



1. Project Data

Project ID P156479	Project Name Chad Safety Nets Project
Country Chad	Practice Area(Lead) Social Protection & Jobs

L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-D1340,TF-A2801	Closing Date (Original) 31-Dec-2020	Total Project Cost (USD) 10,037,135.85
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Bank Approval Date 01-Sep-2016	Closing Date (Actual) 30-Apr-2020
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	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	10,000,000.00	5,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	9,992,168.70	5,000,000.00
Actual	10,037,135.85	5,000,000.00

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to pilot cash transfers and cash-for-work interventions to the poor and lay the foundations of an adaptive safety nets system (Financing Agreement, dated October 5, 2016, Schedule 1). Output targets were revised during the final year of the project informally. (Restructurings only changed closing dates, and the Results Framework (RF) targets were not listed as revised in the ICR). While



this could call for a split evaluation, this ICR and ICR review did not apply one since it was clear from the outset that such split would not affect the outcome rating.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

Cofinancing amounts listed below were given in ICR, paragraphs 15-19 and actual expenditures were given in ICR, Table 4.1, p. 52 (with some notes on discrepancies below).

Component 1: Safety Net Pilots: (Appraisal Cost US\$6.5 million equivalent, of which US\$3.1 million equivalent from IDA financing (IDA-D1340) and US\$3.4 million equivalent from the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (SASPP) multidonor trust fund (ASP-MDTF); actual expenditures US\$6.9 million).

This component was designed to provide supplemental consumption and diversify income opportunities for poor households in three different areas of Chad by piloting unconditional cash transfers (CTs) and Cash for Work (CfW) activities. Pilot CfW interventions for the poor in urban and semi-urban locations in N'Djamena would finance 80 days of work at US\$2.00 per day worked (5 hours per day) for 9,000 beneficiaries over a period of three years and would be focused on such minor public works as street cleaning, garbage collection, rehabilitation and gutter and culvert cleaning, sidewalk paving using locally produced materials, and the Logone River Bank restoration. CTs to poor households with children under the age of 12 and/or pregnant women (monthly transfers of US\$25.00, payable every two months, to 6,200 households) were focused on Logone Occidental region and Bahr el Ghazal (ICR, paragraph 16 and Annex 4, paragraph 3, p. 52).

In addition to cash transfers, the component was to support "Accompanying Measures" to raise awareness on topics such as exclusive breastfeeding, nutrition, water sanitation, and hygiene (for CT transfers) and financial literacy (for CfW transfers) (ICR, paragraphs 16 and 17). After the mid-term review (MTR), IDA and the Government agreed to reallocate some funds originally planned for CfWs to CTs (easier to implement) and to two new categories of interventions: "adaptive safety net transfers" targeted at specific villages with seasonal food insecurity, and "productive inclusion measures" targeted to a random sample of CT recipients. They also decided to cancel accompanying measures for the CfW and devote some of the additional resources to implementation challenges including communication strategies (ICR, paragraph 24, task team leader (TTL) meeting, June 16, 2020).

Component 2: Development of Service Delivery Instruments: (Appraisal cost US\$1.6 million, completely funded by the ASP-MDTF; actual expenditure US\$1.2 million.)

This component was designed to support the development and use of a new institutional framework with service delivery instruments capable of providing the operational building blocks to support the new Social



Safety Net (SSN) system, for this project and future projects. The component would finance (a) an efficient and cost-effective targeting mechanism and harmonized data collection; (b) a unified social registry (USR) which would initially have data for Project beneficiaries only; (c) a payment system; (d) a grievance management system; and (e) a management information system (MIS) for both pilot transfer programs. During the course of project implementation, the Government passed a decree in September 2017 requiring the use of a unified questionnaire for household surveys, with all data captured in the USR. This meant that the data in the USR went beyond covering project beneficiaries only, and would cover not only non-targeted populations for this project, but some participants in other donors' programs as well (ICR, paragraph 18).

Component 3: Project Management, Communication and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):
(Appraisal cost US\$1.9 million, completely funded by IDA; actual expenditure US\$1.9 million).

This component would establish the Safety Net Unit (CFS) responsible for implementation of the project, which was placed under the Ministry of Economy and Development Planning (MEDP) (formerly the Ministry of Planning and Prospective (Project Appraisal Document (PAD), paragraph 39). The component would equip the CFS to implement the project by financing key procurement and financial management components and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The component would also finance information and communication campaigns to raise awareness among potential participants and the population at large on the purposes and design of the project.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost. Project cost was estimated at US\$10 million, of which US\$5 million was to be provided by IDA (IDA-D1340) and US\$5 million by the ASP-MDTF. The ICR's datasheet, p. 2 listed the project cost as revised downward to US\$9.99 million, and the actual final disbursed amount at completion as US\$10.04 million. The ICR's Table 4.1, Costs by Component (p. 52), listed the actual costs at completion at US\$10 million. The TTL stated the numbers in the data sheet (ICR, p. 2) were system generated and were not under their control and were likely due to exchange rate adjustments (TTL, June 22, 2020). They confirmed there was no formal revision of targets in the restructuring which took place after the mid-term review (MTR). Some redistribution of finances took place within the allowed 15% for reallocation of proceeds between components. The final actual amount disbursed of the IDA portion was US\$5.31 million according to the ICR, Table 4.1, p. 52 and US\$5.04 million, according to ICR, p. 2 data sheet. The TTLs again attributed these discrepancies to exchange rate changes. There were no discrepancies in the ASP-MDTF-financed components, which had disbursed US\$5 million at completion.

Financing. Component 1 financing was split: IDA financed US\$3.1 million and the ASP-MDTF financed US\$3.4 million. For component 2, US\$1.6 million was financed entirely by the ASP-MDTF. Component 3 (US\$1.9 million) was financed entirely by IDA. There was no borrower contribution. Some costs of World Bank supervision were borne by the ASP-MDTF.

Dates. The original SSN project was approved September 1, 2016 and became effective December 22, 2016. The original closing date was December 31, 2020 for the IDA components (ICR, p. 2) and June 30, 2018 for the ASP-MDTF (Grant Agreement, p. 14, paragraph B2). The first restructuring, approved June 11, 2018 extended the closing date of the ASP-MDTF to September 30, 2019. The second restructuring, approved September 26, 2019 extended it further (for ASP-MDTF) to December 31, 2019. During both these restructurings, the closing date for the IDA component remained the same. The Project's mid-term review (MTR) took place as planned (January 2019). Afterwards, some reallocation of proceeds



which implicitly changed targets took place, but these were not formally recorded (ICR, paragraph 86). The third and final restructuring, approved May 9, 2020 (ICR, p. 2) synchronized the closing dates of IDA and ASP-MDTF, moving the dates for both portions up to April 30, 2020, since the project had largely achieved its objectives and a follow-on project with scaled up objectives had been approved (Chad-Refugee and Host Community Support Project (PARCA) (ICR, paragraph 25).

