PREPARED AS PART OF “RUSSIA AS A DONOR INITIATIVE” (RDI) PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED BY THE WORLD BANK FINANCIALLY SUPPORTED BY UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID) 61890 v2 RUSSIANS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE Findings of Public Opinion Research: Nationwide Representative Survey Prepared By: Leveda Center, Russian Independent Polling and Sociological Research Organisation World Bank Task Team Leader for RDI Program: Andrei R. Markov, Senior Partnership Specialist World Bank Public Opinion Research Coordinators: Sharon Felzer, Senior Communications Officer Svetlana Markova, Communications Consultant June 2011 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS STUDY DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................ 3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...................................................................................................... 9 ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA............................................................................................ 12 RUSSIA’S IMAGE IN PUBLIC OPINION ........................................................................ 12 INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC AWARENESS ................ 16 ATTITUDE TO RUSSIA’S AID TO POORER NATIONS ............................................... 21 TYPES OF RESPONDENTS BY ATTITUDE TO AID TO POORER NATIONS........... 27 CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................................... 34 3 STUDY DESCRIPTION This report presents the data of a public survey on the subject of Russia as a Donor. The purpose of the study was to obtain information about and analyze public opinion of Russia’s participation in aid to poorer nations. Key objectives: 1. Developing tools for conducting the survey; 2. Conducting the survey of a representative sample of the Russian population; 3. Analyzing the data to identify the main trends in Russians’ attitudes toward their country’s participation in aid to poorer nations. The subject of the study included the following components:  Image of Russia in public opinion;  Interest in international affairs and awareness of Russia’s participation in programs of aid to poorer nations;  Public attitude toward Russia’s contribution to aid to poorer nations (degree of support, priorities, spheres, types and forms of aid);  Key types of respondents with different attitudes to Russia’s aid to poorer nations. STUDY METHODOLOGY Survey. The sample survey of the Russian general public was conducted in the form of formal face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes. The survey tools, including a questionnaire and a set of instructional materials for the interviewers and survey organizer, were developed by Levada Center specialists. The questionnaire was discussed with the Client and approved for field work; it included 51 questions on subjects indicated in the Terms of Reference. The average interview lasted 35 minutes. Sample criteria. A four-stage stratified probability sample representing Russian adults aged 18 years or more was designed for the Russia as a New Donor study. The sample, which totaled 1,503 persons, did not include:  Persons on active army duty;  Persons in detention and those residing in monasteries and other restricted-access communities;  Residents of small communities (with fewer than 50 residents);  Residents of Chechnya and Ingushetia (because of high risks to interviewers);  Residents of the Far North, including the Nenets Autonomous Area, the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area, the Taimyr Autonomous Area, the Evenk Autonomous Area, Chukotka and the Sakhalin Oblast, because of the remoteness of those territories. Urban communities and rural administrative districts were used as sampling units in the first stage of the selection, with pre-stratification applied to the selection of communities based on the population number and administrative status (urban/rural) of the community as stratum-forming characteristics. Urban communities and rural districts were selected from each stratum independently and at random with the probability in proportion to its size (population number). Altogether, 96 cities and 35 rural administrative districts in 6 republics, 8 krais and 30 oblasts were selected. Survey areas were selected from among election wards in urban communities and from the total number of villages in the rural areas in the second stage. The number of areas chosen was determined so that an average of 6-8 respondents would be surveyed in one area. Therefore, one-to-two villages were selected in 4 the rural areas and one-to-two election wards in the urban communities. The exceptions were Moscow and St. Petersburg, with 10 and 5 election wards, respectively. Altogether, the survey covered 171 such areas. In the third stage of the selection, interviewers chose households in their survey areas based on the random route method according to the standard instructions developed by Levada Center specialists. One respondent was chosen in the fourth stage, using the rule of a nearest birthday to the date of an interview within the selected household. In cases of refusal to be interviewed or the absence of the potential respondent, the interviewer made up to three repeat visits. All instances when respondents were unavailable were recorded by interviewers on special route lists. Data weighting. The controlled characteristics of the respondents, such as gender, age and education, were somewhat different from those of the Russian population as a whole. In other words, the share of some age, gender and education groups in the sample was higher than in the general population. Such shifts in mass surveys occur because of refusals to be interviewed and replacement of unavailable respondents and households with no one at home. This is why the survey data were weighted by gender, age and education with controlled distribution of the sample by federal districts and types of communities, so as to bring the characteristics of the respondents more in line with those of the general population. Distribution of controlled groups by gender, age, education in surveyed data, in weighted data and in statistics (%) Gender Gender Age Age 25- Age Age Educ Educ Educ М F 18-24 39 40-54 55+ higher secondary primary Surveyed data 38,89 61,10 12,96 26,86 25,80 34,37 27,72 46,67 25,60 Weighted data 45,24 54,75 14,66 27,07 28,43 29,83 22,52 46,33 31,14 Statistics 45,31 54,71 14,75 26,96 28,39 29,93 22,38 46,50 31,14 Survey organization and conduct. The survey was conducted from June 25 to July 19, 2010, on the following technological principles: a) Respondents were interviewed by specially trained interviewers. b) Instructional materials for briefing interviewers were developed by specialists of the survey organization department of the Levada Center, who also supervised field work and conducted post- field control of conducted interviews by mail. c) Interviews with respondents at every survey point (community) were organized by staff members of regional sociological centers, which are partnered with the Levada Center and have been cooperating with it under contracts on the basis of uniform methods and techniques. The processing department of the Levada Center arranged for merging the data sets received from the regional centers into a single body, verified and cleaned them up and formed the database in the required electronic format. Control over interviewers’ work. The interviewers’ work was controlled over the phone, by repeat visits and partially by mail. About 468 addresses were checked out. The checklist included verification of the interview, the correct selection of the respondent within the household, responses to some of the questions on the questionnaire and the duration of the interview. No deviations were found between the actual interviews and the sample criteria or methodology. 5 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS1 Gender. Males and females are represented among the respondents in virtually equal proportion, just as among the general adult Russian population: 45 percent and 55 percent, respectively. Age. Young people aged 18 to 24 account for 15% of the respondents. The other age groups are represented in roughly equal shares (Figure 1). Men prevail in the younger age group and women among older respondents, which is explained by men’s lower life expectancy as compared to women’s. The men-to- women ratio is virtually equal in all the other age groups (Figure 2). Figure 1. Distribution by age. 35 30 30 28 27 25 20 15 15 10 5 0 18-24 years 25-39 years 40-54 years 55+ years Figure 2. Distribution of respondents by gender and age. 100% 24 80% 35 60% 30 27 40% 28 26 20% 18 12 0% Male Female 18-24 years 25-39 years 40-54 years 55+ years 1 Weighted body of data was used. 6 Education. Most of the respondents have secondary or higher education. Only one out of five has not completed secondary education (Fig. 3). On average, women are somewhat better educated than men (Figure 4). Figure 3. Distribution of respondents by education. 19 22 59 higher and incomplete higher secondary special / vocational-technical below secondary special / vocational-technical Figure 4. Distribution of respondents by gender and education. 100% 19 18 80% 60% 57 61 40% 20% 20 25 0% male female higher and incomplete higher secondary special / vocational-technical below secondary special / vocational-technical Survey geography. A plurality of the respondents reside in urban communities; only one-fourth of them are rural residents (Figure 5). Figure 5. Distribution of respondents by community type. villages 26 towns 26 medium-size cities 20 major cities 18 Moscow & St.Petersburg 10 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 7 The structure of urban residents is heterogeneous in terms of living conditions. One out of ten residents lives in a metropolitan city, Moscow or St. Petersburg; another 18 percent reside in large cities of 500,000 or more residents, usually krai or oblast centers which are the seats of regional authorities and hubs of business activity and which offer a large percentage of quality jobs. Meanwhile, one-half of the urban residents live in medium-sized or small communities, where the living conditions and labor market are markedly worse than those in the oblast/krai centers and where lifestyles, especially in the smaller communities, still are semi-rural/semi-urban. Employment. More than one-half of the respondents are employees or self-employed. Pensioners (age and disability) account for one-fourth of the respondents, the unemployed and homemakers for 14 percent, and students for 3 percent (Figure 6). Figure 6. Employment. 60 57 50 40 30 25 20 10 7 7 3 0 employed retirees homemakers unemployed students The occupational structure of employment is shown on Figure 7. Respondents working in specialist positions that require higher education account for more than one-quarter of the total. Apart from that, one in every ten respondents has a managerial job. One in every five is an office worker performing technical or support functions that do not require higher education, but that usually call for general or specialized secondary education. Respondents doing work other than manual work account for almost two-thirds of the total, while manual laborers make up a little more than one-third of the employed respondents. Figure 7. Occupational structure of employed respondents. 40 37 35 30 28 25 22 20 15 10 10 5 2 0 workers specialists office workers managers servicemen 8 Financial standing. The financial circumstances of respondents (self-identified through a selection of attitudinal statements) are represented on Figure 8. A little more than one-third (38%) believes that they live in poverty. Most of the respondents tend to think that their circumstances are “decent.” Only 4% of respondents report living well and having no financial problems. Figure 8. Self-rating of financial circumstances. 1 3 4 35 57 we live well without any particular financial concerns we live more or less decently we barely make ends meet we live below poverty line undecided Social mood. Most of the respondents are in a good, balanced mood, but one-fourth of them say they feel frustration, anxiety and fear (Figure 9). Figure 9. Social mood. 70 60 60 50 40 30 21 20 13 10 4 2 0 excellent normal, feel tension, feel fear, undecided mood balanced frustration anxiety mood People in the older age groups and rural residents (among which the percentage of the elderly is higher) more often report being in a bad mood, while younger people and residents of metropolitan areas more often characterize their mood as “excellent.” 9 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1. The majority of the Russian population sees Russia as a land of rich natural resources (and for residents of metropolitan areas, a place of rich culture), but with a weak economy and a high poverty level. When assessing the country’s “poverty-wealth” status, survey respondents give lower estimates of the national social capital – the education level and degree of trust among people – than of the Russian economic potential. Estimates of the respondents’ own property status have practically no effect on the perception of Russia as a poor or wealthy country. This attests to the fact that when assessing Russia, people are more guided by generally accepted stereotypes than by the assessment of their own situation. 2. Half the population believes that Russia plays a notable role in international affairs. Russians most often associate their country’s international role with military and political affairs and much less often with international trade, business or cultural exchanges. At the same time, prevailing public opinion is that Russia currently needs to pay more attention to its domestic development problems. This is evidenced by the fact that Russians are more focused on domestic developments and affairs and report relatively low interest in international developments, including aid to poorer nations. 3. The low interest in the country’s role in international aid correlates with Russians being poorly informed of the work of international organizations and different countries, including Russia itself, to provide relief to the world’s poorer countries. Only half of those polled have ever come across any news reports about the efforts of developed countries, Russia included, to help poorer nations overcome poverty and backwardness. Most of those polled in Russia know nothing or have never heard of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals program. Russian television is the main source of information for all population groups. People of the older age groups (those over 40) also get information from the Russian media, while the younger people (between 18 and 39 years of age) more frequently use the Internet. 4. Lack of information goes hand in hand with a fairly weak interest in information about aid to poorer nations: a mere one quarter of the respondents have shown some interest in such information, focusing mostly on which countries get relief and on how it is used. However, half of those polled would like to know more about the Millennium Development Goals program. 5. Respondents with higher education living in large cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg in particular, and who estimate their financial status as being fairly good, show the greatest interest in international affairs and in information about aid to poorer nations. These groups are distinguished from other respondents not only by being better informed about international affairs, but also by the content of their interest and their use of a broader set of information sources. 6. Two factors that largely determine attitudes about Russia’s role as a donor are, on the one hand, 1) public perceptions of Russia as a wealthy country with a weak economy and a high poverty level which nevertheless plays a notable role on the world scene, and 2) conversely, a minimal interest in international affairs and an under-informed population. 7. The majority of the Russian population (three-quarters of those polled) approves of Russia helping poorer nations and believes that it must provide aid. Most Russians agree with the following arguments in favor of giving such aid: a) humanitarian considerations (it is necessary to help victims of natural disasters); b) enhancement of Russia’s influence in the world; c) increasing the number of countries that are friendly to Russia; 10 d) desire to protect itself from threats coming from poorer neighbors because of their unstable social and political situation (“their problems may become ours”); e) promoting Russian business in those countries. At the same time most Russians agree with the following arguments against giving such aid: a) aid will not reach those who need it because of corruption and political instability; b) Russia is not wealthy enough both to give aid to poorer nations and simultaneously tackle its own poverty problems; c) aid to poor nations will not make more countries friendly toward Russia. 8. A majority of respondents said that it is most important that Russian aid goes to nations that have fallen victim to natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.). Former Soviet republics in need of aid came second (selected by 47% of survey respondents). This attitude correlates with the widespread opinion shared by two-thirds of the respondents that Russian aid should go to the country’s neighbors because Russia has much in common with them in terms of history and culture, as distinct from the poorer nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Next in order of perceived importance was aid given to the poorer nations directly neighboring Russia that may pose terrorist threats (44% of respondents). The poorer nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America came in last among the choices of countries to receive Russian aid. 9. Most of those polled in Russia spoke in favor of keeping aid to poorer nations at the current level, while one-quarter to one-third of those polled advocated cutting aid. 10. According to those polled, Russian aid could be most effective in areas such as health care, combating infectious diseases, primary education and the development of industries in those countries. Other areas figured far less frequently in the answers. With respect to types of aid, half of those polled thought that Russia could offer the most effective aid to poorer nations in the form of training skilled personnel (52% were in favor of Russian institutions of higher education enrolling students from those countries) and sending Russian specialists to work in those countries (58%). Financial aid to the poorest nations was the least popular option and received support from only 15% of respondents. To a certain extent, beliefs regarding the most effective types of aid seemed to have survived from the Soviet period, when the Soviet Union helped African and Asian nations to take the road of socialist development, including sending specialists to those countries and training students from those countries at Soviet schools of higher learning. Knowledge of these policies was fairly widespread among the population, not only through the media, but also at the level of everyday life. 11. Those polled were divided in their opinion about the most effective forms of aid. A plurality – 44% – considered it most effective to help poorer nations by taking part in international programs in cooperation with organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, whereas 39% of those polled felt that direct aid to the governments of poorer nations would be more effective. At the same time the overwhelming majority of those polled agreed that when helping poorer nations, Russia should act jointly with other developed countries and international organizations. Even though opinion is divided on this question, respondents, nonetheless, tend to regard Russian involvement in joint programs as the most effective form of aid to poorer nations. This conclusion is consonant with focus group and in-depth interview results. 12. The overwhelming majority of those polled in Russia share the opinion that even when deciding to take part in aiding poorer nations, Russia should look after its own interests first. The most frequently selected aid objectives included those that would benefit Russia, with preference given to political rather than economic objectives. These included winning more friends for Russia (32%), reducing the threat of terrorism (31%), and enhancing Russian influence in the world and raising its prestige (30%). 11 Altruistic reasons for giving aid to poorer nations were selected far less frequently. These included reducing destitution in those countries (23%) and laying the groundwork for sustainable long-term development in those countries (19%). 13. Responses to questions about the value of Russia’s foreign aid programs were inconsistent, contradictory and ranged widely. A cluster analysis of opinions about Russian involvement in aiding poorer nations has shown that about one- third of the population (35%) consistently support foreign aid, while opponents, or skeptics, account for about 20%. Although about half of opponents feel that foreign aid should be kept at current levels, most respondents in this group do not feel it is important for Russia to participate in aid programs and favor cutting aid levels. In order for to shift attitudes of those currently opposed to foreign aid, it is necessary to provide more information about Russia’s role as a donor, to explain Russian objectives and interests in international aid, and to publicize the concrete results of such aid. This information should be provided through television, the press, and the Internet and would have greater impact if it comes from heads of state and famous journalists. 14. Because of low awareness of Russia’s participation in international aid/development, it is difficult to assess public perceptions of foreign aid. However, the survey data point toward generally positive attitudes toward Russian aid to developing or impoverished nations. This attitude is not differentiated to any significant extent socially or demographically (e.g., by age groups, education level, place of residence or occupational status). Whether positive or negative, public attitudes toward foreign aid depends on the general culture, world view (e.g., that helping the needy is the “right” thing to do), openness to the outside world and relative levels of optimism/pessimism, rather than on social or demographic characteristics. 12 ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA RUSSIA’S IMAGE IN PUBLIC OPINION Assessments of the current economic situation. Most of the respondents think Russia’s current economy is not in good shape. About one-half of them (46%) see the economy as bad or somewhat bad, a slightly smaller share (40%) as average, and only one out of ten say the economy is good. Assessments of how well the government is handling the consequences of the economic crisis are not high either. Only 18% of the respondents see the government’s performance as successful, while the views of it as unsuccessful or average are distributed in roughly equal proportion (42% each). At the same time, expectations of changes in Russia’s economic situation in the next year are relatively optimistic. For example, more than one-half of the respondents (57%) expect the economic situation to improve rather than worsen, while only about a quarter (24%) thinks it will deteriorate. One of five respondents is undecided. These data do not differ significantly by socio-demographic groups or types of community; it can be noted only that, on average, residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg have a more positive view of the economic situation and the government’s efforts to overcome the crisis. However, their overall expectations do not differ from those of the population as a whole. Assessments of poverty. In the view of three-fourths of the respondents, one-half or more of Russians live in poverty, while only 15% believe that less than one-half of the population is poor. At the same time the respondents’ assessments of their own financial circumstances show a more favorable picture: almost two- thirds think they are not poor, and only one-third of the respondents (35%) characterize their situation as poverty (“barely making ends meet”), while 3% say they “live below the poverty line.” This contradiction is known in public opinion sociology as the funnel effect. Research has shown that Russians tend to have a more negative view of circumstances in the country as a whole than that of their place of residence, and they also assess their own financial circumstances as being better than the general financial status throughout Russia. The results of this survey were consistent with this phenomenon. Is Russia a wealthy or a poor nation? Of those polled, 36% say that Russia is a wealthy nation, while 14% think that it is poor. Among the residents of the metropolitan areas, 17% said that they think of Russia as a wealthy country. However, the prevailing opinion is that Russia is wealthy in some ways and poor in others (48%). Russians associate their country’s wealth mostly with its rich natural resources and large territory (Fig. 10). Only 18% of the respondents relate Russia’s wealth to its rich culture. Notably, close to one-half of the respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg, the homes of major museums, theaters and libraries, cited Russia’s cultural riches. The country’s social capital, including high educational standards and the degree of trust among people, figures in very few responses (Figure 10). 13 Figure 10. Distribution of responses to the question “What do you think is the most valid characteristic of Russia being like a wealthy nation?” (% of respondents) rich natural resources 86 large territory 61 cultural wealth (literature, music, ballet, painting) 18 high educational standards 6 developed economy, including industry 6 trust and mutual assistance among people 2 undecided 1 decent living standards of most of the population 1 Russians associate their country’s being poor most often with the poverty of a large segment of the population, a weak economy, backward infrastructure and low health care standards. “Degradation of culture” and “low level of trust and mutual assistance among people” account for 6-7 percent of the responses (Figure 11). Figure 11. Distribution of responses to the question “What do you think is the most valid characteristic of Russia being like a poor nation?” (% of respondents) poverty of a large segment of the population 50 weak economy and backward industry 42 poor roads and decrepit housing 27 low health care and educational services standards 19 short life expectancy 12 decline of culture 8 low level of trust and mutual assistance among 6 people poor environmental condition 6 undecided 3 14 Young people under 24 years of age are more likely to associate Russia’s poverty with the poor condition of the environment (27% versus the average 16%), while residents of the metropolitan areas cite low life expectancy (31% versus 12% on average). Self-assessments of financial circumstances have virtually no effect on perceptions of Russia as a poor or wealthy nation. Those who think of themselves as poor are slightly more likely to view Russia as a poor rather than a wealthy country (16% versus 10% of those who live “decently”). But these differences are not significant, which indicates that people’s perceptions of Russia follow generally accepted stereotypes rather than appreciation of their own situation. Therefore, most Russians see their country as a land of rich natural resources (and residents of the metropolitan areas, as a land of rich culture), but a weak economy and impoverished population. Assessments of the country’s social capital, such as educational levels and the degree of trust among people, are used far less frequently in characterizing the nation’s “wealth-poverty” than assessments of its economic potential. Russia’s role in international affairs. 45% of respondents believe that Russia has little-to-no influence on international affairs, while 50% says its influence is significant or somewhat significant. Russians more often link this influence to military and political international affairs and far less to international trade, business and cultural exchanges. Public opinion similarly often relates Russia’s international influence to aid to poorer nations (Fig. 12). However, residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg far less frequently named “aid to poorer nations” as the sphere where Russia had a notable influence (26% versus the average 41%). These residents more often pointed to “international cultural exchanges” as the sphere where Russia, in their view, had the most impact (40% compared to 24% on average). Figure. 12. Distribution of responses to the question “In what areas of international affairs does Russia have the most influence?” (the responses add up to more than 100 percent because more than one response could be given) in combating terrorism 44 in resolving international conflicts 44 in reducing nuclear weapons 42 in providing economic aid to poorer nations 41 in fighting the spread of drugs 26 in trade and international business 24 in international cultural exchange 24 undecided 6 The prevailing public opinion is that currently it is more important for Russia to grapple with it domestic problems than to play an active role in international affairs. 15 This finding shows that Russians are more focused on affairs and developments within the country, hence their relatively low interest in international affairs, including problems of international aid to poorer nations. To a notable extent, this situation is the result of Russians’ low awareness of the efforts of international organizations and different countries, including Russia, to reduce extreme destitution and backwardness in the poorer nations of the world. 16 INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC AWARENESS Interest in international affairs is low among all the population groups: one-fourth (23%) of the respondents have no interest whatsoever in information pertaining to international affairs, while about one-half of the respondents (47%) are largely uninterested. 23% percent show weak interest, and only 7% say that they are strongly interested in international developments. The groups least interested in international affairs are women, young people (aged 18 to 24), people with lower than a secondary education and rural residents. The groups more interested in the topic include men, people in the middle age group (40 to 54), people with higher education and urban residents. With respect to specific areas of international affairs, respondents are most interested in Russia’s relationships with other countries, international political developments and foreign armed conflicts (Figure 13), with economic and cultural developments attracting less interest. Figure 13. Distribution of responses to the question “What information about international affairs is of particular interest to you?” (% of respondents) 4 14 5 29 37 12 8 international political developments foreign armed conflicts international cultural events Russia’s relations with other countries Russia’s economic aid to poorer nations trade, international business other not interested in information about international affairs On average, respondents show most interest in Russia’s relations with FSU republics, European countries and the US (Figure 14). Keen interest in FSU republics is of more likely of respondents aged 55 or more (79%), those with less than secondary education (70%), and residents of medium-sized cities (83%). Such individuals retain interest in the affairs of those countries linked to the Soviet past. However, younger people, residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg and wealthier people are more interested in Russia’s relations with European nations and the US. Figure 14. Distribution of responses to the question “Relations with what countries are of most interest to you?” (% of respondents). Any number of answers could be given. 17 Former Soviet 63 countries European countries 45 USA 43 China, India and other 22 Asian countries African countries 6 other countries 2 undecided 2 Public awareness of Russia’s aid to poorer nations. The overwhelming majority of respondents (91%) are aware of Russia’s humanitarian relief in countries badly hit by natural disasters. But only one-half of the respondents (53%) are familiar with news reports (e.g., articles, media or Internet debates or TV programs) about the efforts of developed countries, including Russia, to help the poorer nations cope with poverty and backwardness. Urban respondents (59%) and respondents with higher education (60%) are more informed. The key sources of information about aid to poorer nations by Russia and other developed countries are Russian TV programs, reports in the Russian press and the Internet (Fig. 15). Figure 15. Distribution of responses to the question “What are your most frequent sources of such information?” (% of respondents, with not more than two responses to be given). Russian TV programs 85 reports in Russian press 24 Internet 16 Russian radio broadcasts 9 discussions with friends and coworkers 5 foreign TV programs 3 Russian TV is the main source of information for all the groups of respondents. Respondent segments differ in their use of information sources besides TV. For example, older respondents (above 40) learn about aid to poorer and developing nations from the Russian press more often than others (31%), while younger respondents (18-24 and 25-39) are more likely to rely on the Internet (35% and 22%, respectively). On average, respondents show a rather limited interest in information about aid to poorer and developing nations per se. For example, only one-quarter of respondents are interested in such information; half of the 18 respondents (53%) have virtually no interest in it (“somewhat uninterested”); while one in five (22 percent) have no interest in it at all. Figure 16. Distribution of responses to the question “What information about Russia’s aid to poorer and developing countries is of the most interest to you?” (% of respondents, any number of responses could be chosen). what is the concrete purpose of this aid 51 how the recipient countries use this aid 42 what countries receive humanitarian relief and 40 developmental aid type and scope of aid provided by Russia 36 what benefits Russia gets by aiding poorer 25 nations about Russia’s participation in international aid 16 programs about Russia’s cooperation with international 13 organizations, such as World Bank, UN, etc undecided 5 Most of the respondents (70%) do not know about and have not heard anything about the UN Millennium Development Goals Program. About one-quarter has heard something about it but do not know the details, and only 7% say they know about it. People with higher education, as well as residents of Moscow or St. Petersburg, are more likely to have heard about the program than rural respondents or respondents with lower than secondary education. Along awareness levels about the UN program, the survey also asked about respondents’ interest in learning more about it. Overall, half of the respondents (53%) would like to learn more about the Millennium Development Goals Program. A larger percentage of people with higher education (61%), along with residents of Moscow or St. Petersburg (65%) reported interest in learning more about the program. Most respondents would like to hear which specific countries receive aid from Russia, and in what form. Further, they stated a preference to hear this information from the RF president, the RF prime minister, and from journalists and specialists in international affairs (Figure 17). Figure 17. Distribution of responses to the question “Would you like influential and prestigious Russians to clarify which of the poorer nations receive and what form of aid from Russia?” (% of respondents, not more than three answers could be selected). 19 RF President 49 RF Prime Minister 30 I do not need clarifications/I am indifferent to 23 them journalists, specialists in international affairs 12 head of region/republic or city/district I live in 8 chief clergyman (Patriarch of Russia/Chief of 6 the Council of Muftis/Chief Rabbi) undecided 5 leader of the political party I support 2 popular performers, famous athletes 1 other 1 Credibility of information sources. Along with questions about their awareness of international affairs and aid to poorer nations, respondents were asked to state to what extent they trust or mistrust different information sources. Answers to this question imply a link between the use of specific information sources and trust in them (Figure 18). Figure 18. Distribution of responses to the question “To what extent do you trust…” 100% 7 3 8 11 90% 17 20 33 36 80% 29 31 22 21 70% 60% 50% 24 39 40% 77 64 63 67 30% 62 20% 40 29 10% 0% Russian national Russian local Russian TV foreign TV Russian radio Internet information from newspapers and newspapers and stations relatives and magazines magazines friends undecided mistrust trust Russian television enjoys the most trust (and popularity) among the respondents: 77% voiced trust in it, with only respondents with higher education showing slightly less trust (71%). 20 Second highest in terms of trust are Russian centrally published newspapers, magazines and “information from friends and relatives,” with Russian radio stations and local newspapers and magazines ranking almost as high. Altogether, 40% of the respondents trust the Internet, with foreign TV being viewed the most skeptically. Respondents found it particularly hard to assess those sources because they use them less frequently. For example, respondents in the 55+ age group found it hard to assess their degree of trust in foreign TV (42% “undecided”) and the Internet (60% “undecided”). These information sources are notably more credible with respondents under age 24 (37% “trust” foreign TV and 55% ”trust” the Internet), respondents with higher education (35% and 58%, respectively) and residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg (43% and 62%, respectively). The conclusion to be reached is that Russians’ low interest in international affairs and limited knowledge about the country’s aid to poorer nations is coupled with their poor awareness of these issues. Respondents with higher education, those residing in major cities, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, and those who consider themselves financially well-off show the most interest in international affairs and aid to poorer nations. 21 ATTITUDE TO RUSSIA’S AID TO POORER NATIONS Degree of support. A large majority of Russians (83%) believes that Russia does offer help to poorer nations, including the CIS countries, and they generally favor this participation in helping those nations overcome poverty and backwardness. Altogether, three-fourths of the respondents approve of Russia’s aid contributions and believe to varying degrees that it is important for Russia to participate with other developed countries in the international aid programs of the UN and the World Bank. (Figure 19). Figure 19. Distribution of responses to the question “Overall, do you approve of Russia’s aid to the poorer countries of the world?” (% of respondents) 5 3 yes 17 no I am indifferent to whether such aid is provided or not undecided 75 72% of respondents agree that Russia must contribute to aid programs for the poorer nations in order to boost her influence on the world stage. (Figure 20). Figure 20. Distribution of responses to the question “To what extent do you agree that Russia should participate in international aid programs for poorer nations in order to increase her influence on the world stage?” (% of respondents) 8 20 72 agree disagree undecided Public opinion views the moral aspect of providing of aid as important. The large majority of the respondents (77%) agree that active participation in programs of aid to poorer nations is a characteristic of a modern developed country. Moreover, about two-thirds of respondents believe that developed countries are morally responsible for reducing extreme poverty in impoverished nations. Residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg are less likely to say they believe in the moral imperative of aid to poorer nations: half of them (52%) believe that the developed countries should be morally responsible for reducing world poverty, while 43% (versus 31%, on average) are of the opposite view. Who to help: public opinion priorities. Most Russians think that their country, while participating in aid programs, is not a major donor country. In their view, the largest donors are developed nations, such as the Netherlands, the US and Japan. Russia was mentioned by just a small percent of the respondents. 22 Nevertheless, 41 percent of them believe that Russia plays a notable role in international affairs related to aid to poorer nations. Two-thirds of participants in the study view Russia’s topmost priority for international aid to be for those countries which have been hit by natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.). Second most important in the respondents’ view is aid for FSU countries in need (47% of the respondents). This position is in line with the common view shared by two-thirds of the respondents that Russian aid should go to the country’s neighbors because they, unlike countries of Africa and Latin America, have much in common with Russia in terms of history and culture. Third in terms of perceived priority is aid for Russia’s poorer neighbors where there is a potential threat of terrorism (44% of the respondents). The poorer countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America were considered the lowest priority for Russian aid. (Table 1). Table 1. Distribution of responses to the question “What countries should Russia aid…?” % of respondents First priority * - countries badly hit by natural disasters 64 Second priority * - poorer FSU countries 47 Third priority 44 - poorer neighbors of Russia that could pose a terrorist threat - poorer countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America 23 * positions receiving the largest number of responses are indicated Scope of aid. Most respondents are in favor of maintaining the present scope of aid to poorer nations, while one-fourth to one-third of them want a reduction in that aid (Figure 21). This finding is not surprising given the view of two-thirds of respondents that Russia is unable to help others while simultaneously raising the living standards at home and the belief of 80% of respondents that one-half or more of the population in Russia is poor. Figure 21. Distribution of responses to the question “What do you think should be the scope of Russia’s aid to …” (% of respondents) countries hit by natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.)? 9 8 26 larger than now smaller than now same as now undecided 57 23 poorer FSU countries? 11 7 larger than now 32 smaller than now same as now undecided 50 countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia? 13 7 larger than now 36 smaller than now same as now undecided 45 Spheres and types of aid to poorer nations. As for those areas of life in poorer countries in which Russia could offer particularly effective aid, respondents pointed primarily to health care, primary education and the construction of industrial facilities within those countries. Other spheres were mentioned far less frequently. (Figure 22). Figure 22. Distribution of responses to the question “In what spheres of life could Russia offer particularly effective aide to poorer nations?” (% of respondents) health aid, control of infectious diseases 67 broadening access to primary education 25 development of industrial facilities within the countries 19 infrastructure development 16 agriculture development 14 development of national universities 8 broadening access to new technology, such as mobile 6 communications environmental protection 6 undecided 5 24 Generally, there are no notable differences in the views of various demographic groups. However, residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg and other more developed metropolitan areas, as well as more affluent respondents, were more likely to select economic areas, such as the construction of industrial facilities (32%), infrastructure development (28%) and development of agriculture (20%). As for the types of aid, one-half of respondents believe that Russia can be particularly effective in helping poorer nations by training skilled personnel (teaching students from those countries at Russian institutions of higher learning) and by sending Russian specialists to work in those countries. Half as many support subsidized food and equipment supplies and the construction of roads, hospitals and schools by Russian companies. Cash aid is the least appealing, with just 15% of respondents selecting it (Figure 23). Figure 23. Distribution of responses to the question “What types of aid do you think Russia could offer to poorer nations?” (% of respondents) sending Russian specialists (engineers, doctors, 58 teachers) to work in poorer countries training students from poorer countries at Russian 52 institutions of higher learning supplies of food and equipment at subsidized 30 prices (below world market value) construction of roads, hospitals and schools by 25 Russian specialists (companies) cash aid to governments of such countries 15 undecided 5 There are no marked differences between the perceptions of various demographic groups regarding possible types of aid to poorer nations. It can only be noted that residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg specified more often than average the training of students from those countries in Russian institutions of higher learning (64% versus 52%), which is understandable given that the concentration of universities and experience of training foreign students in those cities is higher than elsewhere in Russia. In our view, the current perceptions of the most effective types of aid have survived to some extent from the Soviet period, when the Soviet Union helped countries of Africa and Asia embark on the road of socialist development, in particular, by exporting Soviet specialists and training students from those countries in Soviet institutions of higher learning. This information was fairly widespread among the population, not only though the mass media, but also through common discourse. Forms of aid. Views of the most effective forms of aid are divided. A plurality of respondents believe that the most efficient way of helping poorer nations is by participating in international aid programs in cooperation with organizations such as the World Bank and the UN, while a smaller percentage say that direct aid to the governments of poorer nations is more effective. One of six respondents is undecided (Figure 24). 25 Figure 24. Distribution of responses to the question “In what cases is aid to poorer nations the most efficient?” (% of respondents) 17 directly to governments of such countries 39 through international programs in cooperation with organizations such as World Bank, UN undecided 44 Residents of the two capitals and major cities were more likely to cite participation in international programs as the most efficient form of aid, while residents of towns and villages tended to support direct aid to the governments of the countries concerned. At the same time, most of the respondents (84%) agreed that in aiding the poorer nations, Russia should work jointly with other countries and international organizations because that could yield better results. These contradictory findings indicate that there is no solid opinion of this matter and that the Russians predominantly tend to view Russia’s participation in joint programs as a more efficient form of aid to poorer nations. Purposes of aid to poorer nations. Overall, a large majority of respondents (88%) agree that Russia should proceed primarily from her own interests in making decisions on participating in aid programs. This is consistent with attitudes that the most important goals of an aid program are those whose achievement would benefit Russia, especially politically. Respondents place roughly equal importance on the goals of winning more friends for Russia, reducing the threat of terrorism, and enhancing Russia’s prestige in the world. A quarter of respondents supported the economic objective of securing favorable conditions for the entry of Russian goods and businesses into the markets of the recipient countries. The more altruistic goals – reducing extreme poverty in those countries and laying the foundations for their long-term sustainable development – were least likely to be mentioned. (Figure 25). Young people under 24, people with higher education, and residents of the two capitals named economic objectives (promoting Russian goods and businesses) as frequently as political ones. Yet young people cited less frequently goals related to creating conditions for the sustainable development of poorer nations (15% in that age group as compared to the average 19%), and residents of the two capitals were less like to select goals associated with reducing extreme poverty in those countries (10% of the respondents in the two capitals versus 23% on average). Figure 25. Distribution of responses to the question “Russia may have different objectives in aiding poorer nations. Which of the following objectives would you characterize as the more important?” (% of respondents) 26 winning more friends for Russia 32 reducing the threat of terrorism and spread of drugs 31 that is posed by Russia’s neighbors enhancing Russia’s influence and raising her prestige 30 in the world securing favorable conditions for entry of Russian goods and businesses to the markets of such 25 countries reducing extreme poverty and destitution in such 23 countries creating the foundations for sustainable development 19 of poorer countries 27 TYPES OF RESPONDENTS BY ATTITUDE TO AID TO POORER NATIONS To gauge levels of public sentiment either in favor of or against Russia’s aid to poorer nations, respondents were given eleven statements reflecting different attitudes to Russia’s contribution to such aid and were asked to agree or disagree with each statement. Out of these, eight reflected a positive and three a somewhat negative attitude towards Russian aid policies. An analysis of responses concerning agreement or disagreement with the suggested views demonstrates that public opinion of Russian aid to poorer nations is mixed. (Tables 3 and 4). While most Russians polled held positive views of aid to poorer nations, others did not. But most important, agreement with both positive and negative views is rather widespread. For example, while three-fourths of respondents approve of Russia’s aid to poor nations, 71% agree that this aid has little effect. Altogether, two-thirds of those polled believe that Russia is not wealthy enough to simultaneously help poorer nations while also improving standards of living at home. In addition, 40% of respondents think that Russia’s aid to poorer nations will not help her win more friends. No specific social or demographic groups could be identified that are more likely than others to hold “self-contradictory” attitudes about Russian aid. This shows that mixed opinions are widespread in all the social and demographic groups. That is why a cluster analysis based on agreements or disagreements with the 11 different attitudinal statements about Russian foreign aid, as mentioned above, has been carried out. The intention of this analysis is to establish, if possible, what segment of the population is consistent in its opinion of the need for Russia to contribute to such aid and what segment of the population is of the opposite view. In addition, data reflecting the respondents’ perceptions of Russia as a poor or wealthy country, the degree of her influence on international affairs and the degree of the respondents’ interest in international affairs have all been used in the analysis. (Tables 5, 6 and 7). Based on these data, altogether 3 types of respondents with different attitudinal profiles can be identified. For the purpose of this report, they can be characterized as “consistent proponents,” “contradictory proponents” and “skeptics.” (Table 2). Table 2. Types of respondents by attitude to Russia’s participation in aid to the poorer nations Types Number % 1. Skeptics 293 20 2. Contradictory proponents 681 45 3. Consistent proponents 529 35 All respondents 1,503 100 The questions used in the analysis and the distribution of responses by aggregates and by type are presented in tables 5-8. The “consistent proponents” account for one-third of Russians polled (35%). This group is characterized by a pronounced positive attitude toward various aspects of Russia’s participation in aid to poorer nations and an absence of virtually any inconsistency in these attitudes. Virtually all the representatives of this segment (93%) approve of Russia’s aid to poorer nations and three-fourths of them believe it important for Russian to participate in international aid programs together with other developed countries. Altogether, two-thirds of respondents of this type share the view that developed countries should be morally responsible for reducing world poverty levels. Most of them think that the amounts of aid to poorer nations should remain at today’s level. However, the share of those who are in favor of increased aid is higher among the “proponents” (10-14% versus the average 6%) than in other groups, although not by much. 28 Even with their largely positive attitude to supporting Russian aid for poorer nations, respondents of this type show little interest in information about this aspect of Russia’s activities. One out of ten has no interest whatsoever in such information, and about as many (10%) say they have very little interest in it. About one- half (48%) reported a lack of interest, to one extent or another, while one-third have displayed moderate interest. However, the level of interest in such information among this group is notably higher than the average for the respondents in the other two groups. Respondents of this type are characterized by an overall positive attitude. Most of them (81%) characterize their mood as excellent or normal. The “proponents” rate Russia’s economic situation more highly than the average for all the respondents (5.1 versus 4.6 on the ten-point scale) and give better marks to the government. More than one-half of the respondents of this type (59%) consider Russia a wealthy country and only 7% think it is poor. Altogether two-thirds of the “consistent proponents” believe they lead “more or less decent lives.” The share of people in the 40-54 years age group (that is, those who were 18-22 years old in the age of Perestroika and Glasnost) is slightly higher in that group than in the others, but the percentage of older people (55 years and older) is lower. The share of people with higher and secondary education, skilled workers, businessmen and residents of large cities is also slightly higher. The “skeptics” are in the minority among Russian respondents – about 20% percent. As compared with the proponents, they are far more critical of Russia’s participation in aid to poorer nations. Respondents without a defined position, who answered “don’t know” or “hard to say” to questions, have also been included in this group. As with the “consistent proponents,” these respondents are virtually unwavering in their attitudes. They are consistently negative toward various aspects of aid to poorer nations. One-half of such respondents believe that participation in international aid programs is not important for Russia, while only one-third of them think it important. A little less than half of them (43%) hold that developed countries should not be morally responsible for reducing world poverty levels, while 19% have no opinion in this regard. And although half of respondents from this group approve of Russia’s aid to poorer nations, the share of those who approve in this group is the lowest compared with the others, both on average and on other types (49% versus 76% on average and versus 93% among the “proponents”). About as many – 45% of the respondents – disapprove of Russia’s aid to poorer nations or are indifferent. One-half of respondents of this type are in favor of reducing aid to the poorer countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and to the poorer CIS countries (except for humanitarian relief). Three-fourths of the “skeptics” show a lack of interest, to one extent or another, in information about international affairs, and even more of them –86% of the respondents –, have no interest in information about Russia’s aid to poorer nations. The “skeptics” are generally characterized by more negative attitudes. This group has a higher share of those who characterize their mood as “being under stress” and “having fears and anxiety” (33% versus 25% for the “consistent proponents”). The “skeptics” have a poorer view of Russia’s economic situation and the government’s work than do the “consistent proponents.” The “skeptics” rate the economic situation in Russia at 4.5 points on the 10-point scale versus the proponents’ rating of 5.1 points, and they rate the government’s performance at 4.6 points versus 5.3 points, respectively. Only 20% of respondents of this type think Russia a wealthy country, which is 1.5 times less than the average for all respondents and 3 times less than that for the “consistent proponents.” About as many respondents in this group (23%) consider Russia a poor country. Respondents from this group have a generally poorer view of their own living standards: 46% of them believe that they barely make ends meet or live below the poverty line (versus 32% among the “proponents”). 29 There are more women than men among the “skeptics” (59% versus 50% on average among all the respondents). The percentages of people older than 55 years, workers, and those with sub-secondary education are higher. The share of residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg is somewhat higher (16% versus 6% among the “proponents” and 11% on average). The representation of rural residents is similar to that in the other groups. The “contradictory proponents” represent a particularly large percentage of respondents at about 45%. Like the “consistent proponents,” they have primarily positive views of Russia’s participation in aiding poorer nations. However, compared with the “consistent proponents,” a smaller share of this group agrees with positive attitude statements concerning aid to poorer nations, while the percentage of those who agree with negative attitudes is higher. The views of these respondents vary, ranging from one side of the question to its opposite. In many respects this type of inconsistency of opinion is closer to the average for the entire group of the respondents than are the attitudes of the other two segments, and can therefore be characterized as “the mean.” The opinion of the respondents of this type regarding the importance for Russia to participate in international aid programs is closer to that of the “skeptics” rather than the “consistent proponents”: one half of them (49%) believe that these types of programs are important to Russia, while about as many (48%) think they are unimportant. At the same time more than one half of the respondents of this type (57%) hold that developed countries should take moral responsibility for reducing world poverty levels, while only a little more than one-third of them (37%) are of the opposite opinion. The share of those who approve of Russia’s aid to the world’s poorest nations is about the same as for the total number of the respondents, amounting to 73%; this figure is lower than that for the “consistent proponents” but higher than in the case of the “skeptics.” Still, there are more respondents in this group who favor cutting economic aid to Asian and African countries (46%) as compared to those advocating the same level of aid (38%). However, the number of supporters of maintaining aid levels to the poorer CIS countries is higher (48%) than that of opponents of this course. The overall attitude of the respondents from this group is close to that prevailing in the general public: 70% of the respondents of this type characterize their mood as excellent or normal (versus the average 73% for all the respondents). Their perception of Russia is closer to that of the “skeptics” than that of the “consistent proponents.” One quarter of the respondents in this group believe Russia to be a wealthy country, which is below the average for the total number of respondents (36%), while more than one half of them (58%) think it poor in some respects and wealthy in others (averaging 48%). These respondents’ views of their own living standards are close to the average for the total number of respondents. Most of them (60% versus 61% on average) assess their living standards as “living more or less decently,” while a lower share (39% versus 38% on average) as “living below the poverty level.” The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents of this type are close to the average characteristics of the total number of respondents. The typological analysis of the data demonstrates that, while the public is poorly informed of and shows little interest in international affairs, a generally favorable attitude to Russia’s participation in aid to poorer nations prevails among Russians. However, the consistent proponents of such aid accounts for only about one-third of the population. A positive attitude is mixed with contradictory views among almost one half of the population. Skeptical attitudes to Russia having the capacity and the imperative to be a donor country are also found among the public, but they are not dominant: they are shared by one out of five among the adult population. The analysis has also demonstrated that the types of respondents have no clear-cut social or demographic 30 characteristics. In other words, each type of attitude toward Russia’s role as a donor country are found in all the social, demographic and settlement groups of the population. 31 Table 3. To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements about Russia’s aid to the poorer nations (% of respondents). Aid to poorer nations is inefficient because it will not reach the needy because of political instability and corruption All respondents Skeptics Contradictory Consistent proponents proponents Agree 70 61 82 61 Disagree 22 20 14 33 Undecided 8 19 4 6 Russia should participate in international programs of aid to poorer nations in order to enhance her influence in the global world Agree 72 34 71 94 Disagree 20 33 26 5 Undecided 8 33 3 1 By improving living conditions in poorer countries on her borders, Russia will help reduce immigration into her territory Agree 66 32 69 82 Disagree 27 44 29 14 Undecided 7 24 2 4 Russian aid should target its neighbors because the country has much in common in terms of history and culture with them, but not with countries of Africa and Latin America Agree 69 30 73 86 Disagree 22 35 24 12 Undecided 9 35 3 2 Russia should primarily help poor neighbors, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, because instability in those countries poses a threat to Russia Agree 71 40 79 79 Disagree 24 37 21 20 Undecided 5 23 0 1 Russia should help poorer countries to help advance Russian businesses there and expand markets for its goods Agree 73 28 80 89 Disagree 17 31 18 9 Undecided 10 41 2 2 Russia should help poorer countries regardless of their geographic situation Agree 53 22 51 72 Disagree 35 38 43 25 Undecided 12 41 6 4 32 Table 4. Which of the statements is closer to your point of view? (% of respondents). All Skeptics Contradictory Consistent respondents proponents proponents Russia is a sufficiently wealthy country to help poorer nations and raise the living standards at 30 8 4 74 home simultaneously Russia is not wealthy enough to help poorer nations and raise the living standards at home 65 82 89 26 simultaneously Undecided 5 10 7 0 By helping poorer countries, 50 24 31 88 Russia wins more friends Aid to poorer countries will not win Russia more friends 40 53 56 11 Undecided 10 23 13 1 Table 5. Opinions of whether Russia is a wealthy country differ: some say that she is more like a wealthy country, while others argue that she is more like a poor one. Still others hold that she is wealthy in some ways and poor in others. What is your personal opinion? (% of respondents). All respondents Skeptics Contradictory Consistent proponents proponents Russia is more like a 36 20 25 59 wealthy country Russia is more like a 14 23 15 7 poor country Russia is a wealthy country in some ways and a poor country in 48 51 58 33 others Undecided 2 6 2 1 33 Table 6. To what extent are you interested in international affairs and in Russia’s relations with other countries? Please rate your interest on a ten-point scale, with 1 indicating no interest at all and 10 very keen interest (% of the respondents). All respondents Skeptics Contradictory Consistent proponents proponents No interest at all (1+2) 23 30 26 15 More likely not interested 47 47 51 41 (3+4+5) More likely interested 22 19 18 30 (6+7+8) Keenly interested (9+10) 7 2 5 13 Undecided 1 1 1 1 Table 7. What influence do you think Russia is exerting on international affairs? Please rate its influence on a ten-point scale, with 1 indicating no influence at all and 10 very noticeable influence (% of respondents). All Skeptics Contradictory Consistent respondents proponents proponents No influence at all (1+2) 9 9 13 3 More likely no influence 36 32 47 24 (3+4+5) More likely some 37 34 31 47 influence (6+7+8) Very noticeable influence 12 10 6 21 (9+10) Undecided 5 15 2 4 34 CONCLUSIONS The overwhelming majority of Russians support their country’s aid to countries hit by natural disasters. As for the poorer nations of the world, most Russians approve of their country’s aid to such countries and agree that Russia’s status in the world makes it imperative for her to participate in international aid programs. At the same time, most Russians believe that Russia is not wealthy enough to expand such aid because of the more pressing need to focus on improving the living standards of its own population. However, only about one-fifth of those polled have a mostly negative attitude toward Russia’s participation in such programs. As for foreign aid recipients, the public prioritizes aid to the poorer CIS nations, and only after them, to Asian and African countries. Support for aid is rather abstract because the public is poorly informed of Russia’s international aid activities: about one half of the respondents have not heard anything about the country’s participation in programs of aid to poorer nations, including the UN Millennium Development Goals program. Therefore, at this point there is no solid base for shaping a solid public opinion. The positive attitude of most of the survey respondents can be characterized as a favorable mood. These attitudes are not determined in any significant way by social and demographic groups (e.g., by age, education level, residence or occupation). The prevalence of negative or positive attitudes at a time of scant information and weak interest in international affairs, including Russia’s participation in aid to poorer nations, is more likely explained by the general cultural level, world outlook (with aid to the needy being seen as an approved behavior), openness to the outside world, and overall public sentiments, rather than to social and demographic characteristics. Support for the positive view of Russia’s participation in international aid programs can be secured and negative attitudes to it mitigated not so much through influencing certain groups of the population but rather, first, by better informing the public about Russia’s activities in this sphere and, second, by reducing isolationism and orientation exclusively to domestic affairs and the spread of altruistic ideas in Russian society. The mass media could contribute to fostering such attitudes with programs such as “Russia as a Donor Country,” in particular, with the participation of top national leaders and influential journalists, by better informing the public, and by promoting more informed public support for this sphere of Russia’s international activities.