55603 v1 he Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Bangsa (Communication Forum of Aceh (MSR) was undertaken by the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Sons of the Nation, FORKAB) to Board (BRA), the National Development Planning Agency advocate for claims for assistance. (BAPPENAS), AusAID, DFID, the Embassy of the Kingdom Members of these groups have of the Netherlands, UNDP, the USAID-SERASI program and the World received assistance through BRA. Bank between May 2008 and December 2009 with IOM contributing in Moreover, almost all of the 2,035 the initial phase. It builds upon recent efforts by BRA and its partners to former political prisoners released better plan and coordinate post-conflict programming, based on a shared after the MoU have received understanding and strategic vision. The MSR has engaged a wide range of assistance, as have a number of Former combatant with a water buffalo that he received as assistance. government, international and local stakeholders. prisoners released before the MoU. Four years on from the Helsinki MoU, it provides a framework for future Approximately 1.5 million people or 39 percent of the population policies and programs to consolidate peace and development in Aceh. The consider themselves to be victims of conflict. Displacement, trauma, MSR employs a comprehensive framework to identify post-conflict needs damage to property, disruption to primary livelihood source, and physical and issues in Aceh and ways to most effectively respond to them. It considers injury or illness are the most common forms of victimhood. Victims are issues relating to livelihoods and the economy, politics, security and social concentrated in the four most heavily conflict affected districts plus cohesion, and governance and institutions. Within each of these areas, the Lhokseumawe. report discusses existing programs, needs, challenges and constraints at Types of Conflict Victim the individual, community and macro levels. This allows for a consideration of the policies and programs that can build the foundations for sustainable peace and development in post-conflict Aceh. MSR Analytical Framework Source: ARLS. Women were affected by the conflict in a number of ways. A small number carried arms, approximately 680 were in GAM's military structure, and 3,800 played a variety of supporting roles in the conflict. Many women were The Conflict Affected forced to take on the role of the Former political prisoner in her new cafe primary provider for their families. The conflict had negative impacts on most of Aceh's population. The she set up with assistance. Some witnessed the death of family MSR estimates that there are 14,300 former Free Aceh Movement members while others continue (GAM)combatants in Aceh. Over half of the former combatants can to suffer from the uncertainty of disappearance. An unknown number of be found in the four most heavily conflict affected districts: Aceh Utara, women on both sides of the conflict were subject to sexual violence. While Bireuen, Aceh Timur and Pidie. some women have shown remarkable strength, others are still traumatised. Stigma and a reluctance to openly address the issue are hampering effective Nationalistic groups that opposed responses to the problem. GAM during the conflict now come under the collective banner of Over 400,000 people were displaced by the conflict. While most have Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of returned, between 45,000 and 145,000 people are still displaced, the Homeland, PETA). Many of the mostly in the four most heavily affected conflict districts. Returnees former GAM fighters underwent re- often face significant challenges upon return such as retrieving property, education (binaan) by the Indonesian rebuilding relationships and finding work. IDPs and resettlers face issues Government. After the MoU they of tension with host communities, access to resources and, again, formed their own organisation employment. Reaping the harvest of peace called Forum Komunikasi Anak through work. MSR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 Cost of Conflict by District Broken irrigation dam before and after rehabilitation in Bandar Baru, Pidie. The Cost of Conflict The conflict exerted an immense toll on Aceh. The economic cost of the conflict is estimated to be Rp. 107.4 trillion (US$ 10.7 billion). This is almost twice the cost of damage and losses from the December 2004 tsunami. Economic losses due to the conflict were eight times greater than the cost of damages incurred. The provincial economy incurred 61 percent or Rp. 65.5 trillion (US$ 6.5 billion) of the total cost of conflict, while the cost to the national government was Rp. 41.9 trillion (US$ 4.2 billion). The productive sector bore the brunt of conflict damage and loss. Agriculture and enterprise were particularly affected, heavily impacting on the lives of rural communities. The conflict damaged rice and other agricultural fields and killed livestock in nearly all districts. Over 50 percent of rural infrastructure in Aceh was damaged directly or indirectly to some degree as a result of the conflict. Almost 4,000 schools (two-thirds of the total Source: Cost of Conflict in Aceh, MSR. in rural Aceh) were damaged. As of 2006, 33,000 houses were completely destroyed and another 77,000 had sustained heavy or moderate damage. sixth the amount provided for the tsunami reconstruction effort, despite the The fighting also damaged 7,700 km of road and almost 2,200 bridges. greater levels of damage and loss from the conflict. Needs in agriculture and The cost to the government of maintaining security during the conflict is transport remain in conflict-affected areas. estimated at Rp. 22.5 trillion (US$ 2.3 billion), or 21 percent of the total cost of conflict. Foregone tax and utilities revenues were also significant. Direct or specific reintegration and peace-building assistance to the Sectoral Proportions of Conflict Costs end of 2008 has totalled Rp. 3.7 trillion (US$ 365.6 million). Similar shares have been provided by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and by international donors. Of the total funding committed for reintegration and peace-building programs, 96 percent has already been allocated and 81 percent has been disbursed. Given the remaining needs, this underscores the need for new support for direct peace-building programming in the short to medium term. GoI assistance includes Rp. 135 billion (US$ 13.5 million) of district and provincial government funds allocated to general development programs in conflict-affected regions. In addition, an estimated Rp. 5.3 trillion (US$ 529.5 million) of tsunami recovery and development funds have Source: Cost of Conflict in Aceh, MSR. supported post-conflict recovery in areas not affected by the tsunami. The conflict had the greatest impact on the north-east districts of Aceh Utara, Aceh Timur, Pidie and Bireuen, while Aceh Selatan, Bener The four most heavily conflict-affected districts of Aceh Utara, Bireuen, Meriah, Aceh Besar and Aceh Tengah were also heavily affected. The Aceh Timur and Pidie have received the highest levels of assistance, pattern of damage and loss differed across districts, with particular types of indicating effective geographic targeting. Thirty-eight donors and 89 infrastructure and facilities sustaining different levels of loss in each district, implementing organisations have delivered 140 direct reintegration and underscoring the need to design district-specific approaches to address peace-building programs across Aceh. This is significantly lower than the damage and effectively help communities resume productive lives. Sunk number of agencies involved in tsunami reconstruction, making coordination costs, which cannot be recovered or compensated for, account for Rp. potentially easier. A wide variety of approaches to support post-conflict 46.1 trillion (US$ 4.6 billion) or 48 percent of losses. Recoverable loss can recovery have been followed. conceivably be compensated for (although this not recommended by this report) and accounts for Rp. 49.5 trillion (US$ 5.0 billion) or 52 percent of Many former combatants and conflict victims claim they have yet to loss. receive any assistance. However, as a group, former combatants and civilian conflict victims have received greater amounts of reintegration Stock-Take of Post-Conflict Assistance assistance than civilian non-victims. To date, the greatest share of funds has been allocated to projects focusing on governance and administration; Although large strides have been made in addressing the needs of followed by community culture and religious facilities; housing; and conflict-affected individuals and communities, total funds provided to enterprise support. Agriculture and livestock account for a small proportion date have been inadequate to address damage and losses caused by of post-conflict recovery assistance. BRA has commited to provide housing the conflict. However, over the long term the total peace dividend from the assistance to almost 30,000 households, in line with the total number peace process provided by the government will exceed the provincial cost of destroyed households as of 2006. BRA has already supported the of conflict. reconstruction of three quarters of these. The total amount of funds committed to reintegration and peace- The Government of Aceh stands to receive an estimated additional building is estimated at Rp. 9.0 trillion (US$ 895.1 million). This is one- Rp. 78.6 trillion (US$ 7.9 billion) in special autonomy funds between MSR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 2006 and 2027 as a result of the to provide skills training or business development support to former Law on the Governing of Aceh combatants, political prisoners or conflict victims. Only a small number of (LoGA). The total value of the peace former combatants or amnestied political prisoners have returned to school dividend in Aceh from the autonomy since the conflict ended. funds and assistance is 130 percent of the provincial cost of conflict giving In the medium to long term, strategies to promote general growth may Aceh a chance to build back better be more effective in dealing with the needs of most conflict-affected from conflict. Most of this funding is people than targeted assistance programs. However, certain vulnerable provided by the central government population groups­­especially IDPs/recent returnees, conflict widows and Teachers and students enjoy a theatre performance for peace in Aceh Tengah. as part of the special autonomy female-headed households­­will continue to require carefully targeted funds. If these funds are spent assistance. Targeting of such groups should be based on indicators of properly, they can clearly address the majority of long-term reintegration vulnerability rather then conflict-era identity markers, and in most cases and post-conflict needs. To do so, these funds must be employed in an communities will be best placed to decide on who should benefit. effective and transparent manner. Future donor support should focus on Male and Female-Headed Households capacity-development and institutional strengthening, and improving the conflict-sensitive delivery of services and development programs. Livelihoods and the Economy Nearly all population groups are benefiting from Aceh's economic recovery since the end of the conflict­­particularly from the resumption of agriculture and small-scale trade. There has been a significant rise in employment levels among former combatants, with most now working; ex-combatants are now more likely to have jobs than the non-combatant population. Most former Much of the poverty reduction seen in Aceh is a result of the recent combatants and ex-political prisoners have returned to the occupations they growth of the province's economy. This growth is largely due to held prior to joining the insurgency­­mainly farming and agricultural wage the massive influx of tsunami reconstruction aid. As the post-tsunami labour, with others mainly performing non-agricultural daily wage labour. reconstruction period draws to a close, non-farm employment opportunities Employment for Combatants and Civilians in the construction and service sectors are dwindling. Although inflation has flattened, high living costs are impacting households' ability to save and invest, and a high minimum wage is affecting employment generation through new investment. Despite a concerted effort by provincial and local governments and numerous donor- supported programs aimed at creating a conducive business climate, investment in Aceh remains minimal. The draft Aceh Green Policy framework employs a progressive approach to investment and development. Politics, Security and Social Cohesion Despite high employment rates, former combatants are, on average, Great progress has been achieved in reintegrating former combatants, less wealthy and have lower incomes than the civilian population at political prisoners and returnees into social and political life in Aceh. large. There is large variation within the former combatant population; since However, the persistence of conflict-era identities and structures continues the conflict ended, certain groups, particularly former GAM military (TNA) to thwart the full assimilation of some of these individuals into society. officers, are accruing wealth more rapidly than other population groups. Levels of violent conflict have dropped dramatically since the signing Reintegration assistance has had little measurable impact on the of the Helsinki accords. Moreover, in the first half of 2009, the number economic status of recipient households. In fact households that did of incidents of violence fell from previous years. Crime rates are well not receive assistance have increased welfare levels faster than those below those of neighbouring North Sumatra province and a perceived rise in households that did receive assistance. In part, this is because many criminality in 2008 that was undermining public trust in the peace process, government programs have delivered cash without guidance, follow-up may have lessened with the successful elections and reduction in violent or assistance to ensure its effective use. Few services or programs exist incidents. While this is encouraging, tensions over ongoing aid, mistrust Household Welfare: Received and Not Received Assistance Violent Incidents and Deaths by Month (2005 - mid 2009) Violent Incidents (excl. GAM vs GoI) GAM vs GoI Violent Incidents Deaths 70 Number of Violent Incidents (Jan 2005 - Jun 2008) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Jan Mar May JulAug ep Nov ec Feb ar May JulAug ep Nov ec Feb ar May JulAug ep Nov ec Feb ar May JulAug ep Nov ec Feb ar May Feb Apr Jun S Oct D Jan M Apr Jun S Oct D Jan M Apr Jun S Oct D Jan M Apr Jun S Oct D Jan M Apr Jun 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Source: ARLS. Source: ACMU/APMU. MSR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 between groups and dwindling the year, are welcome and hopefully reconstruction funds means that will improve BRA's effectiveness. recent positive trends are not assured in the long term and ongoing attention There is no broad government-wide is required. strategy being implemented for consolidating the peace process in Vigilantism, disputes over govern- Aceh. The initial government strategy ment contracts, aid conflicts of Presidential Instruction No. 15, and domestic violence are the 2005 while bold and innovative has Working in post-conflict Aceh most prevalent forms of localised not been fully nor systematically Villagers working on a new irrigation violence in post-conflict Aceh. Politically, it is still too early for the implemented, especially in regards channel in Tangse, Pidie. provincial and national governments to consider the establishment of two to assistance. This has hampered new provinces in Aceh's mountainous interior and south-western regions. the mainstreaming of conflict recovery planning and sensitivity across the Power-sharing arrangements between Aceh and Jakarta are still to be government agencies and institutions. Despite coordination efforts and solidly defined and currently peace is not sufficiently consolidated to handle directives to action towards these agencies by the Coordinating Ministry such upheavals. The legitimacy of partition can be examined once peace for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs as the lead coordinating agency is further consolidated. Moreover, the continued presence of conflict- designated by the Instruction, these have not been completely translated era organizations such as the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA), PETA into concrete actions. Lack of proper delegation and follow up has put and FORKAB, pose a challenge to political stability and security. Rising pressure on BRA as the local agency tasked with overseeing the peace membership in these organizations perpetuates both conflict-era identities process. and pressure on the government for ongoing individual assistance. International experience and expertise is not being effectively provided Rural communities in Aceh are characterised by strong social capital or utilised to support the peace process in Aceh. Most international and high levels of trust in local village-level leadership. In contrast, public agencies have formulated and implemented programs without adequate trust in higher levels of government remains low. In highland areas inter- co-ordination with each other or with the government. More effort should village and inter-ethnic relations are a source of tension, as are IDP/returnee put in to working with and supporting government-led implementation in relations with villagers throughout the province. Deeper reintegration of the future. former combatants has yet to occur with limited close friendships with civilians. Progress has been made in tackling corruption in Aceh with the Closest Friends and Prospective Business Partners Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the Region and Ex-TNA Ex-TNA Civilians Civilians Community of Aceh and Nias (BRR) having set new standards for the 0.7 70% province. Recent provincial government initiatives to tackle corruption are 60% 0.6 also welcome and should be strengthened. However, during the conflict, 50% Aceh had a reputation as one of the most corrupt provinces in Indonesia 0.5 40% 0.4 30% 0.3 and predatory practices from the conflict period still continue to a degree. 20% 0.2 This is further compounded by limited local government capacity, another 10% 0.1 legacy of the conflict era. 0%0 Ex-TNA Ex-TNA KPA member KPAmember Conflict victim Conflict Victim Conflict returnee Conflict Returnee IDP IDP Source: ARLS. Men only. The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) are still cautious toward Question: Name five people whom you consider (...) to be your closest friends, and three people the activities and motives of KPA and GAM members. They are active in with whom you would start a business. internal security roles taking an agressive interpretation of the clauses in the Elections for heads of regional government and, more recently, for LoGA regarding the TNI's role in `the maintenance, protection, and defense district, provincial and national members of parliament, were largely of the integrity and sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of free and fair with relatively low levels of violence and high participation Indonesia'. This risks alienating sections of the Acehnese public if overdone. rates. However, as in other parts of Indonesia, there were problems such Improved law enforcement is also crucial to the long-term success of the as `money politics' and intimidation in elections, which could undermine the peace process. While the police's record in solving crime has improved, there process of establishing democratic governance in a still recovering Aceh. is still a need to develop its investigative capacity, overall professionalism and its relationship with communities. The legal system overall also requires Governance and Institutions ongoing attention to build its capacity and public faith in its institutions. The Aceh peace process is led by the government and as such differs Considering the high levels of trust among rural communities in from many other post-conflict programs worldwide. This provides many village government and customary institutions, these entities can opportunities; but there have also been limitations in the effectiveness of play an important role in consolidating peace in Aceh, and need to be government programs and strategies. prioritised in peace-building, recovery and development programs. Local government also represents a crucial locus for increased women's A comprehensive and inclusive strategy across the government for participation in decision-making and peace-building. consolidating peace in Aceh is still lacking although recent efforts by BRA in producing a draft `Comprehensive Action Plan' for its work is a positive development. There is no effective and broad institutional structure to oversee the wider implementation of the peace process in the long term. Initial attempts to incorporate reintegration and post-conflict recovery and development programs into relevant line ministry activities have faltered. The mandate of BRA is broad, contested and constrained, despite the issue of a new Governor's Decree in June of this year. BRA's performance is constrained by limited authority, lack of institutional consensus with Jakarta, overly ambitious planning, funding delays, inadequate staff capacity and organisational problems. Recent restructuring and internal attempts to clarify the agency's function and authority, and a revised Decree due later in Village meeting to discuss aid in Gempang, Pidie. MSR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 Towards a Framework for Supporting Peaceful Development in Aceh Macro Level 1. Programs and strategies are needed to promote investment and The MSR provides a number of recommendations that can serve as a basis business development. A portion of Aceh's special autonomy fund for the development of future strategies to help consolidate peace and windfall and other public funds should be utilised for this. promote prosperity in post-conflict Aceh. 2. Improvements in access to credit and modern financial services are Livelihoods and Economy needed to support investment and enterprise development in the province. This includes: loosening regulations to allow bank and Individual Level other financial institution branch expansion and more flexible lending 1. The time for widespread individual targeting of reintegration assistance amounts to cover the needs of rural entrepreneurs and small-to- has passed. There is a need for both the government and donors to medium-sized enterprises; improving methods of assessing credit transition quickly to approaches aimed at improving community and worthiness; further mentoring and capacity building of micro and small general welfare. credit institutions; building partnerships between commercial and such credit institutions to develop more flexible lending products; and better 2. That said, limited targeted assistance needs to continue for certain promoting finance and business services in inland areas. vulnerable groups such as female-headed households, displaced peoples, recent returnees, certain types of conflict victims, including 3. Support for business development services to improve accessibility, those who suffered from sexual violence, and the elderly, along with e.g. through government subsidies and partnerships with finance potentially problematic groups such as unemployed or underemployed institutions, is recommended. former combatants and youth in high conflict-intensity districts. 4. A more attractive business environment is needed to attract 3. The criteria for further individually-targeted assistance need to shift investment and counterbalance declining oil and gas revenues and from the MoU categories (former combatants, amnestied prisoners, tsunami reconstruction aid­­in particular, there is a need to support and conflict victims) to other vulnerability measures. These should growth in agriculture and agro-forestry, and to increase value adding focus on: within the province. Aceh Green should be supported and pursued as provincial government framework for investment and development that a. The most marginalised households and individuals, who are is innovative and supportive of the long-term peace process. struggling to benefit from community-based and broader development approaches; and 5. Major government investments are required in transportation, power, irrigation and other infrastructure, especially in areas with high levels of b. Security concerns, i.e., limited economic assistance to individuals conflict damage and poverty. who pose a security risk. 6. Ongoing monitoring of the economic situation in Aceh can assist in Identification of individuals should be done by communities, rather devising effective development programs and regulatory frameworks. through conflict era structures, and should include benefits for the wider community. Labelling beneficiaries based on conflict­era Politics, Security and Social Cohesion identities should be avoided. Individual Level Community Level 1. While the overall emphasis of post-conflict programming should 1. Community-managed government programs such as PNPM/BKPG change to broader development projects, some individually-targeted and donor programs that also coordinate and work with government projects are needed for groups who pose a risk to peace (see above) should be continued and, if successful, expanded. Programs such as or are a source of tension. These should focus on building capacity these can be useful in providing much needed: to enhance long-term earning power, breaking up disruptive social a. Small-scale infrastructure construction projects--including networks, and combining economic assistance with social support. roads, bridges, irrigation, drainage, water and sanitation--which When assisting individuals, there should be broader benefits for the generate short-term employment and income opportunities, while community as well. providing badly needed infrastructure to reduce isolation and 2. Programs to send vulnerable individuals overseas for work, or inter- promote economic development in rural areas; province for skills training courses, have promise. b. Livelihood projects and small to medium-scale enterprise 3. Domestic violence can be combated through both preventive and development, including provision of capital, skills development, responsive measures including public awareness and education value chain development, improving market access and campaigns (especially those targeting boys and men), women's strengthening of village micro-credit associations, and collective empowerment, and support services for victims of domestic violence. production and/or marketing groups. These programs have This can include support for, and collaboration with, local and provincial proven especially effective in providing income support for women's NGOs and CBOs and with local government. disadvantaged women in the community. 2. Developing partnerships between local government agencies and Community Level NGOs can be effective in improving quality, enhancing government 1. Community and business development activities can enhance social legitimacy and building understanding. cohesion if they bring together people from different social groups. This 3. Existing mechanisms such as PNPM/BKPG and the MUSRENBANG may be applied to areas with displaced people and recent returnees, can be strengthened in terms of their contribution to consolidation of high numbers of former combatants and communities split politically peace by building the capacity of facilitators and government officials during the conflict. for conflict-sensitive planning, strengthening mechanism to ensure 2. Village institutions and communities should be engaged in the marginalised groups are more fully included, and by linking community implementation of village infrastructure and social and economic initiatives to complementary government and donor programs and development programs to increase social cohesion and ensure projects. Additional components supported by donors or government effectiveness. Where possible, existing platforms for this should be to these existing mechanism that specifically aim to build peace such used. as socialization of peace process issues (Truth and Reconciliation 3. Village and local government leaders should be educated in conflict Commission, assistance to conflict victims etc.) or conflict resolution resolution techniques. training to village leaders will add peace consolidation value to these mechanism. 4. Increased women's participation in village government and decision- making structures can significantly improve the equity and conflict- MSR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 sensitiveness of local initiatives and programs. 2. In the long term, BAPPEDA can ensure that conflict sensitivy is 5. Constructing community meeting facilities can help build social mainstreamed in to government wide planning and programming, cohesion and collective action capacity. and that coordination between development stakeholders is effective with support from BAPPENAS. Setting up a consultative body such as Macro Level conflict sensitive desk or section in the provincial and district BAPPEDA office could be a way to achieve this. 1. The provincial and national governments at this time should delay consideration of the establishment of new provinces until peace is 3. International support for the transition and long-term strategic planning more consolidated. Grievances can be addressed through increased in the form of technical assistance, research, assessment and policy government support for local development initiatives, infrastructure advice is encouraged. and improved service delivery in restive areas. 4. The capacity of the provincial-level committee developing a proposed 2. There is a need for continued monitoring of the security condition in plan for the allocation of special autonomy resources should be Aceh in order to be able to respond quickly to emerging issues. strenghthened­­emphasising conflict-sensitive development, and incorporating the conflict-intensity index as a guide for strategy and Governance and Institutions program development. 5. Continued consensus building is needed among all parties involved Community Level in MoU and LoGA implementation. This includes simplifying and 1. There is a need to support the further development of effective, clarifying the various fora engaged in communication, coordination accountable and transparent village government institutions and and planning. structures. This should include skills training and mentoring. 6. Although TNI has a legitimate mandate based on the LoGA for 2. The implementation of provincial and district legislation on village maintaining, protecting and securing the unity and sovereignty of the governance should be accelerated. Republic of Indonesia, this needs to be done in a way that rebuilds 3. The MUSRENBANG process can be strengthened and expanded with trust with Acehnese especially in former GAM strongholds and areas technical inputs and support from donors and by taking measures of high conflict. Moreover, the spirit of the MoU limiting their role to to ensure that grass-roots voices are heard and that decisions are external defence rather than internal security should be pursued as far conflict-sensitive. as possible. Ongoing professionalization should also be continued. 7. Police skills and capacities to investigate crimes and arrest culprits need Macro Level to be further developed. Local police in Aceh need more personnel, 1. BRA together with BAPPENAS and BAPPEDA should develop a improved investigative skills, and better training beyond community transition plan leading to the handover of conflict related programming policing programs. to provincial line ministries and agencies, and its closure over the next 8. There is a need to improve security sector governance through two to four years with the following steps: strengthened oversight mechanism, support to provincial and a. Partnering with other government agencies, BAPPEDA and BRA district parliaments, NGOs, and accountability institutions such as should develop a framework and action plan for mainstreaming ombudsmen. peace-building and conflict-sensitive programming throughout 9. While improvements have been made, there is still a need to increase the provincial government. government transparency and oversight. This includes assisting anti- b. An assessment to be undertaken on the implementation of corruption NGOs at the provincial and local levels, and reform and Presidential Instruction No. 15, 2005 as the foundation national capacity-building of the legal system. More stringent procedures framework of the peace process. The result of this assessment for contractors engaging in government infrastructure projects are will take in to account the fact that four years have passed necessary to ensure quality of work and transparency. since the promulgation of the Instruction and that the present 10. The research, development and analysis capacity of provincial day situation and needs have changed. Based on the result, and district governments need to be bolstered, to help ensure that new and concrete directions can be formulated to all relevant development planning is based on accurate data. agencies and institutions to assume a more active role with clear 11. International support for the peace process remains vital, but should responsibilities. shift from direct implementation to support for government and civil c. Establishing an interim coordinating body that is co-chaired by society-led initiatives within a comprehensive framework. International BRA and BAPPEDA and that engages the international community, experience and expertise in developing and implementing strategies for relevant government agencies and Acehnese civil society, and conflict-sensitive service delivery and program design should form the works to devise mechanism for the transition of longer term basis of international capacity and institutional development support. peace­building programming and conflict-sensitive development to ministries and agencies. d. Ensuring capacity and support for civil society to take up some of the `soft' peace­building activities such as advocacy, dialogues, and socialization that may not fall under government agency mandates. BAPPENAS