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The PDO was and remains highly relevant for several reasons. First, Chad has suffered from high poverty and low socioeconomic indicators for some time (a rank of 185 out of 188 in human development index in 2015), and recent oil price decreases have further exacerbated the low living standards. It also has suffered from drought and conflict stresses. Second, where extant, actual safety net services were provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and official aid organizations, often in the context of periodic disasters; sustainable capacity for safety net protection was largely missing in CHAD and limited to some few services targeted at children (ICR, paragraphs 1-6). Third, a new opportunity presented itself in July 2015 when the Government's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS 2016-2020) was approved in July 2015. This project provided an opportunity for the Bank/IDA and donor partners to operationalize the NSPS, and relaunch lending operations after a several-years-gap (ICR, paragraph 7).

Finally, and most importantly, the project as designed was aligned and remains aligned with the World Bank's Country Partnership Framework (FY2016-2020) (CPF) (Report No. 95277-TD dated November 3, 2015), particularly Objective 3.3 addressing "building human capital and reducing vulnerability". That area of engagement clearly outlined health, education, and social protection as its pillars, with a focus on establishing a social protection system targeting the most vulnerable households. The continued relevance at completion is also evidenced by the fact that this project set the stage for a follow-on, even more ambitious social protection project, PARCA (P164748) (ICR, paragraph 25). The Government is currently in the process of updating its NSPS, showing its continuing commitment to social protection and poverty alleviation (ICR, paragraph 28).

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

To pilot cash transfer and cash-for-work interventions to the poor



Rationale

Theory of Change:

Safety net Pilot Preparation **activities** included targeting design, identification of beneficiaries, identification of public works activities for cash for work, and mobilization of local implementers for accompanying measures. These activities were envisioned to lead to two types of outputs: (a) cash transfers (CfW, CTs, and, later, "adaptive safety net transfers" defined below) and (b) accompanying measures that focused on human development and "productive inclusion". Arising from these outputs, envisioned **outcomes for beneficiaries** included temporary employment, increased consumption, some diversified income-generating activities, improved human development (e.g. improved nutrition, school attendance). If these were sustained, an additional envisioned outcome for beneficiaries would be reduced vulnerability. Envisioned **outcomes for country** included lessons learned (from the pilot) for scaleup and progress toward the building of a long-term sustainable safety net system. If these outcomes were achieved, envisioned **impact for select beneficiaries** would include increased capacity or long-term investment in human development and diversified economic activities, and thus increased resilience.

Interdependence: Full implementation of the safety net pilot activities were understood to be dependent on Objective 2 (establishing the foundations of the adaptive safety nets system), Component 2 (development of the service delivery instruments), and Component 3 (support for procurement, financial management and M&E).

Outputs and associated intermediate results:

Cash for Work: Partially Achieved. In each district, two CfW rounds of four months were initially scheduled. During each round, 1500 people (one person per household) were to work for 80 days and earn CFAF 1,200 per working day, equivalent of US\$2.00 (5 hours per day). The total targeted number of beneficiaries was 9,000 beneficiaries working over a period of three years. However, this pilot program only transferred cash to 6,956 beneficiary households --only 77% of the original target. The total number of days worked achieved (Intermediate Result Indicator (IRI)) likewise proportionally fell short of its target (720,000 days) to about 549,560 days (IRI); the ICR reported inconsistently on this indicator, mentioning that some weaknesses in the MIS and monitoring cast doubt on some of the data (ICR, paragraph 34). The main reason for not meeting targets was a delay in receiving the Government's approval of the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) (TTL, June 16, 2020). There were also issues with inexperienced local implementers, and slow choice of public works. The planned phased implementation could not be achieved, and thus the two planned rounds of program implementation (with a feedback loop for learning) did not take place as planned. Trying to implement them simultaneously resulted in a shortage of tools, and some unsafe work conditions. Some discontent and communication issues surfaced. (See Section 10a to come on Safeguard issues.) Because of these implementation issues, after the MTR, two key decisions were agreed with Government: a) the CfW beneficiary target was revised downward, and some funds originally meant for CfW were transferred to finance "adaptive safety net cash transfers" for 1040 households (see below); and b) no "accompanying measures" (financial literacy) would be undertaken for the CfW (IRI). On the positive side, 99% of recipients (both CfW and CT) received payments on time (IRI).

Regular Cash Transferred to CT Beneficiaries: Achieved. The project exactly achieved its original target by transferring regular cash to 6,200 CT household beneficiaries. Women in households received payments of US\$25 equivalent, payable every two months for two years. The impact evaluation showed that these transfers resulted in an increase in consumption of at least 47%, which, when discounted, justified the project.



An additional 1,404 temporary “adaptive cash transfers” were later added. (ICR, Annex 1, p. 38, see below for more detail). Qualitative indicators which were met or exceeded include timeliness of payments (99% for both pilot programs), successful targeting, and full participation in human development “accompany measures” (village meetings) as well as “productive inclusion measures” for a sample of beneficiaries. (See below for more detail on these related output components.)

“Adaptive Cash Transfers”: *Achieved.* After the MTR, as mentioned above, a decision was made to revise downward the target for CfW beneficiaries and reallocate some funds to “adaptive cash transfers”. Although the PAD and ICR also used this term as one that encompasses all cash transfers (e.g. Objective 1), in this particular case, the additional “adaptive cash transfers” were defined as CTs which were deployed in response to a shock (such as a climate shock) and were generally short and temporary in nature compared to poverty targeted CTs (ICR, p.12, footnote 5). During the 2019 lean season, the CFS provided these adaptive cash transfers in the south Bahr El Ghazal to particularly vulnerable households at high risk of food insecurity. Assistance of CFAF 15,000 per household per month (or US\$25) was provided over a period of four months (from June to September 2019). These transfers benefitted villages and households that were not covered by regular CTs. After selecting 22 villages in south Bahr El Ghazal using geographic targeting based on food insecurity, the CFS carried out community validation and beneficiary households’ registration processes, starting with 1,026 households in June 2019 and continuing with more households in 10 additional villages. In the beneficiary villages, all registered households systematically benefitted from the adaptive cash transfer intervention - 1404 in total (ICR, Annex 6, paragraphs 16-17).

Aggregate Pilot Cash Transfers: *Almost Achieved.* When the adaptive cash transfers were added to the achieved target for CTs and the lower achievements of CfW, the result is that all types of pilot cash transfers reached 14,560 beneficiary households, or 96% of the original aggregate PDO target (but with different composition than originally planned) (PDO indicator, ICR, Annex 1). The ICR stated that the expected number of female beneficiaries was exceeded (PDO indicator). About 99% of payments were on time for the combined total of beneficiaries (ICR, Annex 1). All beneficiaries had their identification and socioeconomic information recorded in the new social registry and in the Management Information System (MIS) (See below - Objective 2).

Human Development Accompanying Measures Provided to CT Beneficiaries: *Achieved.* The project provided “Accompanying Measures” to all CT beneficiaries, surpassing its target of 80%. These included community-based sessions on human development topics such as exclusive breastfeeding; water supply, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); nutrition; and other topics intended to induce behavioral changes that could improve health and life expectancy (ICR, paragraph 11). They were delivered through two reinforcing approaches: first, sessions were delivered at the village level through community assemblies and gatherings (allowing some non-beneficiaries to benefit); second, targeted beneficiaries received additional house visits and follow-up to help ensure a solid comprehension and adoption of measures (ICR, paragraph 32).

Training and Accompanying Measures Provided to Productive Inclusion Beneficiaries: *Achieved.* Productive inclusion measures, added for 2000 CT beneficiaries selected randomly, were implemented with technical assistance by national non-Governmental organizations (NGOs), and included: (a) establishing and coaching groups, (b) training in technical and micro-entrepreneurial skills (How to Start and Improve Your Business), (c) productive grants, and (d) improving households’ access to the input market (ICR, Annex 1).

Outcomes:



Pilot Program Learning Outcomes: Achieved. The CfW pilot, which lagged in implementation, generated significant learning which could lead to potential improvements going forward, e.g. the need to: plan for complementary materials, such as tools (ICR, paragraph 31); better judge capacity of implementing partners; better communicate with beneficiaries and authorities; and incentivize members of community oversight committees. Indeed, the ICR stated that some lessons were applied during the final year of the project. However, economic analysis (Annex 4) also cautioned that the cost/benefit ratio of CfW interventions in this project (judged comparable to that in other countries) proved much more expensive than CTs in the same context, and under some conditions could cost more than the benefits generated. Indeed, the follow-on project PARCA, will finance only CTs and not CfWs.

Outcomes for Beneficiaries: Partially Achieved. An impact evaluation using regression discontinuity and one year of data on a sample of 1,653 CT beneficiaries was performed (Annex 4, TTL, June 16, 2020). The TTL stated that all references to results from the impact evaluation were statistically significant, although the ICR did not use that terminology.

In addition to the increase in consumption mentioned above, the impact evaluation also showed large positive impacts at the household level on diversification of income-generating activities, and reduced debt. Expenditures on health nearly doubled. Within agriculture, the harvest and investment in livestock increased. Women receiving a CT were more likely to start a new business or work in wage employment than those who did not (ICR, paragraph 33). A qualitative evaluation, still ongoing (ICR, paragraph 33, and footnote 11) reinforced the findings on increased investment, including effects on school attendance. It also revealed the villagers' appreciation of the public works produced in CfW activities, particularly flood control. These public works benefits reached also non-project beneficiaries; qualitative assessments also identified some improved outcomes for villagers participating in accompanying measures who were not direct beneficiaries of the project.

Adaptive Safety Net Transfers: Some Qualitative Evidence of Achievement. Spread over four months, these transfers helped ensure 1404 households' adequate consumption during their lean period. The testimonies received showed an impact on the households' resilience and eating habits (ICR, Annex 6, paragraphs 1 – 2). Detailed information on these "testimonies" were not provided.

Productive Inclusion Accompanying Measures: Some Qualitative Evidence of Achievement. An impact evaluation for these measures is underway. Anecdotal evidence from the field suggests that these productive inclusion measures have had positive effects. An example is that following the completion of the savings groups activity, women restarted them to sustain the benefits perceived in enabling them to make investments and larger purchases (ICR, paragraph 32).

Rating
Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

To lay the foundations of an adaptive safety nets system

Rationale



Theory of change:

Establishment of CFS and harmonized data collection mechanisms using a unified social registry (USR) were envisioned to lead to outputs in the form of targeting mechanisms, development of payment systems, setup of a Grievance Redress Mechanism, development/refinement of a Management Information System (MIS), and other support needed for piloting of cash transfer programs. Together, these outputs were envisioned to contribute to two outcomes: the completion of the pilots and the foundation of an adaptive safety net system ready for further scale up. Over the longer term (beyond the time frame of the project) the envisioned impact would be a long-term sustainable safety net system anchored in CFS that would improve consumption and reduce vulnerability of poor households on a larger scale.

Interdependence: Achievement of this objective would depend on completion of the pilots of cash transfer and cash-for-work interventions -- including learning from those pilots -- as well as on the Component 3 support for procurement, financial management, and M&E, to strengthen the CFS.

Outputs and associated intermediate results:

Operationalization of the Social Safety Net Unit (CFS): Achieved. The CFS, set up to assume full responsibility for social protection, became operational, as shown by its support of the pilots, and the machinery involved in delivering them (see below) (PDO indicator). Key staffing was a condition of effectiveness and carried out by an international firm. Intensive support by the World Bank team provided needed technical assistance. Operational expenditures were maintained at 15% of the total project cost (partially due to the fact that some costs were shared with the follow-on project PARCA (ICR, paragraph 37) (IRI).

Development of Targeting Methods: Achieved. The project designed, tested, and validated three methods of targeting (PDO indicator), the first two of which supported the original design of this project (and the third added when supplemental funds became available): a) for the CT program, a three-tiered approach that combined geographical targeting, a poverty means testing and a community based validation; b) for the CfW, a two tiered approach using geographical targeting and self-targeting (providing wages below the average wage); and c) for the "adaptive CTs", only geographical targeting, considered the most cost-effective way to reach those experiencing sporadic food insecurity shocks. To support the targeting, four household surveys were carried out in the provinces of Bahr El Ghazal and Logone Occidental, as well as in three districts of N'Djamena—the 7th, 8th, and 9th arrondissements (ICR, Annex 6, paragraph 22). The targeting was reported in Annex 1 to be highly effective, with 99% of beneficiaries found to live below the poverty line (ICR, paragraph 38 and Annex 1) (PDO indicator). However, that figure derived from impact evaluation findings, which were based on only a sample of the CT beneficiaries. A clarifying note would have been warranted in reporting on this indicator in Annex 1 of the ICR.

Development and Rollout of USR: Achieved. The project effectively led the development and maintenance of the USR under the National Institute for Statistics, Economic and Demographic Studies, fully funded by the Government. This registry stores data collected from a unified questionnaire made mandatory by the Government in a decree issued September 2017. The target of registering all beneficiaries of the pilot cash transfers in the USR was met (PDO indicator, ICR, Annex 1). In addition, the USR has increased its coverage to include socioeconomic data on other citizens, and the data collected on beneficiaries of other partners' projects (ICR, paragraph 39). This sub-component included the development of the information system, the elaboration of a policy providing broad guidance on its data security, the development and validation of a



USR manual, and the conclusion of several protocols for data collection and use (ICR, Annex 6, paragraph 22).

A New Management Information System (MIS, PDO indicator): Partially Achieved. The MIS was developed and used for targeting, validation, registration, payments, and overall project management. An interesting feature is that mobile phone applications as well as identity cards with quick response (QR) codes were developed to allow for agents in the field to have access to beneficiary data. At the time of the payment the QR code was scanned to identify beneficiaries and record payments. (However, feedback from the field suggests this was not done systematically (ICR, Section IV B)). At project closing, the MIS was also being partially used for monitoring, but it was not yet fully supporting supervision. While the MIS was functioning and had all its components, and could generate data, it did not automatically generate reports on demand yet (IRI). The project management needed to decide the content of reporting desired, to open the way to further refinement (ICR, Annex 1).

An institutionalized Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM): Achieved. The GRM was developed by project-end, albeit rolled out in stages (IRI). First there were local committees, then a hotline, followed by an email address, and finally a web platform. Sensitization training was conducted, and a communications strategy developed along the way to help ensure awareness of these tools. However, the grievance system had not yet been incorporated into the MIS.

Outcomes:

Institution-Building and Government Commitment: Achieved. The formal establishment of the CFS and the continued update of the Government's NSPS demonstrate the Government's commitment to continuing progress toward a sustainable social protection system. The experience gained by the CFS in the implementation of this project represented significant institution-building which can support a future scaling up of the system. Capacity building included training, hiring of consultants, and implementation support from World Bank team members, and the effective delivery of the pilots demonstrated the concrete results achieved (ICR, paras. 37–41). The CFS also managed turnover effectively when the M&E specialist took over as head of the CFS (ICR, paragraph 71). Institution-building also involved having access to the tools to effectively implement initiatives. The harmonization of data, USR, targeting mechanisms, and MIS were all building blocks which strengthened the capacity of the CFS to contribute to the longer-term national social protection system.

Improved Donor Coordination in Alignment with Government: Partially Achieved. The harmonization of data and increased use of the USR by Government and all partners is also contributing to improved donor and partner coordination in the area of social protection. This can result in improved alignment of donor projects with Government's overall goals and strategies and improve implementation of disparate projects. Protocols for data sharing are being developed (ICR, paragraph 39).

Rating
Substantial



OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

After shifting some funds between different types of cash transfers due to implementation difficulties, the original targets for the aggregate number of beneficiaries reached were almost met (96%), demonstrating the potential of at least one pilot program as designed (CT). Lessons were learned for improving delivery of the other (CfW). Expectations for female participation, targeting efficiency and speed of payments were met. The impact evaluation revealed some human development and income diversification outcomes which could yield lasting benefits for participants. With substantial technical assistance from the Bank, the CFS proved up to the task of delivering the pilots with the support of the URS, MIS, and GRM, which will be further refined by a follow-on project.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

Economic Analysis at Appraisal

The economic analysis of the CT and CfW pilots in the PAD provided ex ante estimates of their potential impact on poverty and consumption for different benefits scenarios. No formal cost-benefit analysis was undertaken. To sum, the CfW in the N'Djamena capital area was expected to cover 40% of the food gap for 9000 participants. The CT was expected to cover 53-55% of the food gap for 6200 participants in the two rural areas selected.

The main source of data was the Survey on Consumption and the Informal Sector in Chad (ECOSIT) carried out by the National Statistical Office (NSO) in 2011. It included all 20 regions of the country, stratified into 20 clusters per region, of which 12 were urban and 8 were rural, plus 100 urban clusters in the capital, N'Djamena. Using the weighting methodology provided by the NSO, this survey covered a population of 10.02 million. The data was collected in 2001 and was thus already considerably outdated at appraisal. For the CfW pilot, to be based in N'Djamena, fewer households fell below the poverty line. Thus, the analysis for the CfW program varied the number of days worked and the daily wages to show the degree of coverage that the pilot could afford, and the corresponding impact on poverty and consumption changes. The final intervention chosen from the scenarios was US\$2.05 equivalent per day wage for 80 days of work which would cover 40% of the food poverty gap and allow up to 9000 individuals to participate, one from each of the food-poor households in N'Djamena, the equivalent of 74% of the population there. For the CfW pilot, a 35% overhead was factored into the costs.

A similar approach was used for the CT pilot. Scenarios estimated the impact on poverty and consumption of the benefits assuming different levels of payments. The intervention chosen was US\$25.64 per month per household for a period of 24 months (paid every two months). Based on the ECOSIT data, these benefit packages would cover at least 53-55% percent of the food poverty gap in the respective regions in which the pilots would be implemented--one South Sudanian and one Sahelian. The simulations considered two areas in those regions: Bahr el Gazel (BEG) and Logone Occidental. BEG ranks highly for food insecurity and Logone Occidental has a high incidence of food poverty and is six times more populous than BEG. For these reasons, the scenario and project design called for three households to be covered in Logone Occidental to every one



household covered in BEG. Given an expected budget of US\$ 4.5 million for the implementation of this subcomponent, an estimated up to 6,200 households could be covered in the pilot. The scenarios assumed effective targeting to the poorest households and 15% overhead (PAD, p. 53 – 55).

Ex Post Analysis of CfW Interventions

The ICR did not use the same approach as the PAD for an updated economic analysis, as the ECOSIT survey remained the only finalized survey available. (An update is underway.) Instead, economists used an approach where the actual ex-post cost-effectiveness of the program is estimated, in terms of how much it would cost to transfer US\$ 1.00 to beneficiaries based on three variables: (a) labor intensity, (b) targeting performance, and (c) net wage gain from the program.

The updated analyses showed that in this project, it costs US\$1.00 for every US\$2.67 transferred in wage benefits to the intended CfW recipients. The average annual cost per household of the CfW was US\$31.14, which is comparable to other projects in the region (e.g. South Sudan, ICR, Annex 4 paragraph 5).

The slightly higher benefits of this project compared to other countries was due to the high labor intensity of 61% percent and the precision of the targeting. (See ICR, Annex 4). However, in this project, even further improvements could have been made, since for optimal implementation, more money was needed for complementary equipment and tools for beneficiaries to ensure full cost-effectiveness. It is also worth noting that by comparison, CTs were much more cost-effective, financing US\$14.75 in cash transfers for each US\$1.00 in costs.

Ex-Post Analysis of CT Interventions

In the case of CTs, the data from an impact evaluation provided enough quantitative information to calculate an internal rate of return (IRR) and cost-benefit analysis. The impact analysis used “with project” and “without project” scenarios based on a sample of 1,653 and a regression discontinuity methodology (TTL, June 16, 2020). To sum, the expected incremental benefits of the with-project scenario justified the project costs for the CTs. Benefits were represented by increases in consumption, which in one year ranged from 47 to 77% (Annex 4, paragraphs 14-15). The IRR ranged from 8.9 to 15.7%, and the corresponding net present value of benefits (NPV) ranged from US\$4.92 million to US\$12.24 million (5% discount rate). The survey and qualitative interviews also revealed gains in diversification of income, savings and investment, and behavioral change which could contribute to longer-term human development, though without precise citation of analytic methods or statistical significance. (See Section 4 for more detail on those less quantifiable benefits.)

Implementation Efficiency

The main argument for implementation efficiency is that the project ended 8 months ahead of schedule. However, the composition of Component 1 that was completed was quite different from that appraised. Reallocation of proceeds from the more difficult-to-implement CfW to CTs was carried out, with the addition of “adaptive safety net” CTs which involved only geographic targeting, arguably the easiest form of targeting, although some new beneficiaries had to be registered. Accompanying measures for the CfW were dropped, and these were larger in scale (7000-9000 beneficiaries) than the productive inclusion measures added (2000 beneficiaries).

The cost-effectiveness of Component 1 was also affected by the significant delay that occurred in CfW transfers due to the Government’s late signing of the ESMF framework, which led to a lack of the planned sequential implementation of components, and the desired feedback loops. The consequences of these delays included a



shortage of equipment, safeguard problems, and a shortfall in meeting CfW targets. The ICR did not give enough detail on these delays in a quantitative sense to weigh their impact against other accomplishments. Since the CfW interventions were implemented adequately only during the last half of the project period, it could be argued that a substantial part of the project, as originally designed, could have been implemented more efficiently. (The CfW component is a larger component of the costs of Component 1 than the CT component.)

Balancing these aspects are the significant achievements of Component 2 and 3. For them, implementation savings were achieved by a) incorporating Mauritania’s MIS framework into Chad’s MIS design and b) sharing some of the Project Management costs with a follow-on project, PARCA (leading project management costs to be only 15% of total costs rather than the 20% target) (ICR, Annex 1 and Table 4.1 in Annex 4).

Considering the positive IRR and NPV and the respective cost-effectiveness of the three components, overall efficiency is rated substantial.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	8.90	14.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Given a high relevance, substantial efficacy, and substantial efficiency, the overall outcome is rated satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The Risk to Development outcome varies by component. The outcomes from Component 1’s CfW are unlikely to be maintained as the follow-on project (PARCA) does not include these types of interventions (or these particular beneficiaries). Neither those particular outcomes in terms of increased consumption and investment activities, nor the institutional structure for delivering them will be sustained, as they were reliant



on local implementing agencies and NGOs. For the CT consumption, it is also likely that the follow-on project, PARCA, will target different beneficiaries, but it will operate on a significantly larger scale (25,000 beneficiaries) and will build on the institution-building and service delivery outcomes which derived from the project. The signs of increased food security, diversification of income sources, and human development investment, bode well for sustaining outcomes, particularly given the village-wide benefits cited earlier. However, conditions for progress remain fragile and depend on sustained external aid, no further decrease in oil prices or increase in refugees, and continued Government support, and with elections on the horizon, there is some political risk. While substantial capacity-building and institutionalization has taken place, scaling up to 25,000 beneficiaries can still strain capacity. Finally, Government has already expressed concern about security in the urban areas among unemployed youth due to in-migration and pressure from refugees, and any cash transfer project runs the risk of striking divisive chords within the country. The risk to development outcome at the time of PAD for the project was substantial (PAD, paragraphs 48 – 50) and many of the factors contributing to that, as noted above, continue.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The re-engagement of the World Bank and its assistance to Chad was prepared and implemented within a coordinated framework of World Bank assistance. There were two development policy operations, one in an emergency context in 2016 and 2017 (Emergency Fiscal Stabilization Development Policy Operation (EFSSO, P163968), and the second focused on structural resilience and growth (First Programmatic Economic Recovery and Resilience Grant (P163424)). Some elements of the Chad SSN were incorporated in the form of prior actions in the EFSSO, which raised the visibility and boosted the central role of social protection in mitigating negative effects on the poor during a macroeconomic structural adjustment period.

Also, the timing of the World Bank's re-engagement in Chad, and of the project's preparation, coincided with the establishment of the ASP-MDTF. In 2014/2015, that trust fund-- at the time fully funded by U.K. Department for International Development (DFID)-- was established with the specific purpose of developing adaptive social protection systems in six Sahel countries. The decision to cofinance the SSN project with a doable slice of this ASP-MDTF was a good feature of the project, which helped incorporate regional lessons and provide needed resources for intensive supervision. The resulting project was aligned with the Government's new National Social Protection Strategy (ICR, paragraph 28), and considered Government preferences in its design (e.g. prioritizing N'Djamena for CfW to provide occupation for youth to stem potential violence and unrest). Project design also used lessons learned from other social protection projects in the Sahel, both World Bank-financed and others, tempered with an awareness of capacity limitations in fragile countries. The design of targeting mechanisms and the decisions on payment amounts and rounds, in particular, drew on experiences in other countries.

The risk was correctly rated as substantial, due to contextual factors and limited Government capacity. In response to those limitations, it was a condition of effectiveness of the project to hire core staff for the CFS (PAD, p. v) who would be recruited by an international firm using international competitive bidding (PAD, paragraph 2). There were other covenants mandated continuously throughout the project (PAD, p. v-vi), which provided useful milestones and matched some of the targets in the Results Framework. Also,



intensive supervision and capacity building elements were built into the design. A study tour to Mauritania resulted in an agreement to use their framework for the MIS, yielding substantial savings for the project.

The preparation team did significant analytical work during the preparation phase: first a broad scoping study: Washington, DC, World Bank 2016, Chad - Shaping Adaptive Safety Nets to Address Vulnerability (English), and then two studies particularly focused on providing details for the operational Manual: Gunman, Julius. 2017, Chad: A Payment Landscape Assessment; and World Bank 2016, Developing an Identity Management Framework in Support of Social Protection in Chad, Working Paper ICR, paragraph 60). However, some parts of the Operational Manual were not complete at the time of approval (condition of disbursement) PAD, p. v-vi). The TTL stated (June 16, 2020) that this was speedily rectified.

In light of capacity constraints, the components were planned to be implemented sequentially, allowing both adequate supervision, and feedback loops for learning. (This was not realized in Component 1, resulting in problems in compliance with safeguards). Also, the project design relied on the use of implementing partners (IPs) on the ground, such as NGOs. In the event, the capacity of these IPs proved to be weak.

Procurement design incorporated a good, practical feature. Chad's official procurement processes involved a very low approval threshold above which the approval of the country's president was required. Given the Project's limited duration and the Project's plan for sequential roll-out, the preparation team worked with the Government to establish a Procurement Committee for the project that would bypass certain aspects of these procedures. This was essential in later avoiding procurement delays during implementation (ICR, paragraph 62).

There were moderate shortcomings in quality at entry. The M&E framework was appropriate in its simplicity (to respond to limited capacity) but fell short in not incorporating indicators typical of a pilot, that could yield lessons going forward (See Section 9 below). Another problem was the lack of an adequate communications plan, recognized midway in the project as a problem that needed correction (ICR, paragraphs 35, 100). Finally, the project relied on voluntary validation committees for confirmation of beneficiary identification and also grievance committees to register complaints. Reliance on such volunteer labor had some advantages but could be demanding and sometimes left the committees unmotivated and uncooperative as they saw beneficiaries receiving benefits while they received nothing (ICR, paragraph 99). This design issue could have been anticipated.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The ICR described supervision teams which provided intensive support during the first year of implementation, when they met weekly by videoconference. These meetings were later changed to bimonthly. The supervision team included a member based in N'Djamena. The team provided seven ISRs, one every semester, with an additional one in December 2018 when implementation issues led to PDO supervision ratings of moderately satisfactory. The supervision team responded to the safeguard issues with pragmatism and persistence. The ICR did not provide details on what efforts were made to resolve



serious financial management issues (late audits, see Section 10b below). But by the time of closing, both implementation and PDO supervision ratings were satisfactory.

Examples of some of the sound project adjustments that the teams agreed upon with the Government were: a) decrease in targets for CfW, including the decision not to pursue accompanying measures; b) corresponding transfer of some funds for that component to the CT transfers; and c) addition of productive inclusion measures for 2000 beneficiaries. These decisions were registered in supervision reports but not reflected in a formal restructuring, on the recommendation of the Country Manager (TTL, June 16, 2020).

The level of intensive supervision and technical assistance was possible due to the Bank-executed trust fund provided by the ASP-MDTF. Participation of staff of other donors was mostly arms-length, however, and they always reported to Bank staff (TTL, June 16, 2020).

Quality of Supervision Rating

Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The **Objectives** were well specified in the PAD, with a robust definition of “adaptive safety nets” (PAD, paragraph 12) and the specification of the target group (the poor). For re-engagement with a country like Chad, which suffered from extensive poverty and food insecurity, simultaneous implementation of: a) pilot cash transfer programs, based on experience of other similar countries, with b) institution-building and systems development reflected a good design choice.

Results Framework (RF) and Indicators: There was no explicit theory of change prepared, as this was not required by the Bank until 2018. The RF was designed to be simple, with six PDO indicators and seven Implementation Results Indicators (IRIs) (PAD, p. 20). This design appropriately avoided overburdening a Government agency with limited capacity, but can be criticized for not including: a) indicators that could have shed more light on factors affecting success or lack of success of the pilots, needed for learning for future possible design adjustments; and b) disaggregation by gender within each of the two planned separate types of transfer programs: CfW and CTs. An indicator on increases in consumption would have been appropriate, as per the economic analysis in the PAD, but the design did not build in detailed surveys which would have allowed data collection on this indicator. Provision could have been made for the household surveys built in for developing the targeting, to be repeated to record actual post-project consumption. (An impact evaluation with appropriate surveys was later added.) Another problem with the RF was that some qualitative indicators, particularly under Component 2, did not provide sufficient definition to judge if targets were attained or not (e.g. “grievance mechanism functional”). Finally, given the report of communications issues and complaints (ICR, paragraphs 33 and 99), it would have been useful to have an indicator (and target) for the number and/or percentage of grievances resolved successfully. The



inclusion of several intermediate results indicators on qualitative aspects of implementation, such as effectiveness of targeting, and timeliness of payments, was a good feature of the RF.

Planning for Baselines: In cases of both beneficiary counts, and institutional indicators, baselines were all zero, as the project was piloting interventions and building institutions from the ground up. The one exception was that the Prime Minister had already issued a decree to establish the CFS, and had it approved. The target was then to make the CFS fully operational. With no surveys planned, there were no issues on timing of data collection on baselines.

Institutional Arrangements: An M&E officer was specified as one of the key staff of the CFS, agreed to be recruited by an international firm (ICR, paragraph 61). The CFS reported to the Ministry of Economy and Development Planning. A Steering Committee established shortly after approval assured coordination with other ministries responsible for social development (ICR, paragraphs 21, 84). With the technical assistance provided by Bank teams, these arrangements worked well.

M&E Tools: The project preparation planned several M&E tools to assess progress and provide for course correction, which represent sound M&E design. In addition to regular monitoring of project activities, aided by the MIS, the project would conduct: (a) a process evaluation and (b) a targeting evaluation. Those evaluations would be conducted before the Mid Term Review (MTR), planned for the first term of calendar year 2018 when the first cycle of CT and CfW activities would have been completed (PAD, paragraph 37). For the process evaluation, local implementing partners, such as payment agencies and NGOs in charge of accompanying measures, would be interviewed, to identify bottlenecks and recommend solutions. There would also be an assessment of the MIS. In addition, a small beneficiary satisfaction assessment was a possibility to hear the views of the participants with sub-components such as payment procedures and accompanying measures. The targeting assessment would compare the approach developed based on studies supported by the ASP MDTF-- which would have combined community, geographical, and poverty approaches, using survey data and a simple means test exercise-- with national survey poverty criteria. This would reveal any inclusion and exclusion errors.

b. M&E Implementation

Positive aspects of M&E implementation included the addition of an impact evaluation during implementation (regression discontinuity methodology), and the recording of all original RF indicator values in the results framework. Also, the qualitative interviews of participants mentioned as a possibility in the PAD were carried out. Care was taken to monitor separately the expanded activities (adaptive safety net and productive inclusion accompanying measures) in the supervision reports and RF, as well as in an impact evaluation which obtained one year of data but is still ongoing (ICR, paragraph 72). The mid-term review was carried out as planned (ICR, paragraph 24). Key informant reviews were also held as part of the ICR process.

However, during implementation, the issues identified with respect to lack of indicators suitable for a pilot and the issues on definition of the Objective 2 indicators were not corrected (Section above plus ICR, paragraphs 68-69). Also, there was not enough information in the ICR on the methodology of the impact evaluation to fully judge the soundness of its conclusions. The ICR did not always report if results from the impact evaluation were statistically significant (e.g. ICR, paragraph 45); the TTL later stated they were (June 16, 2020).



As for routine monitoring and reporting, the ICR stated that there was adequate reporting to monitor the project's progress, but despite a consultant being hired to assist the M&E specialist with MIS development, lags in its development and testing meant some reliance on implementing partners' and supervision teams' manual reports for most of the project duration.

Consequential problems which affected implementation include: a) errors in registration, despite the use of community validation committees, given the lack of suitable beneficiary identification in some cases; b) inaccuracies in payments which arose from the necessity of using manual entry during MIS testing; and c) reliance on implementing partners' reporting for the CfW programs due to a lack of MIS capability to initially monitor activities by registered days worked and different payment amounts (ICR, paragraph 71).

There was not enough information in the ICR to judge if the PAD-planned M&E capacity-building took place and would be sustainable. The ICR did mention that a challenge arose when the M&E specialist was called on to become coordinator of the CFS, resulting in a need for staffing replacement, but the full impact was not discussed (ICR, paragraph 71).

c. M&E Utilization

Despite difficulties in project monitoring, the M&E information was regularly communicated to the Bank/ASP MDTF implementation teams and put to use. The teams met regularly to review, discuss, and adjust implementation approaches. The indicators were used to adjust targets, albeit informally outside of a formal restructuring (ICR, paragraph 73). Review of the progress of the MIS was an important topic of discussion, to determine the necessary upgrades and additional modules. Reporting back on the early rudimentary grievance reporting measures also led to gradual improvement.

The MTR, informed by the process evaluation, was particularly significant in that its discussion with the government led to several key decisions:

- a) Subcomponent 1.1 (CfW) would be reduced in scope from 9,000 to 7,000 beneficiaries. In addition, the accompanying measures for this subcomponent would not be implemented.
- b) Subcomponent 1.2 (CT) would be increased using Project savings from Component 2. The increase in funds allocated to CTs would provide 'adaptive' cash transfers, which would be temporary and would target the most food-insecure households during the 2019 lean season. The method of targeting would be simple geographic targeting.
- c) Subcomponent 1.2 would also include accompanying productive inclusion measures, which would help build household resilience— also an important aspect of "adaptive' safety nets".

The findings of the impact evaluation were also used by the implementation teams to report outcomes to supplement the more limited indicators in the RF. These findings, as well as some of the operational lessons learned, will likely guide the follow-on PARCA project (ICR, paragraph 73) and contribute to scaled up operations and M&E capacity-building.



M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was rated Category B for the Environmental Assessment Category, triggering OP/BP 4.01. Planned works under the CfW were expected to be small in scale and able to be mitigated with the Environmental and Social Plan (ESP) under the Environmental and Social Framework (ESMF) prepared by the Government. However, there were delays in Government's sign-off of the ESMF (ICR, paragraph 67). These delays in approval of the ESMF were identified by TTLs as the main delay in the project which led to the inability to proceed with components sequentially as planned.

Furthermore, implementation of the ESP was deemed less than satisfactory for two reasons. First, the lack of appropriate phasing of components as planned led to a shortage of safety equipment (boots, gloves, masks, and vests), as the different public works were implemented simultaneously. While there were no hazardous consequences, the needed preventative conditions were not present for a safe workplace environment. These issues were addressed during the final year of implementation. This lack of safeguard compliance was one reason for the reduction in targeted beneficiaries of the CfW component (ICR, paragraph 76).

Second, there were two occupational health and safety incidents, which-- though only indirectly related to the project-- were not reported adequately to the Bank. The World Bank is still awaiting full documentation on the first incident, which involved a death and injury of two workers in a non-project related traffic incident. There are two versions of what happened, but both show the project was neither the cause of the incident, nor could have prevented it. As a result of Government's late reporting, the World Bank reviewed the environmental and social screening processes for the CfW and helped develop an action plan to prevent such occurrences in the last round of CfW (ICR, paragraph 77).

The second incident, concerning a physical fight between a CfW supervisor and a motorist, was reported promptly. The two parties involved submitted to mediation and the incident report was judged to be satisfactory (ICR, paragraph 78).

Issues with social safeguards also arose, since the GRM in place initially was weak and relied exclusively on committees. The World Bank's safeguard staff worked with the Government to put in place an improved GRM, which was fully functioning by the last year of the project (ICR, paragraph 79 and Annex 1).

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management was moderately satisfactory during implementation in the last two ISRs. The team used the accounting software properly and delivered quarterly interim financial reports, but there were other problems. The most salient deficiency was the failure to hire an internal auditor until December 2019,



two months before the project's closing date. Other deficiencies in internal controls identified during financial management missions included:

- a) inconsistencies reported in the payments by the payment agency that were not properly documented and addressed by the CFS;
- b) control procedures required at the end of each project cycle that were not performed or not properly documented; and
- c) opportunities to use control activities on electronic tablets that were not systematically implemented.

Procurement: As described earlier, one positive feature of the design of the project was agreement by the Government to bypass certain bureaucratic procurement procedures for the project (ICR, paragraph 64). The main deficiency was lack of timely upload and maintenance of documents from the procurement processes into the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement system (STEP). While the procurement specialist resigned a year before project completion, this did not affect implementation, as the CFS was able to rely on support from a procurement specialist working on another World Bank-Financed project. Most of the procurement had been completed at the time of this substitution. Procurement was rated moderately satisfactory at the time of the last two ISRs.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

Since the accompanying measures of the pilot programs for the designated beneficiaries were always expected to lead to some long-term human development outcomes for direct beneficiaries, these are not considered as "unintended" in this ICRR. However, qualitative interviews (being written up into a forthcoming report), revealed spillover effects for other villagers, which included gifts, and a boost in consumption within the village, which benefitted vendors and non-targeted households. The ICR did not state if these were statistically significant. In addition, the public works for which the workers received cash for work, e.g. building classrooms, constructing a borehole, cleaning streets, etc, conferred benefits on other villages (ICR, paragraph 55).

d. Other

Some evidence of longer-term benefits for human development and investment that went beyond increased food consumption were shown by the impact evaluation (statistically significant results, according to TTL, June 16, 2020) and qualitative interviews (forthcoming, results not verified to be statistically significant). These could potentially lead to benefits that would last beyond the life of this project (ICR, paragraph 33). (See Section 4 above.)

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
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Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	This ICR Review rated Quality at Entry as moderately satisfactory because of moderate shortcomings in project design, such as the inadequacy of indicators related to piloting in the context of an operation whose objectives included piloting key interventions, and the lack of an adequate communications plan.
Quality of M&E	Modest	Substantial	The M&E system as designed and implemented was sufficient to assess the achievement of objectives.
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

1. If the objective of a project is to pilot interventions in a given country context, then the results framework needs to be tailored to this purpose. Particularly in a re-engagement project in a fragile country context, the RF for the project should go beyond institutional accomplishment indicators and indicators of beneficiary reach and devise some indicators which shed light on factors which contributed to success or challenges for the pilot, including delays. Then, when scale up is implemented, the design can be based more accurately on actual experience and learning. In this project, the RF indicators for the pilot intervention components focused almost exclusively on coverage and did not include enough IRIs to reap full lessons learned. The analysis of causes of delays and bottlenecks had to be mostly based on supervision observations, with little help from the RF (ICR, paragraph 95).

2. For projects that rely on local implementing agencies and NGOs in addition to Government, often in a fragile country context, it is important to assess the availability and capacity of these local entities upfront, and not just focus on capacity assessment and institution-building for the Government. In this project, labor-intensive implementation of sub-components (for CfW) (and its monitoring until the MIS was up and running) depended on local implementing agencies. Their capacity was lower than expected. Thus, technical assistance provided for completion of the project had to be broadened to include this non-Governmental sector, requiring more resources (ICR, paragraph 96).

3. Cash for Work (CfW) activities are significantly more costly and difficult to roll out than simple cash transfers (CTs), particularly in a fragile country situation. In this project, US\$1.00 yielded benefits of US\$14.75 for CT beneficiaries, but only US\$2.67 for CfW interventions. The latter figure is comparable to costs of CfWs in other neighboring countries. In this project, although targeting and labor intensity indicators were high relative to other countries, factors increasing complexity and costs included delays in planning public works activities, lining up tools and protective equipment



needed, and securing environmental approvals. While there still may be valid reasons to choose cash for work over simpler CTs, the differences in cost-benefit ratios are significant and likely generalizable across countries (ICR, p. 52, Annex 4, paragraph 2).

4. In cash transfer programs, the use of community committees for target validation and payment oversight has some advantages, but incentives also need to be considered. In this project, the use of such committees led to difficulties when some members who were not beneficiaries, (received no transfers) became discontent and did not fully fulfill their role, as observed under the project (ICR, paragraph 99).

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

Results Orientation, Thoroughness, and Evidence: The ICR was generally thorough and well-documented. The sections dealing with context at appraisal and Quality at Entry were particularly thorough. The theory of change was well-constructed. There were some data and comments of the cofinanciers and Government that could have been cited, to add to the body of evidence. For example, the Government's report summary in Annex 6 reported in paragraph 20 that 18,950 households benefitted from accompanying measures, bolstering the case that spillover effects occurred. Also, in Annex 5 the cofinanciers expressed the view that the experience of implementation of the "adaptive safety nets" added midway during Implementation was not adequately covered. Also, the cofinanciers mentioned that there were no indicators of Government satisfaction or buy-in monitored during the project.

Another gap was that the section on supervision was very input-oriented and did not discuss how the supervision teams responded to and resolved specific implementation problems. For example, the ICR nowhere discussed the Bank team's response to the lag in the Government team's undertaking of internal audits (delayed until two months before closing.) A cross-reference to the Safeguard Section's issues could have also been made in the section on supervision. Finally, there was no mention of the supervision team's response, if any, to the flaws in the RF, which could have been flagged and addressed during project implementation.

Analysis: the ratings were largely well-supported by evidence and logic. An important improvement would have been to describe better the methodology of the impact evaluation and cite which results were statistically significant, using more precise language. Some other minor deficiencies were: a) there was ambiguity in the definition of the count of beneficiaries as households or individuals (later corrected by TTL); b) among the various groups of beneficiaries receiving different types of assistance, it was not clear when there was overlap; and c) the analysis of implementation efficiency partially justifying the rating highlighted more the changes in composition of the project which benefitted from fortuitous savings, as opposed to those which resulted from implementation inefficiencies and delays, both of which had a bearing on the analysis.

Candor and Coverage of Issues: The ICR was marked by candor in that it cited the many implementation difficulties experienced. A minor shortcoming was that they were presented in list form, and full clarification



awaited the TTL meeting June 16, 2020 for more details on relative timing, priority and consequences. (For example, the fact that the delay in Government approval of the EMP was the major cause of delay for CfW implementation). In discussion of factors affecting implementation, the factors were by and large discussed separately for the two objectives/three components, and there was less coverage of cases where interdependence between them led to delays.

Lessons: When correctly defined, an ICR lesson takes the form of a generalizable lesson bolstered by evidence specific to the project; a statement based on assumptions is not a helpful lesson. Some of the ICR's lessons were well stated and informative, while others were in fact “findings” and some were based on projections of what might have happened under the project under different circumstances.

Clarity and Length: The ICR was sufficiently clear to present a logical story of the project's performance, with much detail on factors affecting implementation, and on the reasons behind the change in project sub-components and targets. However, for a relatively simple project, (few components, simple RF, few restructurings involving only changes in closing), it could have been more concise.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial