ICRR 14323 Report Number : ICRR14323 IEG ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 06/07/2014 Country : Russian Federation Project ID : P082239 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Hydrometerological US$M ): Project Costs (US$M): 133.33 178.50 System Modernization Project L/C Number : L4769 Loan/ US$M): Loan /Credit (US$M): 80.0 79.7 Sector Board : Environment Cofinancing (US$M): US$M ): Cofinanciers : Board Approval Date : 03/17/2005 Closing Date : 09/30/2010 05/31/2013 Sector (s): Central government administration (100%) Theme (s): Natural disaster management (50% - P); Water resource management (25% - S); Administrative and civil service reform (25% - S) Prepared by : Reviewed by : ICR Review Group : Coordinator : John Redwood John R. Eriksson Christopher David IEGPS1 Nelson 2. Project Objectives and Components: a. Objectives: According to the PAD, the main project objective was "to increase the accuracy of forecasts provided to the Russian people and economy by modernizing key elements of the technical base and strengthening RosHydromet's [RHM's] institutional arrangements." The Loan Agreement, however, stated its "objectives" as follows: "to (i) improve RHM's capacity to provide meteorological and hydrological services and assure their effective and timely delivery to the Government and the public; and (ii) mitigate environmental risks to life and the economy from unfavorable weather conditions. The ICR (para. 7, pg. 6) adopts the Loan Agreement definition because it was legally binding, and so does this review. b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? No c. Components: 1. Modernization of Computing, Archiving and Telecommunications Facilities (appraisal costs: US$ 62.1 million; actual costs: US$ 54.5 million). This component had the following subcomponents : (a) Modernization of the Moscow World Meteorological Center (MWC) and Obninsk Archiving Facility (appraisal costs: US$ 41.0 million; actual costs: US$ 41.5 million); (b) Restructuring of Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk Regional Meteorological Centers (RMCs) and Modernization of the Main Geophysical Observatory (GGO) (appraisal costs: US$ 10.7 million; actual costs: US$ 8.0 million); and (c) Modernization of the Communications and Data Transmission System (appraisal costs: US$ 10.4 million; actual costs: US$ 5.0 million). 2. Upgrading of the Observational Networks (appraisal costs: US$ 56.9 million; actual costs: US$ 103.9 million), with the following subcomponents : (a) Surface Observation Network (appraisal costs: US$ 23.3 million; actual costs: US$ 63.3 million); (b) Aerological (Upper Air) Network (appraisal costs: US$ 6.6 million; actual costs: US$ 13.4 million); (c) Meteorological Radars and Lightning Detection (appraisal costs: US$ 11.4 million; actual costs: US$ 0); (d) Regional Hydrometeorological Centers (appraisal costs: US$ 7.2 million; actual costs: US$ 6.7 million); and (e) Hydrological Network (appraisal costs: US$ 8.4 million; actual costs: US$ 20.5 million). 3. Institutional Strengthening, Improvement in Output Dissemination and Emergency Preparedness (appraisal costs: US$ 7.9 million; actual costs: US$ 11.1 million) with the following subcomponents : (a) Institutional Strengthening (appraisal costs: US$ 3.6 million; actual costs: US$ 8.9 million); (b) Client Service System (appraisal costs: US$ 1.9 million; actual costs: US$ 1.0 million); (c) Emergency Preparedness and Response (appraisal costs: US$ 2.4 million; actual costs: US$ 0.7 million); and (d) Review of RosHydromet Subsystems for Environmental Monitoring : (appraisal costs: US$ 0; actual costs: US$ 0.5 million) 4. Project Management and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) (appraisal costs: US$ 6.4 million; actual costs: US$ 9.0 million). The ICR, however, labels this component "Project Management, Training and Monitoring and Evaluation/Preparation of the Second National Hydromet Modernization Project ." The ICR does not specifically explain why "Training" was added to this component nor how much was spent for this purpose -- as opposed to preparation of the follow-on project, for example -- but the PAD (para 16) did indicate that the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) would "provide assistance to RosHydromet in such areas as procurement, financial management and disbursement" and that "a key consultant, the design integrator, would assist RosHydromet during detailed project preparation and then later during implementation to ensure that a fully integrated national weather service is maintained." According to the project team, the role of this "design integrator" was critical to the successful implementation of the project. d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Project costs increased by 41 percent over the life of the project . The Bank loan amount remained unchanged, although there were several reallocations of loan proceeds among expenditure categories between September 2007 and July 2012. Increases in project costs were mainly due to additional investments under several subcomponents to further expand key observational networks and were financed primarily with additional counterpart resources provided by the Russian Government for this purpose . Unexpected cost escalations also affected the project during early stages of implementation according to the ICR (para. 30, pp. 13-14). In some cases,however, appraisal costs also appear to have been considerably overestimated, as with respect to the subcomponent for modernization of communications and data transmission systems, for which, according to Annex 2 of the ICR (pg. 30), the planned outputs were fully achieved or exceeded, but at slightly less than the originally expected cost, which was reduced accordingly at the time of the mid-term review in 2008. Financing and Borrower Contribution : The additional project costs were financed by the Government of the Russian Federation (GoR), whose actual contribution exceeded the appraisal estimate by 85 percent (US$ 98.8 million compared with US$ 53.3 million). The additional counterpart resources were primarily to finance further expansion of the observational networks as mentioned above . Dates The project closing date was extended three times, from the end of September 2010 to the end of May 2013, Dates: the last extension, from August 31, 2012 to May 31, 2013, having been approved by the Regional Vice President primarily to allow for completion of the remaining actions for preparation of the follow -on operation (Hydromet Modermization II, which has subsequently been approved by the Bank . The project team informed IEG that this practice is common in the Russia Portfolio in order to permit compliance with one of the requirements under the Government's Resolution 43 regarding the preparation of new proposals for external funding prior to formal requests by the Ministry of Finance to the Bank and other IFIs . Other reasons for the extensions were initial implementation delays due to slower than expected preparation of technical packages and procurement documents due (especially for supercomputers and associated equipment ) due to their complexity and rapidly evolving technology, as well as for the supply and installation of equipment for the surface meteorological network (ultimately entailing a combined value of the contracts involved exceeding US$ 60 million) and "unpredictably long export procedures by the US Department of Commerce"). (ICR, para. 29, pg. 13) 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: a. Relevance of Objectives: High The project is consistent with two of the four objectives of the current The relevance of project objectives is High. Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2012-2016: (i) increasing growth and diversification, more specifically the subobjective of sustainable development and environmental protection and the associated outcome of improved management of environmental risks and natural resources; and (ii) deepening Russia's global and regional role and the subobjective of global public goods and corresponding outcome of strengthened Russian participation in the provision of global public goods . (CPS, pg. 17) More specifically, in supporting the modernization of Russia's Hydrometeorological Service, it helped to ensure the country's compliance with its international obligations with respect to weather and climate data sharing . Project objectives also continue to be highly relevant in terms of country priorities, especially in view of its increasing concern with climate variability and change, as reflected in the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, adopted in December 2009, and the subsequent Comprehensive Plan for Implementing the Climate Change Doctrine for the Period until 2020, introduced by the Goverment in April 2011. This plan includes measures to reduce economic damage in key sectors from extreme weather events and to improve the effectiveness of hydrometeorological safety and strengthen Russian collaboration in international efforts to address climate change. More specifically, this plan recommends further modernization of the national weather, hydrological and environmental monitoring systems (ICR, para. 43, pg. 17) b. Relevance of Design: The relevance of project design was Substantial as its three components contained the technical, investment, and institutional strengthening elements necessary to, once satisfactorily implemented, achieve its stated objectives . This was reflected in th ecompartively simple but adequate Results Framework with an adequate Key Performance Indicator (KPI) -- i.e., lead time increases for national and regional weather forecasts -- and set of Intermediate Outcome Indicators (IOIs) at the individual component level, which are set out in Annex 3 of the PAD (pp. 50-55). For example, with respect to the first component's objective to upgrade computing capacity and capacity for the transmission, archiving and retrieval of data, the associated IOIs included that computing centers obtain operational forecasts at higher resolution, that data collected and transmitted in the Russian Federation does not encounter infrastructure bottlenecks, and that response time drops for archived data, while that for the second component, whose objective was to modernize key components of RosHydromet's observation network was that the availability and quality of data that contribute to weather forecasting were improved and secured . 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): As observed above, the project's objectives, according to the Loan Agreement were : "to (i) improve RHM's capacity to provide meteorological and hydrological services and assure their effective and timely delivery to the Government and the public; and (ii) mitigate environmental risks to life and the economy from unfavorable weather conditions." Project results in relation to each of these objectives will be assessed in turn : Improve RHM's capacity to provide meteorological and hydrological services and assure their effective and timely delivery to the Government and the public . The project achieved this objective by modernizing and strengthening RosHydromet's infrastructure, technical capacity, and institutional arrangements, and, as a result, improving the accuracy and timeliness of the weather forecasts provided to the Government and the Russian public . The specific indications in this regard are: (i) global forecasts achieved 144 hours lead time in mid-troposphere, fully achieving the project target and representing an improvement of about 24 hours and at 120 hours lead time in the lower atmosphere it achieved 48 hours improvement, likewise achieving the project target; (ii) the global forecast anomaly correlation in mid-troposphere was achieved with 96 hours lead time and 72 hours lead time in the lower atmosphere, representing an improvement of 24-36 hours in relation to the baseline values and also achieving the project targets; and (iii) regional forecasts at Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk likewise achieved and anomaly correlation targets with values of 36 hours lead time in the lower atmosphere, thereby also meeting project targets in this regard . These figures, which are also supported by the qualitative results of the beneficiary survey (see the section on M&E utilization below) indicate that the improvements introduced under the project successfully reduced the time required to generate weather forecasts, in the process exceeding the project's targets, and making them available to the public, although, in the case of emergency situations, the effective use of this information, once provided by RosHydromet to the emergency responders, depends on the actions of the latter, which are not under the former's control. The project also helped to establish a basis for RosHydromet's further institutional development by supporting development of a "Strategy of Activities in Hydrometeorology and Related Areas until 2030 (with Regard to Climate Change Aspects)" and contributing both to its financial sustainability and to Russia's compliance with its international obligations as a result of the improved forecasts issued by the Moscow WMC and timely delivery of data from World Meteorological Organization (WMO) stations to the Global Telecommunications System (GTS). Achievement of this objective is rated Substantial . Mitigate environmental risks to life and the economy from unfavorable weather conditions . The project likewise contributed to the achievement of this objective by making more accurate and timely weather forecasts possible . In this regard, more specifically, it improved the delivery of forecasts and warnings to the public by increasing the average lead time of storm warnings from 30 to 60 minutes for flash floods and from 1 to 1.5 hours for strong storms. The ICR (para. 46, pg. 18) appropriately points out, however, that this is a "necessary" but not "sufficient" condition in terms of the actual mitigation of severe weather -related risks, observing that, as already noted in relation to the previous objective, "even though the improvement in the accuracy and timeliness of forecasts is an extremely important input to the decision to act, ultimately RosHydromet can only be responsible for the information flow and not the outcome of he first responder's action or inaction ." Achievement of this objective is, therefore,also rated Substantial . 5. Efficiency: The PAD presented the findings of a study conducted by the Bank and RosHydromet to estimate the expected economic benefits of the project based on a methodology to which the Chief Economist of NOAA (the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration ) contributed. This study found that, with project implementation, direct annual losses due to unfavorable weather and hydrological conditions and disasters would decrease by 8.5 percent on average, and that the total annual economic effect of the project would be on the order of US$ 70-150 million on the assumption that direct weather -related annual losses in Russia would be on the order of some US$ 1-2 billion. It also observed that "if similar economic effects were sustained over seven years (a conservative estimate in light of the assumptions made), the near-term economic effect of the project would be in the range of USD 480-1,000 million, far exceeding project costs ." (PAD, pg. 24) The ICR essentially replicated and refined this "economic efficiency" analysis utilizing actual project costs, stating that "the main benefits elicited for evaluating the Project's economic efficiency were the prevention of economic losses in weather-dependent sectors of the economy, avoided loss of human life, and benefits to the general public, " (para. 55, pg. 21), an analysis that was set out in detail in Annex 3 of this document. Among its results were that total economic losses among key sectors was estimated at US$ 1.0-1.6 billion annually, with the majority of these impacts occurring in the housing and communal, fuel and energy, agriculture and motor transport sectors . Using a total project cost of US$ 178.5 million and conservative assumptions regarding economic losses, the ICR concludes that "economic efficiency was 1:1.22 after discounting benefits and costs over the 7 year lifetime of the project -- and not accounting for human losses -- [which] implies that for every US$ 1 invested there was a corresponding benefit of US$ 1.22 from reduced economic losses in sectors reliant on weather information ." Using less conservative assumptions, these ratios increased to 1:2.0 (after accounting for human losses ) and from 1:9.1 to 1:15.2 (using upper limit values and accounting for general public benefits ascertained from a socioeconomic survey in 2010 that sought to assess the value of hydrometeorological information by the general public ). A sensitivity analysis found that changes in the assumption regarding the general public's willingness to pay for improved weather information had the greatest impact on these results, but only changed the overall estimate of benefits by 3.9 percent. (ICR, para. 57, pg. 22 and Annex 3). This analysis seems quite comprehensive and well done, although no ERRs were calculated in either the PAD or the ICR. This could easily have been done and the reason for not doing so is not clear because all of the requisite information on costs and readily quantifiable benefits seem to be available . Based on the results of this analysis and despite the significant increase in the costs of some subcomponents, and, thus of project costs as a whole, together with the close to 3-year extension of the closing date in relation to the appraisal expectations, efficiency is rated Substantial ERR )/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) FRR ) at appraisal and the re- re -estimated value at evaluation : Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope* Appraisal No ICR estimate No * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome: High while relevance of project design, efficacy (with respect to both The relevance of project objectives was High, objectives), and efficiency are rated Substantial . Thus, overall the outcome of this project is Satisfactory . a. Outcome Rating : Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Two potential risks to the development outcome rating were identified in the ICR (paras. 68-70, pg. 24): (i) financial resources provided to RosHydroment; and (ii) stability of qualified staff. Over the course of the project, the budget for RosHydromet was increased from US$ 76.6 in 2003 to US$ 570 million in 2011, mainly for staff salaries, suggesting likely greater financial and personnel sustainability in the future, although additional resources are still needed for research and development. The agency is also implementing a plan for long -term staff development by training specialized personnel in technical universities and retaining both young and more experienced staff . One of the contributing factors in this regard was the establishment of regional training centers in Moscow, St . Petersberg, Rostov-on-Don, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, and Vladivostok, which are expected to train about 3,000 specialists from the agency each year, also reducing travel -- and, thus, overall training -- costs. Bank approval of Hydromet Modernization II Project in September 2013, which seeks to further enhance national capacity to deliver more accurate and timely weather, hydrological and climate information, and maintains the same structure as the present operation, will also help to ensure sustainability of the results achieved by it . a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate 8. Assessment of Bank Performance: a. Quality at entry: Project preparation was assisted by Bank staff and consultants with relevant skills and country experience, and included the participation of specialists from the Meteorological Service of Canada and the US National Weather Service of NOAA to review technical aspects of project design . For the most part, quality at entry was adequate, although the ICR (para. 71, pg. 24) mentions, without elaborating, "some minor shortcomings with the way the PDO was framed and measured." In addition, the "most important" of the lessons put forward in this document is "the need to invest heavily in the detailed technical preparation and planning for a project of such technical complexity." Similarly, "slow implementation and disbursements during the first years of implementation were largely due to a need to spend considerable amount of time for the preparation of technical specifications and tender documents, as well as for addressing evaluation and scoping issues ."These statements suggest more serious shortcomings in this regard . However, the project team subsequently clarified to IEG that this was the first project of its kind and scope that the Bank had supported -- and, thus, a very valuable learning opportunity -- and that neither the project extensions nor the increased costs of some subcomponents was attributable to inadequate quality-at-entry. This is also an area involving sophisticated, costly, and rapidly evolving technology, which means that "adaptive management" is particularly important during implementation and points to the importance of the "system integrator" brought in under this project and retained under the follow -on operation. at -Entry Rating : Quality -at- Moderately Satisfactory b. Quality of supervision: Bank supervision appears to have been both timely and helpful . and the fact that the TTL was initially based in Moscow seems to have contributed positively in this regard, "as he was able to travel on demand, especially in critical situations," according to the ICR (para. 73, pg. 25). The continuous presence of fiduciary staff in the supervision team was reportedly also particularly important as "detailed procurement reviews identified and addressed many issues which otherwise would have hampered implementation ." (para. 74, pg. 25) Quality of Supervision Rating : Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating : Satisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: a. Government Performance: Government commitment was strong throughout preparation and implementation and is manifested by the significant increase in project counterpart funding when actual costs proved to be considerably higher than those estimated at appraisal even though the third most expensive subcomponent in terms of estimated costs at appraisal (for meteorological radars and lighnting detection ) was dropped from the project when an alternative source of funding was found . The Government also maintained the structure of the Project Management Committee (PMC), headed by RosHydromet and with members from the Ministries of Finance and of Economic Development and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which met 121 times during the life of the project and oversaw its implementation and coordination among the different agencies involved . This performance is impressive. Government Performance Rating Highly Satisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance: Both RosHydromet and BEA performed well during project implementation . As concerns the former, the ICR highlights the performance of both of its Expert Committee and its Component managers and Subcomponent leaders who "oversaw the implementation process and played a proactive role in developing specific technical solutions, which lead (sic) to a range of adjustments and modifications for improved design and better performance of the RosHydromet system ." (para. 77, pg. 26) BEA, in turn, was credited with "managing and coordinating a large number of complex procurement packages and overseeing their implementation throughout all project sites," among other pertinent activities . An initial staffing delay in BEA was characterized by the ICR as a "bottleneck" and it could have assigned more staff to the project considering the "massive" tasks for which it was responsible (although no specific details are provided in this regard ), but this apparently did not detract from its effective handling of procurement and financial management matters or its positive performance in terms of project monitoring. Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization: a. M&E Design: Project design included a good Monitoring and Results Framework with 19 KPI and IOIs covering the PDO and components. For the most part, these indicators were well -defined and some were very technical due to the nature of the project. Two of the IOIs, however, needed to be modified, more specifically : (i) the indicator -- and associated activity -- for "area covered by strong wind alarms with the help of Doppler radar or precipitation increases " was dropped because procurement of meteorological radars under the project was canceled, as the Doppler radar program was instead implemented under the Government's Federal Targeted Program on geophysical monitoring, which reportedly "provides a considerable amount of funding for modernization of the meteorological radar observation network: (ICR, para. 9, pg. 6); and (ii) the indicator for "prevented direct economic losses " was revised to "accuracy of forecasts of dangerous weather events, " because it proved impossible to measure direct losses attributable to the project due to lack of reliable data .The project also introduced a beneficiary survey as a way of assessing its services and client needs, so as to improve client satisfaction . b. M&E Implementation: The ICR does not specifically report on M&E implementation other than with respect to the two changes in indicators briefly described above . The project team subsequently informed IEG that this was a very good system and was properly implemented by RosHydromet and BEA . All project results indicators were regularly monitored and reported on in a timely fashion, with up -to-date results made available to the Bank in advance of all supervision missions. c. M&E Utilization: According to the ICR (para. 35, pg. 14), "while the project had a comprehensive M&E system, the reporting in the Bank's internal Implementation Status Report system was limited, " a shortcoming that was apparently corrected following the Mid-term Review in December 2008, after which time "the project outcomes, using PDO and intermediate indicators, were quite systematically assessed ." However, this refers to the Bank's internal reporting and not utilization of M&E results by the Borrower or the supervision team per se. The project team subsequently informed IEG that the data provided though the project M&E system was collected, updated, and disseminated on a regular basis and was used by both the Implementing Agencies and the Bank to monitor project implementation progress. The beneficiary survey also proved to be helpful, and the ICR briefly summarizes its results in a specific Annex (No. 5). More specifically, this survey, which was carried out in three stages, found a consistently positive estimate of satisfaction with the quality of the hydrometeorological information provided by RosHydromet among all user groups with an upward trend over time ., particularly in terms of the accessibility, disclosure and relevance of this information, but also in terms of lead time and timeliness of forecasts together with their accuracy and reliability . Based on the above assessments, overall M&E quality is rated Substantial .. M&E Quality Rating : Substantial 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards: The project was classified in Category C due to its minimal environmental risks . Standard environmental guidelines were included in the bidding packages for refurbishment of existing buildings and the installation of new equipment . Guidelines for Russian environmental assessment (EA) procedures were also incorporated in the Project Implementing Unit's Operational Manual. Compliance with safeguard policies was reportedly monitored throughout implementation and no significant issues were observed . b. Fiduciary Compliance: Only minor issues affected procurement performance and these were reportedly resolved, even though the project suffered significant initial procurement delays because of the technical complexity of the goods and works to be procured. Two minor cases of misprocurement from the Consultant Services category due to a conflict of interest (and involving just over US$ 75,000 in November 2009 and just under US$ 20,000 in June 2010, respectively) were recorded. However, these amounts were returned and canceled from the loan . Financial management was generally in compliance with Bank procedures, Financial Management Reports were submitted on time, and Audit reports were clean with no significant issues highlighted . c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative): The only unintended impact reported in the ICR (para. 66, pg. 23) was that, during implementation of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Subcomponent, the need to revise the Ministry of Emergency's normative documents and regulations was identified, and, at the time of the ICR, it was not clear if this revision had occurred . d. Other: As concerns institutional aspects, the project should be credited with strengthening RosHydromet, including the undertaking of a detailed institutional and regulatory review and evaluation of its economic and financial system . The ICR (para. 65, pg. 23) also notes that "the momentum created by the Project in terms of visibility and benefits of RosHydromet's services was complemented by the development of the 'Strategy of Activities in Hydrometeorology and Related Areas for the Period until 2030 (including Climate Change Aspects'), which was approved by the Government in September 2010," which is seen as providing a "strong basis" for the agency's future development . 12. 12. Ratings : ICR IEG Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome : Satisfactory Satisfactory Risk to Development Moderate Moderate Outcome : Bank Performance : Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance : Satisfactory Satisfactory Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTES: NOTES - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: The ICR cites several lessons of more generic relevance, the most significant of which are : 1. There should be greater investment in the detailed technical preparation and planning for a project of technical complexity such as the present one and the front -loading of project implementation with preparation of technical designs should be avoided . 2 .Pioneering projects such as the present one should envisage contingency funds /unallocated resources because the true scale of works and goods may be unveiled only during detailed designs and is particularly relevant when such designs are not completed during preparation . 3. Institutional strengthening and capacity improvements are complicated but absolutely essential to ensure sustainability of project results . In this connection, both the Borrower and the Bank, therefore, should seek to ensure the stability of their teams in order to facilitate continuous understanding and productive dialogue on these issues. 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No Why? As a "flagship "operation in a technically complex area, this project should be assessed in further detail together with its follow-on project (Hydromet Modernization II) once the latter is completed, because they are likely to present useful lessons for similar projects in other countries at a time when hydrometeorological changes associated with climate change will present increasing environmental and developmental challenges for all Bank member countries. 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: This is a well-written and documented ICR that also presents an interesting analysis of the project's "economic efficiency" and brings useful lessons, especially for a first stand -alone project Bankwide of this scope . It could have been stronger, however, in terms of its explantation of the reasons for the changes -- in some cases significant ones -- in project costs, both before and after the mid -term review, in relation to the appraisal estimates and for the nearly three year extension of the project closing date . It also could also have calculated an ex -post ERR (even though this was not done in the PAD) using actual project costs and provided more information with respect to the "minor shortcomings in the way the PDO was framed and measured " and in terms of M&E implementation and utilization . The most important of these aspects, however, were satisfactorily clarified by the project team in its subsequent meeting with IEG. a.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory