



1. Project Data

Project ID P133380	Project Name Zambezi River Basin Development Project	
Country Africa	Practice Area(Lead) Water	
L/C/TF Number(s) TF-16238	Closing Date (Original) 30-Sep-2016	Total Project Cost (USD) 5,786,276.67
Bank Approval Date 30-May-2014	Closing Date (Actual) 31-Dec-2018	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	6,000,000.00	6,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	6,000,000.00	5,786,276.67
Actual	5,932,436.24	5,786,276.67

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Loan Agreement “The objective of the project is to advance the preparation of the Batoka Gorge Hydro-electric Scheme and strengthen cooperative development within the Zambezi River Basin.”

This project is part of a broader program of support within the Zambezi River Basin which is facilitated through the multi-donor trust fund CIWA (Cooperation in International Waters in Africa). According to the PAD, the



program objective of CIWA is “to strengthen cooperative management and development within the Zambezi River Basin to facilitate sustainable, climate resilient growth”.

For the purposes of this ICR Review, two sub-objectives will be assessed:

Sub-objective 1 – To advance the preparation of the Batoka Gorge Hydroelectric Scheme

Sub-objective 2 – To strengthen cooperative development within the Zambezi River Basin

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

(1) Feasibility studies for the proposed Batoka Gorge Hydro-Electric Scheme (HES) on the Zambezi River (Estimated cost: US \$1.8 million, Actual cost: US\$ 2.7 million) – The engineering studies aimed to assess, update, and develop a fully bankable feasibility study, complete up to the tender design and documentation for the development of Batoka Gorge HES and associated transmission lines to evacuate the power. The study is intended to facilitate mobilization of the required resources for the development of the scheme within the shortest possible time and address the prevailing power supply shortages within the Southern African Power Pool. This recipient-executed activity will be supported through the provision of consulting services, non-consulting goods and services, and operating expenses associated with workshops, training, and capacity enhancement initiatives.

(2) Environmental and Social Assessment for the proposed Batoka Gorge HES on the Zambezi River (Estimated cost: US\$ 1.44 million, Actual cost: US\$ 1.8 million) – This aimed to evaluate the design for the Batoka Gorge HES and develop the Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), Resettlement Policy Frameworks (RPFs), and Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) as needed for each infrastructure investment associated with the project. This recipient executed activity will be supported through the provision of: i) Consulting Services; and, ii) Operating expenses associated with workshops, training, and capacity enhancement initiatives.

(3) Transaction Advisory Services for the proposed Batoka Gorge HES on the Zambezi River (Estimated cost: US\$ 0.80 million, Actual cost: US\$ 1.40 million including component 4 costs) - The objective of the Transaction Advisors is to provide legal and financial transaction advice to the Zambezi River Authority on the Development of the proposed Batoka Gorge HES. This will include an assessment of different potential transaction structures, including options for public or private funding, and public-private partnerships, with a view to recommending the optimal, bankable structure that takes into consideration prevailing market conditions, priorities of the stakeholders involved, and the technical parameters and development schedule resulting from the updated feasibility study. This recipient-executed activity will be supported through the



provision of: i) Consulting services and technical assistance; and, ii) Operating expenses associated with workshops, training, and capacity enhancement initiatives.

(4) Legal and Institutional Reviews to support the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) (Estimated cost: US\$ 0.80 million, No actual cost since the contract was combined with component 3)- The objective of the Legal and Institutional Support is to carry out a program of activities to enhance the legal and institutional framework for the operation and safety of the Kariba hydropower complex, and enhance the Recipient's capacity for water resource management and control within the Zambezi River Basin. This recipient-executed activity will be supported through the provision of: i) technical assistance; and, ii) Operating expenses.

(e) Dam Break Analysis to ZRA (Estimated cost: US\$ 1.20 million, Actual cost: US\$0 as the component was financed by the Kariba Dam Rehabilitation Project- KDRP) The objective of the dam break analysis is to support the ZRA to enhance the sustainable development and efficient management of the Zambezi River Basin through a collaborative exercise with other dam operators in the Basin in undertaking a dam break analysis. This will provide a methodology and the supporting system to allow forecasters to generate a dam failure forecast and evaluate the consequences of a potential dam breach in the Zambezi River Basin.

Note: the estimated costs for each of the components were taken from the ICR as they were not available in the PAD or Loan Agreement.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The actual project cost was US\$7.5mn, compared to the appraised cost of US\$6mn. Additional costs were incurred due to i) changes in the scope of the technical work as the project progressed; ii) increasingly intensive meeting and consultation schedules; iii) delays in decision making due to the bi-national nature of the client; and iv) change in scope after the two governments appointed the African Development Bank as the lead financial arranger for the project.

Financing and Borrower Contribution: The additional funding of US\$1.5mn came from the ZRA's own funds after the Bank decided against additional financing in December 2018. The two governments decided on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) approach for the Batoka Gorge HES, which was a significant shift from the project's original plan to publicly finance the dam and privately finance the two power stations, thus eliminating the need for further financing from the Bank.

Dates: The project was restructured on three occasions during the implementation period:

- Restructuring 1, completed in September 2016, extended the closing date from the original date of September 30, 2016 to September 30, 2017 due to delays in the review and approval process of the feasibility studies and the need to ensure alignment with other assignments [from Aide memoire of Oct 2016]. Amount disbursed: US\$ 3.48mn.
- Restructuring 2, completed in September 2017, extended the closing date from the revised date of September 30, 2017 to August 31, 2018 based on the estimated time needed for additional work in the draft proposals for the engineering studies and the environmental and social assessment. [Aide memoire of Sep 2017]. Amount disbursed: US\$4.51mn.

Restructuring 3, completed in August 2018, extended the closing date by three months to December 31, 2018. This short extension happened in the context of a discussion about Additional Financing, to provide



time for the Bank to make decisions and ZRA to pursue alternative financing. Results indicators were reformatted during this restructuring to align with the updated template. [ICR]. Amount disbursed: US\$5.13mn.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The project's development objective (PDO) is directly relevant to Zambia's 2018 Country Partnership Framework (CPF), Objective 1.3: "Access to and quality of resilient infrastructure services (initial emphasis on electricity and roads) increases in selected rural and small towns". The Bank would contribute to increasing the access to and quality of resilient infrastructure services (initial emphasis on electricity and roads) in rural areas and small towns. In addition, a strong power supply is needed to achieve Objective 1.1 of boosting the productivity of the agri-business sector. This objective falls under the focus area 1 on "more even territorial development". According to the CPF, access to electricity among the rural households is a mere 4%. The CPF also states that Zambia's integration within the African region has been slow. Regional integration is important for the country's aim to develop its economic infrastructure and boost its competitiveness.

The Zimbabwean reconstruction fund also prioritizes the need to focus on infrastructure development, specifically in the energy, water and sanitation areas, for private sector growth (Annex II Indicative results framework).

The ICR also states that the PDO remains relevant to the Bank's regional strategy, which emphasizes the need for scaling up energy services and regional integration.

Given the the PDO's close alignment with the Zambia 2018 CPF objectives 1.1 and 1.3 and its relevance to the Zimbabwean reconstruction fund strategy, the relevance of this project development objective is Substantial.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

To advance the preparation of the Batoka Gorge Hydro-electric Scheme.



Rationale

Theory of Change:

This project's development objective is to advance the preparation of the Batoka Gorge Hydro-electric Scheme and strengthen cooperative development within the Zambezi River Basin. The project would finance the technical studies that are needed to implement the hydroelectric scheme, provide technical advisory services and legal and institutional support to the ZRA, and conduct a dam break analysis. These activities will facilitate mobilization of resources for development of the HES, and strengthen the cooperative development within the Zambezi River Basin. The assumptions are that the technical studies will meet the standards needed to mobilize resources to develop the HES, and that the legal and institutional support to ZRA will strengthen cooperative development in the Basin.

Outputs:

- The technical feasibility studies were still in draft stages at the time of project closing. Furthermore, the tender design documents were not completed under this project and will be done by the AFDB, which was appointed as the lead financial arranger by the clients.
- The Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) were not fully completed at project closing but the final versions were under review at the time of ICR preparation.
- The deliverables completed for the transaction and legal advisory services include i) an economic analysis, ii) a risk assessment report, iii) an options analysis for the commercial structuring of the project, and iv) a market sounding and solicitation strategy. Since the AFDB was appointed as the lead financial arranger, the development of final financing and tender documents were not completed under this project.

For further clarification on the status of these studies after project completion, IEG asked the ICR team whether there was any updated information available on whether these studies were completed and officially accepted by the government. The ICR team responded that as per Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) update (February 2020):

- The Engineering Feasibility Studies (EFS) were completed and approved in October 2019 while the draft Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) report -- with the associated Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMP) -- was completed in September 2019.
- The public disclosure for the draft ESIA and ESMP is expected to commence within the first quarter of 2020 after which the reports will be submitted to the Environmental Regulatory Authorities of Zambia and Zimbabwe for consideration and approval.

In February 2019, ZRA shortlisted three potential developers for the project, namely

1. Consortium of Power Construction Corporation of China Limited (Power China) and General Electric (GE).
2. China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG), China International and Water Electric Corporation (CWE) and China GeZhouba Group Company Limited (CGGC).
3. Salini-Impregilo of Italy.



The three shortlisted firms were issued with a Request for Proposals (RfP) with a closing date of 13th September 2019.

However, in consideration of the need to expedite the project in the wake of the obtaining acute power shortages in the two countries and the region, the Council of Ministers (COM) for the Authority, at its Extra Ordinary meeting held on 12th July 2019 made an emergency decision to award the contract for the development of the BGHES to the Consortium of Power Construction Corporation of China Limited (Power China) and General Electric (GE) on a Build, Operate and Transfer "basis. Negotiations with the consortium are ongoing. ZRA is proceeding with the development of the Batoka Gorge HES. The construction commencement is expected to be in August 2020.

Furthermore, As of February 2020, the ESIA has been completed and was accepted by ZRA with the associated ESMP. ESIA and ESMP, which will be disclosed to the public and updated according to the feedback received. The reports will be submitted subsequently to the Environmental Regulatory Agencies of the two contracting states for approval.

The ZRA is in the process of procuring Technical Advisory Services for implementation of the project, including a Social Specialist and an Environmental Specialist, who will be responsible for monitoring the implementation the Environmental and Social Management Plan and the Resettlement Action Plan.

Outcome:

With this additional evidence provided by the ICR team on the status of the studies post project completion date, sub-objective 1 is rated as substantially achieved.

Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

To strengthen cooperative development within the Zambezi River Basin.

Rationale

Outputs-

- The revised legal framework for the ZRA was endorsed by their respective Council of Ministers (COM). The proposal to include Ministries responsible for water in the governance structure was also endorsed.
- The dam break analysis component was moved to the Kariba Dam Rehabilitation project, which the ZRA is undertaking.

For further clarification on the status of the revised legal framework and the dam break analysis, IEG asked the ICR team to what extent the legal frameworks were made operational and whether the dam break analysis was conducted as part of the Kariba Dam Rehabilitation Project under the ZRA. The ICR team responded that ZRA and the two governments have taken on board the recommendation to expand of the



Governance structure of the Authority to include the Ministries of Water from both Contracting States. To this end, the Authority has since obtained approval from the COM to amend the Zambezi River Authority Acts in the two States to include, as part of COM and Board Membership, the Ministries responsible for water in both Contracting States.

Also, the Dam Break Analysis was carried out as a regional analysis for the entire Lower Zambezi Basin with models developed for Batoka Gorge Dam, Kariba Dam, Itezhi-Tezhi Dam, Kafue Gorge Upper and Lower Dams, Cahora Bassa Dam and Mphanda Nkuwa Dam.

It is expected that the dam break analysis will be completed at the end of the first quarter of 2020. ZRA also expects that the outputs from the dam break analysis will be used to develop emergency preparedness plans (EPP) for each dam in the Zambezi Basin by each respective dam operator.

Outcome:

With the additional evidence provided by the ICR team on the revised legal framework and the dam break analysis, sub-objective 2 is rated as substantially achieved.

Rating
Substantial

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

While the technical feasibility studies and the ESIA's were not completed at the time of project closure, additional evidence gathered from the ICR team a year after project closure, indicates that the studies were completed and that the Batoka Gorge HES is advancing. Similarly, the additional evidence provided by the ICR team after project completion shows that the revised legal frameworks are in the process of being operationalized and that the dam break analysis is expected to be completed in 2020.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

The project went through 3 restructurings to extend the project duration. Additional financing was also sought to address cost overruns and implementation delays.



The cost and time overruns were due to changes in the scope of the technical work required, delays in decision making due to the need to get two governments – Zambia and Zimbabwe- to agree on various issues. Other delays resulted from a much higher number of meetings with both governments than anticipated, and the process of appointment of AfDB in the end as the lead financial arranger.

There was no IRR/ERR conducted as the project only supported the delivery of studies needed for the hydroelectric schemes. The ICR assesses efficiency based on whether the project was completed on time and within budget and in the context of industry norms, and whether the final project costs justifies the economic gains from hydroelectric scheme.

Since the project was not completed on time and went above the budget, the efficiency in this context is low. However, as the ICR states, relatively low client capacity and the general complexity of this project being owned by two governments provides context and justification on the delays and cost overruns. In terms of the projected economic gains from the HES being built, thereby increasing electricity supply that would bring in revenue for the governments and boost economic growth, the costs of this project seem justified.

Overall, efficiency is rated Modest- the appraisal cost estimates proved to be inaccurate as there were many delays and an overall project cost overrun. However, as the ICR states ‘Given that these studies were transboundary in nature, and involved relatively low capacity clients, the amount of resources and time spent on the studies is not unreasonable’.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The relevance of the project’s objective is substantial: accelerating preparatory efforts to support eventual investments in electricity supply expansion is closely aligned with the development agendas of Zambia and Zimbabwe and the Bank’s priority areas in the two countries.

Efficacy is rated Substantial as the two objectives of the project were achieved.

Efficiency is rated modest as the project closed while the studies were not yet complete and there were cost overruns.



Outcome is thus rated moderately satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The ICR cited two risks related to the development of the Batoka Gorge HES itself. The first related to the readiness and capacity of SAPP to optimize the economic benefits from HES (absorption of electricity, transmission lines capacity to evacuate and trade power, and ensuring a competitive tariff). Another risk cited was on the environmental and social impact of building HES such as on the tourism and rafting industry. The BOT option which the ZRA ended up adopting also comes with risks related to development costs.

IEG inquired regarding the mitigation measures in place to address these risks to which the ICR team responded that AfDB continues to provide advice to the two Governments including on the integration of BGHES with SAPP. Furthermore, the Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMP) detailing the proposed mitigation measures for the identified negative impacts of the project includes the mitigation measures relating to the identified impacts on the rafting and tourism communities. Livelihood Restoration Plans have been developed for the project and in the case of the rafting and tourism industry, specialist studies have been undertaken to appreciate the impacts and thereby devise appropriate mitigation measures. The proposed mitigation measures include adopting a reservoir operating regime that involves regulating the reservoir levels to allow for half day rafting trips during low flows when rafting is undertaken. The mitigation measures outlined in the ESMP will be refined after the disclosure process to take into account any further submissions from members of the public, interested parties and other stakeholders including the rafting community. The governments expect the project will also open up other opportunities that will enhance tourism in the area including creation of additional lodging facilities, water sports, and fishing activities.

An additional risk that should be considered is that of likely impacts from climate change. As mentioned in Zambia's CPF, due to volatile rainfall the 2015/16, a national power crisis occurred as the existing dams were not able to generate the needed power. There is a need to diversify the sources of electricity in order to manage for these types of climate change risks.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The ICR (Section III A. Key factors during preparation) indicated that the project's quality-at-entry was weakened by the following:

- An unrealistic time frame envisaged for a project that involves a relatively new client preparing complex technical studies for a large hydropower project.



- Agreeing on a logistically complex governance structure involving representatives at the Ministerial and Permanent Secretary levels of both client countries which resulted in delays in decision-making.

On the other hand, there were also factors that strengthened the quality -at-entry:

- The Bank used its convening power to help the two countries resolve a long-term debt dispute to move forward with this project.
- The technical and economic work that preceded the project was a solid foundation for the preparation of this project.

The Bank team also accurately assessed the procurement risk as substantial, as it ended up materializing during implementation. Mitigation measures were also put in place to manage this risk.

Quality-at-Entry Rating Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The ICR mentions that the Bank team was proactive in addressing implementation challenges faced by the client including extensions of contracts and resolving contractual disagreements. ISRs were regularly issued and were candid about the challenges faced by the project and downgraded the project when there were contracts that were allowed to lapse. Team continuity was reasonable with limited turnover of staff. The Bank team regularly engaged with the client on both high-level matters and technical matters, providing timely inputs and advice to the counterparts and CMU. Senior Bank staff were also mobilized to participate in the supervision missions to provide technical advice, quality control, and compliance monitoring. The ICR states that “the breadth and depth of the team mobilized were seen by management as best practice.”

However, the team did not focus sufficiently on ensuring high level understanding and renewing high level commitment to the process during the latter parts of the project’s implementation when there were changes to the leadership both with the client and the Bank.

Quality of Supervision Rating Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization



a. M&E Design

The M&E framework at the design stage (as shown in the PAD) included both the CIWA program level indicators and indicators that are more specific to the project. The project level indicators used were the global indicators for all CIWA projects to measure progress of the program.

In the third restructuring of the project, the results indicators were restructured to align with the updated results framework template and were simplified which 'improved chances for reporting on the project with honesty and realism' (ICR pp 59). The results framework in the ICR also reflects more directly the activities and outputs of the project.

The ICR states that the program level and project level results were "incorrectly squeezed together into the project level results framework" which creates a confusing results framework for administrative and evaluation purposes.

Baseline indicators were included in the framework which were mostly the absence of the various studies and legal frameworks that the project will be delivering.

The indicators in the ICR results framework (that relate to the project and not the program) were mostly specific and measurable (updated feasibility & ESIA, options for investment transaction structure assessed, completion of joint dam break analysis). The indicator on 'legal frameworks for transboundary water management and development harmonized' seems too ambitious for the project..

b. M&E Implementation

Although the results framework was not well-designed at the start of the project, the ICR mentions that the team focused on the deliverables of the project while they were monitoring the project.

According to the ICR, the client was fairly regular in reporting progress toward the objectives on a quarterly basis, although not always in writing. The client- ZRA- also took measures such as hiring a planning and scheduling engineer and a contract management expert to monitor project performance using specific software which improved the client's capacity to monitor and report on progress.

The results framework was also restructured to align with the new format and simplified to enable better reporting on the progress of the project.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR states that the M&E process as designed was used to manage the project, monitor progress, and inform decision making and implementation. To gather some additional information on this, IEG asked the ICR team to provide some examples on how the M&E process was used. The ICR team mentioned that the results framework was aligned with the contract management approach for the project, so there were separate contracts for the specific components and associated targets, including for the engineering studies, the environmental and social studies, the transaction advisory work, and the



dam break analysis. This created distinct workstreams that could be monitored separately, with greater clarity around accountabilities and milestones.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as Category A under the Bank's environmental and social safeguards policies. According to the PAD, the safeguards triggered by this project were Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12, Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4.11, Safety of Dams OP/BP 4.37, Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01, Natural Habitats OP/BP 4.04, Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01, and OP 7.50, Projects in International Waterways.

The planned assessment instruments include Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA), Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), Resettlement Policy Frameworks (RPFs) and Resettlement Action Plans (RAP). These assessments were part of the project (Component 2).

The ICR states that the ESIA's were conducted according to the requirements of the Bank's safeguard policies during the project and that each of the safeguard issues triggered were directly addressed within the studies. The studies were not completed at the time of project closing but are being completed under the same contracts and TORs.

There was a systems issue where the safeguards were not correctly triggered in the system, and therefore were only assessed in aggregate via the ISRs. They were, however, assessed individually through the social and environment team's own systems.

In the 'Risk to Development Outcome' section of the ICR, the risk of the Batoka Gorge HES taking place in an environmentally sensitive area—Victoria Falls- was cited. There is potential impact on the rare bird species for which Batoka Gorge is a key habitat. The ESIA incorporates this risk in its plans and it is critical that the safeguard instruments and final detailed design documents are aligned.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management: According to the ICR, the financial management systems were rated Moderately Satisfactory throughout the project, The ICR team added that while financial reports as well as annual audits were submitted on time, , disbursements were lagging while actual expenditures were always below budget. The ICR does not mention whether the auditor opinions were qualified or not.



Procurement: Procurement was rated as a high risk in the PAD and issues materialized during project implementation as anticipated. While the Bank’s procurement rules were adhered to, there were ‘some minor deviations’ which were addressed during implementation. The ICR notes a downgrade of procurement from ‘Satisfactory’ to ‘Moderately Satisfactory’ in 2017 due to contract management issues.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

An unintended positive impact of this project was capacity building for the ZRA. The ICR mentions that the project had a significant impact on the ability of the ZRA to plan and manage feasibility studies for hydropower projects which is directly relevant to their mandate. Through this project, the ZRA developed the basic structures, staff, and procedures to implement similar projects in the future.

Another unintended positive impact was the ability of ZRA to secure private financing for the HES. The additional electricity shortages, growing energy utility deficits, and deteriorating public debt situation put pressure on the clients to advance the project faster. It also made it less likely that the HES could be financed by public funds, resulting in the adoption of the BOT model.

d. Other

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

- **Incorporating a realistic time-frame for large hydropower projects that span more than one country client, especially those with less capacity, can be critical to improving project design.** The project was restructured three times to extend the project closing date and encountered several delays that increased project cost. The project component outputs were not completed at project closing. A more realistic time-frame- knowing the complexity of these types of projects with low capacity clients- could have helped avoid these delays and costs.



- **Anticipating the need for and planning stronger capacity building support for clients with less experience in conducting feasibility studies for large complex hydroelectric schemes can mitigate risks related to implementation (like procurement) more effectively.** The ICR states that while the risks identified during preparation were generally accurate and mitigation measures were in place, there were still delays to the project.
- **Having well-designed governance structures for projects that are transboundary in nature involving more than one government can positively impact the speed at which decisions can be made to move the project forward.** The ICR mentions that one of the causes for delays in implementation was the slow pace of decision making due to the need for agreement from high level government officials of two countries.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

Overall, the ICR provided sufficient evidence to support the ratings for relevance of outcomes, efficacy, and efficiency. Additional information on efficacy and efficiency would have further enriched the evidence base for the ratings. For example, for efficacy, the ICR could have provided some more evidence/ information on how the draft versions of the outputs were planned to be used for the advancement of the Batoka Gorge HES. Similarly, the rating for efficiency was based on the project cost and time in comparison to industry norms. It would have been useful to include any data on the average time and cost of similar projects in the hydropower sector to support the rating. Other areas where more concrete evidence would have been useful include M&E utilization and on fiduciary issues.

Overall, the report has followed guidelines and is written in a clear and concise manner. The report was also candid about the challenges faced by the project.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial

