Document of The World Bank Report No: ICROO001300 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (ffiRD-47310 ffiRD-77540 IDA-38840) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$32.8 MILLION AND A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 21.9 MILLION (US$32.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA FORA LAND MANAGEMENT AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT June 28, 2011 Social, Environment and Rural Development Unit Sustainable Development Department East Asia Pacific Region C1JRRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective February 16,2011) Currency Unit = Indonesian Rupiah IDR 8,895.21 == US$ 1 US$ 1.00 = IDR 0.00011 FISCAL YEAR January 1 Decemoor31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS Adat Customary practices defined as a uncodified body of rules of behavior, enforced by social sanctions~.varying frQm time to time and from place to place ADB Asian Development Bank AWP Annual Work Frogranl (for the respective year of project implementation) BAL Basic Agrarian Law - Undang Undang Pokok Agraria (UUPA), Law No.5 of 1960 Bappenas National Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional) BPHTB Bea Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan (Revenue for Obtaining Right on Land and Building) BPN National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) CPMU Central Project Management Unit DIPA Approval for Release of Budget Funds (under National Budget System, Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran) ELAF Enhancing the Legal and Administrative Framework for Land (TA pfogramfunded by ADB) ERR Economic Rate of Return FAO United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization FGD Focus Group Discussionis FM Financial Management FMR Financial Monitoring Report FRR Financial Rate of Return Hak Ulayat Communal (land) rights IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IPB Institut Pertanian Bogor IPSLA· Institutional Partnership for Strengthening Land Administration, funded by Sweden ISR Implementation Status Report ITB Institut Tecknologi Bandung KDP Kecamatan Development Project KPI Key Performance Indicator KPPN Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara (State Treasury Office ofMoF) Keppres Presidential Decree LAP Land Administration Project (fIrst land administration project in Indonesia funded by World Bank) LGU Local Government Unit LIS Land Information System LMPDP Land Management and Policy Development Project LOC Land Office Computerization M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MoF Ministry of Finance MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTR Mid Term Review NA Not Applicable NCB National Competitive Bidding NGO Non-Government Organization NLIS National Land Information System NLPF National Land Policy Framework NOL No-Objection Letter PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PIU Project Implementation Unit PRS Project Results Summary QAE Quality at Entry QAG Quality Assurance Group (World Bank) QALP-l Quality Assessment of the Lending Portfolio 2008 QSA Quality Of Supervision Assessment RALAS Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System Project SAT Systematic Adjudication Team/s SEBS Socia-Economic Baseline Study SEIS Socio Economic Impact Study SIL Specific Investment Loan SLIM Sistem Layanan Inforinasi Mandiri (Land Information Services System) TA Technical Assistance UGM Universitas Gajah Mada (Yogyakarta) USD United States Dollars Vice President: James W. Adams, EAPVP Country Director: Stefan G. Koeberle, EACIF Sector Manager: Franz R. Drees-G!oss, EASIS Project Team Leader: Keith C. Bell, EASER ICR Team Leader: Keith C. Bell, EASER REPUBUC OF INDONESIA LAND MANAGEMENT AND POUCY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B.KeyDates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................................... 5 3. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................. .-............ 13 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................................... 18 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...................................................................... 19 6. Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................................ 22 7. Comments on Issues Raised by BorrowerlImplementing AgencieslPartners ........................... 24 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................................... 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component.; ................................................................................................ 28 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................- ............................................................... 41 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............................. 42 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................................... 45 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................................... 49 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................................... 50 Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...................................... 80 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ....................................................................................... 81 . Map mRD #38053 ............................................................... :............. :......................................... 84 i QhUlrlU>.tt Amount: Ilm,plemeotillg Agencies: National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) National Land Agency (BPN) of Home Affairs u .. 'U'.. ...,. and Other lI:rternAI 04/29/2004 Review: 03/31/2007 OS/25/2007 12/3112009 12/3112009 . Outcomes: Risk to Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: "-----___-+-_...118!...:....!__...j::;:.~J ~.~ . ,~.J !Qual·ty aE try. t n. !Moderately l!:!nsati·SlactOIy IG' '. lModerately , . 1 ! 1 S! , overnment. i , nsatisfactory !--... ..-.-.-.--...-.-------. _._-_ .. _ - - _ . _ - - - - - - _ . _ . ; - - - _ . _..:_-_._--_._--_....... _- ----~.-- ~ality of S~rvision: JModeratel Satisfacto lIm lementing --od;~;t~fi-- . ·--..----··--·---! 1 ~:~!~-l-yory-~---'-l ---~-''"''---'-------'--'-r;-::---' : ~'~ . !l\.gency/Agencies: i-iOv-e-ra-U-B-a-n-k---' oderatel Satisfacto iOveraU Borrower iPerformanee: , y ry lPerformanee: . lunsatisfactory Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No): es Problem Project at any lity of Yes oderately Satisfactory ime (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): 00 rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: nsatisfactory 58 53 General """1'1""""" sector 2 2 Law and 4 4 Other social services - 12 Administrative and civil service-reform Land administration and 29 29 Other 14 14 14 14 29 29 --- , , '« ,,' " "" \. , Vice President: lTames W. Adams Jemal-ud-din Kassum Country Director: Stefan G. Koeberle ~drew D. Steer Sector Manager: Franz R. Drees-Gross ~kD. Wilson Project Team Leader: Keith Clifford Bell WaelZakout ICR Team Leader: Keith Clifford Bell ICR Primary Author: Keith Clifford Bell Surajit Goswami ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objectives are to (i) improve land tenure security and enhance the efficiency, transparency, and improve service delivery of land titling and ·registration; and (ii) enhance local government capacity to undertake land management functions with great efficiency and transparency. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) not applicable i~~~~-~~~~)·····""-- "--i . I !Approximately 27 million : I ml I?n new b d i '1 3 'II' ,I 12 ' ml Ion tIt es : 1 • alue 1.. '. i V O e e Ima e I f th st' t d 80 I. It es reglstere y ' d f' f I . d (' d)' i lquantl'tatl've or . 'II' I . t bi 1 d jen 0 proJect, 0 I,reglstere Issue ,I lItH Ion regIs era e an I h' h 95 . d 2 1 'Ir ' iQualitative) I I ' Ind ' h d IW IC percent an ,ml Ion I i .I 'I~:~et:t~, onesla ailbare cOfill~ct~d by ~istributed, . : l ene IClarles, l I , ---~ [I?1!~~_~~~i~~~~_JQ~~?!/~Q_Qi ...___ ._. _. _____ ~!?'!(~.QQ.~___ . __ .___ . .1_. ___ ...... _.. ___ ... J!~!?'!~QQ2_ . _. ____.; ... ... IComments IRegistration'achieved is 80 percent of target; distribution 72 percent of target. I(incl, % jFollowing LMPDP's closure, BPN advised that about 2.3 million titles I~'?~i~~~~~!!!) ires.is!~E~~ & .:?.:.!.I?i!~i~.~!i!!~.~ ..~~_~!!"i_~~!~:_~?!~I!!~~~!~~_~Y.~~.~~~: .... _ . . _...___.. _. __l ; IInformation system for decentralized and improved land administration and i IIndicator 4 : Imanagement is created and functioning well 1--··· ..--........... ·-t·····················-···································-································--1Lis·strat~gy-··-- ·r······ . . . . . . .-----.. . . . . . . . . -, . . . -.....--.. I .. . . . . j ioutline LIS Plan developed and I :adopted by Iprep, under BPN . IStrat. Plan 07-09, , IS i orne IOltia " , I i12/31106, IS d ta, [)ietal'Ied plan, not i .d a acceSS,l d "d iL' I : evelopments of I : d " I I !prepare ,LImite IValue 'information systems in a ~n}, ~ncmgd! Iprogress made due Iquantitative or Ifew land offices under the [Ptan° , " is ICdlesdan I' d Ii arsmalze fi ~o lack of BPN ~ ISpaOlsh-funded ~an~ land adopted by I IQualitative) e ffice Co~putenzatIon 106/30/07, (LOC) project. ational LIS IN.' I I Ifligh level enga- Igement. LIS Strat. !plan- Advisor, idelivered report, jimplementation I I th th I I ll'.....- -a.t.--e achieved D. . 108/3"i12004--. ........ - J,P;1 2 I.iln3?}I~/t2QmO?-O'~7-1:~ -~ JI .- ~.la2Ia/ r/20an09 . ln3~limp '_'j·I,. iComments - ;There ha-s-be-en-no-L-IS-im---'-p....;Ie....;m-e-n....;ta....;ti....;o-n-.-O-u-tl-'i~'-e-p-re-p-ar-a-t-io-n----L, minimal and . Kincl, % lactivities by the advisor very late in the project puts the indicator at less than 15 ! lachievement) Ipercent achievement. ! r-----~-- ..-·-------lLocal g~verIDnent ~trength~~ed to efficiently undertake iand management ------; iIndicator 5 : ~ ________ ~._ct_io_n_s_,______--,-_ _ _ _ _ _--,--_ _ _ ---,--._ _ _ _ _-< . Weak capacity, No . l5 pilot land I 15 LGU land inational government management I 'I Illlanagement pi ots IValue linvestment since Keppres ,initiatives for . Icompleted,l,125 iquantitative or '34/2003 re-assigned ILGUs initiated by I IQualitative) :responsibilities from BPNiJanuary 2006, I ILGU officials itrained from 400 to LGUs without Strategic plan for : .J~~~~P~~~~~g~~1!~~_L~~pp~~__!~~I~~~!.__L ___ _ ...--~~~~,---------------, iv ,-"'--'''---''---'--'--''--'''-''-''---'-'-'''-----'-'----_··__·_········......,..-_·__··_-_·_·_-_··_·_-·---·T---------··_·············_··_·-r-·_·--··_·----_··_-·_······_·_·_.__.__.-.._, I ! !budget. i . jgovernment iadopted by I ! : ! ! I pecember 2007. ,I i lAlllocal !governments II !receive land lmanagement I jtra~g by end of I I rOJect. ' jDate.achieved _8/3)1200±. _. ___ 11213112009 -------'-__________.....J!.~31/2009 ---_._--i !Comments . I i i I kin~l. % ITarget fully (100 percent) achieved.. i jaChlevement) ~ i...._.~ _____ . __ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ •.L..._" __ , _ _ ~_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ •_ _ _ •_ _ _ _ _ _ .~ •• _ . _ _ _ •_ _ _ •_ _ ••. _ ••• _ _ _ _ ._'~. _ _ •_ _ _ _ _ .• _. __ -:"~ ~. : __ •_______ .. _ •.•• _____ ... (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) MTR, 852, 000 produced (85 loerjcent target) of 661,501 (78 !Per'cenit) collected. alsoPOO lindicat,or #3 above. iSee also Key indicator #3 above (incl. percent achievement) I G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs v Unsatisfactory L.. _~._.L"-!~{Q.?{~~Q!._.......M~~tel~ s~~f~!}'__;_.M~~~t.!~!~!~t.!~r.~!~!IJ__.~. ___ . _. __.l!.:!~_ . ~ i i i Moderately i .. : ! ! 9 i 06129/2008.! Unsatisfactory : . Unsatisfactory: .30.14 I r··-----r····--·----··-··-----·-·--+--·----·---·-·------.-.-.----.--..-.-.-.-.--..---;-..- ..- -.. -.----.----.-.-._.-., , 10 i 05108/2009 I M~erately ! M~erately; 38.41 i I I Unsatisfactory i Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 09/0912009 33.56 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 12 I 0211812010 45.81 I Unsatisfacto Unsatisfacto H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable I. Disbunement Profile - Orlgln~ ---- Forin~1y Rnlsed - - Actu~ 70 60 50 I. :: vt ! 20 10 o 11\ • • N 11\ • • N w • • N w • • N ... • • ,.. ... • • N • • • N • • • ,.. • N ... ... ... • -- • • • • ... N ... • -- ... • ... ,.. ,.. N N vi 1. Project Context, Development Objeetives aDd Desiga 1.1 CODtext at Appraisal Country aDd Seetor' BackgrouDd. At appraisal, the Indonesian land sector was perceived as one of the most inefficient sectors in the Indonesian economy: • The legal framework was fragmented and allowed wide'discretion in interpreting the law. • National Land Agency (BPN) offices did not provide an acceptable quality of service. • The pace of land titling as slow and was falling behind the increase in new land parcels. • Uncertain tenure and high transaction risks hindered land markets and investment. • Local governments lacked capacity to execute their land management responsibilities. Legal Framework. Land management and titling in Indonesia was governed by the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, unwritten customary (adat) law, and a series of laws, regulations, and policies that were passed after 1967 but which were often inconsistent or in conflict with one another and with previous laws. The result was a complex array of incidental laws, ministerial and other decrees, and ad-hoc regulations that allowed wide discretion in interpreting the law and allocating of land rights, and provided little basis for fair resolution of tenure disputes. Administra.tion. BPN had responsibility for titling, registration, surveying and mapping, but responsibility for nine other key activities had been transferred to local governments, including dispute resolution, land use planning, and compensation for appropriated land. However, local governments did not have the training, personnel, offices, and other assets needed to carry out these functions effectively. The quality of serVices provided by both BPN and local governments was very poor, despite a previous Bank-financed project, i.e. the Land Administration Project (LAP), P003984, aimed at improving the performance ofBPN. Titling. Only about 34 percent of all land parcels were titled, and· the number of new parcels (mainly from subdivision of existing parcels) was increasing more quickly than they could be registered and titled. Titling rates were low and the titling process was slow because of complex and overlapping patterns of land tenure, weak institutional capacity of BPN, absence of documentation, long-term disputes, and unclear procedures for adjudication. Land markets. Buyers and sellers faced high transaction risks because of uncertain titles, regulations, procedures, and adjudication. Efficient and fair land markets had not developed and the number of registered transactions involving titled land was low. Although mortgages on titled land increased slightly under LAP, 'in general land still could not be used as collateral to mobilize financial resources. Unclear titles, unreliable and inaccessible records, and a refusal to recognize informal but valid ownership were also leading to social conflict, particularly as Indonesia's economy and government evolved rapidly after the end of the Suharto era in 1998. RatioDale for Bank Involvement. The Bank already had global expertise in land administration and management, including in four East Asian countries other than Indonesia (Laos, Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia). It also had direct sectoral experience in Indonesia through the LAP 1 project, which closed in December 2001. During implementation of LAP, the Bank deepened its understanding of the country's land sector and institutions as well as its working relationship with the Indonesian government and with BPN in particular. The lessons and experience both from LAP and other countries would allow the Bank to provide sound technical, institutional, and policy advice and to bring greater coherence to overall donor efforts in the sector. By improving land management services and institutional capacity, increasing registration and . titling, and strengthening tenure security and land markets, the project would support the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) goals of improving the investment climate and making service delivery responsive to the needs of the poor. More specifically, it would improve both the security and val~e of the poor; s assets and help create more investment and economic opportunities for the poor. It would also support the government's decentralization agenda, under which many land management functions had already been transferred to local governments. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Performance Indicators The objectives are to: (i) improve land tenure security and enhance the efficiency, transparency and improve service delivery of land titling and registration; and (ii) enhance local government capacity to undertake land management functions with great efficiency and transparency. The PAD (section 2.1) listed five key performance indicators (KPIs): a. Key land policies developed and regulations drafted. b. Compliance with the minimum service standards. c. Number of titles issued. d. Improvement in land tenure security and speed in resolving land disputes. e. Increase in land ~arket activities and increase in registration of subsequent transactions. However, the Project Design Summary in Annex 1 of the PAD (and in the Development Credit Agreement) comprised ten KPIs that overlapped with but did not directly correspond to the five listed above. See Section 1.7 and Annex 2 for detailed discussion of the treatment of indicators during supervision and in the ICR. . 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification PDO. The PD~ was not revised. Indicators. The KPIs were not formally revised. However, because of discrepancies between the different lists of indicators, as well as issues of relevance and utility, the ICR includes the entire set ofKPIs in Annex 2, but presents a subset of those indicators in the Data Sheet·that combines the key elements most relevant to the PD~. Also, it is important to note that there were no changes made to any of the indicators themselves. It is noted the PD~ indicators lacked values. In almost all cases the indicator took the form of a non~quantified increase or decrease,. rather than a percentage or number to increase/decrease by. See Section 1.7 and Annex 2 for details. 2 1.4 Main Beneficiaries The project's primary target beneficiaries were the 2.5 million households expected to receive land titles. Having fonnal titles would increase their tenure security and the value of their land assets, improve access to credit, and create conditions that could foster increased investment, productivity, and economic opportunities. Many of the expected beneficiaries were to have been the poor and vulnerable who, because of time and resource constraints, had not previously obtained land titles through the existing system. The second key set of beneficiaries, were BPN, Bappenas, MoHA and the local governments which were expected to establish a clearer regulatory and legal framework, stronger institutional capacity to carry out their land-related mandates in titling, land administration and management, governance and policy formulation. It was also envisaged that the project would provide indirect benefits to the broader population which would also enjoy improved land management and titling services after the project closed as well as the ongoing benefits of more active and efficient land markets' and related economic benefits and opportunities. 1.S Original Components The project had five main components: 1. Development ofthe Land Policy and Regulatory Framework This component would support the development of a land policy and regulatory framework for land management through: (i) the development of government capacity to coordinate formulation of land policies through consultative processes; (ii) the development of a national land policy; (iii) the formulation and studies of specific key policies in the areas of land management and administration and the development and drafting of the regulatory framework to implement them. 2. Institutional Development, Capacity Buiiding, and Training The objectives of this component were to support BPN's transformation into a transparent, responsive and more service-oriented institution and to develop the capacity of local academic institutions to provide land administration education and training. As described under Component 5, many land management functions were transferred from national to local authority under Presidential Decree No. 34 of 2003 (Keppres 34/2003). The residual functions (including land registration, titling, surveying and mapping) are delivered by BPN through provincial, district and local land offices. This component includes subcomponents covering: (i) development and implementation oflong- term strategic planning for BPN; (ii) re-engineering of land offices to deliver transparent and efficient land administration services to the community at the local level, (iii) support to the legal department of BPN to develop policy and prepare laws and' regulations, (iv) education and training to strengthen land administration expertise, and (v) overall project management. 3 3. Implementation ofan Accelerated Land Titling Program This component wOuld support an accelerated national land titling program through: (i) community awareness and participation; (ii) systematic land titling; (iii) streamlining of Land Office registration processes (such as the process of sporadic registration); and (iv) increased capacity of the private surveying sector. The component proposed a program of systematic registration that initially focused on five provinces in Java with modest expansi~ to 4-5 selected urban centers outside Java. 4. Development ofa Land Iriformation System The objective of this component was to develop a framework for a Land Information System (LIS}-along the lines called for in Keppres 34/2003-to facilitate improved access to land information for government agencies and civil society, promote transparency and facilitate public participation in land management, and improve land administration services. The need for this LIS was based on the premise that land information is critical for effective decision~making on social, economic and environmental issues at all levels of government. The component would support these goals through: (i) development of a national land information strategy; (ii) establishment of LIS infrastructure; and (iii) a LIS pilot study covering one district. 5. " Capacity Building Support for Local Government This component, administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs, would strengthen the capacity, efficiency, and transparency of loCal governments in carrying out their land management functions, " and in particularly the nine activities transferred from national to local authority under Keppres 3412003. These activities were: (a) location permit issuance; (b) taking of land in the public interest; (c) cultivated land dispute settlement; (d) compensation detennination for land taken for development; (e) land distribution and compensation for land held in excess of standards;" (f) detennination and resolution of ulayat land problems; (g) resolution of unutilized land problems; (h) land opening permit provision; and (i) land use planning in local government jurisdictions. The component's main activities included: (a)" an in-depth assessment of the local governments' . capacity to undertake their new functions; (b) a pilot training and capacity building program for five local governments; (c) development of a national strategy for strengthening local· government land administration, and (d) technical assistance for implementation. 1~6 Revised Components There were no revisions to the project components. 1.7 Other Signifieant Changes As mentioned in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, there were discrepancies between the 5 key indicators listed in the beginning of the PAD and the 10 key PDQ indicators (and 24 component output indicators) listed in the Project Design Summary in Annex 1 of the PAD. Neither set of indicators fully covered the main parts of the PDQ. Therefore, during supervision and completion reporting the task team used a subset of indicators for project reporting that combined the most relevant elements of both versions of the iildicators, as determined by the Bank and borrower ·project teams. The complete set of indicators (see Annex 2) was also tracked and was reported regularly in the mission aide-memoire. 4 This primary subset of indicators included three of the five KPIs- from the main PAD document (section 2.1) and two additional indicators that combined key elements of the indicators in the results annex: Main PAD (Section A.2) a) Key land policies developed and regulations drafted. b) Compliance with the minimum service standards. c) Number of titles issUed and distributed (i.e. collected by beneficiaries). PAD Annex 1 d) Infonnation system for decentralized and improved land administration and management created and functioning well. e) Local government strengthened to efficiently undertake land management functions. The two indicators drawn from the annex dealt with elements of the PD~ that were not adequately addressed in the five KPls from the main PAD, specifically the service delivery aspects of the land registration system and the capacity. of local governments. . Many of the indicators that were not included in this primary subset were related to outcomes that could not be reliably measured during the implementation period or clearly attributed to the project (such as decrease in informal payments, or increase in land market activity and land values). In addition, most -would be measured. only in two socio-economic studies for baseline and impact assessment. Ultimately the baseline was not carried out until the time of the mid-term review, and neither the baseline nor the impact study yielded robust data on many of the indicators. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry The project's main strengths at entry were: (a) it addressed very relevant problems in the sector with very relevant activities and investments, and (b) it included a detailed anti-corruption strategy addressing key governance issues throughout the project. The main weaknesses were (a) underestimating risks, particularly related to inter-institutional coordination, high-level program oversight, and the capacity and commitment of BPN to bring about major policy changes, (b) shortcomings or inconsistencies in the indicator framework, which required clarification during implementation, and (c) inadequately incorporating the lessons from previous operations, such as avoiding excessive complexity. There was· not a QAG quality of entry (QAE) assessment, but the Bank's seventh Quality of Supervision Assessment (QAS7)1 in 2006 called the project ''well-designed'' and the 2008 Quality 1 QAS7 the B~'s supervision of the project. It did not assess project design. 5 Assessment of the Lending Portfolio (QALP-l)2 which reviewed a broader range of project elements, concluded that design was Moderately Satisfactory and identified several design shortcomings, including overestimation of implementing agency capacity, commitment, and high- level project coordination, and late scheduling of critical monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities. Soundness ofbackground analysis The background analysis and project rationale were strong. The Bank· had a very' good understanding of land policy, administration, and titling issues in Indonesia both through its experience and evaluation of the earlier project (LAP), assessments and studies commissioned during preparation ofLMPDP, and review of third-party studies and analysis. The project identified the importance of increasing title registration and improving the legal ftamework, capacity, and transparency of national and local governments in the sector as a way to strengthen tenure security, improve services, and foster efficient and effective land markets. These outcomes are expected to contribute to higher-level impacts of increasing well-being and economic opportunities for the poor. The main obstacles to achieving these outcomes and objectives were identified as being an outdated and fragmented legal and regulatory framework, poor institutional arrangements and capacity for providing effective land administration and management services, and weak local government capacity to carry out their newly acquired responsibilities. Preparation alSo included careful analysis of fraud and corruption problems and specific measures to address them. The lessons learned from earlier operations and experience were sound, such as addressing land titling in the context of a broader policy approach, focusing on systematic registration in entire areas, and incorporating traditional land rights customs (adatluluyat) into the regulatory frame~ork. Specific lessons from LAP included making sure that activities led to actual policies and regulations rather than just studies, the importance of transforming BPN into an efficient and accountable partner and implementing agency,and establishing sound and transparent dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure public confidence in the system. Assessment ofproject design The objectives and their translation into components and activities were well-designed. The first main objective, on land tenure security and improved titling and registration services, was linked to components 1-4, which focused on (a) policy and regulatory reform, (b) capacity building for BPN, (c) accelerated land titling, and (d) developing land information systems. The second main objective, on local government capacity, was mainly linked to Component 5 activities for building the capacity of local governments through capacity assessment, direct training of local government staff in the project area, strategic planning for ongoing capacity building, and project management support to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), which was the main implementing agency for these activities. 2 QALP-I assessed five project elements: (a) Quality of Design; (b) Quality ofImplementation; (c) Quality of Bank Supervision; and (d) Likelihood of Achieving the Development Objectives. . 6 However, the design tried to mitigate some of the concerns about agencies carrying through on commitments and completing intermediate outputs by making many of these . outputs dated covenants, which reduced flexibility and may have diminished rather than increased the likelihood of keeping the project on track. In addition, with three' implementing agencies carrying out different activities, a high-level steering committee was included in the project design to ensure proper coordination and leadership. The failure to establish this committee or provide the needed leadership could be interpreted' as a combination of shortcomings in design, risk assessment, and performance by either the government or implem~nting agency. Despite the validity or the lessons learned from previous experiences and attempts to take them into account in the project design, the project still fell into some of the same pitfalls as previous projects (such as studies not leading to policy reform, or insufficient capacity and coordination). Unfortunately, the effective coordination mechanism that existed during the project preparation period, ceased to operate after the project became effective. Bappenas' efforts to re-initiate high-level coordination mechanisms did not come to fruition, although there was coordination at a technical level. Accordingly, the successful land policy study program did not proceed to policy formulation. Although Bappenas has advised that the studies would be inputs to the National Medium Term Development Plan (NMTDP), 2010-2014, this remains to be seen, and in the absence of a high-level coordination mechanism would seem to be unlikely. Another shortcoming, mentioned previously, were the inconsistencies in defining the KPIs and other indicators, and their linkage to the PDQs. The M&E arrangements also were not as strong as they could have been, as explained in more detail in Section 2.3. Government commitment and stakeholder involvement While at entry the government was clearly committed to the objectives of the project and there' was high-level oversight and direction during. preparation,' the commitment of specific agencies to some elements of the project design was not as strong as it could have been. In part this was because the responsibilities and interests of different agencies in implementing the project were not always in hannony, which contributed to implementation arrangements that were fairly complex while at the same time creating greater challenges for project coordination, oversight, and leadership. Government commitment during implementation and assessment of commitment as a risk are discussed in other sections. Stakeholders were consulted regularly throughout the design phase of the project, and their input was reflected in the draft environmental assessment and environmental management plan. The Bank's preparation team independently met with, civil society organizations to learn first-hand the concerns of the various stakeholders, ranging from, traditional community groups to the mayors' association. The project also included provisions for ongoing stakeholder and civil society consultation and involvem.ent during most aspects of project implementation. Assessment ofrisks The main risk that was underestimated was lack of effective coordination from the Steering Committee, which was rated as modest but should have been substantial or even high, considering both its likelihood and impact on implementation and outcomes. Another key risk, the weak capacity of BPN to implement the project, and particularly the capacity of top 7 management to foster major institutional, policy, and regulatory change, was not specifically assessed as a risk in the PAD, but should· have been considered substantial or high. A closely related risk, the commitment of BPN to reform, transparency, and openness,·was properly rated as substantial, but like many of the other risks, the mitigation measures proposed were aimed more at limiting exposure of the project by slowing or scaling back the project in response to risk, rather than reducing the likelihood of the risk and mitigating its impact. Corruption concerns were reflected in the assessment matrix in terms of openness, transparency, financial management, and accountability in different parts of the project, which were all rated as substantial (except for ~ocal governments, which rated low). The project included a detailed anti- corruption framework, and the three implementing agencies agreed to specific mitigation measures in six main areas: (a) enhanced disclosure provisions; (b) standardization of procedures; in particular bidding and contractdoouments; (c) service standards development and monitoring; (d) civil society oversight and feedback; (e) complaints handling mechanisms ·and the use of· sanctions; and (t) strengthening of internal controls and payment validation. 2.2 Implementation Implementation was strong in terms of activities related to land titling and local government capacity, but weaker in policy development, institutional· development, and particularly land information systems. The project got off to a slow start, largely for reasons beyond its control and once activities were well underway there was uneven performance and commitment from the implementing agencies, and lack of strong coordination and leadership from the government. Some project design and preparation factors contributed to implementation problems, but were not the main cause for the project's shortcomings. Transition ofgovernment and natural disasters Two major events that took place following project approval and effectiveness substantially slowed project start-up .during the first two years of implementation: (a) Indonesia's ·first~ever direct presidential election and the transition· of power to anew administration, and (b) the devastating tsunami that struck Aceh in December 2004, followed by a major earthquake off North Sumatra in March 2005. The new government took office in October 2004, introducing its own reform agenda, significant changes to budgetary and procurement systems, and significant turnover in key management and staff positions, including the head to the main implementing agency (BPN). The recovery and reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami and earthquake dominated the attention of most national government institutions for some time, including BPN. The Bank and the government prepared a series of emergency reconstruction projects, including the Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System Project (RALAS), which was implemented by BPN and ran in parallel with LMPDP. Having to ''fight on two fronts" at the same time strained the agency's capacity, particularly that of its top management. Factors generally subject to government control The project's major activities suffered from a pattern of "stop-start" implementation related to the government's bulky and complicated system for releasing the DIPA, including donor funds, which by law must pass through the parliament and then a series of additional steps. These 8 regulations can also result in delays when changes are made to project activities or the specific use of funds, as well as transferring uilused funds from one year's implementation plan to the next. In the first calendar year of implementation (2005), the budget release process was not completed until June; Similar delays occurred throughout project implementation. , , The project also suffered from the government's failure to establish the LMPDP Project Steering Committee, as called for iil the project design and required by the legal agreement. This committee was to play a key role in guiding land policy development, the implementation of which was particularly affected as a result. The fact that this committee could not be set up may indicate that the government and/or BPN is reluctant to change the institutional status quo in areas where BPN enjoys a de-facto policymaking role. Stronger government oversight or intervention could also have helped address the factors contributing to BPN's under-performance in work planning and reporting and its failure to comply with a number of loan covenants.. Factors generally subject to implementing agency control . The project had one overall Central Project Manageplent Unit (CPMU) established within BPN as well as 'three project implementation units (PIUs) established within MoHA, BAPPENAS, and BPN to carry out the activities of each implementing agency. Two of the project's implementing . agencies (MoHA and BAPPENAS) made appropriate staffmg and resource commitments to their PIUs and provided adequate technical and managerial skills. But BPN, the agency responsible 'for the overall implementation as well·as most project activities (90 percent of the project by cost), did not assign full time staff to manage the project and also lacked strong leadership. Unfortunately BPN was reluctant to utilize Credit hired key expert consultants, in areas such as project management, M&E, procurement, FM, IT and GIS. The project design, identified BPN's capacity weaknesses and proposed hiring of TA in response. Unfortunately, this did not occur. Again, both Bappenas and MoHA, which also had capacity limitations, hired the requisite TA, utilizing the CreditlLoan, and achieved significant success in project implementation. BPN did not seem sufficiently committed to making progress in areas under the project other than issuing.titles. Even when it came to titling activities, BPN Pusat (central office in Jakarta) was a bottleneck because it did not decentralize much of the decision-making. Without full-time BPN staff to manage to the project, the agency could not adequately identify and resolve implementation issues without assistance from the Bank. Full-time BPN project management staff could have fostered: • Stronger ownership of the project and accountability for implementation progress (particularly for the tasks other than land titling). • Greater initiative in solving performance issues (project management, alignment of project planniIig with budgeting, disbursement planning and procurement planning, as well as project M&E and reporting) • Better understanding of procurementlbudget process issues. 9 QAG assessments (QSA7 and QALP-l) The QSA7 report noted: "Project implementation suffered in the initial phase due to lack of Government budgetary allocation which coincided with emergence of country level challenges such as changing political scenario, the Tsunami and the earthquake. The budget problem is rooted in the national laws that require donor lending to pass through the parliamentary process, which unnecessarily delays the clearance of annual release of funds for the projects. This was further aggravated by changes in the senior staff at the national and project level." A more recent QAG assessment in November 2008 (QALP-l) agreed with the most current ISR ratings for progress toward development objectives (moderately ~atisfactory) and overall implementation progress (unsatisfactory). It rated quality of project design as moderately satisfactory, implementation as unsatisfactory, and Bank supervision as satisfactory, stating that "In essence, this project has been very poorly implemented, despite good. supervision effort." The findings were generally in line with those expressed in this ICR, and the main shortcomings in implementation related to the lack ofa high-level coordination (or steering) committee, lack of appropriate counterpart staffing for the project, irregular budget flows, weak procurement capacity and performance, insufficient socialization of the project, and the persIstence of informal payments in land titling. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization BPN was unable to effectively monitor some of its key project activities, and did not establish a monitoring capacity through an independent national consulting firm, university, or NGO, as was intended under the project design. Some weaknesses in the project's M&E system were related to the design of the original project results framework, but the main shortcomings were due to poor M&E capacity and implementation. On the other hand, Bappenas and MoHA were able to very effectively monitor the implementation of their project activities under Components 1 and 5 respectively. Design . The project design outlined an ambitious M&E approach based on a combination of internal and external monitoring and reporting, and required that the details of the system be finalized and put in place during. the initial stages of implementation. Responsibility for internal monitoring would be assigned to the relevant agencies or implementation units, while the external monitoring would· be carried out by an independent national consulting firm, university, or NGO for some aspects and by stakeholders and CSOs involved with the .project for others. The external monitoring would coverall key project activities, including land titling, performance of the implementing agencies and local governments, land disputes, complaints handling, and compliance with service standards. The service standard monitoring was given special attention, though it would begin at a later stage, after the standards were in place. Socio-economic impacts would be measured through a baseline survey (SEBS) in the first year and an impact survey (SEIS) in the final year of the project. As mentioned in Section 1.7, there were some discrepancies between the KPls stated in the beginning of the PAD and those listed in the results framework in Annex 1. Also, some of the indicators were difficult to measure over the implementation period of the project or to clearly 10 attribute to the project activities. Furthermore, measurement of the majority of the PDQ indicators in the annex relied entirely on the SEIS. It is noted that the November 2008 QALP-l reported that scheduling the main baseline survey for well after project effectiveness was a serious shortcoming, particularly "given the Bank's long engagement in the sector and the time it took to prepare the project." It also said that the ten indicators for the PDQ were too numerous and too demanding. Implementation The project baseline (SEBS) was only completed in May 2007, at the time of the project's MTR. Besides being-late, it was also poorly executed and incomplete, and did not address or establish a baseline for the majority of the ten PDQ outcome indicators it was intended to measure. The impact survey (SEIS) was also poorly managed, failed to assess the majority of PDQ and was ineffective in assessing its impacts. The SEIS consultants reported to the indicators, _ Bank, after the fact, that they had not seen the PAD or been provided with key project supervision documents before designing and carrying out the survey. There was little evidence that the extensive comments provided by the Bank on the SEIS consultant's inception report were considered in carrying out the survey and drafting the final report, and BPNdid respond to Bank requests to share intermediary reports from the SEIS team. Throughout implementation, the project lacked a timely and reliable monitoring system, even for project inputs. For example, four months after the project closed, reliable data on disbursements by component was still not available. In general, the overall M&E system did not provide information on beneficiaries and usually did not provide good information prior to supervision missions. Utilization There was no effective monitoring system to provide feedback to help improve BPN's day-to- day operations in titling or land office management. -Similarly, both the SEBS and SEIS would seem to have been prepared more to comply with Bank requirements rather than for utilization within the implementing agencies to improve project management monitoring. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance" Environmental safoguards The project was designated as Environmental Category B. The direct project activities had negligible potential for environmental impacts, mainly related to renovation of some existing offices. These civil works were covered by the building renovation permits based on Indonesian regulations that the Bank determined were sufficient for the type of works carried out. Land titling h8s no direct environmental impact" on land. The titling process essentially formalizes the existing occupancy of the land, confirming the possessory rights of the legitimate occupants with a land title certificate. It is noted however, that once people do have a title, they are more likely to invest in their property, including making improvements. The SEIS reported 11 that almost 48% of respondents would be willing to improve their land after they received Ii title. Any such improvements would be subject to the government's environmental, planning and building regulations. The project implementation complied with environmental safeguards. Social safeguards The project built on the preparation team's social specialists to educate the adjudication teams, raising their awareness and training them. To safeguard indigenous peoples' issues, the project precluded titling where ownership claims were contested or claimed by indigenous people, any government entity, or a community. In addition, off Java, it precluded titling activities in the rural areas. Systematic adjudication was not undertaken in forestry and conflict areas. The project implementation complied with social safeguards. Financial management and Procurement Although the financial management system for LMPDP needed strengthening during implementation, at the transaction level it worked reasonably well. However, FM reports usually were not delivered on schedule and were not always consistent or properly authenticated by senior officers. Delays in FM report submission were often due to late submission of reports from the respective PIUs to the CPMU. There also was not an effective, integrated system for collectively tracking and analyzing the detailed contract and account details contained in individual files. Despite continuing shortcomings, FM issues did not significantly affect project outputs and outcomes, though it made accounting for resources slow and cumbersome. The main budget issue affecting implementation progress, as discussed in Section 2.2, was the recurring delay in completing the procedural process for releasing funds approved in the government's DIPA. Annual procurement planning was problematic, and for a couple of years the Bank team worked full-tin;te with the project to provide intensive guidance to complete the task. Weaknesses in preparation of bidding documents and in systematic compliance with standard procurement and bid evaluation procedures also caused some problems and delays, but these decreased as the project progressed and capacity increased. 2.5 Post-Completion OperationlNext Phase Although ~ was some discussion of project extension, and interest on the part of BPN in continuing activities related to institutional development and LIS, the project closed on schedule and there is no specific plan for a follow-on operation or next phase. In discussions with BPN on extension, BPN advised the Bank that it did not wish to undertake systematic titling, despite the fact that at least 70 percent of the country remains to be titled. Both Bappenas and MOHA advised that they had achieved their respective objectives under the project and did not need to continue: From the range of policy studies and NLPF development, Bappenas has been effective in bringing a number of key land tenure issues into the preparation ofNMTDP. In the case ofMOHA, with the finalization of the strategic implementation plan for local government land management, the goverpment budget will be utilized for a national roll-out to all 300 LOUs and 3600 districts. MOHA's strategic implementation plan for local government land management has been developed from the valuable lessons, practical experience and capacity building from Component 5 of the project 12 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation At the time of the ICR, the project objectives continued to be highly relevant. Improved land tenure security, service delivery in land titling, and local government capacity for land management are important for reducing poverty. promoting economic growth, and strengthening governance and institutional capacity. At approval, the main Country Assistance Strategy goals supported by the project were effective implementation of decentralization ~d sustainable income-generating opportunities for the poor. The operation is still relevant to the goals of the 2009-12 Country Partnership Strategy, which builds on the governance focus of the 2004-08 Country Assistance Strategy by emphasizing improvement of government programs and strengthening institutions. While the project objectives, components, and activities were highly relevant throughout the implementation period, implementation suffered in large part because the design overestimated the capacity and commitment of the main implementing agency and underestimated the need for strong government coordination and leadership. The fact that the policy development and institutional and service delivery objectives of the project fell short, reinforces their continuing relevance but also indicates that stronger implementation arrangements and government commitment are required to aChieve them. In addition, better monitoring and evaluation arrangements and more specific and measurable outcome indicators would help improve performance and identify. areas where linkages between activities, outputs, and outcomes need to be strengthened. For example, like previous projects, LMPDP produced various land studies, reports, and strategies in specific topical areas, but these did not lead to clear and cohesive policy directions or reform. More specific policy goals, such as resolving conflicts between the basic agrarian and forestry laws, could provide a clearer roadmap for policy development and addressing key issues affecting land tenure security. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Land tenure security In regard to the objective of improving land tenure security, the project was quite successful in terms of producing and distributing new titles through the systematic land titling component. However, land tenure insecurity cOmes not only from lack of titles, but also from lack of clear laws, regulations, and policies, and from conflicts between laws. In this regard, the project fell short. While it produced a National Land Policy Framework (NLPF) and many worthwhile policy and planning studies, they have not yet resulted in regulatory reform, the adoption of a clear overarching regulatory framework, or resolution of legal inconsistencies such as the conflict between the basic agrarian and forestry laws. The government's ability to formulate land policy and regulations, an important underpinning of tenure ~urity, did not tangibly improve. Furthermore, many of the indicators for tenure security and the impact of tenure security were not conclusively measured in the project's closing socioeconomic impact survey. Still, the tenure security gains from titling alone were substantial, directly benefited at least two million 13 landowners, and there is some evidence that this in tum improved the investment environment, strengthened land markets, and increased economic opportunities. Service delivery In terms of enhancing the efficiency, transparency, and impr(}vingservice delivery of land titling and registration, the project was substantially less successful. Although improvement in service delivery (including governance) was a critical element of the project design, only minimal progress was made. Service delivery standards were prepared, but no monitoring was undertaken and there is no data to show that service actually improved. Regarding. governance, including the persistence of informal payments in the titling process, concerns were raised by both the media and the supervision team, and while BPN acknowledged the concerns, it never took decisive remedial action. Efficiency of titling remained more or less at the same level as during the LAP project (1994-2001) and were not enhanced through the project's technology improvements using global positioning and electronic total station technologies as well as GIS. Ultimately, the project's titling outputs were entirely budget driven, and although effi~iency gains were well within BPN's capacity, output levels were constrained by the budget assigned. That is, productivity was a function of budget and planned unit cost, rather than by capacity and potential to deliver at a more efficient unit cost. Development of a new land information system (LIS), which was relevant to both the tenure security and service delivery objectives of the project, made only modest progress on intermediate steps, with no tangible progress toward establishing an actual system. Local government capacity The project was considerably more successful.in achieving the objective of enhancing local government capacity to undertake land management functions with great efficiency and transparency. The local governments were motivated to address this issue (and enhance their capacity) because they found efficient undertaking of land management functions could lead to improvement of their finances and local services. The activities and outputs of the local government component-piloting operational strategic plans in five local governments and providing training to staff in. 400 local governments-were fully achieved. However, the indicators related to this objective faced the familiar challenge of how to measure capacity outcomes rather than activities and outputs, so while implementation was quite successful and the perception of local governments favorable, the project did not include mechanisms to clearly measure the capacity strengthening outcomes in tangible terms; 3.3 Efficiency The project cost ofUS$51.6 million puts the cost of producing and distributing roughly 1.7 million titles at US$30 per title. This compares favorably with the US$65 per title as indicated in the recent ICR for Lao PDR, Second Land Titling Project. This positive efficiency result of LMPDP can be attributed to the project spending 83 percent of the total cost on systematic land titling which led to worthwhile improvement in land security for 99 percent of the respondents where the systematic land titling program was undertaken. The per title cost drops to about US$25, if only direct costs 14 for land titling are considered, and could be as low as US$17 per title if one assumes the number of titles (2.1 million) and direct titling costs (US$35.6 million) indicated in the Government's report. At Approval, with various benefits that had been quantified (such. as, the increase in the use of titles to obtain credit going up by 12.8 percent in the project area etc.), the PAD had estimated a project ERR of 33 percent, and a FRR of 16 percent. The Socio Economic Impact Study (SEIS) undertaken at the end of project implementation did not estimate the benefits quantitatively. Consequently, without reliable quantified data on benefits, such calculations were not attempted for the ICR The ICR estimates titled land value to be US$360 per parcel and the value of all land titled under the project (1.7 milFon titles, the output validated by the Bank) at over US$600 million. This implies that to cover the cost of the project the increase in value of the land required is less than 9 percent. This is quite conceivable particularly in the semi-urban, communities where the probability of conflicts 'and the value of land titles rise more than they do in rural communities. The above calculations also demonstrate why sporadic titling with its US$150 per parcel price tag,makes sense only in some communities. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory The'overall outcome of the project is rated moderately unsatisfactory. While relevance was high, and efficiency was reasonably good, there were significant shortcomings in the achievement of some objectives. The project had mixed results in achieving the first main objective (land, tenure and service delivery) but was more successful in achieving the goals related to the second objective (local government capacity). However, the first part ofthePDO, which can be viewed as two distinct but interrelated objectives, is considered more important to the overall project objectives as well as higher-level development impacts not directly measured by the project. On the first objective, the project had moderately satisfactory outcomes in acCelerating systematic land titling, achieving at 92% of its target of 2.5 million titles. 3 More than 22 percent were issued to women, and another 4 percent to women as joint owners. Results of the socioeconomic impact surveys (see Section 3.6 and Annex 5) reflect strong positive perceptions among stakeholders of the transparency and fairness of the systematic titling, as well as the importance of land titles and the belief that titles increase land values. Although the survey was not designed to compile objective data to support these perceptions, more than 90 percent of respondents expressed positive opinions on these core questions. However, while issuing land titles is one critical element in improving land tenure security, progress was unsatisfactory in other key areas related to enhancing the efficiency, transparency, and improving service delivery of land titling and registration. Re- engineering of model BPN land offices was not completed. Service standards were developed and adopted, but were not implemented and monitored. Development of a new land infonnation system 3Following the closure ofLMPDP at December 31, 2009, BPN has advised in its final report for the ICR, dated Feb 25,2011, that 2,308,815 titles were registered (issued), which would represent an achievement of 92%. The Bank was unable to validate this final achievement. 15 did not proceed beyond the planning stage. Many ofthe phmned. intennediatepolicy and regulatory studies and strategies were completed, but they were not coordinated and carried through in a way that would achieve the intended policy outcomes. For example, there was no resolution of problems arising from competing and sometimes conflicting laws for forest and agricultural lands. Similarly, efficiency, transparency, and service delivery for sporadic land titling and subsequent registration efforts were not significantly improved by the project. There was evidence in the socioeconomic impact survey of positive perceptions about the effect of title security on land values, economic opportunity, investment, access to credit, and strengthening of land markets. However, the survey only.included participants in the systematic titling program, and the survey design and fmdings were not highly rigorous. Part of the problem in this regard is that these indicators verge on higher-level development impacts, rather than project outcomes that are both measurable over a short period and attributable to the project. ·The project had satisfactory achievement of the second main objective, namely to enhance local government capacity to undertake land management functions with great efficiency and transparency. The local government land management pilots were successful and provide a model that can be scaled up nationwide. Training of local government officials and staff met the target of 400 local governments (1,125 individualS). While these indicators measure outputs· rather than outcomes, the strong interest and participation from local governments is evidence of • the value and timeliness of the training and capacity building. The project also helped strengthened the capacity of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), which is responsible for facilitating local governments' adoption of these decentralized responsibilities, and created both a needs assessment and a strategic plan for ongoing capacity building in the sector. 3.5 OverarchingThemes, ~her Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Poverty. lloverty-based targeting and direct measurement of poverty impacts was not part of the project design,· but it is believed to have mainly benefited poor households. The socioeconomic baseline study suggested that 70-80 percent of the beneficiary households had annual incomes below US$I,OOO (roughly US$250 per capita). Even if there was underreporting of income, it is evident that most beneficiaries had low incomes. Furthermore, subsidization of titling fees under the project's systematic titling program benefited many households that cOuld not have afforded a title under the regular (sporadic) titling program. Gender. The systematic titling program put considerable effort into ensuring women's rights to titles. This was facilitated by the prevailing culture where women enjoy land ownership under' the traditional titling system, though formal titles have typically named men rather than·women as the landowner. Overall, 22.5 percent of the titles registered under the project went to women, and 4.2 percent included women as co-owners. Titling to women increased as the project progressed, with the SEIS reporting that roughly. 46 percent of the titles distributed through the project in 2009 went to women. Social Development. By having an effective participatory process in place in all project areas, the project also delivered the social development outcome of reducing conflict over land. Similar 16 gains were not achieved for those communities in "forest" land because the overlapping jurisdiction of laws in those areas remained unresolved under the project. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening There was minimal institutional change/strengthening of BPN during the project despite the development of a comprehensive strategic plan for the agency. Institutional gains at Bappenas were also limited. On the other hand, the institutional strengthening at MOHA was substantial. With the completion of the local land management pilots, MOHA gained valuable expertise needed to effectively assist local government units (LGUs) on an ongoing basis. The training provided to more than 1,000 LGU officials similarly strengthened capacity in 400 LGUs. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Toward the end of the project, LMPDP was able to achieve some harmonization of a range of different activities supporting land-related legal reform, viz. with another Bank-funded operation and also an Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded program, which has paved the way for drafting of a new draft law on land acquisition. During the final two years of project implementation, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) began providing technical assistance for revision of land laws, with particular emphasis on valuation and land acquisition under its program for "Enhancing the Legal and Administrative Framework for Land" (ELAF). This was independent of LMPDP. At the same time, the Bank commenced analytical work on land acquisition in conjunction with an mRD-funded Infrastructure Development Policy Loan (IDPL) project. Component 1 underLMPDP was undertook a number of policy studies. Although these three activities were disconnected, the Bank task team engaged in regular dialogue with each. For a long time these activities were disconnected, despite the Bank team's continued recommendations to BPN, to undertake a leadership and coordination role in order to harmonize the respective efforts. Successive Bank supervision missions during 2008 and 2009, as reported in the respective aide- memoires, gave a lot of focus to this issue, including bringing the matter to the attention of the BPN Head, who also endorsed the need for harmonization, through the land acquisition committee that he chaired. Subsequently, by the time of preparing this ICR, the government announced a new draft law on land acquisition, which had draWn upon the respective efforts discussed above. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Although a workshop was not held specifically for the purpose of the ICR, the project's final socioeconomic impact survey (SEIS) product:;d many findings on the views of project beneficiaries and stakeholders about the project's systematic land titling program (Component 3). The survey found evidence of good program performance and/or that respondents had strong favorable perceptions of most aspects of the project's systematic titling program, including: • Inclusion of communities in the land titling process. • Inclusion of gender concerns and promotion of title rights for women. • Dissemination of program and titling information though public campaigns (posters, leaflets, radio, television, and public notification). 17 • Usage of titles received and post-titling impact on land values in the area. • Understanding ofthe content and use ofland titles (including use as collateral). •. Quality of titles. • Technical performance offield teams. • Knowledge and use of the complaints handling mechanism. • Increased options for investment, land use, or other economic opportunities. Some of the findings reflected strong positive perceptions of the value of titles (more than 90 percent for most key questions, such as the effect on land values), but the survey did not attempt the more difficult task of compiling and analyzing objective data to support those perceptions. Around 45 percent of respondents were unfamiliar with using titles as collateral for borrowing. Unfortunately the survey did not clearly advise on the proportion that had used or would consider using their titles to help access formal credit. The Executive Summary of the SEIS is at Annex 5. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate The risk to the limited land tenure outcomes achieved by registering new land titles in the project areas is low to moderate, and the risks to outcomes achieved in strengthening local government capacity is moderate. However, the .risk to the outcomes of improving land tenure security generally (outside the project's accelerated title program) and enhancing the transparency, efficiency, and quality of land titling and service delivery is high. That is, there is a high likelihood that the intended outcomes expected but not yet realized under the project still will not be achieved. The land titles already issued under the project clearly improved the tenure security of the direct beneficiaries of that program. There is negligible risk that the security of those titles will be compromised, which in itself is a significant benefit. There is moderate risk to realizing the higher level development impacts that should result from having secure tenure, because it is unclear whether beneficiaries can fully take full advantage of their tenure security if land markets, regulations, and services in general are still not efficient, reliable, and trustworthy. Risk to the local government capacity strengthening achieved under the project is moderate. The two main factors are that MoRA is now better positioned to scale up these efforts and continue strengthening local capacity, and that local governments and stakeholders have strong incentives to better carry out their decentralized land management responsibilities and functions. However, the track record for local capacity building in Indonesia's decentralization program is not strong, and if MoRA does not have the resources to continue capacity building, local governments ultimately might not be able to effectively carry out their decentralized responsibilities in land management, administration, and planning. The greatest challenge is posed by the lack of improvements in efficiency, transparency, and service delivery for land titling and regulation overall in Indonesia. The unrealized outputs and outcomes (in policy and regulatory reform, institutional capacity, model land offices, 18 computerized information systems, and governance) have less likelihood of being realized now that the project is closed. A number of the intermediate outputs have been completed, and there have been early steps toward enhancements in some areas (for example, development of service standards), but not to the threshold required to ensure sustainability. The pace of titling is likely to fall back to pre-project levels, prospects for resolving tenure security issues related to poorly defined or conflicting laws and regulations are not promising, and the institutional capacity and political commitment to carry forward needed refonns is uncertain .. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory The Bank preparation identified and addressed very relevant problems in the land sector and developed a detailed anti-corruption strategy. Background analysis was extensive and well-done, consultation with relevant stakeholders was effectively used to improve the project design, and the composition and resources of the preparation team were more than sufficient. Nevertheless, the team could have better incorporated the experiences and lessons learned from the Bank's previous land project in Indonesia (LAP), and there could have been more careful consideration of the institutional differences and capacity of the three implementing agencies in the project design and implementation arrangements. Although the project results framework included the indicators needed to track the project outputs and outcomes, they were not always consistently stated (variation between the KPIs and the RF) and included too many PD~ indicators that could only be measured through an end-of-project impact assessment. The Bank's independent Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA7) undertaken in late 2006 assessed the project as being well-designed, but the independent Bank Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP-l) in 2008 rated the quality of design as moderately satisfactory, which is in line with the assessment in this ICR. (b) Quality a/Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The Bank supervision team utilized its solid experience with systematic land titling very effectively. The Bank's expertise in this area helped activities keep pace with the project schedule even though BPN was strained by having to address, in parallel, tsunami -affected areas through the RALAS Project at the same time as it implemented LMPDP. When the work on systematic titling was well underway, the Bank's task team leader (TTL) was able to establish a good dialogue on local government and with MORA that led to satisfactory results in Component 5. The TL was deployed full-time to Indonesia for more than a year beginning in early 2005, working closely with BPN in support of both RALAS and LMPDP. Later the TTL managed the project from Washington, with the support of a small team of experienced professionals in Indonesia monitoring RALAS on a full-time basis and providing cross-support to LMPDP. 19 On fiduciary aspects, local expertise based in the country office provided ongoing supervision as well as targeted support to the implementing agencies at critical junctures that generally helped prevent shortcomings in this area from jeopardizing implementation progress. However, at times, the Bank was slow in processing procurement requests from the borrower, which· contributed to project implementation delays. The Bank initiated independent fiduciary reviews were generally late in finalization and the subsequent communications of the respective review findings to the borrower were delayed for such long periods, that such reviews proved to be of limited value to improving borrower performance. The Bank supervision team used F AO support extensively for supervising the land policy and institutional development components and to a lesser degree the titling work. As part of the MTR, the Chief of FAO's Land Tenure Service undertook an independent review of all project components, arriving at findings that were similar to those of the Bank team. The project supervision team repeatedly encouraged BPN to take more substantive action to address governance concerns and implement anti-corruption measures. The Bank also instituted independent reviews of FM, procurement and, towards the end of the project the results of the anti-corruption framework. Although BPN eventually acknowledged that serious governance issues existed, and these were discussed in the government's completion report, no demonstrable actions were taken and there seemed to be a lack of commitment to addressing entrenched corruption in land administration. The Bank's independent QSA7 undertaken in late 2006 assessed Bank supervision as Moderately Satisfactory. In 2008, the Bank's QALP-l rated Bank-supervision as Satisfactory, and noted that the project was poorly implemented "despite good supervision effort" by the Bank. (c) Justification ofRatingfor Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The rating is based on the combination of (a) a moderately unsatisfactory rating for Quality at Entry and (b) a moderately satisfactory rating for Quality of Supervision. Although the project's Outcome rating is moderately unsatisfactory, Overall Bank Performance is rated MS in this case rather than MU because the Bank's perfonnance, and in particular the MU performance in ensuring quality at entry, was not a significant factor in the project failing to achieve an MS rating for Outcomes. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory - The rating is based on the government's unwillingness or inability to responsively engage with the Bank supervision team despite repeated indications of BPN's weak performance in annual work program planning, project management and reporting: The government also did not ensure compliance with some key loan covenants that affected project outcomes, particularly the establishment and maintenance of a high-level Steering (or coordination) Committee and the 20 assignment of adequate project staffing. The lack of such a committee was problematic because it was intended not only to provide general guidance, coordination, and leadership, but also to serve a direct role as steering committee for land policy development, which ultimately produced many studies and policy frameworks but little policy or regulatory reform. The government helped ensure that the three implementing agencies complied with the project's budget requirements, but seemed less interested in intervening or providing strong guidance for the project otherwise. Project implementation was also affected every year by procedural delays in the release of budget allocations, which the government could have more actively helped to resolve. (b) Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory The rating is based mainly on BPN's performance, which was at best moderately unsatisfactory. The uneven leadership and commitment of senior management at BPN was a key reason that the agency made little progress other than in systematic land titling, and even in that area BPN headquarters became a bottleneck because it did not decentralize decision-making. It was also largely unresponsive to concerns about informal payments in land titling, and failed to assign BPN staff on a full-time basis for project management in both the CPMU and the BPN-specific PIU, which led to poor work planning and reporting. A mitigating factor that prevents BPN's performance from being rated unsatisfactory is that its capacity was strained· by working simultaneously on the e~ergency land project in Aceh. The performance of MOHA and BAPPENAS is rated satisfactory, and their senior management had the skills and commitment to deliver the tasks for which they were responsible. However, while· BAPPENAS was responsible for implementing the Land Policy Development activities in Component 1, elevating the studies into policy development and regulations required the engagement of a high-level committee. It is noted that at least two critical issues from the NLPF and the policy studies were successfully included in theNMTDP 2010-2014. Unfortunately, the Coordination Committee, which had been effective during project preparation, ceased to exist, once the project became effective, and actual policy formulation did not proceed. This was not anticipated in the project design, although it was anticipated that BPN itself, in its role as the lead the implementing agency, would provide strong project-level coordination, between the three implementing agencies. Since the tasks and responsibilities of BAPPENAS and MoHA were relatively modest compared to those of BPN, and since BPN was also the lead implementing agency, the performance of BPN was the primary determinant of the overall implementing agency rating. (c) Justification ofRatingfor Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall borrower's performance is deemed moderately unsatisfactory for the reasons stated above. Essentially, the borrower did not take effective charge of its project and did not effectively utilize the advice and support provided by the Bank. 21 6. Lessons Learned (a) General Lessons The Contentious Nature of Land Sector Reforms. In any country, bringing about refonns to the land sector is always contentious and highly political. As such, policy and institutional refonns are extraordinarily challenging and invariably take a long time to achieve. Therefore, whilst identification of the long-tenn refonn agenda is extremely valuable, great patience is required, and a slower pace of implementation should be planned for with realistic targets. La£k of High Level Oversight and Coordination. High level engagement and oversight is required throughout the period of project implementation to ensure the policy and institutional refonn agendas are progressed, and to also re-calibrate the project implementation schedule and priorities as is deemed necessary due to delays and unexpected challenges encountered. It is also important to have such high level coordination in place for a project which has more than one implementing agency. (b) Spe£ifi£ Lessons for Land Administration in Indonesia Alignment of Project Implementatioil Plan with the Government's Budget Cy£le.LMPDP became effective in August 2004, but unfortunately this date was not aligned with the government budget or DIPA cycle, meaning that there was little progress for over one year. The DIPA cycle is fairly rigid, and if an agency misses the preparation and submission schedule for the forthcoming project year, procurement and disbursement cannot progress. Therefore, the Project Implementation Plan must make allowance for the date of project effectiveness, and both the borrower and external financier must be cognizant of the impacts of missing the DIPA schedule. Project Complexity. LMPDP was a complex and ambitious project with three implementing agencies and ambitious targets working in a sector with weak governance. The initial project LAP experienced many similar challenges to those experienced by LMPDP, especially regarding policy and institutional refonn, capacity, project management and governance. At times during the implementation of LMPDP, especially in trying to address. the challenges, sensitive relationship issues eclipsed the actual project issues. Therefore, especially in working in the Indonesia land sector, a less ambitious project design with simple implementation arrangements would lead to more effective implementation. Project Baseline and PD~ Indi£ators. The Results Framework and the M&E system go hand- in-hand and should be designed with implementation in mind. The experience under LMPDP is a reminder that objectives should be kept as simple as possible and should avoid including vaguely-specified impacts and outcomes whose achievement requires achieving progress outside of the Project's control. Broadly-defined outcome indicators are difficult (if not impossible) to measure and in the case of this Project show that the operational aspects of M&E had not been sufficiently thought through at the design stage. For a Results Framework to be credible, it is essential to have the core elements of an M&E system established before project implementation commences, including having all baseline data prepared. 22 The project baseline, SEBS~ largely did not produce baseline data that would enable measurement of progress against the PD~ indicators. Thus it is very important that the baseline fulfils the fundamental purpose of providing core data against which progress can be measured. LMPDP incorporated ten. PDO indicators. All of these indicators were intenoed to measure factors (or perceptions), that could actually be measured under the project's M&E system. Rather, they were resultant impacts and hence intended to be assessed through the SEIS. LMPDP's SEIS was weakly designed,. and largely did not assess the PD~ indicators. QALP-l advised: "Moreover, the PAD included 10 indicators for the two-part DO: these were too many and too demanding". The project SEBS should preferably be undertaken prior to completion of project appraisal, and be used to influence the project design, including the PDQ indicators. It is best if the majority of indicators can be measured through actual project implementation under the M&E system, and progress monitored, rather than rely only on an end of project socio-economic assessment that measures perceptions. Completion of the SEBS only around the time of the MTR, allowed insufficient time to even consider in any potential project re-structuring. Land policy reform. Little progress has been made in the overall land policy reform agenda despite significant investment under LAP, LMPDP and the Land Policy Dialogue AAA program. Additional interventions have been conducted through the Swedish funded IPSLA, ADB-funded ELAF and the support of the Bank for the preparation of the draft land acquisition law over the past two years (in conjunction with the Bank's IDPL series). The legal and regulatory environment of Indonesia is very complex, and was aptly named by the BPN Head as ''the jungle of regulations". As mentioned above, unless there is a high level engagement in land policy reform, then policy studies do not lead to policy development and the subsequent reform of laws and regulations. Need for full-time project staff. The borrower's ICR report makes a strong case for full-time project staff to be assigned both at the central and provincial levels. Under LAP, BPN developed significant project and technical capacity. However, under LMPDP, the majority of such experienced staff were not assigned to the project, and certainly none worked full-time. Throughout LMPDP's history, BPN underwent frequent institutional changes, with staff being relocated and retired. The other implementing agencies, Bappenas and MOHA, fared better in this area, as government staff assigned, albeit not on a full-time basis, stayed with the project for most of the implementation, and made effective use of consultants/contractors. Reluctance of the Borrower to use CreditILoan Funds for Technical Assistance. All of the earlier land administration projects in East Asia, have had comprehensive T A programs funded by a donor partner through a grant. The experience has been that where donor grant TA is not available, there is a strong resistance to utilizing the Loan and Credit funds to procure TA. LMPDP, which did not have a donor partner to provide grant TA, was designed with dependency on TA to be procured from the Credit and Loan funds. For the most part, this did not occur, for those aspects of the project under BPN, and this significantly impacted project management, M&E, procurement, FM and technical aspects of the project. LMPDP drew some benefit through cross-support from RALAS project monitoring staff funded by the Bank, and also the country presence of the task manager during 2005-06. However, in such circumstances, a simpler, less ambitious project design, with intensive Bank supervision would help overcome the lack of TA. 23 The effectiveness of having a long list of legal covenants to mitigate project implementation risks. LMPDP had a long list of legal covenants, primarily to mitigate the many project risks. However, as identified by QALP-l, in working with the country sensitivi~ies, it was not possible for the Bank to enforce many of the covenants. QALP-l noted that: "The long list of dated covenants indicated, however, that the borrower had not taken many prior actions, and suggested that commitment was not wholehearted." That such a long list of covenants was designed, and on top of a long project preparation period of around five years, would suggest that implementation issues could be expected. Hence, it is important that where implementation commitment may be a concern, the best mitigation may be to design a scaled-down project. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrowerllmplementing AgencieslPartnen (a) Borrowerllmplementing Agencies A summary of the implementing agencies' report is at Annex 7.·The report was submitted to the Bank on February 25,2011. As this comprehensive report comprises abnost 300 pages, this ICR has included only the sections: (a) Executive Summary; and (b) Chapter V Lessons Learned and Recommendations. The full report, as submitted, has been placed· on the project files of the World Bank. The Bank also very much appreciates the cooperation of the implementing agencies in reviewing the Draft ICR Report and submitting detailed, thoughtful comments in a timely manner. The· full list of the implementing· agencies' comments are also included at Annex 7.The following are key comments from the World Bank on the implementing agencies' report: • Project ranngs. The borrower specific comments on the ratings assigned in the ICR to project performance are acknowledged. Following a review, and especially in light of the Bank's own concerns on the preparation of the project, the Bank performance for quality at entry has been adjusted to moderately unsatisfactory. The borrower's comments especially concerning procuremeJ:it delays have also been noted, and accordingly the Bank performance for quality of supervision has been adjusted to moderately satisfactory. • Number of titles distributed Regarding the number of titles registered and then distributed to land owners, the differences reported by the implementing agencies. in the finalized government report, submitted February 25, 2011, are acknowledged in project accotnplishments and also in the efficiency analysis. However, the Bank was not able to validate any increases in these results after project closure. • Procurement. The Bank agrees that there were delays in the processing of reque.sts by the Bank team. The Bank office in Jakarta is working to remedy this. However, the Bank notes the complexities of procurement under the project which were exacerbated by there being three implementing agencies, and for BPN, provincial PIUs. Unfortunately, delays to procurement were experienced throughout LMPDP implementation due to the folfowing: (a) late submission of annual procurement plans; (b) incomplete and erroneous submissions; (c) failure to follow advice of the Bank procurement team. Many of these deficiencies could have been minimized through developing greater procurement capacity in BPN, through the early hiring of a procurement expert. Therefore, it is important for both the Bank and the borrower to remedy procurement weaknesses. 24 • Loan Cancellations. The Bank notes the concerns raised by the borrower regarding the Bank's slow processing of the government's two requests to cancel loan funds. The Bank records show that the borrower's two separate submissions, involved a series of submission withdrawal and re-submission by the borrower following identification of errors. • Loan/Credit Amounts. The small variations for the Loan/Credit Revised Amount and Disbursed Amount are considered to due to slight differences in the manner of calculating SDR equivalents. • KPls. It is agreed that the formulation ofKPIs could have been improved, and especially those indicators related to the PDOs, could have been more measurable and relevant. It is noted that as BPN did not deliver the SEBS until around the time of the MTR, and given overall difficulties of engagement, it was not possible to achieve any commitment to re- visit KPIs through a project restructuring. • Assignment of Full-time Project Staff, It is agreed that the assignment of full-time staff is required for successful project management and implementation, and indeed the CreditILoan agreed required that there be qualified and experienced staff available at all times. The implementing agencies were regularly reminded of this require~ent, and also of the need to hire experienced consultants. • Re-assignment and Transferring of BPN Staff. It is agreed that this was a significant impediment to the CPMU and the PIUs under BPN. Experienced staff were frequently moved and replaced and project capacity weakened. .• Study Tours. It is agreed that the program of overseas study tours undertaken by representatives of the three implementing agencies and also the three universities were relevant to the project and provide areas of experience that would be beneficial for implementation to Indonesia. • Governance. It is agreed that corruption and collusion in land affairs are major issues and require the commitment of senior BPN management. • Land policy development. On land policy development, the project was designed to develop policy, using the studies undertaken. Whilst studies were successfully completed, these had not progressed to the level of actual development of government policy. Nonetheless, the studies provide useful inputs to any land policy formulation that may progress. Bappenas' success in having a number of key issues from the NLPF and policy studies included in the NMTDP 2010-14, is acknowledged. It is also noted thatBappenas and the Bank exchanged letters regarding the synchronization of policy studies under LMPDP Component 1 and BPN's own policy work. Bappenas' efforts to subsequently harmonize these activities from 2009 are acknowledged. This has also been noted in Annex 2 of the ICR. • Complexity of land laws and regulations. It is agreed that there continues to be a complex plethora of land laws and regulations in Indonesia and government leadership to develop a single comprehensive land law would overcome the contradictions of the various agrarian and forestry laws and provide a coherent legal framework for all government institutions. • Public Awareness for titling and complaints. It is agreed that community awareness and understanding are critical for successful implementation of a land registration program. BPN should undertake more frequent and intense programs of public awareness-raising 25 on land registration and the associated benefits of the fonnal system for transfers and collaterization. There is also a need for more intensive public awareness of recourse for complaints, grievances and land disputes. • Priorities for titling. It is agreed that given that a majority of Indonesian still remains to be titled, prioritization of registration programs should be given to the areas most in need, especially in areas of changing land use and also areas of high land conflict in order to bring about the resolution of disputes. • Re-eng;neering of land offices and LIS development. The comments on the work funded by Spain under LOC are noted. The PAD also noted the initial work on LOC, and the project's Components 2 and 4 was designed to build upon this early work. Unfortunately, no further work was undertaken during the implementation under LMPDP. • Layanan Rakyat Untuk Sertifikasi Tanah (LARASITA - The Peoples' Services Program for Land Certification). The initial developments of LARASITA are acknowledged, but the Bank supervision team observed that actual implementation was confined to a small number of pilot sites and was not mainstreamed. Conceptually LARASITA is very innovative and has significant potential to serve the needs of remote land owners. However, it requires a very significant investment commitment. More importantly, unless BPN is able to address the serious weaknesses in data security, records management, governance and general service delivery, then LARASITA would be unable to deliver any fonD. of sustainable benefit to land administration reform. • Sistem Layanan InformaSi Mandiri (SLIM-- Land Information Services System). The . Component 5 pilot programs were generally very successful, and the proposal from MoHA that SLIM should be rolled out on a national basis, is endorsed. (b) Co-rmaneiers NA (e) Other Partners and Stakeholders NA 26 Annex 1. Projed Costs and Financing (a) Projed Cost by Component (in USD million equivalent) Component 1: Land Policy 2: Institutional Development, 9.06 A.72 52 Capacity Building, and Training Component 3: Implementation of an 64.96 42.60 66 Accelerated Land Titling Program Component 4: Development of a Land 2.79 0 0 Information System Component 5: Support to Local 5.76 1.76 31 Government Total Baseline Cost 85.43 51.59 60 Physical Contingencies 0 0 0 Price Contingencies 2.20 0 0 Total Project Costs 87.63 51.59 59 (b) Financing Borrower. 22.03 9.73 44 IBRD Loan 32.80 8.90 27 IDA Credit 32.80 32.96** 100 Total 87.63 51.59 . 59 •• Equivalent to SDR 21.4 million. 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: This component supported: • Subcomponent. 1. 1 Development of Government Capacity to Formulate Land Policy; • Subcomponent 1.2 Development of a National Land Policy; and • Su~mponent 1.3 Formulation of Specific Land Policy/Regulatory Instruments. Expected outcomes: NLPF developed; improvement in government capacity to .formulate policy; and priority land policies and regulatory instruments formul~ted and adopted. Achievement: Moderately Satisfactory The achievement of the specific. outputs identified at appraisal under this component can be summarized as follows: . • The component did create a small land policy technical secretariat within BAPPENAS, which provided oversight to the preparation of several land-related policy studies. These studies were supervised by a management consultant firm,. with the studies themselves prepared by specific consultant teams. Overall there was limited public consultation undertaken. The Government was unable to create the LMPDP Coordinating Committee that was to provide strategic oversight and guidance to the policy development process and endorse policy study recommendations. Consequently, the inclusion of all sector ministries and agencies in the land policy development and implementation process was far from ideal, and there was no Government leadership to make recommendations on which agency was best suited to take the lead in developing each of the policy areas. • While a National Land Policy Framework (NLPF) was developed, and it workshop was convened to prepare the draft NMTDP, it is too early to judge whether the NLPF will provide valuable input to the proposed revisions in the BAL and other important laws and regulations in the country. related to land and land resources such forest and mining. The consultation process in the revision of the BAL was not undertaken. Furthermore, whilst Bappenas undertook related policy studies under this component, BPN itself also undertook work outside of the project, with a lack of harmonization between the efforts of the two institutions up until 2009. • Policy studies on Instruments of Land Tax and Fee Structure, Support for Local Government in Spatial Planning and Land Use control, Adat Land Tenure, Land Market, and Distribution of State Land were completed and final reports were submitted to the Bank. Consultative workshops on the final draft reports for two studies on Sustainability of Land Titling and Registration Programs and Impact Assessment of the disharmony among the Laws and Regulations related to Land were conducted, although broader public consultation was not achieved. • There were no land policies or regulatory instruments formulated and adopted. • Overall, capacity in Bappenas was enhanced under the project. 28 Component 2: This component supported: • Subcomponent 2.1 Development and Implementation ofBPN Long-tenn Strategic Plan; • Subcomponent 2.2 Re-EngineeringofLand Offices; • Subcomponent 2.3 Support to the Legal Department ofBPN • Subcomponent 2.4 Education and Training; and • Subcomponent 2.5 Overall Project Management Expected outcomes: Land administration strengthened; operational capacity and service levels improved. Achievement: Moderately Unsatisfactory The achievement of the specific outputs identified at appraisal under this component can be summarized as follows: • BPN prepared an initial Strategic Plan for the period 2007-2009, which overall covered the key elements of the land administration reform agenda for Indonesia including online service delivery, good governance, data security, acCeleration of land tenure security and so forth. Unfortunately, BPN did not proceed to implement in any major way, the identified actions under the Strategic Plan. BPN also announced its intentions to revise the Strategic Plan to cover the period 2010-14. • BPN dropped the reengineering effort at 5 land offices although it started to display publicly at provincial/district land offices standard service lists that included both the time-frame and the schedule of fees for the services. It also decided that it would monitor on its own. the implementation of th~ standards, instead of using an independent entity. However, because the pace of the development of ~tandards development was slow, BPN at Completion of the project is in no position to introduce/monitor these standards. No progress was made on the computerization of land records and enhancing security of land records, although it was raised as a major issue in the BPN Strategic Plan and continues to be a major risk. • Although -serious governance issues were raised concerning the delivery of land administration services by BPN land offices, whilst BPN acknowledged the concerns both during the project life and also in its report to the ICR, no specific action was taken. • Land administration education programs at the three universities i.e., Universitas Gajah Mada (UGM, Yogyakarta), Institut Tecknologi Bandung (ITB). and Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB) were developed and had· reached the second intakes before Loan closure. Although the quality of the programs developed were sound, there was no commitment to sustain the programs beyond the life of the project. 29 • On the sub-component that was to provide support to BPN's Legal Department, there was no implementation. Overall project management and commitment was weak throughout the life of project implementation. BPN was challenged throughout the project period within the critical activities of annual planning, budget preparation, procurement, financial management, M&E and reporting. A major weakness in implementation was that the government did not appoint any full-time personnel to manage and implement the project. • Overall, there was a lack of project coordination, especially between the three separate implementing agencies. To a large degree, this meant that the project appeared to be three independent projects under implementation. The LMPDP Steering Committee, which had functioned during project preparation and had been chaired by EKON, did not convene throughout the entire project implementation period. • A socio-economic and environmental impact assessment study was completed at the end of the project period. Component 3: This component supported: • Subcomponent 3.1: Community Awareness and Participation; • Subcomponent 3.2: Systematic Land Titling; • Subcomponent 3.3: Streamlining Land Office Registration Processes; • Subcomponent 3.4: Development of the Private Surveying Sector. Expected outcomes: Land titles are issued efficiently and effectively; development of the private surveying sector. Achievement: Moderately Satisfactory The achievement of the specific outputs identified at appraisal under this component can be summarized as follows: • Approximately 2 million land parcels were registered following surveying and adjudication with signed land title certificates prepared - representing an achievement of 80 percent of the project target of 2.5 million. From these, approximately 1.7 million certificates were distributed to owners, equivalent to 85 percent of all titles prepared (against the project target of95 percent). • More than'450,000 titles were issued to women owners and a further 89,000 issued in joint names (husband and wife) spouses) • Supported information dissemination to communities before surveying and adjudication started in the community. Organized community information campaigns, through focus groups discussions and workshops to explain the project objectives, rationale and benefits, as well as explain the forms, the costs, the procedures and legal rights of the communities, covering men and women separately. 30 • In addition to community infonnation dissemination, supported infonnation dissemina- tion through mass media (television, radio and newspapers) and posters about systematic, sporadic land titling program, and land transaction registration. • The component helped collect community land profiles to define village boundaries, describe land distribution and identify any pre-existing land disputes. This infonnation was used in the planning of the titling program and later for monitoring the socioeconomic impacts of the project. Community members were recruited to join the systematic adjudication teams (SATs) and were provided on the job training. Provided on the job training to local civil society or community members to undertake the village level information dissemination and community awareness and participation campaigns. • BPN was unable to reduce costs even though technological changes pennitted it to deliver titles more efficiently. The cadastral survey component of the systematic program was fully contracted to the private sector. However, this did not demonstrate any efficiency gains as throughout productive remained at levels detennined under LAP in 1997, as budget assignment, including payment of allowances, was set on those dated productivity levels .In addition to the work related to systematic titling, the component was unable to streamline sporadic titling activities (titling on demand). • The component was unable to support an industry study to fmd out, among other things, what will stimulate the private cadastral surveying sector. No systematic review of legislation for licensing of surveyors and assistance was undertaken that could lead to the development of regulations governing industry practice. Lastly, the component did not finance technical assistance and training to private sector surveyors, and support the establishment of a viable industry association, which could be encouraged to exercise control over industry standards and regulatory controls. Component 4: This component supported: • Subcomponent 4.1: Development of a Land Infonnation Strategy • Subcomponent 4.2: Establishment of LIS Infrastructure • Subcomponent 4.3: Deveiop LIS Pilot Study. Expected outcomes: Development of a national LIS for decentralized and improved land administration and management is created and operational. Achievement: Unsatisfactory The achievement of the outputs identified at appraisal under this component can be summarized as follows: • Outline LIS Plan prepared under BPN Strategic Plan 2007-2009. LIS strategy indicating the key features that need to be incorporated in the development of a national LIS was outlined in the BPN Strategic Plan. However, the Land Infonnation System Steering Committee w:as not established, and no LIS Support Group dedicated to providing 31 technical advisory support to the Government is currently in place. No key technical standards and the key LIS policies, as identified in the LIS strategy (from the first subcomponent) were developed. • Limited progress made due to lack of BPN high level engagement, and institutional support. , • An international LIS expert undertook a review of BPN's requirements and for the preparation of the LIS Strategic Plan, in late 2009, which was delivered as the project implementation closed. • The envisaged pilot study spanning one district and incorporating data and information relating to land management contributed by a range of agencies was not undertaken. Consequently, BPN is not in a position to finalize the design and implementation plan of the national land information system as is required by the Presidential Decree 34/2003 Article 1. . Component 5: This component supported: • Subcomponent 5.1: Assessment of Local Government's Capacity to Undertake Land Administration and Management Functions; • Subcomponent 5.2: Training and Capacity Building; • Subcomponent 5.3: Preparation of Strategic Plan for Broader Strengthening of Local Government Land Management; • Subcomponent 5.4: Support to Project Management Unit. Expected outcomes: LGU land management functions reviewed and capacity assessed; LGUs strengthened to efficiently undertake land management functions. Achievement: Highly Satisfactory The achievement of the outputs identified at appraisal under this component can be summarized as follows: • Assessed local government's capacity through several case studies. The case studies evaluated the current norms, standard operating procedures and practices; existing human and other resources for implementation, and corruption issues and ways to address them. Based on them, the project developed a self-assessment instrument to be used nationally. The fmal report prioritized training and other needs, responding to demand from local government units. • Provided training for staff of local government entities on a variety of topics, including participatory land use. planning, community mapping, participatory decision-making for issuance of location permit, land dispute resolution, and identification of land to be acquired for public purposes. The training program was expanded to other parts of the country through regional training workshops and other 32 learning events: 1,125 LGU officials trained from 400 districts and LGUs,.in spite of slow take off for the component given the ambitious and challenging nature of the tasks. • Five LGU land management pilots completed were completed in five separate LGUs, covering a different land management functions at each site. Following the completion and evaluation of these five pilots, the five LGUs then undertook implementation of the all five functions. Significant, SLIM, initially piloted in Sleman District, will be rolled out to all LGUs nationally. • The Strategic Plan on Local Government Land Management was completed by project closure, and is providing MoHA with its roadmap to mainstream the developments and lessons learned under LMPDP Component 5. Component was designed to support MoHA in c8rrying out its role in support of local government land management, because MoHA had limited experience in undertaking large international projects. The component built MoHA's capacity to serve the deconcentrated management system and helped MoHA ready itself to manage much larger initiatives in support of local government entities. • Study tours were undertaken to China, Germany, South Korea and Australia to review local government land management. PD~ Indieaton (from Annex 1 0/the PAD) perception of land tenure security applicable Increase See comments. Comments I Partially achieved. The results framework did not set a specific target for this indicator and the SEIS (2007) for LMPDP did not report on this directly. However. the very high perception (94%) reported in , Indicator 5 of whether titles increased land values. strongly suggests that similar perceptions exist i Ifor tenure security. It is noted that the first land project, LAP. identified through its own impact II . Iassessment, that 7()oAI of respondents were of the view that their tenure security had improved . ,SMERU, 2003). . ,! !_._"_.._-_.. _--,+"---_._-_.__._-"_._--_._--------_. -_.__.-------------..; ~I-~~!..~!!.~-.-.- . -+In~~-~~ces~to fO~Jl~~~t --.--.--"----'--'"T.,--.---.-.. ..__._~ ~_-~~ue-"-.-.~~t av~la~:.._______. ~ m~ase _ _._._ _ _ _l See comments _ . " _ _~ _ I Comments INot achieved. ; IThe 11% ofdid notwhoawished tofor how manyplanned to use the title to formal credit,is·noted that II Ithat SEBS those set baseline register land household had access as collateral. It but reported i ! Ithe impact assessment conducted at the end of LAP showed a 12.8% increase in use of titles for ! ! jcollateral (SMERU 2003). i ! i iThe SEIS assessment is ambiguous. It reports that 45% of the participants said they never used Itheir land certificate as collateral for formal credit. However, thiS does not mean that the other i 54% did use the title as collateral, since elsewhere the study said that 45% had ''no idea" of doing I I I so, and it was unclear whether they had not, did not plan to, or were unaware that they could use it ! L---. ______ !as collateral. This may be a remnant impact of the Dutch colonial period in which land and i ____________ ~. ________ ~ ______________ ~ ______________ __ ! ~ ~. ~, 33 agrarian policy were isolated from one another and Indonesians did not have the option of using land assets to access credit. The SEIS also reported that 52% of the participants intended to keep the land as valuable property. and 48% said they were willing to change. their land utilization after certification. •Indicator 3 Increase of formal land market aCtivities Value available % increase See comments Comments The SEBS did not establish a baseline and the SEIS did not assess the impact. In LAP, there had i been only marginal increase (less than 2%) in land transactions where systematic registration had I undertaken (SMERU 2003), though it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from that over a i short time frame, particularly absent data about informal marketS and other economic factors (see I Indicator 7). ! Indicator 4 Increase investment in agriculture land and property development Value increase See comments Comments The project did not set a specific target, SEBS did not establish a baseline, and SEIS did not assess the outcome. In LAP there was an average increase of5.4% (12.3% in rural areas and 3.5% in urban and semi-urban areas) (SMERU (2003). IndicatorS ,Increase in land values Value available % increase See comments Comments Not achieved. The project did not set a specific target and the SEBS did not establish a baseline. The SEIS reported that more than 99% of respondents viewed land certificates as a valuable document, and 94% specifically believed that it increased land values. Given the short time frame and the man~ factors other than titling that could affect actual prices, these perceptions of stakeholders may I actually be more meaningful than simple data on prices alone. In LAP, 133% of urban and 33% of I semi-urban beneficiaries said that land titles had increased their land value (SMERU 2003). increase See comments Comments IThere was not.a specific target or baseline. The SEBS reported that 67% of households were not familiar with land registration, but it did not measure the satisfaction rate of those who were. The i , SEIS reported impressive satisfaction rates, but not whether satisfaction had increased. The results ! reported by the SEIS on the titling process included satisfaction with fairness (93%), transparency i (94%), and results (90%). ' Indicator 7 Increased percentage of subsequent transactions registered in land offices Value available % increase See comments Comments achieved. There was not a specific target or baseline, and the SEIS did not assess this (also see Indicator 3). The indicator itself presents difficulties because measuring the percentage of transactions ".. . 34 Ire1!:istc;,red in land offices subsequent to titling (versus not re1!:istered prior to titling) also requires baseline and outcome data on unregistered transactions. Indicator 8 number of complaints about land re1!:istration Value % increase See comments Comments This indicator lacked a specific target or baseline, and data was not available on complaints handled under the project. The very high rates of satisfaction reported in Indicator 6 suggest that number of complaints was low. Even if data were available, its usefulness would be questionable since improved complaints handling and mechanisms could increase the number of recorded complaints even though there were fewer complaints or disputes. 9 .Decrease in informal payments in land registration process Value % increase See comments Comments There were no specific targets or baseline for this indicator, and it was not assessed by the SEIS. By their nature, informal payments are difficult to monitor or document, and are not likely to be !retlOrt4~ in formal complaints. The persistence of informal payments was reported in the media. Task team monitoring confirmed that it was a significant issue, and raised it repeatedly with the government. BPN acknowledged the issue, but was not known to have taken any remedial action. Value increase See comments Comments target, baseline, or impact assessment. See Indicator 5 for data on satisfaction with land titling Component Output Indicators (from Annex 1 of the PAD) Completion of consultation of National Land Policy Framework by December 31,2004 and submission of white paper by March 31, 2005 for government consideration and adoption 'No baseline NLPF completed and then white completed Jan 2009. Value ! paper prepared and submitted. White paper not prepared. Comments .Partially achieved. NLPF completed byJanuary 2009. A follow-up consultation workshop on NLPF was convened in INovember 2009. . .' The preparation ofNLPF coincides with preparation of the Medium Term Development Plan, 2010-14 and Bappenas is utilizing NLPF as the reference document for policy discussions on land. Indicator 1.2 Policies on adat and communal land prepared; draft regulations prepared and submitted for by Sep 30, 2007 35 Policy completed, regulations Final report of policy study and drafted and submitted for specific technical documents completed Comments Partially achieved.. Policy study prepared only and did not proceed to drafting of regulations. Indicator 1.3 Policy on land use and spatial planning will be p~d and submitted for adoption by December 2007 . Value No baseline prepared and submitted Final report and specific technical documents completed Mar 2008 Comments Partially achieved. Policy study prepared only. Indicator 1.4 by June 2006 Value No baseline prepared and submitted Final report completed, in 2008. Comments Partially achieved. Policy study prepared only. Indicator I.S Study on simplification ofland tenure instruments, including state land completed and submitted for adoption by June 2008 Value baseline Policy prepared and submitted report completed, in Mar 2008. ! . I for adoption CommentS Fully achieved. Policy study prepared only. 1.6 Tax and fee structure study completed by Dec 2006 Value No baseline Study completed Final report completed, in Mar 2008. Comments Fully achieved. Policy study prepared only. Indicator 1.7 Land markets study completed by December 31, 2006 Value ,completed Final report completed in Comments Indicator 1.8 Study on provision ofland for public infrastructure and compensation completed by December i Value Study completed 36 , < initial study was cancelled'in 2008 at request ofBappenas, had been undertaken elsewhere. June 3, 2008, TORs for two new studies were submitted to the Bank and endorsed: Sustainability of land titling and registration programs (part of2009 work plan) • The impact assessment of the disharmony among the laws and regulations related to land (new topic proposed; part of2009 work plan). Both were completed in Jan 2010. BPN long-term strategic plan and human resources management development plan (HRMDP) is prepared and adopted by January 31, 2006 Value Previous strategic plan in Strategic plan and HRMDP Strategic plan prepared and adopted place. prepared and adopted. late 2007, for period 2007-2009. HRMDP not done. Comments Fully achieved. BPN has decided to revise and update the Strategic Plan in 2009 (for 2010-2014). Though proposed to be part ofLMPDP 2009 procurement plan, BPN has decided to use government resources for this task and hence drop~d out of the LMPDP pian. The revised Strategic 'Plan is expected to be available by the first quarter of2010. Indicator 2.2 Five model land offices by June 2007, and 15 by the end of the project Value Five offices re-engineered. action taken A further fifteen by end of Comments achieved. BPN had identified five sites for model land offices and requirements were included in the Procurement Plan for 2009. Later, however, BPN decided to cancel activity under this sub- - I i I component. The Bank was advised of the "cancellation" only towards end of project. The Bank did not agree to this as it represented a major impact on the PDO. i I ~-------------------t------- ---------------------------------------------------------------1 !Indicator 2.3 IMinimum service stan9a,rds developed by December 31, 2005 and monitoring system in place I I IDecember 31, 2006 I !-V~lue- I _ INO baseline. /' Service~iandards developed~Standards completed. Monitoring system in place. !Monitoring - not commenced. -, 1 i i Independent monitoring - no action i . taken -ji Comments i Partially achieved. ! - ' - IHead ofBPN has endorsed the revisions made to the service standards (2006). The revised I Istandards now, being disseminated for adoption by district land <;>ffices. However, no independent I ,I monitoring pursued, with BPN advising in mid-2009 it had cancelled the activity as it had delayed I !procurement throughout the project period. _ I IIndicator 2.4 All re-engineered land offices meeting 70% of service standards by Decembef 31, 2007 and 90% I of the standards by the end of project Value I No services standards Re-engineered land offices INo action. I meeting 70% of services ! standards by Dec 31 2007 & i ! L_________________l ________________ ____________...___: ; Meeting 9()01o by project close L _________________________ 37 BPN only advised towards end of project (mid-2009) that it had cancelled this activity. Indicator 2.S Land administration and management education program established and operational by August 2007 Value Some existing programs Program established and Completed - three different for surveying and LIS - operational. programs established and operational but no broader land administration and managements program in place. Comments Fully achieved. First cycle of masters programs in three academic institutions completed in October 2008. The second cycle of training for 30 students has commenced at the three institutions. The new batches commenced in December 2008 (lTB) and in January 2009 (UGM) and April (IPB). One million titles issued by systematic titling by mid-term review (March 2007) and 1.5 million titles issued by the'end of the project (December 2009). Value 27 million of the 1 million by MTR 852,000 titles were issued by MTR. In"jrinn'" estimated 80 Further 1.5 million by close. 1>U...." .. land parcels (30 Total: 2.5 million 2,308,805 land titles issued I n ...........tl had been following closure of project. registered in the 40 years ofland registration . implementation Approx. two million titles issued under LAP. Comments Partially achieved. The final Bank mission in Nov. 2009 reported a total of2,000,468 titles (issued/signed) have been registered against a total project's target of 2.5 million. Of these 2,000,468 titles registered, the project has so far distributed 1,712,292 c::ertificates to land owners (representing 72% of the total as against the intended target of2,375,000). Following the closure ofLMPDP at December 31,2009, BPN has advised in its final report for ICR, dated Feb 25, 2011, that 2,308,815 titles were registered (92% of the target) and 2,138,966 titles were distributed (92% of the target). The Bank was unable to validate this final achievement. The term "issued" means the surveying and adjudication has been completed, as well as , ! ! ' requisite office procedures to prepare. the title certificate and register it. The certificate has also ! 1 [been officially signed by BPN. Issued does not mean that it has been distributed to and received by I the owner. I . . __ . . __ _____ ___ __ i.-.--.-.. . . -.. .---..---.-.--t. - . . . -..---.. . __,__. . . . ._ . . . __._. ._,,_.___._. _ . , . _"___._._.___. __. . ___._.,__. . --.~ ~ _._.,,~._. 1 __._. ___:--._.__.__._. . . . . . . . . .___. ___. IIndicator 3.2 !" . -·v~~~ . -..--..-.. . 195% of titles collected by beneficiaries l --lN~·b~ifu;. ·----..·---·-·. -T9s%-..-· . . .--..--.. -.. . -..--- . . .-.. .-.-.. -T %. . .--..--..----.. --.--.. 72 '--'-"--'-1 __ . f.--..-_...-.........·--._. . -.---.l-·-·--·-:. ·-_. . ---.. . . ._-.. . .·_. __. . ____..1:'.'.::..._._. __.__. _. ._. ____. .___.____. . . .__._. _ . .J . ~___. . __. . . . . .__. . _._._. . . __. ._._. . ._. . _._. . ___. -·. . . . . -..·,1 . i Comments 1Partially achieved. . i ! !Refer to comments under Indicator 3.1. iIndicator 3.3 190010 of systematic titling parcels adjudicated, surveyed and registered I Value INO baseline. 190% 172% 38 Commerits Partially achieved. Refer to comments under Indicator 3.1. BPN reported that it had an accumulated backlog of 434,552 land parcels over the project period. In FY 2009, it has received budget for clearing 214,000 land parcels. This implies that there will be a carryover of about 220,552 incomplete land at the end of the project closing date of Dec 31, 2009. Indicator 3.4 Percentage of land titles issued in the name of women or injoint ownership Value baseline. % 23% of titles issued were in name of women owners. of titles issued,were in names of owners Comments Partially achieved. Whilst no specific target value was set, the achievements were modest. A total of 454,985 certificates were issued in the name of women (representing about 23% of the total) and 88,577 as , titles (with spouses or siblings and representing about 4% of the total). ' Value s.m~tp.o", developed Outline Strategy developed in late , ' 2007, and included in BPN Strategic 1 Plan 2007-2009. i Comments Partially achieved. BPN Strategic Plan (Book 2 pp32-36) provides an outline and direction for the LIS Strategic Plan. ! Detailed study for LIS Strategic Plan was completed only by closure of project and report finalized Dec. 2009. The report highlights key implementation issues, rather than a plan for implementation. (See also Indicator 4.3). Indicator 4.2 ey LIS data sharing, access and pricing policy, and data standards (as in LIS strategy) finalized d.adoptedby June 30, 2007 Value ,No baseline Policy and standards finalized No action taken and adopted. Comments Not achieved. BPN advised that this would,be implemented through re-engineering of land offices (LOC and LARASITA). Although BPN consistently confirmed that it would undertake re-engineering model: offices at five sites, no action was taken during the five years ofLMPDP. Indicator 4.3 Natlonal LIS plan completed by December 31, 2007 Value baseline Policy and standards finalized No action taken and adopted. ' I. Comments Partially achieved. BPN mobilized a consultant to assist in developing a Strategic Plan for LIS, only in late 2009. A report, rather than an actual implementation plan, was completed by Dec 2009. sessment Report completed by March 2006 and national regulations developed and issued by cember 31,2006 39 Comments ;Fully achieved. !RepOD completed in late 2009. After MOItA received results from the second round of pilots, the ireport was then updated by late DeC. 2009. MOHA confitmedthat the RepOrt will serve as an ! I input for the National regulations to be developed. i I IIndicator 5.2 IAt least 100 local governments receive training by March 2007 (mid-term review) and all local L governments by the end of the project _ i Value iNo baseline 100 local governments trained 1400 districts including LGUs. : l__________~-------~--------1!~'!:=~:!:feet -L-------_-------J - Comments I Fully achieved. end. j _ l i MOHA advised that it trained a total of 1,135 officials from 400 districts -loea! governments -(camats, bupatis, heads ofBappeda offices, assistants to bupatis and others) on the issuance of j ,I location permit, land acquisition for public purposes, land conflict resolution, land contlict on r communal land and land use planning. The training of all local governments is will be conducted i ! !_ I - I in FY 2010 using government funds. Indonesia has around 300 LGUs and 3600 districts. Although ! MOHA had claimed target exceeded, this is not the case as all LGUs are not trained. Estimated I I 1G-30% ofall LOU. and - - compleO:d. . I ~,!icator ~~~___ Piloting o~~~alland management initiatives commenced by Jan~ 2006 _ _______ J Value No baseline Pilots commenced 5 Pilots completed. I Comments Fully achieved. All five pilots completed in 2008. As each pilot undertook a different application, on completion of the initial round, MOHA then implement all 5 applications in each of the S pilot sites. In order to ensure sustainability of the lessons learnt from pilot projects, the Director General of I I Loeal Autonomy ofMOHA had issued a circular letter No. 193/1408/0TDA dated June 2, 2009 ! advising the respective Bupatis in Tanah Datar, Maros, Sleman and Walikota Denpasar to allocate I Irequired budget for the development of aerial photography in their region and as a follow up to the : ! I' pilot activities, and scale-up the efforts and make the five pilots as centers of learning for land i I management. - - I 1-----------------------1-----------------------------------------------------,----------------_---------------------------1 i Indicator 5.4 IStrategic plan for broader support to local government in land management is completed and I adopted by December 2007. ; Value INO baseline Strategic Plan completed and Strategic Plan completed and adopted. ladopted. - Comments IFully achieved. !The final report of the Strategic Plan for Loeal Governments on Land Management, based on the Ipilots, was been prepared and presented to the government. Further action would only occur after Iproject closure. 40 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis As was expected at Appraisal, most project benefits at Completion have been derived from the implementation of the systematic land titling, under Component 3. This is mainly because the outcome of improved land security came only in areas where systematic land titling could be undertaken. In other areas, the outcome of improved land tenure security and the corresponding ben~fits could have come only if the policy environment was improved or only if BPN service of sporadic land titling, and broader land administration services was improved, and such improvements could be monitored. When they did not materialize, the benefits from improved land security in those areas also did not materialize. The benefit from the other important outcome that of improved capacity of local goveriunent, was never measured under the project. The "project cost of US$51.6 million puts the cost of delivering roughly 1.7 million titles at US$30 per title. This compares favorably with the US$65 per title as indicated in a recent ICRof a land project in a nearby country (viz. Lao PDR, Second Land Titling Project). This positive efficiency result ofLMPDP can be attributed to the projectspending 83 percent of the total cost on systematic land titling which led to worthwhile improvement in "land security for 99 percent of the respondents where systematic land titling program was undertaken. The per title cost drops to about US$25, if only direct costs for land titling are considered, and could be as low as US$17 per title if one assumes the number of titles (2.1 million) and direct titling costs (US$35.6 million) indicated in the Government's report. The Cost Benefit Analysis Summary carried at Appraisal (Annex 4 of the PAD) calculated the ERR from holding a title based on a household survey implemented under the previous project. This survey had indicated that land titles improved: (a) tenure security, (b) access to credit; (c) investment incentives of land owners; and (d) land prices. The SEIS carried out under LMPDP confirmed (a) and (d) for 94-99 percent of the respondents, but on (b) found that less than half the land owners had ever used land certificates to obtain credit, and on (c) found that titles did not result in increased investments in agricultural inputs and on land directly. At Approval, with various benefits that had been quantified (such as the increase in use of title to obtain credit going up by 12.8 percent in project area etc.), the PAD had estimated a project ERR of 33 percent, and FRR of 16 percent. SEIS did not estimate the benefits quantitatively. Consequently, without reliable quantified data on benefits, such calculations were not attempted for the ICR. SEIS also did not summarize (over the whole land titling program) titled land area on the basis of land use, such as, housing, farming, fisheries, industries etc. This may be because different land use in different communities (semi-urban, rural, or island) differed considerably in plot sizes and per square meter prices. For example, land for housing (including the attached yard) is about 100 sq. m. on average in a farming community but their farm land sizes are much larger. Prices per sq. meters similarly had wide ranges. The ICR estimates titled land value to be US$360 per parcel or the value of all land titled under the project (1.7 million titles) over US$600 million. This implies that to cover the cost of the project the increase in valu~ of the land required is less than 9 percent. This is quite conceivable particularly in the semi-urban communities where the probability of conflicts and the value of land titles rise more than they do in rural communities. The above calculations also demonstrate why sporadic titling with its US$150 per parcel price tag makes sense only in some communities. 41 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes y project management. Besides, the World Bank should appoint ·dedicated officer to discuss issues related to procurement process with the project management. In pro~ssive way, the World Bank may take policy that if the review result cannot be obtained on the targeted time, then it can be decided that the World Bank has agreed. (6) Multi years system for procurement is suggested for the future to avoid dependency with the budget document issuance. As previously mentioned, LMPDP consultant mobilization. was affected by the budget document issuance. If the multi years system was adopted, there would have been no such problem. (7) To avoid ambiguity between the Bank's guidelines and the Presidential Regulation one, procurement training should be conducted early of the project and in 'adequate number. (8) It is suggested to: (1) formulation of new type of SBD for ''works'' which states clearly that the contract is "lump sum" which related to output, instead of "time based"; (2) the owner estimate should only state the unit price of whole activity/process, instead of describe detail cost such as man-month, transportation, accommodation, etc. These are to avoid discrepancy such as on cadastral'survey package. (9) To avoid redundancy in audit and to save cost, may be it will be better to appoint one auditor only instead of many auditor as applied in LMPDP. As described earlier, three auditors were appointed to audit·LMPDP, i.e. BPKP, BPN's inspectorate general, and the auditor from the World Bank. (10) All procurement mechanism and system should be carried out consistently by all parties. c. Financial Aspects 1) For SP2D GUlNihil, KPPN should issue SP2D called SP2D Pengganti (SP2D Replacement) and submit the copy to project management for FMR purpose. Besides, BI should submit regular p~tout of special account to proj~ct management for cross check purpose regarding issued SP2D. Moreover, the World Bank should issued client connection regularly to project management hence the update status of replenishment can be provided. 56 (2) Adequate capable financial officer and hislher assistant should be ·provided, either in the executing/implementing agency or the World Bank itself. This is ·to ensure good financial management and coordination. Capacity of KPPN officers should be mentioned here as well. Some KPPN's officers had no experience in project funded by foreign loan/grant. This affected financial disbursement particularly in portion detennination of RK and RMP. Subsequently, this affected FMR compilation. Sufficient treasury training may become one solution for lack of financial officer. For alternative, support from financial expert/consultant (as applied in the last quarter ofLMPDP, which is too short) is a good solution. (3) Both parties should state equipment lifetime, in Project Appraisal Document (pAD) such as for server, computer, vehicle, etc. Subsequently, the cost table should accommodate disbursement plan for their replacements. This is to avoid disturbance in project implementation caused by inadequate/damaged equipment. (4) Flexible or multi years financial system is suggested to ensure replenishment of eligible expenditure although beyond the due date regulated by Gors financial disbursement system such as in case of Kabupaten Blora, Banjar, Tanah Bumbu, and NTB province in year 2009. It is hoped also that problem in the beginning of fiscal years related to DiPA (budget document) and its guidance can be avoided. Moreover, the zero disbursement in the first quarter and the escalation of disbursement in the last quarter in each year can be prevented as well. (5) Price escalation policy which stated in agreement document is strongly recommend~. This is to avoid irrelevant unit cost that has caused problem in LMPDP. (6) Good correspondence between both parties, in this case the project management and the Bank, was a critical point for the successful of the program. Miscommunication or lack of communication may cause loss to one party/both. No response from the Bank regarding request for the second loan cancellation from GoI would make loss to GoI since the commitment fee that should be paid (7) Application of State Treasurer's Special Account (RK-BUN) should be avoided. This practice is clearly unfair. Honestly the borrower has rights to use the fund since the borrower will pay the commitment fee. Supply of sufficient fund as stated in the agreement is mandatory for the lender. Insufficient fund in the special account such as in LMPDP and RALAS has decreased the project performance and made loss to the GoI. (8) Development and usage of on-line financial reporting system for the same kind of project in the future should be taken into account. For LMPDP case, the on-line system should connect the executing agency, KPPN, BI, and the World Bank. Replenishment process should be on-line among BPN as the executing agency, KPPN, BI, PKN, and the World Bank. The point is: the executing agency (in this case: BPN) should get privilege from MoF (PKN) to monitor the process. BPN should have privilege to communicate directly with BI regarding financial consolidation such as to solve pending and outstanding issues. BI should provide the real time status or print out of RK (special account) regularly and automatically. The World Bank should also provide and issue regularly the status of client connection. It is hoped that through this kind of system, problem such as pending and outstanding issues can be avoided. It would be better ifFMR used was on-line one and user friendly. This is to make the compilation ofFMR either in PIU or PMU run smoothly. 57 (9) Faster method for revision of budget document (DIP A) is needed. Late in adjudication process caused by slow DIPA revision process such as in 2005 and 2009 should become lesson learned for the future. D. Land Policy Formulation (1) Despite the LMPDP has been closed on the end of year 2009, the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of Policy Study Process can continually be used as the instrument to conduct the consultative process of land policy formulation. Besides that, the experiences of implementation of Component A LMPDP also will be useful in preparation of the next National Medium Term Development Plan (NMTDP) 2014-2019. (2) It is admitted that after the loan signing of LMPDP, the function of Coordination committee of LMPDP indeed was no longer effective as expected due to reorganization in respective institutions. In dealing with such situation, with coordination function carried by Bappenas, the NLPF and outputs of policy studies have been used in preparation of the substance of NMTDP2010-2014. The NMTDP 2010-2014 has been legalized by Presidential Regulation number 5 year 2010. Besides, in its role as the secretariat of National Spatial Plan Coordination Board, Bappenas also can bring strategic and current land issues to be discussed in that forum, which established by Presidential Decree No.4 year 2009 and consists of related ministries, including BPN. (3) It can be concluded that such a formulation of land policy through land policy secretariat was quite effective. This become lesson learned for the future to run effective secretariat like this. In addition, the NLPF may become the reference of land policy framework for respective institutions. (4) Public campaign. Considering that maintenance and updating ofwww.landpolicy.or.id was less optimal, in the future the more intensive monitoring is needed. Moreover, an effort to sustain that website is also needed. For the time being, available alternative is linking or integrating the website with the website of National Spatial Plan Coordination Board (www.bkprn.org), combine it with BPN's website www.bpn.go.id or Bappenas' one· www.bappenas.go.id to ensure its sustainability. May be it will be better also for RRI and TVRI (GoI's broadcast radio and television, respectively) to have special program regarding land issues. The themes may suit community's need. Regarding bulletin, BPN's Public Relations Bureau may continue its issuance and distribution to community. (5) Partnerships with Advisory Consultant, Management Consultant, and Studies Consultants. One office for Advisory Consultant, Management Consultant and Studies Consultants is indeed very useful to attempt coordination and effectiveness of Component A LMPDP. The availability of Standard Operating Procedure of working together was significant to build efficient and effective cooperation among those related parties. Moreover, providing interval time between the mobilization of management consultant and other consultants will also be helpful for the management consultant to establish and prepare operationalization of the one office. This kind of partnership is suggested in the future. (6) It is also important to take into account that it will be better if the ICR preparation can be initiated earlier, probably one or two year before the closing date. Therefore, for the future, the ICR preparation should be covered in the scope of work of both Advisory Consultant and Management Consultant. 58 (7) Some recommended relevant policy can be fonnulated as the followings: a) Clarify the legal status of land registration that it is to legally strengthening. and confinning the legal status of a title holder from being a 'de facto' landowner to become a 'de jure' one. The civil right legal status of the owner should not be confused with the power of a man (corpus) to do legal action. Thus, an underage orphan, as a man is the sense of 'corpus', is eligible to own land and be registered as a 'de jure' ownership. b) Adat land rights are not siniilarto communal land or 'hakulayat'. Therefore, to register adat right of the adat community's land is always possible, providing that the intensive study should be conducted prior to the titling program. The study· should discover and find the best safety mode to converse the adat title in compliance to rights in the article 16 of BAL, and the mode to protect the adat status of the land in the certificate. This means, Indonesia should be able to develop his own model of land registration c) BPN should issue a decree forjoint titling names of husband and wife, register land under the name of women and men, register the land under the name ofan orphan or under age. d) Revenue for obtaining right on land and building (BPHTB) should not be used as a condition to register lands in the first time registration. The reason for that is because the first time land registration is a State's mode of confinning the legal status of a title holder to become a 'de jure' landowner and to bring the landowner be registered in a modem State's land administration system. e). Announcements and field preparation in the community of the chosen area for systematic adjudication should be made at least two months before mobilizing adjudication team in the relevant village. The announcement is to let the relevant community members know of the incoming program, and to explain them the kinds of documents should be provided. Explain and train the village administration staff to help mobilize the community members to agree among the abutted landowners of the land boundaries and boundary stakes placement with a clear mark on the sticks. It is a good idea, if the adjoining landowners' agreement on their land boundaries and boundary sticks placement be put in a written statement endorsed by the village head or other staff member. f) Systematic land adjudication should be prioritized and continuously conducted to cover the whole lands within the state's territory. It is highly recommended, because it has been proven that systematic adjudication is the most effective mode to systematically register lands with affordable cost for the poor people, good quality and validity of survey document, and timely issuing thdand certificate for the landowners. g) The basic category for choosing areas to implement the systematic land adjudication is on the basis of village, instead of total parcels target. After all land in the target villages totally registered, then followed by the next adjoining village(s) until the whole area ofland in the country, fully registered and administered properly. h) The fonn and legal status of the prevailing land registration regulation, PP No. 24 of the year 1997, should be strengthened to become a Law that covers all land title registrations. Title registration, should not be interpreted and specified to only for the private individual rights but also including state, public and Adat community's rights. This is necessary, because the legal status of a land title, as understood in the land law 59 doctrine and principle, is a civil right of 'man' in the sense of a 'corpus' to hold land as a landowner with freehold title. i) State and government as body corporate with sovereignty power and authority to eontrolland within the state's territory, is by law doctrine are the landowner, either as a land possessor or a landowner. The -title registration is therefore, should cover all partels so that each parcel within the state territory could· be determine its specific title and title holder, regardless of the agrarian rights over the lands. j) Consequently, forest lands under forestry authority and domain, should; also be systematically registered and determine the specific title of the Forestry Minister. This is because, the Ministry of Forestry only hold the agrarian rights of managing the land which is possessed and control by the state. Therefore, Land Law registration should also covers all forest areas within the state territory. k) Anticipation to the equal status of women and men in landownership, as provided in Article 9 (2) of the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, the PP No. 24/1997 should be revised by added a special article to allow the joint titling namely to mention the name of husband and wife in the certificate, and all siblings names' over the undivided inherited land. 1) It is necessary to enact the special Indonesian Land Law to coordinate the other agrarian laws namely: Basic Agrarian Law, Forestry Law, Mining Law, Apartment Law, Spatial, etc. That is to end up the existing 'dual agrarian' and even 'multiplicity' agrarian laws and policy ruled by Basic Agrarian Law, Forestry Law, Mining Law, Apartment Law, Spatial Law, etc. E. Institutional Development & Capacity BuDding To support the on-going reform and capacity building in sector institutions, it is suggested that: (1) AdMinistrative and surveyor staffs in the Land Office, needs improvement both in quality and quantity, particularly in the rural areas. (2) Staffs that had worked in systematic land adjudication should be rewarded by promotion of ranks or structural position in the office. (3) Training to improve staffs' skill and intellectual ability in understanding land law is necessary to be able to handle their jobs both in the office and in the field. (4) Improve and empower the landowners to be responsible in boundary stakes and to take good care of their boundaries sticks. Landowners should understand that removing a boundary stick from its original spot is a criminal act. (4) Improve and empower the landowners to be responsible in boundary stakes and to take good care of their boundalies sticks. Landowners should understand that removing a boundary stick from its original spot is a criminal act. (5) Improve the skill and ability to take care all land documents including the 'warkah' in a good and systematic filing cabinet that can be quickly trace when needed. (6) BPN surveyors' staffs should be increase in number and quality to help speed up land survey and to control the license surveyors' work in the systematic adjudication activities. ' 60 (7) BPN should be endowed with power and authority to supervise and control the quality of license surveyors' work in the field. (8) Field adjudication honorarium should be paid high enough to motivate them concentrate in their works in the field. (9) BPN should provide a regulation to· empower surveyor to enter any house yard and parcel to survey and measure the area securely, and that any hindrance by the landowners to stop the activities is counted as a criminal act. (10) The doctrine of negative system in land registration should be changed to make it positive, right after the land was registered. F. Accelerated Land Titling (1) It is suggested to continue the public campaign for adjudication. Although the base line study found 66:6% of the household have no understanding of Systematic Land Registration, after pre-adjudication public campaign, the understanding increase as depicted in the community perceptions. Surprisingly that 94.79% of the respondents confirms that they understand the important of all information contains in the land certificate are important and 78.13% said that all information contained in the land certificate meet their requirement. This kind of evaluation must have the result of a better understanding about content of the land certificate, which is also correspond with discovered in the base line study about 96.2% of community's interest to have their land be registered. (2) Campaign in understanding of the contents of land tittles and usage of titles received and post-titling impact on land valued in the area One of proposed objectives of the LMPDP project is to improve land tenure security. Improved land tenure security would reduce land conflicts; induce more land-related investment, and increase lending through land titles as collateral, which will all contribute to sustaining economic recovery. In the long term, the project will contribute to increased government revenues from land related taxes and fees, which could be utilized for better public services to the community. It is evident that most beneficiaries have not ever used the land title to access credit to improve their economicllivelihoods activity. Community empowerment on the use of land certificate to improve their economic activity seems to be the next agenda. This empowerment program is needed so those communities able to improve their economic activity yet maintain their asset (land ownership). Field data shows that only 45.37% of the participants had ever used land certificate to obtain credit in the Bank. Considering of unfamiliar usage of Banking system by the Natives Indonesian because of the Dutch isolation land and agrarian policy that create 'dual economy', then the use of land certificate after systematic registration, is a big leap ahead in breaking the 'dual economy' system. Another impressive fact in this regard, is the use of land certificate by the Native Indonesian for collateral. This is impressive, because the participants who are used to be the Natives and now become the Indonesian citizen, has for the first time obtain land certificate that can be mortgaged in the Bank for obtaining credit. Community awareness and understanding on the benefit of land certificate will contribute to success and 61 acceleration of any land titling and registration programs. It is expected that the more community awareness and understanding on the benefit of land titling and registration, the more self-initiated and self-financed land titling and registration will happen. Community's understands on the content and relevance of the land titles is high enough to reach 79.86%. The awareness, however, is only on the physical appearance and typographical of a land certificate. In-depth interview and FGD confirms that people in the community has not yet understand about the legal status and consequence of having a land certificate. The understanding of land certificate as a legal prove and state protection and guarantee of their 'de jure' civil right is unaware. This is normal, because not only the layman in the community but the learnt intellectual members of the community and government officials as well, have no understanding of land certificate as a legal protection, guarantee and security of their 'de jure' title as a landowner. As a consequence of the lack of understanding land certificate as 'de jure' evidence, then the awareness of its relevance to legal consequence ofland title is also unknown. The low understand of legal consequence and status of the land title, make people in the community only have the ability to evaluate the physical error appears in the land certificate. This ability is high enough that it reaches 80.79%. But they can only discover the typographical err of name recording and parcel's area mistakes. The title holder never cares about checking the accuracy and existence of boundary sticks placement and its physical existence in the field. They are also did not aware and did not know about their legal obligations to take care of the boundaries sticks, and the legal consequence of moving a boundary stick from its original spot is· a criminal act. Thus, communities understand of the law and legal consequence of land title and land certificate is still very low. The acknowledgement of 45.37% of the participants to use their land certificate to obtain credit, suggest that it is caused by merely economic interest, not be based on a law and legal awareness of a land certificate. Nonetheless, this is a good sign of social and economic impact of having a land certificate as a 'de jure' title for business enterprise. The fact explain that land certificate provide open access for the landowners to participate in the modem economy business. An access that for centuries, because of the Dutch land and agrarian isolation policy, never been provided before for the Natives Indonesian both in rural or sub-urban and in the cities. The Dutch land registration norms as ruled in the Dutch Civil Code54, only valid for the European and Foreign Orientals, for their Dutch landownership calls 'eigendom'. The Native Indonesians who owns landownership under Adat Law, is not legally recognized and never been registered for its 'de jure' right. Therefore, the Native Indonesians are excluded from using land certificate for banking collateral to obtain credit. Hence, the 45.37% of the participants using their land certificate for obtaining credit is a great leap forward to experiencing banking system in modem economic live. (3) Changes in Land Use Patterns. Field data reveals that there are 42.82% participants perceives that land use often change after certification, which is supported by 47.57% who say that they will change their land utilization after registration. In- depth interview and FGD reveals that the change of land use after certification is caused by developing commercial business and house development. Change in the 62 land use pattern for business investment is increasing up to 47.57%, both in rural and sub-urban areas. In rural areas like Sambas and Barito Kuala, title holders generally tend to use their land certificate for obtaining capital in the bank for developing small business. In Sambas, orange and coconut business is booming that many of the landowners develop a combination of agricultural use of their paddy field and orange orchards. In Barito Kuala, by contrast, many participants still questions about the need of registering their land. The query is based on the fact that for decades .living in their adat community, there is no land conflict and lives goes smoothly and peacefully. The social situation is understandable, because Barito Kuala belongs to the rural area where city is being develop and economic live has not flourish yet. But when economic and city lives flourish like it is in Sambas, then the need for land registration will increase. Actually there is no direct correlation between land registration and change in the land use pattern. Change in the land use pattern is commonly caused by population and economic increase and government developmental policy. In this three main causes, a lot of land will be needed that land acquisition program will be developed regardless of it is registered or not. But obviously land registration has direct impact in increasing land value and price in the land market. This is confirmed by the fact of 48.26% of the participants said that after registration, a lot of land transactions happen. The need for having land certificates in the community is very high for economic purposes. It is also suggest that socioeconomic impact of land registration is to provide open access for the common people in the society to use the certificate as collateral for obtaining credit and cash capital from the bank or other formal financial institutions. Thus, the mode of changes in land use pattern after land registration is not to use it for non eConomic purpose, which could make the landowners lost their land, but in the contrary to enhance their prosperity. In addition, land registration also has its direct impact to the poor people to reduce their reliance on moneylenders for obtaining cash money with very high interest. (4) Tax holiday policy regarding BPHTB tax for first time land registration. Another nuisance is the insistence of collecting the Revenue for Obtaining Right on Land and Building (Bea Perolehan Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan-abbrv. BPHTB) in the, first time registration. ,The insistence makes a lot of landowners drop out from participating in systematic adjudication, because of lack of money to pay the revenue. As described in the previous chapter, the critical issue. in the land certification was the inability of people to pay taxes under the BPHTB. Learning for the future is the need of coordination with the Ministry of Finance and local governments to give about BPHTB and "pologoro" (amount of money as the income for village) policy. This is recommended also by Study on Sustainability of Land Titling and Registration. (5) APBD (local budget) for first time land registration (if applicable).55 (6) Another choice for first time land registration fund is through private partnership. The third party provides the fund with land management authority compensation.56 (7) . Areas urgently needing land titling are: • The left over parcels in the previous adjudication area that has not yet done. 63 • The adjacent village of the previous adjudicated area, to avoid envy of the adjacent community and to fulfill the principle .of fully systematic adjudication. • Areas where economic and commercial growth is growing, to help the title holders able to obtain capital gain. • Area where land and. agrarian conflict and disputes are plenty, but need pre- adjudication study to identify types of conflict and stimulate the disputants to speed up solving their conflict because the prognim is planned to be conducted. • Area that are covered by house dwellers in the forestry land. • Villages next to cities. • Area where adat land law still strongly adheres by the people, but had a pre- adjudication study to determine the best mode of registering adat land. • Areas a long State's border lines should also be systematically adjudicated, whether occupied, unoccupied, tilled or forest land. (8) It is recommended that LMPDP also cover the pre-adjudication cost, or clearly acknowledge that pre-adjudication cost may exist and further declare that LMPDP lets people decided among themselves whatever cost is applicable; (9) BPN shall conduct ~ore frequent and intensive socialization on how to submit complaint or report on land disputes to BPNlland office; (10) BPN shall arrange post-titling prognim designed·· to advocate and empower community on how to prudentially use the land certificate to rise their income yet minimizing potential risk of losing their assetlland; (11) Clarify the legal status ofland registration to legally strengthening and confirming the legal status of a title. holder from beh,.g a 'de facto' landowner to become a 'de jure' one. The civil right legal status of the owner should not be confused with the power of a man (corpus) to do legal action. Thus, an under-age orphan, asa man is the sense of 'corpus', is eligible to own land and be registered as a 'de jure' ownership; (12) Adat land rights are not similar to communal land or 'hak ulayat'. Therefore, to register adatright of the adat community's land is always possible, providing that the serious study should be conducted prior to the titling prognim. The study should discover and find the best safely mode to converse the adat title in compliance to rights in the article 16 of BAL, and the mode to protect the adat status of the land in the certificate. This means, Indonesia should be able to develop his own model of land registration; (13) BPN should issue a decree for joint titling names of husband and wife, register land under the name of women and men, register the land under the name of an orphan or under age; (14) Revenue for obtaining land right and building (BPHTB) should not be used as a condition to register lands in the first time registration. The·· reason for that is 64 because the first time land registration is a State's mode of confirming the legal status of a title holder to become a 'de jure' landowner and to bring the landowner be registered in a modern State's land administration system; (15) Announcements and field preparation in the conununity of the chosen area for systematic adjudication should be made at least two months before mobilizing adjudication team in the relevant village. The announcement is to let the relevant community members know of the incoming program, and to explain them the kinds of documents should be provided. Explain and train the village administration staff to help mobilize the community members to agree among the abutted landowners of the land boundaries and boundary. stakes placement with a clear mark on the sticks. It is a good idea, if the adjoining landowners' agreement on their land boundaries and boundary stakes placement be put in a written statement endorsed by the village head or other staff member. (16) It is recommended that BPN should adopt to implement only one mode of land registration model namely Systematic Registration as administered in the Government Regulation (PP) No. 24 of the year 1997. This is necessary, to help avoid the multiple modes of land registration that causes several forms and appearance of land title certificates, which is confusing when it is used as legal evidence in law suits. (17) The basis to determine the systematic registration is on the village unit ra,ther than target number in several scattered villages. It has··· been a fact that target number creates scattered unsystematic registered parcels in a village that had impaired the feature of systematic registration, and creates envy among people in the village as well as difficulty in dispute settlement. (18) Systematic registration should not only cover the first time registered parcels but also including the sporadic regi~ parcels in the village. To resurvey the registered sporadic parcels within the systematic registration village area, is' to renew or revised or to reconfirm the accuracy of spatial and textual data of the registered parcels in the village; which help develop, the one clear systematic land administration system in the village and in Indonesia as a whole. (19) BPN should take active initiative to develop a Land Law of Indonesia, as the basis for. legal foundation and guidance to integrate the development and implementation of all agrarian laws in Indonesia. This is the only way to overcome the contradictory norms and regulations and yet to synchronize and abolish· the dual and even multiple systems of agrarian laws implemented by several government institutions in Indonesia without Land Law principle, doctrine, theory and philosophy to coherently synchronize the agrarian rules and norms enforce by several different government institutions. (20) The basic principle of land policy for Indonesia, should be defined and enforced that all Indonesian citizen are the landowner and are equally entitle with no gender inequality to own land as a freehold ownership calls 'hak milik', . regardless of them being a 'de facto' or 'de jure' landownership. 65 (21) Based on the landownership theory and the doctrine of State's right of land control (hak menguasai dari Negara) over land, then it is recommended that every single inch of land within the state's territory along its borderlines should be registered. This is to include the demilitarized zone along the state's borderline with. the neighboring foreign state. That·is to legally confirms the 'de facto' claim of the state to become the 'de jure' state right of control. It is necessary, to strengthen the legal claim against any foreigners' entrance or encroachment into the State's territory ·that raises state power and authority to call for State's legal defend its borderline under the land doctrine of 'trespass' principle. G. National Land Information System A very important part of the proposed·NLIS strategy therefore is the establishment of a National Council for Land Infonnation of Indonesia. This Council has to take leadership in the development of the NLIS in conjunction with the NSDI. The Council is not taking over responsibilities from the participating organizations but coordinating the solution of the problems that are hindering the establishment of the NLIS and the NSDI. The Council should be assisted by a number of technical working groups for specific issues regarding the NLIS. The Council should have the following tasks: (1) A continuous effort to convince the political leaders of Indonesia and the Indonesian society that a sustainable investment in the NLIS is necessary to solve the Land Policy issues (2) To show to the participating organizations that the joint commitment is real a.t)d to stimulate mutual cooperation (3) To manage relations with the wider group of stakeholders of the NLIS (4) To solve the issues that are hindering the implementation of the NLIS like: • Incompatibility of regulations • . Conflicting mandates with respect to the NLIS • Data sharing issues • Coordination of investments (5) To take custodianship for the infonnation component in a number of pilot projects where the solution for important Land Policy issues are tested. These pilots should deliver solved Land Policy issues and NLIS-showcases for further development. The pilot area in Makassar to test the approach for the improvement of infonnal settlements (IPSLA) is a very suitable opportunity in the urban environment. Another good possibility is in Sleman were a well trained district government office is established. In the rural areas also pilots should be developed to test specific needs of processes of agrarian refonn and land access and in an urban area to test the support to the urban land market. These pilot project need a coordinated approach involving all NLIS stakeholders, all land infonnation should be made available~ the used IT systems should be made compatible and staff of all stakeholders should be trained to use the relevant elements of the NLIS. Also a transparent environment is needed to be able to use the results in other areas. (6) The Council will also be responsible for the development of an integrated Knowledge Management Strategy for the NLIS. The development of the NLIS 66 will change the necessary capacity of staff and organizations. Important elements of this Knowledge Management Strategy can be: • To coordinate educational programs with national and international universities. • To discuss structure ofUniversitj courses • To organize regular conferences and workshops to discuss NLIS and NSDI issues • To spread knowledge developed in the pilot projects,. successes and lessons learned. (7) . Implementation of the NLIS has to be well planned based on geographic priorities derived from the Land Policy. H. Capacity Building Support for Local Government By gathering and analyzing the data related to land matters, land use, permits, and SLIM development, the following conclusive items are proposed below: (1) Updating the system and the textual and spatial data is compulsory to make SLIM sustainable. (2) Land management needs to be improved to meet sustainable environmental conditions. Trainings related to land management especially in monitoring and evaluation, arid also in land dispute resolution is highly recommended. (3) Capacity of Regional Government should be upgraded immediately to all district/city with aerial photography. (4) Directorate DPOD & HAL is suggested to facilitate the development of SLIM in land area to all district and city in Indonesia. Successful of SLIM in five area will become good example for other districts in whole country. (5) For the SLIM successful, the government need the budget support for aerial photography, monitoring and evaluation, and the system development itself. (6) Experience from other countries which has been described in chapter 3 (from overseas study in Australia, China, Germany, and South Korea) should become lesson learned for GoI in improving land management. I. Good Governance.and Anti Corruption Framework (1) . In the future, to enhance disclosure provisions, it is required to make publicly available the date of payment in any contract and'the date of request for such payment. The bank implementation team is required to bring up this issue and provide adequate guidance to the implementing agency of their future project. (2) Senior management commitment and force is required to address the mitigation measures. BPN could benefit immensely from learning how to put together change management programs to address not only anti-corruption issues but other issues as well, such as improving customer service and containing cost. (3) To reduce corruption and collusion in land affairs, clarify and streamline all land . allocation criteria and procedures for land distribution, certification, acquisition, and transformation (and rezoning) of interest in land by providing regulatory 67 transparency, on-line public records with land and tax infonnation, and provide due process (fundamental principles of justice) for public review and appeal. (4) The Gol (BPN, MoHA, and Bappenas) have consistently involved NGO/universities in procurement committee for transparency and good governance. Indeed, MoHA and BPN have issued letter to Bupatilwalikota around Indonesia in suggestion not to collect retribution or other kinds of fee for processing of land documents in this project. J. Gender Mainstreaming Good achievement related to gender issues should be continued in another project in the future. K. Community Participation Based on research result, recommendations for BPN in community empowennent for the future can be described below: (1). Revitalization of running programs in BPN, including; re-coordination in agency partner for empowennent program such as Department of Marine and Fisheries, Department of Agriculture, Department of Cooperation and Small Holder Company, Banks and other financial agent, (2) Community Base Land Registration Program (MPBM) must functioned as effort to develqp community will and participation in registering their land. Community participation in "this tenn are: 1) community has a willingness in following socialization in land program; 2) community become pint in land management as an effort for giving a responsibility in increasing community· trust in land management; 3) community able to give input in land management, psychologically has an attitude in supporting land program. (3) BPN shall arrange the post-titling program designed to advocate and empower community on how to prudentially use the land certificate to raise their income yet minimizing potential risk of losing their assetlland. L. Negative impacts of this kind of program and sugg"ted mechanisms to minimb:e them (1) In the community level, the possible negative impacts of the program is the neglecting of women's right as the landowner by the not well trained field adjudication team members. Another possible negative impact is the neglecting of recording the name of an OIphan and under age in the certificate, due to the reliance of the lawyers on the Dutch Civil Code that only an adult or the name of a guardian that appear in the certificate. As a result, it is predicted that the misused of the OIphan and under age land by the guardian, is very likely to happen on the risk of the OIphan and under age interests. (2) Add item in the land investigation fonn (DI 20 I) by adding specification of the three type of landed property namely: (a) the joint or common property, (b). inherited property, and (c). brought in marriage property. 68 (3) Clarifying the meaning of civil right on land and the landownership theory, in which land titling program is only to ascertain and confirming the legal status of an owner, from the 'de facto' to become a 'de jure' owner. Hence, a land parcel can be registered under an under age's or even a baby's name, but any legal action over the land should be represented by the guardian. . (4) The possibility of land lost which may further followed by rise of poverty was submitted during FGD in Kabupaten Lampung Selatan and Kota Cilegon. Respondent said that if beneficiaries do not have adequate understanding on how to prudentially use the land certificate to obtain credit from formal financial institution, they may end up at land lost as the bank confiscate the land due to credit failure. (5) In order to mitigate this negative impact, post-titling empowerment prograln should be provided to educate beneficiaries on how to prudentially use the land certificate. (6) Some people perceived that adjudication program is totally free from any cost. They did not know which cost component covered by the World Bank. They did not know that other cost related to pre-adjudication may exist i.e. for the issuance of surat k:eterangan tanah, duty stamp, boundary stake or reasonable fee for volunteer which work for the people. Illegal fee should be interpreted as any collection by BPN, Land Office, and adjudication team or license surveyor contractor. (7) The terms "gratis" (totally free) and "semua biaya ditanggung Bank Dunia" (all cost covered by the World Bank) imply that any collection for money related to adjudication program is illegal. (8) In order to mitigate the next case, the project shall clarify on all misunderstanding with regard to. cost components for land adjudication and explain which cost component is covered by project/World Bank and which cost component is not covered. The project shall further inform that all cost components which is not covered by LMPDP shall be part of community participation. M. KPIs Formulation of KPI should be discussed thoroughly in order to suit the regulation related to the implementation. It should be stated objectively and realistic. (b) Summary of Borrower's Comments on ICR The following.comments on the Draft ICR Report were submitted to the Bank by BPN on April 21, 2011. The submitted comments also included: (i) Bappenas' letter to the Bank dated March 13,2009); (ii) the Bank's letter to Bappenas dated March 18, 2009; (iii) BPN's letter to the Bank dated March 31,2009; and (iv) a copy of the President of Indonesia's Keppress 4 of2009. These additional documents, after being reviewed, have been placed on the project files. 69 Letter to the Bank dated April 21, 2011 BADAN PERTAHAHAN NASIONAL REPUBLIKIHDONESIA JALANSI$!Jf4GAMANGARAJANO,2 JA~rAsaATAN t2014KOTAKPOS1403 TElEPON! 12289()1.1l9539: ~.tm.!Hm.!9 Number : 1:H6/1£.3-300!lV!2:QU Attacbtml'nt : 1(.> bundle $lJbject : I..aOOMaIlli~1111!d Polilty ~t project Draft I~ntllfkm COI1ipletibR.and lti$utt(ICk)1tep«I Tor Mr. Keith.C; 90ll tMkT.m~~ Srl¢iaI etly~1tid Rund SlmainlibioDc\i• •_ I!.Uf Mill.rmdPaoir~R" ThtIWorld9Mk OelItP6BdI. follOwtng..., O\lf.. lett~ da~·Aprif 4,:w!)J. w¢ Ili~ ap~l4tod ~opfIMDnlty to ~ ~W«ld BMk V«1~ofu.1PDP DnlfllCR Report. WI.laA1ll11.ppysi~mis ~ WOIIIcI .,~ IIlloIh side~ivc ~It OlWttheWotid Bank OpinkmlllldG~ of l~a.; Wt~ Ihll.tlftisdlllftlCk R.eportisOOt".IIy~\1Il tM Nttaeh~ _ _ ' " ",. have in~ fmp~OIJ CORtple!:1a1l ~we "\11. $\1111.00 f.::bniar)ilOIl, 1'1lere~.llOO:IC. fI~ ~tobt~~ I$b.•ltIOUIdo(tlliaueitlldi~ 1$ .wellu·OW .O_(if J!hY$iCId ~(inIlJudingllUlllb«(lj'tl'1fi).. ""ilioh 1W.l.loo,ldcmbty difl'erem. k"~81y:rw~ to tI1Ie the _ r~ am! iOOl'I!:CS duem til.. l.MPOP i.ooJy OI!eproj«t we had -.. ~ ..... ~WlI$ lIOIamyolftctllimilllr prujRt.va~ wIrid1 «IUtdma~.lWIl{u$iOlJ bthe_~~ and ~ipitllUWhcw ~ WCl\': clitfmntdata available fOt' lIJ!e. project. Also _ of WMtt.8.1mlc (}pIllion 10_· ~tend ~ .~ the int\:m1:Irion and ~ dtlrins the im~lioo(lj'LMf'/)P. Coo.~ CfOvm!ll!mt of 'lICf.oM$ia . .ssmefl.t .1I#Id .l.)xe~iSl\lIft~·.h!J OOift (lj'thIJ It"ll wJUd\ is lismI inthelitw:lunu, we In~1xI1h partiuto ~ ·Iho.·.~ which .. ldloulli .,. balallcc the ratIng orBan\. and 8QnQWe't.p~M«'; We look f~ to 1I_~i,* W<>It ftlf'll _~iw .00. inreSMi~U"POP tC.Jt.~ iln4thllnk yl:m for yoorkim.f~, cc: · Dr,. Wi~ClWrmanoft.ad N..iooaIA~(BPN) • MI'. DCddy ~nudyo,Dir«t« for8pi1liaiPfanil!ng ilhd·UlldAIl1!irs. Beppenll:\l • Mr. Al:!dummmanM.. LMpt)P Comp. 5 PN,ie<.'t Mmi• • MOnA ~ Mr. ft. Fil1l1ll~ tMPJ)pProj~/)im:tOt'•. BPN ·M(. ·~.Smotir.8PN - Mr.pctopor. fktti ofFOtCip~tioo DivRlM.8PN 70 Comments on the Draft ICR for LMPDP No T The Draft Of ICR J Cooiments I ~s GENERAL COMMENTS Ratlngs : Bank = ModErately$8ilsf8ciary, BarONet" = It iJlfficult rai'efihappenedWhen theb.4ces~/The.c:ti\tieS,ln re-engineering CrfMI because. didoot di!lcenlrUze roochof the deCJsbn,. landdllc;e.s-are theisu~e~ dmill~ olinf~ tecl)Cl.C!II!l9'i~d1h8 ~t:I'dllceJlClU~, Th~ fl'l!Jfiss~ deer~fCiractUcllcatiat ICCatlQI end adjudicatIOn team. ThiS Is ..·· .. lairnedlo tnaliter dltnge hattuifcliliQllocation end acljudicsfiQl~rotaIIQI. age10:"The Ifndtlg$Mngener'" in bWKh . e Fa ... .LMPDPI.. . . . . .iliQl. coonInatlat~beMen'~enlreI andlOcallJCMllllmet'i1 hlld beiiicllfrii(fCltif, thl~ expfll,$tid In .... · ..ICR, .'nd... Ihft. tbI\' ... .... '.!niIQs In $hoI!1t;di. . .. rna.. in .!l¢Iudiic! sdI;lf~ Io~ local ~itles' arid InsilutlQls. ~tbn ntI8Ced. to the /8CI( of a hIflhiI/f! r toor~ (or ~. commttee. l8CilOi ~::r=':,,;~r~· 1.==:::'.=mence..· ~.sOc!iiIl.~, ~I;.. ~ ," '1., .... , . . : . . " , ........ ~,..;,·..-ther--.·• .... ,..,..-,,-. ... • nd tile per$/$~ of1nkrmal ".yn:reritS" iand titling" .~4,()f9 74 No The DraftOUCR Comments Remarks 17 I P,,8Q, 10: .. BPN,,", was Unilble, 10 ,8 " , e t I ' e c ,,tiVeIy,. ''lWeakn,' ess in M&E system, was signlficahlty monitor, ed by, leek d, PME COOSult,ant., As dlScilSsed, earlier, this was because 01 t a f f 'e c" , , P$ge 12 : '7I7ere wils no effective monitori!Jg syslem Iolprdllem in is procurement process Which was na onlyBPN'srespalslbility, butalsothe Bank's as well. provide feedback 10 hetl, ifr¥Jt'oll8 SPN'sdSy-to-day ~ 11'1 WIng or land office managemellt. Similarly, both the SEBS andSEIS would seem 10 have been prepared more to comply with Banl<.requi"emen/$ rather than for utilization,' within tha ifI¥1Iementii!g1 agencies to ~ p-ojectmanagement monifori!Jg" 18IPagen:-"fheprojecftiaselirle islES$) W!I$ ,,0iW ctm1pietsd 11'1 May 2007, at /he time of the prOjects" MTfl Besides, being' /ale, if was a~ pOCrIyexeculedi and fncorrViIeJ"', itnd did not address or estabfSh a ~seIine for the rnaj1r1ty of /he ten PDO oulcom& indir;attJrs it wilsintenc/ecllo measure" 19 IPSge-11:-flirOi.iQhOlltlmpfeinentafliiii,thePr0ie9ra<;kdlirnelyaridilillllblerriiXlifcilllgSY5teffiiSSUe)ias beerlcornrnented<~Iier. Weaki:iliS$ in M&E ~tem\yiinlgnffh;aiiiE. ,12: "There was no effective monitOriiJg syslemto affected by ,tack, dPME COnsultant. For financial is$I.Ies, they werememklnedin GoIlCR Repat as well. See sectidl 4,.1.4 Page, proVide '-dback to he~ ~ BPN's dSy-to-day Financial Utilization for detailed explanillion. operiItbil$ 11'1 _orland offit:;emanagement: SimiIar/y,both the SEBSand SE/S WOIJId'seemto, hal(ff betm,preparedmore to cOf1JJ/ywith Bani< requi'emefll$ rather, fhan for Utilization wihin the impIementiilg agencies to,~ pr0ie9t managemenlmonifori!Jg" 20 PIlQa 13; 'WilHt1the proftIct objectives, components, IfShouid benaedhere that thelmplementlng agencies ccmmithid to carried out the projOct. Ho.veller, implemented prqect$ and ac/Mties, were, h(1h/y releVant tht"cIugbout "Ihe durinQ the time ~.e notonty lMPOR let t~ mention here such as RAkAS, LARASITA, ELAF 'l.and, IP~lA,' etc.Thej /nv)lementation pet"iQcI, imPlementatiOn $uII'ered in IIIrge need,ed attention ali 'MIlt. part because the deSign dWrestimilted the capacity endcomml/rrJerJfofthe mall'l imPIerntmtinQ agency and uncferestlmilted the need fOr Wong" go,vernment COordll'latiOn and leadership. The, fact fhat the policy: CWoiebpment ,and Institutionil/and ser'Vice deliveryi objecli1les of the projectfe// shat reinfofr;estherl continulngreievance buta/so indica",s that $~ imPlementation 8/T8llge1tJenfs and government' Con!mitITIentare reqI1i"ed to achlell8 them" 21-IPage 14: "Development of a neW /and iI'Iformefbn ForinfamatiOn Systems ,under compOnent O,It IScCIrlsidei'i!dthat the Implementation did net achieve slgliiflCant result system whir;h is relevant to both the tenure security fNIt!N8f. this was becatl$Elthe programcCIrlt8tned In thlll compooent had similarities withanaher prqect funded by the Gol ~ serVibe delivery objectives Of the project ~ routine program) lind the Go..emmeOt of Spain (LOCprogta)1). See' Goillersico of ICR fa' fUrthet detail. 0/1Iy modes/progress on inlrlrrnedia,'" steps,withno 181!gib1e' progress towatd,stablishing an actuall $)islem:" PageSof9 75 J NO Th8 Dl'aIl'OfICR - -T--------- - - ---commarts IIimiiiiII;: 25 ,PaQa 1,panigraph3:, " dM,OHAtnd 1) The World Banlc'draI c:tlCjultedq:Jt$ slaIernenI/pIItdGd lrriPIamentaliCiI rapat parIIaIIy,hfllted'klGd ' SlMfllltaChrnentS:, ' 'IB/.F>PENA8 /$ raiedSarIsfaQfay, tnrJ Ihet - - ) Jtb also nwiritlO'I8I;Iil &d's repcrt ch_lV, page~; thIl '~IIh~LPF~ ndh~ fQnnIIl~ Itatu$.""'" II 1JPras\def1!llll ~No 4 yew 2P09. management ~ 'the slcltS al'l!t Ci:JtJln/fmlMf ki lraIegic Issues and adlClII plaf)s hIM'" usad~a ~c. al pdJcy fomtu{atlcli, pFf,IO'ImS and~al NIIIJchIII deIIIeritg the, ta'slcsfor which, '!hey were teBpOMIJIe. "'dT.-moe\llll~ Flan 2OtO:2014 (Ntm)P) whlCh hali biari ~On ~'ReguI8IICIt NO. '5)fir 2011r. , . . . , whle ,SAPPliItM,$ wa,& ies~ ~ ," ' . , ~theLsnd PoI:,r ~e<:tMIe$,tt Willi ItS COcrdInallClll funcIIcXj In nalldlat dlMiq)lnenl pIiilnlnll, Bappenas hauutha1ty~ 1II,,1Iie NLPF 1$ hlWtt ~ frcm B!lPPenas dated March ~'J. ,eJMrllon ii' thci . " . . . . ,poI/cV: , I~ 1i'id,,1irIIs reqiltad t h e ' DP. For IIIforr'nIItiCn two cut c:t rilai\ land ISSUes il MTDP .... In In"'" Ibose IdIdIIIed il Nl.PFwhlCh are: 1. 2009 sUbject: "Plan fer Including NLPF raccmmenQiltlal as hljiIUts Into1tie ~ a fIIQh-IIweI ~. U~~ - COcIltiIIIon ~. whIr;tJ _.1 dCtMt ~ , MTDP' ",..,.flon, ceased Ill." .".,. the Pto/iIIt:'t 1. Land tanur. secwtlY lieCtme iI'IftIctMt. ThIs was nOt ~ In Ilia 2. hlequlyln land tanurund utlllzaliOlt t des~ dIr6uJb f wa antbtlaled that 8PN) LlIlter fran 8IppentS dilled *C!'t 11, 2009, ~o: 17201Dt.7;5.103I2OO9, IlIso CIlipIiIIi'Ied lb. In'ck!Skl!I d Ibe kae« tt Is roe as !he Iud the ~mm, agency. ddaI hi the NLPF l1li0 Ibe MTDP. Th!lfafcre. itwaald ~mere\objeclMlIf the Barite adQpt and ~lIIIIZelbe 1WWk# prov/,dti $tQt/g pr(Jject.-J coordNlkiiJ. IndOitesll I~att«i report prOpatIOnlllly. bafween !heihtee~1ing agencies;" 28 IChapter 6~ Le$SOI1s Learned ~ d.'~'.tnpI,ei'TIeiUIIal. 'pIIin .. ,~men!'. budgell:)(lte,'. The, . , . h"takli~ftomatllhelesson.leamed.sui:b are; AlIiit'ment •. will .. ' Bin.htsed'thil LMPD',.• em. dIIii 'dale wall CleUgnad.lhe !J(MII1lment'sbUdget ~. DlPA~. 'T'hhtore. Ih:e\l$Bd,alllle JRIlI$li:for OWI',a:IIJl/IIIII:; ~t~. 11'11 Benle h!lIhl~tedlhJl u.J!bp was en ambIticusprqeet and I " " worfdrIg tna,~ • weal! ~ "~.'... Ii ...... . ........ n How-,., •. " think ".". whanlhe supeNlslen was.... .. ..... _ ......sotl\~ '.' . ance.', ... '. 1Ci"...........hi' .I,n........ .. ......, ._.~I_ 1Il1iiItiOiIs. prq . .. 's.......e11'1lJIemen.·itlliCn man.·'' - . . ' ,WdIIII or .... ..'.' ·ectWilh ,...... ..,. ......... ,. . . '. .. _I aBd tQ' mere effeCtIw' lmpIerrieibtton. ·..•. ... d we IhJl perf9rmed' - G::. . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . """. . . .--..,. . . . . . .• ." emen~ Wdllj:lnm alSo. . Pn:ject beIieIIIe etid'POO ii'ldcJlors.. The BankiSlalodthiil LtAPOPinecrporJled tenPQolnclcitcn. which want actual) Ie. dJlIII1d sect.(If'~,I3PN~. whtl,t tile ~.': staled abqtIl II1II.... Ial tetmrJfcnn ~ 1$ 11'11 COIII.antiCUS naw. '. . ' . . . ... ·vakJable.sreat pallilncelueqllted. lB\d'UlcMer paQe c:t1",*",enlJlldI shai~ be~; Lack d h~ 1M (MIS- end cocrdi\ilion.Unf~1 Ibe CocI'drIatIon Camitfeec. could nd .lSl8bIistIedaftel ~ iL.MPD.P' l!Jf!!li:lMIrI.·• • it. ~~' .. s. sOrneprdlletn$SUi:h ~'.·S~ Ili'idef.~Ml1.·.l1GttrailSbm(ntO·Pd.11ll ' QIU.... . Cpment, hlghJM c:oordIniilicn cculd nd beperfcrnled, lanchector C'OCIrdlnaticin Will'..... ~ 4 could ndlM " lMId PdICV 1'efOim.11'II Bank stIII.ad thal1tie legal and rlQU/sGry BiWlrcnriMiilt of Indonesia Is VfiY cornplelc so a U1t14 Pop$$ bas been~ in lhe.~·BPf\l~ Page9of'9, 79 Annex 8. Comments of Co-fmaneiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N.A. 80 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Aberg, A. et al, (2007), Institutional Partnership for Strengthening Land Administration (IPSLA), Inception Report, Swede Survey, October 2007. Achmad, C. B. (2004), 'Building Physical Cadastre: A New Approach for Speeding-up the Land Registration Processes in Indonesia', Proceedings of 3rd FIG Regional Conference, October 3-7, 2004, Jakarta, Indonesia, p. 7. Alpindo Arga Cipta, PT, (2008), Land Market Study, Report prepared under LMPDP Component 1 for Bappenas, October 2008, Jakarta. Asian Developinent Bank (2001), Partnership Agreement on Poverty Reduction between Government of Indonesia and Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank; Asian Development Bank (2002), Indigenous Peoples I Ethnic Minorities and Poverty Reduction - Indonesia, Environment and Social Safeguard Division Regional and Sustainable Development Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines. BAPPENAS (2003), National Land Policy Framework (NLPF) (Kerangka Kebijakan Pertanahan Nasional), Coordinating Team, Land Management and Policy Development, Coordinating Ministry of Economy, May 2003, Jakarta. BAPPENAS (2005), Formulation of the New National Land Policy Framework (NLPF). Jakarta. Billpas ASri Kersana, PT, (2008), Adat Land Tenure: Technical Document -, The Regulating Draft on the Recognition of the Right to Control Communal Land of Customary Law Communities, Report prepared under LMPDP Component 1 for Bappenas, December 2008, Jakarta. BPN (2005), Terms of Reference - Data Conversion, Kota Depok, Jakarta. BPN (2006), Pilot Land Information System: Scope of Project (Revised), Kota Depok, Jakarta, March 2006. BPN, (2007), Strategic Plan 2007-2009, The National Land Board of the Republic of Indonesia, Book I and n, Jakarta BPN, (2010), LMPDP ICR Report, Jakarta. BPN, Bappenas and MoHA, (2007), LMPDP Report for the Mid-Term Review, May 2007, Jakarta. BPS (2006), The Economic Growth of Indonesia 2005, BPS, Statistics Indonesia, Jakarta. Deutsch, R. (2008) Support Mission Report forLMPDP, May 2008. De Wandeler, K. (2008), LMPDP: Review of Component 5, June 2008.Ganeshaglobal Sarana, PT, (2007), Institutional Development Consultant Final Report, Denpasar City, prepared for MoHA LMPDP Component 5. Geojaya Tehnik, PT, (2009), Formulation ofMoHA's Strategic Plan for Building the Capacity of Local Government in Land Management, prepared for MoHA under LMPDP Component 5, December 2009, Jakarta. 81 Global Procurement Consultants Ltd, and Coffey International Development, (2007), Post procurement and Financial Review ofLMPDP for the period January 1,2006 to Drecember 31,2006), Final Report, December 2007. Global Procurement Consultants Ltd, and Coffey International Development, (2008), Post procurement and Financial Review ofLMPDP for the period January 1,2007 to December 31, 2007), Final Report. Global Procurement Consultants Ltd, and Coffey International Development, (2009), Post procurement and Financial Review of LMPDP for the period January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008), Final Report. Goswami, S, (2009), The Republic of Indonesia Land Management and Policy Development Project (LMPDP), and Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System Project (RALAS) Mission Report on Good Governance Framework and Transparency, June 29-July 10,2009. Government of Indonesia, (1960) Basic Agrarian Law, No. 511960, Undang Undang Pokok Agraria (UUPA). Government ofIndonesia, (1967) Basic Forestry Law, No.5 of 1967, Undang Undang Pokok Kehutanan (UUPK). Inacon Luhur Pertiwi, PT, (2007), Streamlining Land Tenure Instruments and the Deflnition and Management of State Land ofLMPDP, prepared for Bappenas under LMPDP Component 1, November 2007, Jakarta. Laarakker, P.M. (2009), LIS Strategic Plan, Final report, prepared for BPN under LMPDP Component 4, Netherlands Cadastre, Land Registry and Mapping Agency, December 2009. Lenggogeni Consulting PT, (2007) Socio-Economic Baseline Study for LMPDP, May 2007, Jakarta. Luhur Peretiwi, PT, (2009), Socio Economic Impact Study: LMPDP, Final Report, Jakarta. Marquardt, M. (several 2004-2006), Back to Offlce Land Policy Consultant Reports for LMPDP, prepared for World Bank and FAD, June 2004, February 2005, May 2006, November 2006. MDHA (2005), Terms of Reference - Institutional Development Consultant in Land Management, Sleman District -Pilot Project of Component 5, Jakarta. Puser Bumi Consultant, PT, (2007), Institutional Development Consultant Final Report, the Region of Sleman, prepared for MoHA under LMPDP Component 5. Rasicipta Consultama, PT, (2009), Sustainability of Land Titling and Registration Programs, Report prepared under LMPDP Component 1 for Bappenas, March 2009, Jakarta. Schultink, G. and Safik, A, (2009) Land Policies, Strategies and Proposal to Strengthen Agrarian Reform, Inception Report, July 15,2009. SMERU Research Institute. (2003), An Impact Evaluation of Systematic Land Titling under the Land Administration Project, The SMERU Research Team, Jakarta. Srinivas, S. (2006), LMPDP: Technical Mission to Review project Implementation, August- September 2006, prepared for World Bank and FAD. 82 Subaryono & Lukito E.N. (2004), Assessment of the Development of Land Infonnation Systems in the Directorate of Land and Building Taxes, Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia, Proceedings of FIG Regional Conference October 3-7, 2004, Jakarta, Indonesia p. 8. Sucofindo (Persero), PT, (2009), The Impact Assessment of the Dishannony Among the Laws and Regulations Related to Land, Report prepared under LMPDP Component 1 for Bappenas, December 2009, Jakarta. . Tjondronegoro, S. (2003), Land Policy in Indonesia: An Evaluation Paper for the World Bank, Feb. 2003. Wiradi, G. and Endang Suhendar, 2003 Report on Land Dialogue: Land Problems in the Context of Regional Autonomy, February 2003. World Bank (2002), Implementation Completion Report: Indonesia Land Administration Project Washington D.C., Report No: 23684. World Bank (2004a), Project Appraisal Document: Land Management Policy Development Program (LMPDP), Washington D.C., Report No: 28178-IND. World Bank (2004b), Updated Project Infonnation Document (PID), Land Management Policy Development Program LMPDP, Washington D.C., Report No: AB414. 83 MAP SECTION This moo was produced by 11 5 0 125 Talaud Celebes i! Is. Sea % PACIFIC OCEAN 24 ' O· ;, I o I 100 I 200 I 300 I 400 Miles ~·""""\.__ ~·,~ .... ~"""""",,::s.:.._~,...., .tx,'- 16 .:l Madura ,,Sura ~ya .. . :!.'::Q ba~~~;<;,-Welar•• '•-"'" ~_ .~) .: - t . Alor r:::">• Mao .-,3 Bab\!" <:J ~.'--'"""~"-<.,. ~~~ ,~~~..~\=:~ 1J~MOR'LESTE bok ·1.5 ~6tbram "r-:" f' "un.~~ ~ Denpasa r ...--'\..18 Arafura Sea 100 • 105• I 17 'L"'--" , <.... J... _ I11ll0 r 10· . .<> .~ Kupang INDIAN OCEAN