37891 Working Paper Local Governance, Transparency and Anti-Corruption in Community-Driven Development in Vietnam November 2005 This Working Paper was by Sea-Change Partners for the World Bank Office in Vietnam. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Abbreviations CBRIP Community Based Rural Infrastructure Project CDB Community Development Boards (NMPRP) CDBC Community Development Budget Component (NMPRP) CDD Community Driven Development CEM Community for Ethnic Minority Affairs CPCC Commune Project Coordinating Committee (CBRIP) CPMU Central Project Management Unit DPMU District Project Management Unit (NMPRP) DTSG District Technical Support Group (CBRIP) GD Grassroots Democracy HEPRP Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Program M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDRP Mountain Rural Development Program MPI Ministry of Planning and Investment MOLISA Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs NCB National Competitive Bidding NMPRP Northern Mountains Poverty Reduction Project NTP-PR National Target Program on Poverty Reduction P-CLIP Poor Communities Livelihoods and Infrastructure Program PC People's Committee PMB Project Management Record PSB Project Supervision Board PPMU Province Project Management Unit RIDEF Rural Infrastructure Development Fund SEDEMA Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund UNDP United Nations Development Program VCP Vietnam Communist Party + 3 < 4= % , + 5 3 3 %5 + , + > # 4 + + +5 3 ? + ? # 5 4 $ + > 4" 5 @ 74 # + + 5 4 5 5 4" + 5 = " + 4 < ? 6 + + ? > 5 + % , 5 + 5% + + 4 # + + + + 4 6 5 5 5 > = # # + % + , A = 6 + B C + 5 A +5 + 3 . 5 + 5 3 + % CD , = 0 6 3 % 0 8 E 3 08E ,4 5 + + 5 4 4 2 6 3 5 64 % 5 3 5 + + 4, + 4 6 # 5 4 + + 5 5 5 % 3 + + 4, 5 + 4 1 6 + 4 + + 5 6 # + 4 ! 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" $ 6 + 3 + + -8> -2+ + + + 5 08E -2+ + + % + , 5 # + - 9 + # - + 4 " 6 > 5 4 + 5 % + + + , 5 % + ,4 # $ % 2+ + 6 -" + 5 - + 4 L5 + L 5 % + + 6 ,4 # & iv " + 5 6 -:+ + 5 + - E + + -9 # + 5 3 -0 - E + + )21 % : I $ @ 7 )21 + ,4 E + + : I4 + + + 4 + 5 + % + + + , 5 % > 5 6 + ,4 E 5 # + + 4$ 5 < 7 + + + > 5 4 > + 4 5 + + < 4 + 4" @ 7- # 4 > 5 5 5 6 4 %4 45 > + , 4 E + + + # 4. 5 + + + # + + + 5 6 5 5 A= 7 A 1 5 + ' + 6 5 6 + 6 6 5 6 3 + 4! + + %4 4G5 +# + + H, 6 5 5 + 6 @ 7 5 4E + + 4$ 6 G H # + v @ 6 7 5 + + - ! + % + +, - 9 + + + %+ < 5 , + 4 5 + + < = " # 4 =" 5 < 3 4 " + 5 5 4 1 6 5 5 + @ 7 @ 7 A ?5 < 7 ? 6 < 4 " 5 # + % ,4 0 + 5 4 > 5 + @ + 7 # + 5 < + 4" + 5 5 4 ! + 5 + =" 4 + # + + 5 5 + 4 vi Table of Contents 1. Introduction ­ 1 2. Analytical Approach ­ 5 3. Linking Corruption Risks to Vietnam's Institutional Context ­ 9 4. Linking Program Design and Corruption Risks ­ 21 5. Recommendations and Discussion Platform ­ 40 Annexes: A ­ Current and Prospective Anti-Corruption Laws and Regulations of Vietnam ­ 52 B ­ Key Institutional Relationships in Program ­ 135 and CBRIP ­ 58 C ­ Fieldwork Sites ­ 62 D ­ Summary of Key Features of Selected Programs ­ 63 E ­ Management and Monitoring Financial Incentives in CBRIP and Program ­ 135-64 Work Cited ­ 65 Endnotes - 69 vii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eneric corruption 4. Program design risks in small-scale Program context features and strategy, e.g. infra. programs, e.g. public info., competitive fund theft, collusion... procurement... Institutional context at national and local levels as it affects critical capacities: 3. Institutional - Planning and coordination 3. Institutional strengths weaknesses and - Oversight and quality control and opportunities for threats - Responsiveness to reform endusers 5. Policy and program learning / redesign 2. Diverse outcomes, which can be mixed, contingent on specific environments and changing over time. - # 5 5 5 + + 5 5 4 "6 + L + 6 5 3 L + 4 ? + # 5 3 %4 4 + + + + + ,4E @+ 7 + + + + + + + 64* + + + 5 + 5 + 5 4 3 4 %4 4 + ,4 E 3 5 6 > + 6 + 4" + L > 6 5 6 6 5 6 > 5 65 49 + @ 67 + 3 + # + 4 . 5 # + + + 54E + + 7 5 4 %% 4 4 + + 7 3 ,4E + 7 + 5 5 6 4 # 5 6 1 # + 4 E #L < L 5 6 5 + 4 . : 3 + ++ % 5 3 5 + + 4, + 4" 6 5 6 @ 7 > 4 ! G + + 3 HL 6 = 0 67 08E L 6 + 5 64 # 5 # 3 % + = 0 6 ,4 ( + L 3 3 L @ 7 + 4 5 5 5 5 6 4 5 6 < 4 # 5 6? 5 6 6 4 C J 5 6 5 5 6 4 6 5 + 5 4 7 5 )()/ & " * " " & " ""- " % 6 Central / provincial government District level `government' EXECUTIVE Legislative (People's Com) oversight Judicial Technical oversight agencies Legend: Horizontal oversight Commune level `government Horizontal coordination EXECUTIVE Hierarchical accountability (People's Com) Legislative oversight (oversight) Monitoring / supervisory Democratic accountability (to boards endusers / local citizens) Villagers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o! 3 + 5 5 + + 4 o" 4" @ + 7 6 + + 4 ! ? + 6 ? > < 4 5 + 10 4$ + 4E 5 6 + + C + + 5 6 5 4 E # +?5 + ? 5 4 + 6 4 # 5 + + + + 4 + + 5 + 4E J CBP DB + + + + 7 CD 4CB Box 3.1: The story of Hai Thuong commune (Tinh Gia district, Thanh Hoa province) The imposing Nghi Son cement factory, a joint venture between a Japanese firm and a central ministry, was built in this sea-side commune from 1996 and put into operation by 2001, having been delayed by the Asian financial crisis. A huge ramp from which to offload cement produced in the plant juts a hundred meters into the bay. The plant is the source of considerable resentment locally, openly expressed by the People's Committee officials: compensation for land clearance was "extremely low"; residents are certain that air quality has suffered, although a central Ministry environmental team found otherwise; and, with only 15 commune residents employed (as cleaners) in the plant, "it has not brought us any additional income or infrastructure," notes the People's Committee chairman of the commune, who adds wryly that "they did donate some free cement last year." These officials note a 65-35% split of profits between the Japanese and Vietnamese side, respectively, with the central government claiming 20% and the provincial government 15% of the Vietnamese share. The World Bank-supported CBRIP project in this locality ­ "although modestly funded" ­ was said to have a much more positive impact on local development, "because we are able to decide on what types of infrastructure we need most and because the people are then directly involved in using that infrastructure." Source: Fieldwork in Thanh Hoa province 4E 5 5 % 4 4 + ,5 6 5 4" + 5 4CN! # + + + CD 4= + + + + 4 4 5 5 + - # 6 + # 4" # #D4C + + + + + + 4 64 + < ? + 5 ? 6 + 49+ 5 # + 11 + 4" 5 + @ 7 4 5 > + + 5 # 8 E :+ ! % #D4 ,4 Box 3.2: The RIDEF experiment stumbles in mountainous districts) The Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDEF) was supported by UNCDF and AusAid in all districts of Quang Nam province over the second half of the 1990s. The project devolved block grants for small-scale infrastructure according to a needs-based formula, and established procedures for participatory decision-making for funds allocated to communes. Two independent evaluations1 concluded the project had generally succeed in piloting its institutions in the lowland districts of Quang Nam province, and the project was closely examined in the design of much larger government programs that followed. But in 2 of 14 districts of the province classified as "high mountainous, the project faced huge implementation challenges that were quite distinct from lowland areas. The primary reported obstacles were related to governance and institutions: corruption (always a problem in infrastructure projects) was reportedly higher; attitudes of district staff vis-à-vis the participatory methods more skeptical; the planning and budgeting norms proved to be difficult to apply in more remote localities with higher unit costs of implementation and lower population density; and monitoring and quality control by the project implementation unit (at the provincial level) proved difficult. Part of the relative failure of the project in these districts stemmed from the fact that in contrast to the generally positive learning orientation in the project mentioned above, no special adjustments to the process were designed for these areas. Source: adapted from Fritzen and Stanley, 2001: p. 17 # 1 4 7 E < 5 @# +7 + # + 4 # + 5 o # + 7 + + + 1 2 + +4 o < %< , 5 + + CI- o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ox 3.3: The Law on Complaints and Denunciations: Limitations of a legalistic approach The 1992 Constitution confirms the right of citizens to "complain and accuse a State owned enterprise or economic or social organization, a people's armed force unit or any individual of their illegal activities to the state agency with jurisdiction. The complaints and accusations must be considered and settled with in the regulated time-limit by the state agencies." (Article 74). The Vietnamese press has made much of this right as a mechanism to hold officials accountable for their actions. However, a number of problems have emerged over more than 13 years of implementation, even after a major clarification of the Law on Complaints and Denunciations in 1998. The first problem concerning implementation is that the appropriate body for receiving the complaint is, in the first instance, the leader of the administrative agency which are the subject of a complaint. This acts as a powerful deterrent to raising complaints. In fact, rather than enshrining protection against whistleblowers, the Constitution emphasizes that "it is strictly forbidden to use the making of complaints or accusations as a means of revenge or by exploiting provisions made for complaint and accusations to slander or complain falsely." The second concerns the inability of the State Inspectorate to effectively resolve complaints; it acts mainly as an advisor for the leaders of the same level of government to settle complaints, and final decisions on complaint resolution are made by the People's Committee executives of the same or higher level. The complaint resolution process at present thus presents a prime example of an approach to legal accountability that is partly undermined by executive dominance. However, its legal and policy framework is still in flux. The stated policy of the Communist Party regarding complaints is increasingly to transfer authority regarding administrative complaints to the court system, which might place a somewhat greater distance between the subjects of investigation and the adjudicating system. - * < 5 6 5 G H 5 G + 4H F + 41 4 + # + K + 5 < 4" ) " " G + + 4HD E # + + # + 6 5 # + 4 5+ 4 < + GT > 7 5 T 5 +H4DC " + + 15 6 5 5 + > 41 + 5 + 5 5 5 5 4E G H+ 5 < + % , G + QR + + + 5 5 THD 9 + < 4 + 5 # 4 3 3 4DD + 4 7 + 5 3 ' 4 # + G H G + 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 + H4DJ " 6 + 5 6 + 5 5 5 + 4 9 6 5 # + 5 4! + CFF 5 + 4D G+ H%# , 5 o " + + + -DB o "+ # 5 + % , + + 5 6 + # % , % 5 3 6,4DN o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ox 3.4: The effects of improved `grassroots democracy' on mobilization and distribution of resources for poverty reduction ­ Evidence from an Oxfam-GB study "Local people now discuss issues related to mobilization and distribution of local resources for poverty reduction better, in a considerable number of communities. The GRDD has helped mobilize more local resources for poverty reduction programs (local contributions to Government investment programs and local voluntary support to the poor). Community organizations participate actively in the management and distribution of such resource. Women, the poor, elderly, single people, ethnic minorities, and generally those with least formal education still have little voice in the discussions about poverty reduction, due to their limited capabilities. Nevertheless, distribution of resources for poverty reduction has become fairer and more effective. This is at least partly because of the [grassroots democratization decree]." Source: NCSSH-IoE/Oxfam GB (2003), p.28 " 2: + 3 4 2: + + + 5 + 4 + + # D4CJD # 2:4 + + + 5 + 5 : 4 5 +('/ " " 1 " &* 8 Central government / Party leadership: (incentives for action: enhanced legitimacy, control over resources spent in local poverty reduction programs) Raise aspirations, generate Communicate clear performance standards, demand for change, communicate stimulate innovation, delegation coupled clear standards as `rights' with enhanced accountability for outcomes Local (commune-level) People's Communities: Committee executives and Party cells: (incentives for action: (incentives for action: greater legitimacy development and political and public support; upper level praise) empowerment) Pressure for transparency and participation, monitoring 1 + + 2: - 5 D4C4JJ 7 # + + + 5 18 6 + 5 4 : # ! ! > 5 4 " 5 3 @ 7 # #D4D +- 5 5 + 4 5 5 6 5 + + 4" 6 G + 6 H + 5 4J E 5 5 # 6 + + 4E 6 5 6 5 6 + 5 5 4 * # 5 + < 6 4 5 5 % 5 + + , 5 + + 4 5 5 + + 6 % < , # 5 6 54 19 &" +('/ " 1 &" 9 $ * &" & " * " " 1 &" 2 % 6 5 6 + 4 +, " 5 > 4 + 5 + - + - @ 7 - 2:4 7 = 6 2: 4 = + # + 5 4 + K + E - 4 7 !5 5 5 + + 5 % 4 4 , # + 5 + 5 4 + 9# 6 5 # 5 4 > 2: > @# +7 4 !5 # 2:- 5 4 < E > + 5 5 + + 4 ) + # # + 6 5 @ 74 &5 + # + 4 . 5+ 5 + # # + # 4 +5 6 + + 5 + 6 5 6 5 + 4 # 5 5 6 5 + 3 # 4 20 ,- $ 5 + + 5 4 + 6 6? # 5 3 4 5 ? + % CD, # 5 % 08E ,40 5 + # + + 5 B C ) + " + % ) 8 B C ,4 1 + 5 + 6 + + 5 + . ) " 5 # # + % + + ,- +4 = + # 5 + . ) " 3 % 5 CD 08E ,4%" #J4D J4D ,4 . ) " + 5 + > 4 . 5 ) " + + 6 5 + 4" 5 CD . + 5 ) " + 3 5 + 5 5 + + + CD 08E 3 4 . 5 # + 5 6 + + + + 3 + + A . 5 + 6 5 7 7 + + A " + + @ 7 + CD 08E A E 5 6? 6 ?5 # + +4 E + 3 %5 5 > + , + # 5 5 > 5 64 0 55 6 4 5 + 6 40 CD 08E + 21 5 +5 4 +5 CD + ) 4 = # 3 = 0 6 = # % % )$ 8, 5 5 CD 3 + + 4 + ? 5 3 4= 5+ 5 5 + 4 / ""- " % 6 + 2+ 6 + 4! 5 5 4 # + % 4 4 , 4 + 4 "5 + + 4" % # +, 5 6 5 + 4 Box 4.1: Factors Influencing P-135 Sub-Project Outcomes The ways in which rural communities in Vietnam organize themselves around community development projects and as well as the factors that influence the outcomes in such projects in different institutional and socio-economic contexts have been the subject of some recent work (see, for example, Shanks et. al. 2003, Community Driven Development in Vietnam: A Review and Discussion Platform). Of particular interest to this report, their study examined the experience of P-135, particularly the way in which the guidelines on the exercise of local democracy are interpreted and operationalized at the community level in Program 135 implementation. Based on data from Tuyen Quang Province, the Shanks report concluded that the delegation of both decision-making powers and resources to the commune level had not reached the extent originally envisioned in the program, due in large measure to the trade-offs between increasing local capacity and participation on the one hand, and improving the speed and efficiency of investment planning on the other. The report also examined the experience of selected donor and NGO-supported projects, particularly on the financing and procurement mechanisms, community participation, and management of commune and village infrastructure. Among other things, it found that there was a strong `centralizing influence' in the application of many regulations (including those of the World Bank) which seemed to work against effective introduction of commune-managed and supervised projects. The centralizing influence was due to several factors, including the general inclination at the various levels of government to prioritize external and upward (as opposed to horizontal and/or downward) accountability mechanisms. The report tied this tendency to the often erroneous assumption by many upper-level officials that commune and village-level officials, particularly in the poor areas, are incapable of assuming full responsibility for planning, implementing and managing small-scale infrastructure works and development activities due to low capacity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he district is the owner of the 135 program. They consulted us about the type of investment for example school or irrigation. However, they + decided how many rooms should be there in the school or how high the dam should be, etc. " ­ 3 Communal authority commented about the selection process of a P-135 subproject in Phu Son % $0,4E commune, Tan Ky district. 5 3 " The leaders decided to build a market because it is the inter-commune center for several communes. It is in line with the objective of the inter-commune investment program. The + 3 % $0,4 $0 + + + 4 + + C 3 4 08E # 6 5 6 5 2 + 7 5 CD 4" +5JF 08E 7 5 6 % , 08E 3 + 3 + + 3 5 6 -% , 7 6 5 7 7 3 + 3 - % , > 3 4 & + 5 8E 3 5 + +5 + + 3 4E 5 + 08E 5 + + + 5 5 + 3 4 @ 7 08E 5 + + + + + 4< + $0 + 4 5 5 + 6 4 25 > 6 7 E + 3 5 5 4 ! CD 6 + 5 + + + 6 @ 7 - 6 5 6 4 E 5 5 + CD + 4 08E 7 6 4 = 5 " CBRIP selected scheme based on the needs 3 of community. Almost 100% of villagers participated in the selection. We had a 6 meeting for this, men and women separately. We sent our selection to commune to + prioritize the scheme for each village. " ­ 6 + 5 Communal authority in Giai Xuan commune, - 5 Tan Ky district. 5 + 4 . 5+ " CBRIP gives chance for local people to 6 manage the project. We selected the scheme 5 4 E that benefits most people, especially the + 5 poor. " ­ Female member, Communal 08E 4 < $ " ! # + % 5 # ? , 6 4 + + @ 75 @ 7 + 6 6 6 5 6 6 3 6 4E + + 5 3 + 6 5 5 5 5 6 4 6 6 + 4& + # + % , + 4 0 5 6 5 CD 08E 5 + 5 + 4" + + CD 08E 5 + + 08E 3 3 % $0, CD + + 5 64 + 3 4! + 5 4 5 + > 5 6 + 4 26 Box 4.2: Project identification in the RIDEF The UNCDF's Rural Infrastructure Development Fund distributed funds among targeted communes in a way that marked a significant departure from government planning norms for small-scale infrastructure in the mid-1990s. Based on the total investment funds available, an Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) was calculated based on an index combining three commun-level indicators ­ population, average income per capita and an `index of infrastructure need' for each commune (based on the current state and availability of basic infrastructure). The IPF method had a mixed reception. It was hailed as a move towards transparent, formula-based block grant allocations to the community level, and thus much appreciated by the province and local levels of government, and evaluations found that community members tended to perceive a high degree of `ownership' over the funds allocated in this manner. On the other hand, the relatively complex calculation of the formula and the difficulty of precisely measuring income per capita and infrastructure need led alternately to some bewilderment and contention at the grassroots level. Once the indicative planning figure had been calculated, Planning and Technical Support Groups (PSG/TSG) from the district, comprised of a small number of personnel from technical line agencies based at the district level who have been trained in the project methodology, would facilitate a planning process at the commune level. This was one of the first attempts to systematically outline a process for option-generation and decision-making that would be aggregated (beginning from all villages before proceeding to the commune level), inclusive (e.g. specifying required proportions of female representation present at the meetings), and criteria-based (leading from a general discussion of local priorities to rankings of how particular options `scored' in terms of those priorities). Evaluations of the local planning process concluded that the methodology was largely successful in fostering local ownership over decision-making, but that the finer, more qualitative aspects of the selection process ­ such as the inclusiveness of the process ­ varied widely in actual implementation, not least because the district-based officers facilitating the planning showed differing levels of commitment to such qualities. 