IEG Report Number: ICRR14782 ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data: Date Posted: 06/23/2015 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic of Project ID: P086294 Appraisal Actual Project Name: Drc Education Sector Project Costs (US$M): 150.5 152.2 Project L/C Number: Loan/Credit (US$M): 150.0 151.7 Sector Board: Education Cofinancing (US$M): Cofinanciers: Board Approval Date : 06/05/2007 Closing Date: 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Sector(s): Primary education (81%); Central government administration (14%); Tertiary education (3%); General education sector (2%) Theme(s): Education for all (33%); Administrative and civil service reform (17%); Public expenditure; financial management and procurement (17%); Social safety nets (17%); Education for the knowledge economy (16%) Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Group: Coordinator: Katharina Ferl Judyth L. Twigg Lourdes N. Pagaran IEGPS2 2. Project Objectives and Components: a. Objectives: According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, p. 8) and the Financing Agreement (p. 5), the objectives of the project were “to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education and to prepare the ground for a sustainable development and financing of the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future transition to a sector wide program.” In 2012, the project was restructured (level 2) to include new PDO level indicators to better measure the objectives, and outcome targets were adjusted upwards to reflect the new closing date. These changes were refinements and do not materially change the intent of the project objectives. Hence, this review will not undertake a split rating. Since the PDO is broad, this review will assess the intent of the first dimension of the project objectives, "to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education," using the results framework and components. b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? No c. Components: The project consisted of four components: Component 1: Increase Access and Equity at Primary Level (appraisal estimate US $ 104.52 million, revised allocation US$ 108.9 million, actual US$ 107.64 million): This component was to finance the following activities: i) rehabilitating primary school infrastructure and developing a sustainable national strategy for school rehabilitation; ii) rehabilitating the National Pedagogical University, the only high-level institution in the country that focuses on training teachers and tertiary-level teacher educators, and that conducts pedagogical research; iii) improving equity of access to primary education by supporting the government in eliminating parents’ monetary contributions to sustaining operating costs for primary schools and integrating 30,000 primary school teachers into the public payroll; and iv) strengthening safeguards in the teacher payment system by strengthening the capacity of the department responsible for monitoring the payment of teacher salaries. Component 2: Improve Quality of Primary Education (appraisal estimate US $ 28.76 million, revised allocation US$ 25.3 million, actual US$ 28.72 million): This component was to finance the following activities: i) providing textbooks for grades one and two in mathematics and reading, as well as teacher guides; ii) training inspectors, school advisers and school directors in the use of textbooks; iii) developing a data base in the Ministry of National Education (MEPSP) to track stocks of textbooks in schools; iv) conducting study tours to countries with well-functioning databases to track textbooks; and v) building capacity to assess learning achievements and to conduct research on learning and retention in schools by establishing a partnership between the National Pedagogical University and the Inspectorate, which will be responsible for assessment. Component 3: Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education Sector (appraisal estimate US $ 5.06 million, revised allocation US $ 7.2 million, actual US$ 6.99 million): This component was to finance the following activities: i) providing technical assistance to support policy reform in the area of pre-service and in-service teacher training; and ii) providing technical assistance to support the preparation of a sector-wide education strategy. Component 4: Project Coordination and Management (appraisal estimate US $ 11.7 million, revised allocation US$ 9.1 million, actual US$ 8.85 million): This component was to finance activities to build capacity in project management and coordination of the steering committee, which consists of the MEPSP, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Budget. Also, this component was to finance the operation of a Project Coordination and Management Unit and the purchase of goods and services necessary for implementation of the project. d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Cost: The project was estimated to cost US$ 150.5 million. Actual cost was US$ 152.2 million. Financing: The project was financed by a US$ 150.0 million IDA grant. Due to exchange rate gains, US$ 151.7 million was disbursed. Borrower Contribution : The recipient contributed US$ 0.5 million to cover taxes and duties. Dates: The project was restructured twice:  On October 31, 2012, the project was restructured as follows: i) two PDO level indicators were added and others were revised; ii) some outcome targets were adjusted upwards; iii) disbursement conditions were modified to reflect the reality of the sector and its development, facilitating the financing of the teachers’ salaries and school operating costs based on lessons learned from other IDA-financed projects; iv) activities under components 1 and 3 were adjusted to focus project implementation on core areas having the most impact on the PDOs; v) a new implementation method for the primary school infrastructure program was introduced and assigned to the Unité de Coordination des Projets (UCOP), the government’s project implementation unit; vi) the already implemented procurement arrangements were formalized; and vii) the closing date was extended from December 31, 2012 to December 31, 2013 to allow the financing of teachers’ salaries and school operating costs, complete the second phase of the civil works program, and develop the Country Status Report and the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey, with preliminary application in selected provinces.  On November 14, 2013, the project was restructured to extend the closing date from December 31, 2013 to October 31, 2014 to allow the government to implement the following activities: i) complete the school infrastructure program, especially for schools in remote areas with intermittent conflict; (ii) communicate and share results of a number of institutional activities (sector strategy, Public Expenditure Tracking Survey, student learning assessment); and (iii) fully utilize the uncommitted balance of the Grant. 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: a. Relevance of Objectives: Substantial: The objectives of the project were substantially relevant to country conditions, government strategy, and Bank strategy. Conflict and high levels of corruption had a negative impact on social and economic development in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the time of project appraisal, the DRC was one of the poorest countries in the world and ranked 167 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index. The education sector was facing several challenges, including the following: i) limited access with disparities among regions and genders due to households having to pay school fees; ii) poor quality of education services due to an insufficient number of trained teachers, and lack of adequate training materials and classrooms; and iii) lack of a legal and regulatory framework to support the financial sustainability of the sector. At the time of project appraisal, the government allocated less than two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to the education sector, three percentage points below the average of five percent in other sub-Saharan countries. At project appraisal, according to the PAD (p. 7), the project was in line with a joint donors’ Country Assistance Framework, which emphasized the importance of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. Also, according to the ICR (p. 3), the project was in line with the Government’s development priorities at the time of project appraisal, which included the reorganization and strengthening of the education sector, the development of an education for all action plan, and a pact to modernize higher education. The project was also in line with the Bank Country Assistance Strategy (2008-2011), which focused on including improving access to social services and reducing vulnerability under one of its five pillars. The project was also in line with the current Country Assistance Strategy (2013-2016), which focuses in one of its three strategic objectives on “increasing access to social services and raising human development indicators” by strengthening governance and service delivery systems, while supporting delivery of services to the population. However, the project development objective was broad and not sufficiently monitorable, especially the first dimension of the PDO, "to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education." b. Relevance of Design: Modest: The PDO was vague and broad, and the link between the PDO and planned interventions of components 1 and 2 was mismatched and not sufficiently clear. While the PDO is about “preventing further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education,” the components refer to increased access, equity and quality. The project’s components included activities that aimed to improve access to, equity of, and quality of primary education services, while also supporting the institutional and financial strengthening of the sector. 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): Since the PDO is broad, this review will assess the intent of the first dimension of the project objectives, "to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education," using the results framework and components. To prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education : Substantial Outputs:  1,467 classrooms were built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions, not achieving the target of 1,572 classrooms. In addition, 187 offices and 167 sanitary facilities were rehabilitated and reconstructed.  18 million textbooks were purchased and distributed, surpassing the original target of 11 million and the revised target of 14 million textbooks.  A student-to-textbook ratio of 1:2 was achieved, and each student received one math book and one French book .  A teacher-to-teacher guide ratio of 1:2 was achieved, and each teacher received one math teacher guide and one French teacher guide.  