the greater its strategic significance, the more likely it will be that donors will take aid coordination seriously. But these characteristics are seldom if ever amenable to deliberate modification. The desire of government officials to maintain the status quo has also been cited as an obstacle to country leadership (World Bank 1998e: 34). This is part of institutional capacity, broadly defined to include incentive structures. 5. Another donor characteristic is diversity and complexity of procedural and accountability requirements, which can also impede greater country leadership. However, it is plausible that the greater the development orientation, the greater the willing- ness of donors to harmonize procedural requirements. The same comment applies to the internal incentive structures of donor agencies that mitigate against coordination (World Bank 1998e: 34). Several replies to the joint questionnaire sent by the UNDP and the Bank to donors mentioned development orientation and procedural diversity as potential barriers to effective aid coordination. 6. OED data for 1998 suggest that mutual accountability is associated with a more mature relationship between the Bank and the borrower or other codeliverers. Under effective mutual accountability, the partners jointly clarify and set (i) goals and responsibilities; (ii) performance expectations that are balanced by commensurate resources of each party; (iii) credible reporting mechanisms to demonstrate performance achieved and what has been learned; and (iv) reasonable review and adjustment systems to ensure that feedback on the performance achieved and difficulties encountered can be recognized and corrected as necessary (World Bank 1998m: 43). Chapter 3 1. Based on literature and document reviews, interviews, and OED field visits to Ethiopia, C.hana, and Vietnam (Evans and Battaile 1998) (also see box 3.8, Ethiopia's Education Sector Development Program). A recent paper by Helleiner on aid relation- ships in Tanzania reports "dramatic change" at the macroeconomic management level, where the government is seen to have moved significantly toward the assertion and establishment of a degree of leadership over development programs . . . "hardly conceivable" . . . in 1995 (Helleiner 1999: 5). 2. A local donor representative interviewed by OED voiced a more critical observation. What wvas allegedly to have been a joint Bank-UNDP-government effort to develop a joint paper for the CG became two parallel papers, with the Bank insisting on giving prominent place to the paper prepared by its consultants, virtually ignoring the UNDP-governrnent paper. 3. Some ambiguity in the terms civil society and private sector require clarification. Civil society refers to the not-for-profit sector; private sector to privately owned for-profit enterprises (and not-for-profit organizations intended to promote private sector interests, such as chambers of commerce). Civil society also includes other major groupings of organizations, such as religious bodies, professional associations, labor unions, community-based organizations, and non-profit educational and re- search organizations. 4. If the figures are disaggregated between civil society and the private sector, government respondents rated the latter's participation somewhat higher than that of civil society; local donor representatives' ratings were the opposite of government's, but the difference between the two is marginal. 5. It appears that in-country CG meetings will decline in number from a peak of 7 in 1998 to 3 in 1999. Of the 209 reported Bank-chaired or co-chaired CGs (including aid groups, consortia, and development forums) held during 1992-99, 193 occurred in donor countries, with about 75 percent in Paris. In addition, there were 68 reported donors' meetings and 9 investors' conferences, also chaired by the Bank, but only 5 occurred in borrower countries. Despite some corrections, these data, which are reported by Regions to the External Affairs Vice-Presidency, probably contain additional errors. See Annex 2 for further discussion. 67 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK 6. Although several respondents remarked on the difficulty of doing so. 7. In contrast to respondent views about resource mobilization, the facts are that real ODA per capita has declined, not only globally since the first years of this decade, but also for virtually all recipient countries individually. See table A3.2 in Annex 3. For a schematic presentation of aid coordination impacts, outcomes, outputs, "production process," and inputs, see box A5.1 in Annex 5. 8. Drawn from OECD/DAC-Creditor Reporting System electronic database. Commitments are taken as a proxy for the number of projects. The former will exceed the latter to the extent that there are multiple commitments per project. Some projects, however, may be active for a number of years without a fresh commitment of funds. 9. The underestimation could be the result of several factors: (1) 6 of 22 DAC donors did not respond; (2) the consistency of response varies considerably from country to country; and (3) respondents may have chosen not to mention sectors in which they considered themselves not "most active." Interviewees during OED country visits to Ethiopia and Vietnam reported up to 30 official donors in the health sector alone. The DAC sector exercise reports 7 donors active in the Ghanaian health sector, but DAC CRS data for 1994-96 show 12 donors having made commitments to the health sector in Ghana. 10. A recent Danish government report on development cooperation issues in Tanzania concludes that such practices often undermine government ownership (Helleiner and others 1995: 14). In the early 1990s there were a reported 15 such stand-alone projects in the health sector alone in Tanzania (van de Walle and Johnston 1996:49). Drawing from a review of donor experience in Africa, Berg concludes that technical cooperation in these circumstances "substitutes for and subsidizes government operating budgets," and "misuses the technical assistance personnel resource, reducing its effectiveness for institution building" (Berg 1993: 213-14). The term wasteful competition was used to describe the situation in the Philippines Country Assistance Review (World Bank 1998g: 55): "Although past aid coordination by the Bank was praised by donors and government alike, there is much friendly but wasteful competition, especially in lending to the social sectors, and little reciprocal concern about other donors' results." 11. An attempt was made to examine systematically the frequency of Bank missions, but the only available database is for supervision missions. Since these are the product of multiple determinants, no obvious pattern emerged from the data. For example, there was no observable relationship between frequency of missions and location of the Country Director in the field. 12. A determined effort was made by a DAC working party in 1998 and early 1999 to untie with respect to least-developed countries, but owing to continuing reservations by several DAC members, the May 1999 High-Level Meeting did not announce significant progress. Nonetheless, it has been argued that generic problems, such as procurement tying, may best be pursued at higher-level forums, such as the DAC and the SPA, rather than at the country level (Lister and Stevens 1992: 43). However, as the recent evaluation of the SPA pointed out, linkages need to be strengthened between the SPA and such country-level forums as CGs and local coordination mechanisms (World Bank 1998h: 109-14). The issue is not one of either-or, but a need for both-and. 13. These prerequisites are drawn from a range of literature (in particular, Harrold and Associates 1995), as well as from interviews conducted during country field visits. 14. One respondent argued that effective aid coordination will have little impact on the level of ODA. Reduction of the latter has to do with donors' budget constraints. A more optimistic respondent noted that aid coordination is not expected to have an immediate effect on levels of ODA, but that it will contribute to long-term spending. 15. A change in mechanism to coordinate aid is to be formalized by a letter from the government to both the World Bank and the UNDP. World Bank/UNDP Aid Coordination Agreement, signed April 30, 1996 (para 5.2). 16. Interviews: Morey 1998 and Babson 1998. 17. These responses were provided in writing by 14 local donor representatives and were also volunteered by several donor interviewees during country visits. 18. This is by no means a new problem for the Bank. As far back as 1984, the report of the Jaycox Working Group noted: "While the Bank is often looked to for leadership on coordination, our partners have not always found us the most cooperative institution with which to work. Sharing information, even with co-financing partners, has often been done reluctantly, if at all, and there are reports of arrogance in some Bank staff attitudes toward other donors and borrowers" (World Bank 1984: 13). 19. The Bank's Operational Directive 14.30 draws attention to the efficiency of aid coordination activities when it calls for aid coordination groups to simplify and improve coordination among donors with, at times, competing demands and offers, and 68 E ND N O TE S thus reduce the burden on the recipient's scarce staff time and resources and the inefficiencies assDciated with duplicative efforts (World Bank 1989a: para 6(f)). 20. The previously cited paper prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a persuasive case for "operationalizing transactions costs [of delivering aid] so that they can be monitored (not necessarily measured at the cardinal level, but at least monitored for change over time) . . [so as to have]... a measure of efficiency gains" (Dische 1999: 47). With regard to sectors, the greater diversity and room for differences over basic priorities (for example, the relative roles of the public and private sectors) in agriculture than in education and health may explain what would appear to be greater progress made by sector programs in the latter sectors than in the former (Jones interview 1999). 21. The previously cited review of aid coordination commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs finds that on the basis of experience reviewed in Mozambique, Tanzania, and elsewhere, participants find aid coordination meetings limited to information sharing to be of only marginal use (Disch 1999:3). 22. See evaluation of "National Technical Cooperation Assessment and Programs," known as the NaTCAP initiative (Will- iams 1991: 7-8, 27-28). 23. NEX was introduced globally by the UNDP in the early 1990s. 24. The 1997 CAS for Cote d'Ivoire indicates that a PHRD grant was intended to support a new coordinating and monitoring unit for World Bank and U.N.-supported activities, to be fully integrated in government structure, and to have a long-term monitoring role. The Philippines Country Assistance Review identifies several approaches used by the Bank to help improve country aid coordination capacity (World Bank 1998g: 51-56). 25. Established in 1991 with support from the Bank and other donors, the Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) seeks to build regional institutional capacity in policy analysis and development management. The ACBF has become a compo- nent of PACT, although major shortcomings in administrative and financial management were identified in Bank audits in 1992 and 1994. 26. PERs for Tanzania have observed that donor resources are poorly integrated in the budget. The OED Country Assistance Evaluation for Tanzania (World Bank 2000a) deduces that virtually 70 percent of donor resources do not pass through the government budget. This is not meant to suggest that direct provision of aid by donors to civil society and the private sector should be precluded, but that all resources channeled through the public sector should be integrated with the budget process. 27. Described in and in Peters and Chao 1998: 177-90. 28. Recent reviews of sector programs in Africa come to a rather cautious conclusion about their potential for these reasons. See Jones 1997 and 1999, as well as World Bank 19981. 29. One interlocutor noted that placing donor representatives with significant delegated authority in the field would reinforce the movement of CG meetings to the country, since representatives with greater levels of decisionmaking authority would already be located there. 30. Inadequate understanding by donor staff and consultants of the country in which they were working was also mentioned by several interlocutors during a country visit conducted for the review. Chapter 4 1. Raphaeli 1984: 5. Sources for box 4.1 include Maipose, Somolekae, and Johnston 1996; Stacy 1999; van de Walle and Johnston 1996; and interviews with Johnston and Stevens 1998. 2. Several such indicators are proposed for each of the eight factors, along with possible measures and measurement methods, in Aid Coordination-Moving toward Partnership: the Challenge of Measurement, (Discussion Paper, June 1999; see list of papers prepared for the review in the Bibliography). Chapter 5 1. The forum, "From Aid Coordination to Development Partnership," was jointly organized by the OECD/DAC, UNDP, and World Bank, and held at the OECD, December 7-8, 1999. 69 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK 2. The thrust of the group's emphasis is described in a note to the heads of multilateral members from Jean-Claude Faure, Chairman of the OECD/DAC, "Strategic Monitoring of Key Changes in Agency Procedures and Behavior Needed to Implement Country-led Partnerships," October 30, 2000 (JCF(00)172). 