1% "% /-(8 1 5 3 $ 0 % $0, + + 7 4$ # + + + + 7 % ,4 > 6 , E 5 % 5 6 5 + 5 , + + " The cost estimation was much higher than the 5 > 4 actual cost. The budget for a kindergarten was 125 million VND. If we built the construction + ourselves, the cost might be only 70 to 80 million VND max. I believe that if local + contractor was hired, we could save about one 5 third of the cost. " ­ Village head, Giai Xuan 5 4E + 5 % , 6 6 5 + @ 7 - % , % 3 8E ,4 3 08E 5 5 ! 5 + $0 + + 4 + $0 + 4" + $0 + + 5 + + 4! 5 + 27 + + 4 2 6 5 5 6 5 > 5 + 08E 3 CD + " The design of our village cultural house # has some irrelevant features. For 5 4" example, there are two windows on the end + of the house that are unnecessary as we % , use that end to decorate the house with 5 curtain, Uncle Ho statue, and flags. We + - will never open these two windows. 5 However, when we asked the contractor to exclude these two windows to save on costs, the contractor refused to comply, 6 7 saying that he had to abide strictly to 6 5 +4 the design. Another example is the exit door. We would want to have another exit 6 door to ensure the safety in case of 5 6 emergency. Again, the contractor claimed 5 3 + 4 & 6 5 + + + 5 @ 7 + @ 7 + 3 4 E 5+ 08E CD 4E 08E + 4. 3 5 + + 40 + 5 + + +4" + 7 + +4 5 6+ 5 +4 < " + # 3 5 + + + 4" + 6 6 6 +4 = + 5 6 3 CD 8E L 5 + + 5 + 4 1% ! " "% /-(8 CD > 5 + % , " ! > +<):C 5 > -% , " > <):C 5 > + - % , 5 + CD 5 3 + + 5 6 4% 0 #J4D 2+ 5 6 5 + CD ,4 4 C 28 E CD 5 3 5 $0 + + + 4E 5 3 $05 5 + + 4E 5 3 $04 E 2 # 5 3 CD + + 5 + + + 49+ 5 + + 5 + + + 5 5 5 4 > 6 78 " + + 3 4" 5 6 5 + 6 5 K + 4 " The project is implemented in the commune, for the commune, and commune has to monitor the work of the contractor. However, we are not invited to select the contractor." ­ Communal authority in Phu Son commune, Tan Ky district. " If we had the right to select the contractor, we could do the bidding. I believe that this process would make the contractor respect the commune PMB and PSB more and follow our suggestions to improve their work. At the moment, the contractor just listens to district and provincial authorities as they hold the decision-making power. We at commune level only have the right to propose changes. " ­ Communal official, Phu Son commune, Tinh Gia district. " Our top priority was the quality of the construction. If the quality had been poor, we would all have suffered. Therefore, we had to look for consensus within various levels. Sometimes our lobby was successful, at " CD 08E > 5 + % ,= " ! 6="!7 5 6 + + * : -% , ? 1 6 ?75 D> 5 3 + + * : -% ," " + 5 6 5 4 E 5 5 + # % , CD 4 = 08E 5 5 6 5 @ 7 4 E 08E + # 5 6 + 4 + + + 4 29 $< 5 " 3 5 + 41 6 K + 4" 6 + + + + K + # + 4 5 5 CD 08E 3 5 5 + 5 CD + 5 3 5 4 " J + CD % 5 3 & % CDD, @1 1 5 5 *): 3 5 $1&E " 7 + + < 5 5 ) 8 B C 4 + 6 41 + CD 4 @ 6 7 + 5 6 +4 6 + + + + - - 5 6 + 4 E + + + + + + CD + @ : = 6 2 7% :=2, J ) 8% B C ,4 E D @1 1 5 + 5 5 3 4J 1 5 5 CD + + 3 4 1% # $ % "% /-(8 % , # 8E 5 3 3 $ 0 % $0, 7 4 3 + 0 % 0, 5 7 + 4E 0 $0 + 5 5 6 4& 6 5 $05 6 5 7 3 4 = + 3 + 5 + G > H > 2 4G 5 4H % ,$ % 8 CD + 7 4$ 5 + 5 > 5 CD 49 + <): 30 4 CD 5 5 + 3 4 + + 3 + + 4" 3 + 4 5 $0 3 4" 4E 5 > 6 5 6 4. 5+ 5 G H > 6 5 6 4 > 6 7 < > - 5 5 3 - 6 $0 4 0 CD " They need some more years to get used to the infrastructure management and build up their 6 capacity." " ­ District authority in charge of P-135, Tan Ky district. 5 6 " If the capacity of the commune officials is > weak, give more training to them; increase the support from district technical staff and allow 4 villagers to participate. " ­ Communal ! authority, Phu Son commune, Tinh Gia district + (in response to district concerns of local 7 $0 capacity. 0 @ 7 " It takes so long for the district to approve # 5 our year two investment plan. We have submitted 4 our proposal for more than one month but no work has been done though it should have taken % , only 10 to 15 days by law. When we asked the district people in charge, they said that they # 8" + $0 08E 3 5 + 4* 8E $0 + 4 $0 + + + 5 + 4" + % $0, 5 5 + + - 3 5 4 3 + % 0, + 4 31 Box 4.3: Central Government Procurement and Bidding for Small Works Several dedicated Government decrees on bidding and procurement delineate the regulations and procedures used in Government investment programs for small-scale investments at commune level (such as under P-135). The key document is the Procurement Regulation Decree (No. 88/1999/ND-CP) whose purpose was "to enforce a uniform management of procurements of consultants, goods, works, and selection of investors for implementation of projects or parts of projects" in Vietnam. Article 1 of the decree lays out the spirit of regulation by emphasizing among other things that (a) the purpose of procurement works should be to select appropriate bidders through a "competitive, fair and transparent process to ensure economy and efficiency of the project;" and (b) any procurement cycle should include the following steps: "pre-bid preparation, bidding, bid evaluation, review and approval, announcement of award, negotiation and finalization of contract and contract signing." Chapter V of that decree specifically deals with the procurement of "small packages" (i.e., goods or works less than VND 2.0 billion in value) and lays down four general principles. First, only enterprises that are located in the concerned province or cities under central management are eligible to bid for any of the small works (The only exception is for state corporations (or `general' corporations) and their subsidiaries). Second, when the number of such qualified potential bidders is less than 3, bidders from outside of the province are invited. Third, if a package is technically complex, then central government corporations (referred to as `general' corporations or their subsidiaries are invited). And fourth, all bids have to follow a single envelope bidding process as summarized below. 1. Bidding Procedures: The procuring entity for a particular work (or consultants hired for the purpose) are responsible for (a) the preparation of the bidding documents; (b) the direct invitation for bids or advertising invitation for bids; and (b) the receiving, opening, evaluating and ranking of the bids. Subsequent reviews of the bids and contract signing, may or may not necessarily be done by the procuring entity, consultants. 2. Bid Documentation: Bidding documents prepared by procuring entity are required to not only be simple and clear, but should also include the following: (a) a letter of invitation for the bid; (b) the technical specifications and instructions and implementation schedule (if the bid is for the procurement of goods) or, the technical design with approved bills of quantity, technical instructions and implementation schedule (if the bid is for civil works); (c) the bid evaluation criteria in technical terms; and (d) the type of bid and performance security. 3. Bids: Bidders are required shall ensure correctness and feasibility and all bids have to include (a) a bid form, copy of business licenses, bid security; (b) a technical proposal and implementation schedule; and (c) the bid price. 4. Bid Evaluation: The only bids evaluated are those that are determined to not only fulfill the provisions in (3) above, but are also deemed to be generally error-free. Furthermore, a bid is ineligible for evaluation if its price exceeds an approved estimated price. The bidder whose bid is responsive to technical requirements specified in the bidding documents and has lowest evaluated price (after any error correction and adjustment of deviations in accordance with bidding documents), is recommended for contract award. 5. Bidding results: The decree requires that all bid results be subjected to review and approval by competent person or authority and, that the successful bidder be invited by the procuring entity for negotiation of contract finalization and signing. 6. Bid and performance securities: For those awarded the contract, the requirement is that bid and performance securities should be equivalent to 1% of bid price and 3% of contract price respectively and the procuring entity may request these securities in a fixed amount. 32 Box 4.4: Practice of and Views on Limited Bidding and Contractor Selection In CBRIP projects, the commune PMB is responsible for the selection of the contractor and the process usually unfolds this way: About 3 to 5 contractors are invited to submit bids for each investment scheme. The actual contractor selection takes place at a communal hall with the participation of the majority of villagers in the respective commune, including members of the commune management board. Based on a combination of the capital capacity, planned implementation duration, commitment to quality and cost expressed in the bids, the coordination board then selects the most appropriate company for the work. Village heads in Tinh Gia district that the team talked to are very happy with the selection process as one said: "We prefer bidding to direct appointment of contractor. The contractor appointment has so many risks to corruption. You could give the contract to your relatives, your friends, your colleagues, your `umbrella' or just your `relationships'. Bidding, even selected bidding, is more democratic and more transparent which enhances the trust of the villagers and increases their participation in the implementation of the project." Several others disagreed with such positive sentiments however and specifically took issue with the fact that the selection of the contractors within CBRIP is subject to approval by the district level. Said one representative: "In fact, I have to say frankly that the normal way of choosing contractor is under signal from above, we chose 2 or 3 out of 5 and the final decision from district. There is no reason why the commune level ought not to be given a direct hand at deciding which contractor to do the job." Indeed, one of the challenges that communal PMBs face in contractor selection in both P-135 and CBRIP projects, is a lack of information about the capabilities of bidding companies. Almost all of the bidding companies are located at the provincial and district centers and PMBs very often don't have much access to information about contractor capabilities and/or history. Thus, commune PMBs usually have no other choice but to judge the capacity of the various contractors indirectly by inquiring about their "reputation" (Does the company have experience in building similar schemes elsewhere? Do it have a good record with regards to quality? Do they look good in their profile on record? Do they have enough financial capacity to carry out the work without advance payments? Sometimes, the communal PMB will even visit a construction project built by a prospective company. According to most PMBs, if two companies have the same capabilities they would favor the local company. This practice does not follow national guidelines, but is entirely `local policy' by commune authorities as it eases local authorities' influence if something bad happened. One commune authority in Tan Ky district referred to limited bidding as a learning process: "The only information we have about the contractors is the list of eligible companies provided by province. In the first year, we selected rather randomly by looking at their experience and profile. We gave the contract to build a school to company that has built a lot of schools. By limited bidding, we could save 4-5% of total cost of the construction. Now, we are more confident in the process of limited bidding. I am sure that contractor appointment is vulnerable to risks ­ tieu cuc." 33 Box 4.5: Financial Reporting for a P-135 Project in Tinh Gia District According to the director of Tinh Gia district treasury, the district has a better capacity to prepare the documentation for fund disbursement than the communes do for the financial reporting under P-135. In his opinion, whenever the ownership of the P-135 programs was transferred to commune level, the treasury has to spend more time assisting the respective commune PMB to complete the necessary documentation. He estimated that about 70% of the requests he handles are returned for supplemental documentation--something that in his unnecessary paperwork. He pointed out that the quality of construction in any P-135 investment scheme largely depends on the monitoring by villagers and the respective commune PSB rather than on the paper work his office handles. He thus thought that it is better to transfer the ownership of P-135 to communes given the local accountability that the PMB, PSB and villagers exercise, and which in turn, can help reduce fund leakage. For its part, the commune PMB found no difficulty in working with the district treasury, and in fact, expressed only appreciation for the support they receive from the treasury, particularly in documentation for payment, fund disbursements, and so on. % ,$ % 08E CD 4! + + + + 4 08E 5 + # 4" 5 " We want to build a bigger 4 # + school to receive all our + 5 children. However, the fund 4 allocated could not cover and we could not advance the fund of " 08E 3 next financial year. Due to this 08E constraint, we had to build a +4! smaller school that does not have 6 enough space for all our children. It is an inefficient + 4 5 4= + 5 CD 4 " 5 CD 5 + 08E 3 > 4! # @ 7 $0 + 08E 3 " If the management is from above, the 5 procedure would be complicated and un- + transparent. We will have to go forth and back to solve any problem. " ­ Commune # authority, Giai Xuan, Tan Ky district (in reference to local (as opposed to district) management. 4! 6 L 5 6 > 49 5 08E 3 5 + + 34 L 4 < 1" * CD @ 7 + 4 % # E 2 E ' ,4E 5 5 $0 ' 5 CD 5 5 > 5 + 3 # 4 E 08E @ 7 + + L 5 5 + 5 4" CD 5+ @ 7 + 08E 4 6 + 40 5 > 5 + > + 4% " #J4J + CD 08E ,4 E + 5 6 4" + + 0 @ 7 + 4 + 6 + + 5 6 + 4" + + + 3 4 " 3 + + 0 + 5 + + + 4 5 6 + 5 + + + 4 = + + 5 + 5 4 1% # & "% /-(8 " + 5 # CD 5 # 4% 0 #J4I # ,4" 5 5 5 3 5 + + + + 4 5 + 5 5 3 4= 5 3 5 3 > 4 E + + 5 65 + + % #J4N ,4 E 08E 3 + 08E + ++ + 41 + D N + + 08E 3 5 + 4* 08E + + 7 5 6 3 % 4 4 6 > > ,4" + 5 5 5 6 + 7 4 35 Box 4.6: Project Management and Monitoring in the Mountain Rural Development Program The difficulties encountered in the introduction of village-level participatory planning and monitoring and evaluation in SIDA's Mountain Rural Development Program is instructive. An extensive review (Jorgensen et al., 2001) emphasizes (as did chapter three above) the salience of governance and institutional constraints: "The VDB [Village Development Budget scheme] was ambitious in its intentions considering the administrative culture in which it was set in motion. Accordingly, a number of obstacles emerge from the very outset. First, it was difficult to get information across to middle levels about the new purpose of the scheme and it was seen as more or less `business as usual' or at best as a technically change more than a scheme with a democratic component. Neither was the villagers properly informed about their rights to decide about the new village plan. Often they did not know that they were to make decisions let alone knowing what to decide about. Marginalized groups, particularly poor households and women, were particularly neglected. The reasons should be found in a double-sided distrust between villagers and higher levels. Villagers and local institutions tend to see the traditional role of village meetings as top-down institution for transfer of information and the ensuing popular lack of trust in village meetings. Commune and higher-level officials have on their part difficulties trusting the villager's ability to make decisions. This is even the case with natural resources management, where communities in the research area were known for their traditionally sustainable management of water and forest resources. During the period of implementation, subsidies were purchased and distributed much the same way as they had been before, i.e. mainly at district level. In practice it appeared to be administratively difficult to purchase cross breed seeds, trees, and fertilizer at a village level. The construction work was the area where villagers could have more influence and also contribute with work force and other inputs. Even here, the higher levels interfered and wrested the initiative from the villagers and the Village Management Groups. No systematic local monitoring was carried out." The authors note achievements as well, notably that "there is a growing awareness of people's rights and they voice their demands more than before." " 4 5 $0 0 + 3 4 + 5 # C <): <): 6 C4N 3 5 2 V 4" + ' 0 + 5 + 5 + 4 ) " + + 08E + $0 0 + 4N 3 4E 5 + 5 + 4 > 6 7 + 5 6 CD 8E 3 5 4 6 + 5 + > + 4 @ 7 + 5 4 * + 4 + # 5 3 ? CD 08E ? 5 # 5 + . ) " 4 36 ! 5 + - 3 5 3 4 5 # + + 3 + 4 5 J4 ,4 " 3 @ 7 5 6? % 5 + + , % 5 5 ,4 5+ 3 4! # 5 6 6 ? 4 4 5 CD 4 Box 4.7: Monitoring and Complaints Mechanisms in a P-135 Community Project In a P-135 project in Tinh Gia district's Tan Truong commune, villagers elected three members to form a village- monitoring group to supervise the construction along with members of commune People's Supervision Board (PSB). Each member of the village monitoring group receives 15,000 VND as a daily allowance for their work. The commune People's Committee (PC) approved the village monitoring board and authorized the board suspend the implementation of the work for a day if they determined that something was wrong. The contractor was informed about the nature of village monitoring group before work on the community scheme commenced. As part of their job, the village monitoring had a copy of the work design as well as some simple indicators to monitor the work of the contractor. The monitoring group were to report to the commune PSB, the PMB, and the contractor about any misuse of materials should they have spotted any. Any complaint filed against the contractor would, at least in theory, compel the commune PMB to take appropriate actions after consultation with PSB. Individual monitoring was also encouraged and mobilized in some cases. Before the start of the project, the village head convened a village meeting to present the project design, cost estimation, and purpose. Afterwards, any villagers interested in the work were free to visit the field during project implementation. In theory, any concerned villagers about the project could report to the village monitoring group. However, in reality there have been virtually no such reports in this (as well as any of the other village or commune we visited) ­ a finding that can be interpreted in a variety of ways. There is much difference between official and unofficial practice when it comes to dealing with complaints from members of the community. A villager is required to make his or her complaint in writing and anonymous complaints are not followed upon. After the written complaint has filed, the commune management board convenes to discuss the problem and decide if they are authorized to solve the problem. If they decide that they are not or cannot resolve the problem with whoever is complaining, then the complaint is supposed to be passed on to the district level. However, political and social considerations seem to prevent any villagers from complaining in such a formal manner, thus giving a false skewed picture about complaints. 37 Table 4.2 Descriptive Summary of Fieldwork Findings Stage Program design characteristics The Test: Findings: Accountability Corruption Program 135 CBRIP relationships risk levels tested Project - Differentiation between district and - Commune always scheme owner Hierarchical: Stable Low, but heavily identifica- commune as project owner funding framework and dependent on tion - Vvillage heads play key role in priority setting fiscal transfers; degree of - No direct consultations at the village level and scheme identification process fostering collective community - Beneficiaries are supposed to contribute - Women's role is very important and women ownership at the local participation in 10% of the project budget either financially or given opportunity for deciding tie-breakers if level design. physically. necessary. Democratic: Inclusive - Targeted scheme beneficiaries are required to local planning process contribute some 5% of project budget. - Reliance on pre-approved lists of scheme - Cmmune PMB tables investment proposal to Design and design and planning firms and `technical' district for approval to be sent to provincial PMB. Horizontal: Relatively high, planning consultants from province. - Commune PMB hires technical consultant for Coordination of particularly where - Reliance on district functional departments investment report. technical inputs and district remains for scheme design and cost estimation before oversight to prevent project holder. approval by People's Committee (PC). -Province signs legal funding agreement collusion and ensure Higher in P-135 permitting commune coordination board to hire procedural compliance than in CBRIP. company. Democratic: Monitoring - In schemes where commune is the project - Commune coordination board prepares Bidding procedural compliance, holder, the commune PMB will select three documents inviting 3-5 construction firms to join and articulation of local contractors to propose to the district PC. the limited bidding list. contracting preferences - District PC then selects one of the - Commune PMB then selects contractor contractors to send to the provincial PC for approval. - Commune PMB gets approval from district PC before sending an official offer letter to the - In schemes where the district is the project selected contractor. holder, contractor appointed directly by the district PMB. - Where commune is the project holder: - Provincial PMB manages key CBRIP Manage- commune project management board works processes (management, finance and Hierarchical / Moderately high, ment and closely with district authorities in the accounting, monitoring and evaluation, and horizontal: Coordination due to high financial management of investment scheme community trainers). of implementation complexity and reporting - Project supervision board (commune PSB) - Technical support group that provides technical process across levels of limited supervises scheme implementation and training to commune level together with government and transparency in overseas district technical staff. provincial community trainers. implementing agencies; financial matters; - Where district is project owner, district level - At the commune level is a management board, cross-checks for and disjunction PMB establishes and works together with a PMB, established with representation of procedural compliance between commune level PSB. commune authorities, and two elected villagers responsibility as - Budget of P-135 managed by central-level from each village and they act as project owner. project holder district treasury officer \`independent' from the - Commune management board elects a and decision- district PC. separate project supervision board to provide making authority - Provincial finance department transfers daily monitoring of the construction. (still at higher annually all earmarked P-135 funds to the - All CBRIP project funds administered by levels). provincial treasury, after which monies are separate CBRIP accountant at the commune transferred to the district treasury. level , supervised by district Treasury officer. Monitoring - Some funds set aside for program - 1.7% and 2% of scheme funds respectively, set Hierarchical: Technical Relatively low on and management but amount at discretion of aside for scheme management and for M&E by district-level average but evaluation scheme PMB `technical' monitoring although agencies; procedural varied; highly (M&E) compliance dependent on - No dedicated funds for either `technical' or - No dedicated funds for `community' monitoring. degree of `community' monitoring - All villagers typically have the right to monitor Democratic / horizontal: community - Regardless of whether the district or the technical aspects of contractor's work and Monitoring by organization. commune is the project holder, commune- routinely do. representatives of end- level PSB supervises scheme implementation - Villagers also elect two persons to monitor the users concerning as well as overseeing district technical staff. work regularly on behalf of the entire village. quality of work; ability to - Village heads, usually part of the commune - After the contractor selection, commune raise red flags? PSB, play critical role in scheme coordination board elects PSB, which, together implementation supervision, particularly in with PMB, is trained on management and daily monitoring of equipment and materials. technical aspects of the project. - `Technical' supervision of the investment - `Technical' aspects of the schemes monitored scheme carried out by `independent' by trained `independent' consultants. consultants. 38 5 % CD , + # 4 @ 7 + 5 5 6 3 4 5 4 Box 4.8: Monitoring of Technical Aspects of P-135 and CBRIP Projects Whereas community monitoring focuses mainly on daily monitoring of equipment and materials, the monitoring of the more `technical' aspects of the projects focuses on engineering and safety quality. In both P-135 and CBRIP projects, such `technical' monitoring is done by "independent," trained consultants. In P135 program, the technical consultants come from district functional departments such as the Industry and Commerce departments (as was the case in Tinh Gia district), or the Infrastructure and Technical department (as was the case in Tan Ky district). In Tan Ky, there are only 3 technical staff responsible for all state management responsibilities and technical support to P-135 projects in the entire district. As the result, their work sometimes did not meet the requirements of the program and the expectation of commune people. In CBRIP, 2 percent of the total cost of a project is used to hire an independent consultant to monitor the technical aspects of the works. The consultants visit the field at critical stages of the work. More often than not, the consultants are not local but from the district--something that does not sit well with local communities. Furthermore, because these technical or design companies are normally located far away from the actual construction their representative very often only show up only at the beginning and end of a project. ! 5 + + 5 6 3 + 4E > # + 4E 08E 3 + 3 5 2 + 4 " 5 6 + # 4 E + 3 + > 4 5 + 5 + + % ,4 0 # 08E 5 + 5 + 3 5 4 39 .< " $ " % < 5 + 5 + 5 4 5 5 + @+ 7 4. 5+ 5 + 4E 6 5 + + + + 4 5 + + 4 + + 4E ? ? + 4 4 4 + 5 # 3 6 + 4 + + 9 :+ $ " % 9:9$",4 9:9$" 5 5 CD B C 5 5 # 4 + + + + 4 - 6 $ / 3 J +5 + + 3 3 + + 4 + +5 3 # + 5 + 6 CD 08E 3 4 0 5 3 4 4C 5 5 + 4 :+ @+ 7 6 5 5 + # @+ 7 4! @ 7 6 + 08E 3 5 + 5 % + , 6 6 + 6 + + 3 + 5 4 6 7 A 8 40 2+ + 3 + + % 5+ ,4 5 5 4" 5 5 4 3 + + + + 5 08E 4& 6 5 5 6 5 + 6 4 : I $ + + 3 3 + + 4 $ 3 ! " 8 0 5 6 5 6 + + # 4E 6 + 4 5 + + 4 + 6 # 4E 5+ + + ? 5+ 5 4E 5 + Q+ R5 6 4 & 6 5 + 5 + + + 5 6 4 3 + + 5 + 4 @+ 7 @ 5 5 7 + % K + , + + % + , 4 + # + 5 4 & 6 5 + # 5 + @+ 7 @ 7 4 2 + + 5 + 4! # 5 6 5 + + CD + + G> # H + 5 5 5 + 4 + + 3 < 4 + + + + + 4 41 > 5 + + + 4 > K K % , + 5 # 4 + + + + + 4 " 4! # 3 4 6 7 @ 7 4 E B K + 6 + + % 4 4 5 K K ,4E + + + D B + 4 + 4E 5 5 + 5 6 5 > 4 5 = 3 K 3 3 + + 4 + 5 + 3 3 5 + + # + 6 4 # 5 % + , + 6 6 49+ + - 5 # # + 5 6 + 4 " + @+ 7 @ 7 @ 7 5 + + 3 % KK K$* , 5 % ,5 + 5 6 5 4 5 $ : ) 4I 5 # 6 + 5 > 4 1 + 5 6 3 + 4" + + 5 + 5 % + ,4 3 + 4 " + 3 4) + + + + 42 4E 08E )$ 8 + 5 6 6 - + - - + - - # + + 4N @ 8 3 # 1 + + # 4 2 6 5 @ 7 + % # 5,4 " + 5 5 > 5 5 6 CD 4 + + 4 + + 4" + 08E )$ 8 + + + 4 E I + 8E 3 5 + > 5 5 + 4 @ # 8 $ 7 : ) 4I + + 3 4 " 5 + > 6 3 3 % # ,5 3 + + 4 > + + + 4 " 3 + 5 6 + 5 # @ 7 @ 7 4 6 + 5 6 4 @ 43 " 5 + - + 4 & 6 5 + + 5 5 +49 + + + 4 " + + + + 5 + 4 08E )$ 8 + 5 CD 4 9# + 5 3 5 @ 7 % 6 E , + 4 @ B $ K E + + 4" + 3 E 4 5 + + K )21 % : I $ @ 7 )21 + ,4 ) > E + # = 0 6 3 + E ' :+ 3 %': ,4 , 5 4 - E 9:9$" 5 5 + # + +4$ 5 < 7 + + + > 5 9:9$" 4 > + 9:9$" 4 5 + < 4 + + 4" @ 7- 44 # 4 # +4" 5 4C 3 + 5 5 6 4" 4 > 5 5 5 6 4 % 4 45 > + , 4 "6 + + + # 4. 5 + + + # + + + 5 6 5 5 A= 7 A 1 5 + ' + 6 5 6 + 6 5 5 # + 6 CD 9:9$" + # + + # + 4F + + + 4 + + # 4$ + + 5 6 6 + 5 + % , K + 4. 5 + A 5 + + + + 4E + 6 5 4 9 +5 6 # 4 45 &".('/ * % 6 &* 6 * " $ %% "* 3 :+ @+ 7 5 & 5 5 : K $ 6 + 3 $ K + + + : $ K 4 + < + + $ K + 5 08E 4 + 0 K 2+ + $ K + % + , 5 + # + 4 E + $ K + + + E # $ K + + + 0 $ K $ + 0 & 5K # 4 " & & 5K $ K! 8 2+ + K + 6 4 & 5 " + !5 5 4 " & & 5K $ K9+ " & & 5K + 5 6 + E $ K. :+ + 8 + 5 & 5 E + 8 + 5 & 5 + 4 9 # + & K 3 $ K. 0 & & 5K$ )21 E $ K. 46 " 6 5 6 3 + 4! + + % 4 4G5 +# + + H, 6 5 4 5 6 + + + + ' 7 @)5 $ + 7% #4C, + 5 6 4: + + 3 + 4 Box 5.1: Lessons from Korea's `New Community Movement' One of the fundamental practical difficulties associated with decentralized poverty alleviation investments is how to value or reward successful poverty alleviation efforts planned and implemented by local cadres and communities. Some relevant lessons may be learned from the Korean Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement), a rural development program initiated in South Korea in 1971, when South Korea faced several rural development challenges similar in some ways to those facing Vietnam at present. The government initially distributed about 340 bags of cement to each of the country's (approximately 35,000) villages. Villages were then evaluated on results, and in the next year, the government selected the 50% of these villages who had achieved the best results with their cement, and increased the gift to 500 bags of cement and one ton of steel rods. Each year, the size of government funding increased--but it was highly competitive, and rigorously evaluated. The Saemaul movement emphasized four key principles: 1) rewarding the best work, 2) categorizing villages by quality of work, 3) learning by doing, and 4) matching funds--the government only donated funds to villages that provided at least 50% of total resources (land, labor, money). This movement had the additional benefit of recognizing (through experience) the need for high quality villager leaders, and led to the establishment of leadership training institutes Source: Fritzen and Nachuk, 2003 1 5 + G + 6 5 + Q R5 + + 4H 1 B + + 5 # + + > 6 + -BC 6 + 7 # + % , + 4B 4 5 + +? 6 + + 6 % 3 + ,? 6 + + + 4 5 + 6 @ 7 5 4E + + 4 5 + # + 5 4" E G5 # 5 + + 4H BD + +*): BJ # $M9 ?5 B ? 40 J = 0 6 E BB 5 = 0 6 5 2 + E 5 > 6 + # + 5 4 + < 4 47 Box 5.2: Experimental approaches that measure corruption directly: An example from Indonesia' A two-year, ongoing research project uses controlled, randomized experiments to examine the level of corruption affecting the World Bank-supported Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) in its road building projects and the effectiveness of certain anti-corruption interventions in reducing corruption. The overall strategy for measuring corruption is to obtain an independent estimate of the amount actually spent on a project and compare it to reported expenditures. The study will do this by conducting a detailed, on-site engineering survey of the 600 of KDP villages that constructed village roads with a relatively uniform design. Engineers take 10 measurements of the depth and volume of each of the road's various layers, estimate the volume of materials actually used in the project, multiply this by standard price estimates, and compare it to an estimate of the cost and quality of road materials obtained with no construction (in a controlled setting) . From this information, fund leakage or a `loss ratio' can be estimated. Measuring corruption in this way is both expensive and only possible for some types of (highly comparable) project investments. However, the measure obtained can be considered a direct estimate of loss to corruption, more accurate than other available indirect measures. It can also be compared with measures of corruption that are more cheaply obtained (such as presence of complaints in a sub-project, or cost per unit km of road built) to determine how highly these measures are correlated. Three measures are examined to see if they result in better complaints handling and more transparent decision- making: enhancing community participation and the availability of anonymous complaints boxes, and raising the likelihood of an audit. By adopting an experimental design ­ varying the likelihood of a project board experiencing an audit to 100% in some villages, for instance ­ an estimate of the marginal contribution of increasing investments in specific interventions can be obtained. These estimates promise tangible measurements of "what works" to reduce corruption that can be used to justify and to calibrate anti-corruption investments in similar projects. 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Current anti-corruption laws and regulations Current anti-corruption laws and regulations in Vietnam are mainly defined in the following documents: Criminal Code 1999; Revised Ordinance on cadres and civil servants 2003; Ordinance on Anti-Corruption 1998 and Revised version 2000; Decree 117/2003 on guiding the implementation of the Ordinance on Cadres and Civil Servants; Circular 09/2004 on guiding the implementation of the Decree 117; Decree 64/1998/ND-CP on defining details and guidelines for implementation of the Ordinance on Anti-Corruption; Circular 14/1999/TT-CDTQG dated 22nd September 1999 of the National Reserves General Department on guiding the implementation of the Decree 64/1998/ND-CP of the Government. 1. Criminal Code 1999 In the Criminal Code, Part A (corruption crimes) of Chapter XX (title-related crimes) defines acts of corruption which are regarded as crimes. Crimes defined as corruption under the Criminal Code fall into 7 categories: embezzlement of assets (Article 278); taking bribes (Article 279); abuse of position or authority to deprive individuals of assets (Article 280); in-service taking advantage of position or authority (Article 281); in-service abuse of power (Article 282); taking advantage of position or authority to harm others in order to make profit (Article 283); and use of false personal details at work (Article 284). In the 1999 Criminal Code, the criterion for distinguishing cases designated as `crimes of corruption' , as opposed to those designated `violations of regulations' for cadres was changed from the 1985 Criminal Code. The 1999 Criminal Code lowers the ceiling on acts considered as corruption from those which involve misappropriation of funds or materials in excess of VND 5 million in value in the 1985 code, to cases which involve sums in excess of VND 500,000 in value. Under the 1999 code, acts involving the misappropriation of funds in excess of VND 500,000 in value and even less in some cases are regarded as crimes rather than regulation violations (which means they are to "be regarded as crime and be settled as prescribed in the Criminal Codes"). This change reflects the increasingly strict policy of the State of Vietnam towards crimes of corruption. 2. Revised Ordinance on cadres and civil servants 1998 and Revised Ordinance on anti- corruption 2000 The Ordinance on cadres and civil servants and Ordinance on anti-corruption comprehensively define measures to fight against corruption by cadres and civil servants by clearly defining proscribed actions for cadres and civil servants. These regulations aim to ensure cadres and civil servants act in accordance with laws and state management principles while undertaking their duties, and at the same time prevent corruption. * Adapted from Nguyen Tuan Minh, 2005; used with permission. &- a. Ordinance on cadres and civil servants 1998 This Ordinance stipulates proscribed actions for cadres and civil servants. It covers aspects of personal conduct in the course of undertaking duties, paying special attention to ethical conduct and nepotism. The Ordinance defines 4 categories of proscribed action applicable to all categories of cadres and civil servants (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18). It also defines two types of proscribed action for cadres and civil servants in leadership positions (Article 19 and 20). Article 19 delineates prudential limits on the actions of the spouse of the Head or Deputy Head of a state agency. His or her spouse is not entitled to invest in enterprises in sectors which are managed by the said person. Article 20 stipulates that of a state agency or organization must not appoint his or her spouse, father, mother, children, blood brothers and sisters to leading positions of functional departments such as the personnel department, accounting, financial affairs, cashier and storekeeper in the same agency or organization. Further prohibitions are placed on allowing his/her family members to purchase goods or sign business contracts with the same agency or organization. These regulations aim to prevent corruption resulting from nepotism amongst the Heads and Deputy Heads of agencies and organizations. b. Ordinance on anti-corruption Whereas the Ordinance on cadres and civil servants only defines the prohibited conduct of cadres and civil servants, the Ordinance on anti-corruption also defines practical measures to prevent and combat against corruption. Article 3 of the Ordinance on anti-corruption clearly defines acts which are regarded as corruption: 1. Asset embezzlement; 2. Bribery taking; 3. Abuse of position and authority to gain assets; 4. In-service taking advantage of position and authority to make profits; 5. In-service abuse of power to make profits; 6. Taking advantage of titles and authorities to harm others for personal benefit; 7. Use of false personal information at work for personal benefit With the objective of effectively combating corruption, it is necessary to combine strict punitive measures for corruption with preventive measures to limit the opportunity for corruption and define a code of conduct. The Ordinance prescribes preventive measures as follows: 1. The definition of prohibited conduct for people in positions of leadership and authority in order to prevent opportunities and pre-conditions for corruption arising. For Heads and Deputy Heads of agencies and organizations, apart from the general prohibitions on conduct, they are also prohibited from engaging in any conduct which may compromise their ability to make management decisions objectively (Article 13) 2. The definition of principles for the valuation of the property and assets of cadres. In the short term, the valuation of assets either of high value or belonging to cadres in high positions of authority as stipulated in Directive 10/CT of the Politburo is required. This Directive was actually implemented with Decree 64/1998 of the Government which defines individuals subject to this legislation, types of asset and valuation procedures at specific time (specifically defined at Chapter II of Decree 64/1998). These regulations aim to ensure that the legislation can actually be implemented in practical contexts, ensuring that the Ordinance is enforceable in practice. This is intended to avoid disorder or uncertainty in the implementation of the ordinance (Article 14). 3. Requiring the compulsory publication of administrative procedures in all areas related to citizens, agencies and organizations. Administrative procedures are also required to be &% straight forward and simple, thus avoiding difficult procedures which give opportunities for officials to collect illegal fees and charges (Article 15). 4. Defining the responsibilities of the Heads of agencies and organizations in taking measures to prevent corruption; establishing the liability of the person in charge who allows acts of corruption to take place; establishing the liability of people who do not fulfill their responsibilities and mandates resulting in crime of corruption by others (Article 16 and 17). 5. Defining the obligations of all citizens to detect corruption; agencies and organizations are responsible for ensuring the interests and safety of `whistle blowers' ; provision is also made for the protection of the rights of individuals in cases where malicious and defamatory allegations of corruption are made without grounds (Article 18 and 19). The Ordinance also defines punitive measures for corruption (Articles 21-30). This was also implemented in Chapter IV of Decree 64/1998. The Ordinance states that in principle, any corruption act will be strictly and clearly settled by punitive measures and prosecution where criminal liability is found. Assets gained through corrupt practices will be returned; assets which are gained as a result of bribery will be confiscated and the perpetrators will be responsible for indemnity; People who commit acts of bribery which fall beyond the scope of criminal liability will be treated, depending on the nature and seriousness of their acts, by punitive measures (i.e. reprimand, warning, lowered salary level, lowered scale and dismissal). Article 23 of the Ordinance also makes provision for the consideration of both exacerbating and mitigating factors in the determination of punitive measures to be taken against perpetrators. Mitigating factors include pro-active confession, any attempts made to ameliorate the consequences of corruption, pro-active return of assets gained by corruption etc. Factors which are considered to exacerbate acts of corruption include refusal to follow instructions on asset revocation, intentional concealment of corruption, obstruction of agencies and organizations investigations into corruption. Apart from being punished, perpetrators are also responsible for returning assets derived from corruption or provide indemnity in recompense for acts of corruption. Article 24 of the Ordinance stipulates that people who are found to have committed acts of corruption and have been forced to leave their job will not be eligible to become cadres or civil servants of state agencies and organizations for 3-5 years. The Ordinance also stipulates that State inspectorates are entitled to take necessary measures, as prescribed in the Ordinance, on inspection to limit damages to state assets. These measures include asset valuation, freezing the assets of perpetrators, requesting temporary suspension of work for individuals being investigated for corruption, etc. In addition, the Ordinance stipulates that state inspectorates are responsible for checking and supervising the Heads of State agencies and organizations in their exercise of disciplinary actions and the reclamation of assets from perpetrators. In the course of the settlement of crimes, the Ordinance stipulates that inspection agencies, prosecutors and courts are responsible for investigating and prosecuting, as rapidly as possible and by strict implementation of the law acts of corruption no matter what the position of the individuals involved. For those cases which fall beyond the scope of criminal proceedings, prosecutors must transfer the files and request agencies and organizations to take disciplinary actions. & In addition the Ordinance also stipulates the responsibility of the state agencies in the fight against corruption ( from Article 31 to 36) These regulations aim to clarify the responsibilities of the agencies in preventing and dealing with corruption, specifically: Stipulating the responsibilities of the People' s Prosecutor to monitor the execution of law during the investigation, prosecution and judgment of crimes of corruption; to synthesize and submit regular and ad hoc reports to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, in the mean time, to inform the Prime Minister. Stipulating the responsibilities of the state inspectorate bodies in inspecting, monitoring, giving general support to the administrative agencies during the process of applying the measures to prevent, detect and punish corrupt acts. The General state inspectorate synthesizes and submits regular or ad hoc reports to the government and the Prime Minister on the anti-corruption activities in the whole country. Stipulating that the Prime Minister should direct ministries, ministerial agencies, Government affiliated agencies and provincial People' s Committees to implement measures to prevent and deal with corruption and report to the National Assembly, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and the President on the fight against corruption nationwide. The General state inspectorate executes anti corruption legislation and cooperates with the Minister for National Security, Minister for National Defense, and other leaders of the related agencies to support Government in organizing and directing the fight against corruption, and punishing corruption in the whole country. Stipulating that the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, Commission for Ethnics Nationalities, Commissions of the National Assembly, and representatives of the National Assembly should monitor the implementation of measures to prevent and deal with the inspection of, investigation, prosecution and judgment of corrupt acts. Stipulating that the responsibilities of the People' s Council at all levels in monitoring the implementation of the measures to prevent and deal with the inspection, investigation, prosecution, judgment of corrupt acts in the local area. Stipulating the responsibilities of the People' s Committee, The People' s tribunal president and the People' s Prosecutor to report to the People' s Council at the same level, and keep the Father Front at the same level informed about the fight against corruption in the local area. According to the Ordinance, a specialized anti-corruption body is not established. Fighting against corruption is the responsibility of the whole Party and the nation. The organization and steering of this fight are primarily undertaken by the collective Party executive committee at all levels and leaders of sectors and level. In addition, the fight against corruption relates to all sectors and levels and all aspects of social life, therefore no definition of state management in this area is developed. However, in the facilitation of monitoring and research on corruption, it is stated in the Ordinance that the two focal bodies are the Supreme People' s Prosecutor and the Government, which is directly the state Inspectorate. The Supreme People' s Prosecutor takes the responsibility for monitoring acts of corruption dealt with under the criminal code. From an administrative perspective, the state inspectorate has responsibility for research and recommendations regarding measures for the prevention of and fighting against corruption nationwide. 3. Other legal documents Aside from the documents already discussed there are several other legal documents relating to corruption: && The 1998 Ordinance on Thrift practice and anti-waste, Decree 38-1998 of the execution of this Ordinance; Instruction of the Minister of Ministry of Finance No 04/2004/CT- BTC on 06/4/2004 on strengthening the thrift practice and anti-waste in the financial sector. These documents stipulate the responsibilities of agencies and civil servants as regards thrift practice and anti-waste and stipulate punishment in the case where reglautions are contavined . Instruction of the Prime Minister No 48/2004/CT-TTg on 24/12/2004 on the organization the Tet festival of the Year of the Rooster 2005. This document stated some specific regulations for ministers, leaders of ministerial agencies, government affiliated agencies and chairmen of provincial People' s Committees: o Organizing Tet celebration at agencies without extravagant expenditure; no flowers and presents are brought to the private residence of leaders so that more time can be spent with family and relatives. o Abusing the occasion of Tet and other festivals to party lavishly is prohibited; and so is using public funds or resources, or sponsors to give presents to individuals or organizations of any kind which are not allowed by the state regulations. The agencies which have the right to reward individuals and units on their merit must publicize the rewarding list and grade. Public cars are not allowed to be used for private purposes before, during and after Tet. II. Possible future changes in anti-corruption laws of Vietnam 1. Overarching Anti-corruption Law (currently in draft form) Tackling corruption is an urgent issue for the Vietnamese Government. The Government is directing authorized agencies to prepare a draft anti-corruption law. The Government Inspectorate has been asked to prepare the seminar resolution on anti-corruption, thrift practice and anti-waste to submit to the Government in February 2005. The Government Inspectorate also has responsibility to prepare the draft law on Anti-corruption for National Assembly' s comments at the mid-term meeting sessions and for approval at the end of 2005. The main themes are to be preventing and fighting corruption, the development of more transparent procedures and a cleaner and stronger contingent of civil servants. In the basic contents of the draft anti-corruption law which is being prepared, there are several new points: a. Civil servants who receive presents more than 50USD have to report them In the Article `Don'ts and Dos of civil servants' the conditions under which giving presents is acceptable are stipulated. The article states that the giving and receiving presents have to be relevant to the tradition and customs of the nation, and that the senders as well as the receivers are not allowed to abuse the occasion of giving by receiving or mediating bribes. The article will stipulate limitations on the value of the present for differing grades of official and occasions upon which presents can be given. On the receipt of the presents over the stipulated maximum value, the civil servants have the obligation to report in a timely manner and in sufficient detail. The receivers of presents have to publicize the payment of income tax if the total received property on one occasion reaches or surpasses the duty-free limit according to the Ordinance on Income Tax for high income. The &. receivers are encouraged to return the presents which are over the limit or make a donation in lieu to the public fund. Civil servants have to report presents from foreign individuals or organizations valued more than 50 USD. The authorized person will decide whether the civil servants are allowed to accept the present or whether it should be confiscated and placed in a public fund. They can accept presents of a value below 50 USD, any presents of a value greater than 50 USD will be confiscated, or if they which to keep the present the balance in excess of 50 USD must be donated to public funds. The draft also presents sanctions to punish civil servants who violate regulations on presents. Civil servants found to be guilty of corruption will be penalized under the administrative procedures depending on the level of corruption. If the perpetrator is not a civil servant, they will also be punished under administrative procedures or according to the regulations of the organization in which they work. b. Further detailing of `corrupt acts' Apart from the 7 corrupt acts as defined in the Ordinance on Anti-corruption and Criminal Codes, the draft includes 8 additional acts which are to be regarded as corruption: - Giving bribes - Mediating bribes - Abuse of power to seek benefits - Embezzlement of property in the private sector - Bribery in the private sector - Bribery amongst foreign civil servants or employees of the international public organizations - Intimidation or obstruction of witnesses, complainant or the persons who are in charge of detecting and dealing with corruption or the collaborators of the bodies for detecting and dealing with corruption. - No declaration or deceitful declaration in property valuation (no explanation for the undeclared property or the legal origin of the holdings) c. Position which are susceptible to corruption have to be rotated every 3 to 5 years According to the draft Anti-corruption Law, civil servants in positions susceptible to corruption have to be rotated every 3 to 5 years to other positions not in the list. The list of positions susceptible to corruption are in the following areas: customs, tax, public property procurement, business registration, market management, police, court, prosecution, planning and investment, inspection, audit, infrastructure construction, land management, and in anti-corruption bodies. 2. The draft Decree on Civil Servant Performance Inspection The Ministry of Home Affairs has been ordered to prepare the draft Decree on Civil Servant Performance Inspection to submit to the Government in the regular meeting session on February 2005. According to the Decree, the Civil Servant Performance Inspection body will be established. The civil servants who work for this body will disguise themselves as citizens having transactions with the government agencies, if behavior of harassment or bureaucracy are detected, they will report the abuse to the authorized agencies. The promulgation of this Decree is also an important monitoring mechanism to ensure the accountability and responsibility of the civil servants. this legislation is designed to deter corruption and harassment from civil servants. &/ 0& )snosrepyeK( IP rotcartnoC srotcartnoC M+FO M IDD+FOD )snosrepyeK( IPD+FOD srotcartnoC tnemegana setilEdraoBtnemegana M531 setilEdraoB M531 setilElanummoC .+' B1nahtero M launnAotnidedulcnI dnuFfotnuomA )nmulocetarapessategduB( B1nahtsseL namriahC CPD draoBgnirotino M531 draoBtnemegana draoBnoisivrepuS M531 ASILO M ASILOD draoBgnirotino GNITEE )dibi( " IP M draoBnoitcepsnI M MEGALLIV " retsini DRAOB * MemirP )namriahC( rotcerid MEC >/ )namriahC-eciVgnidnatS( eciffognidnatS531 CPP FO )daeH(]namriahcecivronamriahC[ IPD )namriahC( DE renoissimmoCgnidnatS eciffognidnatS531 namriahC CPD draoBtnemegana M531 NOISIVREPUS LANU M # M DRAO ROD MOC M CEC DRAOD draoBgnirotino M 531 margorP LARTNEC GNIREETS EETI ENU M MOC LAICNIVORP GNIREETS EETTI M MOC TCIRTSID LEVEL )ROTSEVNISA( 2002-8991 M MOC LEVEL )rotsevnisA( 5002-3002 Key `Vertical' Institutional Arrangements for CBRIP World Bank Overall MPI Central One Project Special coordination & Project Account under support for capacity Management Unit CMPU building by CPMU (CPMU) CBRIP: Management PPC/DPI supported by PPMU Management Province Project from counterpart Management Unit levels, fund funds (PPMU) flow and investment ownership Districts the DPC " investment owner District Technical for inter-commune Support Group $ 2 works (DTSG) " Communes the Commune Project investment owner Coordinating for commune works Committee $ 2 (under USD 50,000) (and Commune Supervision Boards) Source: World Bank (2005) &1 3. noisivrepuS srotcartnoC IPM+B W eciffOgnidnatSPIRBIC IPD eciffOgnidnatSPIRBIC eciffOtnemeganaMPIRBC draoBtnemeganaMPIRBC gnitovsegalliV PRPMNrednustnemegnarrAlanoitutitsnI'lacitreV`dna'latnoziroH`yeK gnirotinoM seitiroirP yrusaerT knaB yrusaerT knaB lartneC ecnivorP tcirtsiD enummoC tnatnuoccAfeihC egalliV Institutional Arrangements for CBRIP World Bank Overall MPI Central CPMU Special coordination & Project Account support for capacity Management Unit building by CPMU (CPMU) NMPRP: Provinces the PPC/DPI 6 Investment owner Management Province Project Province Special for larger schemes Management Unit levels, fund Accounts (NCB) (PPMU) flow and investment ownership District Second Districts the DPC Generation investment owner District Technical Accounts in for a majority of Support Group Commercial Bank small works (DTSG) Commune Project Communes the Commune Project Accounts investment owner for Coordinating in commercial Commune Committee bank Development Budget Component (15% (and Commune project funds) Supervision Boards) Source: World Bank (2005) . # /5 "4 Thanh Hoa Province, Tinh Gia District Commune/village P 135 or CBRIP Project Holder 1Phu Son Commune P 135 Commune 2Tan Truong Commune P 135 Commune Dong Lach village Tam Son village 3Hai Thuong Commune CBRIP Commune Lien Trung village Lien Son village Nam Hai village Lien Dinh village Lien Hai village Cao Lu village Nghe An Province, Tan Ky District Commune/village 135 or CBRIP Project Holder 1Giai Xuan Commune P 135 District Quyet Tam village CBRIP Commune Nuoc Xanh village Dong Tho village Van Xuan village Van Long village Xuan Tien village 2Phu Son Commune P 135 District CBRIP Commune 3Tien Ky Commune P 135 District Meeting in Village 5 CBRIP Commune .- #$/ * %> *5 % " Progra Sourc Timef Scale Funding Investm Key design features m e / rame ent Focal emphasi point s 135 Govern 1998- 2300 communes in VND400 Small-scale Area-based and decentralized (Program ment of 2005 whole country million per infrastructur planning and management to Assist Vietnam commune per e the Poorest / year x 6 years Encouragement of local Communes CEMM of support for community participation in ) A and each selection, supervision and others commune management of schemes Use of local community contributions NMPRP IDA 2002- 368 upland USD 132.5 Small-scale Capacity building and training (Northern (World 2007 communes in 44 million (USD infrastructur Mountains Bank) districts in 6 110m IDA e and Emphasis on local project Poverty and local provinces of the loan + 12m livelihood planning and management Reduction commun Northern Mountains counterpart services Key emphasis on district level Program ities Region. (96% of funds + project communes 10.5m co- Use of local community included in Program financing contributions 135). from DFID for capacity building). CBRIP IDA 2002- 611 communes in USD 123.4 Small-scale Highly participatory in planning (Communit (World 2007 98 districts in 13 million (USD infrastructur and management of development y-based Bank) provinces of the 102.8m IDA e activities Rural and local Central Region from loan + 20.6m Infrastructu commun Thanh Hoa Province counterpart Use of technical support from re Project) ities in the north to Binh funds and deconcentrated project management Thuan in the south local team as well as district team (68% of project contributions) Local capacity training in key communes included aspects of project management in Program 135). Key emphasis on commune and village level Use of local community contributions RIDEF UNCDF/ 1995- 122 communes in VND166.5 Small-scale Use of indicative planning figure (Rural UNDP; 2001 Quang Nam billion infrastructur Infrastructu Quang province e Extensive local planning process re Nam Technical support from district Developme province team nt Fund) MRDP SIDA / 1996- 64 communes in VND~10.5 Livelihood Village Development Budgets (Mountain Ministry 2001 five provinces billion total services, directly managed at village level to Rural of natural fund activities in integrated village Developme Agricult resource plan nt ure and managemen Program) Rural t, Training in participatory process Develop infrastructur ment e, training .% # / 5 " 1 '+. CBRIP Management 1.7% budgeted -Used at the PMB' s discretion. Project holder could be given to community monitors but not required. In Giai Xuan commune for example, villagers were elected and paid from this fund to serve on the community monitoring board. It worked to increase the seriousness of the position to the holders and villager interest in the position was high. Monitoring Community 0% budgeted -The capacity, determination, and sense of duty to community are the incentives for the community monitors. What determines these qualities is unclear and varies by commune. Technical 2% budgeted -This amount seems to be enough in communes with large population in low- lying easily accessible areas and not enough in all others. Program 135 Management Yes, budgeted ­ amount -Used at the PMBs discretion. Project holder unclear could be given to community monitors but not required. Monitoring Community 0% budgeted Technical 0% budgeted -"Independent" consultants monitor the technical aspect. The technical consultants come from district functional department such as the Industry and Commerce department in Tinh Gia district or Infrastructure and Technical department in Tan Ky district. If they are members of the district PMB as in Tan Ky they get an allowance from the 135 management budget, but it does not seem to be enough considering they are very rarely present at the project scene and often have to be requested many times to come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