SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | P  OLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 Targeting versus Universality: HIGHLIGHT Is There a Middle Ground?1,2 In the last few years, proposals to introduce a universal basic income or UBI have proliferated. P ­ roponents point out that narrowly targeted programs exclude many of the poor. Critics point out that universality Zaineb Majoka and Robert spreads limited resources thinly over the population limiting the impact on poverty for a given level of Palacios spending. While high income countries can claw back the transfer to the higher income group through a progressive income tax, this is not possible in developing countries where most people operate in I. Background and Overview the informal sector. This note looks at an alternative to either narrow targeting or UBI. It uses household survey data from A global average of 45 percent of the bottom quintile 52 low and middle-income countries to compare the is enrolled in social safety net programs. However, poverty impact of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) to a transfer that is gradually reduced as estimated this figure is significantly lower in poor countries. In consumption increases. The taper can be set at the last twenty years, coverage of these programs has different rates and can lead to zero transfers to households above a chosen threshold. The Tapered been increasing steadily in Sub-Saharan Africa and Universal Basic Income (or TUBI) could be based on Asia where a growing number of flagship programs proxy indicators for unobserved income from special surveys and administrative databases. Both are have been introduced. For example, in Tanzania, the becoming more common as government databases coverage of Productive Safety Nets Program increased are digitized. from 0.4 to 10 percent of population between 2013 and 2016. In Ethiopia, a similar program covers more than eight percent of the population. In the Philippines, close to 25 percent of the population is covered. At least 142  countries now have such programs with 1 This note was authored by Zaineb Majoka and Robert Palacios, acknowledging useful inputs from Ugo Gentilini, Emil Tesliuc, David Coady, Margaret Grosh, Ruslan Yemtsov, Nithin Upamathi, Background Note for the White Paper of the Social Protection & Jobs Global Practice 2019 and Gabriela Inchauste. The authors can be contacted at mzaineb@worldbank.org and rpalacios@worldbank.org 2 Citation guideline: Majoka, Z. and Palacios, R. 2018. “Targeting versus Universality: Is  there a middle ground?” World Bank. Washington D.C. 1 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE  OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 low and middle-income countries spending an average In Iran, the quasi-UBI led to a 5-percentage point decline of around 1.5 percent of GDP with median spending in poverty.5 In both cases, budgets were tied to revenue at 1.1  percent of GDP. But there is a high degree of generated from natural resources.6, 7 variation in spending where Kenya spends 0.37 percent while Liberia spends 2.64 percent.3 The cost of a UBI depends on the level of benefit chosen. A recent IMF study estimated that it would cost around Despite this historic expansion, limited budgets and 6-7  percent of GDP in higher income countries and imperfect implementation have led to mixed results. In 3-4 percent in developing countries if the benefit were low income countries, less than one in five people in to be set at 25 percent of median per capita income.8 In the poorest quintile receive any transfer. This is partly Mexico, it will cost 7 percent of GDP if the benefit is set because there are many households clustered around the at the minimum rural poverty line.9 In order to have  a poverty line and distinguishing between them at a given significant impact on poverty, a UBI would require point in time often leads to arbitrary outcomes. Also, an expenditure close to five percent of GDP, as was the information may not be updated frequently enough. case in Iran and as has been proposed in India.10 This is more than three times the average spending on social These problems are well known to those administering assistance in low and middle income countries. As Luke and supporting targeted programs. Low coverage Marinelli, an economist at the University of Bath said, of many social assistance schemes is due to budget “An affordable UBI is inadequate, and an adequate UBI constraints which often leads to rationing. A program is unaffordable.”11 that is not so constrained and pays benefits through the middle part of the distribution will reduce these errors. An alternative to UBI that also seeks to ensure a minimum income level is the negative income tax or NIT. Recently, the idea of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) Milton Friedman proposed to give people below a certain has been resurrected, this time as an answer to the level of income a transfer effectively extending the job losses anticipated in the wake of automation and progressive income tax schedule into negative territory. artificial intelligence. Proponents of universal benefits Tondani (2009) shows that both UBI and NIT can result also point out that it helps overcome the exclusion in the same outcome in terms of net income distribution. errors inherent in targeted programs. In the few However, the two options differ substantially in terms examples of existing UBI programs such as Mongolia of implementation. First, a UBI requires a larger fiscal and Iran, a significant impact on poverty has been footprint - both spending and taxes – than the NIT. Most observed. In Mongolia, the rather large UBI reduced poverty by 33.7 percent and inequality by 21 percent.4   5 Salehi-Isfahani (2014).   6 Yeung and Howes (2015). Poverty rates were 32.6 percent without the UBI, and 21.6 percent with the transfer; inequality as measured by the Palma ratio declined from 1.76 to 1.39.   7 Salehi-Isfahani (2014).   8 IMF (2017). 3 World Bank (2018).   9 Cantu (2017).   4 Yeung and Howes (2015). Poverty rates were 32.6 percent without 10 https://www.economist.com/news/finance-economics/21716025- the UBI, and 21.6 percent with the transfer; inequality as measured india-taking-idea-universal-basic-income-seriously-if-not. by the Palma ratio declined from 1.76 to 1.39. 11 https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05259-x 2 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 relevant for developing countries, however, is the fact II. Data and Methodology that a prerequisite for the NIT is the ability to accurately assess the income of an individual or family. This is The simulations which follow are based on data found simply not possible in low and middle-income countries in the Global Micro Database (GMD), a collection of where the informal sector is dominant and most income household surveys that have been is harmonized across at the bottom of distribution is unobserved. countries.12 The countries were selected based on data availability from 2008 or later. There are 52 countries On the other hand, availability of data that is correlated with around 4.2 million observations in total. To with income or consumption is increasing rapidly with estimate poverty rates, per capita income or per capita the emergence of digital government. It has made it consumption variable in LCU is used depending on possible to use multiple administrative databases and which concept is used to measure national poverty in a social registries that cover most of the population to particular country.13 rank households based on proxies and mimic a negative income tax. By using proxies that are normally correlated Relative poverty rates are measured since the objective with consumption based on household survey data, the here is to compare the poverty impact of two types of government could ‘claw back’ benefits for more affluent cash transfers – UBI and TUBI – in both low and middle- households based on consumption estimates. income countries. The poverty line is set at 50 percent of median per capita income or consumption in each This tapering of a cash transfer with broad but not country. The poverty impact of a Universal Basic Income necessarily universal coverage is similar to what is done (UBI) scheme is simulated where the amount of transfer with the social pension in Chile. Households are ranked to each individual is 5 percent of average per capita from poorest to richest based on administrative data income or consumption. The total budget required and those in the bottom 60 percent of the distribution for such a universal scheme varies across countries and with elderly members are eligible for the non- costing between 1.8 and 5.3  percent of GDP. Keeping contributory pension. This is reduced however, for each this budget constant, a TUBI is designed where bottom peso of contributory pension income. The result is a quintiles receive a higher transfer amount, which then tapered benefit, which tries to alleviate old age poverty gradually decreases to zero (Figure 1). while increasing contributory savings. Here “taper” refers to decrease in benefits with increase in income or consumption. A tapered UBI or TUBI could take an infinite number of shapes depending on the parameters of the taper chosen. The next section simulates the poverty impact of a UBI and two particular forms of TUBI using data from 52 low and middle- income countries. 12 For background details on GMD, see Castaneda et al 2016. 13 An important feature of the GMD is that it uses the same welfare aggregates as those used in calculating poverty estimates published by PovcalNet and the World Development Indicators. 3 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE  OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 Since the budget required for these schemes is much higher than what LMICs currently spend on their safety nets programs, an alternative TUBI design is also considered where the total budget is reduced to half Figure 1: Comparison of UBI and TUBI Transfer Schedule while coverage is also until sixth decile (Figure 1). 10 9.5 9 9 8.5 Transfer as % of average per capita welfare The TUBI can have both an income effect and a 8 7.5 substitution effect whereas UBI generates only an 7 7 6.5 income effect.14 There is little empirical evidence on 6 5.5 5 any significant impact on labor market behavior for the 5 5 4.5 UBI.15 The impact of the TUBI will depend on, among 4 3.5 other things, the marginal tax rate implied by the taper. 3 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest UBI TUBI1 TUBI2 Source: Author’s calculations. Note: TUBI1 uses the same budget as UBI while TUBI2 uses half the budget. Figure 2: Reduction in Headcount Poverty Rate with UBI 10 ZAF 0.0903108 9 8 7 BWA 6 0.0556374 Percent 5 4 3 2 1 0 G G M D H L BWN A L V L E U H O A D V N N D Q KH Z M A MO DG M X NG MZ NE I NG R A C L K R L L RW E A N E V K N A A VN R M ZM F B W BO CH CO NP PH PO ZA CZ KA O PS SL PA PE TJ UK CI HR E SL NI BG BI ET GH HN IN LK TZ UG EC AF AR BT GE HU ID IR LS SE TU AR M M Source: Author’s calculations based on GMD. 14 The income effect is caused by recipients’ overall income increase. The substitution effect takes place when work earnings are partially offset by reduced TUBI cash transfer. 15 Marinescu (2017) & Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei (2017). 4 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 The simulations also ignore the differences between transfers, the reduction in poverty rate due to UBI is 10.3 each type of transfer in terms of inclusion and exclusion percentage points. The average reduction in inequality is errors and differences in the cost of administration. 1.9 Gini points.18 Finally, this analysis has thus far ignored the impact of financing the transfers. This is done in the next section. Next, we compare the poverty impact of UBI with TUBI using the budget as described in Figure 1. All else equal, TUBI has a greater poverty impact than UBI ranging III. Results and Implications16 between 3.1 and 19.1 percentage points.19 However, if the budget is kept constant, targeted programs, even The average impact of a flat UBI of 5 percent of average with high exclusion errors, lead to greater improvement per capita consumption or income on the head count in welfare as compared to universal programs (Hanna poverty rate is around 4.6 percentage points. Figure and Olken 2018). It is primarily because of a higher 2 shows that this hides significant variation across per beneficiary transfer to the poor. The impact on countries – between 1.9 and 10.3 percentage points. headcount poverty rates of a TUBI with a lower budget The impact is higher in countries with a greater degree is similar as shown in Figure 3. This is due to much of inequality, probably because average per capita steeper taper, where payments end by the sixth decile consumption is higher relative to that in lower quintile.17 rather than significantly lowering the average amount For example, in Botswana, there is a 6.6 percentage point of transfer to bottom deciles. This helps illustrate a key reduction in headcount poverty. Similarly, in South Africa trade-off, namely, that maintaining the poverty impact where the poverty gap index is 7.4 percent before the with a lower budget comes at the cost of increasing the Figure 3: Change in Poverty Rates after TUBI vs. UBI 16 14 12 10 Percent 8 6 4 2 0 KH Z E A G A L K L U A C A G V ZM F D A VN R A O M X A NGR N M V NG E K L D V M O L BWN R RW E N B N D DG M L M Z L H N M Q H NE I W CO CH KA CZ ZA BO NP PO PH PA SL PS CI O UK LK NI GH TJ UG E PE SL AR EC BG HR TZ AF HN IN GE SE BI LS BT ET HU ID TU IR AR M M Change after TUBI1 Change after TUBI2 Change after UBI Source: Author’s calculations based on GMD. Note: The budget for TUBI1 is the same as the UBI while TUBI2 uses half the budget. 18 If a flat 5 percent UBI is implemented along with a 5 percent VAT on individual welfare, the average reduction in headcount poverty rate and poverty gap index is 4.3 and 2.3 percentage points 16 Results by country are available upon request. respectively. 17 IMF 2017 19 Country level results available on request. 5 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE  OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 probability that work effort is reduced due to the higher marginal tax. At the same time, it shows that a more realistic level of spending on an TUBI can have the same impact on poverty as a UBI that requires a budget twice as large. Figure 4: Net Transfer of TUBI after VAT Financing 15 To this point, we have ignored the impact of the revenue Transfer as % of average per capita welfare 9.5 10 8.5 7.5 6.5 5.5 side of the equation. While it is possible that existing 5 7.94 4.5 5% 3.5 2.5 1.5 spending could be reallocated to these programs 0.5 0 –1.28 (including blanket subsidies in some countries), in –5 most cases, it would require an increase in total social –10 assistance spending. This could be financed by a variety of new taxes some of which would offset the poverty –15 –14.38 reduction observed in Figures 2 and 3. Consumption –20 Poorest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Richest taxes are more regressive than other taxes20 such as land or wealth taxes and would undo some of the gains Source: Authors’ calculations based on GMD. for the poor thus reducing the poverty impact. In this sense, simulating the use of a value added tax to finance the above UBIs or TUBIs provides a kind of lower bound estimate of the net poverty impact. Figure 4 shows the impact of levying a flat 5 percent VAT to finance UBI or TUBI.21 Post-taxes, the transfer to the Figure 5: Poverty Impact of UBI and TUBI after 5% VAT bottom quintiles shown by the solid line remains positive 16 14 0.1447596 with only minor reductions to the amounts received by 12 the poorest deciles. The net transfer becomes slightly 10 negative by the 7th decile and sizably negative for the Percent 8 0.0739239 6 top quintile. The top quintile, on average, pays twice as 0.0527421 4 0.0337241 much as the bottom decile receives. 2 0.0164768 0.0072529 0.001716 0.0030599 0 UBI TUBI UBI TUBI Figure 5 shows the largest, median, and smallest net Change in Headcount Change in PGI Poverty Rate poverty impact of the combined tax and transfer in a Min Max Mean VAT-financed, UBI or TUBI. The latter option yields twice Source: Authors’ calculations based on GMD. the impact for the same budget. The results mirror the 20 Recent evidence suggests that consumption taxes are less regressive than previously thought, see Bachas et al., (2018). 21 LAC countries have been excluded from these simulations because of lack of household consumption estimates in household survey data. 6 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 findings of Harris et al. (2018) where a UBI funded by costs and the share of the cost related to eligibility eliminating VAT exemptions leads to larger net gains to determination, i.e., targeting. The figures show an the poorer households. Here a more progressive TUBI is average targeting cost of 3.5 percent of total spending. financed by the VAT with even stronger results. However, the cost of targeting will be significantly higher if extensive data is collected periodically to determine or update poverty status. IV. Implementation Challenges Table 1: Administrative Cost of Last-Resort Income Support Program As discussed, these simulations ignore administrative Admin Cost Cost of Determining costs. These will be higher for the TUBI due to the need as % of Total Eligibility as % of to rank households by level of welfare.22 Would these Country Cost Admin Cost costs significantly alter the results? Data on the cost of Albania 2005 7.2 69.8 targeting are rarely published and difficult to disentangle Armenia 2006 2.2 17.9 in most cases. Bulgaria 2007 16.2 51.6 Krygz Rep 2006 9.3 17.7 Lithuania 2005 6.5 27.9 The figures that are available suggest that the huge Romania 2005 7.1 49.2 advantage of the tapered benefit over the UBI will Source: Tesliuc et al. 2014. Note: The administrative cost in Bulgaria is much higher than other countries not change significantly. For example, the massive because the program has a very stringent eligibility criterion, which makes it enrollment process used to score households in Pakistan costly to implement. for its cash transfer scheme cost US$2.2 per household yielding a ratio of about 6.5 percent of annual spending. Increasingly, countries can use administrative databases Assuming that this is repeated every three or four that contain data on individuals and households years, the reduction in funds available compared to a that allow them to assign scores based on proxy UBI would be less than 2-3 percent of total spending. indicators such as owning vehicles, land or property, A similar exercise in Bangladesh yielded a ratio of about energy consumption, and other variables correlated 5 percent if the cost was incurred once every three years. to consumption and wealth. The shift away from cash and towards digital transactions will add to the amount These are examples of ‘census sweeps’ or surveys that of data available. Turkey already uses 28 databases in are conducted periodically and apply to most or all of its integrated social information system to determine the population. Middle-income countries tend to use relative need for the purposes of health insurance and an application process that includes a determination social assistance. Egypt does something similar using 34 of eligibility. Table 1 shows the total administrative linked databases. The ability to link so much personal data obviously implies the need for safeguards of the 22 Other costs are common to both UBI and TUBI. Ideally, there would kind recently adopted by the European Union.23 be no need for an application or enrolment process. A population registry with uniquely identified individual members of households would be harnessed and payments would be made directly into bank accounts. These were essentially the conditions that allowed for the almost universal transfers in Iran and Mongolia but would represent a major challenge for most developing countries where identification systems are often rudimentary and do not cover the 23 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was adopted in entire population and financial inclusion is limited. May 2018. 7 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE  OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 These approaches allow policymakers to mimic the kind VI. Conclusions of progressive income tax system found in high-income countries and to implement a TUBI. However, to the Proponents of universal basic income argue that it extent that errors are introduced relative to a universal avoids exclusion errors and minimizes potential negative benefit, the simulated reduction in poverty rates will be behavioral effects that arise in targeted programs. lower.24 Having moved beyond the narrow targeting that Skeptics focus on its high cost relative to its impact on currently prevails however, the exclusion errors should poverty. be greatly reduced although the error will now take the form of a greater or lesser amount of transfer than appropriate. Nevertheless, arbitrary differences between Financing the UBI with a progressive tax could yield similar households should be reduced compared to a the same impact as a negative income tax in countries dichotomous world where many receive nothing. where incomes can be observed. But incomes cannot be observed in most developing countries. Instead, extending the logic of the proxy means test combined This will cost more in most countries. Some countries with increasingly available administrative data makes it could finance UBIs or TUBIs by reforming universal possible to rank households and gradually reduce the subsidy programs as in the case of Iran’s energy subsidy transfer in a way that mimics the progressive income reforms. A budget neutral carbon tax of the type being tax. The simulations presented above showed that on rolled out in Canada is another environmentally friendly average the most gradual taper rate reduced poverty by option.25 Countries with natural resource revenues could twice as much as the UBI. The higher the taper rate the choose to distribute it in the form of cash transfers, as lower the cost but the greater the marginal tax rate on in the case of the state of Alaska in the United States. A consumption/income. significant number of countries already spend the share of GDP simulated here and could replace those programs, as was proposed in India. Finally, some countries might Either type of transfer will require additional resources, choose to increase taxes to raise the required funds; in but our simulations suggest that even if financed by those cases, the incidence of the tax would need to be an earmarked VAT, the net effect is highly progressive. taken into account as above.26 If  governments are concerned with exclusion error among the poor, they should expand the budget and coverage of the program significantly above the poverty line.  Gradually reducing the transfer to those with higher levels of consumption will reduce poverty rates much more than a UBI for the same level of spending. Ultimately, there is no cheap alternative to a cash transfer with broad coverage if significant poverty reduction with minimal exclusion is to be achieved. 24 For cross-country empirical evidence of the accuracy of targeted social safety net schemes, see World Bank (2017). 25 See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus​ -97-per-cent/2018/oct/26/canada-passed-a-carbon-tax-that-will​ -give-most-canadians-more-money 26 IMF (2017). 8 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 References Bachas, Pierre, Lucie Gadenne, Anders Jensen. 2018. “Informal consumption and indirect tax design: consumption diaries evidence from 15 countries”, World Bank. Cantu, Ricardo. 2017. “Ingreso básico en México: ¿A quién beneficiaría y cuánto costaría?” CIEP. Online. http://ciep.mx/ingreso-basico​-en- mexico-a-quien-beneficiaria-y-cuanto-costaria/ Castañeda, Andres, Dung Doan, David Newhouse, Minh C. 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Development Policy Center, Australia. 10 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 Annex 1 – Country/Year for Household Survey AFG 2011 RWA 2010 ARG 2014 SEN 2011 ARM 2013 SLE 2011 BGD 2010 SLV 2014 BIH 2007 TJK 2009 BOL 2014 TUN 2010 BTN 2012 TZA 2011 BWA 2009 UGA 2012 CHL 2013 UKR 2013 CIV 2008 VNM 2014 COL 2014 ZAF 2010 CZE 2013 ZMB 2010 ECU 2014 ETH 2010 GEO 2013 GHA 2005 HND 2013 HRV 2013 HUN 2013 IDN 2014 IND 2011 IRQ 2012 KAZ 2013 KHM 2012 KSV 2013 LKA 2012 LSO 2010 MDG 2010 MEX 2014 MNG 2012 MOZ 2008 MWI 2010 NER 2011 NGA 2010 NIC 2014 NPL 2010 PAK 2013 PER 2014 PHL 2012 POL 2013 PSE 2009 11 SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS | POLICY & TECHNICAL NOTE  OCTOBER 2019 | No. 22 © 2019 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: +1 (202) 473 1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. 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