Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00005454 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT IDA- D1650 and IDA-H9070 and TF-17290 ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.3 MILLION (US$5 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 37. MILLION (US$50 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$17 MILLION TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FOR THE PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT June 30, 2022 Governance Global Practice Eastern and Southern Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective May 31, 2022) Currency Unit = Congolese Franc (CDF) CDF 2003.97 = US$1 US$1.35 = SDR 1 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Jean-Christophe Carret Regional Director: Asad Alam Practice Manager: Omowunmi Ladipo Task Team Leader(s): Mamadou Lamarane Deme ICR Main Contributors: Neeta Sirur, Dief Reagen Nochi Faha ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing ASA Advisory Services and Analytics ASYCUDA Automated System for Customs Data CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDF Congolaise Franc CoA Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes) COREF Coordination Committee for Public Finance Reform (Comité d’Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques) CSO Civil Society Organization DAF Directorate of Administration and Finance DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DRM Domestic Resource Mobilization FCDO Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (of the United Kingdom) formerly Department for International Development GDP Gross domestic product ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IGF Inspectorate General of Finance (Inspection Générale des Finances) IPF Investment Project Financing IRI Intermediate Results Indicator IRR Internal Rate of Return ISR Implementation Status and Results Report M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDTF Multi-donor Trust Fund MOF Ministry of Finances NA National Assembly NPV Net Present Value PAD Project Appraisal Document PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability PDO Project Development Objective PFMAP Public Financial Management and Accountability Program PFM Public Financial Management PIU Project Implementation Unit PSRFP Strategic Plan for Public Finance Reform (Plan Stratégique de Réforme des Finances Publiques) RF Result Framework SAI Supreme Audit Institution SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic SNG Subnational Government TA Technical Assistance TDEs Territorial Decentralized Entities TOC Theory of Change ToR Terms of References UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID U.S. Agency for International Development VAT Value Added Tax TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 5 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................5 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ..............................................................13 II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 14 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................14 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ......................................................................................14 C. EFFICIENCY ...........................................................................................................................19 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ....................................................................19 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS .........................................................................................20 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 21 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ...................................................................................21 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................................21 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 22 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................22 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE .....................................................23 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ...........................................................................................................24 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .......................................................................................25 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 25 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 27 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 37 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 39 ANNEX 4. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS................................................................. 40 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 43 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name P145747 DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability Country Financing Instrument Congo, Democratic Republic of Investment Project Financing Original EA Category Revised EA Category Not Required (C) Not Required (C) Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Democratic Republic of Congo COREF, COREF Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO The proposed project development objective is to enhance the credibility, transparency, and accountability in the management and use of central government and selected sub-national governments’ finances. Considering the complementarity with other donor and Bank-funded programs, the proposed MDTF operation will focus on downstream PFM reforms of the central government and public financial management in selected provinces ( Equator, Kasai Oriental and North Kivu). Revised PDO The project development objective (PDO) is to improve domestic revenue mobilization, public expenditure management, and accountability, at central level and in selected provinces. Page 1 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing 5,000,000 4,641,836 4,329,354 IDA-H9070 17,000,000 16,999,512 16,999,512 TF-17290 50,000,000 44,402,000 45,126,009 IDA-D1650 Total 72,000,000 66,043,348 66,454,875 Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0 Borrower/Recipient 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 Total Project Cost 72,000,000 66,043,349 66,454,876 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 30-Jan-2014 23-May-2014 18-Jun-2018 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2021 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 23-Dec-2021 67.55 Change in Components and Cost Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Satisfactory Satisfactory Modest Page 2 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 24-Nov-2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.36 02 23-Jun-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.62 03 29-Dec-2015 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.16 04 27-Jun-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.76 05 21-Dec-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.39 06 29-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 19.37 07 02-Jan-2018 Satisfactory Satisfactory 28.76 08 30-Jun-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 37.68 09 25-Feb-2019 Satisfactory Satisfactory 47.06 10 12-Sep-2019 Satisfactory Satisfactory 52.97 11 21-May-2020 Satisfactory Satisfactory 59.03 12 05-Jan-2021 Satisfactory Satisfactory 62.57 SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Public Administration 100 Central Government (Central Agencies) 42 Sub-National Government 46 Other Public Administration 12 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Page 3 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Public Sector Management 90 Public Finance Management 45 Public Expenditure Management 45 Public Administration 45 Transparency, Accountability and Good 45 Governance Social Development and Protection 11 Social Inclusion 11 Participation and Civic Engagement 11 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Eustache Ouayoro Jean-Christophe Carret Director: Edward Olowo-Okere Asad Alam Practice Manager: Renaud Seligmann Omowunmi Ladipo Task Team Leader(s): Saidou Diop Mamadou Lamarane Deme ICR Contributing Author: Neeta G. Sirur Page 4 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL 1. This implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) assesses the achievements of the Public Financial Management and Accountability Project (PFMAP), approved by the Board on January 30, 2014, and an Additional Financing (AF, P159160), approved on February 17, 2017 – referred to as the ‘Program’ for purposes of this report. The PFMAP was originally funded by a US$17 million Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and a US$5 million grant from the International Development Association (IDA). The AF, financed through a US$50 million IDA grant, scaled up the original project and revised both the Project Development Objective (PDO) and the expected outcomes. Context at appraisal of Original Project 2. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had a long history of conflict, political upheaval/instability, authoritarian rule, and exploitation which has contributed to a climate of insecurity, violence, and fragility that complicated PFMAP development and design. DRC’s colonial history was marked by repression and extreme brutality -- including forced labor and mass killings – a legacy that continues into modern times. Since independence in 1960, the Congolese population has endured a series of overlapping violent crises. While the national conflicts of the 1990s (that is, the 1st and 2nd Congo wars) have given way to more localized conflicts in recent decades. The latter are no less damaging. Sporadic waves of fighting across many parts of the country made the DRC a complex and challenging context for project development (for both the original project and its AF). Over 5 million Congolese people were displaced within the country, representing the third largest population of internally displaced people in the world. 3. The persistent instability and cycles of conflict over the country’s vast mineral resource endowments had also led to weak governance and institutions at both central and sub-national levels – in turn, breeding corruption, eroding trust in government, and hampering reform implementation, service delivery, and private sector growth. Political conflict and availability of enormous mineral wealth has bred and reinforces corruption, which, in turn, further weakens the social contract. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranked the DRC in the lowest decile of 180 countries and in the lowest quintile with respect to the perceived level of public sector corruption. Moreover, distrust of the state continued to be widespread among the public, reflecting poor public services and high levels of corruption at national, provincial and local levels. 4. Improved governance and more effective, transparent, institutions have long been seen as central to the challenge of translating the DRC enormous mineral and water resource endowments into sustainable growth and improved welfare for the country’s population. The DRC has a history of authoritarian regimes, and associated centralization and mismanagement of public resources. This has had a detrimental effect on the country’s socioeconomic development results and indicators, fuelling fragility and conflict. The country has experienced persistent governance deficiencies affecting public institutions, public service delivery and the business investment climate at both central and local levels. At the time that the Program was being prepared in 2013/14, the DRC was one of the poorest countries in the world, despite its vast resources. Although the DRC achieved rapid real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in some periods (for example, from 2010-2014), it was mainly due to favorable terms of trade for its mineral exports. Then, as now, weak, inefficient, and non-transparent public administration and resource use have been an important factor in preventing gains from being widely shared with the country’s population of over 86 million people. Poverty Page 5 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) remained crushingly high, at around 70 percent, and the country ranked near the bottom of the Human Development Index (0.37), below the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 0.40. 5. The DRC faced a number of daunting issues with respect to public financial management (PFM) at the time that preparation of Program was initiated. Two Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments, issued in 2008 and 2011 respectively, had identified some of the main challenges of DRCs PFM system, as follows: • A weak budget planning process exhibiting little linkage between allocations and policy priorities • Absence of a coherent and consistent medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) • Inadequate budget execution processes • Ineffective internal and external controls • Bottlenecks in public expenditures management and procurement, leading to low budget execution rates and inefficient public spending in priority sectors • Lack of an effective accounting system, as well as a weak cash management process and unreliable public financial information and reporting. The excessive influence of political considerations compounded these challenges, frequently leading to the circumvention of the existing (albeit sparse) instructions for budget processes as well as contributing to the underfunding of priority sectors. 6. Considering the need to address some of the country’s long-standing governance and PFM challenges, the government adopted a Strategic Plan for Public Finance Reform (Plan Stratégique de Réforme des Finances Publiques -PSRFP) in 2010. The PSRFP, championed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and supported by DRC’s development partners, was developed through a wide consultative process and, for the first time, offered a harmonized framework for channeling the government’s development actions and donor interventions in the areas of PFM. The strategy comprised six focus areas, namely budget reform, tax system reform, improved management of public expenditures, strengthened public accounting and cash management, improved financial controls and fiscal decentralization. A Coordination Committee for Public Finance Reform (Comité d’Orientation de la Réforme des Finances Publiques (COREF)) was established to supervise and coordinate the implementation of the PSRFP. In addition, a PFM consultation framework (Cadre Permanent de Concertation sur les Réformes des Finances Publiques (CPCRFP)) was established by the MOF to maintain a regular dialogue with the country’s development partners on PFM issues. 7. Over the next few years, the government took other critical steps aimed at strengthening the legal and institutional framework for PFM. Important pieces of legislation were approved, including: (i) the Public Financial Management Act (Loi n° 11/011 du 13 juillet 2011 relative aux Finances Publiques, LOFIP); (ii) the Public Procurement Law (Loi n° 10/010 du 27 Avril 2010 relative aux marches publics); (iii) the 2013 Strategy for the Public Sector Reform; and (iv) the Organic Law of Public Administration at central, provincial, and local levels (Loi Organique sur les Fonctions Publiques Centrale, Provinciale et Locale). Together with the PSRFP, these laws formed an adequate de jure framework for strengthening public resource management, though there remained important gaps between the laws as written and actual implementation on the ground. 8. Analytic and strategy work undertaken by the government and its partners, including the World Bank, during this period helped identify additional PFM issues, further buttressing the momentum for institutional and public finance reform. For instance, the government’s 2011-15 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and successive World Bank Advisory Services and Analytics (ASA) work and Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) emphasized the need for a new, durable social compact between government and the public, resting, in large measure, on increased efficiency and transparency in the management of public resources. Page 6 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) The first strategic objective of the FY13-16 CAS1 was aimed at increasing state effectiveness and improving good governance with a focus on (i) supporting the implementation of the DRC’s PFM action plan at central and provincial levels; (ii) strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) on the demand side to participate in the budget process and promote accountability; and (iii) reinforcing the capacity of state oversight institutions, including the parliament. Some of these priorities were already being addressed via an ongoing IDA-financed operation, DRC Governance Capacity Enhancement Project (P104041), which was laying the groundwork for improvements in tax administration and budget management at central and provincial levels. These formed a foundation for the design of the PFMAP. Context at appraisal of the Additional Financing 9. Country economic developments and ASA undertaken following PFMAP approval in early 2014 shed further light on the weaknesses in the performance of public administration overall, including PFM, which formed the background to the PFMAP AF. A downturn in the commodities market worsened DRC’s fiscal deficit, exposing huge weaknesses in tax administration, inefficiencies in spending attributable to poor programming of public investments, high reliance on single-source contracting in the public sector and over- centralization of budget management processes. Moreover, many PFM problems were exacerbated at local level following passage of the law of ‘découpage’ in 2015, which created 26 provinces from 11 with obvious challenges for subnational governance, given the lack of administrative and institutional capacity in many of the provinces. In this context, a decision was taken to scale up with AF to ensure due attention to the emerging PFM issues. 2 With regard to PFM reforms, it was expected that the AF would support Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) in addition to scaled up public expenditure process improvements at the center and in selected provinces 3. 10. The need for continued emphasis on strengthened public resource management was later validated in the 2018 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) 4, which also pointed to the need for greater attention to upstream PFM issues and sub-national PFM issues. Of particular concern was the continued low DRM, especially in the mining sector, due both to deficient tax policy/legislation and ineffective administrative processes. This, in turn, added constraints to needed spending on infrastructure, social services and other pro-poor programs. Other important issues highlighted in the SCD and other ASAs included the inconsistent implementation of the 2010 procurement law, continued weaknesses in accounting and the cash management process and neglect of priority sectors. A number of political economy studies were conducted in the 2008-2017 period which highlighted the difficulty of implementing reforms in DRC. Inter alia, these studies found that the underlying dynamics of the DRC’s political system – including the inability of citizens to effectively articulate their interests, the inability of elites to make credible commitments to each other and new political fault lines (coalition politics and changing centre-province relations) – made DRC an especially difficult environment for holistic reforms. In addition, the high degree of resistance to change on the parts of some segments of the civil service was seen as likely to further complicate reform efforts. The implication was that, starting from a very low point, moving the needle towards improved public administration and PFM processes in DRC would likely have a stop-go character, requiring sustained commitment from partners over an extended period of time to yield positive results. 1 Congo, Democratic Republic of - Country Assistance Strategy for the period FY13 - FY16 (Report Number 66158). 2013. 2 AF and restructuring was prepared at the same time for the Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation Project (P122229), a complementary operation in the sector to address related public administration aspects. 3 The provinces selected included the territory covered by the three original PFMAP provinces plus Kinshasa. 4 Congo, Democratic Republic of - Systematic Country Diagnostic (Report Number 112733). 2018. Page 7 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) 11. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Program was responsive to country circumstances and emerging needs and its development objectives contributed directly to the World Bank strategy as laid out in the FY13-16 CAS. The Program was also firmly anchored in the government’s PRSP II which included a focus on strengthening governance and transparency through reforming public administration and PFM. Moreover, the Program design consciously sought to complement ongoing PFM activities being supported by other partners to avoid duplication. Complementarity with other partners was also a key consideration in the selection of provinces to support. Further details concerning the Program’s PDOs, components and planned results/outcomes are provided below, following a short discussion of the Theory of Change (TOC). Theory of Change (Results Chain) 12. Neither the original Project Appraisal Document (PAD) nor the AF Project Paper included a Theory of Change, as this was not an institutional requirement at the time they were prepared and approved. However, a TOC was developed as part of the ICR, covering the entire World Bank- and donor-supported Program. As mentioned earlier, in general terms, actions and outcomes related to revenue mobilization and management were added under the AF while outcomes related to expenditure management and accountability at central and provincial levels were included from the start in 2014. Although the revised PDO combines the central and provincial levels in laying out the Program’s goals of revenue mobilization, budget management and accountability, the TOC separates provincial level activities and results because activities at province level occurred on a separate timeline and differed in content from central level activities intended to achieve the same general goals. Page 8 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Figure 1: Theory of Change CHALLENGES ACTIVITIES OUTPUTS MT OUTCOMES RESULT AREA 1: IMPROVE DOMESTIC REVENUE MOBILIZATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL * Inadequate tax policies and legal Fiscal potential assessments Improved taxpayer database frameworks Simplify the nomenclature of taxes, Elaborate a procedure manual *low contribution of the extractive mining sector royalties collection, Revisions of regulatory provisions Modernized tax instruments and rationalized industries sector to the revenue on exemptions and clarification of tax responsibilities by central, exemptions procedures Increased tax collection * Endemic fraud and corruption on tax province and local levels. * Capacity, knowledge and resource gaps of the tax administration system Offices upgrade, strengthening of customs inspection services, Improved tax administration organizational trainings, support to ITAS implementation, materials acquisition, framework and service delivery software acquisition RESULT AREA 2: IMPROVE EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL * Weak budget planning Development of budgetary instruments, PIP development, revise * Lack of a comprehensive and credible debt management process, elaborate decree on budgetary Improved budget preparation process budget linked to public policies governance * Low Budget execution rate Capacity building, Revision of budgetary nomenclature, coaching of * Abuse in the use of the Improved PBB framework and use in selected selected ministries on PBB, software development on PBB exceptional/emergency procedures ministries management, role clarification *Excessive centralization of budget execution authority DGTCP framework in place, National Accountants Mapping of accountants’ positions, Capacity building, Elaboration * Lengthy steps network set-up, Chartered accountant network of technical tools and dissemination * Non-compliance of accounting established practices with international standards Recruitment of DAFs, Capacity building of DAFs, Elaboration of Improved budget * Weak accounting capacity DAF appointed and operational in line ministries * Expenditures chain information system tools: roadmap, manual of procedures, guidelines for DAFs execution rate centralized Feasibility study expenditure extension; equipment acquisition, Automated budget execution process and *Poor procurement process training, development of an M&E system of expenditures chain, extension of expenditure chain information in * Inefficient procurement units support system interoperability MDA Capacity building, hardware and software acquisition, procurement Automated procurement procedures audits, Operationalization of ARMP, build capacity of ARMP and DGCMP Compliant procurement contracts on procurement control RESULT AREA 3: STRENGTHEN BUDGET OVERSIGHT AND IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY * Lack of independence of the Court of Capacity building and certification, material acquisition and process Annual audit reports and sectoral audits Account and weakness of the digitalization for SAI and IGF published; investigations of corruption Inspectorate General of Finance (IGF) Lead time between audit Assessment on the SAI report, trainings, elaboration of manual of • Timeliness of SAI reports/budget review * Limited HR capacities procedures for budget law review, recruitment/training of IGF • Number of Hearing reports on government completion by SAI and * Delays of report publication * Limited public access to budgetary personnel officials’ audit submission of audited information financial statements to * Low capacity of CSOs to raise Training on participatory budgeting, CSO undertake analysis on Provinces implementing Participatory Budget parliament awareness and lobby for budget budget execution, CSO participation to budget analysis sessions CSO monitoring execution reports transparency RESULT AREA 4: STRENGTHEN PFM AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL * Increased number of taxpayers * Low revenue mobilization capacity Training on local taxation, organize taxpayer’s enrolment Strengthened PFM systems in * Improved revenue collected in selected * Weak accountability of subnational campaigns, Revision of tax registries, Material acquisition provinces selected provinces governments (SNG) * Implementation gap of decentralization Civil society trainings on accountability tools, participatory Setup Participatory Budgeting committees and transfer mechanism Budgeting campaigns, organization of debates on budget reports, strategy operational Page 9 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 13. The original PDO as stated in both the PAD and the legal agreement was “to enhance credibility, transparency, and accountability in the management and use of central government and selected sub-national governments’ finances”. 14. The 2017 AF formally revised the PDO to expand its scope to cover the scaled-up and new activities targeted to upstream challenges that became apparent during the early years of implementation. The PDO was revised to: “Improve domestic revenue mobilization, public expenditure management, and accountability at central level and in selected provinces”. As indicated in the revised PDO, the AF sought, inter alia, to (a) enhance DRM capacity; (b) further strengthen budget planning and forecasting processes; (c) further improve public accounting and reporting; and (d) scale up support in provinces as necessitated by the impact of the 2015 law of découpage. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 15. The original results matrix of the PFMAP PAD did not include outcome indicators related to project activities but rather relied on the notion that results would be tracked/monitored via annually updated PEFA indicators. PEFA indicators were expected to track project progress and help assess the project’s outcome including: (I) Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to the original approved budget; (ii) Public access to key fiscal information; (iii) Predictability in the availability of funds for the commitment of expenditures; (iv) Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditures; (v) Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit; (vi) Legislative oversight of audit reports; and at the subnational government (SNG) level: and (viii) Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget. One intermediate indicator was included pertaining to the average lead time for processing an expenditure through to payment in five pilot line ministries. 16. The approach of using PEFA-based indicators to assess outcomes proved unworkable for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it assumed that PEFAs would be regularly conducted, thereby enabling regular assessment of improvements in DRC’s PFM processes. In fact, no PEFA assessment was conducted over 2014- 16, making it impossible to use PEFA findings to monitor progress and results. Second, changes in PEFA methodology that were made over this period (that is, 2016) meant that even if the PEFA had been done, comparisons on many indicators would have been hard, in turn making it difficult to assess progress. Finally, given the high-level nature of the PEFA framework indicators, it would likely have proved difficult to attribute observed outcomes to PFMAP interventions. 17. The AF streamlined the indicators, at both PDO and intermediate level, to better measure progress on the revised components and subcomponents, and newly introduced activities. All PEFA-based indicators (which were PDO indicators) included under the original project design were dropped or revised to create a clearer link to Program activities. New indicators at both the PDO and intermediate levels were added, thereby allowing for better measurement of progress on the original and revised components and subcomponents and new activities. In addition, indicators on citizen engagement and gender, as well as on participatory budgeting, were introduced. The specific changes introduced through the AF were as follows: PDO level indicators • Dropping PEFA related PDO indicators at the central level and in the selected provinces, including: (i) PI.1: Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to the original approved budget; (ii) PI.10: Public access to key fiscal information; (iii) PI.16: Predictability in the availability of funds for the commitment of expenditures; (iv) PI. 20: Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditures; (v) PI. 26: Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit; (vi) PI. 28: Legislative oversight of audit reports; and at the SNG level; (vii) PI. 1: Aggregate expenditure out-turns compared to the original approved budget; (viii) PI. 2: Page 10 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to the original approved budget; and (ix) PI. 3: Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget. • Introducing new PDO indicators, including: (I) the annual tax collection rate; (ii) the budget execution rate, excluding donor-funded projects; and (iii) proportion of public expenditures audited by the Inspectorate General of Finance (Inspection Générale des Finances, IGF). The new indicators were directly linked to the three main elements of the revised PDO -- namely, improved DRM, better budget planning and processes, and improved accountability. Intermediate Results Indicators (IRIs) • Dropping the original IRI concerning reduction in average lead time for processing an expenditure through to payment in five pilot line ministries. • Introducing seven new IRIs including: (i) accuracy of domestic revenue projection; (ii) female staff trained on fiscal and custom administration; (iii) public procurement contracts awarded outside the public procurement system; (iv) elapsed time from completion of the annual audits by the Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes) to submission of the audited financial statements to parliament; (v) Territorial Decentralized Entities (TDEs) with participatory budgeting under implementation (Citizen engagement indicator); (vi) Pro-poor expenditure execution rate in provinces; and (vii) Internal revenue generation by provinces. IRIs (ii) and (v) were included to measure performance with respect to gender inclusion and citizen engagement, both of which were new emphases in the AF vis a vis the original project. 18. The revisions to the results framework do not require a split rating based on ICR guidelines for Investment Project Financing (IPF). The principal reasons underlying the decision are twofold: (i) the AF expanded the scope of the original project, maintaining all the activities associated with strengthening public expenditure management (and scaling them up in some instances) while expanding the number of line ministries and provinces covered and adding a new focus on DRM; and (ii) the revised PDO and IRIs are more clearly linked to the components themselves (versus the high level PEFA indicators originally included) and thus provide a more robust means of assessing the impact of the Program. Components 19. In line with the original development objective of focusing on the efficient and transparent use of budget resources at central level and in selected provinces, the original project components concentrated on budget execution, internal audit and external oversight at the central government level and in the three selected provinces. The original Program comprised four components as follows: • Improving budget execution processes through the empowerment of line ministries in the budget execution process, the enhancement of cash management, and the strengthening of internal audits (US$4.5 million). The component included three sub-components: (a) strengthening PFM capacity in line ministries; (b) enhancing cash management; and (c) strengthening of the IGF. • Strengthening budget oversight through support to external audit processes, legislative oversight, public access to key fiscal information, and the promotion of participatory public expenditure management (US$5.1 million). This component included three sub-components, namely: (a) strengthening external audit processes; (b) strengthening legislative oversight of budget expenditures, and (c) increasing public access to key fiscal information and participatory public expenditure management. • Strengthening PFM systems in the Provinces of Equateur, Kasaï-Oriental, and Nord Kivu (US$10 million). This component included one subcomponent per province, each aimed at accelerating implementation Page 11 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) of the “plateforme minimale”, that is, a minimum provincial PFM standard agreed by the government and all donors. This was to be achieved through the implementation of the following activities: (i) strengthening the capacity of the Provincial Assembly to oversee the budget process; (ii) strengthening provincial institutional and technical PFM capacities; (iii) supporting the operation of the provincial Steering and Monitoring Committee for Local Public Finance Reform; and (iv) supporting the development of participatory budgeting and budget control by provincial citizens. • Project management (US$2.5 million) including activities to enhance coordination and collaboration among all stakeholders in PFM reform implementation. 20. The MDTF financing agreement was amended after approval to include a new sub-component related to budget planning and programming under Component 1 and to include an additional province under Component 3. The amendments enabled the project to provide support for macroeconomic forecasting and programming as well as performance budgeting at the central level. The amendment also allowed for project funds to cover the province of Kinshasa, bringing the total supported provinces to four. The PDO and results framework were not revised as part of these changes to the Financing Agreement. 21. Following satisfactory implementation of the original program for the first three years, the government requested AF in the amount of US$50 million. The AF aimed to strengthen the development impact of the project, adapted World Bank assistance to changing government priorities and ASA findings, and enhanced the likelihood of achieving the revised PDO. The AF, which extended the project closing date from December 31, 2018 to December 31, 2021, maintained all original activities and added new activities designed to: (i) enhance DRM capacity; (ii) further strengthen budget planning and forecasting processes; (iii) improve public accounting and reporting, including through citizen engagement; and (iv) scale up IDA support to cover the new provinces created by the 2015 “decoupage” law within the territory of the three original provinces. These new activities and the remaining original activities were organized into the following four components, building on the PFMAP’s original components: • Component 1: Supporting Domestic Revenue Mobilization and Expenditures Management. The purpose of this component was to support the government in improving its revenue mobilization capacity and to improve expenditure management by empowering the line ministries in the budget execution process. It consisted of five subcomponents including: (i) supporting DRM; (ii) strengthening the budget management capacity of line ministries; (iii) supporting the implementation of the public procurement law; (iv) strengthening cash management and the public accounting system; and (v) strengthening internal control systems, particularly the IGF. • Component 2: Strengthening Budget Oversight and Improving Transparency. The purpose of this component was to strengthen the external oversight in PFM. It consisted of three subcomponents including: (i) strengthening external audit processes; (ii) strengthening the legislative oversight; and (iii) increasing public access to key fiscal Information and participatory public expenditure management. • Component 3: Establishing PFM Systems at the Provincial level. The purpose of this component was to improve the PFM systems in former provinces covered by the World Bank before the “decoupage” 3 using, as reference, the minimum reform platform agreed upon with donors and the respective PFM roadmaps of each province. • Component 4: Project Management. This component supported activities to enhance coordination and collaboration among all stakeholders in PFM reform implementation. Page 12 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Table 1: Project Cost by Component (US$ millions) Original* AF** Actual*** Component (Revised under AF in italics) IDA MDTF IDA IDA H9070 D1650 TF17290 H9070 1. Improving Budget Execution Processes 1.0 3.5 18.5 12.2 (Supporting Domestic Revenue Mobilization and Expenditures Management) 2. Strengthening Budget Oversight 1.2 3.9 2.3 3.1 (Strengthening Budget Oversight and Improving Transparency) 3. Strengthening PFM systems at provincial level 2.3 7.7 23.2 20.1 (Establishing PFM Systems at the Provincial Level) 4. Project Management 0.5 2.0 6.0 9.4 Total Approved 5.0 17.1 50.0 44.9 Cancelled** (US$6.6 million under RES49424) 22.1 -6.6 Total 65.5 Notes: *World Bank, PAD789 **World Bank, AF Project Paper (PAD1928) *** December 2021 Interim Financial Report (IFR) 22. Table 1 shows the final allocation by each component. In December 2021 the government and IDA agreed to cancel US$6.6 million. This took account of the fact that many planned activities, including for example, some technical assistance (TA), procurement of equipment, and delivery of workshops and training, had to be cancelled or delayed indefinitely due to travel restrictions, supply chain disruptions, lockdowns, and social distancing measures due to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). With the Program nearing its closing date and a follow-on US$250 million governance project 5 (ENCORE – P171762) approved in December 2021, the MOF took the practical step of requesting cancellation of the Program’s undisbursed balance so that remaining funds could be used for other priorities, including addressing the COVID-19 crisis. B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION 23. The changes to the Program and their rationales have been discussed in the preceding section but are summarized below. A list of main amendments to the MDTF is also provided. • Additional Financing of US$50 million was approved in February 2017: The AF aimed at strengthening the development impact of the Program, adjusting to changing government priorities, and enhancing the achievement of the PDO. In addition, the AF extended the closing date for three additional years, from December 31, 2018, to December 31, 2021, to allow for the successful implementation of the scaled-up and newly introduced activities. • Level Two Restructuring approved December 23, 2021 – As already noted, the advent of the COVID- 19 health crisis led to delays or cancellation of some Program activities. In this context, and with the Program nearing its closing date, government requested cancelation of the Program’s undisbursed balance of SDR 4 million so that the funds might revert to the DRC IDA allocation and used for other priorities. This was the only change included in this Level-Two restructuring. • Amendments to the Trust Fund ▫ The first amendment on December 17, 2014 consisted of minor changes to the disbursement schedule. 5See Congo, Democratic Republic of - Enhancing Collection of Revenue and Expenditure Management Project (Report Number PAD4615) Page 13 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) ▫ The second amendment on March 31, 2015 consisted of adding new activities related to: (i) budget preparation -- including support for macroeconomic forecasting, multiyear budgeting and programming, and performance-based budgeting; (ii) addition of Kinshasa as a project-supported province; and (iii) the addition of a supplemental contribution equivalent to Euro 4 million from Belgium (as a silent contributor, through FCDO). II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs 24. The relevance of the Program’s development objective is rated as High. As noted at the outset of this report, the Program’s original PDO was fully consistent with the World Bank’s FY13-16 CAS goals and derived directly from the government’s donor-supported PFM strategy – that is, the 2010 PSRFP and associated legal and institutional reforms. In fact, the CAS identified the PFMAP as a key instrument of engagement with the DRC. There was also substantial continuity with a predecessor project, DRC Governance Capacity Enhancement Project (P104041), which had laid the foundation for the PFM reforms carried forward by the PFMAP. Both the original PDO and the revised PDO (formally introduced through the AF) responded effectively to changing country needs and analysis undertaken as part of the FY18 SCD, including the addition of Kinshasa and newly created provinces, greater attention to macro-forecasting and budget planning and, especially, concerted focus on addressing resource mobilization shortcomings. 25. The themes of the Program’s PDO continue to be critical to DRC’s development, currently and for the medium-term as evidenced by the governance focus of FY22 CPF and the content of a follow-on PFM Project (ENCORE). The emphasis on strengthened PFM and resource mobilization is a central theme in the government’s 2018-22 National Development Plan, and the first strategic objective of the World Bank Group’s FY22-26 Country Partnership Framework 6 highlights the need for continuing improvements in public resource management transparency and accountability. The ENCORE project builds on the Program’s achievements, and a development policy operation (DPO) presented at the Board on mid-June 2022 following a 15-year hiatus is focused on supporting governance and PFM related reforms. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 26. This ICR uses an integrated assessment following the ICR Guidelines which indicate that revision of the PDO does not trigger a split rating if the scope of the project is expanded. The revisions expanded the scope of the program through the addition of activities aimed at strengthening DRM, scaling up some activities related to public expenditure management and accountability and increasing the number of provinces supported (albeit within the original territorial space). The revised Results Framework (RF) was not only more expansive and ambitious than the original results matrix, it also sought to create a closer link between Program activities and expected results. In this context, the ICR focuses on assessing the RF as modified through the AF documentation (presented below). 27. This assessment reviews the Program’s achievements and shortcomings along the four dimensions laid out in the TOC and congruent with the RF (Table 2 and Annex 1). These include the following: (i) improved DRM at national level; (ii) improved budget planning and execution (expenditure management) at national level; 6 See Congo, Democratic Republic of - Country Partnership Framework for the Period FY22-26 (Report Number 168084). 2022. Page 14 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) (iii) strengthened PFM accountability mechanisms; and (iv) provincial level improvements in PFM. Although province level activities also focused on resource mobilization, budget management and accountability, the Program activities at province levels are treated separately because they were substantially different from most national level interventions and occurred on their own timeline. The assessment takes into account the difficult political economy issues that the Program faced throughout implementation as well as the impact of COVID-19 restrictions that either postponed or constrained many Program activities in 2020 and 2021. Table 2: Summary of Results Framework Indicator Indicator Base Target Achievement Observation Level line PDO 1 Annual rate of increase in tax collection 3% 8% 41% Achieved PDO 2 Budget execution rate (excluding donor funded projects) 68% 70% 104% Achieved PDO 3 Public expenditures audited by IGF 0 20% 47% Achieved IRI 1 Accuracy of domestic revenue projections 73% 87% 108% Achieved IRI 2 Female staff trained in fiscal and customs administration 0 20% 22.4% Achieved IRI 3 Procurement contracts awarded outside public 41% 25% 58.5% Not Achieved procurement system IRI 4 Lead time between audit completion by SAI and 3 months 2 months 1.7 months Achieved submission of audited financial statements to parliament IRI 5 Average annual increase in own revenue generated by 3% 10% 31.7% Achieved provinces IRI 6 TDEs implementing participatory budgeting 1 50 51 Achieved IRI 7 Pro-poor expenditure execution rate in the provinces 0 12% NA Not Achieved (not measured) Source: Authors based on ISRs National Level Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM): 28. The Program played an important role in improving the capacity of the central government to strengthen DRM. Notably, Program activities helped to: (i) clarify and streamline the allocation of tax authority and tax rates between central, provincial and municipal levels by providing TA, training and legal changes; (ii) expand customs operations management system - Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) to several border offices through provision of IT equipment and training of customs officers with a focus on ensuring inclusion of female staff in training programs (IRI #2); (iii) consolidate implementation of legislated revisions to the Income tax (personal and corporate) system through updated procedures. Moreover, in coordination with the French Development Agency, the Program helped to secure approval and begin implementation of a new digitized system (ISYS Regies) to link the central bank, the revenue agencies, MOF, Treasury, and the commercial banks to allow for better tracking, recording and reconciliation of tax payments. These, and other Program- supported activities clearly had a strong positive impact on DRM capacity in the country, although the COVID- 19 crisis and associated restrictions affected training programs for revenue administrations (customs, tax, non- tax) in 2020 and 2021. 29. Assessing whether the above Program-supported improvements in DRM were sufficient to meet the RF targets (that is, PDO indicator #1 and IRI #1) for central-level revenue mobilization was not a straightforward undertaking. As shown in Table 2, the actual outcomes surpassed the targets set in the RF. These outcomes reflect both Program activities as well as increases in the prices of key commodities (for example, cobalt, copper) and changes in the CDF-USD exchange rate – the latter factors not explicitly foreseen or accounted for in the design of the RF. In this context, the relative impact of the Program’s contributions to the observed increase in tax collection and tax projection based on a review of Program activities, experience in other countries with similar reforms, and in-depth discussions with government officials as well as World Bank Page 15 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) staff was assessed. Based on this exercise, it was determined that Program activities had played a sufficient role in strengthening DRM to have achieved or slightly surpassed the revenue mobilization and revenue projection targets laid out in the RF. In addition, it should be recognized that the World Bank’s presence and engagement in the DRM area played an important role in ensuring that a significant proportion of the higher revenues from these price increases were in fact collected. National Level Expenditure Management: 30. National budget and expenditure management received significant support throughout the PFMAP Program, substantially achieving most of the Program goals. Program-provided TA was instrumental in developing the tools and procedures to improve budget forecasting, strengthen tax collection and recordation and allow for multi-year budget programming. Support was also provided to strengthen monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of government programs to better inform and improve allocation choices. In addition, in preparation for results-based-budgeting, revisions were made to standardize and implement budget classification across ministries together with the development of appropriate information technology (IT) systems. The Program provided training to equip staff at different levels to adopt and implement these initiatives. Improved budget forecasting and other improvements allowed for more credible revenue projections, in turn, helping to close the large gap that had existed between budget forecasts and budget execution (PDO indicator #2). Emergency pandemic spending may also have contributed to high budget execution in the Program’s final two or so years. 31. An important achievement of the Program was putting in place some of the building blocks needed to begin decentralizing budget allocation and control beyond the MOF and strengthening oversight of the budget by the legislature and citizens. For instance, the Program, through TA and workshops, significantly strengthened the capacity of the legislature to understand and analyze the budget. It also helped establish a more decentralized, transparent and participatory process for budget formulation involving annual budget programming workshops with all stakeholders including line ministries, non-governmental organizations and broader civil society representatives. Civil society representatives were also invited to technical discussions in Parliament. These processes – which are now well-established -- constituted an important step towards opening up the budgeting formulation process, which had been opaque and tightly centralized with the MOF and the Ministry of Budget 7. Similarly, the Program helped establish Directorates of Administration and Finance (DAFs) in 12 line ministries that previously had no capacity to formulate or execute their own budgets. This has removed a key hurdle to the planned transfer of some budget authority from the MOF to other ministries, although the actual transfer of authority to line ministries was impeded during this Program’s life by political factors. 32. Finally, it should be noted that the Program was unable to achieve its goals with respect to procurement, largely reflecting insufficient political will to adopt and implement a transparent process for public procurement. Program inputs (TA and training) helped strengthen the country’s Procurement Board, develop an integrated Public Procurement Information System, and publish a procurement magazine. The newly developed system was initially expected to be rolled out in line ministries. However, government did not pass the regulation and rules necessary to make the system operational. As a result, the intermediate indicator (IRI #3) related to reduction in procurement made without formal processing (that is, “sole source” purchases outside formal procurement rules) was not met. In fact, a joint evaluation of procurement undertaken by the World Bank and the government 8 indicates that the situation worsened over the life of the Program as shown in Table 2. 7Opaqueness and centralization continue to characterize the budget execution processes and decisions. 8Rapport d’Évaluation du système de passation des marchés publics de la République Démocratique du Congo - MAPS II, the World Bank, June 2020 Page 16 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Accountability at National and Provincial Level: 33. A major accomplishment of the Program was to increase accountability in PFM. One clear area of success was the effort to strengthen the capacity of the IGF to audit and investigate anomalies in spending, inter alia, through: (i) introduction of risk-based audits; (ii) recruitment and training of a cohort of 80 new IGF staff; (iii) purchase of audit applications and provision of associated training and equipment. These activities translated not only into a significant increase in audits of public expenditures (PDO indicator #3) but, with the backing of the Office of the President, the IGF’s investigations have led to several high-profile political figures being charged and tried on corruption charges, for the first time in DRC history – in turn, helping to curb the climate of corruption and impunity that pervades DRC’s public sector. The Program’s efforts to institutionalize and increase informed participation by line ministries and civil society in budget formulation and parliamentary budget discussions are also playing a part in increasing accountability over the Program period. 34. Program activities to strengthen the DRC’s Court of Accounts (CoA) also led to some improvements, including reduced time for completion of audits of public financial statements and presentation to Parliament (IRI #4). However, despite a revised (stronger) legal framework supported by the Program and adopted by Parliament in 2018, the CoA did not make use of its newly established independent status and has not been proactive in its mission. Therefore, it has thus far been unable to produce more relevant and significant budget reviews. Stronger political backing, a new board and a more strategic approach is likely needed to increase its impact in the future. The follow-on World Bank ENCORE project as well as several other donors’ programs funded by the Norwegians (in association with the INTOSAI Development Initiative), and Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office of the United Kingdom (FCDO) will continue working with the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) to improve accountability in the use of country resources. 35. The Program also helped create the legal basis for a network of accounting units across ministries and provinces that will allow for tracking, registering, consolidating, and reporting all government and provincial financial and budgetary transactions, enabling implementation of a single treasury account and establishing better internal controls with respect to public expenditures. Implementation of the network was not achieved, however, and will be taken forward over the medium-term, with support from the follow-on World Bank operations (ENCORE Project and DPO) and the ongoing International Monetary Fund (IMF) Extended Credit Facility program. Strengthening PFM in Selected Provinces: 36. Activities to strengthen PFM at the provincial level were adjusted over the life of the Program to adapt to the changes brought about by the 2015 law of “decoupage” which extended the original four Program provinces to 20 provinces. In this context, the Program committed significant additional resources for provincial PFM support and departed from the “plateforme minimale” strategy (adopted for the original provinces) towards a more opportunistic approach for the new provinces, taking advantage of openings for meaningful PFM improvements as these arose. The emphasis of the Program at provincial level were: (i) to strengthen the provincial tax departments to increase own revenues vis a vis central transfers (IRI #5); (ii) strengthen expenditure management and help assure more regular funding for pro-poor government programs using locally generated revenues (IRI #7); and (iii) to increase citizen engagement in the budget allocation process, especially at the level of the TDEs (IRI #6). 37. Data compiled by the government shows that the average annual rate of increase in revenue mobilized was considerable, increasing from 3 percent to nearly 32 percent, albeit with large variation among Program provinces. While some of this increase may be attributable to Program activities – including clarification of provincial taxation authority, strengthening of Provincial Tax Departments, and support for taxpayer surveys and databases – it is also due to the very low initial level of revenue collection and to rapid Page 17 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) economic growth in some provinces. For instance, mining revenues boomed in the Kivus and former Katanga provinces and growth was high in Kongo Central, where the national port is located and Kinshasa, the capital city. The impact of increased revenue on pro-poor spending by the provinces was not feasible to measure, despite several attempts by the project implementation unit (PIU) and its network, given poor budget recording and reporting by most provinces. However, there is little doubt that Program efforts to institutionalize and promote citizen participation in the budget process 9 was arguably the most successful element of the Program’s provincial and local level activities. 51 TDEs (principally in Kinshasa, North Kivu and South Kivu) had already opted to involve citizens in budget discussions by the Program’s end and other TDEs have indicated keen interest in adopting similar citizen participation programs. The impact of citizen involvement has been seen in the TDEs, especially in the choice of small infrastructure projects initiated by citizens. Moreover, donors such as the FCDO, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have also started or signaled their intention to replicate the approach in other provinces/TDEs. Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 38. Overall efficacy is rated as Substantial. Despite the difficult political context and the long history of governance problems in the DRC, the Program achieved all three of its PDO indicators and five of seven IRIs. While the failure of the DRM-related indicators to account for non-Program factors such as mineral price and exchange rate fluctuations complicated the assessment of the PDO related to tax revenue collection, stakeholders indicated that Program activities had a sufficiently strong impact to achieve the target of an annual increase in tax collection of 8 percent (albeit not the observed result of 41 percent). PDO indicators associated with public expenditure management and accountability were also met, with strong progress recorded with respect to the performance of the IGF in proactively conducting audits and identifying corruption at even the highest levels of government. Similarly, the Program not only met targets with respect to training of women staff, it also helped raise a broader awareness of gender issues within the sector, including in the organization of participatory budgeting workshops and associated activities. The emphasis on citizen engagement at national and local levels was a particularly strong feature of the Program. The successes in opening up the budget formulation and execution process to citizen scrutiny should not be underestimated, given the DRC’s long history of centralization of budgetary matters. Participatory budgeting at the TDE level was also an enormous departure from established practice and has gathered considerable momentum across TDEs and with the DRC’s external partners. The Program helped promote progress even in the areas where it was unable to meet the RF target. In particular, as already mentioned, Program support was instrumental in putting in place all the building blocks for a new digitized procurement system. Future operations in the sector could quickly capitalize on this base, once the political climate is more conducive and right instruments (policy) are available for public procurement reform. 9With support from the Program, the government defined a formal 4-steps process to introduce and promote budget participation before its implementation in several TDEs. Page 18 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) C. EFFICIENCY Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 39. The benefits attributable to this Program were not expressed in terms of monetary value at design stage, and neither the original PAD nor the AF documents offered a quantification of expected economic benefits. The Program supported activities aimed at improving budget credibility, strengthening budget execution, improving internal controls, enhancing oversight, improving revenue mobilization and administration capacity and increasing transparency in the management of public resources at central government and sub-national level. Thus, the benefits of this Program that were identified at the appraisal stage (PAD), were expected to generate annual savings for the government which were likely to more than offset the costs of implementing the Program. The economic and financial benefits that the program will produce should exceed the costs of the program in terms of current value. 40. An ex-post economic and financial analysis was prepared to estimate the economic rate of return of the Program, incorporating actual disbursement figures. Based on this ex-post analysis, the Program is viable over 10 years: the Program has a Net Present Value (NPV) of US$34.28 million discounted at 11 10 percent and an economic Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 35 percent. The results of the financial analysis also suggest that the Program is financially justified, with the financial NPV estimated at US$19.42 million based on a 5 percent real interest rate. The analysis employed an incremental approach, which, by design, compares scenarios with and without the Program (counterfactual scenario). In the economic analysis, time savings accrue from lowering the costs to economic actors of compliance with the tax regulations. Government’s savings are calculated as both the reduction in administrative costs of collecting taxes and customs duties for MOF and expenditure savings from greater control over spending; improving and consolidating the value added tax (VAT) reform; supporting the improvement of tax policies and legislation on tax exemptions; strengthening inspection services to fight against fraud on tax; supporting voluntary compliance initiatives and improving the quality of human resources and their working conditions. A more detailed analysis of the economic gains and benefits is presented in Annex 4. 41. The Program also had several indirect (unquantified) benefits, mostly in the form of knowledge and governance improvements. These derived from the provision of: (i) improved transparency and effectiveness in budget oversight at the central level; (ii) strengthening PFM oversight capacity of the IGF, the CoA, and the National Assembly (NA); and (iii) provided resources to consolidate citizen participation in the budgeting process. 42. In light of the above analysis, the Program’s overall efficiency is rated as Substantial as benefits and returns are judged to be in line with similar projects in the sector. D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 43. Based on the above assessment and ratings for Relevance (High), Efficacy (Substantial) and Efficiency (Substantial) the derived overall outcome rating for the Program is Satisfactory. 10Given the evolution of the country’s economic situation we used a discount rate of 11 percent. Moreover, we rely on a descriptive approach proposed by the World Bank, it has been suggested that discount rates for developing countries be in the 8 to 12 percent range (World Bank OPSPQ. 2016. Discounting Costs and Benefits in Economic Analysis of World Bank Projects). The United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO) also use a rate of 11% for fragile and conflict affected states. Page 19 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS Not Applicable Gender 44. The project was not gender-tagged. Efforts in the gender area represented a limited but an important step in the DRC where gender concerns had rarely (if ever) been considered in policy and programmatic decisions within the PFM and governance areas. The Program began a dialogue on gender which led not only to the training of female staff to facilitate their advancement in customs and tax administration positions but also increased sensitivity to gender considerations in public forums. These included efforts to encourage and track women’s participation in citizen engagement efforts such as the “Tribunals de Expression Populaire” involving community level budget consultations. Institutional Strengthening 45. Nearly the entire focus of the Program was institutional strengthening. Key examples included the IGF which has played a critical role in the government’s anti-corruption efforts. The Program’s activities to revitalize the IGF were of critical importance in enabling it to rise to the challenge once the political environment became more favorable. The Program also helped lay the groundwork for deconcentration of budget formulation and execution to line ministries by creating and building the capacity of 12 DAFs covering priority sectors such as education, health, agriculture, and infrastructure. In addition, the Program’s effort to clarify the tax authorities of the three levels of government (central, provincial, and local) has strengthened the capacity of PFM authorities at each level to better mobilize resources and improve budget planning. Finally, the Program played an important role in promoting institutionalization of citizen oversight and participation in budgeting, especially at provincial level -- a major step forward in increasing transparency in PFM in the DRC. Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 46. The Program sought to address poverty and boost shared prosperity both directly and indirectly. Direct efforts were targeted at central level (increase expected in budget credibility to boost expenditure in social sectors) and provincial level, where an increasing share of provincial revenues (and expenditures) was to have been directed to pro-poor spending, including the social sectors and basic infrastructure. Regarding the central level, the creation and operationalization of the DAF at the Ministry of Education, with support from the project, was instrumental in developing and implementing the free primary education program promoted by the President in 2020. The DAF was able to develop the multi-year fiscal framework, and financial impacts generated by the program, thereby helping the government to efficiently plan for this critical program. The extent to which increased pro-poor spending occurred at provincial level remains unclear, however, given difficulties in gathering reliable allocation and expenditure data from the provinces. In terms of indirect impacts, there is little doubt that improved revenue collection and better, more transparent management of public finances could lead to improved resource allocation and use in line with the DRC’s stated policy goals of addressing poverty, building human capital and creating economic opportunity. The extent to which this will occur in practice is largely a matter of political will and may be expected to be a variable process, given DRC’s past trajectory. Page 20 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 47. The original project was prepared in a favorable environment. As noted at the outset, government had committed to strengthening PFM, including committing to a consultative PSRFP and convening its external partners to help support its implementation. The government also passed a number of legislative measures that were intended to make the Plan operational. Donor support for the reform program was strong and there were concerted efforts to harmonize assistance for PFM at both central and provincial levels. In fact, as previously mentioned, PFMAP garnered significant financial support from FCDO with IDA making a much smaller contribution. The PFMAP also benefited from and was based in analytic work undertaken via the PEFA program, which helped identify key areas of weakness for the project to address. The PFMAP project also built on an earlier governance and PFM project, the Establishing Capacity for Core Public Management Project (P117382) 11 approved by the Board in 2011 and in its last phase of implementation when the PFMAP was under preparation and subsequently approved. This meant that the government counterparts in the relevant ministries were already familiar with the World Bank processes and the PFMAP teams on both the government and World Bank sides could benefit from the experience gained in the sector. 48. Political conditions were less favorable in some respects at the time the AF was prepared and presented to the Board (2017). In particular, political tensions were very high in the period of 2016-2018 due to the postponement of the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections as the then president sought to extend his term over the objections of opposition parties. There were also strains in the government’s relationship with the donor community. This made it difficult to secure the attention of policymakers or attract significant co-financing for the AF, which was solely financed from IDA resources. Nevertheless, proceeding with the AF was appropriate as the 2018 election brought to power a new government with a stated commitment to fighting corruption and strengthening PFM. The AF built on the ongoing PFMAP, scaling up and adding new emphases as previously mentioned. It also had to cope with the reality of the “decoupage” law which had created new provinces with very weak (or virtually non-existent) PFM capacity. B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 49. Political and health conditions were important factors that affected Program implementation. Health crises were an important constraint, first with the re-emergence of Ebola in some of the Program provinces and, subsequently, the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the cancellation of several planned activities. Moreover, as previously mentioned, political backing for the Program varied with the changes in government and the interests of the specific Minister of Finance in office. While the early phase and the last years of the Program’s implementation were bolstered by strong leadership at the MOF, the interim years of political crisis (mid-2015-2019) were characterized by frequent changes in ministers with varying degrees of commitment to PFM reforms. Some of this variability was mitigated by the fact that the Program management was directed by COREF, a permanent institution established within the MOF with strong links within the government. The experience gained by COREF in the early phase of the Program also proved valuable in navigating political tensions when these arose. 11 See World Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo - Establishing Capacity for Core Public Management Project (Report Number ICR4032). 2017. Page 21 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 50. As noted in Section I, the M&E design was modified under the AF to accommodate expansion of the Program’s scope and to allow for better attribution of observed outputs/results to Program activities. The initial RF, though prepared according to Bank guidelines and well-aligned with the government’s PSRFP, was heavily dependent on the regular conduct of PEFA assessments which did not take place annually as anticipated during PFMAP preparation. In light of this and other shortcomings with the use of PEFA indicators, a revised RF was prepared, that became the basis for Program monitoring by both the government (via the PIU) and the World Bank. The revised RF – used to assess Program’s efficacy in this ICR -- focused more on outcomes than outputs, and at the same time, attempted to capture more clearly the contribution of the Program components/activities towards the achievement of the outcomes. It also specified data sources for the indicators. For the most part, the revised RF did achieve its goals of improving the coverage of the Program’s aims and components, scope for attribution, and regular measurement of progress. However, as discussed in the section on Program’s efficacy, it failed in some instances to anticipate the impact of exogenous factors including commodity price and exchange rate fluctuations on tax collection. In addition, the indicator on procurement was poorly formulated; while the intention was to track purchases made outside of the existing procurement rules, it referred instead to monitoring sole source purchases which is allowable under the procurement law in specified circumstances. This, and the failure to implement the digitized procurement system, complicated monitoring. M&E Implementation 51. M&E was accorded high priority throughout Program implementation. A well-qualified M&E Specialist was recruited to the PIU and a network of provincial level M&E contributors was established to provide regular updates from the provinces. The team systematically reported on progress of key indicators and prepared M&E reports on a regular basis. These were shared with the World Bank Implementation Support team, which, in turn, included the data in their Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISR) and helped to resolve issues as they were identified. M&E was rated Satisfactory in all project ISRs, covering the period from November 2014 to January 2021. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that despite noting that the tax revenue collection indicators were distorted by extraneous factors and that the procurement indicator was ambiguous, no initiative was taken to formally revise the RF following implementation of the AF. M&E Utilization 52. The Results Framework was used to prioritize Program activities and develop annual work plans, especially in the last three years of the Program’s life. Both the MOF/COREF and the World Bank teams tried to ensure that there was a tight linkage between the expected outputs/results and the activities implemented. For instance, in order to conform to M&E requirements, the IGF developed audit applications that enabled regular tracking and reporting on the expenditures audited. This, in turn, helped in the planning and implementation of the IGF’s work program and was at least partially responsible for the IGF’s success in achieving strong results. The CoA also conducted an institutional reorganization, including establishing the provincial chambers of accounts in response to the targets set in the RF related to the submission of annual audit reports to Parliament and provincial legislatures. This institutional reorganization allowed CoA to Page 22 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) improve its internal processes and to accelerate its audit processing mandate. Similarly, the gender indicator was instrumental in getting the MOF and the Tax Administration to ensure the participation of women in its training activities. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 53. The overall rating of the quality of M&E is Modest. While there were clearly some strong aspects in the implementation and utilization of the M&E framework as described above, there were also notable flaws in the RF design, including: (i) problems with initial RF formulation (too high level and too dependent on the regular conduct of the PEFA), (ii) some poorly designed indicators (regarding tax collection and procurement) in the revised RF which complicated monitoring and final evaluation, and (iii) the lack of an outcome (PDO level) indicator to monitor impact of the provincial level activities. Perhaps most concerning was the failure to formally revise the RF during implementation even after the problems in measurement were recognized by both the PIU and the World Bank teams. B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE 54. Environmental and Social Safeguards: The environmental screening of the project undertaken by the World Bank classified the Program as Category C. No safeguard policy was triggered for this project, as it had minimal or no adverse environmental impacts. So, beyond the screening, no further Environmental Assessment was required. During project implementation, it was therefore not necessary to have a safeguard specialist within PIU. In addition, no environmental issue requiring safeguards support was reported to the World Bank. Thus, the environmental and social risk rating of the project remained low throughout the project’s life. 55. Financial Management (FM). Adequate FM arrangements were in place throughout Program implementation. FM performance was mostly rated Satisfactory through the life cycle of the Program, except during the review conducted in December 2014 and January 2020. All the interim financial reports were submitted on time and were acceptable to the World Bank. The external auditors issued unqualified opinions on the financial statements and the audit recommendations were implemented. There were additional missions that took place on a regular basis to ensure that the FM risk remain low. 56. The PFMAP Program was the first DRC operation to implement internal audit conducted by the IGF. During the period of IGF intervention, the internal audit reports were generally acceptable to the World Bank with a performance rated satisfactory. Recommendations were implemented on a regular basis. The Program experienced some issues with its commercial bank in 2021, leading to important delays of payments to suppliers and service providers. This situation is still ongoing during the grace period, as there are partners who have been awaiting their payments for almost a month. As the Program needs to return a balance of unused funds for an average of US$1 million, the support of the MOF is expected to facilitate transactions with the commercial bank. 57. Procurement. Procurement moved forward normally after two years of project implementation, with the recruitment of a new procurement team including a well-qualified Procurement Specialist and a Procurement Assistant. One issue faced in the initial phase was gaining the cooperation of beneficiary agencies/units that were required to develop terms of references (ToRs) and technical specifications for supplies and services. To overcome this issue, the PIU put in place a strategy of stimulating participation and ownership of the project by the stakeholders, through conduct of seminars and workshops, which enabled them to contribute to the procurement process (elaboration of the ToRs/technical specifications of the Page 23 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) supplies, evaluation of the bids, contract management, review, and validation of the deliverables). In particular, payments of the consultants and suppliers were made subject to the approval of both the beneficiary administrations and COREF, rather than COREF alone. C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry 58. The World Bank’s performance in ensuring the quality of the PFMAP Program was Satisfactory. The identification and preparation team worked cooperatively with both government counterparts and internal and external partners to develop a design that: (i) responded to the government’s PSRFP program and framework; (ii) took careful account of available analytical work; (iii) furthered key objectives of the World Bank’s CAS; and (iv) ensured that the World Bank’s intervention was complementary to ongoing government and donor-supported initiatives. The World Bank teams that prepared the Program (initially and at the AF stage) had strong technical skills as well as country knowledge and the skills mix was appropriate. Due attention was paid to assessing fiduciary and environmental/social issues and poverty and gender aspects were highlighted through the AF. Implementation arrangements were well designed, including the establishment of the PIU as an integral part of the MOF and the decision to have province-based PIU liaison units and staff. Quality of Supervision 59. The quality of supervision is also rated Satisfactory. After the first year of implementation, the World Bank located the Program Task Team Leader in the Country Office, a decision that was highly appreciated by government counterparts and other country stakeholders as this afforded the opportunity for weekly meetings to discuss project matters and resolve emerging issues. Placing key staff in the field (and minimizing turnover) also allowed them the space to better understand the difficult political and social context of the DRC, enabling timely interactions with key national actors to help maintain progress in implementation and manage risks even through the politically tense and turbulent 2016-2018 period. As attested to by the ISRs, there was consistent attention paid to the development impact of Program activities, especially institutional capacity building and citizen engagement in the budget process. The Program’s fiduciary aspects were closely monitored with both the financial management specialist and the procurement specialist located in Kinshasa and interacting frequently with their PIU counterparts. As already alluded to in the M&E section, an area of weakness was the failure of the team to formally revise some aspects of the RF, even after noting issues associated with attribution. in part, this may have been the result of the advent of COVID-related disruptions to work. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 60. Overall, Bank performance is rated Satisfactory. Quality at entry was extremely strong on the key dimensions of strategic relevance, policy development, and technical and fiduciary quality. With respect to supervision as well, the Bank performed its role in a responsive and timely manner, while effectively managing risks and addressing bottlenecks. However, the neglect of formal revisions to the RF in line with implementation experience was an important omission that complicated the monitoring and eventual evaluation of Program achievements. Page 24 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 61. Given the long history of weak governance and PFM in the DRC the risk to the sustainability of the Program’s development outcome remains Substantial. However, there are some factors that improve the probability that key outcomes might be sustained and perhaps even extended. Inter alia, these include: (i) the stated commitment of DRC’s current leadership to vigorously fight corruption and strengthen public finances; (ii) the expectation that the current 2021-2023 International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit Facility program will go forward in the coming months and be followed closely by the World Bank’s DPO involving strong governance and PFM measures; and (iii) the engagement of DRC’s other external partners including the European Union, Belgium, France, USAID, UNDP and FCDO in strengthening PFM through new operations aimed at digitizing tax administration, strengthening monitoring and collection of revenues from mining and strengthening expenditure management in the provinces. 62. The World Bank’s continuing engagement in the PFM sector through the ENCORE project is also expected to play an important role in sustaining and extending the gains made under the Program. Based on lessons learned and building on the Program results, ENCORE project uses Performance Based Conditions (PBCs) and focuses on helping the central government to: (i) increase revenue, by building its capacity to control and collect more mining revenues; (ii) improve expenditure management, by consolidating budget credibility, making the accounting department operational, introducing new IT systems (IFMIS, e-procurement and HRMIS); and enhancing external controls through support to the SAI. ENCORE project will also continue to provide support to selected provincial government to build their PFM systems and get more revenue to fund public services based on lessons learned from the Program. V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 63. The Program’s experience offers some important lessons for future governance and PFM projects in the DRC and in other similar contexts. These are the following:  Long-term Commitment. Overcoming DRC’s long history of weak governance and absence of transparency in public finances is a long-term endeavor, requiring strong commitment from the World Bank to stay engaged, even in the face of setbacks. In this case, the strong commitment of the World Bank Country Management Unit to stay the course in making governance and PFM a centerpiece of the country dialogue over consecutive CPF periods -- despite sometimes uneven progress -- was a critical factor in enabling the PFMAP Program to continue pressing forward with needed reforms.  Realism in Reform Expectations. World Bank operations need to be realistic in setting objectives in an FCV context such as DRC, recognizing that changes are likely to be incremental and, even then, highly subject to changes in country circumstances, political leadership and government commitment. The IGF is a particularly good example of the stop-start nature of progress in DRC. Although Program investments in the IGF had been made in the early years of the Program, the institution initially appeared to have little impact. It was only in the last 2-3 years of the Program – after the presidential elections -- that the country’s leadership recognized that the IGF was a capable, effective and valuable instrument to fight corruption and reduce misuse of government funds. Once it gained political support, the IGF became (and, for now, remains) highly effective in combatting public corruption.  Avoiding Reliance on PEFA for Monitoring Results. As seen in other contemporaneous PFM projects, the PFMAP’s reliance on PEFAs to monitor and measure Program results was clearly ill-advised for the reasons discussed in this report. First and foremost, the PEFA indicators often are too high level to Page 25 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) enable accurate tracking of project impacts and results. Identification of results that can be more directly attributed to Program activities is preferable both to monitor results and make course corrections in real time. Secondly, reliance on PEFA is inadvisable because there is little guarantee that they will be regularly conducted or that they will maintain the same structure /methodology over a project’s life.  Backing from Policy Instruments. Sensitive reform areas like revenue management, public procurement, and transfer of commitment authority (for example, from MOF to line ministries) are difficult to tackle through investment operations alone. The odds of achieving meaningful and sustainable change would be significantly strengthened if a coordinated strategy is adopted, involving development policy financing (DPFs), results-based operations (that is program for results or IPF with performance-based conditions) and traditional investments. One example (noted in the preceding discussion) is procurement, where, in the absence of necessary regulatory piece, little progress was made despite Program successes in designing and developing a modern, IT-based procurement system.  Positive Role of Citizen Engagement. Promoting the participation of broader civil society can make a difference – albeit incrementally – in reducing opacity in public finance, even in a context such as DRC’s where public finance management has traditionally been very tightly held. Through training and workshops, the Program helped introduce some public input and scrutiny on budget matters, which will not be easy to reverse without political costs.  Management Arrangements. Program management by a permanent government institution (COREF) with qualified staff and strong links within the MOF and other key actors within the government was critical to effective implementation – including skillfully addressing political tensions which inevitably arose. In addition, given the DRC’s vast territory and connectivity issues, projects cannot be managed solely through a Kinshasa-based PIU. If a project is intended to cover both central and provincial level activities, it is essential that a network of provincial units be established to promote project activities, ensure implementation requirements are followed and monitor outputs and results on a continuous basis. The relative independence of program implementation plans in the center and individual provinces was an important factor in continued implementation of this Program -- even in the face of unfavorable national political developments, localized conflicts/violence and the COVID-19 and Ebola outbreaks. In addition, it is important to have key members of the Bank’s task team located in the country to allow for timely and politically sensitive resolution of policy and project issues as well as more regular travel to the provinces. . Page 26 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS Table 1: Components and Outputs (NB This table shows the results framework as generated from the system. However, the reported PDO and indicators are not up to date since the last ISR was archived in January 2021. Therefore the actual and final values of the PDO, and intermediate indicators as reported in the government’s Implementation Completion report and reviewed by the World Bank Team are presented in Table A.2 which follows). A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improve domestic revenue mobilization, public expenditure management, and accountability Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Annual tax collection rate Percentage 1.00 8.00 41.00 31-Oct-2012 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. Despite COVID, a significant increase of 41% in overall tax revenue expressed in $ was registered, greatly exceeding the target of 8%.This high performance mainly reflects positive fluctuations in international prices of minerals but also in project support to DRM (including the ISYS Regies implementation and training) and in Government efforts to step up its oversight and supervision of the three revenue administrations’ activities and performance through regular reporting at the weekly Council of Ministers Page 27 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Budget execution rate, Percentage 50.00 70.00 103.70 excluding donor-funded projects 31-Oct-2012 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved: The budget execution rate increased from 68% in 2016, to 89.6 in 2018, to 103.7% in 2021 – far exceeding the target of 70%. The achievement largely reflects more realistic revenue projections and associated annual budgets. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Public expenditures audited Percentage 0.00 20.00 47.00 by the Inspectorate General of Finance 31-Oct-2012 30-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved: By 2018, the IGF was auditing 22.3% of central public expenditures, already exceeding the end-Program target of 20 percent. The audit coverage rate in 2020 was 36.9%. Since 2020, the IGF has received strong political support for its investigations and has significantly and positively impacted the fight against corruption in DRC. A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Component 1- Supporting Domestic Revenue Mobilization and Expenditures Management Page 28 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Accuracy of domestic Percentage 50.00 87.00 108.00 revenue projection 01-Dec-2016 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved: 2021 actual revenues were 107.9% of initial projections reflecting both better projections (several budgets, including 2020 and 2021 were revised downward to account for reduced revenue projections) and improved collection of revenues, from 2020. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Female staff trained on fiscal Percentage 0.00 20.00 22.40 and custom administration 01-Dec-2016 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved: By end of 2020, the proportion of female fiscal and customs administration staff with complete specialized training was 22.4%, exceeding the Program target of 20 percent. This proportion remained similar in 2021 as the pandemic restrictions precluded conduct of further training. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Public procurement Percentage 59.00 25.00 58.50 Page 29 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) contracts awarded outside 01-Dec-2016 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 the public procurement system Comments (achievements against targets): Not Achieved: In the absence of expected progress on the new digitized procurement system, ARMP was unable to regularly collect data and the indicator was not monitored as intended. The proxy used by the PIU – the % volume of expenditure on public contracts awarded by mutual agreement (i.e., on a sole source basis) – derived from the MAPS II evaluation showed an increase over the Program period to 58.5% in 2020 Component: Component 2 - Strengthening Budget Oversight and Improving Transparency Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Delay from completion of the Months 7.50 2.00 1.70 annual audits by Cour des Comptes to submitting the 31-Oct-2012 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 audited financial statements to the parliament Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved: The timeframe for reviewing the central government's accountability is in line with the PEFA's A rating and reflects the effort made by the government under the Program to strengthen external control of the budget. Component: Component 3 - Establishing PFM Systems at the Provincial Level Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Page 30 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Target Completion Territorial Decentralized Number 1.00 50.00 51.00 Entities (TDEs) with participatory budgeting 01-Dec-2016 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 under implementation (Citizen engagement indicator) Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. In 2021, 51 TDEs implemented a participatory budgeting approach compared to a target of 50. These include Kinshasa (24); North Kivu (13); Equateur (2); South-UBANGI (2) and South Kivu (10) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Pro-poor expenditure Percentage 0.00 12.00 7.80 execution rate in provinces 01-Dec-2016 31-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Not Achieved (not measured): Provincial budget data and reports remain too weak and irregularly available, to accurately assess actual pro-poor expenditures. The end of project data of 7.8% was the last one measured in September 2020. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Page 31 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Internally generated revenue Percentage 3.00 10.00 31.70 by provinces 01-Dec-2016 30-Dec-2021 31-Dec-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. Despite the interruption due to COVID19 restrictions from 2020, the Program period saw a significant increase in average own-revenues collected by the project-supported provinces, This is due both to Program activities as well as to rapid economic growth in several project provinces Page 32 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Table A. 2: Results Framework Details Indicator’s name End-2021 Description Narrative Assessment Baseline Target (or most 2016 2021 recent) PDO Indicator 1: Annual rate of 3% 8% 41% Measured by the annual rate of Achieved: In 2021, the growth rate of tax collected over the period increase in tax collection increase in tax collection at central 2020 at the central level was estimated to be 40.9 percent in US$ level. Data source: Central Bank of terms (even higher in CDF). This outcome mostly reflects Congo and Ministry of Finance. fluctuations in the prices of key minerals but is partially attributable to project activities. Indicator 2: Budget execution 68% 70% 104% Measured as a percentage change in Achieved: the budget execution rate increased from 68 percent in rate, excluding donor-funded the budget execution rate (excluding 2016 to 103.7 percent in 2021 – far exceeding the target of 70 projects. donor-funded projects) in comparison percent. Budget execution increased over the project period: from to the approved annual budget at 68 percent in 2016 to 89.6 in 2018 to 103.7 percent in 2021, central level. Data source: Ministry of largely reflecting more realistic revenue projections and associated Budget annual budget reports. annual budgets. Indicator 3: Public expenditures 0% 20% 47% Percent of central public expenditures Achieved: By 2018, the IGF had audited 22.3 percent of central audited by the IGF covered by IGF annual audit. Data public expenditures, already exceeding the end-Program target of source: IGF Annual Audit Report. 20 percent. The audit coverage rate in 2020 was 36.9 percent. The IGF has received strong political support for its investigations from 2020. Intermediate Results Indicators Indicator 1: Accuracy of domestic 73% 87% 108 Domestic revenue collected as Achieved: 2021 actual revenues were 107.9 percent of initial revenue projections. percent of initial revenue projection projections reflecting both better projections and improved at central level. Data source: Annual collection of revenue. budget reports Indicator 2: Female staff trained in 0% 20% 22.4% Measured as percent of female staff Achieved: By 2020, the proportion of female fiscal and customs fiscal and customs administration (2020) with completed specialized training in administration staff with complete specialized training was 22.4 fiscal and customs administration. percent, exceeding the Program target of 20 percent. This Data source: Training reports and lists proportion remained similar in 2021 as the pandemic restrictions of participants. precluded conduct of further training. Page 33 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Indicator 3: Public procurement 41% 25% 58.5% Measured as a percentage of the Not Achieved: In the absence of expected progress on the new contracts awarded outside of the (2015) (2020) annual public procurement contracts digitized procurement system, ARMP was unable to regularly public procurement system. that were awarded outside of the collect data and the indicator was not monitored as intended. The current public procurement system. proxy used by the PIU – the percent volume of expenditure on Data source: Procurement Board public contracts awarded by mutual agreement (i.e., on a sole (ARMP) Reports. source basis) – derived from the MAPS II evaluation showed an increase over the Program period to 58.5 percent in 2020. Indicator 4: Lead time from 3 mos. 2 mos. 1.7 mos. Measures the elapsed time from Achieved: The timeframe for reviewing the central government's completion of the annual audits completion of the annual audit by the accountability is in line with the PEFA's A rating and reflects all the by the SAI to submission of the SAI to their formal submission to efforts made by the government through the Program to audited financial statements to Parliament. Data source: CDC report strengthen external control of the budget. the Parliament. Indicator 5: Internally generated 3% 10% 31.7% Measured through the average Achieved. The Program period saw a significant increase in revenues by provinces annual increase in the amount of average own-revenues collected by the project-supported internally generated revenues by provinces. This is due both to Program activities as well as to rapid provinces. Data source: Report of the economic growth in several project provinces. COREF provincial units. Indicator 6: Decentralized 1 50 51 The cumulative number of TDEs Achieved: In 2021, 51 TDEs implemented a participatory Territorial Entities (TDEs) implementing participatory budgeting approach compared to a target of 50. These include implementing budgeting. Data source: Evaluation Kinshasa (24); North Kivu (13); Equateur (2); South-UBANGI (2) and participatory budgeting report of the budget participation South Kivu (10) processes. Indicator 7: Pro-poor expenditure 0% 12% NA Measured through the average Not Achieved (not measured): Provincial budget data and reports execution rate in the provinces. relative difference between the actual remain too weak and erratically available, to accurately assess and planned pro-poor expenditure actual expenditures on the pro-poor sectors. execution at provincial level, annually. Data source: Budget execution reports of the provinces. Page 34 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective/Outcome 1: Improve Domestic Revenue Mobilization at The National Level Outcome indicator • Annual rate of increase in tax collection • Accuracy of domestic revenue projections Intermediate Results Indicators • Female staff trained in fiscal and customs administration Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of Outcome 1) • Allocation of tax authority and tax rates clarified between central, provincial and municipal levels Component 1: Supporting • Customs operations management system (ASYCUDA) extended to several border offices Domestic Revenue Mobilization • IT equipment and training of customs officers provided including to female staff and Expenditures Management • Income Tax (personal and corporate) legislations and regulations consolidated and revised • Roll out of ISYS Regie to DGARD offices (supported)Increased Domestic Revenue Mobilization Objective/Outcome 2: Improved Budget Planning and Execution (Expenditure Management) at National Level Outcome Indicators • Budget execution rate, excluding donor-funded projects. Intermediate Results Indicators • Public procurement contracts awarded outside of the public procurement system Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of Outcome 2) • Created and strengthened DAF in 12 line ministries • Developed tools and procedures to improve budget forecasting, strengthen tax collection and recordation and allow for multi-year budget programming Component 2: Strengthening • Strengthened M&E of government programs to better inform and improve allocation choices. Budget Oversight and Improving • Standardized and implemented budget classification across ministries together with the development of appropriate Transparency information technology (IT) systems • Trained and equip staff at different levels • Strengthened capacity of the legislature to understand and analyze the budget • Developed a modern IT system to track and support procurement processes and activities Page 35 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) Objective/Outcome 3: Strengthen Budget Oversight and Improve Transparency Outcome Indicators • More effective internal audit entities (scope of IGF audits) • Lead time from completion of the annual audits by the SAI to submission of the audited financial statements to the Intermediate Results Indicators Parliament. Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of Outcome 2) Component 1: Strengthening • Strengthened legal SAI independence Budget Oversight and Improving • Strengthened Legislative Oversight capacities Transparency • Increased Public Access to Key Fiscal Information and Participatory Budgeting Objective/Outcome 3 Strengthen PFM at the Provincial Level • Increased revenues collected in selected provinces Outcome Indicators • Increased citizen monitoring and participation in budget • Internally generated revenues by provinces Intermediate Results Indicators • Territorial Decentralized Entities (TDEs) implementing participatory budgeting • Pro-poor expenditure execution rate in the provinces Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of Outcome 3) • Strengthened the capacities of provincial assemblies • Strengthened the provincial government’s institutional and technical capacities in budget formulation, execution, and Component 3: Establishing PFM reporting. Systems at the Provincial Level • Strengthened the institutional and technical capacities of the provincial revenue divisions • Supported the PB exercises in 52 TDEs in Kinshasa and selected provinces Page 36 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Saidou Diop Task Team Leader(s) Chiara Bronchi Lead Public Sector Specialist Jean Mabi Mulumba Senior Public Sector Specialist Kolie Ousmane Maurice Megnan Sr Financial Management Specialist Bourama Diaite Senior Procurement Specialist Donald Herrings Mphande Lead Financial Management Specialist, Peer Reviewer Gert Johannes Alwyn Van Der Linde Lead Financial Management Specialist, Peer Reviewer Franck Bessette Sr Financial Management Specialist, Peer Reviewer Aleksandar Kocevski Operations Officer Lucie Lufiauluisu Bobola Program Assistant Lanssina Traore Procurement Specialist Angelo Donou Financial Management Specialist Thomas Maketa Lutete Consultant, Governance Specialist Emeran Serge M. Menang Evouna Social Specialist Supervision/ICR Mamadou Lamarane Deme Task Team Leader(s) Jean-Claude Azonfack, Clement Tukeba Lessa Kimpuni, Procurement Specialist(s) Lanssina Traore Bertille Gerardine Ngameni Wepanjue Financial Management Specialist Nelia Polines Dinkin Team Member Hugues Agossou Team Member Cheick Traore Team Member Henri Fortin Team Member Jeannine Kashosi Nkakala Team Member Jean Mabi Mulumba Team Member Suran K C Shrestha Team Member Lydie Madjou Team Member Richard Everett Social Specialist Issa Thiam Team Member Joelle Nkombela Mukungu Environmental Specialist Raymond Sinsi Lumbuenamo Team Member Tresor Angela Ikobo Procurement Team Christophe Ngongo Muzyumba Environmental Specialist Page 37 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) B. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY14 14.431 83,544.04 FY15 7.128 33,434.30 FY16 10.932 75,839.53 FY17 0 28.50 FY18 3.199 17,617.91 Total 35.69 210,464.28 Supervision/ICR FY14 10.940 94,466.88 FY15 8.302 82,706.22 FY16 10.831 69,483.17 FY17 47.613 562,486.15 FY18 40.807 434,502.04 FY19 35.394 271,473.20 FY20 10.140 95,756.77 Total 164.03 1,610,874.43 Page 38 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Amount at Approval Actual at Project Percentage of Approval Components (US$M) Closing (US$M) (percent) Component 1- Supporting Domestic Revenue Mobilization and Expenditures 23.0 20.0 87 Management Component 2 - Strengthening Budget 7.4 7.0 95 Oversight and Improving Transparency Component 3 - Establishing PFM 33.2 30.0 90 Systems at the Provincial Level Component 4- Project Management 8.5 8.5 100 Total 72.1 65.5 91 Page 39 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) ANNEX 4. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. This annex summarizes the economic and financial analysis of the project. At project design, the major benefits attributable to this project were difficult to express in monetary value. For this reason, neither the original PAD nor any of the AF papers offered a quantification of the economic benefits. Moreover, the detailed methodology was neither presented in the PAD nor recorded in other project documentations and filed in the system. The ex-post economic analysis focuses on the subcomponents that aim at increasing revenue mobilization and improve expenditure management at the central level and selected provinces. The Cost Benefit Analysis arises to address issues related to unsustainable, poor-quality spending attributed to weakness in expenditure management and control payroll that curb the ability to align limited resources with policy goals thereby creating inefficiencies in spending. Moreover, difficulties in collecting internally generated revenue could result to tax evasion and tax avoidance due to poor voluntary compliance. The cost benefit analysis is based on estimating quantifiable benefit streams. Description of the economic gains expected from the project components: 2. Component 1 - Supporting Domestic Revenue Mobilization and Expenditures Management. The project supported the government’s efforts in improving its revenue mobilization capacity and expenditures management to empower the line ministries in the budget execution processes. Specifically, the project: (a) supported Domestic Revenue Mobilization; (b) strengthened the budgetary capacity of line ministries; (c) supported the implementation of the public procurement law; (d) strengthened cash management and public accounting system; and (e) strengthened the internal control systems. Ex-post Quantitative assessment of benefits and costs 3. Methodology. The analysis employed an incremental approach, which, by design, compares the scenario without the project (counterfactual scenario) and the scenario with the project. Benefits and costs attributable to the project are measured by comparing the situation with and without the project. The growth rate of taxes collection is assumed to be 8 percent per annum on average. The analysis assumes a 12 percent discount rate 12 and a time horizon of 10 years. 4. Savings from strengthened expenditure controls. There is consensus that savings from rigorous expenditure controls using adequate tools lead to annual government expenditure efficiency improvements. Expenditure efficiency is assumed to improve by 1 percent of spending per year from year six. The spending savings are expected to arise from (i) enhancement of DRM collection capacity, (ii) improvement in policy- based budgeting, (iii) increase in confidence and credibility of budgetary allocation for line ministry and improvement in ability to spend money effectively via the procurement system, and (iv) improvement in transparency and accountability in the mobilization and use of public fund. Savings come from efficiency gains via spending review, internal and external audits, and rigorous expenditure control across all categories of expenditures. 5. Reducing tax evasion. Increase in revenues resulting from reduced tax evasion are assumed to be 0.05 percent of GDP from year 6 of the project. Over the period 2010-2020, tax to GDP ratio averaged 8.53 percent and is among the lowest in the sub-region. This low rate can be attributed to high tax evasion and avoidance, especially in the mining sectors. Global Witness, a non-profit organization promoting transparency and accountability published a report on July 2017 indicating that approximately US$750 million from mining 12Basedon a descriptive approach, it has been suggested that discount rates for developing countries be in the 8 to 12 percent range (World Bank OPSPQ. 2016. Discounting Costs and Benefits in Economic Analysis of World Bank Projects). Page 40 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) evaded from DRC public treasury over the period 2013-2015. Moreover, all Africa Global Media’s report 2017 also indicates that DRC is losing approximately US$1.3 billion in revenue each year due to a failure by public bodies, tax agencies and the state mining firm Gécamines to remit levies, and the pillage of revenue in suspicious deals. The World Bank estimates suggest that the tax gap represents 5.3 percent of GDP and a score of paying tax of 40.9 percent. The factors underpinning this poor performance include, inter alia: limited computerization in tax administration, large tax expenditure (2 percent of GDP) and widespread informality, narrow tax base, a breakdown of the VAT system, proliferation of nuisance taxes and tax collection agencies, overlap between national and provincial taxes and pervasive corruption. 6. Reduced tax administration costs. Savings are assumed to be a 0.5 percent reduction in year 4 and a further 0.5 percent reduction in years 5 and 6. Tax administration savings assume a 0.5 percent reduction in administrative costs in the first year, and 0.5 percent in the next three years, after which administrative costs grow as per the base case. Data from the Government of DRC suggest that administrative costs have fallen by 59.24 percent between 2019 and 2020 and could also fall from 2021. 7. Expenditure savings. Expenditure savings due to greater control over spending are assumed to be 0.02 percent reduction from year 6. The project has provided extensive technical support to strengthen the DRC’s oversight institutions especially the IGF and the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI). This training consolidated and enhanced IGF’s human capacity by increasing staff numbers and their skills, in the financial arena, but also with a wide range of technical expertise. IGF is making headways in controls and achieving tangible impact. Following its investigations, several high-level political figures have been convicted of the charges brought against them. One of the high-profile trial cases which concluded in mid-2020 highlighted the existing gaps in budget and procurement controls that facilitated the misappropriations of more than US$50 million of public funds. The IGF is now conducting regular “financial patrols” in public enterprise and tax authorities. Holding everything equal, these controls are expected to increase expenditure savings. 8. Reduced compliance costs for taxpayers. Economic benefits are estimated at 0.01 percent of tax revenues from year 5 of the project. A 2007 World Bank analysis suggests compliance costs lies between the interval 2-10 percent of tax revenues. However, DRC has a poor digital system for tax payments, and the country is ranked 180 out of 190 countries in terms of “Paying Taxes” in Doing Business 2020. The number of payments per year (52) is above the average for Sub-Saharan African Countries (36.6) as is the time (hours per year) spent: 346 days (about 11 and a half months) in the DRC compared to 280.6 in Sub-Saharan African countries. Consequently, a conservative assumption is made for time savings for taxpayers with the advent of ISYS Regie, the online payment system developed through the project. The greatest potential benefits will be in reducing the time to pay taxes and encouraging greater use of simplified on-line transactions. 9. Cost-Benefit Analysis. The cost benefit analysis has been calculated over a project life of 10 years, with a 12 percent social discount rate. The total cost of the project is estimated to be US$62,570,000 financed by FCDO (TF017290 and TF016682); and grants from IDA. These costs have not been modified to remove any tax component 13. The economic net present value of the project is positive at a 12 percent discount rate, with an IRR of 35 percent. Sensitivity analysis at -15 percent of benefits and +15 percent of costs does not materially affect project viability. 10. Financial Appraisal. There is a significant overlap in the quantifiable financial and economic benefits of the project. Using the financial flows based on the assumptions that the project generates a positive financial rate of return of 29 percent, and a positive net present value (based on a compound interest rate of 5 percent) of US$19.42 million. 13 Meaning that no assumption was made on taxes that would be collected from spending the US$62.6 million Page 41 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) 11. Component 2 - Strengthening Budget Oversight and Improving Transparency. The project contributed to improve transparency and effectiveness in budget oversight at the central level. It also assisted the government in strengthening public finance management oversight capacity of the IGF, the SAI, and the NA. The program supported the strengthening of SAI and IGF audit missions, as well as annual budget reviews and NA approval processes. Leadtime, by the SAI, in the submission of the audited government financial statements to the NA have been considerably reduced. In addition, the program encouraged targeted provinces to produce and timely submit financial statements to the SAI. 12. The project also provided resources to consolidate citizen participation in the budgeting process. As a result, citizen participation now features in the annual budget preparation cycle at central and decentralized levels. Further, civil society was involved in budget preparation and undertook a review of the annual Budget Execution Laws. Press conferences were held to publicly share their report. The percentage of Decentralized Territorial Entities (TDEs) with participatory budgeting increased from 1 percent in 2016 to 45 percent in 2018, and 52 in 2021. Almost 8,000 citizens have been involved in the process across four provinces. Twenty-two TDEs have been engaged in choosing projects on behalf of millions of people in their communities. Out of the 16 TDEs that started participatory budgeting for the 2017 budget, 6 have begun work on their investment projects. Participatory budgeting has played an important role in bringing communities closer to local governments and increasing the transparency and accountability in these relationships. 13. Component 3 - Establishing PFM Systems at the Provincial Level. Activities under this component strengthened (a) the capacities of the provincial assembly, including upgrading and equipping of offices; (b) the provincial government’s institutional and technical capacities; (c) the institutional and technical capacities of the provincial revenue division; (d) the capacity of the provincial public procurement bodies; (e) the operation of the Steering and Monitoring Committee for Local Public Finance Reform (Comité de Pilotage et de Suivi); and (f) the development of participatory budgeting and budget control by the citizens in relation. 14. Component 4 - Project Implementation Support. This component provided assistance to the PIU (COREF) for coordination; administration; communication; FM; procurement; monitoring and evaluation, in particular for the annual self-assessment of the PEFA indicators; auditing; and the dissemination of project activities to the central and provincial levels. 15. Unquantified Benefits. The project will be beneficial to all economic actors because of more effective PFM (expenditure and revenue) systems which can be expected to lead to improved transparency and accountability in the mobilization and use of public funds fiscal outcomes and transfers, more efficient and effective public spending, leading to improvements in public services delivery and response to citizen’s needs. While not directly quantifiable, the higher-level economic benefits are likely to arise in terms of greater economic growth as a result of a more stable macroeconomic outlook and reduced risk from fiscal management. Other benefits which have not been quantified could include those accruing to the MOF, Public sector and tax administration who benefited because of the training received and skills generated under the project. Page 42 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS A French translation of the ICR was shared with the counterpart. Edits and comments have been incorporated in the French version on file and reflected in the final report in English. Page 43 of 44 The World Bank DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability (P145747) ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 1. Project Appraisal Document, Report No. PAD789, dated January 3, 2014 2. Additional Financing Project Paper, Report No. PAD1928, dated January 24, 2017 3. Project Restructuring Paper, Report No.: RES49424, dated December 23, 2021 4. Official Documents- Financing Agreement, Grant H907-ZR, dated February 20, 2014 5. Official Documents- Financing Agreement for Grant D165-ZR, dated March 3, 2017 6. Implementation Status and Results Reports: Sequence 1-12 (November 24, 2014–November 13, 2020) 7. Aide-Memories (AMs) (1) October 1-14, 2014 (2) March 8-20, 2015 (3) September 28 – October 8, 2015 (4) May 15 – June 11, 2016 (5) March 15 – April 5, 2017 (6) October 25 – November 14, 2017 (7) June 20 – July 7, 2018 (Mid-Term Review) (8) May 6 – 11 and June 9 – 20, 2019 (9) June 15 – July 3, 2020 8. COREF Mid-Term Report – June 2018 (French) 9. Country Assistance Strategy for FY2013-FY2016 10. Systematic Country Diagnostic, March 2018 11. COREF, PROFIT CONGO, closing report, March 2022 (French) Page 44 of 44