COMPOUNDING
MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of COVID-19
on Syrian Refugees and Host Communities
in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
and Lebanon
DECEMBER 2020
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 2
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Table of contents
Click on the
topics below
List of abbreviations 3
Executive summary 4
Introduction 10
Transmission channels 15
Data sources and baseline characteristics 16
Macroeconomic assumptions 21
Results and discussion 24
Jordan 26
Lebanon 29
Kurdistan Region of Iraq 34
Sensitivity analysis 36
A brief review of international responses to COVID-19 38
Conclusion 40
Annex 42
Links and sources 48
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 3
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
List of abbreviations
COVID-19 The novel Coronavirus disease 2019
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
ILO International Labor Organization
IQD Iraqi Dinars
JOD Jordanian Dinars
KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq
LBP Lebanese Pounds
MENA Middle East and North Africa
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
RNA Rapid Needs Assessment
SMEB Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
SRHCS Syrian Refugee and Host Community Survey
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
VAF Vulnerability Assessment Framework
VASyR Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees
VAT Vulnerability Assessment Tool
WFP World Food Program
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 4
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Executive summary
COVID-19 has had an enormous Acknowledgements
impact on nearly every country in The poverty impact of COVID-19 and
the world. Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon the ensuing confinement policies and The World Bank Group in
collaboration with the United
were already facing difficult to economic contractions have been felt
Nations Refugee Agency
extreme circumstances even before throughout the world, not least by (UNHCR), with funding
the pandemic erupted, making marginalized communities. However, from the Joint Data Center
them particularly vulnerable, and COVID-19 has compounded existing on Forced Displacement,
compounding the effect. This report vulnerabilities or crises in Jordan, prepared this study on the
looks at the impact of the pandemic, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and impact of COVID-19 and
associated lockdowns and economic Lebanon. Syrian refugees – most of ensuing lockdown policies on
shocks and other misfortunes which whom have been displaced for up to the welfare of refugees and
host communities in Jordan,
have compounded the crisis, such nine years – are particularly exposed
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
as sharply lower oil revenues in Iraq given their perilous pre-crisis situation. and Lebanon.
and the Port of Beirut explosion in Host communities in these three
Lebanon, as well as political instability countries, who have supported and This document was written
in both. accommodated such large numbers by Bilal Malaeb and Matthew
of refugees, have also been heavily Wai-Poi (World Bank Group’s
Poverty and Equity Global
The report estimates that 4.4 million affected; all three countries were in
Practice – MENA). The
people in the host communities and strained positions prior to COVID-19, team worked under the
1.1 million refugees or IDPs have been ranging from economic stagnation and guidance of Saroj Kumar
driven into poverty in the immediate high public debt in Jordan, to a collapse Jha, Regional Director of
aftermath of the crisis, and while in public revenues due to international the Middle East Department
this considers all of Lebanon, it only oil price shocks in KRI, to complete (Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan,
includes three governorates in Jordan political and economic crisis in Lebanon. Iran and Syria) at World
Bank, Johannes Hoogeveen,
and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
Practice Manager of the World
due to data limitations. A response By March 2020, all three countries had
Bank’s Poverty and Equity
commensurate with the magnitude of witnessed their first cases of COVID-19 Global Practice for the MENA
the shock is needed to prevent further and introduced stringent containment region, Ayman Gharaibeh,
misery. policies ranging from partial closures Regional Director of the
of schools and shops to full curfew UNHCR Regional Bureau for
(Figure ES1). While these measures were the Middle East and North
initially largely successful in containing Africa, and Alexander Tyler,
Senior External Engagement
the spread of the pandemic, they also
Coordinator; UNHCR Regional
led to a decline in economic activity Bureau for MENA. We are
across most sectors, particularly in the grateful for Laura Rodriguez
informal market. In Jordan and Iraq, the for helpful guidance and
losses are estimated at around 8.2 and support in the data analysis
10.5 percent of 2019’s GDP respectively. phase, and to Nandini
In Lebanon where the COVID-19 crisis is Krishnan and Maria Ana Lugo
compounded by economic and political for a thorough peer review.
The team also benefited from
crises the losses are much higher,
coordination and cooperation
around 25 percent of GDP. Lebanon with colleagues from the
has experienced inflation of over 100 UNHCR Regional Bureau for
percent, largely due to its import MENA and UNHCR country
dependence and currency depreciation. offices in Jordan, KRI, and
Unsurprisingly, given the magnitude Lebanon. Preliminary findings
of these shocks, recent rapid needs were reviewed through
technical consultations in
assessments and UNHCR administrative
Jordan, KRI and Lebanon with
data show that refugees, who are highly
government, United Nations
concentrated in low-skilled jobs in the and NGO stakeholders and
informal sector, have had to reduce through an internal review
food intake, incur additional debt process at the World Bank.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 5
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
and in some instances suffered eviction. as well as estimates based on the national
These conditions exacerbated existing poverty lines for each of the three countries.
vulnerabilities and increased pressure on
social cohesion with their host communities. A key lesson of this study is that
underdeveloped or inaccessible national
This joint UNHCR-World Bank study, statistical systems limit the ability to
funded by the Joint Data Center on Forced accurately estimate poverty and the impact
Displacement, estimates the change in of crises and policy shocks. In the absence
poverty since the onset of COVID-19 among of official and accessible data in two of these
Syrian refugee and host communities in countries, the report necessarily relies on
Jordan 1, KRI and Lebanon. The study employs non-official data and provides estimates
a simulation exercise using macroeconomic based on assumptions that come with
projections on changes in the economy and inherent caveats. The report underlines the
translates these into shocks to household need for greater efforts to regularly collect,
consumption and therefore poverty. update and publish representative and
Understanding the effects of COVID-19, reliable surveys, including on expenditure
and of other compounding crises in the and welfare, to inform policy makers
case of KRI and Lebanon, is a crucial step adequately. This study relies on the Syrian
in informing the policies that need to be Refugees and Host Community Survey,
adopted as the pandemic unfolds and during undertaken by the World Bank in 2015-16,
the recovery period. This study is part of which uses a harmonized instrument across
a multi-phase collaboration between the the three countries. The data are drawn from
World Bank and UNHCR. Phase I, presented three governorates in Jordan with a high
in this report, estimates the impact of the concentration of refugees (Amman, Mafraq,
crisis(es) on poverty among host and refugee and Zarqa), and are representative of Lebanon
communities; Phase II aims to calibrate and KRI. The study also uses the most recent
these simulations with new phone survey projections on macroeconomic aggregates
data reflecting current circumstances on the from World Bank country economists,
ground and to delve more specifically into the remittances and information on changes in
cost of mitigation and policy options. assistance as underlying drivers.
This study uses dynamic simulations to
show changes in poverty on a monthly basis.
The impact of COVID-19 is modeled using
macroeconomic changes in various sectors
of the economy, changes to earnings in
formal and informal sectors, and changes in
remittances (domestic and international) and
inflation. The projections estimate changes in
poverty among host and refugee communities
and estimate the poverty-reducing effects
of government and UNHCR and other
international assistance. In this summary,
the main results are highlighted at the Upper
Middle-Income Country poverty line of
$5.50 per person per day for cross-country
comparability. The full report provides
technical details and sensitivity analyses
1
For Jordan, results reflect data in three governorates with
high concentrations of refugees only: Amman, Mafraq,
and Zarqa
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 6
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure ES1
Total and new
cases of COVID-19
by month and
the stringency Key Findings
of government
response to the In Jordan, since the pandemic first struck and
pandemic the country and society locked down, poverty
is estimated to have increased by 38 percentage
Cases points (p.p.) among Jordanians, and by 18 p.p.
(per million)
among Syrian refugees (Figure ES2); the lower
30,000
increase for refugees reflects the fact that many
25,000 refugees were already living beneath the poverty
20,000
line so there were fewer to be drawn under by
the crisis. The chart shows the percentage of
15,000
the population which falls into poverty from the
10,000 beginning of the crisis, beyond the pre-COVID-19
5,000 poverty rate. This means that at the start of the
crisis more than 1.5 million Jordanians living in
0
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec the three regions covered by this study became
2020
newly poor, as did more than 76,000 Syrian
refugees 2. The impact of COVID-19 is projected
New cases - Iraq Total cases - Iraq
to last for 12 months before returning to pre-
New cases - Jordan Total cases - Jordan
COVID-19 poverty levels.
New cases - Lebanon Total cases - Lebanon
The cash transfers initiated by the government for
Jordanians in the three governorates examined
are estimated to have reduced the poverty impact
Stringency by 12 percent (or 4 p.p.) by the fourth month
Index
of the crisis as a result of the expansion of the
100 Takaful program, the introduction of a cash top-up
for NAF and Takaful beneficiaries and temporary
80
cash assistance to many eligible non-Takaful
60 beneficiaries. The blue line in the charts shows
40 projected poverty with no public response; the
red line shows poverty after considering the
20
impact of the shock but also the public response.
0 For Syrian refugees, there is a 6 percent (2 p.p.)
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2020 mitigation of poverty impacts in the second month
of the crisis and 30 percent (6 p.p.) of the impact
Iraq by the fifth month of the crisis, the months that
Jordan had the largest expansions of UNHCR’s COVID-19
Lebanon
cash assistance program. In this study (and in
the graphs that follow), month 0 represents the
pre-COVID-19 first quarter of 2020, and month 1
Source:
corresponds to April 2020, the first month of the
Authors’ calculation based on data from Our World
In Data - Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina (2020) crisis.
– “Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19) – the data”.
Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved on
11 December 2020 from: https://ourworldindata.org/
coronavirus-data
Note:
The Stringency Index is a composite measure based
on nine response indicators including school closures,
workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value
2
from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest). If policies vary at the Jordanian’s population for Amman, Mafraq, and Zarqa only is
subnational level, the index is shown as the response 3,994,840, as estimated by the end of 2017 based on the official
level of the strictest sub-region. census. The Syrian refugee population is based on the refugees
December data span until 10th of the Month only. registered with UNHCR in these three governorates: 431,168.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 7
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure ES2
Changes in Poverty using the International Poverty Line - JORDAN
JORDANIAN SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
40 40 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
30 30 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20
10 10 Source:
Authors’ calculations
based on SRHCS
(2015/16)
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
Lebanon has been the hardest hit of the three have been projected only until December
countries by COVID-19, where the pandemic 2020, given the high uncertainty around the
arrived in a country already reeling from country’s macroeconomic outlook (Figure
political and economic collapse, soaring ES3). Unlike Jordan and KRI, the increase in
inflation and declining GDP, and soon after poverty is not expected to abate in 2021 as
the Port of Beirut explosion. One-third of the macro-economic crisis continues; Phase II
Lebanese (33 p.p., or 1.7 million people) will explore this in more detail. For refugees in
are expected to have fallen into poverty, Lebanon, UNHCR assistance mitigated around
and as many as 840,000 Syrian refugees 8 percent (3 p.p.) of the increase in poverty.
(56 p.p.); many more Syrians were living Further analysis highlights that much of the
just above the international poverty line potential reduction in poverty as a result of
when COVID-19 hit, making them much the mitigation policies is undone by inflation
more vulnerable 3. The results for Lebanon
Figure ES3
Changes in Poverty using the International Poverty Line
Actual CPI changes - LEBANON
LEBANESE SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
60 60 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
40 40 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (2015/16)
Month Month
3
These figures are calculated based on a population of 6,855,713, according to the UN population statistics,
which includes an unofficial estimate of 1.5 million Syrian refugees.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 8
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
In KRI, hosts, refugees and IDPs faced similar
initial poverty levels and experienced
increases of 24 p.p., 21 p.p., and 28 p.p.,
respectively, when lockdown measures were
most severe (Figure ES4). That means 1.2
million people in the host community will
have fallen into poverty, as well as 49,000
Syrian refugees and more than 180,000 Iraqi
IDPs 4. As is the case for Jordan, after an initial
rapid increase, poverty levels have likely
declined, and are projected to return to pre-
COVID levels some 12 to 14 months after the
onset of the pandemic. The cash assistance
provided to refugees and IDPs mitigated up to
17 percent (5.5 p.p.) of the increase in poverty
when it was administered.
Figure ES4
Changes in Poverty using International Poverty Line
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ
RESIDENT REFUGEE
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
IDP
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) international poverty
30 line (5.5/day)
mitigation -
20 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
10 Source:
Authors’ calculations
based on SRHCS
(2015/16)
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month
4
The population of the host community of KRI (5,167,166) is based on the SWIFT 2017-18 estimates of population. Syrian refugee population (237,052) is based on
UNHCR registration numbers in KRI, and the IDPs population size (643,251) is based on the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix for KRI.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 9
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
The report’s findings should be interpreted Finally, mitigation strategies, if done at
with some caution. The magnitude of the sufficient scale and duration, can help bridge
changes in measured poverty since the the gap between the onset of the crisis and
onset of COVID-19 on refugees and host the economic recovery and lessen the impact
communities would be lower if households of the pandemic on both refugees and host
responded to inflation by substituting for communities. This study has demonstrated
cheaper goods. Yet while this would reduce how such strategies in Jordan and KRI
the impact on measured poverty, such managed to reduce the poverty impact of
negative coping mechanisms do nonetheless COVID-19 (new initiatives in Lebanon are
incur welfare costs. Moreover, while UNHCR expected and will be examined in the second
and government assistance are included phase) but were insufficient to prevent
in this study, other organizations have poverty rising considerably. Looking into
also provided support which has not been 2021, additional responses from governments
captured. and the international community are clearly
needed to prevent continued misery. The
Conversely, poverty during the second phase of the report will seek to
economic recovery path may have been quantify how big such a response might
underestimated. Some projections of the need to be, but given the unprecedented
speed of recovery may be optimistic, for magnitude of the poverty impacts the
example, in light of the time it will likely take response will need to be commensurate.
for a vaccine to be available to the majority
of the population. The crisis may also have
had more severe welfare repercussions given
temporary employment or income losses can
translate into permanent shocks if negative
coping mechanisms are adopted, such as
pulling children out of school, forgoing
medical treatment or selling productive
assets to meet the cost of living. As more
data emerge from ongoing household phone
surveys and the macroeconomic outlooks are
updated, and a more complete mapping of
assistance programs is conducted, the results
presented in this study will be revised as part
of the second phase of this World Bank –
UNHCR collaboration.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 10
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Introduction
The poverty impact of COVID-19 and the Naturally, with the dearth of reliable data in
ensuing confinement policies have been felt this region, assumptions need to be made. As
throughout the globe, not least by such, this report comes with caveats. First,
marginalized communities. In Jordan KRI and this report does not make detailed sub-group
Lebanon, COVID-19 compounded already decompositions of the effects as doing so
existing vulnerabilities. Syrian refugees – would simply reflect the underlying
many of whom have been displaced for nine assumptions on how the shocks are affecting
years – are particularly exposed given their households. As phone survey data come in
perilous pre-crisis situation. Host from each country on how different sectors
communities, especially those in Jordan, KRI and households are being affects, the second
and Lebanon, who have supported and phase report will use these to recalibrate the
accommodated such large numbers of models and produce profiles of the new poor.
refugees, have also been heavily affected. Second, the macroeconomic shocks in KRI
and Lebanon are applied homogenously
This joint UNHCR-World Bank study, funded within economic sectors. Third, the projected
by the Joint Data Center on Forced path for recovery may be more optimistic
Displacement, estimates the change in than how it will pan out in practice as poverty
poverty since the onset of COVID-19 among changes are predicated on income losses
Syrian refugee and host communities in rather than job losses. The report thus refrains
Jordan 1, KRI and Lebanon. Understanding the from the consequences of scarring – because
magnitude of the impact of COVID-19, and of households accumulated debt for instance, or
other crises in the case of Lebanon, has search costs which need to be incurred to find
implications for the policies that governments new jobs. The second phase report will
and international organizations may need to incorporate information on job losses and
adopt as the pandemic unfolds and during the introduce these and scarring into the model.
recovery period. This study the first phase of a
two-phase collaboration between the World At this phase of the study, the report avoids
Bank and UNHCR. Phase I, presented in this providing policy suggestions such as whom to
report, is a diagnostic that simulates the target or how to best provide assistance, as
effects of the crisis(es) on poverty among host doing so requires more detailed data that is
and refugee communities; phase II aims to expected to become available during Phase II.
calibrate these simulations and to delve more One policy implication that can be drawn is
concretely nto the cost of mitigation and the critical need for more and more recent
policy options. official statistics. The preferred data for the
kind of microsimulations presented in this
In light of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of study, official welfare surveys, are either too
collecting face-to-face surveys and the limited old or not accessible, or both. The last
ability of phone surveys to capture Household Budget Survey in Lebanon dates
households’ consumption and poverty levels, from 2011-2012; the comparator survey for
this study relies on microsimulations using Jordan is more recent, it dates from 2017-18
pre-COVID-19 surveys with information on but is not publicly accessible. Only for KRI
household income and consumption. It (and the rest of Iraq) are survey data both
estimates the impact of COVID-19, as well recent and available, although its sample
other confounding crises and economic does not cover refugee populations in
contractions, on poverty by analyzing the sufficient numbers to be used for this study.
baseline characteristics of host and refugee Consequently, this study relies on micro-data
households and projecting the effects of the from a joint survey implemented in 2016, not
macro-economic trends and forecasts on by National Statistical Agencies but by a
these characteristics. To do so, a unique collaboration between the World Bank and
comparable survey has been used, combined UNHCR. This survey is exploited to its fullest
with the latest macro-economic growth and extent but comes with limitations that have
inflation projections and related labor market required additional assumptions and caveats
characteristics of hosts and refugees. that would not have been needed had more
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 11
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
recent, and more representative, welfare data Iraq’s GDP shrank by around 6.8 percent in the
been available. first half of 2020, following a two-year period
of steady growth.
In many respects the countries in this study
have experienced comparable dynamics, By March 2020, all three countries had
including tight fiscal space, receiving and witnessed their first cases of COVID-19 and
supporting large numbers of Syrian refugees introduced stringent containment policies
and have weathered the resulting pressures, ranging from partial closures of schools and
including on public services. Syrian refugees shops to full curfew. These measures were
registered with UNHCR in Jordan, KRI and initially largely successful in containing the
Lebanon have at times exceeded a fifth of the spread of the pandemic (Figure 1), although
host population. As of November 2020, their economic effects on households (along
UNHCR has registered 5.6 million Syrian with the broader contraction in demand) are
refugees, of which 1.8 million are hosted by the subject of this report. The first COVID-19
Jordan, KRI and Lebanon. 2 The total number case was confirmed in Jordan on 2nd March
of Syrians is even higher when including 2020. The country closed its borders on 19th
government estimates of those not registered March. Subsequently, the government of
with UNHCR. Jordan, KRI and Lebanon also Jordan issued defense orders that banned
differ in a number of ways: the general state of non-essential movement nationwide and
their economies, labor policies for refugees, effectively closed all economic sectors. In
lockdown policies and the prevalence and early April, a comprehensive 24-hour curfew
impact of COVID-19 on their societies. was introduced and a few weeks later the
previous lockdown measures were
In Lebanon, the total number of Syrians reintroduced. In early May, restrictions on
refugees is estimated at 1.5 million. Lebanon economic activity began to ease and
has been grappling with political instability, businesses were permitted to reopen at full
an economic crisis and, most recently, the capacity (provided 75 percent of employees
aftermath of the Port of Beirut explosion. The are Jordanians). Over the course of the
economic crisis comes on multiple fronts: subsequent months, intermittent curfew
currency and banking crises, increasing orders were put in place and self-isolation
unemployment and soaring levels of inflation. criteria were introduced. In KRI, the first cases
All these have had devastating effects on both appeared on 5th March. In response, the
Lebanese and refugee communities. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
introduced curfew measures in the areas
Jordan hosts 650,000 registered Syrian affected which later turned into a complete
refugees in addition to Iraqi refugees and lockdown of the region in early April. In May,
refugees of other nationalities. The the more stringent restrictions were relaxed
government estimates that the total number although many were re-imposed in June and
of Syrians refugees could reach as many as 1.4 July. In Lebanon, the first COVID-19 cases
million. 3 The country’s fiscal position has appeared early March. In response, the
been deteriorating since 2017 and coming government introduced a general
into the COVID-19 crisis unemployment had mobilization decree to fight the coronavirus in
been near 19 percent. mid-March. This was relaxed and re-instated
intermittently until May 2020, after which
KRI hosts around 250,000 refugees – almost curfew and car movement restrictions were
all the Syrian refugees in Iraq – and around introduced. In August, following a surge in the
half of the country’s IDPs. While KRI has the number of COVID-19 cases, the government
lowest levels of poverty in Iraq, the country as introduced a second lockdown. In November,
whole continues to face macro-economic new restrictions came into force.
fluctuations and the economic effects of the
pandemic. Iraq relies strongly on oil exports
which constitute around 43 percent of GDP,
which in turn affects the revenue transfers to
KRI. As such, the country was vulnerable to
the global drop in demand and prices of oil.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 12
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure 1
Number of Cases
Manar (4)
of COVID-19 Syrian Refugee
(per million
individuals)
Four-year-old Syrian refugee, Manar,
and stringency is photographed at home in Beirut
of government
response
Cases
(per million)
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2020
New cases - Iraq Total cases - Iraq
New cases - Jordan Total cases - Jordan
New cases - Lebanon Total cases - Lebanon
Stringency
Index
100
80
60
40
20
0
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2020
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Source:
Authors’ calculation based on data from Our World
In Data - Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina (2020)
– “Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19) – the data”.
Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved on
11 December 2020 from: https://ourworldindata.org/
coronavirus-data
Note:
The Stringency Index is a composite measure based
on nine response indicators including school closures,
workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value
from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest). If policies vary at the
subnational level, the index is shown as the response
level of the strictest sub-region.
Photo:
UNHCR / Diego Ibarra Sánchez / Lebanon
December data span until 10th of the Month only.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 13
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
COVID-19’s disruptive effects on economies Given its ubiquity, unemployment in the
have become apparent in recent months. It informal sector affects the most vulnerable
has wreaked havoc on markets, on the supply – including refugees. While some refugees
side by disrupting supply chains and on the have benefited from expansions in UNHCR
demand side through reduced employment, and WFP cash and food programs partially
income shocks, and through the uncertainty buffered its impact, refugees have been
that surrounds the future economic outlook. particularly affected, borrowing more and
The World Bank’s 2020 Poverty and Shared reducing consumption.
Prosperity Report suggests that up to 150
million people will fall below the extreme In Lebanon, according to the recently
poverty line by 2021, reversing years of completed annual Vulnerability Assessment
progress towards poverty alleviation. 4 For the of Syrian Refugees (VASyR, 2020; see Box 2)
MENA region, poverty is estimated to have 88 percent of the refugee population, cannot
increased by roughly 12 to 15 million people afford the Survival Minimum Expenditure
in 2020 alone, at the Upper Middle-Income Basket (SMEB) 7, compared to 55 percent at
Country poverty line of living on $5.50 per the end of 2019.
day. This estimate could rise to upwards of 23
million by the end of 2021. In Jordan, 92 percent of refugees surveyed
in May 2020 had less than 50 JOD of savings
In MENA, economic losses are estimated at left. By June 2020, 40 percent of refugees
around 7.7 percent of the region’s GDP in had debts of more than 100 JOD per capita.
2019, relative to a no-crisis counterfactual. More than 90 percent reported resorting to
Within this headline figure, there is also great least one negative coping strategy such as
variability. In Jordan and Iraq, the losses are reducing meals or expenditure on health and
at around 8.2 and 10.5 percent, respectively. education. 8
In Lebanon, the losses are the highest at 25
percent of its 2019 GDP, with the COVID-19 In KRI, early in the onset of the pandemic,
crisis compounded by the economic and UNHCR protection monitoring in KRI found
political crises mentioned above. that 62 percent of households had reduced
food consumption; 56 percent reported
The impact of the pandemic on informal that they had restricted mobility, affecting
markets is also marked. Jordan, KRI and livelihood opportunities for many of them; 55
Lebanon have large informal markets, percent reported entering further into debt
with poorer workers and precarious to pay for basic necessities; while 30 percent
employment. Informal enterprises often had to seek support from friends and family.
have limited financial cushioning and would Overall, more than 60 percent reported loans
naturally resort to wage cuts and job cuts as their primary source of income during the
or suspensions in times of crisis. 5 Where period August to October 2020. Refugees
governmental regulation may offer support have reported an increase in child marriages
to workers, informal workers fall outside the (12 percent of households), child labor (2
remit of such benefits. In Jordan, ILO surveys percent), and selling household items (2
found that as many 39 percent of vulnerable percent).
workers were not working anymore after the
onset of the crisis; 31 percent of vulnerable Movement restrictions and economic
Jordanians had been temporarily laid off, 17 pressures have exacerbated pre-existing
percent permanently laid off, with 41 percent protection risks, and, in some countries,
on paid leave. 6 In addition, 50 percent report social cohesion. Refugees have experienced
a notable increase in food prices, and 29 a growing number of incidents of
percent not having enough food in the past discrimination, stigmatization or xenophobia.
week mostly because they could not afford it. Tensions with local communities have been
exacerbated as a result of an increasingly
fierce competition over jobs and resources,
particularly in Lebanon. 9
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 14
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Reduced educational opportunities because Taken together, the impact of the COVID-19
of limited access to distance or home learning crisis on poverty has been very serious. The
have particularly affected the poorest in welfare consequences can be transient,
society, including refugee children. 10 Reduced possibly recovering with the rebound in the
income has in some cases resulted in refugees general economy, or they may be longer
being evicted from their homes or having to term. For this reason, this study has applied
share overcrowded apartments. In Jordan, a dynamic simulation model that shows the
prior to the March lockdown, refugees effects of the crisis on a monthly basis over
seeking eviction-related legal assistance and 2020 and 2021. The mitigation strategies that
mediation services from UNHCR comprised governments or international organizations
less than 1 percent of monthly referrals. After adopted in response to the pandemic are also
curfew measures eased again in the third modelled.
quarter of 2020, eviction-related referrals rose
to over 24 percent. This study first outlines the potential channels
of the impact of the pandemic on households
Syrian refugee women, already and their welfare. Next, a description is
disadvantaged, have been particularly provided of the data sources and baseline
affected. 11 With limited access to basic characteristics and vulnerabilities of these
services such as education, shelter, health households, and of the macroeconomic
care, mobile technology and the labor assumptions that shape these
market, the existing challenges faced by microsimulations and the results. Finally, this
women and girls have been exacerbated study concludes with a preliminary discussion
during the lockdowns. 12 An increase in cases on policy implications.
of domestic violence against women has been
reported, with mental health and psycho-
social issues associated with COVID-19
lockdowns also affecting men, women, girls
and boys. 13
Strategies to mitigate the impact of COVID-19
have included the expansion of government
social safety net and humanitarian cash
assistance programs. In Jordan, for example,
in response to the COVID-19 emergency, the
government expanded its existing Takaful
social safety net in terms of the number of
households covered, providing a monetary
top-up to those already included in the
program and provided prompt support to
190,000 Jordanian households soon after
the onset of the crisis. In Lebanon, the
government is planning to expand its existing
safety net from covering the poorest 8 percent
to cover the poorest 24 percent. KRI is piloting
a targeted cash transfer as well. UNHCR, WFP,
other UN agencies and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) have expanded their
cash assistance programs in 2020. The
existence of well-established registration and
cash delivery systems prior to the COVID-19
crisis enabled many organizations to scale-up
quickly in response.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 15
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Transmission channels
The COVID-19 crisis has affected household welfare Figure 2
in a number of ways. The impacts can be monetary Food Price Price changes
and non-monetary, such as service disruptions in Changes in <0%
health, education and other sectors. This study MENA between 0-10%
focuses on the monetary impacts on consumption, February 14th 10-20%
over 20%
the welfare aggregate used to measure poverty and October
in the three countries. Perhaps the most direct 30th, 2020
impact is any reduction in labor income as a result
of contracting the illness, but the more salient
are the impacts on the economic sectors in which Tomatoes Onions Lettuce Bread Rice Potatoes Processed Cheese, Hen eggs Meat of Meat of Oranges Bananas Apples
and and other liquid fresh or in shell, chickens, cattle,
individuals are employed, causing earnings and chicory,
fresh
bakers
wares
milk processed fresh fresh or
chilled
fresh or
chilled
employment shocks.
ARE
Households also face negative effects on their non-
labor income. For instance, households may face BHR
a decline in remittances as a result of the global
economic slowdown. The disruptions in supply DIJ
chains, employment, and changes in demand
DZA
have also affected prices. The price changes vary
among countries in MENA, but for some, staples’ EGY
prices have increased by more than 20 percent from
February to October 2020 (Figure 2). Lebanon in IRN
particular has experienced a large increase in price
levels, largely due to its import dependence and IRQ
currency devaluation, in addition to the effects of
the COVID-19 crisis. Given that the share of food ISR
expenditures is higher among poorer households,
the increase in food prices can have significant JOR
effects on their welfare.
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
MLT
OMN
QAT
SAU
SYR
TUN
YEM
Source:
WB calculations MENA Chief Economist’s Office
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 16
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Data sources and
baseline characteristics
This study relies on the Syrian Refugees Figure 3 shows the distribution of refugees
and Host Communities Survey (SRHCS) and host communities, those in wage labor
undertaken by the World Bank in or working on their own account, across
2015/2016. The SRHCS collects information economic sectors in each of the three
on households’ sources of income and countries according to the SRHCS 17. In
assistance, and provides information on labor Jordan, most refugees in wage labor work in
market characteristics of randomly chosen agriculture, construction, and other service
individuals within these households, among activities, and Jordanians in wage labor work
other data gathered. The survey was designed predominantly in professional and scientific
to be comparable for Syrian refugees and jobs and in education. Among those who
host communities and used a unified survey work on their own account, both refugees
module in KRI, Lebanon, and in three and hosts are concentrated in wholesale and
governorates in Jordan with a high refugee retail. In Lebanon, refugees are concentrated
concentration: Amman, Mafraq, and Zarqa. in agriculture, wholesale, and construction,
For this study, SRHCS data is complemented and the Lebanese community in wholesale
with auxiliary macroeconomic data, as well and retail. KRI has a slightly different labor
as microdata for refugees provided by UNHCR market composition: there seems to be more
and other agencies, such as the Vulnerability similarity in sectors where both refugees/IDPs
Assessment Framework (VAF) from Jordan, and host communities are concentrated, likely
the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian reflecting a combination of work permitting
Refugees (VASyR) from Lebanon, and the and more similar skill levels.
Vulnerability Assessment Tool in KRI.
While the SRHCS survey design is common
across the three countries, the sampling
frames differed considerably, largely due to a
lack of census and other data. 14 In Jordan, due
to limited access to the 2015 Census sampling
frame, the data collected are representative
of Zaatari and Azraq camps. These data were
complemented by purposive samples of the
Amman, Mafraq, and Zarqa governorates.
As such, the results and conclusions drawn
from Jordan are limited to these two camps,
the neighboring areas of the camps, and the
Amman governorate. 15 In Lebanon, due to the
lack of a recent and reliable sampling frame,
the data were collected based on a frame that
consists of the universe of enumeration areas
in the country, with associated estimates of
population. The survey was representative
of host communities and Syrian refugee
populations in KRI and Lebanon. In KRI, it is
representative for refugees as well as IDPs,
inside and outside of camps. 16
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 17
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure 3
Distribution
Across Sectors
of Work
(wage labor and
own account work)
Sectors of work - Wage Labor - JORDAN
Jordanian Syrian
Construction Administrative Accomodation Education
& support & food service
Other services
Mining
Professional, scientific
Manufacturing
Wholesale & retail trade
Wholesale Construction
Transport & storage & retail trade
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Education Other
services
Sectors of work - Own Account - JORDAN
Jordanian Syrian
Construction
Agriculture Manufacturing
Wholesale Wholesale
Manufacturing & retail Other & retail
trade services trade
Transport & storage
Mining
Other services
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 18
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Sectors of work - Wage Labor - LEBANON
Lebanese Syrian
Other services
Wholesale Administrative
& retail trade & support services
Accomodation
& food service
Construction
Transport & storage Human health
& social work
Accomodation & food service Manufacturing
Construction
Agriculture
Public
administration Administrative
& support services Wholesale
& retail trade
Manufacturing
Education
Sectors of work - Own account - LEBANON
Lebanese Syrian
Electricity, gas, steam
Accomodation
& food service Transport
& storage
Transport
& storage Manufacturing
Construction
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale Wholesale
& retail trade & retail trade
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 19
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Sectors of work - Wage Labor - KRI
Transport
& storage
Resident Refugee Wholesale IDP
& retail trade
Education Accomodation
Transport Wholesale
Wholesale & storage & food service
& retail trade
& retail trade Accomodation
Accomodation Public
& food service Human health
& food service administration
& social work
Public
Professional, administration
scientific Construction
Education Manufacturing
Manufacturing Construction
Manufacturing
Human health Other services Education
Construction
& social work
Sectors of work - Own account - KRI
Resident Refugee IDP
Transport
Construction & storage
Transport Accomodation Transport
& storage & food service Professional, & storage
Agriculture scientific
Manufacturing Manufacturing Accomodation
& food service
Construction
Wholesale Wholesale Manufacturing Wholesale
& retail trade & retail trade & retail trade
Source:
Authors’ calculations based on SRHCS (2015/16)
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 20
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
On the welfare side, there are observable Figure 4
differences between host communities and Baseline density
refugees. The consumption distribution 18 is Jordanian
of expenditure Syrian
compared against the international poverty (per capita)
line for Upper Middle-Income Countries ($5.5/ JORDAN national poverty line
day) for cross-country comparison as well as international poverty line
each country’s national poverty line. These
Density
distributions reflect the household per capita
.010
expenditure distribution at the end of 2019,
as they are nowcast based on growth and .008
inflation from the year of the survey .006
(see Box 1).
.004
The analysis begins by examining the pre- .002
COVID-19 “baseline” distributions across 0
the three countries. Figures 4-6 show the 0 200 400 600 800
Expenditure (adj.) in JOD
density distribution of household per capita
expenditure. The density graphs reflect
the proportion of households under the
poverty line, i.e. the area underneath the Figure 5
curve to the left of the poverty line is the Baseline density
fraction of households who are considered of expenditure
Lebanese
poor by that poverty line. For Jordan, the Syrian
(per capita)
expenditure distribution of refugees is both LEBANON national poverty line
more concentrated and much lower than
international poverty line
that of Jordanians. Whereas the mode of
Density
the distribution for Jordanians lies around
.0020
150 JOD per capita per month, for refugees
it is closer to 70 JOD per capita per month. .0015
The differences between host communities .0010
and refugees are larger in Jordan (for the .0005
Mafraq, Zarqa, and Amman governorates)
0
than they are in KRI and in Lebanon. In
0 500 1000 1500
Lebanon, the similarity of the distributions Expenditure (adj.) in ‘000 LBP
may be influenced by the deteriorating
economic conditions from 2019. In both KRI
and Lebanon, while the refugee (and IDPs
in KRI) distribution still lies to the left of the Figure 6
host community’s distribution, the modes Baseline density
Resident / Kurd
are at similar levels. As a consequence, Syrian
of expenditure IDP
many refugees are under the poverty lines (per capita)
in Jordan, under the national poverty line in KURDISTAN national poverty line
Lebanon, and more refugees are under the international poverty line
poverty lines than are the host communities
in general. This higher rate of pre-COVID Density
poverty among refugees in all three countries .006
does mean that there are fewer non-poor .004
refugees who can potentially fall into poverty,
.002
limiting the maximum poverty impacts of the
crisis. 0
0 200 400 600 800
Expenditure (adj.) in ‘000 IQD
Source:
Authors’ calculations based on SRHCS (2015/16)
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 21
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Macroeconomic assumptions
This section presents the macroeconomic Table 1: Macroeconomic Changes in Sectors
changes that underlie the microsimulation of the Economy - JORDAN
results. In particular, the changes relative
to the pre-COVID-19 baseline at the sector Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Economic Sector
2020 2020 2020 2020 2021 2021 2021 2021
level at various quarters of the year are
transformed into monthly changes and Agriculture, forestry
0.5% -30% -6% -6% -4% 0% 0% 0%
and fishing
then used as parameters for the analysis.
For Jordan, the inputs of a computable Mining and quarrying 0.5% -36% 9% 9% 5% 0% 0% 0%
general equilibrium (CGE) model are used to All manufacturing -2.7% -19.6% -26.5% -26.5% -9% 0% 0% 0%
parameterize the macroeconomic changes
by economic sector for the eight quarters Electricity, gas, steam
and air conditioning 0.5% -30% 2% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0%
of 2020 and 2021. 19 A palpable initial shock supply
to the economy is observed for the second Water supply; sewer-
quarter of 2020, after which the economy age, waste manage-
0.5% -30% -30% -30% -18% 0% 0% 0%
ment and remediation
begins to recover throughout 2020 and activities
returns in the first quarter of 2021 to pre-crisis
Construction 0.5% -49% -20% -20% -11% 0% 0% 0%
levels.20 In Table 1 those negative effects are
Wholesale and retail
felt throughout the various economic sectors, trade; repair of motor
0.5% -35% -35% -35% -21% 0% 0% 0%
but the construction and education sectors vehicles and motor-
cycles
are some of the worst hit by the pandemic.
These two sectors have a large concentration Transportation and
0.5% -41% -30% -30% -18% 0% 0% 0%
storage
of refugees and Jordanians, respectively,
as shown in the previous section. In an Accommodation and
0.5% -43% -43% -43% -25% 0% 0% 0%
food service activities
extension, a second wave and lockdown
measures is examined in Jordan, and the Information and
0.5% -31% -25% -25% -15% 0% 0% 0%
communication
economy re-shocked with the Q2 2020
parameters. Financial and insur-
0.5% -31% -15% -15% -9% 0% 0% 0%
ance activities
Real estate activities 0.5% -30% -30% -30% -18% 0% 0% 0%
Professional, scientific
0.5% -47% -47% -47% -27% 0% 0% 0%
and technical activities
Public administration
and defense; compul- 0.5% -10% -10% -10% 10% 9% 9% 9%
sory social security
Education 0.5% -50% -30% -30% -18% 0% 0% 0%
Human health and
0.5% -30% -28% -28% -16% 0% 0% 0%
social work activities
Other service activities 0.5% -38% -26% -26% -15% 0% 0% 0%
Source:
Refaqat, Rodriguez, Wai-Poi,
Griffin and McCartney (2020)
Note:
The parameters shown in this
table are those of the formal
sector. We estimate that the
informal sector observes a
shock 20% more severe in all
economic sectors.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 22
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
In Lebanon, the effects of the pandemic are
compounded by an economic crisis that
pre-dates it, and by the subsequent Port of
Beirut explosion of August 2020. The strongest
driver of poverty changes in Lebanon in 2020
has been inflation. For the simulations, the Table 2: Macroeconomic Changes in Sectors
output of a computable general equilibrium of the Economy – Lebanon
model is used to parameterize the income
shocks for the months of 2020. 21 The model Economic Sector Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Q4 2020
assumes that the Lebanese economy
continues in the same downward trend as Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.5% -0.5% -0.2% -0.2%
2019 in the first quarter of 2020. The impacts
of COVID-19 in the second quarter are then Mining and quarrying -4.2% -20.8% 0.5% 0.5%
added, together with the impact of the All manufacturing -2.7% -19.6% -26.5% -26.5%
explosion in the third quarter. No recovery is
assumed in the fourth quarter. Unlike Jordan Electricity, gas, steam and air
-2.6% -11.0% -19.6% -19.6%
conditioning supply
and KRI, in Lebanon the changes in poverty
in 2020 only are simulated, and not in 2021 Water supply; sewerage, waste
management and remediation -7.5% -17.3% -24.1% -24.1%
due to the increasing uncertainty over the activities
macroeconomic outlook in the country. This
Construction -14.9% -62.4% -68.5% -68.5%
will be revisited in
Phase II. Wholesale and retail trade; repair
-2.4% -10.7% -6.8% -6.8%
of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Transportation and storage -5.3% 5.7% 2.3% 2.3%
Accommodation and food service
-17.0% -38.8% -88.8% -88.8%
activities
Information and communication -4.4% -8.6% -6.5% -6.5%
Financial and insurance activities -0.6% 20.0% 35.3% 35.3%
Real estate activities -10.1% -22.7% -30.2% -30.2%
Professional, scientific and
-1.3% -4.1% 0.3% 0.3%
technical activities
Source:
Public administration and defense;
World Bank (2020), Beirut 22.7% -37.6% -37.0% -37.0%
compulsory social security
Rapid Damage and Needs
Assessment, August 2020
Education -0.3% -16.1% -24.3% -24.3%
Note:
assumptions are based on the Human health and social work
-4.4% -20.0% -31.6% -31.6%
inputs of a computable general activities
equilibrium model. For Q1, we
take the baseline value added Administrative and support
1.1% 23.7% 16.1% 16.1%
growth in sectors in 2019, services
for Q2 we take the baseline
estimates of 2020 including
Arts, entertainment and recre-
1.1% 23.7% 16.1% 16.1%
ation
the impact of COVID-19 and
the economic crisis, for Q3 we
add to the baseline estimates Other service activities 1.1% 23.7% 16.1% 16.1%
the estimated impact of the
Beirut blast of August 2020,
and for Q4 we assume no Activities of households, other
1.1% 23.7% 16.1% 16.1%
recovery. Further, assume that goods and services
the formal sector estimates
at 10% higher than reported
Extraterritorial organizations
in this table, and the informal 1.1% 23.7% 16.1% 16.1%
and bodies
sector’s 10% lower.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 23
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
In KRI, the model relies on macroeconomic Table 3
forecasts for 2020 and 2021 and then adjusts Macroeconomic Changes in Sectors of the Economy
them to quarterly and monthly levels. 22 There – Kurdistan
are two limitations in KRI. First, the forecasts
are based on three sectors – Agriculture, Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Economic Sector
Services, and Industry – which is why there is 2020 2020 2020 2020 2021 2021 2021 2021
less variation between sectors as compared
Agriculture 5.0% -1.0% 3.6% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.5%
to the cases of Lebanon and Jordan. Second,
the macroeconomic projections are for Iraq Manufacturing 4.3% -4.8% 0.5% 1.0% 1.0% 1.4% 2.0% 3.0%
nationally and are not disaggregated to KRI.
Nonetheless, a decline in economic activity Services 4.7% -4% 0.5% 1.0% 1.0% 5.0% 7.0% 8.0%
in the second quarter of 2020 is observed. A
recovery is forecasted starting from the third Source:
Macro Poverty Outlook – Iraq, World Bank (October 2020)
quarter.
Note:
It is important to highlight that these assumptions are based on the annual estimates and forecasts of
estimates are based on forecasts and that the Macro Poverty Outlook of Iraq and spread over the quarters
to obtain quarterly estimates. We assume that the formal sector
the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve, estimates at 10% higher than reported in this table, and the
as such these estimates will be updated as informal sector’s 10% lower.
further data is gathered.
The World Bank estimates an 8.5 percent
decline in remittances to low- and middle-
income MENA countries as a result of the
pandemic in 2020 followed by fall of 7.7
percent in 2021. 23 Naturally, the rebound in
remittances to pre-crisis levels will depend
on the recovery in the global economy. In
Jordan, KRI and Lebanon, remittances play
an important role in household finances.
Further, non-labor income may be affected, Figure 7
including private transfers as well as property, Assumptions on International Remittances
asset, and other business income. An initial the changes in Domestic Remittances
10 percent drop in international remittances Remittances
is assumed, as well as a 50 percent drop in
domestic remittances and a gradual recovery Percentage Reduction
from baseline
for all three countries. Given that the micro-
data on the source of remittances, domestic 0
or international, is not available, the models
assumes an average remittances shock at
-10
each month.
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 24
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Results and discussion
The microsimulation model takes as Two poverty lines are used: the international
parameters the macroeconomic changes poverty line for upper middle-income
in various sectors of work, formal and countries ($5.5/person/day) to allow
informal, the changes in remittances, and comparability across the three contexts, and
shocks households’ various income sources a national poverty line to offer a country
accordingly on a month-by-month basis. The specific benchmark. These poverty lines are
model assumes that there are no behavioral adjusted for inflation on a monthly basis using
responses by households, a one-to-one CPI data.
transmission of the shock from income to
consumption, that households do not adopt In the analysis below, the change in poverty
any consumption smoothing mechanisms from the pre-COVID-19 baseline is modelled,
via asset liquidation or savings depletion 24, i.e. this does not show the levels of poverty
and that there are no poverty traps. Notably, but rather the change from the initial level
it models the changes in income and not of poverty before the pandemic. As such, at
employment, and assumes individuals return baseline – month 0 – the change is set to zero,
to their initial sector of work as the economy and the subsequent months are the increases,
recovers. Further data from phone surveys in percentage points, from the baseline
as well as work permits may be required level. In terms of the timeline of the analysis,
to recalibrate assumptions on return to month 0 corresponds to the projected level
employment. See Box 1 (and a technical of poverty in the first quarter of 2020, and
annex) for further discussion on the modelling month 1 is April 2020, till month 21 which
methodology and important limitations to the corresponds to December 2021. In Jordan, the
approach. results below show a hypothetical scenario
of a second wave of the pandemic, while for
The SRHCS survey used includes income Lebanon and KRI, show the first wave only.
data by source: labor income (wages), own
account income, remittances, asset earnings, It is acknowledged that some of the
pensions, assistance from government/ assumptions presented above may
NGO/WFP /UNHCR (cash or in-kind), auto- underestimate the extent of the crisis as it
consumption, and other income. The unfolds in various ways in different countries,
aggregate income measure was transformed as such, future phases of this work will refine
to the national household consumption the parameters of the model based on new
distributions used to measure poverty (phone-survey and COVID) data.
(see Box 1). The macroeconomic shocks
on the sectors of the economy are then
transformed onto the labor income and
own account income, depending on the
sector of work reported by the reporting
individuals in the household. Remittances
are adjusted according to the estimated drop
in international and domestic remittances,
and changes in government or international
organizations assistance programs are
factored in.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 25
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Box 1 The application of household-specific shocks (based
Methodological on mix of income sources and sector and formality of
Note on employment) to the transformed household per capita
Surveys and consumption then rests upon the assumption that while
Transformations the SRHCS income distribution is far more compressed
than the national survey consumption distribution, it
provides a much more comparable rank ordering of
The 2015/16 SRHCS has some limitations. It does not households. Given the lack of savings in the poorer half of
include a consumption module and has only relatively the distribution in the Jordan HEIS (and likely in Iraq and
limited income data – from eight different sources. It also especially Lebanon pre-COVID-19 but post-economic crisis),
has a number of important advantages over using national this assumption seems defensible. This transformation is
socioeconomic surveys from each country. First, it is implemented separately for host communities and refugees
more recent than the 2012 HBS survey in Lebanon, which in Jordan and Iraq (where data allow disaggregation);
predates the Syrian refugee crisis and its subsequent in Lebanon, the Lebanese distribution is transformed to
impacts on the economy (see, for example, The Fallout of the Lebanese subsample, and the refugees to the non-
War (World Bank 2020). Second, the income categories it Lebanese subsample.
does include, as well as detailed sector of employment of
each respondent, are important for being able to transmit It is important to note that consumption is shocked only
different types of shock to different households. Finally, it by changes to particular income sources. Social assistance
is comparable across all three countries as well as between for both host communities and refugees is modelled
host communities and refugees within each country in separately from labor market income and remittances, so
a manner that the available national surveys for each those relying more on assistance are in fact less vulnerable
country are not. to the economic contraction. Moreover, the expansion
of the social safety net in Jordan since the survey was
The lack of a consumption module, however, is a serious conducted has been modelled and included in the
impediment to producing poverty estimates. To address nowcasted incomes. Formal and informal incomes in each
this, the per capita income distributions in the SRHCS are sector are treated differently under COVID, with informality
transformed for both host communities and refugees to defined as not having a contract of employment and no
the per capita consumption distribution from the national insurance, and treated as being affected 20% worse than
surveys (the 2012 HBS in Lebanon, the 2017-18 SWIFT in the formal sector by the crisis.
Iraq and the 2017-18 HEIS in Jordan, which are used to
estimate the national poverty rate in each country). A Several cautionary words should be said about applying
common method for such a transformation is survey-to- the largely standard macro-microsimulation approach
survey imputation. For example, per capita consumption in countries and communities with high rates of
in SWIFT could be regressed upon common indicators informality and reliance on assistance, such as refugees.
of welfare in both SWIFT and SRHCS and resulting Macroeconomic growth may not translate equally to formal
coefficients used to predict per capita consumption in and informal workers as it is assumed to here. Second,
SRHCS. One drawback with this approach is that the Jordan introduced a work permit scheme for refugees after
predicted distribution tends to be more compact than the the survey used here was conducted and around 150,000
true distribution, which in turn affects poverty estimates permits have been issued, allowing refugees to work in
derived from the predicted distribution. As an alternative, the formal market. This means a minority but significant
a more mechanical transformation is applied, whereby number of households in the survey may have their
a scaling factor is calculated for each percentile of the nowcasted income levels underestimated due to improved
SRHCS income distribution to expand it to match the same working opportunities since the survey was conducted.
percentile of the national survey consumption distribution. Third, due to lack of data, earnings shocks are assumed
This process, while not analytically grounded, produces an to all households’ incomes and no unemployment is
accurate replication of the consumption distribution (see modelled. In reality, some households are likely to
Technical Annex). have lost all labor market income and some households
relatively little. Moreover, household incomes are expected
to recover in line with economic growth, but temporary
income and job losses may become more permanent (a
phenomenon known as “scarring”) or at least slower to
recover due to negative coping mechanisms used during
the shock, such as selling productive assets. All of these
caveats will be further explored in Phase II using data
collected from phone surveys (unemployment, income
losses, characteristics of households most affected) and the
work permit program.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 26
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Jordan
For Jordan, the 2011 national poverty line the poverty line prior to the crisis; in simple
has been inflated to around 67 JOD per terms, many Syrians were already below the
person per month for 2019, which is very poverty line, limiting how many more could
close to the 2019 $5.5/day international fall into poverty, while many Jordanians
poverty line of 72.14 JOD, calculated at 2011 were above the poverty line, increasing the
prices (PPP) and adjusted for inflation to number who could fall below it. Under the
2019. Based on the assumptions presented assumptions of Table 1, these increases in
in Table 1, Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the poverty return back to their pre-crisis levels a
changes in poverty headcount, percentage year after the onset of the pandemic.
points from the baseline poverty rate, at
month 0 (March 2020). Since refugees were Another way of thinking about poverty is not
Al Mafraq
Al Mafraq poorer than Jordanians before the crisis by using a poverty headcount rate as in the
began, their baseline starting point reflects last paragraph, but instead by considering the
the difference in poverty levels between poverty gap. The gap measures how far below
a
a the two communities of approximately 33.3 the line, on average, poor households are.
percentage points, based on the international For example, a poverty gap of 0.07 indicates
poverty line. that poor households are on average 7
percent below the poverty line. In Jordan,
At the onset of the crisis, there is a 38 in the first month of the crisis, not only did
percentage point (p.p.) increase in poverty the poverty headcount rate leap up for both
rates among Jordanians, and a 18 p.p. groups, but the poverty gap did as well. As
increase in poverty rates among Syrian with the poverty rate, the increase in the gap
Syrian Refugee Population refugees,
Host Community noting, as shown in Figure 4, that
Population was larger for Jordanians than Syrians, a
Syrian
( 661,9Refugee
97) Population Host
( 10M Community
) Population
(661,997) ( 1 0 M ) Syrian refugees were poorer than Jordanians fact driven by different factors. As previously
0 - 15,000
0 - 15,000
in pre-crisis period. The higher increase
0 - 100,000
0 - 100,000
noted, the rate went up more for Jordanians
15,001 - 50,000 among
100,001 - 200,000 Jordanians reflects that the mode of because so many Syrians already lived below
15,001 - 50,000 100,001 - 200,000
their consumption distribution was above the poverty line. The poverty gap increased
50,001 - 100,000
50,001 - 100,000
200,001 - 1,000,000
200,001 - 1,000,000 less for Syrians because they were less reliant
Irbid on labor market income and remittances
Irbid
>= 100,001
>= 100,001
>= 1,000,001
1,000,001
>=Al
and more reliant on UN and NGO support,
Mafraq
Ajloun
Ajloun
Jarash
Al Mafraq insulating them to a greater degree.
Jarash
Al Balqa
Al Balqa
Amman
Amman
Annex 3 presents full results for each country
Zarqa
Zarqa
Irbid and sub-population at both international and
Amman
Madaba Amman
Al Mafraq
national poverty lines, and also shows that
Madaba
Ajloun
Jarash
the poverty gap is projected to recover faster
Al Karak Al Balqa for Jordanians as the economy and their
Al Karak Amman
Zarqa
incomes recover along with it, although the
gap ends slightly higher for both groups by
Al Tafilah Amman
Al Tafilah Madaba the end of the forecast period.
Ma'an
Ma'an
Al Karak Syrian Refugee Population Host Community Population In addition to modelling the income shocks,
Syrian Refugee Population
(661,997)
Host Community Population
(10M)
(661,997) (10M) mitigation strategies were also simulated.
0 - 15,000
0 - 15,000
0 - 100,000
0 - 100,000
In Jordan, the Government had planned
Al Tafilah
15,001 - 50,000 100,001 - 200,000 to expand its social safety net, Takaful, for
Al Aqaba 15,001 - 50,000 100,001 - 200,000
Al Aqaba Ma'an Jordanian nationals in 2020 and 2021 prior
50,001 - 100,000
50,001 - 100,000
Syrian Refugee
200,001 - 1,000,000
Population
200,001 - 1,000,000 Host Community toPopulation
the pandemic, with an expectation of
(661,997) (10M)
an additional 25,000 and 40,000 Jordanian
>= 100,001
>= 100,001
0 - 15,000 >= 1,000,001
>= 1,000,001
0 - 100,000
households to receive Takaful assistance in
15,001 - 50,000 2020 and 2021, respectively. In response to
100,001 - 200,000
Al Aqaba
the COVID-19 emergency, the Government
50,001 - 100,000 200,001 - 1,000,000
added a further 10,000 households in 2020
(accelerated entry from the 2021 quota) and
>= 100,001 >= 1,000,001
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 27
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
provided a monetary top-up to those who regular cash assistance, for 2 months. The
are already in the program. In addition, the amount received varied based on household
Government provided six months’ temporary size, and whether they receive food assistance
assistance to 190,000 Jordanian households from WFP. In addition, 2,134 camp households
at the onset of the crisis. who were outside the camp and remained out
of camp due to the restrictions on movement
UNHCR also expanded its cash program in were also provided with emergency cash
response to the COVID-19 crisis in Jordan. assistance. Both UNHCR and the Government
It provided COVID-19 emergency cash of Jordan’s responses are included in the
assistance to 47,046 non-camp vulnerable models that show mitigation strategies.
households who did not receive UNHCR’s
Figure 8
Changes in Poverty using the International Poverty Line - JORDAN
JORDANIAN SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
40 40 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
30 30 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20
10 10 Source:
Authors’ calculations
based on SRHCS
(2015/16)
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
Figure 9
Changes in Poverty using the National Poverty Line - JORDAN
JORDANIAN SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
40 40 national
poverty line
30 30 mitigation -
national
poverty line
20 20
10 10 Source:
Authors’ calculations
based on SRHCS
(2015/16)
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 28
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
In terms of mitigation among Jordanians in the three The same microsimulations are then modelled but
governorates analyzed, there is a mitigation of 4 p.p. including a potential second lockdown in Jordan that
(around 12 percent) of the increase in poverty by the fourth delays recovery. The simulation re-introduces the COVID-19
month of the crisis, as a result of the expansion of the shock in the eighth month of the crisis. Under this more
Takaful program, the introduction of the cash top-up, and severe scenario, poverty rates take substantially longer
the cash assistance to eligible non-Takaful beneficiaries. to return to pre-crisis as shown in Figure 10 and Figure
For Syrian refugees, there is a 2 p.p. (6 percent) mitigation 11, showing recovery 20 months later for both refugees
in the second month of the crisis and 6 p.p. (30 percent) and host communities to pre-pandemic levels. In terms of
at the fifth month of the crisis - the months that had the mitigation, a new mitigation response is not assumed given
largest expansions of UNHCR’s COVID cash assistance that this might not be fiscally feasible. Instead it is assumed
program. that the longer-term Takaful program continues to expand
as originally planned.
Figure 10
Changes in Poverty using the International Poverty Line - Severe Scenario - JORDAN
JORDANIAN SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
40 40 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
30 30 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20
10 10 Source:
Authors’ calculations
based on SRHCS
(2015/16)
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
Figure 11
Changes in Poverty using the National Poverty Line - Severe Scenario - Jordan
JORDANIAN SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
40 40 national
poverty line
30 30 mitigation -
national
poverty line
20 20
10 10 Source:
Authors’ calculations
based on SRHCS
(2015/16)
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 29
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Lebanon
Similar to Jordan, two poverty lines are Given the rate of inflation 25, the impact of
applied: the international poverty line price changes on household consumption is
for upper middle-income countries ($5.5/ ambiguous. For instance, households may
person/day) as well as a national poverty choose to substitute imported products with
line. The national poverty line is nowcast locally produced products at lower prices and
in 2019 at around 457,520 LBP per person/ quality than captured in the Consumer Price
month and the international poverty line at Index. Additionally, households may adjust
around 171,944 LBP per person/month (at their consumption basket and eliminate some
2011 PPP levels and nowcast to 2019). Crucial
LEBANON SITUATION MAP
goods and services from it due to the surge in
in the LEBANON
case SITUATION
of Lebanon is thatMAP the poverty prices.
Syrian Refugees and Host Community Populations
Syrian Refugees and Host Community
lines are adjusted for Populations
inflation
(As of 30 on a monthly
September 2020)
(As of 30 September 2020)
basis, given the soaring levels of inflation the As such, various scenarios are presented
country experienced in 2020 (Figure 12). below with different levels of pass-through
of inflation. Figure 13 shows the changes in
poverty rates from baseline according to the
Akkar Figure 12
Akkar macroeconomic shocks, as well as the actual
Inflation rates in Lebanon
monthly changes in CPI. Figure 15 assumes
based on CPI
month on month that only 50 percent of inflation reduces real
North
North change from Dec 2019 spending power due to substitution. Figure 17
120.00% provides the counterfactual of the changes in
Hermel/Baalbek
Hermel/Baalbek
100.00% poverty due to the sectoral macroeconomic
80.00% shocks without any inflation.
Source: 60.00%
Authors’ calculations 40.00%
The results show a higher baseline poverty
based on data from 20.00% LEBANON SITUATION MAP
CAS Lebanon 0.00% LEBANON SITUATION MAP
rate among refugees 26 than host communities.
Syrian Refugees and Host Community Populations
ount
anon
ount Jan FebSyrian Refugees
Mar Apr and
May Jun Jul Host
Aug SepCommunity
Oct Nov Dec Populations
(AsLEBANON It is
of 30 September around
2020) 10 p.p.
SITUATION MAP higher at the international
anon (As of 30 September 2020)
Syrian Refugees and Host Community Populations
poverty line and 20 percentage points higher
at the national poverty line. In Figure 13,
(As of 30 September 2020)
Bekaa based on macroeconomic shocks and the CPI
Bekaa
Syrian Refugee Population Host Community Population changes, there is a 33 p.p. increase in poverty
Syrian Refugee Population Host Community
Akkar Population
(879,529) (3.86M)
(879,529)
Akkar
(3.86M) among the Lebanese and 56 p.p. among the
0 - 50,000
0 - 50,000
0 - 100,000
0 - 100,000 Akkar Syrian refugees by the end of 2020 at the
50,001 - 100,000 100,001 - 500,000 international poverty line, and an increase by
50,001 - 100,000 North 100,001 - 500,000
North 55 p.p. and 42 p.p. respectively at the national
100,001 - 150,000 500,001 - 1,000,000
100,001 - 150,000 500,001 - 1,000,000
North poverty line (Figure 15). As discussed,
Hermel/Baalbek
Hermel/Baalbek
this may not reflect poverty if it were to
>= 150,001
>= 150,001
>= 1,000,001
>= 1,000,001 20km
be measured, as it does not capture any
Hermel/Baalbek
20km
behavioral responses. However, it does reflect
Beirut true household welfare impacts. Substituting
Beirut
Beirut to cheaper but poorer quality goods and
Beirut Mount
Lebanon
Mount
Beirut services reduces utility even if it means a
Lebanon
Beirut
Mount
higher consumption can be maintained.
Lebanon
Bekaa In Lebanon, the poverty gap was low at
Bekaa
Syrian Refugee Population Host Community Population baseline for both Lebanese and Syrians
Syrian Refugee Population
Bekaa Host Community Population
(879,529)
(879,529)
(3.86M)
(3.86M) (Annex 3). However, it not only leaps
Syrian Refugee Population Host Community Population
0 - 50,000
0 - 50,000 (879,529)
0 - 100,000
0 - 100,000
(3.86M)
considerably higher for Syrians in the first
El Nabatieh 50,001 - 100,000
0 - 50,000
100,001 - 500,000
100,001 - 500,000 0 - 100,000
month of the shock, but the gap continues
El Nabatieh 50,001 - 100,000
South
South
to grow and remains considerably higher at
Lebanon 100,001 - 150,000 50,001 - 100,000 500,001 - 1,000,000 100,001 - 500,000
El Nabatieh
Lebanon 100,001 - 150,000 500,001 - 1,000,000 the end of the first year. This likely reflects
South
Lebanon 100,001 - 150,000
the much higher reliance on wage work (88
500,001 - 1,000,000
>= 150,001
>= 150,001
>= 1,000,001
>= 1,000,001 20km
percent of refugee households compared
>= 150,001
20km
>= 1,000,001
to 56 percent of Lebanese households)
20km
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 30
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
and refugee worker concentration in construction and While the assistance to Syrian refugees mitigates around
manufacturing which were particularly affected. 3 p.p. of their increase in poverty (8 percent) in the second
month but mitigates around 2 p.p. (4 percent) over
The mitigation policies adopted by UNHCR in Lebanon to the months following the crisis, when measured at the
assist the refugees in response to the COVID-19 crisis are international poverty line (Figure 13), it does not show a
also modelled 27, in particular, two interventions. The first is noticeable reduction using the national poverty line (Figure
a COVID-19 cash assistance program which targeted 11,500 14). The reason is that much of the reduction in poverty as
households in May 2020 with 320,000 LBP for three months, a result of the mitigation policies is offset by inflation over
and 12,000 households in August 2020 with 400,000 time. Indeed, Figure 15 to Figure 18 show scenarios with
LBP for three months. Additionally, UNHCR Lebanon lower levels of inflation where the effect of the mitigation
expanded their existing multi-purpose cash assistance by strategies become more noticeable.
approximately 16,000 households in June and by another
6,000 households in August.
Figure 13
Changes in Poverty using the International Poverty Line
Actual CPI changes - LEBANON
LEBANESE SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
60 60 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
40 40 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (2015/16)
Month Month
Figure 14
Changes in Poverty using the National Poverty Line
Actual CPI changes - LEBANON
LEBANESE SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
60 60 national poverty line
mitigation − national
40 40 poverty line
20 20
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Month Month
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 31
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure 15 and Figure 16 show a scenario with a 50 percent Refugees, however, experience a 47 p.p. increase at
inflation pass-through to consumption, reflecting likely the national poverty line and a 38 p.p. increase at the
substitution, and resulting in a slightly lower increase in international poverty line. In this scenario, the mitigation
poverty. For the host community, the crises result in a near strategies mitigate around 4 p.p. (14 percent) of the
39 p.p. increase in 2020 at the national poverty line, and a increase in poverty among refugees at the onset of the
16 p.p. increase at the international poverty line. crisis, to 1 p.p. (3 percent) at the end of 2020, at the
international poverty line, but with minimal reduction
when measured at the national poverty line. These changes
also seem to be reflected by other measures of welfare,
such as the survival and minimum expenditure basket
(SMEB) approach by UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF in the VASyR
2020 (see Box 2).
Figure 15
Changes in Poverty using International Poverty Line
50% inflation pass-through - LEBANON
LEBANESE SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
60 60 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
40 40 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (2015/16)
Month Month
Figure 16
Changes in Poverty using National Poverty Line
50% inflation pass-through - LEBANON
LEBANESE SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
60 60 national poverty line
mitigation − national
40 40 poverty line
20 20
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (2015/16)
Month Month
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 32
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Under the assumption of no inflation, in Figure 17 and that refugees received. Indeed, in this scenario the UNHCR
Figure 18, the impact of COVID-19 crisis (month 1) and assistance to refugees mitigates about 3 p.p. (17 percent)
the Beirut port explosion (month 5) are more clearly of the increase in poverty at the onset of the crisis and
discerned, despite both being obscured by the effects of remains around 3 p.p. (11 percent) in the last month of
the economic crisis. Clearly, the impact on refugees is more 2020, when measured at the international poverty line.
marked than it is for host communities. This is primarily
because refugees are more likely to be employed in the As such, given the levels of inflation in the country, any
informal sector which experiences more severe shocks. The assistance must be scaled up significantly in size and in
mitigation strategies also become more evident, as is the reach to mitigate the effects of the compounded crises.
role of inflation in offsetting the effects of the assistance
Figure 17
Changes in Poverty using International Poverty Line
No inflation counterfactual - LEBANON
LEBANESE SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
60 60 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
40 40 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (2015/16)
Month Month
Figure 18
Changes in Poverty using National Poverty Line
No inflation counterfactual - LEBANON
LEBANESE SYRIAN
Change in Poverty Headcount from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty Headcount from Baseline (p.p.)
60 60 national poverty line
mitigation − national
40 40 poverty line
20 20
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (2015/16)
Month Month
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 33
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Box 2
Findings from
the Vulnerability
Assessment of
Syrian Refugees
in Lebanon
(VASyR) 2020
The Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Main findings
Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) is conducted
jointly by WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF. 2020 • Only 31 percent of HHs have at least one member with legal
is the eighth annual survey assessing the residency. 69 percent of households have no members with
situation of a representative sample of legal residency. Refugees under the age of 30 are less likely
refugee households to identify situational to hold legal residency than those 30 years and above: and
changes and trends. It covers all sectors 20 percent of individuals above 15 years old have legal
and is the cornerstone of the Lebanon Crisis residency. Having legal residency has a positive impact on
Response Plan and programming for many (I) the physical and emotional health of displaced Syrians and
NGO, UN and development actors. Between their families.
August and September 2020, survey teams
visited 4,563 randomly selected Syrian
refugee households, covering all districts • Between March and September of 2020, when asked about
across Lebanon. how they were coping with the COVID-19 outbreak, around
70 percent of displaced Syrian households reported going
The 2020 round of the VASyR provides further further into debt to pay for basic necessities, 70 percent
insight on the welfare impact of the political and 20 percent asking for support from extended family or
and economic crisis that hit Lebanon in late relatives. Some 70 percent also reported a reduction in food
2019, which was then followed by a more consumption.
severe shutdown of the economy in March
2020 resulting from the COVID-19 outbreak.
• When asked about the top priority needs for their family
in relation to the COVID-19 outbreak, around 50 percent of
displaced Syrian households report need for assistance to
cover food costs and 40 percent to cover rent.
Percentage of households
under the MEB and SMEB • Families with limited finances are downgrading their
MEB residential shelter conditions or are moving from residential
SMEB shelters into informal settlements or into structures not
originally built for human inhabitation (non-residential
shelters). Almost half of displaced Syrian households
91% (48 percent) are living in shelters that are either below
humanitarian standards, overcrowded or in danger of
88%
75% collapse.
73%
71%
69% 68%
• The overlapping crises are exacerbating economic
58%
55% vulnerabilities, with the share of displaced Syrians spending
52% 53%
51% less than the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) or the
Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) increasing
in 2020 compared to 2019. As a result of the economic
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
and COVID-19 crisis, almost the entire refugee population
SMEB: LBP 130,500 per capita SMEB: LBP 308,722
MEB: LBP 169,500 per capita per capita have been pushed below the SMEB of 87 USD. Preliminary
2014 SMEB/MEB basket MEB: LBP 350,200
per capita
estimates show that 88 percent had expenditures below the
SMEB.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 34
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Kurdistan Region of Iraq Dahuk
Dahuk
Host Community Population
Host Community Population
For KRI, it is possible to identify Iraq Internally reflects that more households in the host
(38M*)
(38M*)
0 - 1,000,000
Ninewa (IDPs) asErbil
Displaced Persons well as Syrian community who are near the national poverty
Ninewa Erbil
0 - 1,000,000 refugees which allows for a comparison line engage in informal labor, and experience
1,00,001 - 2,000,000 Sulaymaniyah
1,00,001 - 2,000,000 between residents i.e., host communities, Sulaymaniyah a more severe shock compared to formal
2,000,001 - 3,000,000
refugees, and IDPs. As shown Kirkuk
Kirkukin Figure 19 labor.
2,000,001 - 3,000,000
and Figure 20, the displaced population
Salah
>= 3,000,001
experiences a similar poverty
al-Din
Salah rate to that Based on the assumptions presented in Table
al-Din
>= 3,000,001
of the host community at baseline. When
Diyala
Diyala
3, the poverty rate among the host community
measured at the international poverty recovers to pre-crisis levels around 12 months
line, there is a higher spike in the refugees
Baghdad
Baghdad
pandemic,
after the onset of theRefugee Camp
while for
Baghdad
and IDPs’ poverty rates at the onset of the
Baghdad refugees and IDPs a slower
Refugee Camp
recovery is
National capital
Anbar National capital
pandemic, while at the national poverty
Anbar
Wassit observed and poverty remains higher even at
International Boundary
International Boundary
Kerbala Babil Wassit
pattern.
line there is the oppositeKerbala Babil Indeed, 21 months. This slower recovery for refugees
Armistice Demarcation line
Armistice Demarcation line
Boundary of former Palestine Mandate
at the onset of the crisis, hosts experience Qadissiya
Qadissiya
can be attributed to the of former proportion
larger
Boundary
syr_polbnd_l_adm1_1m
Palestine Mandate of
Missan
Syrian Refugee Population an increase of 24 p.p., refugees a 21 p.p., refugee and IDP communities
Missan who rely on
syr_polbnd_l_adm1_1m
Syrian Refugee Population
(241,738)
(241,738) and IDPs 28 p.p. increase Najafin poverty at the remittances, domestic and international, that
0 - 15,000 Thi-Qar
0 - 15,000 international poverty line, and a 9 p.p., 8 p.p.,
Najaf Thi-Qar are assumed to take longer to recover.
15,001 - 50,000
15,001 - 50,000 and 7 p.p. respectively at the national poverty Basrah
Basrah
50,001 - 100,000 line. Muthanna In KRI, where poverty rates are more similar
50,001 - 100,000 Muthanna
between IDPs, hosts and refugees, the
However, it is worth noting that in KRI the baseline poverty gap is higher for both
¯
¯
>= 100,001
>= 100,001
national poverty line reflects very low levels displaced populations (8 percent for refugees,
Dahuk
of poverty at baseline, compared
Dahuk to the 9 percent for IDPs compared to 5 percent
50km
50km
Host Community Population international poverty line. The spike seen for for non-IDPs; see Annex Three). When the
Host Community Population
(38M*)
(38M*)
at the national
the host communityNinewa poverty
Erbil
shock hits, the increase is also projected to
0 - 1,000,000
0 - 1,000,000 line compared to displaced
Ninewa
households
Erbil
be similar for all groups, with an initial leap
1,00,001 - 2,000,000
1,00,001 - 2,000,000
Sulaymaniyah
Sulaymaniyah
of 9-11 percentage points. The recovery path
Kirkuk
Kirkuk
is similar for all three groups, and all remain
2,000,001 - 3,000,000
2,000,001 - 3,000,000 above their baseline rate by the end of the
Salah
al-Din
Salah
forecast period, albeit refugees by a greater
>= 3,000,001 Dahuk al-Din
>= 3,000,001 Diyala degree than both IDPs and non-IDPs.
Diyala
Community Population
M*)
Ninewa Erbil
Baghdad In terms of mitigation strategies, UNHCR
0 - 1,000,000 Baghdad Refugee Camp
Baghdad
Baghdad provided a one-off COVID-19 emergency
Refugee Camp
National capital
cash
Anbar
1,00,001 - 2,000,000
Anbar Sulaymaniyah
Wassit
assistance for the value of 200 USD
National capital
International to
Boundaryall
Babil International Boundary
Kirkuk
Kerbala
Kerbala Babil
Wassit
camp-based refugees and IDPs at the start
Armistice Demarcation line
Armistice Demarcation line
2,000,001 - 3,000,000
of the pandemic, and the same amount toMandate
Boundary of former Palestine Mandate
Qadissiya Boundary of former Palestine
Qadissiya syr_polbnd_l_adm1_1m
Missan
Syrian Refugee Population
Salah
al-Din
vulnerable
Missan refugees and IDPs outside
syr_polbnd_l_adm1_1m camps
>= 3,000,001 Syrian Refugee Population
(241,738)
Diyala in June 2020. For modelling purposes these
(241,738) Najaf Thi-Qar
0 - 15,000
0 - 15,000
Najaf one-off assistance programs are assumed
Thi-Qar
15,001 - 50,000
15,001 - 50,000 Baghdad to be spread
Basrah out over three months. When
Basrah
Refugee Camp
50,001 - 100,000
Baghdad
Muthanna
both programs
National capital
are in place at the second
50,001 - 100,000Anbar Muthanna
Wassit
month, they
International mitigate
Boundary approximately 3.5 p.p.
¯
Kerbala Babil
for refugees (14 percent) and 1p.p. for IDPs
¯
>= 100,001 Armistice Demarcation line
>= 100,001
Qadissiya (3 percent) of the increase in poverty when
Boundary of former Palestine Mandate
syr_polbnd_l_adm1_1m
Missan
Syrian Refugee Population
measured at the international poverty line,
50km
50km
(241,738) and around 1 p.p. (6 percent) and 0.4 p.p. (5
Najaf Thi-Qar
0 - 15,000 percent) respectively at the national poverty
15,001 - 50,000
Basrah
line. Around the third and fourth months,
50,001 - 100,000 Muthanna
there is a higher mitigation for IDPs (5 p.p. or
17 percent of the increase in poverty at the
¯
>= 100,001 international poverty line, and 0.2 p.p. or 3
percent at the national poverty line).
50km
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 35
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure 19
Changes in Poverty using International Poverty Line
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ
RESIDENT REFUGEE
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
IDP
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) international poverty
30 line (5.5/day)
mitigation -
20 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
10 Source:
Authors’ calculations
based on SRHCS
(2015/16)
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month
Figure 20
Changes in Poverty using National Poverty Line
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ
RESIDENT REFUGEE
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
15 15
7.5 7.5
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
IDP national poverty line
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) mitigation − national
15 poverty line
7.5
Source:
0 Authors’ calculations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 based on SRHCS
Month (2015/16)
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 36
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Sensitivity analysis
In the analysis thus far, it has been assumed that the To allow for these possibilities a simple sensitivity analysis
macroeconomic shock (e.g. negative sectoral GDP can be conducted – particularly for Jordan and KRI.
growth) is fully transmitted into the households’ incomes Lebanon is excluded from this analysis because in the
and therefore consumption. While this is a reasonable previous section the sensitivity to inflation pass-through,
assumption given the strict lockdown restrictions which is the main driver of poverty in Lebanon, was already
and limited household savings, it is possible that the presented. It is assumed that the shock is transmitted to
transmission is less than 100 percent. Some households households’ consumption at 75 percent pass-through – e.g.
may resort to coping strategies such as borrowing, selling a 50 percent reduction in GDP at a particular sector, only
assets, using child labor, or shifting their consumption reduces the household’s consumption by 37.5 percent. This
towards cheaper items. While a 100 percent transmission allows a lower bound estimate of the poverty increase. For
does reflect the loss in welfare due to the lower utility consistency, the analysis also assumes a 75 percent pass-
derived from a reduced or less balanced diet, or from the through during the recovery as well.
necessity to make children work, it is possible, in terms of
modelled consumption and hence poverty, that the impact For Jordan, comparing Figure 8 and 10 with Figure 21 and
is higher than it would be compared to a situation where 23, respectively, there is a lower spike in poverty under the
consumption had been measured directly. lower pass-through rate, which naturally leads to a faster
recovery back to baseline levels, for both the national and
It is also possible, indeed likely, that the reduction in international poverty lines. For KRI, the same pattern is
income is varied across the distribution – some lower observed in Figure 23 and 25, compared to Figure 19 and
skilled and poorer households may have lost 100 percent 21, respectively, albeit with lower magnitudes.
of their income, while other types of households may have
lost little or nothing at all. 28
Figure 21
Changes in Poverty using International Poverty Line
75% growth pass-through - JORDAN
JORDANIAN SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
30 30 international poverty
line (5.5/day)
20 20 mitigation -
international poverty
line (5.5/day)
10 10
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 (2015/16)
Month Month
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 37
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure 22
Changes in Poverty using National Poverty Line
75% growth pass-through - JORDAN
JORDANIAN SYRIAN
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
30 30 national poverty line
mitigation -
20 20 national poverty line
10 10
Source:
Authors’ calculations
0 0 based on SRHCS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 (2015/16)
Month Month
Figure 23
Changes in Poverty using National Poverty Line
75% growth pass-through - KRI
RESIDENT REFUGEE
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
8 8
6 6
4 4
2 2
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
IDP
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
8 national poverty line
6
mitigation − national
4 poverty line
2
Source:
0 Authors’ calculations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 based on SRHCS
Month (2015/16)
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 38
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Figure 24
Changes in Poverty using International Poverty Line
75% growth pass-through - KRI
RESIDENT REFUGEE
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.) Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Month Month
IDP international poverty
line (5.5/day)
Change in Poverty from Baseline (p.p.)
mitigation -
30
international poverty
20 line (5.5/day)
10
Source:
0 Authors’ calculations
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 based on SRHCS
Month (2015/16)
A brief review of international
responses to COVID-19
As discussed in the introduction, the second phase of Table 4
this work will incorporate phone survey data from each Types of interventions used around
country to recalibrate the models and characterize the world to respond to COVID-19
which households have become newly poor due to the
crisis, taking into account characteristics such as gender, Social Social Labor Market
education, sector of employment and so forth. This will Assistance Insurance Interventions
inform the design and targeting of government and INGP Cash transfers
responses in each country. Although this country-specific (conditional, Paid sick leave
Wage subsidies
unconditional and support
guidance will come in the next phase, there are still lessons social pensions)
which can be learned from a review of how other countries
Healthcare Activation
have responded. Gentilini et al. (2020, version 13) have In-kind food /
insurance (training)
voucher schemes
compiled a global summary across 212 countries including support measures
what types of programs are being used and how much is School feeding Pensions
Labor regulation
adjustment
being spent. The responses around the world can generally
be classified into three types: social assistance, social Utility and financial
Social security
obligation support Shorter work
insurance, and labor market interventions. There are a contribution
(waiver / time benefits
waiver / subsidy
postponement)
range of different interventions which can fall within each
of these three categories as listed in Table 4. Cash for work
Unemployment
benefits
Source: Adapted from Gentilini et al (2020, version 13).
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 39
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
In upper middle-income countries (UMIC) such as Iraq, Jordan, KRI, and Lebanon entered the COVID crisis in a
Jordan and Lebanon, social protection responses fiscally constrained position, as such, they had little space
constituted of 65 percent social assistance, 24 percent to provide social protection. In Jordan, the government
social insurance and 11 percent labor market interventions; expanded the social assistance programs (Takaful/NAF),
in MENA, the composition was 57 percent, 32 percent including with a temporary top-up payment for COVID-19,
and 11 percent respectively. Social assistance is the most made temporary cash payments to 190,000 informal
common category of response in all countries except for workers who were not existing SP beneficiaries, provided
high income ones (Figure 25) and within social assistance, in-kind support in terms of food distribution, and the
cash transfers are by the far the most common. Out of Ministry of Labor provided a two-week paid leave for public
724 total social assistance measures across 188 countries, sector workers and allowed private companies to reduce
cash transfers represented 340 measures in 156 countries. their social security contributions. The average spending in
Food or food voucher schemes (133 measures in 93 Jordan is estimated at 24 USD per capita.
countries) and utility or financial obligation waivers or
postponements (174 measures in 101 countries) are also In KRI, there is not an active social assistance program, but
very popular. a pilot of a new cash transfer program for a duration of 12
months is being planned and led by the Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs. It includes 100,000 – 225,000 Iraqi Dinars,
depending on the size of the household, and the gender
of its head. The average spending in KRI is thus currently 0
Figure 25 USD per capita, but expected to rise to increase.
Composition of social protection
COVID-19 responses by region In Lebanon, in response to COVID-19, the government
and income level launched a “National Social Solidarity Program” (NSSP),
aimed at assisting households impacted by the lockdown
restrictions. The program aims to provide temporary
61% 24% 14% emergency aid of LBP400,000 to approximately 200,000
World
households, which is around 4 USD per capita (for a 5.9M
HIC 48% 30% 22% population size and LBP3500 to the dollar). However, a
significantly expanded response is planned in 2021 and will
UMIC 65% 24% 11% be fully analyzed in the Phase II report.
LMIC 69% 20% 11% The average spending per capita in UMICs is 57 USD per
capita, and 86 USD per capita in MENA, meaning the size of
LIC 88% 8% 4% the response in Jordan is lower than for peers, albeit from
much constrained fiscal positions, while a host community
response has yet to significantly materialize in similarly
constrained KRI.
World 61% 24% 14%
SAR 80% 16% 4%
North America 50% 44% 6%
MNA 57% 32% 11%
LAC 72% 18% 11% Social Assistance
Social Insurance
ECA 46% 34% 20% Labor Markets
EAP 59% 23% 18%
Source:
Gentilini et al
AFR 84% 9% 7% (2020, version 13)
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 40
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Conclusion
Prior to the pandemic, poverty incidence among refugees
was considerably higher than among host communities
particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, although less so
in KRI. By carrying out microsimulation models based
on macroeconomic assumptions, poverty is found to
The COVID-19 crisis has impacted all. In Jordan, Lebanon have increased rapidly and substantially among both
and KRI its impact has been disproportionate as it has communities, with the impact being most pronounced for
compounded pre-existing vulnerabilities. Those living on refugees in Lebanon and Jordan. The situation in KRI is
the economic margins of society, with few assets, more noteworthy because pre-COVID poverty among refugees
debt, and a dependence on informal sources of income, and IDPs was close to that among hosts, and during
have been particularly affected. Existing vulnerabilities COVID refugees appear affected in similarly ways as host
have left poorer Jordanian, Lebanese, Iraqi and Syrian communities.
refugees with few coping mechanisms, resulting in
difficult choices. Families have been unable to pay for Recovery largely depends on the health of the economy
basic household needs, risking eviction for non-payment at large, the differences between host communities and
of rent. Both refugee and host community children have refugees’ poverty rates at baseline, and the mitigation
faced further challenges in accessing education – limited responses to the crisis. Generally, two years after the
by distance and home-schooling opportunities and the onset of COVID, poverty levels could be expected to have
digital divide. Reports of domestic violence linked to the returned to pre-COVID levels.
lockdowns have increased. Specific risks for women and
girls have been exacerbated. Social tensions are rising as Mitigation strategies, if done at scale and for a sufficient
resources and jobs become even more scarce. length of time, can bridge the gap between the onset of the
crisis and the recovery of the economy to lessen the impact
Understanding the effects of COVID-19 on host and of the pandemic on both refugees and host communities.
refugee communities has important implications on the Other complementary programs such as enabling self-
policies that need to be adopted as the pandemic unfolds reliance could potentially ensure more sustainable
and during the recovery period. This report analyzes support at the household level, the effectiveness and
the changes in poverty rates among refugees and host impact of which will require further research. The
communities as a result of the COVID-19 crisis and the second phase of this report will seek to quantify the
ensuing lockdown policies that have impacted people’s size of the response needed from governments and the
livelihoods both in terms of their labor and non-labor international community. Needless to say, it will have to be
income. commensurate to the magnitude of the impact of the crises
on households estimated in this report.
Key findings • In Jordan, at the onset of the crisis, there is a 38 percentage point increase in poverty rates among
JORDAN Jordanians, and a 18 percentage point increase in poverty rates among Syrian refugees (who started
offer with higher rates of poverty than Jordanians pre-crisis).
• At the height of its impact, the number of poor Jordanians in the three governorates increased by
more than 1.5 million Jordanians; the number of Syrian refugees 29 who became poor is 76,000.
• Under the current assumptions, poverty returns to its pre-crisis levels a year after the onset of the
pandemic. Given the possibility of a second wave and the likely timeline for a vaccine this may be
optimistic.
• Among Jordanians in the three governorates analyzed, social policies mitigated 4 p.p. (around 12
percent) of the increase in poverty by the fourth month of the crisis; for refugees there is a 2 p.p. (6
percent) mitigation in the second month of the crisis and 6 p.p. (30 percent) at the fifth month of the
crisis.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 41
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Key findings • In Lebanon, inflation is the main driver of poverty, with the impact of the COVID crisis in country
LEBANON compounded by other crises: economic and political, and the effects of the Beirut blast.
• There is a 33 p.p. increase in poverty among the Lebanese and 56 p.p. among the Syrian refugees
at the international poverty line, and an increase by 55 p.p. and 42 p.p. respectively at the national
poverty line.
• Expressed in absolute numbers, the projected increase in the number of poor persons is around 1.7
million Lebanese and 840,000 refugees 30 at the international poverty line, and 2.9 million Lebanese
and 630,000 refugee at the national poverty line 31.
• As the increase in poverty is mostly driven by inflationary pressures –with no sign of abating, and
unlike Jordan and KRI there is no projected return to pre-COVID levels of poverty in 2021 for Lebanon.
• Mitigation strategies for refugees in Lebanon, while potentially having positive short-term effects,
from a welfare perspective are largely negated over time by the increasing levels of inflation,
especially if households had not adopted consumption behavioral strategies.
Key findings • In KRI at the onset of the crisis, hosts experience an increase in poverty of 24 p.p., refugees a 21 p.p.
KRI increase, and IDPs 28 p.p. increase in poverty at the international poverty line, and a 9 p.p., 8 p.p., and
7 p.p. respectively at the national poverty line.
• Using the international poverty line and at the height of the crisis, the number of poor persons
increased by 1.2 million persons in host communities, 49,000 among Syrian refugees and more than
180,000 IDPs; at the national poverty line the equivalent increase in poor people is close to 500,000
among host communities, 21,000 among refugees and 48,000 among IDPs32.
• UNHCR assistance in KRI mitigates between 14 and 17 percent of the increase in poverty at the
international poverty line for the displaced community, and 3 percent to 5 percent at the national
poverty line.
A lack of recent and good quality data constituted the “For poverty to be measured effectively, it is crucial that
biggest challenge for this report which was prepared in the the current crisis not prompt governments to reduce their
absence of recent household survey data and informed investment in surveys and other forms of data collection.
by relatively crude macro estimates. It is possible that the Under crisis conditions, reliable poverty data are even
estimates are too optimistic. As the crisis unfolds it is not more important for guiding response and recovery policies
implausible that the length of recovery will be significantly that will not leave vulnerable groups behind.”
longer than what has been modelled. It is equally possible
that the results are too pessimistic: households may Fortunately, some of the most glaring data gaps are
have been able to cope better with the crisis at hand than currently being addressed: phone surveys have been
expected. This points to the importance of better and more launched in KRI and Jordan; in Lebanon a new household
frequent data collection. Or as noted in the World Bank’s survey is being prepared. As more data becomes available,
Shared Prosperity report 2020: the results of this report will be updated in future revisions.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 42
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Annex
This Annex describes some of the technical approaches and assumptions used when preparing the report.
This Annex discusses the following aspects:
1. Transforming the income distribution to a consumption distribution
2. Imputations: sectors of work and assistance
3. Poverty Gap
4. Quarterly estimates
1. Transforming the income As an alternative, a more mechanical transformation was
applied, whereby a scaling factor is calculated for each
distribution to a consumption percentile of the SRHCS income distribution to expand
distribution it to match the same percentile of the national survey
consumption distribution. The scaling factor can be
defined as follows:
As discussed in the main text, the SRHCS is a dataset highly
suitable for this exercise, primarily because it is comparable NatSurvey
across the three countries and comparable between the mean_cons p
refugees and their host communities. As such, for a cross- Sp =
country report that compares these two communities, mean_income p SRHCS
it provides clear advantages over other datasets which
may either be older than the SRHCS or capture only one
of the two communities, or sacrifice representativity of Where s is the scaling factor, p is the percentile subscript,
the underlying population. In addition, the data includes mean_cons and mean_income are the mean consumption
an income module that captures eight different income and income in that percentile, respectively. This process,
sources: wage income, business earnings, pensions, asset while not analytically grounded, produces an accurate
earnings, government/UN/NGO assistance, remittances, replication of the consumption distribution and preserves
auto-consumption, and other income sources. the rank order of the income distribution. The application
of household-specific shocks (based on a mix of income
One drawback in relation to this analysis and in the effort sources and sector and formality of employment) to the
to producing credible poverty estimates, is that the SRHCS transformed household per capita consumption then
lacks a consumption module. To address this impediment, rests upon the assumption that while the SRHCS income
the income distributions in the SRHCS were transformed distribution is far more compressed than the national
to reflect relevant consumption distributions obtained survey consumption distribution, it provides a much more
from respectively the 2017-18 HEIS in Jordan, the 2017- comparable rank ordering of the households. Given the
2018 SWIFT in Iraq, and the 2012 HBS in Lebanon. One lack of savings in the poorer half of the distribution in the
option is to transform the distributions using survey-to- Jordan HEIS (and likely in Iraq and especially in Lebanon
survey imputation techniques. For example, per capita pre-COVID-19 but post-economic crisis), this assumption
consumption in the 2017-18 SWIFT in Iraq could be seems defensible. This transformation is implemented
regressed upon common indicators of welfare in both separately for host communities and refugees in Jordan
SWIFT and SRHCS and the result coefficients would then and KRI, and in Lebanon, the refugees’ distribution is
be used to predict the per capita consumption in SRHCS. mapped onto the non-Lebanese distribution of HBS 2012.
One drawback with this approach is that the predicted
distributions tend to be more compact than the true
distribution, which in turn affect the poverty estimates
derived from the predicted distribution.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 43
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
As shown in Figure 26, Figure 27, and Figure 28, the income For the analysis of the report, under the assumption of 1:1
distribution in SRHCS is very narrow and concentrated. In income to consumption pass-through, it is assumed that
all cases, the income distribution is consistently lower than the percentage contribution of the various income sources
the consumption distribution. In addition, the technique (wages, business earnings, remittances etc.) represent the
used to transform the distribution results replicates the same percentage contribution of the adjusted expenditure
original consumption distribution. distribution.
Figure 26
Income Distribution Transformation - JORDAN
Unadjusted SRHC Distribution
Adjusted SRHC distribution
JORDANIAN SYRIAN HEIS Distribution
.008 .025
.006 .020
.015
.004
.010
.002
.055
0 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Monthly Income / Expenditure Per Capita (JOD) Monthly Income / Expenditure Per Capita (JOD)
Figure 27
Income Distribution Transformation - LEBANON
Unadjusted SRHC Distribution
Adjusted SRHC distribution
LEBANESE NON-LEBANESE HBS Distribution
.0025 .005
.0020 .004
.0015 .003
.0010 .002
.0005 .001
0 0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 0 1000 2000 3000
Monthly Income/Expenditure Per Capita in ’000 LBP Monthly Income/Expenditure Per Capita in ’000 LBP
This graph uses HBS 2012, nowcast to 2019, moves the PC expenditure distribution to start at zero
and stretches the HBS distribution to it assuming 1:1 income to consumption relationship.
Figure 28
Income Distribution Transformation - KRI Unadjusted SRHC Distribution
Adjusted SRHC distribution
SWIFT Distribution
RESIDENT REFUGEE / IDP
.005 .008
.004 .006
.003
.004
.002
.001 .002
0 0
0 500 1000 1500 0 500 1000 1500
Monthly Income/Expenditure Per Capita in ’000 IQD Monthly Income/Expenditure Per Capita in ’000 IQD
This graph uses SWIFT 2017, moves the PC expenditure distribution to start at zero
and stretches the SRHCS distribution to it assuming 1:1 income to consumption relationship.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 44
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
2. Imputations: the two individuals report working, and the household is
Sectors of work and assistance reported to have wage income or own-account income,
their sector of work is imputed based on observable
characteristics (age, sex, nationality and education of the
The SRHCS dataset includes information about the randomly selected adults who do report on sector) using
households’ sources of income including wage income and a multinomial logit model. The same logic is followed
income from own-account work. As the micro simulation for determining informality of the household, where
models are based on the macro-sectoral shocks, it is informality is defined as having a contract or having
necessary to make assumptions on households’ main insurance.
sector of work to determine the level of macroeconomic
shock that they face. Similarly, because it is not possible to match the assistance
programs to individual households in the dataset, benefits
The survey also includes two modules (for wage work are randomly assigned to beneficiaries according to the
and own-account workers) collected for two randomly conditions of the program and by relying on secondary
selected adults within the household where they are asked data. For instance, Takaful program is randomly assigned
about their current employment status and the sector in to a percentage within each decile of the consumption
which they work. For most households, only one of the distribution based on the HEIS data, and the UNHCR
two randomly selected adults report working. As such, assistance similarly using VASyR 2019 for Lebanon, VAF
the household is assigned the sector of that individual. 2019 for Jordan, and VAT 2019 for KRI. Where blanket
Where two of the individuals report their employment, assistance is given to certain group (e.g. camp residents in
and they differ on sector, one of the two individuals’ sector KRI), this is assigned to each household that satisfies its
were randomly selected. For some households, none of criteria.
3. Poverty gap In KRI, where poverty rates are more similar between IDPs,
non-IDPs and refugees, the baseline poverty gap is higher
for both displaced populations (8 percent for refugees, 9
The Poverty Gap measures how far below the line on percent for IDPs compared to 5 percent for non-IDPs). When
average poor households are. For example, a Poverty Gap the shock hits, the increase is also projected to be similar
of 0.07 indicates that poor households are on average 7 for all groups, with an initial leap of 9-11 percentage points.
percent below the poverty line. The table below presents The recovery path is similar for all three groups, and all
the Poverty Gap each month during the crisis. In Jordan remain above their baseline rate by the end of the forecast
at the pre-COVID-19 baseline, poor Jordanian households period, albeit refugees by a greater degree than both IDPs
were on average only 1 percent below the International and non-IDPs. Again, the story is similar if the NPL is used
Poverty Line (IPL or $5.50) while poor Syrians were 4 instead.
percent below. In the first month of the crisis, not only
did the poverty headcount rate leap for both groups, but In Lebanon, the poverty gap was low at baseline for
the poverty gap did as well. As with the poverty rate, the both Lebanese and Syrians. However, it not only leaps
increase in the gap was larger for Jordanians than Syrians. considerably higher for Syrians in the first month of the
This is driven by different factors. The rate went up more shock, the gap continues to grow and remains considerably
for Jordanians because so many Syrians already lived higher at the end of the first year. This likely reflects
below the line; there were less Syrians to be driven below the much higher reliance on wage work (88 percent of
the line by the crisis than there were Jordanians (Figure refugee households compared to 56 percent of Lebanese
4). However, the poverty gap increased less for Syrians households) and refugee worker concentration in
because they were less reliant on labor market income and construction and manufacturing which were particularly
remittances and more on INGO support, insulating them affected.
to a greater degree. The table also shows that the poverty
gap is projected to recover faster for Jordanians as the
economy and their incomes recover along with it, although
the gap ends slightly higher for both groups by the end
of the forecast period. The story is similar if instead the
National Poverty Line (NPL) is used.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 45
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Poverty Gap at the National and
International Poverty Lines
JORDAN
Month Jordanian (IPL) Syrian (IPL) Jordanian (NLP) Syrian (NPL)
0 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03
1 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.11
2 0.23 0.12 0.22 0.11
3 0.23 0.12 0.22 0.11
4 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.07
5 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.06
6 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.05
7 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.05
8 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.05
9 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.05
10 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04
11 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04
12 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04
13 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
14 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
15 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
16 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
17 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
18 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
19 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
20 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
21 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
2020 average 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.07
2021 average 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
LEBANON
Month Lebanese (IPL) Syrian (IPL) Lebanese (NPL) Syrian (NPL)
0 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.21
1 0.04 0.12 0.28 0.46
2 0.05 0.15 0.31 0.50
3 0.08 0.20 0.39 0.58
4 0.10 0.24 0.43 0.62
5 0.13 0.30 0.46 0.65
6 0.14 0.31 0.48 0.66
7 0.15 0.32 0.49 0.67
8 0.15 0.33 0.50 0.68
9 0.16 0.34 0.52 0.69
2020 average 0.10 0.23 0.40 0.57
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 46
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
KRI
Resident Syr Refugee IDP Resident Syr Refugee IDP
Month
(IPL) (IPL) (IPL) (NPL) (NPL) (NPL)
0 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01
1 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.05
2 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.05
3 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.04
4 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.04
5 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.04
6 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.04
7 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.04
8 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.04
9 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.04
10 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.04
11 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.03
12 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.03
13 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
14 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
15 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
16 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
17 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
18 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
19 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
20 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
21 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.03
2020 average 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.04
2021 average 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.03
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 47
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
4. Quarterly estimates
In this section, estimates of the poverty changes at the quarterly level are also
provided. In Q2 of 2020, Jordanians face a 37 p.p. increase at the international
poverty line and a 36 p.p. at the national poverty line, while Syrian refugees face
a 18 p.p. and 15 respectively, and both groups recover by Q2 of 2021. In Lebanon,
by Q4 of 2020, Lebanese experience a 32 p.p. increase at the international poverty
line and a 54 p.p. at the national poverty line, and the Syrian refugees experience
54 p.p. and 42 p.p. increase, respectively. In KRI, in Q2 of 2020, the host community
experiences a 22 p.p. and 9 p.p. increase in poverty, and the refugees a 20 p.p. and
9p.p., and the IDPs a 27 p.p. and 8 p.p. at the international poverty line and national
poverty line respectively.
Estimated Quarterly Changes in Poverty at the National
and International Poverty Lines
International Poverty Line National Poverty Line
Jordanian Refugee Jordanian Refugee
Q1 2020 0 15 0 12
Q2 2020 37 33 36 27
Q3 2020 29 22 27 16
Q4 2020 24 17 23 12
Q1 2021 11 15 9 10
Q2 2021 0 14 0 10
Q3 2021 0 16 0 11
Q4 2021 0 16 0 12
International Poverty Line National Poverty Line
Lebanese Refugee Lebanese Refugee
Q1 2020 0 6 0 18
Q2 2020 13 37 33 52
Q3 2020 27 53 50 58
Q4 2020 32 60 54 60
International Poverty Line National Poverty Line
Resident Refugee IDP Resident Refugee IDP
Q1 2020 0 5 3 0 2 0
Q2 2020 22 25 30 9 11 8
Q3 2020 16 23 27 7 7 7
Q4 2020 11 18 20 5 6 5
Q1 2021 6 14 11 2 5 4
Q2 2021 1 8 5 0 5 2
Q3 2021 0 8 5 0 4 2
Q4 2021 -1 7 5 0 4 1
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 48
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon
Links and sources
1 17
For Jordan, results reflect data in three governorates only: Amman, Mafraq, A household’s sector is based on the sector reported by randomly chosen
and Zarqa. individuals within the household. Where this information is not available
despite a household reporting wage labor or own-account income, it has been
2
http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria; World Bank. 2020. The Fallout imputed based on observable characteristics.
of War : The Regional Consequences of the Conflict in Syria. Washington,
18
DC: World Bank. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ The SRHCS survey does not include a consumption module but does include an
handle/10986/33936 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO income module. The resulting income distributions have been transformed to
national consumption distributions as described in a following section.
3
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International
19
Cooperation, Jordan Response Plan 2020-2022, http://www.jrp.gov.jo/Files/ Refaqat et al, World Bank, Jordan Economic Monitor: Weathering the Storm:
JRP%202020-2022%20web.pdf Spring 2020 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/publication/jordan-
economic-monitor-june-2020
4
World Bank. 2020. Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune.
20
Washington, DC: World Bank. doi: 10.1596/978-1-4648-1602-4. License: Creative It is acknowledged that these assumptions are constantly changing as the
Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ crisis unfolds and the pandemic takes its course. As more data emerge, these
bitstream/handle/10986/34496/9781464816024.pdf assumptions and ensuing results will be revised.
5 21
International Labour Organization, COVID-19 crisis and the informal economy See World Bank (2020), Beirut Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, August
Immediate responses and policy challenges, May 2020, https://www.ilo. 2020.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/
22
briefingnote/wcms_743623.pdf These projections come from the October 2020 World Bank Macroeconomic
and Poverty Outlook for Iraq.
6
International Labour Organization, COVID-19 crisis and the informal economy
23
Immediate responses and policy challenges, May 2020, https://www.ilo. World Bank, Migration and Development Brief 33, October 2020.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/
24
briefingnote/wcms_743623.pdf Survey data in Jordan on debt and savings suggest this is not a strong
assumption for the bottom half of the distribution, while the months long
7
WFP Lebanon, Minimum expenditure basket for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: economic crisis in Lebanon preceding the COVID-19 crisis means many
Rights-based versus expenditure-based approaches (March 2020), https:// households likely have depleted savings (or cannot access them due to banking
reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/minimum-expenditure-basket-syrian-refugees- restrictions).
lebanon-rights-based-versus-expenditure
25
These figures are based on the Central Administration of Statistics of Lebanon
8
UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, Multi-Sectoral Rapid Needs Assessment: COVID-19 – http://www.cas.gov.lb/index.php/economic-statistics-en/cpi-en - other
Jordan: Exploring the impact of COVID-19 on families in Jordan’ https://www. estimates exist (e.g. TradingEconomics and WFP estimates) that can be used for
unicef.org/jordan/reports/multi-sectoral-rapid-needs-assessment-covid-19- further analysis.
jordan
26
https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/covid-19-impact-households-jordan-rapid- Similar to Jordan, the baseline poverty rate is assumed at the poverty of the
assessment-may-2020-enar host community, which is why the graph starts at 0 for the Lebanese graph.
9 27
ARK/UNDP Lebanon Perception Survey (Wave 8) July 2020: both Lebanese (67 The planned response by the Government of Lebanon for Lebanese citizens
percent) and Syrians (44 percent) consider competition for low-skilled jobs as discussed earlier will be modelled and included in a later version of this
the main source of inter-community tensions. paper. Simulations have found that it would reduce the impact of COVID-19
significantly (perhaps by around half), although the underlying data and
10
UNHCR, MENA COVID-19 Emergency Education Response Update, November methodology differ from this three-country report and are not comparable and
19 2020, https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/details/83123 not reported here (see World Bank (forthcoming) Project Appraisal Document
for Lebanon Emergency Crisis and Covid-19 Response Social Safety Net).
11
UN Women, 2018, Unpacking Gendered Realities in Displacement - Syrian
28
Refugees (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq); UN, March 2019: http://arabstates.unwomen. To ensure consistency with the macro-economic assumptions there is not
org/en/digital-library/publications/2018/12/unpacking-gendered-realities-in- variation in the shock within the sector in which households work in. Doing so
displacement is an extension to be implemented as soon as new phone survey data emerge
which would then allow a better assessment of the distributional impact of the
12
Ibid shock.
13 29
UNHCR, Mental Health and Psychosocial Response during COVID-19 Jordanian’s population for Amman, Mafraq, and Zarqa only is 3,994,840, as
Outbreak, June 2020, available at https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/ estimated by the end of 2017 based on the official census. The Syrian refugee
files/UNHCR%20MENA%20Mental%20Health%20and%20Psychological%20 population is based on the refugees registered with UNHCR in these three
support%20during%20COVID-19%20-%20June%202020.pdf governorates: 431,168.
14 30
Krishnan et al, Coping with the Influx Service Delivery to Syrian Refugees and Calculated in relation to the total estimated number of refugees in Lebanon,
Hosts in Jordan, Lebanon, and Kurdistan, Iraq, 2016 https://openknowledge. at 1.5million
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34172/Coping-with-the-Influx-Service-
31
Delivery-to-Syrian-Refugees-and-Hosts-in-Jordan-Lebanon-and-Kurdistan-Iraq. These figures are calculated based on a population size of 6855713, according
pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y to the UN population statistics, of which an unofficial estimate of 1500000
Syrian refugee.
15
For analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on Jordanians nationally, see Refaqat,
32
Rodriguez, Wai-Poi, Griffin and McCartney (2020). The population of the host community of KRI (5,167,166) is based on the SWIFT
2017-18 estimates of population. Syrian refugee population (237,052) is based
16
See Krishnan et al., 2016, for detailed information of the survey design. on UNHCR registration numbers in KRI, and the IDPs population size (643,251)
is based on the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix for KRI.
COMPOUNDING MISFORTUNES
Changes in Poverty since the onset of Covid-19 on Syrian Refugees and 49
Host Communities in Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Lebanon