53,230 primary inspectors and school advisors received training in the use of textbooks, achieving the target.  National pupil learning assessment mechanisms for grade five of primary school are in place, achieving the target. Two Program for the Analysis of Educations Systems learning assessments were conducted.  Over 4.8 million students in grade 1 and 2 benefited from receiving textbooks. A total of 5.07 million students, teachers, inspectors, etc. benefited from the project, not achieving the target of 13.37 million.  50% of beneficiaries were female, achieving the target. Outcomes:  A Citizen Report Card (CRC) survey was not conducted. It is therefore not clear whether improvements in quality as measured by less teacher absenteeism, increased availability of textbooks, and improved response by schools to parents’ concerns were achieved.  The gross enrollment rate in primary schools increased from 64% in 2007 to 117% in 2014, surpassing the initial target of 75% and the revised target of 105.8%.  The gross first grade intake rate increased from 107.7% in 2012 to 133.1% in 2014, surpassing the target of 129.8%.  The girl-to-boy ratio in primary schools increased from 85% in 2007 to 98% in 2014, exceeding the original target of 95% and almost achieving the revised target of 100%.  The primary school completion rate increased from 29% to 80%, surpassing the original target of 35% and the revised target of 72.5%. To prepare the ground for a sustainable development and financ ing of the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future transition to a sector wide program : Substantial Outputs:  An education strategy was developed (including a sustainable medium-term financial plan), with indicators agreed with donors and approved by the government.  New school construction norms were adopted for the application of a cost-effective school construction strategy.  20,155 primary teachers in “registered” schools were integrated into the public payroll, achieving the target.  A draft textbook policy was developed but has not been adopted by the government, not achieving the target.  A basic education interim development plan was implemented according to an agreed plan, achieving the target.  A system for learning assessment and rating at the primary level, with a rating of three on the Bank's rating scale from one to four.  A new teachers’ statute was approved by the government and implementation has begun, achieving the target.  Reform guidelines for pre-service training were developed and are being applied, achieving the target.  Loi cadre (Institutional Education Framework law) was transmitted to the parliament for adoption, achieving the target.  A convention of partnerships was revised and implemented, achieving the target.  The Citizen Report Card and Public Expenditure Tracking System (PETS) have not been piloted in selected educational provinces, not achieving the target. Therefore, an action plan for an eventual scale-up could not be developed as planned. By the end of the project, one PETS had been carried out.  A draft teacher career structure (training, deployment, salary, incentives) was approved by the government. Outcomes:  The strategy adopted by the Ministry of National Education is being implemented, with financial support of US$ 100 million from development partners and the Global Partnership for Education.  According to the ICR (p. 30), in 2013 only 2.3% of GDP was allocated for education, which is well below the recommendation of 4.1% by the Global Partnership for Education. Education spending has been increasing, but not as rapidly as overall economic growth (ICR, p. 30). 5. Efficiency: Modest: Neither the PAD nor the ICR conducted a traditional economic efficiency analysis. The PAD (p. 106) provides a qualitative cost-benefit analysis, highlighting the project’s main benefits per component. The project assumes the following: i) an investment of US$ 104.52 million to increase access and equity at the primary level will benefit an additional 2.5 million students by the end of the project; ii) an investment of US$ 28.8 million to improve the quality of education will make reading materials available in all schools; iii) an investment of US$ 5.06 million to reform teacher career structures, renovate legal and institutional frameworks, and prepare a strategy and action plan will have a positive impact on the partnership between state and civil society, improve efficiency of school operations, motivate teachers, and provide a clear strategic direction and a coherent budget allocation in line with priorities. However, these are qualitative statements that the project could contribute to the sector. The ICR (p. 22) compares costs of textbooks, constructions, and unit costs by square meter with other countries in the region. This analysis shows that textbook procurement and classroom construction costs in the Democratic Republic of Congo were within the range of costs in other countries in the region. However, these costs are often difficult to compare, especially for construction and unit costs. The project experienced delays in project implementation due primarily to procurement issues (see Section 11b), which is indicative of inefficiencies in the use of the project’s funds. No further information is presented on the cost-effectiveness of the investment of project resources. On balance, efficiency is rated Modest. a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation : Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope* Appraisal