3. A group of 30 representatives of multilateral financial institutions was convened by the Bank's Vice President for Opera- tions Policy and Strategy (OPS) for a one-day "Forum on Operational Policies, Strategies, and Procedures," February 1, 2001. Annex 1 1. Press statement, Utstein Abbey (Norway), July 26, 1999. 2. This figure includes the 13 borrower countries that are members of the Bank-chaired Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development (CGCED). In addition to meetings chaired exclusively by the World Bank, CGs for about eight East European countries are chaired jointly by the Bank and the EU. CGs for Central America are chaired by the IDB, and for Papua New Guinea by the ADB. 3. Some adjustments were made in this group to take into account realities on the ground. Six countries in group one were moved to group two. These countries, although with ODA ratios below the 5 percent ceiling, are former members of the socialist block, and almost all are recent members of the Bank. Since these countries are in transition from centrally planned to free market, globalized economies, it is proposed, unless Country Departments think otherwise, that they be moved to group two. Annex 2 1. Responses were received from 15 official donor organizations, including those for Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States, as well as the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the Inter- American Development Bank. The only international NGO responding to the survey sent by OED was Christian Aid of the U.K. 2. Expenses for the February 10-11 workshop, including participant travel costs, were supported by an allocation from the OED-SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) Partnership Trust Fund. 3. Mr. Marco Rossi, currently head of the Policy and Research Division of SDC, was seconded to OED in October and November 1998 and developed the design followed for the workshops. The OED review team has also drawn upon a very insightful paper, Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness, by Arne Disch, and commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Norwegian Government (Disch 1999). 4. The aid group meetings included in the calendar are generally at the apex-or countrywide-level, rather than sector meetings-such as CGs, development forums, donors' meetings, investors' conferences, and the like. 5. For example, the December 1997 CG Meeting for Tanzania, held in Dar Es-Salaam, is not mentioned. The 1999 calendar shows a CG meeting for Croatia, a country for which there has never been a CG and for which one is not envisioned. Annex 3 1. The fit of the curve to the data, as measured by the Rz of 0.36, is relatively low, owing to the wide spread of observations at lower per capita income levels. Other measures of aid dependency include ODA per capita and the ratio of ODA to central government expenditures. While the magnitudes differ, a similar inverse relationship with GNP is observed and the country rankings are similar. Each aid dependency measure has its limitations. The ODA to GNP ratio was chosen because it is available for a relatively large group of countries and because it is the most widely employed measure. Its main limitation is that GNP in very low income countries tends to be underestimated. The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) method of conversion to a common unit partially corrects for this, but PPP-adjusted data are not quite as widely available as data employing the Atlas method of conversion. The inverse relation of ODA per capita to GNP per capita is less pronounced than that shown in figure A3.1, owing to several outlier countries, while the relation of ODA to central government expenditures is more pronounced, but data are available for only 68 countries. 2. The "fully-loaded" cost includes fringe benefits and overhead. The figure for direct financial cost does not include services provided for Regional and Round Table meetings, which in FY98 were reported to be only about $0.5 million. See figure A3.3. 70 E ND N O TE S Annex 4 1. In some cases, the CAS was embedded in a Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) or Memorandum of the President (MOP). Annex 5 1. Adapted from the Scorecard under the Bank's Strategic Compact. Annex 7 1. Based on self-evaluations, Management has arrived at conclusions about the aid system and the Bank's role in it that are broadly similar to those of OED. For the analytic foundations of the new approach, see World Bank 1998a. 2. For example, OPCS (then OPS) conducted a program of seminars and a workshop, Small States: Enhancing Effectiveness of Donor Assistance, at the 2000 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF, Prague, September 2000. 