Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00001906 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-38560) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.9 MILLION (US$14.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER FOR A FINANCIAL SECTOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT June 30, 2011 Finance and Private Sector Development Department West/Central Africa Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2010) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) CFAF 1.00 = US$0.002 US$ 1.00 = 1.59 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ARSM Agence de Régulation et de Supervision de la Microfinance (Microfinance Regulatory and Supervisory Agency) BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats d'Afrique de I’ Ouest (Central Bank of West African States) BCN Banque Commerciale du Niger CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCP Centre des Chèques Postaux CDN Crédit du Niger CIMA Conference Inter-Africaine des Marchés d’Assurance CNE Caisse Nationale d’épargne CNSS Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (National Social Security Institution) CPCT Caisse de Prêt aux Collectivités Territoriales IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Fund ISR Implementation Status Report KPI Key Performance Indicator MCEPEC Mouvement des Caisses Populaires d'Epargne et de Crédit MFI Microfinance Institutions MTR Mid Term Review NIA Nigérienne d 'Assurance et de Réassurance ONPE Office Nationale des Postes et de l’Épargne PCU Project Management Unit PDO Project Development Objectives PPF Project Preparation Facility PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSAC Niger Public Sector Adjustment Credit SME Small and Medium-size Enterprise SONIDEP Société Nigérienne de Distribution de Produits Pétroliers SONITEL Société Nigérienne de Télécommunications (Telecommunications Company) TA Technical Assistance QAG Quality Assurance Group ii Vice President: Obiageli Ezekwesili Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Sector Manager: Paul Noumba Um Project Team Leader: Korotoumou Ouattara ICR Team Leader: Magueye Dia iii NIGER Financial Sector Technical Assistance CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ........................................................1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .......................................................5 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...................................................................................................10 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome .................................................................13 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..............................................................14 6. Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................16 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...................17 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...........................................................................................18 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ..................................................................................................19 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................................22 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes .............................23 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................................25 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...................................................................26 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................................27 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................................33 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................................34 Map 35 iv A. Basic Information Financial Sector Country: Niger Project Name: Technical Assistance Project Project ID: P074316 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-38560 ICR Date: 03/30/2011 ICR Type: Core ICR Technical Assistance Government of Niger Lending Instrument: Borrower: Loan (GON) Original Total XDR 10.9 million Disbursed Amount: XDR 7.9 million Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 9.4 million Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Finance Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/17/2002 Effectiveness: 08/26/2004 08/26/2004 Appraisal: 04/18/2003 Restructuring(s): Approval: 02/19/2004 Mid-term Review: 01/15/2007 Closing: 04/30/2008 12/31/2010 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Quality at Entry: Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Implementing Moderately Quality of Supervision: Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Unsatisfactory Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Unsatisfactory Performance: Unsatisfactory Performance: v C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Quality at Entry Project at any time Yes Moderately Satisfactory (QEA): (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Unsatisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Banking 30 30 Compulsory pension and unemployment insurance 5 5 Housing finance and real estate markets 20 20 Micro- and SME finance 15 15 Postal services 30 30 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Legal institutions for a market economy 17 17 Other financial and private sector development 33 33 Rural markets 17 17 Social risk mitigation 16 16 State enterprise/bank restructuring and privatization 17 17 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Diariatou Gaye Sector Manager: Paul Noumba Um Gerard A. Byam Project Team Leader: Korotoumou Ouattara André Ryba ICR Team Leader: Magueye Dia ICR Primary Author: Magueye Dia vi F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The global objective of the project is to improve the efficiency, reach and depth of the Niger financial system so that it can fulfill its important role of contributing to growth and poverty reduction. (a) PDO Indicators Original Target Formally Actual Value Achieved Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised Target at Completion or approval documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1: Cost of financial intermediation (spread between lending rate and deposit rate) reduced. Value (quantitative or 8.9% 8% 8.3% qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2001 12/31/2010 12/31/2010 Comments End of project target (incl. % not achieved. achievement) Indicator 2: Financial depth (M2/GDP) increases Value (quantitative or 15.82% 18% 21.86% qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2004 12/31/2010 06/30/2010 Comments End of project target (incl. % met and exceeded. achievement) Indicator 3 : Share of private sector credit to GDP increases Value (quantitative or 6.85% 13% 14.03% qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 12/31/2010 Comments End of project target (incl. % met. achievement) Indicator 4: Efficiency of banks (Profit/loan portfolio) increases Value (quantitative or 10.5% 12% 10.3% qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2008 12/31/2010 Latest available Comments information. (incl. % End of project target achievement) likely to be met. vii (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicators Actual Value Original Target Formally Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised Target Completion or Target approval documents) Values Years The Civil and commercial procedures code amended based on the 2007 study on justice Indicator 1: and financial institutions and cost of enforcing contracts (% claim) decreases Value (quantitative or 42.0% 40% 59.6% qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2004 06/30/2010 12/31/2009 Doing Business report Comments data. (incl. % End of project target achievement) unlikely to be met. Indicator 2: Cost of registering property (% of property value) decreases Value (quantitative or 12.5% 10% 11% qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 12/31/2009 Doing Business report Comments data. (incl. % End of project target achievement) unlikely to be met. Indicator 3 : CDN housing loans to clients increase Value (quantitative or CFAF 257 million F CFA 295 million CFAF 257 million qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 12/31/2010 Baseline data. Target not met. CDN not operational. Comments Privatization (incl. % process failed. Selected achievement) majority shareholder was unable to obtain from a license to operate. Indicator 4: Number of annual supervision missions conducted by the supervisory agency increases Value (quantitative or 0 6 14 qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2001 12/31/2010 11/11/2008 Comments ARSM data. (incl. % End of project target achievement) met and exceeded. Indicator 5: Total number of MFI clients/members increases Value (quantitative or 124,177 300,000 400,754 qualitative) 12/31/2008 Date achieved 10/31/2004 12/31/2010 viii Actual Value Original Target Formally Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised Target Completion or Target approval documents) Values Years Latest available data. End of project target Comments met and (incl. % exceeded. achievement) End of project target unlikely to be met. Indicator 6: Number of female MFI clients/members increases Value (quantitative or 62,172 170,000 231,860 qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 12/31/2008 Comments Latest available data. (incl. % End of project target achievement) met and exceeded. Indicator 7 : Value of deposit (current and savings) accounts at MFIs increases Value (quantitative or CFAF 3,389.62 million F CFA 8,000 million CFAF 9,290 million qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 12/31/2008 Comments Latest available data. (incl. % End of project likely to achievement) be met. Indicator 8: Number of accounts at Postal Bank increases Value (quantitative or 120,000 135,000 120,000 qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 11/11/2008 Baseline Data. Comments Target not met. (incl. % Government has achievement) renounced to create a Postal Bank. Indicator 9: CNSS current deficit declines Value (quantitative or CFAF 1.6 billion CFAF 0.5 billion CFAF 3.6 billion qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 12/31/2010 Latest available data from CNSS. Actuarial study and audit of CNSS Comments has been completed. (incl. % However, achievement) implementation of recommendations will take place after the closure of the project. Indicator 10: Number of people participating in capacity building events Value 0 900 1135 ix Actual Value Original Target Formally Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised Target Completion or Target approval documents) Values Years (quantitative or qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2010 11/30/2010 Comments End of project target (incl. % met and exceeded. achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 05/27/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 12/15/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.44 3 06/30/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.46 4 12/30/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.14 5 04/14/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.67 6 06/29/2006 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.92 7 12/29/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.26 8 05/31/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.49 9 12/20/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.91 10 06/19/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.21 11 12/17/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.16 Moderately Moderately 12 06/29/2009 9.49 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 13 12/28/2009 10.17 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 14 05/31/2010 10.41 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 15 01/04/2011 12.29 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory H. Restructuring N/A x I. Disbursement Profile xi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. At the time of appraisal, the limited reach and capacity of the financial sector in Niger was seen as a major constraint to economic development. The financial sector, which was composed of eight commercial banks, four insurance companies, 178 micro-finance institutions, postal financial services, a social security institution, three stock brokers and a stock exchange, had the following features: - The banking sector which accounted for 62 percent of the sector’s total assets of the sector was fragile and highly concentrated. Banks mainly offered short term credits which were concentrated in the service and trade sectors, followed by mining. Capacity was very low and bank personnel at all levels were poorly trained and lacked knowledge of bank operations. - The development of microfinance institutions was somewhat haphazard, driven by support from donors, who intervened without much coordination. Financial cooperatives suffered from weak internal structures and a lack of professional staff. Their experience with loan recovery was mixed and their reach left much to be desired. - The postal checking services, which could play an important role in a mostly rural country, conducted limited activities; while the postal savings bank had altogether ceased operations. - None of the insurance companies met all of the prudential norms set up by Conference Inter-Africaine des Marchés d’Assurance (CIMA), the regional regulator. The two largest companies were in need of a substantial recapitalization and the newest companies suffered from poor management and a weak financial position. - There were almost no operations in the Niamey segment of the regional stock exchange; nor had much been done to familiarize the population with the operations and with the possibilities offered by the stock exchange. - The social security institution suffered from a lack of autonomy from the State, absence of separate management of branches, excessive operating costs and structural deficits. 2. Financial sector restructuring and deepening was discussed in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) presented to the Board in 2003. The CAS identified ―[a] weak financial sector [that] does not allow for adequate mobilization of domestic resources, nor for financing of private sector and rural development, housing, health care or education." The project was included in the lending program outlined in the CAS. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) recognized the need to strengthen its cross-cutting role so that it can provide support for all sectors of economic activity. A two phase process was considered necessary to restore a healthy and competitive financial sector and an environment conducive to financial sector development. Phase I entailed efforts to stabilize the financial sector and strengthen the legal and judicial environment. Phase II, which was managed by 1 the project, largely involved developing intermediate financial intermediation of proximity (postal financial services and micro-finance) as well as developing the social security system and capacity building. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 3. The original development objective of the project was to improve the efficiency, reach and depth of the Niger financial system so that it could contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction. The specific objectives were to: i) improve the efficiency of the banking system and the insurance industry in the support of private sector and household needs; ii) increase the number of financial institutions of proximity and their clientele; and iii) improve the capacity of the financial sector to deliver financial services. 4. These objectives would be measured by the following indicators: i) increase in financial depth; ii) reduction in cost of financial intermediation; iii) increased number of healthy Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs); and iv) increase in customer satisfaction. The output consisted of diagnostic studies to help formulate appropriate reform strategies, adoption of new laws and judicial reforms pertaining to financial sector development and institutional restructuring and capacity building for financial industry key stakeholders. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 5. The project’s objectives were not revised, but the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were formally amended twice. In April 2008, a Level II restructuring of the project took place with the first extension of the closing date, during which the results framework and key performance indicators were revised, as the Government agreed on three additional benchmarks against which progress would be assessed at project completion. In June 2009, the performance indicators were again revised in response to the Quality Assurance Group (QAG)’s review in December, 2008. To enhance alignment with PDO, the quality assessment recommended that the existing indicators be strengthened in terms of expected outcomes, and that capacity-building activities be better assessed. In addition, mandatory core performance indicators were subsequently added to the KPIs. 6. Following the above mentioned revision, Project Benefits were measured through an assessment of the following PDO indicators: i) increase in financial depth, ii) increase in efficiency of banks, iii) increased share of private sector credit to GDP; and iv) reduction in cost of financial intermediation. A summary of the different revisions is provided in Table 1. Table 1: Original and revised PDO indicators 1 PDO Indicators Original Revised Increased Financial Depth M2/GDP x continued Increase in Ratio of Private Sector Credit to GDP Added in 2008 Decrease in Cost of Financial Intermediation x continued Increase in Efficiency of banks (Profit/Loan portfolio) Added in 2009 Increase in number of healthy Micro Finance x dropped Institutions. (by 15 percent over the life of the project). Improvement in Customer Satisfaction over the life of x dropped the project 2 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 7. Primary target groups were population and institutional categories whose needs were not catered to by the financial sector. It included least favored groups, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and rural communities. By promoting a more diversified and deeper financial sector with increased reach, the project aimed to contribute to economic growth, private sector development and employment creation. By extending the reach of the sector through larger geographic penetration and better adapted products, the project was expected to contribute to poverty alleviation. Consumers were to have improved access to greater and more efficient financial services. In particular, the creation of the postal bank (FINAPOSTE) and the strengthening of microfinance institutions were intended to provide people of all walks of life with the resources they required (through better access to their own savings or through small credits) for the purchase of essential goods and services, school supplies, malaria treatment, etc. Businesses -- large and small -- were to benefit from better sources of financing and from insurance against a variety of risks (accident, theft, fire, etc.). Finally, the project was expected to benefit the Government indirectly by increasing its fiscal resources because of the increased financial and economic activity it would generate. 1.5 Original Components 8. The project was originally implemented through six components: (a) strengthening of the environment within which financial institutions operate; (b) restructuring of the banking sector; (c) development of financial intermediation of proximity; (d) social security reform; (e) capacity building; and (f) project management. Component 1 - Strengthening of the environment. (US$1.87 million) 9. Activities aimed at strengthening the environment included: - Funding for consultants to assist with i) the legislative changes required to allow issuing land titles on vacant properties, ii) the development of guarantees better adapted to rural areas, and iii) the strengthening of urban and rural land registries; - Funding for actions included in the multi-donor reform program and directly related to the financial sector (training of magistrates, lawyers, bailiffs on financial sector issues, seminar on justice and financial institutions, modernization of the judiciary record); - Funding for the publication and diffusion of the third edition of the official Gazette; - Funding for a consultant to conduct a study on the constraints to SME financing, and for the implementation of some of the recommendation. Component 2 - Banking restructuring (US$1.61 million) 10. Through this component, the project set out to monitor progress with the restructuring of two banks already underway when the project was prepared, but its main focus was on Crédit du Niger (CDN) and Caisse de Prêt aux Collectivités Térritoriales (CPCT) (technical assistance and payment of rights of dismissed workers). Additionally, the project sought to finance the preparation of a social housing financing strategy and participate in the first phase of its implementation. 3 Component 3 - Development of financial intermediation of proximity (US$4.355 million) 11. Through this component, the project aimed to assist with: - The implementation of key recommendations of the financial and organizational audits of the main MFIs undertaken under the Project Preparation Facility (PPF); - The strengthening of the supervisory microfinance unit: (a) financing technical assistance for two years to help organize the unit, define its work program and developing procedure manuals; conduct with unit staff on-and off-site supervision; transfer skills to unit staff; (b) purchase of equipment; and (c) training of unit staff; - The restructuring of the post office, and its associated costs (technical assistance payment of rights of dismissed workers and equipment) and creation of FINAPOSTE. Component 4 - Social security reform (US$0.85 million) 12. Under the social security reform component the project was to finance an actuarial audit, technical assistance to implement some of the audit recommendations and the payment of rights of Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS) laid-off workers. Component 5 - Capacity building (US$2.42 million) 13. The project was to fund training for commercial banks and insurance companies (50 percent of costs), training of staff at the microfinance unit within the Ministry of Finance, at the post office, and at the postal financial services subsidiary. The project was to also fund a resident adviser for the Minister of Finance, provide assistance to the Departments of Insurance and Credit at the Ministry, to the bankers' association and contribute to the reinsertion programs of dismissed workers under other components. Component 6 - Project management (US$1.245 million) 14. This component covered salaries, and other operating expenses of the project management unit as well as some training for project staff. 1.6 Revised Components 15. Project components were never formally revised. However, components 3 and 5 have been altered as follows: - With the early closure in June 2007 of the IFAD-funded project which was providing assistance to main MFIs networks, the project extended its support to the microfinance sector. As such, audits of several microfinance networks and institutions have been completed; training and equipment were provided to MFIs and the professional microfinance (ANIP-MF); (component 3 and 5) - Dialogue with the Government allowed the team to convince the authorities to go beyond strengthening of the microfinance unit and to create an autonomous institution dedicated to the oversight of the booming microfinance sector. The Microfinance Regulatory and Supervisory Agency Agence de Régulation et de Supervision de la Microfinance (ARSM) was hence created in lieu of strengthening the existing microfinance unit within the Ministry of Economy and Finance (component 3 ) 4 1.7 Other significant changes 16. The project closing date was extended twice, as follows:  Extension No. 1: 24-month extension from April 2008 to April 2010: The project had experienced delays in completing the restructuring of the CDN, the CPCT and FINAPOSTE. The Government of Niger submitted to IDA a request for closing date extension setting out a timeline for completing the remaining activities within two years and including the following benchmarks/outcomes against which progress would be assessed at the end of 12 months of the project extension: (i) The Postal Bank (FINAPOSTE) would have been fully established, particularly; (ii) deposits frozen since 1992 would be then liquid, and all depositors would have gained access to their accounts; (iii) FINAPOSTE would provide saving and payment services using the 55 postal branches to increase access to finance in financially underserved areas; (iv) The Microfinance Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (ARSM) would be strengthened with required staffing and capacity to supervise and monitor microfinance institutions (MFIs) efficiently and would be able to adequately perform 10 on site inspection missions per year; and (v) the local communities' bank (CPCT) would have been restructured and resumed its activities of mobilizing and providing funds to the local communities as agreed during the Mid Term Review. Following extension of project closing date and to accompany the project new focus on outcome, the Government requested a reallocation of credit proceeds which was agreed to by the International Development Association (IDA).  Extension No. 2: 8-month extension from April 2010 to December 2010: The military coup in February 2010 triggered the Bank’s OP 7.30 policy and delayed a number of planned activities. This second extension was mainly provided to allow the project to respect its contractual obligations vis-à-vis private sector firms and consultants. However the project was also given the opportunity to build on the new momentum at the Ministry of Finance to revive the dialogue on financial sector issues in general and make further progress towards the attainment of project development objectives. In practice, some progress was made but not enough to meet all development objectives. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 17. Relevance of Objectives is High. The global objective of the project was to improve the efficiency, reach and depth of the Niger financial system so that it could fulfill its important role of contributing to growth and poverty reduction. At the time of the project preparation, the 2003 CAS for Niger considered the weakness in the financial sector as one of the main issues that needed to be addressed in order to create conducive conditions for economic development in Niger. To that end, an assistance to reform the financial sector prominently figured in the lending program of the CAS. In addition, the PRSP emphasized the cross-cutting role of the financial sector and the strong need to address its weaknesses so that it can help unlock the high potential of some sectors of economic activity in Niger. The 5 technical underpinnings of this project were financial sector reviews that identified the salient issues in the sector that needed to be addressed through the strengthening of the environment, the stabilization and deepening of the financial sector. Therefore, the objectives of the project were clearly relevant. 18. Design was too ambitious and complex. The scope of the project was too broad given the low institutional capacity within both the Government and the financial sector, and also given the country’s poor track record in terms of reforms. Project design at entry encompassed too many reforms, most of which were under the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. This was despite the fact that past Government commitments to undertake some of the same reforms included in the project had never been followed by action. By way of illustration, well before project inception, the Government of Niger had repeatedly failed to restructure the CDN, despite several commitments to do so, as expressed in its letters of economic policy to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The failed attempt to privatize SONIDEP was another indication that the Government did not consider privatization as the preferred instrument to deal with public enterprises. In retrospect, it would have been more efficient to have a more focused operation (e.g. addressing the banking sector issues), to enhance chances of success and to build the needed momentum to engage the other reforms through subsequent programs. 19. Risk assessment and mitigation measures were inadequate. The Bank team properly identified some of the important risks but failed to provide adequate mitigating measures or raise some other risks.  The critical risks from outputs to objectives: ―Macro-economic stability is not maintained‖ and ―Government resolve to pursue financial sector reform is weakening‖ were adequately identified. However, the rating of the risk assessment as ―Modest‖ was too optimistic for the latter given the above-mentioned poor track record of the country. Instead, the team should have rated the risk of reduced government commitment to the reform of the financial sector as ―High‖ and elaborated more on mitigation measures that were more commensurate with the risks presented and its potential negative effect on meeting the PDO. Linking implementation of some of the reforms to a DPL was also an option that could have helped mitigate the risk of a reduced government commitment for reforms, which the team did not initially consider.  Similarly, though the risks from component to outputs were adequately recognized by the team, assessment of some of them was not candid and/or the proposed mitigation measures were not adequate. For instance, the risk of slippage in the restructuring process of Office Nationale des Postes et de l’Épargne (ONPE) was flagged as moderate, while the context and recent history of ONPE clearly indicated that this risk was more substantial.1 Other business models such as partnerships at product level 1 ONPE was established in 1996 as a result of the split of the telecom company from the post office. It brought under one roof the postal and postal financial services including the postal savings bank (Caisse Nationale d’Epargne) and the postal checking services (Comptes des Chèques Postaux). This initial reform left a lot of bitterness and feelings of injustice among the staff and management of ONPE. Indeed, both rightfully considered that the allocation of resources between the two new entities (SONITEL and ONPE) was unfair and put at serious risk the future of the postal services. Following this restructuring, SONITEL was allocated with the most valuable assets of the parent company, while ONPE only inherited the liabilities. For this reason, it was foreseeable that any new attempt to deprive the Postal Services with what was considered as its unique asset (financial services) would probably trigger serious resistance from the staff and management. 6 between the post office and a bank to distribute its products were much more adapted to the situation of ONPE and would have certainly triggered much less resistance. The mitigation measure ―Ensure the compensation of dismissed workers has been paid and maintain dialogue with stakeholders‖, concretely addressed concerns of workers that would be laid-off but ignored concerns of remaining staff regarding the future and viability of Niger Poste.  The risk that counterpart funds would be lacking and the project could experience delays had been flagged by the team as Substantial. However, to ensure that the Government would inscribe these funds in the budget and make them available as needed, the team relied on discussions with the Government without providing for any mitigating measures. At implementation, when this risk did materialize the Bank team had no leverage to convince the Government to respect its commitments and no instrument to help resolve the resource-gap for the envisioned reforms. Given the budget constraints faced by the Government at the time of preparation, the project could well have allocated part of the credit proceeds to the funding of certain prerequisite measures to ensure success of the reforms. This would have relieved the already strained public resources and mitigated the risks of delays in reforms implementation. 20. Lessons learned from previous operations were not fully taken into account. A key lesson of the Public Sector Adjustment Credit to the Government of Niger was that, in an environment characterized by the Government's weak institutional and implementation capacity, along with an unstable political situation, it is important to keep a reform program design simple. With a reform program spanning over three different subsectors and articulated around six components the design of this operation did not take this key lesson from the Niger Public Sector Adjustment Credit (PSAC) into account. 21. The team recognized the following three key lessons from past Bank projects: (i) the need to support the macro-economic reforms by micro-economic actions; (ii) the need to involve key stakeholders in the early stage of project preparation; (iii) that financial sector reforms are time consuming and necessitate a realistic timetable. Despite this, some of the project’s characteristics indicate that these lessons were not fully incorporated into its design:  The implementation timetable was unrealistic: The original closing date only allowed four years of implementation, which - given the country context and the nature of the proposed reforms - was obviously not long enough.  Consensus-building was not completely achieved during project preparation. It seemed that labor unions did not fully endorse the proposed reform of Niger Poste at project inception. This led to symbolic acts of protest such as the boycott of the meeting the Bank team convened in Paris during preparation to bring together key actors of the reform and some acts of passive resistance during implementation of activities of this sub-component. 22. Stakeholder analysis was incomplete. Involvement of line ministries is usually critical in reforming subsectors considered as social services or public good such as pension schemes or postal services. The project design however paid little attention to the importance of the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of Public Administration (respective line ministries for of Niger Poste and CNSS). Their involvement was necessary not only to ensure continued government commitment and ownership of the reforms but also 7 to influence the management of these two entities for a diligent implementation of activities. The Steering Committee was the institutional vehicle for that purpose. However neither of these two ministries was represented as statutory members of this committee. After the Mid- Term review, the composition of the committee was amended and full membership extended to the Ministry of Communication, the Ministry of Public Administration and the Ministry in charge of Decentralization, which was taking care of the administrative oversight of CPCT. 23. No committed champions were identified for subsectors to be reformed. Government ownership was mainly based on the strong commitment for reforms of the Minister of Finance during project preparation. No other champion was identified by the team to broaden support to the project activities at the Government level. 2.2 Implementation 24. The overall project implementation encountered significant delays due to slow decision-making on the Government’s side, exacerbated by difficult country conditions (see below). Delays in project implementation translated into a disbursement lag that reached 36 months. 25. A restructuring of the project to drop the FINAPOSTE activity and reallocate funds to other activities was recommended by the Mid Term Review (MTR) (recommendation reiterated by the December, 2007 supervision mission) and later supported by the 2008 Bank-IMF FSAP, despite which project content and structure were never amended. The Government of Niger strongly resisted the recommendation, and instead committed to have FINAPOSTE licensed as a bank by end of 2008. As such, despite facing noticeable implementation difficulties, the project only underwent Level II restructurings to adjust some of the key performance indicators, reallocate funds and extend the closing date (twice), which proved insufficient to enable it to achieve its developmental objectives. An assessment by QAG in December 2008 rated the quality of implementation as moderately unsatisfactory, pointing to the Government’s failure to undertake many of the agreed actions, and to weak follow up. Against this background, the second closing date extension (eight months extension from April to December 2010, following the military coup) did prove to be marginally useful, as – under a new Minister of Finance - some key activities could be finalized (including strengthening of ARSM; financial Audits of some microfinance institutions and of CCP/CNE; and finalization of the actuarial study of the private pension system (CNSS), but was not long enough to allow the project to demonstrate significantly improved performance. 26. Factors beyond the Government’s control affected the country’s political and economic situation and had an impact on the overall implementation of the program. These included:  Political turmoil and military coup. In February 2010, Niger went through a military coup that ousted President Tandja. This was the consequence of two years of political turmoil and economic disruption fostered by President Tandja’s push for a change in the constitution to allow him to stand for a third term. This resulted in a transition period that ended April 2011.  Persistent domestic insurgency. A persistent insurgency in the north of the country was the focus of the Government’s attention and resources during the period of the project and contributed to weaken its commitment for reform. 8  Recurrent food crisis. Niger experienced two severe food crises (drought induced) in 2008 and 2010, which commanded the full attention of the Government and contributed to serious budget stringency. 27. Factors within the Government’s control that contributed to delays in completing reforms (and hence meeting the PDOs) included:  Loss of reform champion. During project preparation, the Minister of Finance proved to be a strong champion of the financial sector reform program. However, right after effectiveness, the Minister left the Government. The loss of the main champion seriously affected the implementation of the reforms, in particular of the postal services, CDN and pension scheme.  High turnover at the Ministry of Communication: Five different Ministers of Communication were appointed during project implementation. This introduced an element of instability within the line Ministry that affected the continuity required to build ownership of the proposed reform of ONPE and create an effective champion for reform implementation.  Lack of needed resources to implement the reforms: The Government repeatedly failed to include in the budget and make available the needed funds that it had committed to provide for the following activities: i) payment of the postal debts of Niger Poste, and ii) payment of the capital of FINAPOSTE.  Ineffective Project Steering Committee. During the project’s life, the committee did not provide the effective oversight it was expected to deliver. It lacked proactivity and was unable to ensure continued ownership of the reforms by the key stakeholders. Moreover, the Government’s tendency to bypass the steering committee and set up ad hoc committees to deal with specific issues arising during implementation contributed to further undermine its credibility and its authority. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 2.3.1 M&E design 28. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The M&E framework at entry had shortcomings, especially problems in attributing results for many of the indicators directly to the project (e.g. for interest rate spreads, which are a function of various cost and margin factors; or financial sector depth and credit to private sector, which are similarly influenced by a number of factors, micro and macro). As such, the framework did not provide the grounds to allow an accurate measurement of project specific contribution to achievement of its developmental objectives. 2.3.2 M&E Implementation 29. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. In response to the recommendations of the 2008 QAG review, the team introduced in 2009 a revised set of indicators. At that time, the quality of the data provided was satisfactory and the source was deemed adequate. However, submission of the updated KPIs was problematic and overall quality of the progress reports was mixed. The Project Management Unit (PCU) did not provide proper follow-up for the 9 impact evaluation survey of the capacity building component. As a consequence, the survey encountered significant delays. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 30. Safeguards: The project primarily aimed at providing technical support to the government financial sector adjustment program. As such it was a Category C project which triggered no safeguard policies. 31. Financial management: The overall performance of the project financial management is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The project complied overall with the covenants stated in the loan agreement. The financial audits were submitted on time and issues raised by auditors were properly addressed by project management. The financial management system was deemed adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the Bank loan proceeds were being used for the intended purposes. Difficulties to mobilize the counterpart funds adversely affected the performance of the project’s financial management function. 32. Procurement: The overall performance of the project procurement management is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The procurement function was overseen in situ by the resident procurement specialist and sometimes by a procurement specialist from the regional procurement office at headquarters who helped resolve challenges as they arose. There were some delays in the follow-up of supervision mission’s recommendations. Procurement processes sometimes experienced delays. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 33. The objectives supported by this project are still highly relevant to the country’s priorities and reflected in the Bank’s current CAS for Niger. The country’s priority as stated in the PRSP and the 2008 CAS was to achieve strong, diversified and job-creating growth. Improving the efficiency, reach and depth of the financial system was expected to contribute to private sector-led and diversified growth, thereby enhancing job creation. 34. Overall design of individual components was oriented towards attainment of the project’s development objectives. However some of the proposed institutional reforms needed more in-depth analysis. The technical underpinnings of the project, consisting of financial sector reviews, helped identify the needed reforms but provided little guidance on the way the envisioned institutional reforms should be crafted. For example, in the case of the financial services component, further analysis was necessary to inform the team on the most adequate choice among the possible business models2. Instead the team relied on a ―one size fits all approach‖ and apparently selected the business model implemented in Cape 2 Possible business models for the postal financial services included: Postal bank as subsidiary of Niger Poste, direct government ownership, partnerships at product level between the Niger Poste and a bank to distribute its products or joint- ventures with technical or financial strategic partners. 10 Verde and recommended by an international seminar on postal services reforms. In 2009, following the Government’s inability to establish FINAPOSTE, some of the alternative options outlined by the 2008 Niger FSAP were presented to the Government, which however declined to consider them. 35. Similarly, in the case of the reform of CPCT, after the MTR and based on the findings of a study commissioned by the project, the initial option of trying to create a healthy bank out of CPCT was abandoned and an agency for the funding of local communities established instead. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 36. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The Project did not achieve its development objectives of improving the efficiency, reach and depth of the Niger Financial System so that it could fulfill its important role of contributing to growth and poverty reduction. Some key activities were closed ahead of time and the allocated funds cancelled so that they could be reallocated to the country program. The PDO is rated moderately unsatisfactory, in line with the closing Implementation Status Report (ISR), as - of the four project outcome indicators, only two were met at the project closure, and that too with significant difficulty in establishing attribution to the role of the project: 37. Increase in the share of private sector credit. The share of private sector credit to GDP did increase from the baseline value at project inception (2004) of 6.05 percent to 14.03 percent, as of December 2010, against a target of 13 percent. It was expected that alleviating the constraints to access to credit for the private sector would contribute to increasing the share of private sector credit to GDP. However, given the nature and pace of implementation of the project’s interventions (capacity building and institution development in the micro-finance industry, and provision of training to financial institutions) it is clear that these were not the main driving force behind the significant surge of credit to the private sector recorded during the period. In fact the joint WB-IMF Financial Sector Assessment conducted in Niger in 2008 documented the fact that growth of credit to the economy was mainly driven by the increase in credit demand from the mining, telecommunications, construction, and transportation sectors. Overall, credit to the economy grew by an annual average of 25 percent between 2005 and 2007. As such, the causal relationship between the project’s intervention and this outcome appears to be weak. 38. Increase in Financial Depth. Financial depth, measured by M2/GDP, improved from 15.82 percent in 2004 to 21.86 percent at project closing, exceeding the end-of-project target of 18 percent. At appraisal it was conceived that project would positively impact the financial depth in Niger by supporting the creation of the postal bank, the restructuring of the housing and the local communities’ banks and the reinforcement of microfinance institutions. Given that none of these activities was successfully completed, it is likely that this outcome had little to do with the project. As such, there is no clear evidence that project assistance contributed to the achievement of this development objective. 39. Reduction in cost of financial intermediation. This objective was not met. Despite slight improvement, intermediation cost margins (8.3 percent as of December 2010) remained above the end-of-project target set at 8 percent. 11 40. Increase in banking efficiency. Bank profitability did not improve. As of December 2010, the ratio of profits over loan portfolio was 10.3 percent, well below the end-of-project target of 12 percent. 41. In summary, project achievements were mixed: Out of four development outcome indicators, only two were met. Furthermore there is no compelling evidence that the project interventions have contributed to an increased credit to the private sector private or financial depth recorded during the project implementation. On the plus side, analysis of the components presented in Annex 2 suggests that though PDO was not attained, the project did contribute by paving the way to an improved legal environment, as well as towards a better-performing social security system. 3.3 Efficiency 42. Given the technical assistance orientation of the project, it was not possible to quantify its potential benefits at entry. Instead of a standard economic analysis, the team provided a set of potential outcomes against which the contribution of the project could be assessed. After project closure, most of the expected benefits did not materialize: (a) Higher economic growth fostered by a more efficient financial sector the majority of the expected benefits was not achieved; (b) Access to financial services in remote areas did not improve; and (c) There was no evidence of reduction in government spending through reduced subsidies to loss-making public financial institutions (or of increased revenues arising from increased economic activity). Furthermore, because of the failure to set up the postal bank, the project did not contribute in this way to private sector development and poverty alleviation in rural areas as expected. In the end, the cost of IDA borrowing by the Government may have outweighed the net economic and social benefits in terms of increased growth, private sector development of rural areas, etc. 43. Project management was not cost effective, given the overall performance of the project and the PCU. At project closure, the actual cost of project management was found to have been 230 percent higher than the appraisal estimates. It accounted for 22 percent of the total resources of the project, well above the 8.4 percent estimate at appraisal and the standard average of 10 percent for projects in the region. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating 44. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The overall rating of the project is Moderately Unsatisfactory. Although the development objectives of the project were (and are still) relevant to the priorities of the Government of Niger, and were aligned with the Bank’s assistance strategy, inadequacies in design at entry, inadequate follow-up and slow decision- making by the Government seriously hindered attainment of the PDO. As a result, the project did not contribute to improving financial sector efficiency and depth through a successful restructuring of CDN and CPCT (respectively the housing and the local communities’ bank). Neither did it contribute to expanding access to financial services in financially underserved areas with the establishment of the postal bank. This rating is also a composite of a Moderately Satisfactory rating of the components on ―strengthening the environment‖, ―capacity building‖ and ―reforming the social security‖, an Unsatisfactory rating for the ―banking restructuring‖ component and a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for the component on ‖financial intermediation of proximity‖. Finally the Moderately 12 Unsatisfactory rating of the project overall outcome is echoed by the efficiency analysis which found that the resources appeared not to have been efficiently used. 45. It is important to note that, despite difficulties encountered in implementing key reforms of the project, the financial services of proximity component did contribute to the successful establishment of the regulatory and supervision body of the microfinance industry. In addition, the capacity building component has helped finance a significant amount of training for financial institutions and has according to beneficiaries, contributed to strengthening the capacity of their staff and increasing customer satisfaction. Project support has also paved the way for the parametric reform of the social security system. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 46. The project was expected to have an important positive social impact by bringing financial services to remote localities and smaller customers through the development of financial intermediation of proximity (postal services and to a lesser extent micro finance). No socio impact study has been conducted. However given that FINAPOSTE was not created direct social effects are below what was expected at project inception. b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 47. The project has contributed to institutional strengthening of the financial sector through the establishment of a regulatory agency for the microfinance sector and delivery of extensive capacity building for banks and insurance companies. At closing, ARSM, the regulatory body for microfinance was fully operational and successfully performing its supervision mandate. The project supported hiring and salaries payment of 10 staff who received training to strengthen their capacities. To build the capacity of ARSM, the project also financed the acquisition of the required assets to make the agency fully operational. This included furniture and other office equipment such as computers, printers, scanners, photocopiers etc. Training and technical services provided to financial institutions under the ―capacity building‖ sub-component‖ has, according to responses provided by beneficiaries to a questionnaire, increased efficiency in the sector. This has ultimately translated into improved service delivery. c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) N/A. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops N/A 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 48. The risk that development outcomes are not maintained is high. The Niger FSTA project has helped set up the ARSM which, at closing, was fully operational and well- grounded in the financial institutional structure of the country. Possible institutional 13 restructuring of the Ministry of Finance envisioned by the Government would put at risk the existence of the ARSM. The Government is planning to set up at the Ministry of Finance level, an entity to oversee the microfinance industry, which could in the long run take over the supervision mandate of ARSM or at least restrict its independence and autonomy - which are critical ingredients of its success. In addition, in the current configuration, the financial autonomy of ARSM - whose operational costs of the agency were supported by the project – is still a risk (though recent developments indicate one favorable development: that parliament has voted to allocate financial resources to ARSM from the current government budget). In the long run, the financial autonomy of ARSM can best be mitigated by transforming the organization into an Etablissement Public à caractère Administratif (EPA). 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry 49. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The PDO was consistent with the Government’s priorities and the Bank’s strategy at project inception. The main issues to be addressed were properly identified, building on an in-depth analysis of the sector commissioned by the Government. However, project design was too broad, given the weak institutional capacity in Niger. Major lessons derived from previous Bank operations were not factored in the design of the project. Risks were not adequately identified and the mitigation measures were not commensurate with the risks assessment. In addition, the implementation arrangements were not adequately conceived as some key stakeholders for instance were ignored in the composition of the steering committee. Finally, the M&E framework designed at entry was not adequate for a proper follow-up of performance of project activities. The Bank’s performance in ensuring quality at entry is therefore rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. b) Quality of Supervision 50. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. Supervision was conducted regularly, with approximately two missions per year. There were three Task Team Leaders (TTLs) over the course of the project life, with the last TTL located in the field. Moreover the continued presence of the first TTL in the task team ensured continuity in the dialogue with the client. Most of the missions were staffed with the right skills mix. The project also benefited from continued support from the country manager in the field, especially in facilitating the dialogue with the Government. During supervision missions, the project team maintained close dialogue with the IMF and other donors involved in financial sector activities in Niger. However the efforts to engage the IMF on envisioned policy reforms did not foster additional support to advance project implementation. 51. Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were regularly updated. Management regularly commented on the ISRs and provided guidance to the team. However, the overall performance ratings given in these ISRs may have been too optimistic considering the project delays and slow implementation of some of the activities. Implementation Progress and Development Objective ratings were Satisfactory between 2004 and 2006 and Moderately Satisfactory between 2006 and 2008. Following the QAG report’s recommendation in 2008, the DO rating was further downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory. The QAG panel had found that the project team had not been candid enough 14 in its assessment as regards the situation in Niger, failing to highlight that the Government was dealing with some important factors that affected project implementation, such as the insurgency in Northern Niger and the famine in the country. 52. The Bank’s focus on development effectiveness was mixed. The task team provided sound and generally appropriate technical advice to the Government, as exemplified in the case of the privatization of CDN. The team raised in a timely manner issues on the real capacity of the strategic partner (NIA) selected by the authorities, and these early warnings ultimately did materialize. As a consequence, the Banking Commission repeatedly declined to grant a license to NIA on the same grounds initially raised by the task team. However the Bank team failed to adequately address significant implementation delays encountered by the project, particularly regarding the postal services component. The nature of problems identified at the time by the team (reduced commitment for some of the reforms, slow decision making), in retrospect called for more radical solutions than the Level II restructuring that was conducted (resulting in some re-allocation of funds between components, some new indicators and closing date extension). 53. After the Mid-Term Review, despite the Government’s objection to dropping FINAPOSTE and the team’s conviction that the postal bank component would not advance; it was nevertheless decided to extend the project, as originally designed, for another two years. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the extension should have been predicated at the very least on the closing of the most problematic component, i.e. the postal bank; which was not done. 54. Disbursement, financial management and procurement issues were raised in an adequate and timely manner by the team. Recommendations for improvement were adequately reflected in Aide Memoires. However, follow-up of procurement related recommendations experienced some delays. 55. Overall, the quality of supervision was not fully adequate. QAG recognized that the task team was competent, diligent and dedicated and worked to extract the maximum of results in a difficult and deteriorating environment. However, the team could have been more proactive by forcefully pursuing a deeper restructuring of the project when it became obvious that maintaining the status quo would definitely compromise attainment of development objectives. c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance 56. Shortcomings in project design, negatively affecting its ability to attain its objectives; and inadequacies in the quality of supervision (lack of candor and inability to go through with the restructuring of the project), notwithstanding the team’s efforts in a difficult political context, mean that overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance a) Government Performance 57. Rating: Unsatisfactory. At project preparation and inception, government was committed and displayed ownership of the proposed reform agenda. The Minister of Finance of the time was the main champion for the overall project. Unfortunately he left the 15 government just after project effectiveness. Subsequently, ownership and support at government level for the project and its proposed reforms dwindled. Drought-induced famine and local insurgency further contributed to distract government attention and resources from the project. In addition, the project’s Steering Committee proved to be rather ineffective, unable to play its role of overseeing the project and securing continued government ownership of reforms during project implementation. This, combined with the country’s low institutional capacity and its subsequent slow decision-making process, contributed to delaying project implementation and jeopardizing attainment of PDO. Consequently, overall, government’s performance was Unsatisfactory. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance 58. Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory. The project was implemented by a project coordinating unit mostly staffed with committed and qualified personnel. The PCU enjoyed stability with the same coordinator being in charge during project life. However it proved unable to influence speed of decision making on government side or influence policy makers on specific reforms or choices. The coordination between PCU and the four implementing agencies was not effective mainly due to inefficient communication. Limited interactions between these entities did not allow early identification of bottlenecks and swift design of adequate solutions. Besides, lack of information on procedures and eligibility conditions for the training matching grant have been repeatedly raised by beneficiaries. The quality of the management of the other functions of the PCU was uneven. Fiduciary management is rated moderately satisfactory. Procurement process experienced sometimes important delays. Its performance is rated moderately satisfactory. With regards to financial management, audit reports were submitted on time and the accounting system was properly managed. The M&E function is rated unsatisfactory; as some shortfalls were repeatedly reported by the team but remained unresolved. For instance key performance indicators were not updated on a regular basis. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance 59. Government’s inconsistent commitment and its corollaries in terms of slow decision- making and inadequate follow-up negatively affected performance of the project. This coupled with moderately unsatisfactory performance of the PCU led to Unsatisfactory rating of the Borrower’s overall performance. 6. Lessons Learned Implementation of the project provided the following two key lessons: 60. Projects in countries with weak implementation capacity should be kept simple, focused and realistic: The scope of the project was too ambitious in relation to the implementation capacity of the Government and the history of reform programs in the country. The project needed to achieve fairly wide-ranging reform in various sectors. Reforms such as postal services reforms called not only for government commitment but also for active consensus-building to ensure buy-in by key stakeholders, the need for which was underestimated at the outset. As a consequence, the project closing date was extended twice but performance did not improve, mainly because of poor implementation on the Government’s side. 16 61. Technical Assistance projects aimed at supporting complex reforms need to be complemented by budget support operations: Reforms requiring important financial resources should not be contingent on infusion of resources from the government. Non- payment by Government of postal arrears and difficulties in mobilizing the capital of FINAPOSTE contributed to delaying the establishment of the postal bank. Instead, such reforms could have been linked to a parallel policy operation that would also provide additional leverage to the Bank during implementation. Other useful lessons learned from the project include: 62. Building a strong constituency of support for reforms is critical: Reduced government commitment for reforms (following departure from the Government of the project’s leading champion) and weak support of the proposed reform of postal services by the labor unions contributed to its delayed implementation. For projects supporting reforms especially in highly unionized sectors it is critical to seek out several champions, at various governmental levels, whilst ensuring ownership and commitment for the reforms across the board. 63. Implementation arrangements should be conducive to continued ownership of reforms across the board and efficient interactions between implementing agencies. Project Steering Committees should be inclusive to ensure that all stakeholders are represented and have high level representatives able to influence and/or accelerate decision making. Communication between PIU and implementing agencies should be ensured through regular submission of implementation reports. This will also allow early identification of implementation problems and formulation of solutions. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners Borrower/implementing agencies N.A. Cofinanciers N.A. Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society) N.A. 17 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD million equivalent)1 Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) STRENGTHENING THE 1.87 0.51 ENVIRONMENT 27% BANKING RESTRUCTURING 1.61 0.77 48% DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 4.36 5.72 OF PROXIMITY 131% SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 0.85 0.44 52% CAPACITY BUILDING 2.42 1.73 71% PROJECT MANAGEMENT 1.24 2.85 230% Project Preparation advance 0.95 Audit 0.50 Unallocated 1.00 Total Baseline Cost 14.80 12.02 81% Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 14.80 12.02 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 14.80 12.02 Notes: 1: Exchange rate on December 31, 2010: US$1 = 490 FCFA. In January 2004, US$1 = CFAF 514.7. (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 9.82 2.08 .00 International Development Association 14.80 12.02 .00 (IDA) Foreign Private Commercial Sources 0.80 0.001 .00 (unidentified) The Project’s accounting system did not capture the contribution of commercial banks and insurance companies to the training provided to them. 18 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: Strengthening of the environment. This component is rated moderately satisfactory. The project has made substantial progress on the first component. However, its objectives of improvement of the legal environment hindering access to finance were not fully achieved. The project financed the realization of a series of studies on collateral, computerization of trade and credit registries (often with substantial delays). The project also facilitated the organization of a seminar bringing together magistrates, lawyers, bailiffs and managers of financial institutions to identify problems with the judiciary in the recovery of loans and the propose corrective actions. Findings of these studies and seminar fed into an action plan that could not be implemented before the project closed. As a result, the project was not able to achieve the expected impact on legal framework pertaining to the development of the financial sector. It is however noteworthy that the project supported capacity building for the credit registry with the purchase of equipment and organization of training sessions for magistrates, bailiffs and lawyers on financial sector issues. Component 2: Restructuring of Banks: This component is rated unsatisfactory. The project aimed to support the Government of Niger in restructuring the housing bank (CDN) and the local communities Bank (CPCT), which were both bankrupt and under interim administration at project inception. The restructuring of the CDN consisted of transferring bad assets and attempting to privatize 90 percent of the capital of the restructured bank. Was this attempt to fail, the CDN was to be liquidated. The project contributed to bringing the CDN to the point of sale after long delays due to government’s failure to take prerequisite actions (including the implementation of an MOU settling the government and CDN cross debts). The Government launched an international tender, after which a potential strategic investor was identified. Ultimately, the qualified bidder (NIA, an insurance company) proved to be lacking the necessary technical and financial capacities to secure a banking license from BCEAO. Slow decision making at government level delayed switching to the second qualified bidder who was no longer interested when government finally decided to discontinue the negotiations with NIA. A general Assembly of CDN general Assembly held on December 27, 2010 (three days before project closing date) has decided the liquidation of the bank. However the WB is yet received any evidence of the implementation of this decision. The second objective of this component to restructure the CPCT was not met either. During implementation, the option to create a healthy bank out of CPCT was abandoned and an agency for the funding of local communities was legally set-up. ANFICT is a public entity under the authority of the ministry of finance meant to manage the resources and financial aids for the local communities. Yet again, due to the Government’s slow decision-making process, the necessary steps to operationalize ANFICT were not taken. The government failed to appoint the liquidator for CPCT and more importantly hire the key staff for ANFICT. Component 3: Financial intermediation of proximity. The component is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The project aimed to enhance access to financial services through support for the development of microfinance and establishment of a postal bank. While the efforts to restructure the postal operator and set-up an independent subsidiary for the financial services did not materialize when the project closed, support from project has helped improve the quality of microfinance supervision and strengthen the capacity in the sector. Under project assistance, the Regulation and Supervision agency for the microfinance sector — ARSM was set-up and fully operational despite long delays induced by lack of follow-up on government side. After the feasibility study was completed, it took up the Government nine months to adopt the decree creating the ARSM and almost two years and unnecessarily long technical 19 assistance to operationalize the agency. In hindsight, the cost-effectiveness of establishing the agency was not satisfactory insofar it could have been completed in a shorter period of time with much less resources. Failure to establish the financial subsidiary of the postal operator was a major setback to the attainment of this sub-component’s objective of increasing access to finance, especially in financially underserved areas. Successful establishment of FINAPOSTE required several actions from the government including: (i) full and timely payment of the capital, (ii) payment of international postal debts; (iii) settlement of cross debts with ONPE; and (iv) issuance of land titles for Niger Poste’s buildings. The lack of adequate resources and poor follow-up didn’t allow implementation of these actions. In addition, the business model favored by the project at inception was not probably the most adequate option given the context in Niger and the number of other reforms the project was supposed to support. Component 4: Social Security Reform. This component is rated moderately satisfactory. This component sought to address the serious difficulties faced by the CNSS ranging from illiquidity, lack of resources to make all due payments, and high administrative costs attributable to overstaffing. The approach to meet this objective was twofold: (i) to support a parametric reform of the scheme; and (ii) to support the restructuring of CNSS including contribution to the payment of rights of laid-off workers. Objectives were not fully met. Yet, support under the project has allowed completion of a number of prerequisite activities such as the update of the scheme’s data base of contributors and beneficiaries and an update of the existing actuarial study. Because of important delays in completing these studies and technical assistance, it has not been possible for the Government to engage in negotiations with beneficiaries on the envisioned parametric reform. Now that the project is closed, the Government will need to mobilize resources to complete the parametric reform and alleviate the deficits at the CNSS. Due to political considerations (elections in 2009, military transition in 2010), the Government shied away from the restructuring of CNSS. Component 5: Capacity Building. This component is rated moderately satisfactory. This component supported provision of training and technical services to financial institutions, funded capacity building within the Ministry of Finance to reinforce units responsible for the monitoring and supervision of financial institutions, and provided IT equipment to several beneficiaries. The facility dedicated to provision of co-financed training and technical services to financial institutions was highly subscribed. Responses to the questionnaire sent to beneficiaries to assess the impact of training and technical assistance suggests substantial improvement in these institutions day-to-day operations and increase in customers’ satisfaction. This component has also contributed to building the capacity of the ARSM and provided IT equipment to a wide range of beneficiaries. However, some beneficiaries complained that the equipment was not always tailored to their needs and that no maintenance contract was made available. 20 Table 2: Outputs by component Component Output 1. Strengthening of the environment  Seminar bringing together magistrates, lawyers, bailiffs and managers of financial institutions to identify problems with the judiciary hindering financial sector development and the propose corrective actions 1. Reforming the financial legal  Study on collaterals environment  Study on modernization of the trade and credit registry  Action plan for the reform of the financial sector legal framework  Capacity building for magistrates bailiffs and financial sector actors 2. Restructuring of the banks  ANFICT the agency for the funding of local communities has been legally set-up but is not operational yet. Assets of CPCT have been 2.1 restructuring of CPCT identified and will be transferred to ANFICT when CPCT is liquidated.  A general Assembly of CDN general Assembly held on 2.2 Restructuring of CDN December 27, 2010 has decided the liquidation of the bank. However the WB has received no evidence of the implementation of this decision. 3. Financial Intermediation of proximity 3.1 Supporting microfinance  Audits for the main microfinance institutions were conducted sector  ARSM is created and fully operational  Bonds have been issued by the Government to collateralize public deposits frozen after the former CCP ceased activities in 1992; 3.2 Restructuring of ONPE  First phase of the reimbursement of the deposits of former CNE and establishment of the postal has been completed (FCFA 1,555,873,642 out of FCFA 2,067,444,599 bank. released by government)  Second Phase (including accrued interests) has started August 2010. 4. Social Security  Update of the beneficiaries and contributors database of CNSS  Update of the actuarial study 5. Capacity Building  co-financing of training, and seminars for financial institutions  Provision of IT equipment to selected project beneficiaries (Micro finance institutions, implementing agencies, ARSM, etc.) 21 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) 22 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Supervision/ICR Fatiha Amar Program Assistant MNSSD Itchi Gnon Ayindo Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Helene Bertaud Sr Counsel LEGAF Jacqueline Christian Issifi E T Temporary AFMNE Mariama Daifour Ba Program Assistant AFTP3 AFTFS- Jonathan Isaac Darboux Financial Sector Spec. HIS Isabelle Huynh Operations Officer TWICT Aissa Idi Kimba Temporary AFMNE Djibrilla Adamou Issa Sr Financial Sector Spec. AFTFW Sidonie Jocktane Executive Assistant AFMGA Djimossoumta Kondol Voice Secondee AFTFP Salifou Noma Temporary AFMNE Korotoumou Ouattara Sr Financial Economist AFTFW Osval Rocha Andrade Romao Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Andre Ryba Lead banking specialist AFTFW Ibrah Rahamane Sanoussi Procurement Specialist AFTPC Fily Sissoko Lead Financial Management Spec AFTFM Helen Giorghis Taddese Temporary AFTAR Yao Wottor Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT Mamadou Yaro Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY02 11 33.19 FY03 33 128.50 FY04 19 85.22 FY05 2 0.86 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00 Total: 65 247.77 23 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Supervision/ICR FY02 0.00 FY03 0.00 FY04 0.00 FY05 17 96.81 FY06 26 126.00 FY07 26 146.31 FY08 16 95.46 Total: 85 464.58 24 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any) 25 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any) 26 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Synthèse du Rapport Final de l’Evaluation Interne Préparatoire à l’Elaboration du Rapport de fin d’exécution (Rapport d’achèvement) du Projet d’Assistance Technique pour le Développement du Secteur Financier (PDSF). Le Projet de Développement du Secteur Financier (PDSF) a été conçu et financé conjointement entre le Niger et l’IDA pour apporter une assistance technique au secteur financier nigérien. Il a démarré théoriquement ses activités le 30 avril 2004 et devrait les cesser le 31 décembre 2010. C’est dans le cadre de l'achèvement de ce projet qu'une évaluation interne a été organisée. Le rapport de cette mission d’évaluation se présente comme ci-après : Contexte général, justification du projet et de l’évaluation interne de fin d’exécution du PDSF Les indicateurs économiques et de développement humain font du Niger un des pays les plus défavorisés. Au moment de l'élaboration du PDSF, le Niger comptait 8 banques commerciales, 4 sociétés d'assurance, une institution financière postale, une caisse de sécurité sociale, quatre vingt (80) institutions de micro finance et 3 agences de change sans compter une bourse régionale de valeurs avec une antenne à Niamey. Ce secteur financier éprouvait de sérieuses difficultés caractérisées entre autres, par une chute de la masse monétaire de 31%, des crédits de 50% et des fonds en dépôt de 42% entre 1988 et 1998. La situation était aussi préoccupante au niveau des autres sous -secteurs comme les assurances, la poste, la sécurité sociale et les institutions de micro finance. Ce contexte défavorable est le reflet de la dégradation des performances économiques du pays et de son environnement des affaires. Les autorités du Niger avec l'appui de leurs partenaires techniques et financiers ont convenu d'inscrire la réforme du secteur financier dans le cadre de la stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté SRP. Le PDSF a été donc conçu comme instrument de mise en œuvre des composantes financières de la Stratégie Nationale de Réduction de la Pauvreté du Niger. Son objectif global est de contribuer à l'amélioration de l'approfondissement du secteur financier afin de favoriser le développement du secteur privé considéré comme moteur de la croissance et de la lutte contre la pauvreté. L’objectif de l’évaluation du PDSF est de donner au pouvoir public, aux gestionnaires du projet, aux partenaires et aux bénéficiaires, l’occasion de tirer les leçons de l’expérience, d’améliorer les prestations de service, de planifier et d’affecter les ressources et de rendre compte aux principales parties prenantes des résultats obtenus. Méthodologie de l’évaluation interne de fin d’exécution du PDSF Pour exécuter cette mission d’appui au PDSF, le consultant a adopté une démarche en quatre étapes : - une réunion de cadrage avec l’équipe du projet - une étude documentaire à partir des principaux documents figurant dans les archives du PDSF. - des entretiens individuels et de groupes à partir d’un guide d’entretien. - une analyse à partir des constats et appréciations recueillis au niveau de l’étude documentaire et des entretiens. 27 L’évaluation interne a permis d’analyser les résultats obtenus par le PDSF au regard des critères de pertinence, d’efficacité, d’efficience, de qualité de partenariat et de durabilité. Pertinence du PDSF, de ses objectifs de développement et de ses composantes L’objectif global du projet est l’amélioration de l’approfondissement financier, afin de favoriser le développement du secteur privé considéré comme moteur de la croissance et de la réduction de la pauvreté. La réalisation des objectifs assignés au PDSF, est articulée autour de six (6) composantes opérationnelles :  Le renforcement de l’environnement juridique et réglementaire par l’amélioration du cadre législatif, réglementaire, juridique et judiciaire dans lequel opère le secteur financier ;  La restructuration bancaire à travers la privatisation du Crédit du Niger (CDN) et la restructuration de la Caisse de prêts aux Collectivités Territoriales (CPCT) ;  Le développement de l’Intermédiation financière de Proximité, à travers la restructuration de l’office National de la Poste et de l’Epargne (ONPE) et l’assainissement des institutions de microfinance ;  La réforme de la sécurité sociale par la réalisation de l’étude sur l’assainissement des fichiers de la Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS) et la conduite d’une étude actuarielle et des réformes paramétriques ;  Le renforcement des capacités à travers des appuis en formation et en équipements aux structures concernées ;  La gestion du projet pour assurer la coordination et la conduite des activités du projet ainsi que sa gestion administrative et financière. Pour l'essentiel, les objectifs du PDSF sont pertinents et logiques au vu du diagnostic présenté par le document de formulation du projet. Le PDSF a été élaboré dans les règles de l’art et selon les pratiques en vigueur à la Banque Mondiale. Un document d’évaluation du projet a été élaboré à cet effet. Compte tenu de la complexité de ce projet et de sa dimension macro-économique, les concepteurs ont convenu d’une approche flexible qui a facilité des adaptations aux réalités du pays. Gestion administrative et financière du PDSF La gestion du PDSF a été confiée à une unité de gestion, chargée de la mise en œuvre des activités de 5 composantes sous la supervision d’un comité de pilotage et de la tutelle du ministère de l’économie et des finances. Selon l’accord de crédit entre la République du Niger et l’IDA, le PDSF a bénéficié d’un fonds de 16,8 millions de dollars soit 8 440 000 000 de francs CFA dont 1 040 000 000 FCFA à la charge de l’Etat du Niger, et 7 400 000 000 FCFA à la charge de l’IDA. Cette contre - partie nigérienne à laquelle s’ajoutent les exonérations d’impôts et taxes était censée financer les achats en monnaie locale dans une proportion allant de 10 % à 30 %. Sur le plan de la gestion comptable, les comptes du projet ont été régulièrement certifiés par des Experts Comptables inscrits à l’Ordre National des Experts Comptables et des Comptables Agrées (ONECA). L’UGP a élaboré un plan général de passation de marchés, plan à partir duquel des plans annuels de passation de marché ont été adoptés et exécutés après avis de non-objection de l’IDA. Le tableau ci-après rend compte de l’évolution dans l’exécution financière par composante du PDSF du 31 décembre 2005 au 31 décembre 2010. 28 Partenariats du Projet La présente évaluation interne a cherché à apprécier la qualité du partenariat mis en œuvre entre les différentes parties à savoir : - le projet (tutelle, comité de pilotage, UGP) ; - les bénéficiaires de l’intervention ; - le ministère de tutelle du projet (ME/F) ; - les autres ministères impliqués dans la mise en œuvre du projet (MCC, MJ, MUH, MFP/T, etc.) ; - le gouvernement et les partenaires techniques et financiers intervenant dans le secteur financier. Le partenariat entre le projet et les bénéficiaires a très bien fonctionné aux dires des bénéficiaires notamment les banques et leur association(APBEF), les institutions de micro- finance, leur association (ANIP-MF) et l'ARSM. Performance du PDSF Le PDSF a démarré en réalité ses activités en 2005 et au cours des missions de supervision de 2006 et 2008 certaines évolutions sont intervenues notamment la suppression de certaines activités et la réallocation des crédits correspondants, entre les composantes et entre les catégories de dépenses. Composante 1 : Renforcement de l’environnement juridique et réglementaire Cette composante a consommé au 31 décembre 2010 un montant de 264 206 556 FCFA pour une prévision après réallocation de 2008 de 550 000 000 FCFA, soit un taux de réalisation financière de 48%. En termes d’efficacité, cette composante n’a pas été satisfaisante au regard du faible taux de consommation des crédits et de la non mise en œuvre du Plan d’action commun pour la réforme du cadre légal et juridique indispensable pour l’amélioration de l’environnement du secteur financier. Composante 2 : Restructuration Bancaire Au 31 décembre 2010, les réalisations financières de la composante s’élèvent à 397 749 294 FCFA pour des prévisions de 605 000 000 FCFA, soit un taux de consommation de crédits de 65,08%. En termes d’efficacité et d’efficience, cette composante n’a pas été satisfaisante en raison du non aboutissement des principales restructurations envisagées particulièrement la privatisation du Crédit du Niger et l’opérationnalisation de l’Agence Nationale de Financement des Collectivités Territoriales. Composante 3 : Développement de l’Intermédiation Financière de Proximité Au plan financier, les réalisations de la composante s’élèvent à 3 460 943 809 FCFA pour des prévisions révisées en 2008 de 3 362 600 000 FCFA, soit un taux d’exécution financière de 102,93%, très appréciable. Au regard des ressources engagées, l’efficience de la composante est faible car la réforme du secteur postal est inachevée en l’absence de la création effective de Finaposte et ce, malgré les actions menées. Composante 4 : Réforme de la Sécurité Sociale Cette composante a consommé 226 219 898 FCFA pour des révisions faibles de 95 000 000 FCFA, soit un taux de réalisation financière de 238,13%. 29 Les activités prévues ont été menées de façon satisfaisante et avec efficacité malgré l’absence de la mise en œuvre de l’ensemble des recommandations de l’audit actuariel en vue de parvenir à de véritables réformes paramétriques. Composante 5 : Renforcement des Capacités Au plan financier, l’exécution de cette composante s’élève à 889 147 616 FCFA pour des prévisions de 910 000 000 FCFA, après réallocation de 2008, soit un taux de réalisation de 97,71% Les activités de cette composante ont été menées avec efficacité et efficience et les résultats satisfaisants obtenus ont été largement confirmés par les bénéficiaires. Composante 6 : Gestion du Projet Pour des prévisions de 1 346 000 000 FCFA, un montant de 1 467 364 570 FCFA a été consommé, soit un taux de réalisation de 109,02%. Malgré, le sous effectif de l’Unité de Gestion, celle-ci a menée de façon satisfaisante et efficace les activités programmées. Toutefois, des contraintes extérieures à l’Unité de Gestion ont compromis certains résultats attendus. Performance de l’Emprunteur et de la Banque Mondiale La performance de l’emprunteur est jugée modérément satisfaisante. Performance de la Banque Mondiale La performance de la Banque Mondiale est jugée satisfaisante par les partenaires et les bénéficiaires du projet. Contraintes et difficultés de mise en œuvre Le PDSF est un projet d’appui institutionnel et de ce fait, il lui est difficile d’agir directement pour faire valoir les exigences de la mise en œuvre des activités, sans l’appui et l’engagement des autres parties prenantes. Leçons tirées et recommandations en vue de la pérennisation des acquis du PDSF L’examen de l’exécution des différentes composantes du PDSF nous a permis d’identifier ses succès ou ses forces ainsi que ses échecs ou faiblesses. Au titre des acquis : - le renforcement du contrôle et de la gouvernance dans le secteur de la micro - finance avec l’ARSM, - l’équipement et l’amélioration du professionnalisme des structures de contrôle et de surveillance des institutions financières, - l’amélioration de l’environnement juridique et règlementaire, - l’amélioration de la gestion des banques, des compagnies d’assurance et des institutions de micro – finance, - la régularisation de la situation financière et sociale au niveau du secteur postal. Au titre des faiblesses ou défaillances : - le non aboutissement de plusieurs réformes clés comme le CDN, la CPCT, - la non finalisation du processus concernant FINAPOSTE et la Banque de l’Habitat. Au vu de ce bilan, les recommandations du rapport visent à corriger ces défaillances et à assurer la pérennisation des acquis notamment : - la liquidation du CDN, - la nomination des responsables de l’ANFICT qui remplace le CPCT, - la poursuite de l’appui à l’ARSM, de la mise en œuvre des plans d’action et recommandations pour le cadre légal et juridique et la CNSS. 30 Conclusion L’évaluation interne de fin d’exécution du PDSF a permis de faire participer tous les acteurs, gestionnaires, bénéficiaires et partenaires à une appréciation des succès, échecs et contraintes connus par le PDSF dans le cadre de sa mise en œuvre. Elle a ensuite permis d’apprécier la pertinence et la performance du PDSF, de l’emprunteur et de la Banque Mondiale et enfin de formuler des propositions et des recommandations en vue de la consolidation et de la pérennisation des acquis du projet. Il ressort de cette évaluation interne que malgré le non aboutissement de plusieurs reformes, le PDSF a enregistré des résultats positifs dans plusieurs domaines. Les participants à cette auto-évaluation souhaitent que les acquis soient consolidés pour une pérennisation des résultats du PDSF. 31 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders 33 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Harry Huizinga: Determinants of Commercial bank interest margins and profitability; World Bank Working Paper series (1998). Development Credit Agreement. ISR Sequence Nos. 1 to 15. Mission Aide memoires and Management Letters. Project documents (IRIS). World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for Niger (2003). World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for Niger (2008). World Bank, Project Appraisal Document: Niger Financial Sector technical Assistance Project (2004). 34 10°E 15°E L I B YA NIG ER To Djanet To Tajarhi SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS ALGERIA DEPARTMENT CAPITALS NATIONAL CAPITAL NIGER RIVERS Madama MAIN ROADS DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES T é To Tamanrasset é n This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. 20°N The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information n é Mont Greboun shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any (1,944 m ) A G A D E Z endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. r é é 0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers Air Mts. D e D e Arlit Bilma 0 50 100 150 Miles s e r e r t MALI Agadez Ingal TAHOUA D I F F A To Tchin- Gao Tabaradene 15°N 15 15∞N ZINDER CHAD Tahoua Tanout 15°N Keïta TILLABÉRI To Tillabéri Illéla Dakoro Bouza Ouahigouya Téra Filingué MARADI S a h Gouré e l Nguigmi Mt s. 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