No ICR estimate No * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome: Relevance of objectives is rated Substantial. Relevance of design is rated Modest, as the link between the broadly-stated PDO and the activities as described in the project's components was not sufficiently clear. Achievement of the objective to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education was Substantial. Achievement of the objective to prepare the ground for a sustainable development and financing of the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future transition to a sector wide program was also Substantial. Efficiency was Modest, as delays in project implementation were indicative of inefficiencies in the use of the project's financial resources. Taken together, these ratings are indicative of moderate shortcomings in the project's preparation and implementation, leading to an outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory. a. Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: According to the ICR (p. 30), the government is committed to maintaining and scaling up the project’s achievements, and to coordinating its efforts with other development partners. However, the government is facing fiscal challenges that will make the payment of salaries for newly regularized teachers (those teachers who have not yet been included in the public payroll) and the nation-wide elimination of school fees, as stated in the constitution, difficult. According to the ICR (p. 30), even though there has been a trend of rising actual spending on education, the increase has not been proportional to the growth of the country’s GDP. In the meantime, schools continue to charge school fees to poor families. In addition, the country still faces low capacity in the public and private sectors, which could have a negative impact on the maintenance and scaling up of project achievements. a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Significant 8. Assessment of Bank Performance: a. Quality at entry: The project was prepared in a challenging post-conflict context. During project preparation, several studies on economic, financial, technical, fiduciary, social, governance, and environmental issues were conducted. In particular, studies on the teacher salary payment system, enrollment trends, and education for under-served groups, and an institutional and policy assessment informed project preparation. The project built on previous Bank operations in post-conflict areas, international research on effective approaches to stimulating demand for quality education from the poor, and lessons learned from fee abolition efforts and education sector financing strategies in low-income countries. The Bank identified relevant risk factors during project preparation, including: i) decentralization reform being rapidly implemented without sufficient planning or capacity; ii) the government’s inability to cover the multiplicity of school fees currently paid by parents; iii) schools continuing to charge high fees to parents despite project funding; and iv) inefficient use of project resources due to corruption, mismanagement, or lack of transparency in government systems. However, mitigation efforts were not sufficient for addressing some of these risks, especially related to school fees. Also, the risk of weak capacity in the public and private sector to implement project activities was only rated as moderate. However, weak capacity became a significant challenge during project preparation, especially related to fiduciary and M&E functions in the Project Coordination and Management Unit (PCMU) and MEPSP (see Sections 10 and 11b). The project design was overly complex and ambitious and did not sufficiently take into account the challenging environment and how long it would take for project activities to be implemented. The PDO was broad and not appropriately specific. While the first dimension of the PDO was “to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education," components to support this PDO focused on access, equity, and quality. The Results Framework had several shortcomings and did not include sufficient indicators to track project progress. Quality-at-Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory b. Quality of supervision: The ICR (p. 31) states that the Bank worked closely with the PCMU, ministries and other development partners and was responsive to the needs of project stakeholders. However, implementation was very slow at the beginning due to inadequate capacity in the PCMU. By June 2010, almost two and a half years after project effectiveness, little progress had been made and only 17% of project funds had been disbursed. According to the ICR (p. 11), findings of the Mid-Term Review in November 2010 resulted in the development of an extensive action plan to make adaptations to the project. The Bank’s 2010 Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP) recommendation that an external third party should collect and verify project data was not implemented. The ICR (p. 11) states that these issues were not sufficiently addressed during supervision missions. In July 2011, the Bank initiated a level two restructuring. Due to administrative delays by the Bank, the restructuring only became effective in October 2012. The restructuring had a positive impact on project implementation, especially with regards to M&E. However, despite Bank interventions, the project still experienced challenges with weak procurement capacity and identifying teachers in registered schools. The ICR (p. 32) states that even though the project experienced significant implementation delays and a low disbursement rate during the initial years, implementation status reports were consistently rated Satisfactory. This seems to imply a lack of candor and low quality of performance rating. Quality of Supervision Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: a. Government Performance: Despite the challenging and fragile post-conflict environment, the government was committed to achieving the project's development objectives (ICR, p. 32). It cooperated with the Bank and other development partners to build partnerships to support the sustainability of the education sector. The government expanded the educ ation sector strategy and passed critical legal and institutional reforms for the development of the sector such as the new education framework law, the revision of the statutes covering teachers and teacher careers, and the development of sub-sectoral strategies for the Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Labor, and Ministry for Non-formal Education and Literacy. However, even though there has been a trend of increased spending on education, this increase has not been proportional to the growth of the country’s GDP. Government Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance: The PCMU was established to coordinate project implementation among five different ministries. At the time of project effectiveness in January 2008, the PCMU consisted of only two staff. It took until early 2009 for the PCMU to be fully staffed, which led to delays in project implementation. The PCMU lacked capacity in critical areas such as fiduciary management and M&E. Therefore, these functions were initially poorly performed. However, according to the ICR (p. 34), the M&E system was significantly improved during implementation. After a misunderstanding regarding procurement under the first component, procurement functions for this component were handed over to the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The ICR (p. 14) states that the relationship between the PCMU and UNOPS faced some initial challenges that led to delays. After the Mid-Term Review in November 2010, procurement for the first component was assigned to a project management unit within the Ministry of Planning, Unité de Coordination des Projets (UCOP). This led to challenges due to unclear delineation of responsibilities between the PCMU and UCOP. According to the ICR (p. 14), PCMU’s procurement activities under the other components were adequate. The PCMU was responsible for daily management of the project; however, it was often pressured by different ministries and had to ask the MEPSP for authorization of several project tasks. Despite this pressure, according to the ICR (p. 33), the PCMU developed strong technical skills throughout project implementation. Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Moderately Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization: a. M&E Design: The project's objectives were not clearly specified and rather broad. Also, the objectives were weakly reflected in the PDO-level indicators. Most PDO-level indicators did not measure progress related to the delivery of essential services for primary education. The Results Framework in the PAD consisted of five PDO-level indicators and 11 intermediate outcome indicators. The Results Framework did not include sufficient indicators to reflect progress towards the project’s objectives, and some individual indicators measured several different achievements. For example, one indicator measured purchase of textbooks, purchase of teacher guides, textbook-to-student ratios, and teacherguide-to-teacher ratios, packing too many different data points in one indicator. The indicators were measurable in terms of numbers, timing and location. However, the M&E design planned for data to be collected and statistical reports to be produced by the MEPSP, and for progress reports to be submitted by the PCMU, two entities with insufficient capacity to perform these activities. b. M&E Implementation: The implementation of M&E faced several shortcomings due to the MEPSP’s and PCMU’s very limited initial capacity to perform M&E activities. The Bank’s mitigation efforts to build capacity were not sufficient, and M&E functions were not adequately performed during much of the project period to produce good quality and timely data. The Bank’s 2010 QALP recommendation that an external third party should collect and verify project data was not pursued. However, according to the ICR (p.33) the M&E function was strengthened and therefore improved throughout the project period, especially after the restructuring in 2012 M&E. During this restructuring, the Results Framework was significantly revised, with some indicators were added and revised, and some targets increased to reflect the new closing date. M&E activities included a beneficiary assessment, and two student learning assessments for grades two in 2010 and grade five in 2014. The project benefited from activities supported by other projects such as two targeted audits, which were financed by the Bank’s Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project and assessed the financing of school operating costs. Also, the quality of service delivery was evaluated through the heavily indebted poor countries program. The ICR does not provide the results of these assessments. The planned CRC survey, which was to measure the impact of the fee-free policy on the financial burden of school costs on households, was not carried out. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent the fee-free policy relieved households from financial burden. By the end of the project period, the Government was publishing an annual statistical yearbook. c. M&E Utilization: The ICR does not comment on whether or how M&E results informed decision making. M&E Quality Rating: Modest 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards: The project was classified as category B and triggered safeguard policies: OP/BP 4.01 (environmental assessment) and OP/BP 4.12 (involuntary resettlement). During project preparation, an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) were produced and disclosed in the DRC and at the World Bank Infoshop. According to the ICR (p. 14), compliance with safeguards was rated satisfactory throughout project implementation. b. Fiduciary Compliance: Financial Management The PCMU was responsible for financial management. According to the ICR (p. 14), financial management was rated Satisfactory throughout project implementation except in March 2009, when the rating was downgraded to Moderately Satisfactory due to poor quality of interim reports, which subsequently improved. According to the ICR (p. 14), annual audit reports were submitted in a timely manner, did not show any irregularities, and were of unqualified opinion. Procurement Given the PCMU’s lack of procurement experience, a procurement agency was contracted for the procurement of activities under Component 1. For the procurement of all other activities, a procurement specialist was responsible. A misunderstanding regarding the procurement of activities under Component 1 led to delays, and all fiduciary responsibilities were therefore handed over to the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The formalization of this arrangement led to additional delays. However, the ICR (p. 14) states that procurement was effectively performed by UNOPS. After the Mid-Term Review in November 2010, the procurement for activities under Component 1 was transferred to a project implementation unit in the Ministry of Planning. According to the ICR (p. 14), this unit (UCOP) had experience in procurement. However, the ICR does not specify whether UCOP had experience in Bank procurement. Roles and responsibilities between UCOP and PCMU were not clearly defined, which led to challenges. The ICR (p. 14) states that the PCMU’s performance seemed adequate; however, the ICR does not comment on UCOP’s performance. c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative): None reported. d. Other: 12. Ratings: ICR IEG Review Reason for Disagreement/Comments Outcome: Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Risk to Development Significant Significant Outcome: Bank Performance: Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance : Moderately Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Quality of ICR: Satisfactory NOTES: - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: The ICR (p. 34) identifies several valuable lessons, including: 1. Conducting an assessment of available capacity and resources during the initial phases of project implementation is critical, especially in a post-conflict environment. In this project, the Bank conducted several assessments that identified limited capacity in financial management, procurement, and M&E. However, these findings were not sufficiently taken into account in project design, and steps to overcome these challenges effectively and quickly were not identified. 2. Identifying an entity capable of performing M&E activities is an important element of project design and preparation in order to ensure data collection and monitoring of progress towards project objectives from the start of project implementation. In this project, the PCMU and MEPSP lacked capacity to collect, analyze, and report on data. The hiring of a third party to perform M&E activities could have been beneficial. 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: The ICR provides a good overview of project preparation and implementation, and provides extensive detail on adaptations that were made to the Results Framework during the project restructuring, which is very useful. The ICR is candid in its assessment and appropriately critical. The team later clarified that because the PDO is broad, the ICR analyzed the level of achievement of the project in relation to the specific objectives within each component. The ICR also adopted an unconventional approach and examined the risks which had originally been identified at appraisal as potentially posing a threat to the achievement (and/or sustainability) of the outcome. It also examined other risks to sustainability from a financial perspective. The ICR is lengthy and often repetitive, for example, in regards to the first restructuring. The ICR is also sometimes contradictory. While the ICR states on page 11 that weak procurement and financial capacity had a negative impact on project implementation after the Mid-Term Review in November 2010, it states on page 14 that procurement was handled effectively by UNOPS. The ICR does not provide a traditional economic efficiency analysis. It also does not provide information on the utilization of M&E data. The ICR is therefore rated Satisfactory, but only marginally so. a.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory