World Bank Employment Policy Primer September 2003 No. 3 Public Employment Services Functions and Innovations * Background Roles Played by the Employment Service Public Employment Services (PES) in industrialized In most developed countries, the PES now play three countries have traditionally provided job-brokering major roles ­ job brokering, administration of active services ­ arranging for jobseekers to obtain jobs and labor market programs, and administration of unem- employers to fill vacancies. Increasingly, they also ployment benefits. administer unemployment benefits and provide for the delivery of labor market programs. PES are still in their Job brokering initial stages in developing countries where many still The PES attempts to enhance the quality and time- play the traditional role of job placement and registering liness of job matches through its job brokerage role (i.e. the unemployed. operation of a labor exchange). Informational imperfec- There are several good arguments for the provision tions can inhibit the matching of jobseekers to vacan- of employment services. By transmitting information, cies. Better job matches through job brokering lead to they can contribute to labor-market efficiency and both private gains (to both workers and firms) and transparency. PES can also promote equity in access to social gains (through reduced costs associated with the labor market and help disadvantaged workers find unemployment). employment. Furthermore, in countries that have an Traditional job-brokering involves listing vacancies unemployment benefit system, public employment from employers and obtaining information from jobseek- services, if well designed, can play an important role in ers and matching the two. This may involve registering verifying eligibility for receiving benefits and reduce and advertising job vacancies, interviewing jobseekers costs associated with unemployment through ensuring and registering information about them, appraising rapid matches. vacancies and jobseekers and matching them, and liaising There have been significant innovations in the pro- between employers and jobseekers and matching them. vision of employment services in the past few years, In many countries, tight human resource and budg- including the involvement of the private sector in serv- et constraints often have led to ineffective delivery of ice administration and delivery, especially in developed these services. This is changing now with the current countries. Focusing on these programs from an institu- trend in PES job-brokering services in developed coun- tional perspective, this note describes the various roles tries moving away from costly face-to-face interactions played by employment services and recent innovations and towards the extension of self-service facilities for in the management of these services. jobseekers. Kiosks, telephonic facilities and, most *This note was prepared by Amit Dar and edited by Tim Whitehead. The World Bank Employment Policy Primer aims to provide a comprehensive, up-to-date resource on labor market policy issues. The series includes two products: short notes, such as this one, with concise summaries of best practice on various topics and longer papers with new research results or assessments of the literature and recent experience. Primer papers and notes are available on the labor markets website at or by contacting the Social Protection Advisory Service at (202) 458-5267 or by email at . I m p a c t E v a l u a t i o n importantly, the internet provide this self-service. Job- PES usually have a strong knowledge of local labor mar- seekers and employers increasingly contact each other kets, are aware of employer and jobseeker needs, have a through these self-service systems without the interven- local service delivery infrastructure, and are linked to the tion of placement officers. Canada, Japan, Norway, Swe- education/training network as well as the social assis- den, and the U.S., as well as some developing and tran- tance network. In the area of ALMPs, the PES can per- sition countries, have introduced such facilities (see box form some or all of the following roles: 1). The electronic revolution is fundamentally changing the nature of job brokering and transforming the inter- overall management responsibility for programs mediary role of the PES to that of providing the self- whether run by the PES or subcontracted to other service infrastructure for employers and jobseekers to service providers; use. PES staff are able to switch from traditional job- direct delivery of services and programs; brokering activities to providing intensive assistance to policy input into programs run by other organi- hard-to-place and severely disadvantaged individuals zations; and/or who cannot find jobs through the electronic services. referral of participants to programs run by oth- ers. Administering active labor market programs In many OECD countries, the administration of The main adjustment programs where the PES may active labor market programs (ALMPs) has been a be called upon to play a role include job search assistance, major growth area for the PES in recent decades. The training/retraining, and direct job creation programs. The job search assistance interventions are closely tied to the job-brokering function of the PES. In some BOX 1: THE ROLE OF ICT IN EMPLOYMENT SERVICES countries, these services are offered only to those deemed to be in greatest need ­ individuals most likely Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is to experience long periods of unemployment and so increasingly used to deliver PES. Countries such as Aus- tralia, Canada and the U.S. have moved public employ- standing to benefit most from early and intensive job- ment services online, providing not only one-way infor- search assistance. In many