Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Unleashing the potential of local governments in pandemic response Serdar YILMAZ Jamie BOEX Abstract All disasters are local with important repercussions for national and sometimes for international levels. An effective emergency response requires mobilizing local government resources in the fight against disasters including pandemics. Local governments, being closer to people, are well-positioned to identify local vulnerabilities and design appropriate response actions. This paper reviews relevant literatures on the role of local government in the fight against pandemics and identifies two important prerequisites: existence of an intergovernmental coordination mechanism; and local government capacity. The research methodology includes content analysis of qualitative and quantitative information through literature review and available data in public domain. Keywords: disaster management, local government capacity, intergovernmental coordination I. INTRODUCTION In response to large-scale emergencies, such as the outbreak of a pandemic, federal or central authorities have an important role to play. However, this doesn’t mean that there is no place for local governments1 as part of a pandemic emergency response. In fact, all disasters are actually local in nature and in most countries, local governments, being closer to people, are best positioned to form the first line of defence in the fight against a pandemic. Recognizing that natural disasters and health emergencies are events that can be anticipated, the public increasingly expects better public sector leadership responding to all kinds of disasters, including pandemics (Kapucu and van Wart 2006). An effective emergency response requires Accepted for publication in Development in Practice deploying a “whole of government� approach, including the mobilization of local government resources.2 Local government officials, such as firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, are usually first to arrive to the scene of an acute emergency and are able to respond more quickly in the aftermath of a pandemic or other disaster.3 Given their proximity to people, local health officials are typically well-positioned to identify vulnerable communities and design appropriate response actions according to local conditions. Furthermore, local governments are often well-placed to adopt rapidly changing circumstances during large- scale, complex disasters, like pandemics (Baker and Refsgaard 2007). In addition, as part of wider emergency preparedness efforts, local governments can put in place prevention mechanisms as well as resiliency plans that reduce the impact or costs of recovery after disaster (Willoughby et al 2020). In that context, financial resilience of local governments in case of a sudden nationwide shock, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, is an important determinant of the success of pandemic response (Ahrens and Ferry 2020). This paper contributes to the literatures on decentralization, public health and disaster management with a specific focus on the role of local governments in pandemics. Established theories in economics and political science have articulated efficiency and accountability gains from decentralization that could accrue from devolving certain service delivery responsibilities to local governments (Oates 1972; Mueller 1996). However, there is no specific literature on the assignment of responsibilities between levels of governments in pandemics. The paper presents a case for using local governments in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic by providing examples of areas where local government involvement in pandemic response activities would improve the overall effectiveness of public sector, in a way that is synergic to the activities at higher levels. In addition, it complements public health literature by highlighting the importance Accepted for publication in Development in Practice of coordination of central and local level efforts in order to ensure the effective deployment of resources.4 Furthermore, it makes contributions to the disaster management literature by emphasizing the importance of a strong local governance system in the context of developing countries.5 II. THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN PANDEMICS The efficient and responsive provision of pandemic-related response services—as with any other public services— requires that governments satisfy the needs and preferences of citizens as well as possible. This is best achieved by the “subsidiarity� principle, which suggests that the responsibility for any function or task (such as the provision of services) should be assigned to the lowest level of government or administration that can perform the function or task efficiently.6 There is no absolute best way for deciding which level of government should be responsible for particular public services. The adequacy of any assignment of functions and expenditure responsibilities has to be judged in terms of how well it achieves the goals or objectives set up by the government at the outset of an emergency. In case of pandemics, the policy objective is to provide immediate assistance to maintain life, improve health and support the morale and socio- economic wellbeing of the affected population in local communities. The fight against infectious diseases, like the COVID-19 pandemic, cannot be a responsibility of a single jurisdiction. Externalities associated with a health emergency make it a concurrent responsibility between local and central governments.7 Therefore, it requires collaboration between levels of government. In the U.S., for example, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) Accepted for publication in Development in Practice collaborates with state and local health departments “…to solve issues or problems that cannot be easily solved by a single organization or jurisdiction� (CDC 2020). As a public health emergency, the initial or primary impact of COVID-19 pandemic falls on the health care delivery systems in all countries. In addition, the pandemic has a range of secondary impacts on public sector operations as it places stress on socio-economic systems in virtually all countries around the world. In this context, local governments are a critical part of the coronavirus response in many countries as they play important roles in four areas: 1. Increasing the level of emergency and curative local public health service delivery: In many countries, local governments are directly or indirectly involved in the provision of emergency and curative health services. Providing emergency care/curative health services: In countries where subnational governments are responsible for primary healthcare service delivery (in line with the subsidiarity principle), locally-run clinics are the first point of contact for pre-hospital treatment when patients present with symptoms associated with COVID-19. In these countries, local governments will see a major increase of demand for curative health services. An effective clinical response at the primary health facility can reduce the need for further referral and hospitalization. Furthermore, community-based health service delivery has proven to make communities more resilient during health crises (Siekmans et. al. 2017). Even in countries where local governments do not have primary responsibility for health care service delivery,8 local government resources can, if financial resources and systems allow, be used to support related emergency services such as transportation of patients (ambulance service) or providing housing, transportation or other support for medical staff within the locality. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Expanding or supplementing existing health facilities: To the extent that existing (public and private) health facilities may be overwhelmed by a pandemic, local governments are well- positioned to identify and retrofit existing buildings to open emergency care centres for treating patients. In New York, for example, state and city governments teamed up with the federal government to set up field hospitals in the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center and Central Park, and the USTA Billie Jean King National Tennis Center. In Canada, municipal indoor hockey arenas were used in some cases for the same purpose. Increasing testing volumes: Testing is an important public health measure in the identification and treatment of coronavirus infections. The recent examples of China9 and South Korea10 demonstrate the importance and effectiveness of local governments in increasing testing volumes. While overall testing strategy was coordinated by the national governments in both countries, subnational governments played an important role increasing the testing capacity in response to the pandemic. Procurement of medical and personal protective equipment: Regardless of whether local governments operate their own public health facilities, local public health officials are well- positioned to coordinate—and even acquire and distribute, as needed—personal protective equipment as well as medical devices to local health facilities. This ensures greater efficiency and coordination, and prevents local health facilities from competing with each other in purchasing the necessary equipment. In Maryland, U.S., for example, the governor-initiated negotiations led to the purchase of 500,000 coronavirus testing kits from South Korea when the federal government was struggling to provide testing kits to states.11 2. Preventing transmission and epidemiological investigations and tracking: Beyond the role that local governments play in providing clinical health services, local governments have an Accepted for publication in Development in Practice important role to play in preventing transmission of infectious diseases within the local community. Production and dissemination of awareness-raising information: A good emergency communication is an important element of fighting against health emergencies (Gillespie et. al. 2016). It is important to focus on raising awareness and educating communities about nonpharmaceutical intervention and other public health prevention strategies. Local government officials—including elected local officials as well as teachers, police officers, community health workers, market directors and local administrators—are the public officials that citizens most often interact with directly. As such, local governments play an important role in maintaining ongoing communications with community leaders and other stakeholders, in some cases in local languages,12 to ensure consistent messaging. In Nepal, for example, many local governments are actively engaged in promoting hand washing and good hygiene practices as part of the pandemic response. Enforcing social distancing and other administrative measure: Containment of the spread of viruses requires local administrative controls, such as closing restaurants and other businesses as well as enforcing social distancing among the local population. It is often the local inspectors and other “street level bureaucrats� that are typically employed by local governments that are counted on to implement and enforce such measures, as local perception, culture and religion play an important role in maintaining social distancing. Enforcing proper environmental and sanitation regulations: Containment of spread of the virus which requires handling of suspected cases as well as medical equipment according to proper environmental and sanitation regulations. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Investigation of disease outbreaks and clusters is a critical basic government function conducted by the national and subnational authorities. In many African countries, local authorities, including traditional leaders, take part in field epidemiological activities in disease outbreaks and epidemics, serving as guides, providing introductions at the community and household levels, and facilitating community and family participation in investigations (Foster 2002). Contact tracing, recording and reporting of contacts: In countries which successfully contained the spread of the coronavirus, such as Vietnam and South Korea, local authorities are at the heart of contact tracing because the spread of the virus is best understood as a pattern of local outbreaks rather than a national pandemic. Achieving the goal of early detection and isolation of any new cases in order to prevent further transmission requires the involvement of local authorities. During the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, for example, local authorities provided strong support to contact tracing efforts (Senga et. al. 2017). Isolation of suspected cases/managing quarantine sites: In epidemics and pandemics, quarantines have been used for centuries as a public health measure for containing emerging outbreaks, particularly in urban areas. Quarantine involves using the police power of the government to restrict the movement of people who have (potentially) been exposed to a communicable disease to prevent further transmission (Barbera et. al. 2001). Perhaps no public health measure better demonstrates the essential role that local governments can play in pandemic responses than the power to institute a local quarantine.13 In Ukraine, for example, cabinet resolution #211 allows local authorities to create temporary quarantine facilities.14 In the Indian state of Bihar, a major contributor of migrant labour to other states, the state government issued a letter to establish isolation centres in local governments: fully functional local government buildings with water, Accepted for publication in Development in Practice electricity and toilet were transformed to serve as isolation centres for the migrant workers returning from other states due to the lockdown. 3. Mitigating the impact of the pandemic on other local public services: Pandemics often directly or indirectly impact a range of other local public services. To the extent that local governments provide these local services, they must review and adjust (and in some cases, temporarily suspend) the provision of services to reduce the spread of the virus and take action to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on these services. For instance: Ensuring safe water supply: In some emergencies access to water is impacted, particularly in communities where water points are shared. In many countries, local governments are responsible for the delivery of water and sanitation and other utility services. Local government often have special responsibility for providing such services in informal settlement areas, where these services are critical for good hygiene and preventing the spread of infectious diseases. To the extent that households are unable to afford water tariffs or electricity bills during the period of the pandemic, local governments have to find ways to keep the power on and to keep the water running to prevent a bad situation from getting worse. In numerous countries around the world, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Kenya, governments pledged various forms of free or discounted water, deferred the payment of bills, or suspended any disconnection of water supply in response to COVID-19 (Cooper 2020). Mitigating impact on education: In response to the coronavirus pandemic, many countries implemented (temporary) school closures to reduce the spread of the virus. In many countries, local governments are responsible for operating public primary and secondary schools, as well as for regulating private schools within their jurisdiction. In these countries, local governments are Accepted for publication in Development in Practice scrambling to support the continuation of teaching and learning during the physical school closures. In addition, local authorities are assessing whether and when the local conditions permit schools to re-open (possibly prior to the widespread availability of a vaccine). 4. Supporting social and economic relief activities: Beyond the health impact of the coronavirus, the pandemic has triggered one of the most sudden and severe global economic downturns in history. Although the exact role of local governments in providing social and economic relief varies from country to county, local governments are often at the forefront of the public sector’s response: Establishing and operating food and non-food distribution centres: Aid extended to affected populations by local governments forms a significant part of the pandemic relief program in many countries. These consist of a wide range of activities varying from providing food assistance to medical supply distribution (such as face masks) centres. In additional, local governments are better positioned to bring additional relief to affected communities through involving local non- governmental organizations. In Nepal, for example, provincial governments have established provincial COVID-19 relief funds to collect contributions from businesses and private individuals to provide relief for the poor and marginalized communities. In addition, provincial governments formed provincial level human clusters and reorganized provincial coordination focal agency system for effectively coordinating relief effort within their jurisdictions where local governments are involved in the food distribution effort to low income populations. Building and operating homeless shelters: People experiencing unsheltered homelessness may be at risk for infection. In many countries, this includes migrant workers who are likely to experience homelessness as an immediate impact of a pandemic. In order to protect these vulnerable people Accepted for publication in Development in Practice and to avoid further spread of the disease, local governments can establish encampment sites with restroom facilities that have functional water taps and are stocked with hand hygiene materials (soap, drying materials) and bath tissue. In this section we have made arguments for devolving certain responsibilities to local governments in responding to a pandemic. However, there are two important prerequisites in deploying local governments effectively in fighting against the pandemic: first, there needs to be intergovernmental coordination mechanism to ensure effective deployment of resources across government levels; and second, local governments need to be institutionally capacitated to be a valuable partner in pandemic response efforts. In this light, many countries, especially developing ones, national governments need to examine their intergovernmental coordination arrangements and capacity of local governments to determine the extent to which they are able to leverage and deploy local governments effectively. III. PRECONDITION-1 FOR AN EFFECTIVE PANDEMIC RESPONSE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION International experience with past natural disasters and pandemics highlights the importance of coordination within the government and across levels of government to avoid duplication or shared responsibility challenges.15 While coordination mechanisms vary across countries, it is important to clarify the roles and responsibilities of different actors in pandemic response to avoid confusion and effective service provision. A common problem in many countries is the lack of a formal assignment of pandemic response responsibilities across levels of government. Therefore, a clear first step in deploying local Accepted for publication in Development in Practice governments for pandemic response is improving the legislative framework as well as strengthening the implementation of sectoral laws and regulations. A legislative framework for pandemic management clarifies the roles and responsibilities vertically and horizontally within a government during a crisis. It allows multi-agency multi-sectoral response actions by identifying mutual and dynamic tasks rather than individual and static roles. South Korea offers a good example of effective intergovernmental coordination. After the middle eastern respiratory syndrome (MERS) epidemic, South Korea, amended its Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (Act No. 14286) in 2016, establishing a comprehensive framework to respond to infectious diseases. When the first coronavirus cases reported in South Korea, local governments formed Local Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters (LDSCHQ) to allow for effective local coordination in their effort to respond to the pandemic. LDSCHQs play an important role in epidemiological response actions (see Figure 1). The establishment of this coordination modality allowed the central government to undertake vigorous epidemiological measures to track and test suspected cases jointly with local governments. In order to speed up epidemiological investigations, local governments are responsible for conducting preliminary investigations. The central rapid response teams are utilized to help local governments in regions experiencing massive outbreaks. Those identified cases are put under self-quarantine and monitored one-on-one by staff of the Ministry of Interiors and Safety as well as local governments. FIGURE 1 Switzerland, on the other hand, has been using the powers of emergency law for intergovernmental coordination. After the detection of the first COVID-19 case,16 the Swiss Federal Council (FC)17 in an extraordinary session on February 28 classified the situation as an emergency according to Accepted for publication in Development in Practice the Article 6 of the Epidemics Act (EpG), which allows the FC to take over some of the responsibilities of the cantons in consultation with the canton administrations. The FC issued a COVID-19 Ordinance18 on the basis of EpG, which has been revised a dozen times since its issuance in March. However, after the deterioration of the situation the FC declared “Notrecht�19 on March 16, 2020 (for the first time since the World War II), pursuant to the Article 7 of the EpG, giving extraordinary powers to the FC. The Notrecht provision gives emergency powers to the FC, according to the Article 185 of the Federal Constitution, to implement uniform measures in the entire country. The Italian experience, on the other hand, highlights the importance of horizontal and vertical coordination. In Italy, weaknesses in the coordination mechanisms—particularly in the initial phase of the country’s response—were a source of tension between the national government and regions and autonomous provinces. In fact, the prime minister of the country was clearly frustrated by the lapses in the identification of patient zero and contact tracing thereafter. 20 In Italy, the subnational governments struggled to coordinate their response actions among themselves. The central government threatened to roll back autonomy of regions and provinces accusing them of uncoordinated measures in declaring quarantines, school closures, cancellation of social events and limiting economic activities. More importantly, subnational governments had difficulty to trace contacts and track people’s movements during local outbreaks. Another important lesson learned from the coronavirus pandemic is the importance of a “command centre� to collect and monitor data from abroad and from within the country to detect emerging disease threats early and coordinate a response across levels of government. The Italian experience shows that in the absence of accurate and timely information and effective vertical and horizontal Accepted for publication in Development in Practice coordination pandemic response can become a challenging task costing thousands of lives. Similarly, in the U.S, each state funds and operates its own public health and disease surveillance system. As this pandemic started, the consequence of the lack of intergovernmental coordination was a failure to understand the magnitude of the problem and to pursue the kind of testing needed to detect cases and start contact tracing. In Canada a similar set of arrangements worked reasonably well, although both Ontario and Québec requested and obtained military personnel to help in retirement homes; this led to the Canadian military providing on-the-ground observations of issues in these homes.21 IV. PRECONDITION-2 FOR AN EFFECTIVE LOCAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY Another important factor in the effectiveness of local governments in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic is the institutional capacity of these bodies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a strong correlation between local governments’ institutional capacity and the effective of the local level’s COVID-19 response. In countries where local governments have relatively strong institutional capacity, the effectiveness of the local response has been more effective in containing the pandemic. Vietnam provides a very good example of using local governments effectively in fighting against the coronavirus pandemic. The strength of the intergovernmental coordination system and subnational government capacity seem to have been important factors in the success of Vietnam’s fight against the pandemic. At the outset of the pandemic, Vietnam established a National Steering Committee for COVID-19 Prevention and Control chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister. The national steering committee structure was also mirrored at the provincial level. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice The joint efforts of the national and provincial steering committees managed to keep the infection rate very low and contain the spread of the disease in Vietnam (Huynh et. al. 2020). As a result, the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has not been too alarming in Vietnam. Vietnam has invested in improving the institutional capacity of subnational governments over the years.22 An analysis of the institutional capacity of provinces and the prevalence of COVID-19 cases highlights that there is a strong correlation between provincial performance measures and the number of COVID-19 cases (Huynh et. al. 2020). Huynh et. al. (2020) find negative correlations between the number of COVID-19 cases and two different provincial capacity indices. In case of provincial competitiveness index (PCI), there is a clear negative relationship between the index value and the number of COVID-19 cases per 1000 persons (see Figure 2). Huynh et. al. (2020) report the same negative correlation between the provincial governance and public administration performance index (PAPI) and the number of COVID-19 cases per 1000 persons (see Figure 3). Although correlation does not necessarily imply causality, the provincial analysis suggests a strong relationship between local institutional strength and effective local pandemic response actions. FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3 V. CONCLUSION Beyond local governments’ roles directly related to pandemics, natural emergencies and other disasters, COVID-19 is reminding policymakers all around the world that out of all government levels, the local government level is closest to home and thus, the best-positioned to respond to Accepted for publication in Development in Practice their specific challenges. By highlighting the potential value of local governments to the people, in many different countries, the pandemic is also highlighting the obstacles that are standing in the way of local governments performing their functions in an effective manner. In fact, in many countries, local governments are under-appreciated, under-staffed and under- resourced; local government planning and administrative capacity may be weak, and intergovernmental coordination is often ineffective. As such, the pandemic offers an opportunity to identify the numerous areas where local governments can help the public sector accomplish their goal efficiently and effectively beyond the current emergency—better schools, better health services, more public parks, and so on—as well as offering an opportunity to identify the obstacles and binding constraints that stand in the way of local governments playing these role once society has returned to normal. In case of natural disasters, a common view is that the power and resource advantage of the central government means that it is best positioned to implement an effective disaster response. However, there are considerable potential gains from an effective, intergovernmental response to disasters. Therefore, the policy advice is to decentralize specific disaster management responsibilities to local governments whenever they are able to provide an effective and efficient response. Empirical evidence seems to support this advice: more decentralized countries seem to have fewer fatalities in disasters compared to more centralized ones (Skidmore and Toya 2013). Drawing on the disaster management and public finance literatures, we argue that pandemic response requires involvement of local governments in relief effort. The public finance literature suggests that there are efficiency gains from devolving certain responsibilities to local governments. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Notwithstanding the arguments for local government provision of certain services, there are reasons to question the efficiency and effectiveness of relying primarily on local governments for pandemic response (Wolensky and Wolensky 1990). In many developing countries, capacity constraints at the local level form a major impediment in front of effective disaster response (Scott and Tarazona 2011). The capacity of local governments has an important bearing on disaster response effectiveness. Local governments often lack financial, institutional and technical resources and capacities to respond to a pandemic. If we want to prepare and respond effectively to future disasters, including epidemics and pandemics, it is important to build the capacity of local governments, which forms our first line of defence and response. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Figure 1: Coordination of Pandemic Response Actions in South Korea Source: The Government of the Republic of Korea, Tackling COVID-19 Health, Quarantine and Economic Measures: Korean Experience, March 31, 2020. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Figure 2. COVID-19 Cases and Provincial Competitiveness Index Source: Huynh et. al. 2020. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Figure 3. COVID-19 Cases and Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index Source: Huynh et. al. 2020. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Endnotes: 1 In this paper, unless otherwise noted, we use the term “local governments� as the general term for the subnational (local and regional) entities used by the public sector to interact with its citizens below the national level. 2 When considering the diversity of intergovernmental arrangements and disaster prevention and mitigation frameworks around the globe, there is a risk of generalizing issues that are mostly specific to local and country contexts. For instance, firefighters and first responders may not be employed by local governments in every country around the world. Instead, the global experience with decentralization and localization reflects a vast range of practices. As such, in line with much of the recent literature on making decentralization work (e.g., OECD 2019), our aim is not to offer a single, universal prescription to pandemic responses. However, the theoretical and conceptual considerations dealing with decentralization and localization are valid in most country contexts and can be generalized to apply to most—if not all—public administration systems. 3 It should be noted that in some countries, such as many francophone countries, police and fire fighter services are provided by the central government, while in many countries, the private sector is involved in the provision of emergency management services. 4 In the context of local governments’ role in pandemics, the public health literature focuses on issues like public trust (Blair, Morse and Tasi 2017)), public behavior (Bults, et. al. 2011), public mobilization (Ding 2014), state legitimacy (Fluckiger, Ludwig and Onder 2019), and social mobilization (Gillespie, et. al. 2016). 5 There is a robust literature on the role of decentralized governance for effective disaster prevention, mitigation and recovery (Pathak and Ahmad 2018; Paton and Johnston, 2001; Tobin, 1999). 6 Bird (2000) calls the subsidiarity principle “the basic rule of efficient expenditure assignment.� According to the rule of efficient expenditure assignment, “…almost all public services (other than national defense, foreign policy, and surprisingly few others) should in principle be delivered at the local level, with local decision-makers deciding what services are provided, to whom, and in what quantity and quality, and with local taxpayers paying for the services provided� (Bird 2000; p. 2). Accepted for publication in Development in Practice 7 According to Yilmaz, Vaillancourt and Dafflon (2012: p. 108), “if…the activities of one government have important external effects on the individuals or businesses located in other jurisdictions or on other government types, then these activities should be well coordinated among the affected governments.� In the case of pandemic response, there are vertical and horizontal externalities. The nature of health pandemic response requires vertically integrated response; local governments providing certain local functions and central government backstopping local governments. There are also horizontal externalities as contagious nature of the disease makes it easy to move from one geographic area to bordering areas. 8 In Bangladesh, for example, health care service delivery is primarily the responsibility of the central government and provided by field offices and programs of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. In a global study of decentralized health and education finance, Boex and Edwards (2016) find that devolution is the primary modality for delivering health services in fewer than half the developing and transition countries analyzed. 9 Goh, B. (2020, April 14). Getting a coronavirus test in Wuhan: fast, cheap and easy. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-wuhan-testin/getting-a-coronavirus-test-in-wuhan-fast- cheap-and-easy-idUSKCN21W0C5 10 Kim, M. S. (2020, April 17). Seoul’s radical experiment in digital contact tracing. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seouls-radical-experiment-in-digital-contact-tracing 11 Budryk, Z. and Moreno, J. E. (2020, April 30). Maryland governor says coronavirus tests acquired from South Korea under guard at disclosed location. The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/495519-maryland- governor-says-coronavirus-tests-acquired-from-south-korea-under 12 https://globalvoices.org/2020/05/11/promoting-coronavirus-education-through-indigenous-languages/ 13 See Ding (2014) for a discussion on the role of public participation in the success of quarantine measures and excellent discussion on the historical association of quarantines with class, gender, ethnicity, politics, and prejudices. 14 https://oporaua.org/en/news/parliament/19753-nadzvichainii-stan-nadzvichaina-situatsiia-ta-karantin-qna 15 The lack of coordination has been cited as one of the most pressing challenges to the containment efforts of the Ebola virus in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. See Oluseun Olu et. al. (2016); Sacks et. al. (2015); Ross (2017); Thiam et. al. (2015). 16 The first case of COVID-19 was detected in the Canton of Ticino on February 25, 2020. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice 17 The Federal Council is the executive arm of the Swiss Confederation composed of seven members. Each councilor heads one of the seven federal executive departments and the presidency of the Swiss Confederation rotates annually among them. 18 The ordinance lists various measures to reduce the risk of transmission and to combat COVID-19 such as restriction on entry into Switzerland, directing international air traffic to three designated airports, closing border crossings, export restrictions on personal protective equipment and medical supplies, prohibition of face-to-face events and large gatherings, and mandating cantons to report on stock levels of certain medications. 19 Emergency law. 20 Italy scrambles to contain coronavirus outbreak after admitting hospital mess-up. CNN 2020 Feb 26. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/25/europe/italy-coronavirus-backfoot-intl/index.html 21 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/military-long-term-care-home-report-covid-ontario-1.5585844 22 In Vietnam, subnational governments are responsible for nearly 60 percent of total government spending, which is nearly 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice References: Ahrens, T. and Ferry, L. (2020) “Financial resilience of English local government in the aftermath of COVID-19.� Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 32 (5): 813-23. Altman, D. E. and Morgan, D. H. (1983) “The Role of State and Local Government in Health� Health Affairs 2 (4). https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2.4.7 Baker, D. and Refsgaard, K. (2007) “Institutional development and scale matching in disaster response management.� Ecological Economics 63(2-3): 331-343. Barbera, J., Macintyre, A., Gostin, L., Inglesby, T., O’Toole, T., DeAtley, C., Tonat,K., Layton, M. (2001) “Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic And Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences.� Journal of the American Medical Association 286:2711–2717. doi: 10.1001/jama.286.21.2711. Bird, R. M. (2000) Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Universal Principles, Local Applications. Georgia State University Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Working Paper # 00-2. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Boex, J., Edwards, B. (2016) “The (mis-)measurement of fiscal decentralization in developing and transition countries: Accounting for devolved and non-devolved local public sector spending�, Public Finance Review 44(6): 788-810. Blair, Robert A., Benjamin S. Morse, Lily I. Tasi. 2017. “Public health and public trust: Survey evidence from the Ebola Virus Disease epidemic in Liberia� Social Science and Medicine 172: 89- 97. Bults, Marloes, Desirée JMA Beaujean, Onno de Zwart, Gerjo Kok, Pepijn van Empelen, Jim E van Steenbergen, Jan Hendrik Richardus, Hélène ACM Voeten. (2011). “Perceived risk, anxiety, and behavioural responses of the general public during the early phase of the Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in the Netherlands: results of three consecutive online surveys� BMC Public Health 11 https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-11-2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2020) ‘Key Concepts & Definitions’, available at https://www.cdc.gov/publichealthgateway/cjs/concepts.html (retrieved 18 May 2020). Cooper, R. (2020) Water for the Urban Poor and Covid-19. K4D Helpdesk Report 826. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Ding, H. (2014) “Transnational Quarantine Rhetorics: Public Mobilization in SARS and in H1N1 Flu� The Journal of Medical Humanities 35:191–210. DOI 10.1007/s10912-014-9282-8 Foster, S. O. (2002) “Epidemiological investigations in international settings� in Michael B. Gregg (ed.) Field Epidemiology (Oxford University Press: Oxford): 345-353. Fluckiger, Matthias, Markus Ludwig and Ali Sina Onder (2019) “Ebola and State Legitimacy� The Economic Journal 129 (July): 2064-2089. Gillespie, A. M., Obregon, R., El Asawi, R., Richey, C., Manoncourt, E., Joshi, K., Naqvi, S., Pouye, A., Safi, N., Chitnis, K., Quereshib, S. (2016) “Social Mobilization and Community Engagement Central to the Ebola Response in West Africa: Lessons for Future Public Health Emergencies� Global Health: Science and Practice 4 (4): 626-646. Huynh, D., Tosun, M. S., and Yilmaz, S. (2020) “All-of-government response to the COVID-19 pandemic: The case of Vietnam� Public Administration and Development 40 (4): 236-39. Kapucu, N. and van Wart, M. (2006) “The evolving role of the public sector in managing catastrophic disasters lessons learned� Administration and Society 38 (3): 1-30. Mueller, D. (1996) Constitutional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Oates, Wallace E. (1972) Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Oluseun Olu, O., Lamunu, M., Chimbaru, A., Adegboyega, A., Conthe, I., Nsenga, N., Sempiira, N., Kamara, K. and Dafae, F.M. (2016) “Incident Management Systems Are Essential for Effective Coordination of Large Disease Outbreaks: Perspectives from the Coordination of the Ebola Outbreak Response in Sierra Leone� Frontiers in Public Health 4: 254. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2016.00254 Pathak, S. and M. M. Ahmad. (2018) “Role of government in flood disaster recovery for SMEs in Pathumthani province, Thailand� Natural Hazards 93(2): 957-966. Paton, D., and Johnston, D. (2001) “Disasters and communities: vulnerability, resilience and preparedness.� Disaster Prevention and Management 10(4): 270-277. Ross, E. (2017) “Command and control of Sierra Leone's Ebola outbreak response: evolution of the response architecture� Philosophical Transactions B 372. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2016.0306 Sacks, Jilian A., Elizabeth Zehe, Cindil Redick, Alhoussaine Bah, Kai Cowger, Mamady Camara, Aboubacar Diallo, Abdel Nasser Iro Gigo, Ranu S Dhillon, and Anne Liu (2015) “Introduction of Mobile Health Tools to Support Ebola Surveillance and Contact Tracing in Guinea� Global Health Science Practice 3 (4): 646-659. doi: 10.9745/GHSP-D-15-00207 Accepted for publication in Development in Practice Scott, Z. and Tarazona, M. (2011) Study on disaster risk reduction, decentralization and political Economy: Decentralization and disaster risk reduction. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, ISDR, UNDP and Oxford Policy Management. Available at https://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/bgdocs/Scott_&_Tarazona_2011.pdf Senga, M., Koi, A., Moses, L., Wauquier, N., Barboza, P., Fernandez-Garcia, M. D., Engedashet, E., Kuti-George, F., Mitiku, A. D., Vandi, M., Kargbo, D., Formenty, P., Hugonnet, S., Bertherat, E., and Lane, C. (2017) “Contact tracing performance during the Ebola virus disease outbreak in Kenema district, Sierra Leone� Philosophical Transactions B 372. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2016.0300 Shalala, D. E. (1998) “Collaboration in the Fight Against Infectious Diseases.� Emerging Infectious Diseases, 4(3), 354-357. https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0403.980302. Siekmans, K., Sohani, S., Boima, T., Koffa, F., Basil, L. and Laaziz, S. (2017) “Community-based health care is an essential component of a resilient health system: evidence from Ebola outbreak in Liberia� BMC Public Health 17:84 DOI 10.1186/s12889-016-4012-y Skidmore, M., and Toya, H. (2013) “Natural disaster impacts and fiscal decentralization.� Land Economics 89 (1): 101-117. Thiam, S., Delamou, A., Camara, S., Carter, J., Lama, E. K., Ndiaye, B., Nyagero, J., Nduba, J. and Ngom, M. (2015) “Challenges in controlling the Ebola outbreak in two prefectures in Guinea: Accepted for publication in Development in Practice why did communities continue to resist?� Pan African Medical Journal 22 (Suppl 1). doi: 10.11694/pamj.supp.2015.22.1.6626 Tobin, G. (1999) “Sustainability and community resilience: the Holy Grail of Hazard planning?� Environmental Hazards 1: 13-25. Willoughby, K., Bathurst, D., Devereaux, G., Goss, K. C., Kellar, E., Metzenbaum, S., Hoeve, J. T. and Ucellini. L. W. (2020) Emergency and Disaster Management Case Study. National Academy of Public Administration. Wolensky, R. P. and Wolensky, K. C. (1990) “Local Government's problem with disaster management: a literature review and structural analysis.� Review of Policy Research 9(4): 703- 725. Yilmaz, S., Vaillancourt, F and Dafflon, B. (2012) “State and local government finance: Why it matters?� in Robert D. Ebel and John E. Petersen (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of State and Local Government Finance. Oxford University Press: Oxford.