50263 Dissemination note Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program No.6 August 2009 THE END IN SIGHT? Opportunities for the Disarmament & Repatriation of the FDLR in the Democratic Republic of Congo Hans Romkema De Veenhoop This note is an update of Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo - The case of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU (MDRP, June 2007) · The Congrès National pour Executive Ugandan (ADF/NALU) located in the DRC. Due to recent events, the current la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) Summary report only deals with the Rwandan armed groups of which the FDLR challenging the GoDRC: Several rounds of fighting occurred in North Kivu remains by far the most important, in between the rebels of the CNDP and This study is an update of the June terms of its negative impact on the well- the governmental forces of the DRC 2007 report Opportunities and being of the population, the economy (the FARDC). All other existing armed Constraints for the Disarmament and the political environment. groups, both local and foreign, have & Repatriation of Foreign Armed also been involved in this fighting; Groups in the Democratic Republic Since June 2007, the situation has of Congo - The cases of the FDLR, evolved with regards to the FDLR. FNL and ADF/NALU 1 published by · GoDRC negotiates an agree- Key events since then include the ment with Rwandan armed the Multi-country Demobilisation and following: Reintegration Program (MDRP). The groups: GoDRC with support of the Sant'Egidio community organised 2007 report described the main foreign · The Nairobi communiqué: armed groups in the Kivu provinces the governments of the DRC (GoDRC) of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda (GoR) signed the (DRC) and what impact these had Nairobi Communiqué in November on Congolese host communities, the 2007. In that communiqué the two 1 Hans Romkema, Opportunities and process of state-building in the DRC as governments committed to strengthen Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the well as peace, security and development their collaboration on the issue of Democratic Republic of Congo; The cases in the Great Lakes region in general. Rwandan armed groups in the DRC, of the: FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU. MDRP, including military cooperation. The June 2007. The report can be downloaded The focus of the report was on the option of temporary relocation within via the link: http://www.mdrp.org/doc_rep. htm (other reports) and hardcopies can prospects for disarmament and the DRC for disarmed group members be obtained (as long as they are in-stock) repatriation of three armed groups: was mentioned as an acceptable from the MDRP or MONUC (DDRRR section) Rwandan (FDLR), Burundian (FNL) and intermediate solution; offices in eastern DRC. www.mdrp.org 2 0 000 18243 1 8 000 16882 16193 15515 1 6 000 16556 14881 15794 14083 15257 13435 1 4 000 14344 12664 13796 11754 13082 1 2 000 11368 10788 11964 11555 11033 1 0 000 10469 8 000 6 000 4613 4 000 2582 1851 2 000 759 214 1286 0 t r n p r n p r n p r n p r n p r n p 9 Oc 02 Ma Ju Se 03 Ma Ju Se 04 Ma Ju Se 05 Ma Ju Se 06 Ma Ju Se 07 Ma Ju Se 08 r. 0 c. c. c. c. c. c. c. Ma De De De De De De De 09 Cumulative repatriation statistics © MONUC DDRRR national coordination meetings with the FDLR/FOCA2 and/or - A Comité de Pilotage was · MONUC restructuring: MONUC the Ralliement pour l'Unité et la created and tasked with devel- took a more pro-active and pragmatic Démocratie (RUD3/ RPR); meetings oping a plan to `eradicate (the pre- approach to DDRRR which resulted, took place in Pisa, Rome, and sence of) foreign armed groups.' amongst other things, in a stronger Kisangani; A first draft of this plan was presented in September 2008. presence in the field, offering more · Repatriation of disarmed The Disarmament, Demobilisa- repatriation opportunities; and cantoned RUD combatants tion, Repatriation, Rehabilitation was attempted ­ but sabotaged and Reintegration (DDRRR) sub- by the RUD military and political commission of the Committee 2 Even though the GoDRC did not enter was amongst others involved in leadership: The efforts of the GoDRC into official talks with the FDLR/FOCA since the efforts to repatriate the RUD May 2005. The meetings that happened supported by the Eglise du Christ combatants from Kasiki; were informal, either in the field or abroad, au Congo to repatriate 157 RUD and were mostly (but not exclusively) combatants4 and dependants from · Sensitisation and targeted attempts to convince the FDLR/FOCA to Kasiki (Lubero territory, North Kivu). participate in an official meeting in Rome, repatriation by the GoR: The while the RUD-RPR were to be meeting International observers participated in Rwanda Demobilisation and Reinte- in Pisa. All were then to proceed to most of those efforts but it remained a gration Commission (RDRC) further Kisangani for operational planning of the Congolese initiative; developed its communication strategy, implementation. 3 Including with the RPR and the RUD-RPR reinforced its collaboration and political would-be umbrella CND. The latter · Actions of the GoDRC: coordination with the MONUC, and may not exist anymore or never have come participated in the Joint Monitoring into being. - It sidelined or demoted Group and its task force. Furthermore 4 The aim was not just to repatriate these combatants. It was anticipated that if this a number of officials who the GoR (through the RDRC and the initiative would succeed, other RUD and supported and/or collaborated army) facilitated the repatriation of FDLR combatants, and more importantly with the FDLR/FOCA or RUD; some senior FDLR officers; complete units, would follow. 2 · UN Security Council reso- the Great Lakes Region. between Congolese officials and some lutions (SCR) clarify the UN FDLR leaders. These linkages between position: SCR 1804 was a UN The other events were certainly not the Congolese administration and the resolution in support of the Nairobi negligible but they did not have a major FDLR appear to have weakened over Communiqué, reiterating the UN impact on the statistics of the DDRRR the past two years, in part because Security Council's decision to impose a programme (see figure on page 2). The the GoDRC took measures against travel ban on the political and military repatriation of former combatants and some of the most prominent FDLR leadership of the FDLR. In SCR 1856, their dependents continued over the collaborators. Nevertheless, some of the UN Security Council decided that past two years with the same steady these associations persist and still the Disarmament and Demobilisation but slow trickle as had been the case constitute important obstacles to of foreign and Congolese armed group since 2003. The FDLR sustained its serious attempts to settle the FDLR members was the second priority of control over large parts of the North and question. the MONUC (after the protection of South Kivu provinces. Moreover, the civilians); FDLR maintained its grip on various The problem of personal relationships trades (minerals amongst others) in was circumvented during the joint · UN provides an option for the Kivu provinces and continued to operations by the combined effects the use of force against Rwandan establish themselves for the long term. of Rwanda agreeing to arrest the armed groups: In SCR 1856 the leader of the CNDP and by restricting UN Security Council implicitly This suggests that all measures other involvement in the tactical planning allowed MONUC to participate in the than the joint military operations to a small group within the Congolese involuntary disarmament of the foreign have had little impact. Non-coercive military. This precluded any of the armed group members (paragraph 3.g): measures taken up to the end of 2008 officials who might have wanted to "Disarming the foreign armed groups were too few, sometimes not the right spoil the operations from passing in order to ensure their participation ones, and therefore incomplete ­ the sensitive information on to the FDLR. in the disarmament, demobilization, carrot without the stick. In any case, repatriation, resettlement and rein- they were not sufficient to weaken the In any case, not all the recom- tegration process (DDRRR) and the tight control that the extremist FDLR mendations made in the June 2007 release of children associated with political and military leadership had report of the MDRP were instigated, those armed groups;" over its forces7. The power which the for a variety of reasons. Some of political (often based in Europe and those recommendations were not · UN panel of experts report North America) and military (FOCA) easy to implement and met several criminal activities of the FDLR: leadership exercises over the FOCA constraints (e.g., it was proposed The December 2008 report of the and FDLR in the Kivus can be con- that the GoDRC would assume a UN panel of experts noted the illegal sidered as the single most significant leading and coordinating role in the commercial activities of the FDLR constraint to disarmament and DDRRR operations while in a process and prepares the ground for a follow- repatriation. This conclusion was up report that will focus more on already drawn in the 2007 report and the leadership of the FDLR. Several can again be derived from the recent elements of the experts' report could research. also be used to build a legal case against 5 I.e. this could change if the MONUC starts the FDLR; Moreover, some major obstacles to to implement SCR 1856 and in particular the section mentioned above which allows DDRRR had not been removed until the UN Mission to participate in the forcible · Operation Umoja Wetu: The the joint operations started. These disarmament of armed groups. If that part joint operations of the FARDC and the obstacles were on one hand the of the SCR is implemented vigorously, it Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) are internal Congolese conflicts; the rivalry could potentially have another significant launched in early 2009. impact on the ground. between the GoDRC and the CNDP. 6 The impact on the strength of the FDLR On the other hand, there was the were larger still than the DDRRR statistics This last event, the joint operations, unwillingness of some parties within show as there were also 153 militiamen killed supersedes all the others in significan- the DRC administration and military during the operations. Moreover, the official DDRRR statistics do not include the 247 ce and impact 5. These operations not to act in unconditional support of the combatants that were repatriated without only had the most obvious effect on disarmament and repatriation process passing through the MONUC transit facilities. rate of disarmament and repatriation6 of foreign armed groups. The reasons 7 See the comprehensive report by Rakiya and the threat levels upon the FDLR for resisting the official government Omaar on "The Leadership of Rwandan Armed Groups Abroad with a Focus on and other Rwandan rebel groups in policy of actively pursuing DDRRR the FDLR and RUD/Urunana" (for the the DRC, but they also marked a are complex but suggest continuing Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration striking shift in political relations in personal or business relationships Commission; http://www.rdrc.org.rw/ ). 3 of recovering from over a decade of forces was the only intervention internationally sponsored, and war). Moreover, internal divisions (due that had a significant impact on the financed, peace initiative in the DRC. to conflicts of political and economic repatriation statistics thus far. interests) and both structural and managerial weaknesses prevented the The biggest constraint for the Recommendations otherwise well improved efforts of disarmament and repatriation of the GoDRC in becoming successful. the Rwandan armed groups from What we have learned from the past In turn, international partners were Congolese territory is the tight control two years is that in order to dismantle by the leadership over their respective the Rwandan armed groups a concer- urged to act decisively and in a forces. As long as the control structures ted effort of all parties at all levels is concerted manner, both with respect to (military and civilian security services, necessary. their support to the DDRRR operation on the ground and the prosecution military police) function, rank and of the political leadership of the file members will be prevented from Military Operations Rwandan rebel groups in Europe, defecting in fear of their lives (although evidence suggests that the majority If these are continued in an effort North America and Africa. wants to return unconditionally to to dismantle the FDLR's and RUD's Rwanda9). command and control structures, In particular the prosecution of a number of steps should be taken FDLR and RUD leadership has not including the following: occurred. On the one hand, this was The command and control structures due to the difficulty of making a of the FDLR and RUD can only be weakened by prosecuting the leadership · A much tighter regime of discipline judicially sound case linking the FDLR on FARDC troops and sanction of those abroad and through targeted military leadership to war crimes and crimes who commit crimes against the civilian operations. Without these measures, against humanity in the Great Lakes population; the MONUC DDRRR section and its Region. On the other hand, many partners will not be able to achieve observers believe that the prosecution much more than what they have done · If discipline of FARDC troops of Rwandan rebel leaders is a low has not improved, the GoDRC should over the past years (i.e. repatriate on priority in many European countries. consider holding back the FARDC an individual basis those Rwandans Some have suggested that lobby groups, from any military operations. Their who managed to escape from rebel not only within the Rwandan refugee control). indiscipline has so far only strength- community, but also some European ened the FDLR and made it easier for and North American civil society them to operate among the people; By becoming more mobile, increasing organisations and the press8, managed the number of transit facilities, to create confusion to the extent especially in remote locations, and · MONUC should be part of the of influencing the decisions of Euro- by adding more staff to the MONUC joint GoDRC and GoR planning; pean and North American prosecutors DDRRR section, it may be possible to and legislators. A number of the people repatriate slightly higher numbers of · Additional logistical support interviewed even insinuated that defectors, but when no other measures should be provided in terms of there is considerable sympathy for are taken, this will never lead to mass airlift, intelligence gathering and the FDLR amongst some civil society repatriation. The MONUC DDRRR communications capacity. organisations and members of the section cannot dismantle the FDLR on judiciary. its own. It is working against an active and intelligently led organisation with 8 Several independent sources told the Conclusions political/military objectives and a strongly vested interest in collective author that some of the main (European) press agencies appear to have sympathy for the FDLR. This cannot be verified. survival. This organisation is already Over the past two years, there have However, what certainly is the case is that showing signs of expanding the range some of the press agencies (the RFI and the been several promising developments of its activities and may eventually BBC in particular) provide the FDLR with a with regard to the DDRRR operation. become so well entrenched as a platform. They are asked to comment on Most noticeably were the pro-active clandestine force that it assumes any major event in the Great Lakes Region without being questioned about their own approaches of both MONUC and Mafiosi dimensions. It could well negative role in it. The FDLR leadership in the GoDRC. This created several continue to derail the peace process Europe uses these interviews to motivate its opportunities for repatriation but in the Great Lakes Region as it has troops and the civilians in the DRC's forest unfortunately the impact on the for the past 15 years. At this point, it zones, as well as its sympathisers elsewhere. 9 Of the 157 RUD members in the Kasiki repatriation statistics was only limited. is clear that the FDLR also continues camp, over 95% wanted to be repatriated Operation Umoja Wetu of the com- to undermine the credibility of UN unconditionally but they were prevented bined Rwandan and Congolese armed peacekeeping efforts and the entire from doing so by the leadership. 4 Legal Action GoR in addressing the foreign armed provincial government should proceed groups; and plan inclusive DDRRR coordination If legal proceedings are initiated meetings as they proposed in the in the international and national · Ensure that MONUC military DDRRR training that was organised in jurisdictions, then judicial authorities planning includes joint intelligence February 2009 in Goma. should make use of: collection and processing with MONUC DDRRR; The GoDRC should: · The past and ongoing work of the Panel of Experts; · Find a way to provide the DDRRR · Instruct all its officials to support sections of both North and South Kivu the actions of the MONUC DDRRR · The work undertaken by Rakiya with stand-by protection units (military section; Omaar for the Rwanda Demobilisation or police) of their own and formalised and Reintegration Commission; liaison with MONUC military forces · Instruct all officials, in particu- so that problems of inter-operability lar the military, police and the admi- · Reports and archives of human and cooperation in the tasks of nistration, to do everything in their rights organisations and MONUC; identifying and targeting key leaders ability to repatriate as many foreign are eliminated. armed group members as possible. · Information collected by intel- Amongst others, they should learn ligence organisations of the GoDRC · Increase the number of transit what to do if they encounter armed and the GoR. facilities and logistics support to them group members who do not want to be to support rapid extraction, especially repatriated. In addition, they should also send in remote locations; investigators to the Great Lakes The MDRP/TDRP 10 should continue region. The repatriated ex-combatants · Properly planned and imple- and several people involved in the the DDRRR training sessions such as mented media information operations DDRRR operation possess a wealth aimed at communicating the character the one organised in February 2009 in of information. In locations like and behaviour of Rwandan rebel Goma. These trainings should not only Bunyakiri, Walikale, Lubero, Mwenga, movements operating in DRC. The be organised on the provincial level but it should be possible to find further aim of this information operation should also be extended to most of the evidence of crimes committed by the should be to end international sympa- territories. As it can easily be linked FDLR. There are also several people thy for armed groups responsible for to the DDRRR trainings, the MDRP/ who can establish links between the so many war crimes and crimes against TDRP may want to consider funding FDLR leadership in Europe and North humanity in DRC. the development of a local information America and the crimes committed in and sensitisation network. the field. International partners can further Disarmament, Demobi- facilitate the DDRRR work by: Additional lization, Repatriation, · Providing the MONUC DDRRR measures section with fully equipped helicopters. Reinsertion and Currently DDRRR officials often · All parties should deliver the Reintegration cannot respond to a repatriation same consistent message to the FDLR opportunity due to the lack of navigation and RUD along the lines of: "You have (DDRRR) equipment; spent enough time in the DRC. You have got to lay down your arms and if MONUC management, the UN · Funding an increase in the staff of you don't want to be repatriated, you Secretariat and the UN Security the MONUC DDRRR section; will be relocated in the DRC but there Council should: is no other option than to disarm." · Providing a few platoons of well It is particularly important that the · Increase considerably the staff of equipped and highly trained military GoDRC instructs its local officials on the MONUC DDRRR section. The fact or police tasked with the protection of DDRRR missions; this subject; that less than 1% of the MONUC staff is tasked with the second most important objective of the entire mission seems · Funding and providing technical out of balance; support of a local information and 10 The Transitional Demobilization and Rein- sensitisation network. tegration Program - TDRP - is a new program · Ensure that MONUC participates established by the World Bank with donor in joint planning of the GoDRC and The MONUC DDRRR section and the support, following the closure of the MDRP. 5 · The GoDRC and the inter- national partners should develop Acronyms a strategy for temporary relocation of disarmed former armed group members. The donors should make ADF Allied Democratic Forces (Ugandan armed the necessary funds available and the group) GoDRC should communicate the need for such a measure clearly to the CND Congrès National pour la Démocratie population; CNDP Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, · With help of the international Rehabilitation and Reintegration partners, the GoDRC should make DRC Democratic Republic of Congo an effort to make an end to the proliferation of local Congolese armed FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique groups in the Kivu provinces; du Congo (the GoDRC army after 2003) FNL Forces Nationales pour la Libération · The GoDRC and the inter- FDLR Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du national DDRRR partners should Rwanda be skeptical towards FDLR dissidents FOCA Forces Combattants Abacunguzi (military wing who say they are interested in of the FDLR) repatriation but who advance several conditions. Small groups should not GoDRC Government of the DRC receive much attention, and when the GoR Government of Rwanda group is not just constituted of young JMG Joint Monitoring Group soldiers or civilians, the chances are considerable that the efforts will prove MDRP Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration to be in vain; Programme MONUC United Nations Mission in the DRC · The international media NALU National Army for the Liberation of Uganda should be careful not to provide a RDF Rwandan Defence Forces (name of the army of free forum for the FDLR and RUD the GoR since 2002) leadership allowing them to address their troops (of whom many have short- RDRC Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration wave radios). Several reports from the Commission field showed that these interviews help RPR Rassemblement Populaire Rwandais the leadership to tighten their grip RUD Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie on the militiamen and civilians in the Kivu. Such interviews should ideally SCR Security Council Resolution not take place anymore, but if they UN United Nations happen then journalists should at least UNSC UN Security Council ask some critical questions about the role of the FDLR or RUD. This report was commissioned by the Secretariat of the MDRP. The author accepts full responsibility for this report. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the MDRP Secretariat or any partner of the MDRP. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is a multi-agency effort that supports the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region of Central Africa. MDRP is financed by the World Bank and 13 donors ­ Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Commission. It collaborates with national governments and commissions, and with over 30 partner organizations, including United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. 6