countries, especially in the mation but self-service transactions (e.g. job matching OECD, the PES is using "profiling" techniques to identi- services) through the Internet. Some of developing fy such workers (see box 2). countries are following these approaches, e.g. the Philippines with their Phil-JobNet online (www.phil- In many countries, the actual delivery of training jobnet.dole.gov.ph). programs is not seen as one of the core functions of the Developing countries are exploring the role of ICT for PES. In these cases, the role of the PES may be confined new forms of PES delivery with increased focus on the to the recruitment and selection of candidates for such customer. Given low Internet penetration rates in these programs and to help in the placement of trainees in countries, alternative delivery channels are needed employment when these programs are completed. The including call centers and self-service kiosks in public places, such as shopping centers, libraries, telecenters, role of the PES in training is often contractual, seeking and schools. Mobile service centers, i.e., vans with a training services from other public and private sector satellite dish and computer technology, are being used agencies (see box 3). in countries like Brazil to reach out to rural areas. The most important direct job creation interventions Poland offers an example of how to build on existing include public works and wage subsidies. In most coun- infrastructure. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare has a new project in which self-service kiosks will be tries, the primary role of the PES is to refer participants connected to the existing job databases and provide to these programs. job-matching and related services to jobseekers. This is a follow-up project to the automation of some 450 Administering unemployment benefits local labor offices throughout Poland, under which ICT supports job matching, vocational training, and unem- PES have also started to play a larger role in the ployment insurance claim filing and the entry or update administration of unemployment benefit systems. In a of personal data and the approval of eligibility, calcu- few countries, the PES directly administers these lation, and payment of unemployment benefits. schemes. Even when this is not the case, as in most 2 I m p a c t E v a l u a t i o n BOX 2: WORKER PROFILING AND BOX 3: PES IN TRAINING PROVISION REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES The relationship of the PES to training providers is A few OECD countries have introduced variations of becoming more indirect ­ focusing on financial, worker "profiling." In the U.S., through the Worker administrative, and contractual aspects rather than on Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS), states operational aspects. It involves purchasing training are taking pre-emptive action to assist the unem- services from other public and private sector agencies. ployed to reduce the amount of time out of work. Pro- The training contractor may also provide additional filing is done on the basis of a statistical model which counseling services and may be required to accept estimates the probability that a jobseeker will exhaust negotiated responsibility for placing a portion of his/her entitlements. The model uses information on trainees into jobs. Increasingly, employment services level of education, job tenure, changes in employment, are linking payments to output indicators, like job changes in previous occupation/industry, and the local placements, rather than to input indicators, such as unemployment rate. Those identified by the model to number of workers trained. be at high-risk are referred to compulsory reemploy- ment services ­ e.g., job search assistance and train- PES roles regarding training vary in different countries. ing tailored to their individual needs. A similar type of For example: system is also in place in Australia and Canada, where · In Finland, training courses and places in them are models are complemented by more qualitative infor- generally purchased by regional PES offices. mation provided by the employment service. · In Austria, Germany, and Norway, the PES purchases Profiling is most useful in countries that selectively, most of its training needs in the marketplace. rather than universally, offer jobseekers access to job search assistance or training services during the early · In Sweden, the PES annually purchases a large num- stages of the unemployment period. In many European ber of training courses, most of them designed for a countries, e.g., France, Germany and Sweden, these specific target group. Increased competition in the services are offered to all the unemployed as soon as provision of training between public and private they register. Hence these countries find little use for providers has played a crucial role in bringing down profiling as a tool to assess those that receive servic- average training costs and improving quality. es. However, these countries may find profiling useful · In Poland, training programs are purchased from in assessing the needs of clients and in recommending other training providers through public tender and the most cost-effective combination of services for the PES co-operates with training institutions. individuals. In many developing and transition coun- tries, with stringent resource constraints, profiling has the potential to provide a systematic basis for allocat- ing scarce finances. The multiple objectives of the PES have led to ten- sion over their relative importance. Witness the continu- ing debate over whether the PES should administer the OECD countries, registration with the PES for job place- unemployment insurance. Those against the PES having ment is a precondition for benefit payment. The PES this role argue that placement work tends to be reduced also supports unemployment insurance by monitoring in importance with excessive emphasis on unemploy- continuing eligibility and job-search verification. This ment insurance ­ particularly in downturns ­ and that it involves developing standards and enforcing sanctions then becomes seen as an unemployment service, with the to ensure that unemployment benefit claimants actively result that both jobseekers and employers become reluc- look for work and accept suitable job offers. This is crit- tant to use it. The other main conflict arises out of ical for minimizing the disincentive to work created by attempting to balance equity and efficiency goals. Since the availability of unemployment benefits. This moni- employers are usually reluctant to hire the more disad- toring function has become increasingly important in vantaged jobseekers, efforts by the PES to serve this equi- many countries where unemployment benefit eligibility ty objective are likely to be resource-intensive with rela- has been tightened. tively low returns. On the other hand, focusing services Finally, in a few OECD countries, the PES does on the more employable will more easily lead to positive administer the entire unemployment benefit system ­ results in an efficiency sense, but at the cost of assisting including tax collection, benefit determination, benefit the most difficult to place (the so-called "creaming" phe- payment, and eligibility and job-search verification. nomenon). In many countries, private-sector providers 3 I m p a c t E v a l u a t i o n are increasingly serving these more employable clients, customers face when dealing with a variety of bureau- leaving the less employable to the PES. While this may be cracies whose services overlap and interact with one a effective division of tasks, a focus on the hard-to-place another. In these centers, a number of services are deliv- workers can make employers more reluctant to turn to ered from the same premises in order to serve the cus- the PES for job applicants, hence leading to a reduction tomer most efficiently. The U.S. has been a pioneer of in the role and effectiveness of the PES. this approach with centers throughout the country per- forming functions including job-search assistance, Recent Innovations in the Management employment counseling, job referrals, assistance in filing of PES unemployment benefit claims, and information on The next two sections consider some recent innova- training opportunities. Similarly, in the U.K., the local tions in the management of the PES. These include Jobcentre is recognized as a one-stop for employment decentralization, service integration, performance tar- services, referral to training and unemployment bene- geting, and the introduction of market signals in the fits, with benefit agency staff working alongside PES operation of the PES. staff. In Germany, staff in employment offices have access to multiple IT application modules (e.g., job Decentralization matching, UI claim filing) to allow them to service cus- One of the most noticeable trends has been the tomers more efficiently. Some developing and transition decentralization of program management, administra- countries have also been experimenting with imple- tion, and responsibility to regional or local levels. Under menting one-stop centers (see box 4) most decentralization arrangements, the central PES remains responsible for overall budgets and funding, Tiered service delivery. PES can be organized into policy setting, and evaluation. Much of the detailed "tiers" with some general services available to everyone design and implementation, however, is left to regional (e.g., job brokerage services) and more intensive pro- and local offices to tailor programs to their needs. Con- grams only available to clients identified as needing sequently, they have greater discretion in the use of those services. This approach can be linked to worker funding. Decentralization has long been a feature of the profiling to identify the level of need for clients and the PES in the U.S. with states given broad latitude to devel- interventions that are most suitable. Tiered service deliv- op programs that meet the local labor market needs. Similarly in Norway, Germany, and the U.K., decentral- ization is becoming the norm with local offices given BOX 4: ONE-STOP SHOPS: more discretion to spend funds in ways that best meet AN EXAMPLE FROM TURKEY local needs. While decentralization has its obvious benefits, it is The Automation of Local Labor Offices Project (ALLOP) a more difficult environment in which to manage, is a good example of one-stop PES delivery. ALLOP includes an integrated ICT platform. Thus, one employ- requiring less detailed operational control from the cen- ee supported by appropriate technology is the contact ter, greater reliance on performance management meas- partner for all requests of a job-seeker. This single- ures, and an open line of communication between the point-of-registration system is based on a common database for modules including labor market informa- center and the local offices. tion; job career counseling; unemployment benefit cal- culation, and the Active Labor Market Program Appli- Integration of Services cation System. A major issue facing the PES is how to integrate its The integrated system is uniform in all 117 local labor many services so as to ensure efficient delivery. Two new offices which are linked through a wide area network. approaches have been developed ­ one-stop centers and Thus, labor mobility is supported by the possibility to match jobs throughout Turkey. In addition, the ICT tiered service delivery. system improves the process of collecting, processing, and distributing statistical labor market data which One-stop centers. The advent of the one-stop centers can be consolidated and delivered to policymakers reflects the growing acceptance of the difficulties that through electronic channels. 4 I m p a c t E v a l u a t i o n ery can help allocate scarce public resources as efficient- ly as possible. For example, in Sweden, self-service is BOX 5: EXAMPLES OF PES provided over the internet and over six per cent of the PERFORMANCE INDICATORS labor force accesses these services on a monthly basis. Agreements in France. Since the early 1990s, the gov- This system is complemented by call centers at the local ernment has signed agreements with the PES with the and regional level where more individualized services ­ ultimate objective of transforming the service into a such as job-search assistance, vocational guidance, and modern, client-oriented service provider. The following referral to other programs - can be provided. quantitative targets are specified: increasing the PES market share of notified vacancies to 40 per cent of total vacancies in the economy; tripling the number of Performance Targets notified vacancies for executive staff; and reducing the Monitoring performance targets is a standard pro- incidence of very long-term unemployment (two years and more) by one percentage point each year. Within cedure used in public administration where external the framework of these national targets, a series of benchmarks such as profitability or market shares are operational indicators are established on an annual normally not available. Administrative data are generat- basis at decentralized levels. PES offices in each ed by PES activities (e.g., number of individuals served, region, department, and local district participate in the annual negotiation process in which detailed per- types of interventions, follow-up, etc.) at various levels. formance targets are set. Once these targets have been By using such information on a comparative basis, some agreed, their implementation is followed by regular internal measurement of the effectiveness of PES opera- meetings and reports at the national and regional lev- tions can be made. els. Financial incentives are offered to offices that meet their targets, but there are no sanctions for those While performance indicators can simply be used as who fail to do so. ex-post information, the more policy-relevant applica- Performance targets through profiling in The tion is to move from ex-post indicators to ex-ante targets. Netherlands. The Dutch PES is run by a Board in which By measuring performance against such targets, man- government officials are not represented. In allocating agement tools can be applied -- ranging from discre- an annual budget to the PES, the government distin- guishes between a basic budget for normal job-broker- tionary budget allocations to more formal ing services and a performance budget. For the latter, reward/penalty arrangements ­ to raise efficiency. a new type of performance measurement has been The use of performance targets became more introduced. The key performance indicator is "distance prominent with the decentralization of employment from the labor market" which can best be translated into "employability." The unemployed are profiled services in several countries. A typical approach has according to four categories of employability, two of been for the central government to formulate or negoti- which refer to jobseekers who it is judged will only ate national performance targets with the PES agency become employable after either a short or a long inter- and for the central PES agency to "translate" these tar- vention (called 'reintegration plans') by the PES. Per- formance targets are then expressed as numbers of gets for its regional and/or local offices, often on the reintegration plans put in place as well as the share of basis of an agreement between the various levels (see persons who profited from a reintegration plan and box 5). actually found a job. Unfortunately, internal performance indicators are not without problems. By their very nature, they are dependent on administrative data, which are not always workers who are threatened by unemployment rather available. Also the performance indicators from admin- than a focus on the placement of long-term-unem- istrative data do not show the actual impact of a partic- ployed mandated by a performance indicator. Also, ular PES service: e.g., meeting a target for share of long- there will always be a risk that PES staff will "adjust" to term unemployed job-seekers in total placements does targets even if they do not accurately reflect the greatest not say much about the success of the PES office in local needs. reducing long-term unemployment. Further, meeting a Overall, the basic shortcoming of using internal specific target may contribute to the neglect of other performance targets to raise PES efficiency is the urgent policy needs. For instance, a plant shutdown in a absence of external benchmarks against which per- single-company town may require special programs for formance can objectively be measured. This has 5 I m p a c t E v a l u a t i o n prompted some countries to look for alternative solu- sary skills for contract management, and, most impor- tions. One is to introduce market signals into the oper- tantly, fostering competitive markets for the provision of ations of the PES. the service. Vouchers have received a lot of publicity as a means Introducing Markets into of creating incentives for suppliers to provide services Employment Services that are relevant to the needs of the purchaser. Recipi- To improve program effectiveness and to ensure that ents of vouchers can "shop around," thereby introducing customer focus is a primary objective of employment competition on the supply side. To involve the voucher services, many countries have been trying to increase holder in the process, it is common in many OECD competition in areas that, until recently, were dominat- countries to oblige the individual to provide some co- ed by public monopolies. payment along with the voucher in the purchase of the Many OECD countries have made at least some PES labor market services. activities contestable ­ that is, that the PES can be chal- The effectiveness of such schemes can be enhanced lenged ("contested") by other providers who may be by careful design. In particular, it is important that the able to offer the same services at lower costs or with bet- voucher holder have access to information on program ter quality. This has been accomplished through the use options and to have genuine choice among providers. of market mechanisms such as contracting-out, and sep- Indeed, where the PES controls access to services or pro- arating purchasers from providers of public services. vides its own, it may have little incentive to provide all Another approach has been through the liberalization of relevant information to the voucher holder. However, rules and regulations governing private employment where the PES does offer training or other programs agencies to allow them to compete in the placement that are also offered in the private sector, the use of a market with the PES. voucher should lead the PES to operate in a competitive manner, opening up alternative suppliers and also Market Mechanisms improving the quality of its own programs. Market signals have been introduced into PES User charges have not been used widely for a num- operations in many OECD countries. The most com- ber of reasons, one being Convention 96 of the ILO mon are contracting out (for active labor market pro- which prohibits the charging of user fees for PES serv- grams), vouchers (for training), and user charges (for ices with the view to making a profit. It also reflects the placement). obvious point that most unemployed have limited Contracting out involves competitive bidding resources. Nevertheless, user charges do exist in some processes for the delivery of goods and services associat- countries (on a cost-recovery basis), mainly for those ed with PSE. This has been used extensively in the pro- who wish to avail themselves of public placement serv- vision of training. As just one example, the Swedish PES ices. User charges are becoming increasingly common purchases courses from both the public training centers for firms that use resource-intensive PES services. For and private providers. This has resulted in an almost-50- example, in countries such as Belgium, employers pay per-cent drop in the market share of the public the PES for intensive screening of job candidates and providers since 1990 and a 20-per-cent drop in the unit for outplacement services. Little evaluation has been cost of training. The savings are due to both competition done relating to the impact of user charges on enhanc- in the provision of training and an increase in the pro- ing the efficiency of the PES. Still, some evidence does curement skills of the PES. suggest that PES do become more accountable on the When contracting out, it is important to ensure that introduction of these fees. valid comparisons are made between in-house and external bids; otherwise, it may be difficult for private Private Employment Agencies providers to compete against huge public institutions in There has been considerable debate about the role of the provision of services. Other keys include specifying private employment agencies (PEAs). Some OECD contract requirements in terms of outcomes and not countries continue to restrict their market access inputs, monitoring performance, developing the neces- although the dominant trend is in the direction of a lib- 6 I m p a c t E v a l u a t i o n BOX 6: PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES: SOME BOX 7: PEAS IN AUSTRALIA OPERATIONAL PRACTICES In 1998, Australia streamlined the PES and introduced Several different models currently exist in OECD coun- a network of 310 private, community, and government tries: organizations that were paid to place workers. The functions covered by the new network include job-bro- · In many countries, private-sector firms are allowed kering and intensive employment assistance for the to compete with the PES. There is a tendency for unemployed. As agencies receive a fee for each unem- market segmentation because government regula- ployed person they place in a job (with extra fees for tions limit private sector activities in certain areas the long-term unemployed), the system is strongly or because private suppliers tend to restrict their driven by outcomes. activities to certain profitable markets, e.g., filling high-skilled job vacancies and temporary-work The changes provide a new role for the PES. It has placements. become the purchaser of employment services, on behalf of jobseekers. It also regulates and manages the · In Australia and some other countries, governments tendering and contracting process and maintains its fund private agencies, community organizations, policy development and evaluation roles. With this and the PES to place jobseekers in order to stimu- new structure, Australia has introduced an institution- late competition. al structure where the Government is responsible for · In the Netherlands and Switzerland, the PES works both the referral of the eligible unemployed to in partnership with private firms and community employment services and the administration of unem- organizations with placement functions and tempo- ployment benefits, while ensuring that the delivery of rary employment agencies. employment services to the unemployed is subject to contestability by public, private and community providers. This may change the role of the PES in the future: a framework that will generate genuine compe- eralization (see box 6). The ILO has recently adopted the tition not only in the market for easy-to-place job- Private Employment Agency Convention relating to fee- seekers, but also in the services for the long-term charging private agencies. unemployed. While competition from PEAs may enhance the effi- ciency of PES operations, opponents argue that a monopoly position is necessary for the PES to fulfill its It is therefore possible for governments to achieve role of providing universal and cost-free services for all, both equity and efficiency goals without having a including the hard-to-place unemployed. In this view, monopoly on either the design or delivery of place- there is little incentive for the private sector to place the ment services or indeed labor market programs more disadvantaged into jobs, and that this can best be generally. achieved by cost-free placement services available for all Another trend that is becoming more prevalent, job-seekers so that the long-term unemployed have a especially in OECD countries, involves the PES operat- reasonable chance at competing for job vacancies. This ing under autonomous tripartite administrations. argument has been extended to justify an obligation to Involving employer organizations and trade unions in notify vacancies to the PES in some countries. overseeing the PES commits their support to the opera- These concerns can be addressed through design tion of the agency. The remit of such administrations mechanisms. For example, governments have sought to varies from country to country, with some, such as in stimulate competition through payment of fees to pri- Germany and Spain, responsible for a much wider range vate employment agencies to place disadvantaged job- of activities than just the job-brokering role. The success seekers as opposed to solely funding the PES to place of such an approach is obviously dependent on the them. In the Netherlands, the PES has paid a subsidy to degree of consensus between social partners and the temporary work agencies that take the long-term unem- government. While this may not always be easy to ployed on their payrolls. Similarly, Australia has achieve, some countries have used innovative arrange- embarked on an ambitious reform of its employment ments to deal with this issue. In Norway, for example, services where the provision of these services is con- while the PES is mandated to report to a tripartite testable to both public and private providers (see box 7). board, the board cannot give instructions to the Direc- 7 I m p a c t E v a l u a t i o n tor-General. The board is instead used as a forum for Market-based approaches. PES performance has im- discussing ideas and giving feedback. In the Nether- proved in many countries since the adoption of market- lands, there are no government representatives on the based approaches. The possible competition from the board ­ instead, there are independent experts and private sector together with contracting out a few serv- industry and worker representatives. ices through bidding processes, the introduction of vouchers allowing service seekers to choose provider, Conclusion and charging user fees of those who require special serv- Most of the experiences discussed in this note are ices have all resulted in greater choice for customers and from developed countries. Still, they have important les- in cost efficiency in PES provision. sons for developing countries: Monitoring and Evaluation. When PES systems are sys- Country context. Employment services should be tematically monitored and evaluated, the lessons learned designed and reformed keeping the country context in are very useful in reforming program design and imple- perspective. Reforms and innovations have succeeded in mentation details. Better monitoring and evaluation has situations where they have taken into account the also paved the way for contracting out some services to demands and constraints faced in the country. For private providers where public sector delivery was inef- example, it is crucial that adequate capacity ­ personnel, fective or inefficient. Although monitoring and evalua- infrastructure and technology ­ exists prior to imple- tion received limited attention when PES was a virtual mentation. public sector monopoly, it has now become an essential tool in improving PES delivery. Integration of services. In many OECD countries, PES now provide access to multiple services, often offered on Annotated Bibliography an integrated basis. Apart from the traditional job-bro- Fretwell, D. and S. Goldberg (1993). Developing Effective Employment Services. World Bank Discussion Paper. An kering role, many PES also play an effective role in the overview of the issues to be considered while developing management of unemployment insurance and active employment services. labor market programs. As this note has emphasized, OECD (2001). OECD Proceedings: Labor Market Policies and programs increasingly are delivered by various providers the Public Employment Service. OECD, Paris. Discussion of public employment service function and design. in the public and private sectors. OECD (1997). Enhancing the Effectiveness of Active Labor Mar- ket Policies: A Streamlined Public Employment Service. Selectivity. As options for provision of services have OECD, Paris. Discusses recent innovations in the design proliferated, PES have become more selective in the and delivery of employment services. Thuy, P., E. Hansen and D. Price (2001). The Public Employ- services that they themselves deliver. This selectivity ment Service in a Changing Labor Market. International involves not only what types of programs to be delivered Labor Organization, Geneva. Overview of roles and but also the choice of target groups and the coverage of responsibilities of employment services. Provides good practice examples. programs. 8