Page 1 PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID) APPRAISAL STAGE Report No.: 48748 Project Name Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project Region AFRICA Sector Social Development Project ID P113506 Borrower(s) GOVERNMENT OF BURUNDI Implementing Agency National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Environment Category [ ] A [X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined) Date PID Prepared May 14, 2009 Estimated Date of Appraisal Authorization February 2, 2009 Estimated Date of Board Approval June 16, 2009 1. Country and Sector Background Since the early 1990s, the Great Lakes region has been embroiled in a series of closely interlinked conflicts. In Burundi, the most recent period of violence started in 1993, following the assassination of the democratically-elected President Melchior Ndadaye during a coup attempt. A first diplomatic breakthrough occurred on August 28, 2000 when 19 Burundian parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The agreement stipulated a 36- month transition period, during which first a power-sharing transitional government headed by Page 2 President Pierre Buyoya was inaugurated, and then handed over to Vice-president Domitien Ndayizeye on April 30, 2003. Two major armed political parties and movements (APPMs), the Conseil National Pour la Defense de la Démocratie—Forces de la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Forces Nationales de la Libération—Palipehutu (FNL-P) were absent from the Arusha process and continued their armed struggle against the government. A comprehensive cease-fire agreement between the Government of Burundi (GoB) and a portion of the CNDD-FDD (led by Pierre Nkurunziza) was finally signed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, on November 16, 2003. The leadership of this group was subsequently integrated into the government and democratic elections were held in 2005 following the successful conclusion of the political transition process, resulting in the election of President Pierre Nkurunziza. The overall policy framework for Demobilization and Reintegration (D&R) in Burundi is provided by the Arusha Agreement of August 2000 and the comprehensive cease-fire agreement of November 16, 2003. They detail the responsibilities and attributes such as ethnic composition of administrative institutions, including the role of the army and national police force. The integration of combatants of all armed parties into new security and defense forces is a key provision of the Arusha Agreement. The agreement also makes reference to the need to demobilize and reintegrate former combatants who are not to remain with the new defense and security forces. Recent steps to implement the 2006 cease fire agreement by the GoB and the FNL, the last remaining rebel group, are cause for cautious optimism. FNL-Palipehutu formally changed its name to FNL (a prerequisite for potential registration as a political party since according to the Constitution the name of a political party can not refer to ethnicity), agreement was reach for the GoB to set aside 33 posts for members of the FNL to promote political integration, and 247 political prisoners from the FNL were released. Nearly all social indicators sharply deteriorated as a result of the civil war, and are now among the worst in the world. Burundi ranks 167 out of 177 countries in the 2007/2008 Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The wars in Burundi have caused poverty to nearly double and the number of people below the poverty threshold increased from 35 percent in 1993 to 68 percent in 2002. According to a 2006 survey, an estimated 67 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and many live in extreme poverty. The Gini coefficient is estimated at 0.38, reflecting that the main problem is widespread poverty rather than inequality. Poverty is deeper and more pervasive in rural areas, and substantial disparity exists between regions. Almost 97 percent of Burundi’s poor live in rural areas, which have a poverty incidence of 69 percent, compared to 34 percent in urban areas. Urban Bujumbura has the lowest poverty incidence (29 percent), while in provinces it ranges from 57 percent in Bururi to 82 percent in Kirundo, which was the leading supplier of food staples prior to the civil war. 2. Objectives The objective of the Project is to support the efforts of the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members of the National Liberation Forces and the National Liberation Forces – Dissidents; and (ii) provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, as well as to Ex-Combatants demobilized under the Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Page 3 Reintegration Project, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to such female, child, and disabled Ex-Combatants. The project would thereby contribute to consolidation of peace and stability in Burundi and improve security in the Great Lakes region though: ƒ Preserving the capacity of GoB to demobilize and reintegrate combatants of the FNL. ƒ Demobilizing eligible combatants from the FNL and FNL-D and supporting their reinsertion, as well as supporting for a small remaining caseload from the EDRRP. ƒ Providing transitional socio-economic reintegration support to all demobilized FNL and FNL-D ex-combatants, as well as a small remaining caseload from the EDRRP. ƒ Providing specialized socio-economic reintegration and medical support to vulnerable groups, including children associated with the armed forces, women and the disabled. 3. Rationale for Bank Involvement In response to a request made to the World Bank by the GoB, the Burundi Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (EDRRP, or PNDRR in French) was prepared and approved by the World Bank Board of Directors on March 18, 2004. The operation became effective after the signing of the Development Grant Agreement and an initial preparatory period, allowing for disbursements to start on September 10, 2004. The operation was supported through an IDA grant of US$36 million and a complementary grant from the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) of US$41.8 million. The EDRRP aimed to help consolidate peace in Burundi and the Great Lakes region by supporting the implementation of clauses of the Arusha Peace Agreement and subsequent cease- fire agreements related to demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. The principal objectives were to: (i) Demobilize an estimated 55,000 ex-combatants from the Burundian Armed Forces (BAF), members of the APPMs, and subsequently the National Defense Forces (NDF), and support their reintegration into civilian life; (ii) Support the reinsertion of an estimated 20,000 Gardiens de la Paix and approximately 10,000 combattants militants ; and (iii) Contribute to the reallocation of government expenditure from defense to the social and economic sectors over a period of five years. Despite some shortfalls, the D&R program was able to provide support to a significant number of demobilized ex-combatants. As of April 2008, the EDRRP had demobilized over 23,000 adult ex-combatants, all of whom received reinsertion support in the form of transitional subsistence Page 4 allowances (TSA). The program also supported the release of over 3,000 children associated with the fighting forces. To date, almost all children and approximately 90 percent of adult ex- combatants processed by the program have had access to reintegration opportunities. In parallel, the program also provided reinsertion support to approximately 29,000 former Gardiens de la Paix and combattants militants, through a process completed in June 2006. In light of the upcoming closure of the EDRRP in December 31, 2008 and the recognition of pending activities required for the consolidation of the peace process, the GoB met with its international partners and MDRP donors on May 7, 2008 at the World Bank to discuss options for tackling the country’s remaining security concerns. It became clear that in spite of its achievements, the program would be unlikely to fully process the remaining caseload before the project closing date. With regard to demobilization, the country faced two distinct but interrelated potential areas of intervention: (i) the demobilization of the FNL, which remained contingent on the signing of an agreement with the FNL leadership, and (ii) the possible inclusion of the FNL-Dissidents into the EDRRP caseload. For both of these groups, a thorough verification of combatant status was to be finalized and validated. All combatants selected for demobilization were to subsequently require reinsertion and reintegration support. Furthermore, several activities initiated under the EDRRP were to require completion in the future, specifically the socio-economic reintegration of a small remaining caseload of ex-combatants, as well as finalizing targeted support for vulnerable groups including children associated with armed forces and disabled ex-combatants. The continued support to demobilization and reintegration in Burundi is currently an urgent strategic priority in light of: (i) the recent closing of the Burundi chapter of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) 1 in December 31, 2008; and (ii) the need to retain the capacity of the GoB to respond to a demand for D&R from the FNL. Furthermore, with presidential elections scheduled in Burundi for 2010, most observers believe that the final dismantling of all potentially destabilizing forces before the upcoming electoral period is paramount to solidify the transition from a post-conflict society into full recovery and development. To guide the process, the GoB requested that the World Bank take a leadership role in supporting the preparation and financing of this transitional D&R program, and establish and administer a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) with the purpose of receiving donor contributions to support the process. This leadership role was later endorsed by the donor community in Burundi and the United Nations (UN) system. The proposed activity directly contributes to the achievement of the World Bank CAS for Burundi, particularly “CAS Outcome 2.1: Improved reintegration of ex-combatants and vulnerable groups.” 4. Description 1 The MDRP Trust Fund, which closed at the end of 2008, was supported by 13 donors: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission. This partnership enabled coordinated technical support and funding for the complex and sensitive D&R program. Page 5 The project will: (i) preserve the operational and technical capacity of the GoB to demobilize and reintegrate combatants from FNL and FNL-D; (ii) provide reinsertion, reintegration and medical services to a limited caseload remaining from the previous project; and (iii) support demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of up to a maximum of 5,000 FNL combatants and 1,564 FNL-D, in addition to specialized services for the reintegration of up to 600 children associated with the armed groups from the FNL and FNL-D. The proposed project includes the following four components: (i) Demobilization of FNL and FNL-D forces, including encampment, sensitization, validation of combatant status, registration, socio-economic profiling of ex- combatants, surveying expectations for reintegration, pre-discharge orientation programs, medical triage, voluntary counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS, and transport support to communities of return. (ii) Reinsertion support of new demobilized ex-FNL and ex-FNL-D, including resettlement kits and a monetized unconditional cash transfer allowance (known as transitional subsistence allowance) as well as extensive counseling and orientation during the pre-discharge orientation (PDO) process. A small caseload from the previous project will also receive the outstanding payments of their reinsertion support. (iii) Transitional socio-economic reintegration support for all demobilized adult ex- combatants, as well as a small pending caseload from EDRRP, which will support the beneficiaries’ selection of their personal reintegration path. Transitional economic reintegration includes a range of interventions such as the provision of scholarships, employment opportunities, vocational and skills training, and microenterprise generation and promotion (including training on basic business development, accounting skills and promotion of associations). Transitional social reintegration will include the provision of information and sensitization events with ex-combatants and communities, fostering reconciliation, psycho-social trauma counseling and HIV/AIDS counseling and referral. (iv) Support to vulnerable groups. The project would provide specialized support and/or additional protection to vulnerable groups. Particularly vulnerable groups under the project would be those who are unable to fully utilize program benefits due to age, gender, physical or mental disability or any other factor, and therefore require specialized assistance. Traditionally vulnerable groups include children associated with armed forces, female combatants and the disabled. However the project would develop clear criteria to assess vulnerability and identify any other group that may require specialized support, including special cases of civilians in the communities of destination. The expected outcomes to be achieved se include: ƒ Approximately 1,500 ex-combatants from the previous project receive the remainder of their transitional socio-economic reintegration support. Page 6 ƒ Approximately 1,500 disabled ex-combatants demobilized under the EDRRP receive or complete rehabilitation and prosthetic support. ƒ 5,000 combatants from the FNL and 1,560 FNL-D are demobilized, and receive reinsertion payments and transitional socio-economic reintegration support. ƒ All children associated with the FNL and FNL-D are separated from those groups, reunited with their families or placed in care, and receive full reinsertion and reintegration support as appropriate to their status as minors, including completion of reinsertion and reintegration support to approximately 250 children from the previous project. 5. Financing Financing for the project will be provided by an International Development Association (IDA) grant in the amount of SDR 10.1 million (equivalent US$15 million) to the GoB. Additional co- financing resources to support the overall project valued at US$22.5 million would be made available from a Bank-administered multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) set up for this project. Given that there was an operational gap between the closure of the previous D&R operation on December 31, 2008 and the new phase of D&R activities financed by this project, the Bank discussed and agreed with the GoB on proposing the use of retroactive financing of eligible expenses of up to a maximum of US$ 4 million, below the 40 percent of the value of the IDA grant, as allowed for under OP/BP 8.00. 6. Implementation The National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) will continue to be the GoB’s policy guidance body for the project. The NCDRR was established on August 28, 2003, with a mandate to provide policy guidance and to oversee the design and implementation of D&R programming. A streamlined and flexible project technical coordination team (TCT) will serve as the executing agency and recipient of the Government program. The TCT would outsource most services and activities related to demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration to implementation partners (IP) that would provide a full range of services. 2 The TCT’s main responsibilities will include: · Preparing and costing detailed semi-annual implementation plans. · Developing and securing IDA approval for a project implementation manual (PIM). · Contracting IPs, based on transparent procedures for assessment and award. · Supervising and facilitating the activities implemented by IPs, ensuring delivery of timely and quality services to the target population. · Ensuring transparent and accountable administration of project resources (including procurement and financial management). 2 To be recruited following World Bank procedures, competitive bidding and flexible selection methods. Page 7 · Monitoring and evaluating project implementation progress and impacts. · Reporting on a regular basis, including (a) quarterly program implementation progress reports, (b) quarterly financial monitoring reports, and (c) updated procurement plans on a six month basis. · With support from a qualified Environmental Consultant as needed, implementing the ESMF and monitoring of safeguard issues globally in the project, including ensuring that implementation partners account for these issues when implementing their activities. The GoB will chair a D&R Steering Committee (DR-SC) in Bujumbura. The DR-SC will include the NCDRR, the coordinator of the TCT, donors contributing to the MDTF as well as other bilateral donors based in Burundi. The DR-SC main responsibilities would include, among others, to provide advice to address technical constraints during project implementation and technical inputs to review relevant contracts to key IPs. As circumstances require, the DR-SC would expand to include the participation of additional invited members, bringing key elements necessary to maintain the correct strategic placement of the D&R intervention into the larger security, stabilization and recovery effort in Burundi. The utilization of MDTF resources will be regulated by a trust fund committee integrated by representatives of the contributing donors in Bujumbura and chaired by the World Bank. This committee will closely follow project implementation progress and quality. 7. Sustainability The project will promote sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities of return through the development of synergies with ongoing and planned wider recovery and development initiatives, such as community-driven development, agriculture, and public works projects supported by the World Bank, the UNDP, the African Development Bank (AfDB), bilateral donors and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). From the beneficiary perspective, dovetailing the program’s transitional reintegration support with long-term development assistance will multiply gains and the likelihood of sustainability. From the programmatic perspective, such linking will ultimately allow mainstreaming ex-combatant reintegration activities, allowing for a phase-out of these activities through the national D&R program. Additionally, it would allow communities to benefit from the skills ex-combatants gained as a result from the economic and social reintegration support through the project. 8. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector The project design takes into considerations lessons learned and best practices from previous Bank-supported D&R projects in Burundi and the region. Key lessons learned at the technical level include: (i) improvement of demobilization counseling and sensitization; (ii) development of synergies with wider recovery and development initiatives for sustainable reintegration of ex- combatants in their communities of return; (iii) improvement of quality and intensity of training for ex-combatants; (iv) inclusion of spouse and family participation at some stages of the D&R process; (v) ensuring correct phasing of reinsertion and reintegration support through parallel implementation of transitional subsistence allowances and vocational training; (vi) adapted Page 8 assistance for children associated with the armed forces; and (vii) greater inclusion of psycho- social support. At the institutional and process level, key lessons included in project design are: (i) project implementation by a small technical coordination team (TCT) staffed with competitively recruited technical personnel; (ii) highly qualified financial and procurement staff, reinforced by an independent consultant to provide advice on key financial and procurement activities of the project; (iii) outsourcing most project activities to implementation partners (IP); (iv) a single- purpose MDTF, with an associated trust fund committee; (v) a proactive role for the NCDRR; and (vi) proactive communication and sensitization activities. 9. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation) Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Environmental Assessment ( OP / BP 4.01) YES Natural Habitats ( OP / BP 4.04) NO Pest Management ( OP 4.09 ) NO Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11) NO Involuntary Resettlement ( OP / BP 4.12) NO Indigenous Peoples ( OP / BP 4.10) NO Forests ( OP / BP 4.36) NO Safety of Dams ( OP / BP 4.37) NO Projects in Disputed Areas ( OP / BP 7.60) * NO Projects on International Waterways ( OP / BP 7.50) NO Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental and Social Safeguard Issues in Bank-Supported Projects ( OP / BP 4.00) NO 10. List of Factual Technical Documents Emergency Project Paper Integrated Safeguard Data Sheet 11. Contact point Marcelo Jorge Fabre Tel: +1 (202) 473-8477 Fax: +1 (202) 473-8185 e-mail: mfabre@worldbank.org 12. For more information contact: The InfoShop The World Bank * By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the disputed areas Page 9 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: (202) 458-4500 Fax: (202) 522-1500 Web: http://www.worldbank.org/infoshop