71 Bibliography The Bibliography is divided into three sections: External Literature, World Bank Documents, and Documents Prepared for this Review. External Literature Reviewed Arensberg, Walter, Camilla Foltz, and Lawrence Hausman. 1997. Coordinating International Development Assistance. Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, Asilis, Carlos M., and Stuart Brown. 1991. "Western Aid and Soviet Reform: The Role of Coordination." Working Paper 91-13. Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Baehr, Peter. 1997. "Problems of Aid Conditionality: The Netherlands and Indonesia." Third World Quarterly 18 (2). Barry, A.J. 1988. Aid Co-ordination and Aid Effectiveness: A Review of Country and Regional Experience. Development Centre Papers. Paris: OECD. Berg, Elliot.1999. "Aid Failure: The Case of Public Sector Reform." Paper presented to the Aid Conference, University of Copenhagen. Photocopy. .1997. "Dilemmas in Donor Aid Strategies." In: Perspectives on Aidand Development, Catherine Gwin andJoan M. Nelson, eds. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. . 1993. Rethinking Technical Cooperation: Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa. Elliot Berg, coordinator. Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP and Development Alternatives, Inc. New York: UNDP. Carlsson, Jerker, Gloria Somolekae, and Nicolas van de Walle, eds. 1997. Foreign Aid in Africa. i'Learning from Country Experiences. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Cassen, Robert. 1985. "Does Aid Really Work?" The New Society. London. Clift, Charles. 1988 "Aid Coordination: Are There Any Lessons to be Learned From Kenya?" Development Policy Review 6. London. Culpeper, Roy. 1997. The Multilateral Development Banks, Volume 5, Titans or Behemoths? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Diallo, Aliou S., Jim Kelly, Amon Nikoi, and W Haven North. 1991. Capacity Building for Aid Coordination in the Least Developed Countries, Volume II. UNDP Central Evaluation Office Evaluation Studies No. 4/91. New York. Disch, Arne. 1999. "Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness." ECON Centre for Economic Analysis, Oslo. Photocopy. Fillip, Barbara. 1998. Key Frameworks for Aid Coordination in Africa. Consensus Building, Operationalization and Implementation. Washington, D.C.: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Gordon, David. 1966. "Coordinating Aid to Developing Countries." Finance and Development 23. Government of Mali and OECD/DAC. 1997. Review of the International Aid System in Mali. Bamako, Mali. Gwin, Catherine. 1999. The New Development Cooperation Paradigm. ODC Viewpoint. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. Hammel, Werner. 1997. "The Political Dimension of Aid: Developing Countries Must Shoulder Responsibility." Develop- ment and Cooperation 6. 73 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK Helleiner, Gerry. 1999. "Changing Aid Relationships in Tanzanaia (December 1997 through March 1999)." Prepared for the Tanzania Consultative Group Meeting, Paris, May 3-4, 1999. Helleiner, Gerald K., Tony Killick, Nguyuru Lipumba, Benno J. Ndulu, and Knud Erik Svendsen. 1995. Report of the Group of Independent Advisers on Development Cooperation Issues between Tanzania and Its Aid Donors. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jones, Stephen. 1999. "Increasing Aid Effectiveness in Africa? The World Bank and Sector Investment Programmes." Presented at a NORAD Seminar on Sector-wide Approaches, Oslo, February, 1999. Oxford Policy Management. Oxford, U.K. Photocopy. Keck, Margaret F., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1997. "Transnational Advocacy Networks in a Movement Society." Prepared for the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. Photocopy. Kjellstrom, Sven B., and others. 1986. "Aid Coordination: A Recipient's Perspective. The Need for, and Obstacles to, Better Aid Coordination in a Small Economy: The Case of Togo." Finance and Development 23. Korten, David. 1995. "Steps Towards People-Centred Development: Vision and Strategies." In Government-NGO Rela- tions in Asia. Prospects and Challenges for People-Centred Development, Noeleen Heyzer, James V. Riker, and Antonio B. Quizon, eds. London: Macmillan. Lal, Deepak. 1996. "Foreign Aid: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone." Economic Affairs 16 (4). Maipose, Gervase S., and Gloria M. Somolekae and Timothy A. Johnston. 1996. Aid Effectiveness in Botswana. Washing- ton, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. Martin, John, Rita Oskanen, and Toumas Takala. 1999. "Preparation of the Education Sector Development Programme in Ethiopia: Reflections by Participants Final Report." Cambridge Education Consultants, U.K. FTP International, Fin- land. Mason, Edward, and Robert E. Asher. 1973. The World Bank since Bretton Woods. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu- tion. Mathews, Jessica. 1997. "Power Shift." Foreign Affairs 16 (1). Maxwell, Simon, and Roger Riddell. n.d. "The Concept of Partnership in the White Paper." Overseas Development Institute, London. Photocopy. Michel, James. 1994. "Improving Aid Effectiveness." Prepared for the 49th meeting of the Development Committee on October 3, 1994, Washington D.C. Ministers of Development Cooperation of Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. July 26, 1999. "Press Statement." Utstein Abbey, Norway. Miyoshi, Koichi, and Barbara Fillip. 1998. Aid Coordination Matters. Working with Others for Africa's Development. Washington, D.C.: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) USA Office. Miyoshi, K., and others. 1998. Key Frameworks for Coordination in Africa. Consensus Building, Operationalization and Implementation. Washington D.C.: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) USA Office. Moncada, Myrna, Martha Zamora, Vibecke Kubberud, and Jens Claussen (Nordic Consulting Group). 1998. Evaluation of the Development Cooperation between Norway and Nicaragua. UD Evaluation Report 12.98. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Morss, Elliott R. 1984. "Institutional Destruction Resulting from Donor and Project Proliferation in Sub-Saharan African Countries." World Development 12 (4). 74 B IB LI O G RAP HY OECD/DAC (Development Assistance Committee). Various years. Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients. Paris. . 1999a. Development Co-operation. Development Assistance Committee 1998 Report. Paris. . 1999b. "Sector Matrix." DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, 31"t Meeting, 27-28 January 1999. Room Document No. 7, Paris. _____. 1998. Strengthening Development Partnerships: A Working Checklist. Report of the Forum of Development Partners, December 1997. Paris. . 1996. Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-Operation. Paris. . 1992. DAC Principles for Effective Aid: Development Assistance Manual. Paris. _.____ 1986-1998. Report. Annual Report, Chairs of the Development Assistance Committee. Paris. _.___ 1986a. "Guiding Principles for Aid Co-ordination with Developing Countries." OECD/DAkC, Paris (subsequently published as part of OECD/DAC 1992). Photocopy. . 1986b. "Progress Report on the Current Status of Aid Co-ordination Arrangements at the Local Level." Note by the Secretariat. Paris. Paterson, Ted, and Cecil Rajana. 1996. "Review of the Role and Future Direction of the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development (CGCED), Final Report." The North-South Institute, Ottawa. Photocopy. Pavignani, Enrico, and Joaquim Ramalho Durao. 1997. "Aid, Change and Second Thoughts: Coordinating External Resources to the Health Sector in Mozambique." Part of a four country research project, "National Coordination of External Health Resources," funded by the UK Department for International Development and coordinated by the Health Policy Unit of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Photocopy. Pearson, Lester B., and others. 1969. Partners in Development: Report. New York: Praeger. Peters, David, and Shiyan Chao. 1998. "The Sector-Wide Approach in Health: What is it? Where is it leading?" Interna- tional Journal of Health Planning and Management 13. . 1997. "SPA's Linkages to Country-Level Coordination." Photocopy. Petesch, Patti. 1996. "Managing Aid for National Development-Moving Towards Ownership, Participation and Results." Background paper, Bread for the World Institute and Friedrich Ebert Foundation Workshop on National Programming for the New Global Development Agenda: What Role for Civil Society? Photocopy. Schwarz, Gerhard. 1984. "Coordinating Development Aid." Swiss Review of World Affairs 34 (2). Stacy, Roy A. 1999. Aid Coordination and Development Management in Botswana: A Case Study. UNDP. Photocopy. Stokke, Olav. 1995. "Development Assistance: Prospects and Priorities." Development Dialogue 2. Suhrke, Astri (project leader), et al. (Chr. Michelsen Institute in association with Nordic Conisulting Group). 1997. Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique. UD Evaluation Report 4.97. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency). 1997. "Measuring and Managing Results: Lessons for Development Cooperation." Sida Evaluations Newsletter, 6/97. Stockholm. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 1998. "The Round-Table Mechanism." UNDP, DP/1998/CRP.2 New York. 75 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK . 1996. Developing Capacities in Aid Coordination and Management: Vietnam. New York. . 1994. Aid Coordination and Aid Management by Government: A Role for UNDP. New York. Williams, Maurice. 1991. "NaTCAP. National Technical Co-operation Assessment and Programmes: Evaluation," Volume I. Regional Bureau for Africa, Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation, Central Evaluation Office. New York. USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development)/Bolivia 1998. "Bolivia Progress Report on the DAC 21st Century Strategy." La Paz. Photocopy. Wamalwa, William. 1995. "Some Reflections on the Experience of Foreign Aid." Development Dialogue 2. van de Walle, Nicolas, and Timothy A. Johnston. 1996. Improving Aid to Africa. ODC Policy Essay No. 21. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. Wheelan, Robert. 1996. "Foreign Aid: Who Needs It?" Economic Affairs. Whittington, Dale, and Craig Calhoun. 1988. "Who Really Wants Donor-Coordination?" Development Policy Review 6. World Bank Documents Reviewed Balaj, Barbara. 1999. "Post-Conflict Aid Coordination and Program Review of the West Bank and Gaza: Leading the Way Toward Innovation." Wortd Bank, Washington, D.C. Photocopy. Balaj, Barbara, and Christine Wallich. 1999. Aid Coordination and Post-conflict Reconstruction: the West Bank and Gaza Experience. Precis Number 185. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, OED. Evans, Alison, and WilLiam G. Battaile, Jr. 1998. 1997 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness. OED Study Series. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Falconer, Brian. 1997. "Enabling Environment for Economic and Social Development: Sub-Group on the Macroeconomic and Social Framework: UN System Agency Involvement: Uganda." World Bank Resident Mission, Kampala Uganda. Photocopy. Ferroni, Marco. 1999. Reforming Foreign Aid: The Role of International Public Goods. OED Working Paper 4. Washing- ton, D.C. Gibbs, Christopher, Claudia Fumo, and Thomas Kuby. 1998. Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank-Supported Projects: A Review. OED Study Series. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Harrold, Peter, and Associates. 1995. The Broad Sector Approach to Investment Lending: Sector Investment Programs. World Bank Discussion Paper 302, Africa Technical Department Series. Washington D.C. Johnson, John H., and Sulaiman Wasty. 1993. Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs and the Political Economy of Reform. World Bank Discussion Paper 199. Washington, D.C. Jones, Stephen. 1997. Sector Investment Programs in Africa: Issues and Experience. World Bank Technical Paper No. 374, Africa Region Series. Washington, D.C. Killick, Tony. 1991. The Developmental Effectiveness of Aid to Africa. Policy, Research, and External Affairs Working Paper, International Economics Department. Washington, D.C. Kreimer, Alcira, John Eriksson, Robert Muscat, Margaret Arnold, and Colin Scott. 1998. The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction. OED Study Series. Washington, D.C. Lateef, K. Sarwar, editor. 1995. The Evolving Role of the World Bank: Helping Meet the Challenge of Development. Washington, D.C. 76 BIBLIOGRAPHY Lister, Stephen, and Mike Stevens. 1992. "Aid Coordination and Management." Washington, D.C. Photocopy. Picciotto, Robert. 1998. "The Logic of Partnership. A Development Perspective." Operations Evaluation Department, Washington, D.C. Photocopy. Raphaeli, Nimrod. 1984. Public Sector Management in Botswana: Lessons in Pragmatism. World Bank Staff Working Papers 709. Washington, D.C. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1998. Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and Prc.cesses. 1998 Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, Geneva, October 19, 1998. Photocopy. Wolfensohn, James D. 1999. "A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework. " January 21, 1999. Washing- ton, D.C. Photocopy. . 1998. The Other Crisis. Address to the Board of Governors, World Bank, October 6, 1998. Washington, D.C. World Bank. 2000a. Tanzania Country Assistance Evaluation. World Bank Report 20902. OED, Washington, D.C. _.____ 2000b. Ethiopia Country Assistance Evaluation. World Bank Report 21450. OED, Washington, D.C. _. 1999a. "Aid Coordination and the Role of the World Bank. An OED Review. (Phase 1)" OED, Washington, D.C. Photocopy. _____. 1999b. "Background Paper on In-Country Coordination Among MDBs." Presented at the Meeting of the Presi- dents of the Multilateral Development Banks, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, January 22, 1999. Washington, D.C. Photocopy. _ . 1999c. Civil Service Reform. A Review of World Bank Assistance. World Bank Report 19599. OED, Washington, D.C. 1 l999d. Tracking of Support Provided under Sector Programs. SPA (Special Program of Assistance for Africa) Working Group on Economic Management. SPA Plenary Meeting, June 1999. Washington, D.C. ____. 1999e. "World Bank Supports New Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa." News Release No. 99/2200/ AFR, May 21. Washington, D.C. _____. 1998a. Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why. A World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. _.____ 1998b. Bangladesh Country Assistance Review. World Bank Report 17455-BD. OED, Washington, D.C. _.____ 1998c. Bolivia Country Assistance Review. World Bank Report 17957. OED, Washington, D.C. _.____ 1998d. "Guidelines and Good Practice for Civil Society Consultations." Washington, D.C. _.____ 1998e. "Partnership for Development: Proposed Actions for the World Bank: A Discussion Paper." Partnerships Group, Strategy and Resource Management, Washington, D.C. . 1998f. "Partnership for Development: From Vision to Action." Partnerships Group, Strategy and Resource Management, Washington, D.C. 1998g. Philippines Country Assistance Review. World Bank Report 17417. OED, Washington, D.C. . 1998h. The Special Program of Assistance for Africa (SPA): An Independent Evaluation. OED Study Series. Washington, D.C. _____. 1998i. "The World Bank: Addressing the Challenge of Reforming Public Institutions." World Bank, Public Sector Group, PREM Network, Washington, D.C. Photocopy. 77 THE DRIVE TO PARTNERSHIP: AID COORDINATION AND THE WORLD BANK . 1998j. World Bank Annual Report 1998. Washington, D.C. . 1998k. World Development Indicators 1998. Washington, D.C. . 19981. Zimbabwe-The Impact of World Bank Support to the HPN Sector in Zimbabwe. World Bank Report 18141. OED, Washington, D.C. _ - 1998m. 1998 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness. OED Study Series. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. - 1997a. "Evaluation of Economic and Sector Work-A Review." OED, Washington, D.C. . 1997b. Mozambique Country Assistance Review. World Bank Report 17209. OED, Washington, D.C. . 1997c. Poland Country Assistance Review. World Bank Report 16495. OED, Washington, D.C. . 1997d. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. - 1996. Zambia Country Assistance Review. World Bank Report 15675. OED, Washington, D.C. - 1995. Ghana Country Assistance Review. World Bank Report 15675. OED, Washington, D.C. - 1994. "Aid Effectiveness." Paper prepared for the 49th meeting of the Development Committee. Washington, D.C. _____. 1989a. Operational Directive 14.30: "Aid Coordination Groups" (March 28, 1989). In Operational Manual. Washington, D.C. _- 1989b. "The Consultative Group Process: Meeting Mounting Demands for Aid Coordination." World Bank, Strategic Planning and Review Department, Washington D.C. Photocopy. _ - . 1984. "The Bank's Changing Role in Aid Coordination" (Report of the Jaycox Working Group on The Future Role of the World Bank). Washington, D.C. Photocopy. _. 1970. World Bank Annual Report 1970. Washington, D.C. _. 1966. World Bank Annual Report 1965/66. Washington, D.C. . 1959. World Bank Annual Report 1959. Washington, D.C. Documents Prepared for the Review All papers are available from the Corporate Evaluation and Methods Group of the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank (OEDCM). 1. "Aid Coordination and the Role of the World Bank: An OED Review (Phase I)," January 1999. 2. Proceedings of Workshop, "Aid Coordination in an Era of Partnership," February 10-11, 1999, Washington, D.C. 3. Report of OED Mission to Ghana, April 11-22, 1999. 4. Report of OED Mission to Vietnam, April 26-30, 1999. 5. Report of OED Mission to Ethiopia, May 3-11, 1999. 6. "Aid Coordination: Moving toward Partnership: the Challenge of Measurement," June 1999. 7. Posr-Conflict Reconstruction and Aid Coordination: The West Bank and Gaza Experience, OED Precis No. 186, by Barbara Balaj and Christine Wallich, Spring 1999. 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