Trade Note June 6, 2005 WTO ACCESSION: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE Introduction acceding countries. Notwithstanding Since its creation in 1995, twenty new these concerns, the demand for WTO Members have acceded to the World accession remains strong and the goal of WTO "universalization" is often The Trade Organization (WTO). On 13 October 2004, Cambodia became the referred to by most Member countries World Bank WTO's 148th member, almost 10 as a worthwhile objective. Group www.worldbank.org years after it had first applied and just over a year after its membership In this note, we discuss the experience package was approved at the Cancún of developing countries with the Ministerial Conference. Cambodia is WTO accession process and highlight the second least-developed country the implications for policymakers in (LDC) to join the WTO, following applicant countries and in existing Nepal's accession on 23 April 2004. WTO members.1 Countries applying for WTO Why do Nations Join the WTO? International membership face a complex and, in Policymakers from countries seeking most cases, long process. Some to join the WTO give a range of Trade applications date back to the late economic, legal and political reasons Department 1980s (e.g., Algeria) or early 1990s for doing so. For some, the rationale (e.g., Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and is to further integrate their country Saudi Arabia). Applicants often need into the world economy. The to implement substantive reforms to expectation is that more predictable align their domestic institutions and access to foreign markets, which By Simon J. policies with WTO disciplines. Most WTO membership can bring, will Evenett and developing countries lack the result in higher exports. Another Carlos A. Primo capacity to engage effectively in these economic rationale is to attract more Braga negotiations due to the absence of foreign direct investment and, more trained personnel, not to mention generally, to use WTO membership institutional and financial constraints. as a seal of approval recognized by These notes summarize It is worth noting that currently the international business community. recent research on global trade issues. They reflect roughly one-third of the 30 The legal advantages of accessing a solely the views of the governments in the process of rules-based system and of using the author, and do not accession represent LDCs (see Annex WTO dispute-settlement process are necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank I for a list of current applicants). also often mentioned. It is also the Group or its Executive case that many nations join the WTO Directors. As illustrated by the experiences of for political reasons. Transition China, and more recently, Cambodia, economies, for example, often see WTO accession can be an effective WTO membership as a means to lever to promote trade liberalization signal their commitment to joining the Trade Note 22 and substantive regulatory reform. international community of market- There is a generalized perception, based economies. In short, many see however, that the process is too WTO accession as facilitating both cumbersome and onerous for political and economic reform TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 processes within their countries. Memorandum, the applicant successfully concluding bilateral negotiations with each of the There is some overlap between these stated Working Party members, and the adoption of the rationales and the potential benefits of WTO Protocol of Accession by the Working Party and accession identified in economic research, in then by the WTO's General Council or Ministerial particular as they relate to bolstering exports and Conference. foreign direct investment inflows.2 Economists would also point to the benefits that flow from Throughout this process the onus is on the better foreign access to the acceding nation's applicant to satisfy the demands of existing WTO markets, specifically in terms of lower prices for members. This apparently one-sided procedure has and a greater variety of imports. By binding given rise to the following perceptions about the national tariffs, committing to eliminate quotas on accession process: imports, and reforming other state measures, the credibility of an acceding nation's policies can be · The WTO accession process is costly and enhanced and hence the private sector faces less complex. uncertainty. In principle, WTO accession can · The WTO accession process is taking longer improve important components of the national and longer to complete. business environment which, in turn, has sizeable · The price of joining the WTO now includes domestic payoffs. commitments that go beyond the GATT/WTO agreements. The Reality of the WTO Accession Process · The price of joining the WTO is steadily The experience of 20 countries that have joined rising. the WTO since 1995, plus that of the 30 · The WTO accession process takes little countries/custom territories that are currently account of the specific circumstances of seeking to join, form the basis of much of what is applicant countries or their needs for special known about the WTO accession process. Not and differential treatment. every aspect of WTO accession is publicly documented. In particular, little is known about The underlying reason for the emergence of these the numerous bilateral negotiations between an perceptions is that the terms, rather than the applicant and existing WTO members. Perhaps procedures, of WTO accession are not well unsurprisingly, then, a certain amount of folklore defined in legal terms. Paradoxically for a rules- has arisen concerning the WTO accession process. based organization, the WTO has no clear rules for Recently, studies have been able to shed some the "price" of membership. Article XII of the light on the validity of the folklore. The main Marrakesh Agreement, the legal instrument findings in this regard are described below.3 covering the WTO accession process, merely However, readers, and in particular stakeholders in states that new members may join the WTO "on applicant countries, should bear in mind that terms to be agreed." This sparse guidance leaves important steps in the WTO accession process the door wide open to encompass both an remain confidential. It is also important to keep in expedited hassle-free accession process and a mind that non-economic considerations can play a drawn-out, decade-long, and burdensome role in shaping the process.4 accession experience. The prevailing "folklore" points to the latter being closer to the mark. The procedures that an applicant must follow in Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that the time taken to order to become a WTO member are well complete the WTO accession process has steadily established. At least twenty distinct steps can be grown over the past decade. Figure 1 plots in readily identified.5 The most important steps are sequential order the length of time taken to the creation of a Working Party to consider the complete the first 20 accessions (see Annex 2 for application for WTO membership6, the drafting of the identification of the countries in question.) a Memorandum on the applicant's foreign trade Even without the accession of China (the 15th regime, the applicant satisfactorily answering the nation to join the WTO since 1995), the trend is questions of existing WTO members about this TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 clearly upwards; recently acceded countries have taken approximately a decade to negotiate their Figure 2: Tighter commitments on WTO entry.7 agricultural products on DCs 60 Figure 1: A lengthening process sgn 50 200 ndi 180 40 shtn 160 30 140 biffirat mofore 120 20 100 10 80 egarevA mbuN 60 0 40 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 20 Source: Compiled by the authors based on WTO (2004a). 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 Figure 3: Tighter commitments on non- Source: Compiled by the authors based on WTO (2004a). agricultural products on DCs 45 Turning to the "price" of accession, it is important 40 to distinguish between the two broad types of 35 commitments made by acceding countries: those 30 relating directly to market access (on goods and 25 services) and other commitments on rules. sgnidnibffirat 20 e Acceding countries may benefit from transition 15 10 periods or exceptions to existing WTO rules, but 5 these are rarely granted by existing WTO agrevA 0 members. 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 With respect to market access commitments, in the Source: Compiled by the authors based on WTO (2004a). areas of agricultural and non-agricultural The picture that emerges concerning services (typically manufacturing) products there is clear commitments under the GATS tells a similar story. evidence that the price of accession--expressed in Taking the number of services sub-sectors (of the terms of the extent of market access concessions 160 identified in the WTO's classification list) made by acceding countries--is growing over time. committed by countries as a proxy for the "price" Separating out the accession of least developed to be a WTO Member, one observes that LDCs countries (who happen to be the last two countries that were founding members of the WTO to join the WTO) from the other acceding committed on average 20 sub-sectors. The developing countries (DCs), a clear pattern averages for founding Members in the developing emerges in Figures 2 and 3.8 For both agricultural and developed categories, in turn, were and non-agricultural goods the average tariff respectively 44 and 108. Countries that have binding that acceding countries were allowed is acceded since 1995, in turn, have on average falling over time and is now at levels well below committed around 104 sub-sectors.10 Needless to those agreed by developing countries in the say, this is a crude measure of the "services- Uruguay Round.9 In short, from a "mercantilistic" related" price of accession as this figure does not perspective, the relative price of WTO accession is capture the depth (e.g., the scheduling of explicit high (in comparison to Uruguay Round limitations) or the breadth (e.g., the modes of commitments made by peer nations) and growing delivery covered) of the commitment. Still, it is over time. illustrative that countries that went through the WTO accession process typically committed a much higher number of sub-sectors than GATT contracting parties at a similar level of TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 development did in the context of the Uruguay In sum, there is evidence that the accession Round (1986-94) negotiations.11 process is becoming more demanding in terms of market access commitments. Actually, the "July Turning to rules (or non-market access) package" (WTO, 2004c) explicitly recognizes this commitments that countries have adopted when by mentioning that newly acceded Members joining the WTO, the picture is more mixed. With should be granted more flexibility in the the exceptions of China and Taiwan, China, agriculture and non-agricultural market access accession countries signed around 25 such negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda commitments. These commitments typically in view of their extensive market access concern a wide range of state measures, some of commitments. Whether there is a trend increase in which are not obviously trade-related. Bulgaria, WTO+ or WTO- commitments is unclear, but the for example, made commitments with respect to very fact that existing WTO rules allow for them domestic price controls, the privatization of state- is a source of concern. Any such evidence, owned enterprises, and excise taxes on alcohol, as however, should be interpreted with care in view well as many other traditional trade policy-related of the possibility of an adverse-selection bias in measures. the sample of recently acceded countries. After all, most of these countries were transition A controversial question is whether these economies with highly distorted trading regimes to commitments go beyond the commitments agreed start with. Accordingly, it could be argued that the during the Uruguay Round (constituting WTO+ higher demands of WTO members simply reflect commitments) or involve an accession country this reality rather than a systemic trend. agreeing to forgo the rights available to other WTO members (the so-called WTO­ Tough Love or Power Plays? commitments). Whether an accession The critical question, however, is not whether the commitment goes beyond an existing WTO price of WTO accession is rising, but whether the agreement depends in large part on how the latter price is worth paying in terms of its developmental is interpreted, and so it should not be surprising impact. If it is, then the demands made by existing that disagreement is rife on the extent of WTO+ WTO members of acceding countries might be commitments. Moreover, some WTO+ characterized as "tough love." Otherwise, the obligations may only involve consultation with, or WTO accession process may be seen as a one- reporting to, existing WTO members, and thus are sided power play whereby current WTO members of limited developmental significance. Others wring commercial advantage out of weaker may be more fundamental, such as Jordan's economic partners. commitment that if any of its laws or state acts are subsequently found to contradict international When considering the developmental impact of treaties (not just WTO agreements), then the latter WTO accession, two important points should be would have precedence. WTO- commitments are borne in mind. The first is that a comprehensive easier to identify, such as Ecuador's commitment evaluation of WTO accession should examine to eliminate all subsidies before the date of post-accession performance on many metrics, and accession and its commitment never to introduce should consider the state measures taken before them afterwards. China's acceptance of product- and after the date of WTO accession. At present, specific transitional safeguard provisions, which few accession countries have five or more years of can be more easily triggered than regular WTO post-accession data to begin identifying the effect safeguards, provides another example. WTO+ and of WTO accession, so the available evidence here WTO- commitments differentiate WTO members is necessarily limited. Second, most of the and they could be interpreted as contributing to a country-specific studies on WTO accession relate multi-tier multilateral trade system. This systemic to China and involve predictions of likely effects concern is in addition to any of the adverse of its accession, rather than evaluations of actual developmental effects that may result from these impact. specific commitments.12 TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 In fact, much of the available evidence concerns that, once other determinants of market entry were the impact of WTO accession on national exports controlled for, sales of long-standing exports to and imports. This evidence is useful for assessing new markets were not helped by WTO accession. whether accession really does help integrate In contrast, sales of long-standing products to developing countries into the world trading existing foreign markets were found to rise after system. There are two main strands of recent WTO accession -- suggesting that Bulgarian and literature analyzing aggregate studies of trade Ecuadorian exporters responded positively to the flows and the role of the WTO/GATT in incentives created by WTO accession. influencing them. In a series of papers, of which Rose (2003) is a prominent example, Andrew Modest supply side responses to WTO accession Rose has called into question whether membership may be due to two potential factors. First, foreign of the GATT/WTO has actually increased trade barriers faced by some exporters in countries that above the levels expected from the "standard joined the WTO may have in fact changed little gravity" determinants of bilateral trade.13 In after accession. Secondly, exporters were either contrast, analyzing the same data in a different unaware or unable to take advantage of improved way, Subramanian and Wei (2003) find that market access abroad. This could be due to a lack GATT/WTO membership has been associated of information, to expensive and inefficient with a significant increase in imports of infrastructure in the acceding country, or a lack of industrialized countries, although the same cannot experience in successfully shipping goods abroad. be said in the case of developing country In short, whether joining the WTO bolsters a members. nation's exports depends not only on the changes in market access that are supposed to follow from There is little reason, however, to expect that accession (in terms of greater predictability), but exporters in acceding countries respond similarly also on the steps taken by the government and to the different opportunities created by their firms in the applicant country. nation's WTO accession, which is an implicit assumption made in the above two analyses. To summarize, when comparing the grand Recent country-by-country estimates of the impact objectives of nations that seek to join the WTO of WTO accession on imports and exports vary a with the available empirical evidence on what lot, probably because national experience varies a happened to countries after they joined the WTO, lot.14 For example, after stripping out the effects there is an evident mismatch. This may seem of non-trade policy determinants of its trade, disturbing at first sight, but perhaps is not Ecuador's manufacturing imports fell after its surprising given how recent WTO accession has WTO accession in 1996. This apparently evolved and it certainly has not stopped many surprising finding is easy to understand when one countries from applying for WTO membership. In notes that Ecuador raised its applied tariffs across addition, it is important to keep in mind that WTO the board in the years after WTO accession, accession can induce reforms that promote something that was possible in view of the binding transparency and that strengthen domestic policies overhang of its WTO tariff commitments. to cope with balance-of-payments crises and the Another problem with these aggregate studies is like, which are important additional benefits for that they do not shed light on the mechanisms by developing countries.16 Over the past twelve which WTO accession influence national trade months more information has come to light as to flows. For example, did accession bolster sales of how nations can successfully make the most of traditional exports to existing markets or did it WTO accession, a subject to which we now turn. encourage the entry into new markets? Making the Most of the WTO Accession Disaggregated product-line studies of Ecuador's Developing countries need not see themselves as and Bulgaria's exports to the industrialized Quad merely at the mercy of existing WTO members countries shed some light on whether the during the accession process. Concrete steps have incentives created by WTO accession are working been taken by governments in developing or not.15 Kennett, Evenett, and Gage (2005) found countries before, during, and after the WTO TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 accession process in order to push the ratio of percent and below 10 percent for non-agricultural costs to benefits in a pro-development direction. goods. (Least developed countries appear, Moreover many donor agencies and international according to figures 2 and 3 above, to have been development institutions offer programs to build given more lenient treatment.) The employment capacity and expertise. The overriding goal is to and other implications of these market access choose the mix of national and international commitments for adjustment in import-competing initiatives that best meet the applicant's sectors should be considered. development objectives. The following remarks, based on developing country experiences, are Applicants can also expect to sign around 25 rules- offered with this goal in mind.17 related commitments, some which will have implications for sensitive policies such as As early as possible in the WTO accession intellectual property rights. With respect to this process, it is desirable to identify precisely how class of commitments, applicants ought to develop signing binding commitments at the WTO can the capacity to document and demonstrate why a further reform and help attain national priorities. proposal from an existing WTO member is against Cambodia, for example, identified textiles, the applicant's development goals. Identifying clothing, and tourism as sectors which could own national priorities is simply not enough. benefit from reform and developed negotiating Being able to effectively respond to the priorities in its WTO accession process negotiating proposals of other nations is important accordingly. Identification of goals, analysis of if flexibility is to be obtained. If pressed to accept economic options, and formulation of negotiating expensive rules-related commitments, applicants priorities and fall back positions are required at should at a minimum insist on technical assistance this point. Binding commitments can influence to mitigate the implementation costs.18 the behavior of importers, foreign investors, and regulators, and knowing the likely economic and Given the duration, complexity, and wide reaching social impact of different legal commitments will scope of the WTO accession process, accession help an acceding country to determine which legal countries should develop a "road map" that commitments are priorities for it in the first place. identifies the different types of assistance needs Such reasoning will involve matters far beyond the required at each stage of the WTO accession typical reach of the Ministry of Trade, and ideally process in partnership with the financers and the national government should come to a providers of technical assistance. The diagnostic collective view as to what the strategy with respect tools associated with the Integrated Framework, to WTO accession is. This subject should with have been successfully applied in Cambodia, therefore not be treated as a technocratic for example, and that are currently being used in negotiating exercise controlled by a small number the context of Ethiopia's accession, provide a of officials in the Trade Ministry. comprehensive assessment of national needs. In this regard it is also important to avoid Another important step is for applicant countries overlooking post-accession implementation needs to form realistic expectations of what the WTO as this will typically undermine the ability of the accession process involves. Applicants should private sector to capitalize on any export expect this process to take at least five years and opportunities created by joining the WTO. often even longer. Given ministerial and staff turnover, a broad base of government, civil Officials in developing countries have benefited society, and private sector support for the from the experience of experts in other developing accession initiative is required. This is only countries that have recently acceded to the WTO. possible with broad consultation and a clear sense Such so-called South-South learning can be very of the costs, benefits, and priorities of WTO valuable. Jordan, for example, offers such accession. On the basis of recent accession expertise to fellow Middle-Eastern and North experience, current and future developing country African countries that are seeking to join the applicants can expect to have their agricultural WTO. tariffs bound at an average rate well below 20 TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 Shrewd officials from applicant countries have process that could take a decade and involves also sought to optimize the value of any technical considerable complexity in return for uncertain assistance received. Playing a full role in drafting and deferred rewards is the best way to organize the terms of reference for international consultants the WTO accession process. Uncertainty over the is important and so is participating in the selection price of WTO accession gives opponents of trade process for such consultants. Ensuring the and investment reforms a golden opportunity to workshops and consultant visits are tailored to exaggerate the negative and undermine support for country-specific circumstances and involve follow the accession process. Leaders with anything but up is also important. Picking the right officials to the longest time horizons are unlikely to support attend workshops and promoting the learning of seriously an accession effort which pays off up to official WTO languages contributes positively as a decade in the future. It is also worth noting that well. In short, making the most of WTO accession the WTO is probably the only international requires making the most of technical assistance economic organization that asks nations to stick to offered to applicants. a program of such length. Developmental needs and the necessity of sustaining initial support for Concluding Remarks joining the WTO should drive the design and The first 20 completed WTO accessions have operation of the WTO accession process and raised systemic concerns that ought to be of associated technical assistance. Failure to do so interest to existing WTO members as well as to risks creating a growing group of disgruntled applicants. The first concern is that the growing participants in the world trading system whose price of WTO accession, including forcing support for further trade reform will likely be tepid applicants to agree to WTO+ and WTO- at best. commitments, is creating a multi-tiered world trading system in which recently-acceded Finally, it is important to recognize that the WTO countries have higher obligations and more limited accession process can play a useful role in the "rights." This, in turn, is currently manifesting political economy of trade reform. Governments itself in demands of some of the recent applicants which are able to clearly identify their reform to be treated differently in the context of the Doha objectives ex ante are in a much better position to Development Agenda liberalization efforts. Some use the process to their own advantage, leveraging observers have called for applicants to pay a price the multilateral process to advance domestic for accession that is both commensurate with their reform. level of development and with the obligations of existing WTO members at the same level of development.19 The former has been partially recognized by the WTO membership and manifested itself with the WTO General Council's adoption of guidelines for the accession of least developed countries in December 2002.20 To date, the latter -- a call for parity -- has been rejected by WTO members. At a time when the world trading system is supposed to be taking the interests of developing countries more seriously, the lengthening time to negotiate accession and the uncertainty created by the inadequate legal definition of the price of WTO accession are issues that merit attention. If the goal is to ensure that a WTO accession contributes to national development goals, one has to ask whether expecting a developing country's officials and civil society to sustain interest in a TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 1Throughout this paper we define developing countries comparable figures for acceding countries is ten. At the as encompassing low and middle-income economies, 2-digit level, acceded countries took commitments in 36 according to World Bank definitions. Developing sectors compared to only 17 taken by WTO members. country status in the WTO, in turn, is determined by Finally, at the most disaggregated level, acceding self-selection. Another country grouping utilized in the countries have commitments almost two and a half paper ­ and recognized as such by the WTO ­ is the times bigger--103 as against 42. The accession UN classification of least-developed countries (LDCs). negotiations have resulted in countries undertaking 2 See list of suggested readings and the references commitments that apparently bear no relationship to provided in this note. their level of economic development as reflected in per 3These studies are part of a project titled Preparing For capita income" (page vii). and Evaluating WTO Accessions that was funded by 12Another example of systemic change in the accession the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) process from the GATT-era to the WTO years concerns of Canada. the non-application provision (that allows a Member 4 Iran's request to initiate accession procedures, first not to apply the GATT as a whole or its schedule of presented in 1996, was blocked 21 times by the US due concessions to an acceding Member). In the GATT to non-trade related considerations. It was finally years, a contracting party could not invoke this accepted by the WTO General Council on May 26, provision after it had entered into bilateral negotiations 2005. with the acceding party. Under WTO rules, however, 5 See WTO (1995, 2004a and 2004b) for details about this provision can be invoked even after bilateral the accession process. negotiations have started. 6 Any current member of the WTO can join the 13These determinants are the national incomes of the Working Party established to consider the accession of two trading partners and the geographical distance a new member. between them. Other determinants that are usually 7 If one considers only the time taken from the included in such analyses include proxy variables to submission of the Trade Memorandum until the pick up the effect of two nations sharing a common completion of the process in the case of new WTO language and a common border and their respective members, the time required falls to roughly 5 years. memberships of regional trading agreements. 8 In figures 2 and 3 the data for the LDCs are 14See, for example, Kennett, Evenett, and Gage (2005). represented using hollow vertical bars and the data for 15 That is, to Canada, the members of the European the DCs are represented using solid vertical black bars. Union, Japan, and the United States. Given the delays 9 The following figures provide useful comparators. in the availability of international trade data, in 2004 According to Finger et al (1996) the average bound Bulgaria and Ecuador were the only medium-sized non- MFN tariff rate on the imports of all merchandise goods landlocked countries to join the WTO for which there by a group of 26 lower and middle income countries was five years of post-accession trade data available. imports was 25.2 percent. For industrial goods the The choice of these countries was, therefore, not comparable average bound MFN tariff rate was 20 arbitrary. percent. Anderson and Martin (2005) point out that by 16See, for example, Bacchetta and Drabek (2002). 2001, the average weighted agricultural import tariffs 17 The experiences of six developing countries in were 48 percent for developing countries (WTO organizing for WTO accession can be found in Evenett taxonomy) and 78 for LDCs. (2005a). Evenett (2005b) summarizes the interventions 10It is also worth noting that Nepal and Cambodia, the of a number of developing country participants on this two LDCs that joined the WTO since 1995, committed subject at a joint World Bank-GTZ workshop that was to 76 and 93 sub-sectors, respectively, in contrast to the held in November 2004. Zarcone, Fink and Primo 20 sub-sectors that in average LDCs had committed 18 It is said that certain developing countries have during the Uruguay Round. For further details about successfully used this approach in their WTO accession services commitments in the GATS see Marchetti negotiations. (2004). 19See, for example, Michalopoulos (2002) and Kennett, 11Grynberg, Ognivtsev, and Razzaque (2002) came to a Evenett, and Gage (2005). similar conclusion. They summarize their findings as 20 These Guidelines call on existing members to follows: "At the most aggregate level, while WTO exercise restraint in seeking concessions on trade in members have on average taken up some kind of goods and services from acceding LDCs. See WTO commitment in six sectors out of a maximum of 12, the (2002). TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 Annex I: List of Countries Currently Seeking Accession to the WTO WTO Acceding Countries (and their application date) Europe Middle-East and East Asia and Pacific Sub Saharan Africa South Asia Latin America and and Central Asia North Africa the Caribbean Russia Algeria Viet Nam Sudan* Bhutan* Bahamas (June 1993) (June 1987) (Jan 1995) (Oct 1994) (Sep 1999) (May 2001) Belarus Saudi Arabia Tonga Seychelles Afghanistan* (Sep 1993) (June 1993) (June 1995) (May 1995) (Dec 2004) Ukraine Lebanon Vanuatu*(1) Cape Verde* (Nov (Nov 1993) (Jan 1999) (July 1995) 1999) Uzbekistan Yemen* Lao PDR* Ethiopia* (Dec 1994) (April 2000) (July 1997) (Jan 2003) Kazakhstan Libya Samoa* Sao Tome and (Jan 1996) (June 2004) (April 1998) Principe* (May 2005) Azerbaijan Iraq (June 1997) (Dec 2004) Bosnia & Herz. (May Iran 1999) (May 2005) Andorra (July 1999) Tajikistan (May 2001) Serbia (2) (Feb 2005) Montenegro (Feb 2005) Note 1: The Working Party on the Accession of Vanuatu concluded its work on 29 October 2001. Vanuatu has not, however, followed up on its accession. Note 2: Serbia and Montenegro had originally made a joint application on January 2001, but in February 2005 this application was withdrawn and replaced by individual applications for each one of them as independent customs territories. * Identifies a least-developed country. Annex II: Chronological List of Countries that This paper was written by Simon J. Evenett, have Acceded to the WTO Professor of International Trade and Economic No. New Member Date of Membership Development at the University of St. Gallen and a 1 Ecuador 21-Jan-96 2 Bulgaria 01-Dec-96 non-resident Senior Fellow of the Economic 3 Mongolia 29-Jan-97 Studies Program, The Brookings Institution and 4 Panama 06-Sep-97 Carlos A. Primo Braga, Senior Adviser, 5 Kyrgyz Republic 20-Dec-98 6 Latvia 10-Feb-99 International Trade Department, The World Bank. 7 Estonia 13-Nov-99 Comments and assistance from U. Dadush, C. 8 Jordan 11-Apr-00 9 Georgia 14-Jun-00 Fink, B. Hoekman, A. Hussain, P. Low, K. 10 Albania 08-Sep-00 Lucenti, F. Maertens, W. Martin, P. 11 Oman 09-Nov-00 Reichenmiller, P. Schuler and C. Tully are 12 Croatia 30-Nov-00 13 Lithuania 31-May-01 gratefully acknowledged. This Trade Note can be 14 Moldova 26-Jul-01 downloaded at http://www.worldbank.org/trade. 15 China 11-Dec-01 16 Taiwan, China 01-Jan-02 17 Armenia 05-Feb-03 18 FYR Macedonia 04-Apr-03 19 Nepal 23-Apr-04 20 Cambodia 13 Oct-04 TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 References Anderson, Kym, and W. Martin, 2005, "Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda." Draft manuscript. Bacchetta, Marc and Zdenek Drabek, "Effects of WTO Accession on Policy-Making in Sovereign States: Preliminary lessons from the recent experience of transition countries," Staff Working Paper ERSD-2002- 02. Geneva: WTO. Evenett, Simon J. (ed.), 2005a, Preparing For WTO Accession: Insights From Development Countries. January 2005. Draft manuscript. Evenett, Simon J., 2005b. "Summary Of Participants' Remarks and Recommendations." Prepared after a Joint World Bank-GTZ workshop on WTO accession matters, Berlin, 17-19 November 2004. Draft manuscript. Finger, J. Michael, Melinda D. Ingco, and Ulrich Reincke, 1996, The Uruguay Round: Statistics on Tariff Concessions Given and Received. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Grynberg, Roman, Victor Ognivtsev, and Mohammad A. Razzaque, 2002, Paying the Price for Joining the WTO: A Comparative Assessment of Service Sector Commitments by WTO Members and Acceding Countries. Commonwealth Secretariat. Economic Paper 54. London, UK. Kennett, Maxine, Simon J. Evenett, and Jonathan Gage, 2005, Evaluating WTO Accessions: Legal and Economic Perspectives. Draft manuscript. Marchetti, Juan A., 2004, "Developing Countries in the WTO Services Negotiations," Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-06. Geneva, WTO. Michalopoulos, Constantine, 2002, "WTO Accession." In Bernard M. Hoekman, Philip English, and Aaditya Mattoo (eds). Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Rose, Andrew, 2003, "Which International Institutions Promote International Trade?" Review of International Economics. Subramanian, Arvind and Shang-Jin Wei, 2003, "The WTO Promote Trade, Strongly But Unevenly." IMF Working Paper WP/03/185. Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. WTO, 1995, "Accession to the World Trade Organization," WT/ACC/1. WTO, 2002, "Accession of Least Developed Countries," WT/COMTD/LDC/12. WTO, 2004a, "Technical Note on the Accession Process," WT/ACC/10/Rev.2. WTO, 2004b, "Technical Note on the Accession Process: State of Play and Information on Current Accessions," WT/ACC/11/Rev.4. WTO, 2004c, "Doha Work Programme," WT/L/579. TRADE NOTE June 6, 2005 Zarcone, Fabrizio, Carsten Fink and Carlos A. Primo Braga, 2005, "Technical Assistance and WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience." Prepared after a Joint World Bank-GTZ workshop on WTO accession matters, Berlin, 17-19 November 2004. Draft manuscript. Further Reading Bhattasali, Deepak, William Martin, and Li Shantong, 2004, (editors.) China and the WTO: Accession, Policy Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategy. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz, 2003, "How Does The Trade Regime Affect International Trade?" Mimeo. Department of Political Science. Stanford University. Hamada, Koichi, 2004, "China's entry into the WTO and its impact on the global economic system," in Mike Moore, ed., Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Lissovolik, Bodgan and Yaroslav Lissovolik, 2004. "Russia and the WTO: The "Gravity" of Outsider Status." IMF Working Paper, WP/04/159. Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. Rose, Andrew, 2002a, "Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?" NBER Working Paper # 9273. Rose, Andrew, 2002b, "Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy?" NBER Working Paper # 9347. Rose, Andrew, 2004, "Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?", American Economic Review, 94 (March): 98-114