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Report No: NCO00005519

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION

6761-KG AND D708-KG

ON A CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 18.3 MILLION

(US\$ 25 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 18.3 MILLION

(US\$ 25 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

FOR

SOCIAL PROTECTION EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS PROJECT  
(P174072)

September 29, 2021

Social Protection & Jobs Global Practice  
Europe And Central Asia Region

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective February 9, 2021)

Currency Unit = Kyrgyz Som (KGS)

KGS 84.82 = US\$1

US\$1.44 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

Regional Vice President: Anna M. Bjerde

Country Director: Tatiana Proskuryakova

Regional Director: Fadia M. Saadah

Practice Manager: Cem Mete

Task Team Leader(s): Manuel Salazar, Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CMU	Country Management Unit
ECA	Europe and Central Asia
FA	Financing Agreement
GoK	Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
IDA	International Development Association
KIHS	Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey
MLSD	Ministry of Labor and Social Development
SPJ	Social Protection & Jobs
UBK	<i>Uy-Bulogo Komok</i>

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**DATA SHEET**

**BASIC INFORMATION**

**Product Information**

Project ID	Project Name
P174072	Social Protection Emergency Response and Delivery Systems Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Kyrgyz Republic	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category

**Organizations**

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic	Ministry of Labor and Social Development

**Project Development Objective (PDO)**

Original PDO

The project objectives are to mitigate the effect of, and contribute to the recovery from, economic impacts of the COVID19 pandemic on the poor and vulnerable, and to strengthen the Recipient’s social protection system.

**FINANCING**

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
<b>World Bank Administered Financing</b>			
IDA-67610	25,000,000	-1,371,764	0
IDA-D7080	25,000,000	-1,371,764	0
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	<b>50,000,000</b>	<b>-2,743,528</b>	<b>0</b>



**KEY DATES**

Project	Approval	Effectiveness	Original Closing	Revised Closing
P174072	30-Jul-2020			30-Jun-2024

**RATING OF BANK PERFORMANCE**

Satisfactory

**RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs**

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	13-Nov-2020	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0

**SECTORS AND THEMES**

**Sectors**

Major Sector/Sector	(%)
<b>Social Protection</b>	<b>100</b>
Social Protection	54
Public Administration - Social Protection	46

**Themes**

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3)	(%)
<b>Private Sector Development</b>	<b>22</b>
Enterprise Development	22
Entrepreneurship	22
<b>Finance</b>	<b>15</b>
Financial Infrastructure and Access	15
MSME Finance	15



<b>Social Development and Protection</b>	<b>100</b>
Social Protection	100
Social Safety Nets	100
Social Insurance and Pensions	55
Social protection delivery systems	37
<b>Human Development and Gender</b>	<b>100</b>
Gender	15
Disease Control	100
Pandemic Response	100
Labor Market Policy and Programs	85
Labor Market Institutions	13
<b>Environment and Natural Resource Management</b>	<b>1</b>
Climate change	1
Mitigation	0
Adaptation	1

**ADM STAFF**

Role	At Approval	At NCO
Regional Vice President:	Anna M. Bjerde	Anna M. Bjerde
Country Director:	Lilia Burunciuc	Tatiana A. Proskuryakova
Director:	Fadia M. Saadah	Fadia M. Saadah
Practice Manager:	Cem Mete	Cem Mete
Task Team Leader(s):	Manuel Salazar, Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy	Manuel Salazar, Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy



## I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

1. The Social Protection Emergency Response and Delivery Systems Project was prepared in Q4-FY2020 under the condensed procedures pursuant to Paragraph 12, Section III of the Bank Policy: Investment Project Financing for projects in situations of urgent need of assistance or capacity constraints and approved by the World Bank Board of Executive Directors on July 31, 2020. The Financing Agreement (FA) was signed on September 2, 2020 and the project was ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic Parliament.

2. When the emergency to better address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was declared in the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2020, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (GoK) requested the Bank's urgent support through a grant and a credit of the International Development Association (IDA) in early April 2020. The operation was expected to complement both the Emergency COVID-19 Project (P173766), approved on April 2, 2020 and focused on the health sector, and a set of measures the GoK had taken mostly to support the survival of firms and businesses. Therefore, the Project was prepared in a context in which the COVID-19 pandemic and the related measures to contain it threatened to undo the gains in poverty reduction achieved over the past few years, with a significant proportion of the population facing the risk of falling back into poverty.

3. The economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis downturn were expected to be most severe for the poor and vulnerable households. It was evident that by mid-2020, the economic shock was having adverse effects on labor income and remittances, major factors contributing to poverty reduction. In the Kyrgyz Republic, these effects were likely to be exacerbated by high rates of informality (60 percent of total employment), self-employment (35 percent of total employment), and limited coverage of social insurance. Furthermore, the decline in remittances (which during the pre-COVID pandemic time were equivalent to 30 percent of GDP and mostly received by poor households), combined with higher inflation, would erode households' purchasing power. In addition, domestic businesses reliant on the supply of external raw materials would face supply constraints, resulting in lower output and income. Analyses included in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, Report No. PAD3938 of July 15, 2020) indicated that the impact of the crisis on income and employment may generate an increase in poverty headcount of up to 11 percentage points or close to 600,000 people.

4. In this context, by mid-2020 the Kyrgyz Republic was facing challenges. First, there is an increasing number of poor and vulnerable families—both those currently under support of the Social Assistance system and those affected by the shock and falling below the assistance threshold—requiring Government support. Second, there is a considerable number of new unemployed workers not eligible for either the unemployment insurance scheme (given its stringent accessibility conditions) or social assistance interventions (given the quite low eligibility threshold). And third, as a result of the macroeconomic situation, high unemployment and the consequent fall in social insurance contribution revenues elevated the risk that the Government (the Social Fund) would not be able to pay pensions on time.

5. Given the above mentioned circumstances, the social protection system was expected to play a key role in providing emergency support to vulnerable households as well as assisting households and businesses during the period of economic recovery. As a result, the GoK requested the preparation and implementation support of an emergency operation. The project objectives were to mitigate the effect





of, and contribute to the recovery from, economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the poor and vulnerable, and to strengthen the country's social protection system. The project would achieve its development objectives on the basis of three components intended to (a) mitigate the immediate emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic-related measures to contain it and affecting the income of households, (b) support the recovery stage by providing households with income generating opportunities until economic growth and labor demand accelerate again, and (c) promote structural interventions to strengthen the social protection delivery systems to better support the intended population on time. Overall, the proposed project would support the GoK to develop a social protection system with the capacity to cope with future crises affecting the income of poor and vulnerable households more efficiently and effectively. With these objectives, the project was structured in three components.

6. **Component 1: Emergency Assistance to Households' Income (US\$39 million).** This component had the objective of providing comprehensive short-term support to households and individuals whose incomes had been particularly affected by the negative economic impacts caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as ensuring that those relying on social insurance benefits would receive their payments on time. To achieve this objective, this component would use the country's existing social protection delivery system to (a) provide emergency relief to existing and new eligible beneficiaries of social assistance programs, (b) provide temporary support to newly unemployed individuals, and (c) ensure that eligible individuals regularly receive their social insurance benefits, especially pensions.

7. *Subcomponent 1.1: Emergency Cash Assistance to Poor and Vulnerable Households (US\$12 million).* This subcomponent aimed to support the Government's efforts to assist the poor segment of population whose income has decreased as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. To ensure a swift recovery from the economic downturn, there was a need to assist not only those who were already poor before the crisis but also the transient (new) poor (that is, those who fell below the poverty line because of the crisis). As most of the new poor would not be eligible to claim unemployment insurance (since their employment status may not be easily verified), the most effective way to assist them during the crisis would be through temporary social assistance benefits supplemented with a temporary cash benefit to compensate for lower purchasing power. Therefore, this subcomponent would support the government efforts to expand coverage of the national social assistance through the *Uy-Bulogo Komok* (UBK) program, to assist newly eligible households whose income had fallen below the GMI as a result of the pandemic, and to provide a temporary cash compensation for current and new beneficiaries of the country's UBK program. Estimates based on the 2018 Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey (KIHS) suggested that up to additional 228,000 children will become eligible for the UBK benefit because of reduced labor incomes and remittances.

8. *Subcomponent 1.2: Temporary Allowance for Unemployed Individuals (US\$3 million).* The objective of this subcomponent was to support individuals and households who have been laid off because of the pandemic restrictions, and thus requiring social assistance to meet their needs and to prevent them from falling into poverty. Job losses were expected to be substantial, especially in high-risk sectors which are most vulnerable to the economic effects of the crisis. A large proportion of those who had lost their jobs would not be eligible to receive benefits under the UBK program, which may have resulted in significant increases in poverty levels. If these individuals did fall into poverty, it would be more difficult and expensive to help them recover and reenter the labor market. This subcomponent would complement activities under Subcomponent 1.1 by supporting individuals registered as unemployed but



not eligible to be supported by the UBK or other social assistance programs. The proposed project would support up to estimated 38,000 individuals who would be making regular contributions to the Social Fund but had been laid off due to the economic crisis precipitated by COVID-19.

9. *Subcomponent 1.3: Ensuring Uninterrupted Payments of Social Insurance Benefits (US\$24 million).* The objective of this subcomponent was to support the GoK in making regular social insurance payments, particularly pensions. One of the most striking consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic was the slowing down economic activities and increased unemployment, resulting in a significant reduction of contributions from formal workers to the Social Fund and creating significant fiscal pressure on the Social Fund budget and correspondingly the central budget, which supports any deficit of the Social Fund. This may temporarily jeopardize the ability of the Social Fund to execute all its obligations to beneficiaries, including planned annual indexation of pension benefits. This situation may be further exacerbated by the approval of a deferral in regular pension contributions by firms and businesses to the Social Fund, as then proposed by the GoK. A large proportion of the population relies on monthly pensions to maintain its welfare, and potential delays in such transfers may cause these people to either fall into poverty or take costly coping strategies to smooth consumption. The proposed subcomponent would support the GoK to ensure that pensions and other social insurance benefits under the responsibility of the Social Fund were paid on time. To achieve this, the proposed project would reimburse the GoK for the regular transfer of all social insurance obligations as scheduled, indirectly supporting 650,000 pension beneficiaries.

10. **Component 2: Recovery Support - Productive Inclusion (US\$7.5 million).** This component had the medium-term objective of contributing to the recovery from economic impacts caused by the pandemic by supporting a productive inclusion intervention for poor and jobless individuals. This intervention was part of the GoK's strategy to promote graduation from social assistance programs into permanent sustainable livelihoods by funding the design and implementation of individual business plans. The proposed subcomponent would support beneficiaries through a combination of training, financial support, and technical assistance to implement viable and sustainable start-ups. The proposed project would support the implementation of the first phase (5,000 beneficiaries in selected areas) as well as comprehensive assessments to inform the Government's decision about scaling up the program beyond the scope of this project.

11. **Component 3: Delivery Systems for Social Assistance and Social Insurance (US\$3.5 million).** This component had a longer-term objective of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery systems in social assistance and social insurance so that the Government could count on a social protection system that would (a) timely, safely, and transparently transfer cash allowances to the appropriate target group, (b) improve monitoring of implementation and results of the social protection system, and (c) support clients of the Social Fund with improved member services, including robust and clear record-keeping systems and planning for the possibility of future layoffs or the need for temporary leave, through proper insurance mechanisms. Overall, strengthening social protection delivery systems would better prepare the GoK for future economic slowdowns or other shocks that may negatively impact the income of poor and vulnerable households. The component had three subcomponents.

12. *Subcomponent 3.1: Strengthening Service Delivery Systems of Social Assistance (US\$1 million).* Building on initial measures to ensure effective support during the mitigation and recovery phases of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, this subcomponent had the objective of strengthening the social assistance



delivery system to improve support for the poor and vulnerable. The revamped delivery system should have been able to provide adequate benefits to the appropriate (neediest) groups of the population on time, with the objective of promoting sustainable options for beneficiaries to graduate from social assistance interventions. To achieve these objectives, this subcomponent would have supported the following activities: (a) Improving and streamlining targeting and selection mechanisms of beneficiaries; (b) Improving access to the social assistance from the local level, including further simplifying registration in social assistance programs and building the institutional capacity of the MLSD and local authorities; (c) Strengthening the UBK grievance redress mechanism; and (d) Promoting graduation from and reducing dependence on social assistance programs.

13. *Subcomponent 3.2: Social Insurance Administration (US\$1.5 million).* The proposed subcomponent had the objective of improving effective administration of the social insurance system, including client services. Implementation of the proposed subcomponent would benefit from a comprehensive administrative assessment of the systems of the Social Fund currently conducted by the World Bank. In achieving this goal, the proposed project would have also included the following activities, among others: (a) assessment of and investment into record-keeping and delivery mechanisms in pensions (including increasing share of cashless payments via banks), (b) assessment of options to improve client services, and (c) necessary IT-related equipment and software upgrades. Investments in the Social Fund systems will be required to keep track of all liabilities of the pension program.

14. *Subcomponent 3.3: Project Management (US\$1.0 million).* Activities under this subcomponent would have provided support to the implementation and monitoring of the project and included hiring a group of consultants for a Project Implementation Unit to be set up under the Ministry of Labor and Social Development (MLSD) (including procurement and financial management specialists) and operational costs and basic office equipment, as necessary.

## II. KEY FACTORS LEADING TO CANCELLATION

15. The Project was prepared during the initial emergency stage of the pandemic in the Kyrgyz Republic (the Government approved the first emergency plan to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on March 30, 2020) under the condensed procedures. After approval by the Board on July 31, 2020, the FA was signed on September 2, 2020 and the Project was ratified by the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic. There were no effectiveness conditions specified in the FA. For the Credit and the Grant to become effective, however, the Government had to provide to the Bank a satisfactory legal opinion confirming that the legal agreement to which it is a party has been duly authorized or ratified by, and executed and delivered on its behalf and is legally binding upon it in accordance with the agreement's terms. Components 1 and 2 had disbursement conditions, which the Government started working on as soon as the FA was ratified. A virtual implementation support mission conducted from September 29 to October 8, 2020 made evident that the GoK was on track to make the first withdrawal request by the end of the calendar year once the Legal Opinion would be issued and accepted by the Bank.

16. Despite the progress achieved in moving the disbursement conditions ahead, as a result of the political turmoil that followed the contested Parliament Elections in October 2020, an interim Government was appointed, and most of the managerial level officials who negotiated and approved the project were removed. Given that the interim administration had a different view regarding the measures



to support vulnerable groups negatively affected by the pandemic and an imminent new presidential election was to take place in January 2021, it was decided to stop the discussion on the project scope and structure until a new administration would be in office. On November 20, 2020, the Government sent to the Bank an official request to extend the effectiveness deadline until March 1, 2021, which the Bank has granted.

17. The new administration came to office on January 10, 2021, accompanied with further changes in relevant ministries. The new administration had a different view regarding the support that poor and vulnerable families would receive to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. Despite the fact that the measures proposed in the project were implemented in many countries in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and other regions to support underserved groups negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, the new GoK considered that it would be difficult to scale down temporary measures involving cash benefits, which would create an additional fiscal liability. Therefore, the GoK expressed its concern regarding Subcomponents 1.1 and 1.2, which were at the core of the project. Regarding Subcomponent 1.3, by 2021 the GoK considered that other sources of funds would be used to ensure timely payments of pensions. The new administration also considered that the strengthening of the social protection system supported by Component 3 could be postponed and that some of the proposed activities potentially could be carried out in-house. Regarding component 2, different proposals were discussed including increasing the amount of funds for productive inclusion; however, in a formal communication from the Ministry of Finance, the Government expressed the lack of mechanisms for the implementation and monitoring the intervention and consider it ineffective.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the GoK formally requested the cancellation of the project on February 9, 2021. To have some additional time to discuss pending issues with the GoK, the Bank decided to extend the effectiveness deadline further, until April 1, 2021. After several attempts by the Bank regional leadership and the task team to agree with key Government officials to advance the project towards effectiveness and implementation (including engaging in direct high-level negotiations and extending the effectiveness deadline twice), the FA was terminated by the Bank due to failure to become effective.

### III. BANK PERFORMANCE

18. The Bank received an urgent formal request of support from the GoK on April 13, 2020 after discussions between the Ministry of Finance and the Country Manager a few days before. The Bank quickly responded to the GoK's request to provide support to assist poor and vulnerable families and individuals whose income would be negatively affected by the measures taken to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. The ECA Social Protection & Jobs (SPJ) unit swiftly assembled a team with the adequate knowledge of the country and the areas of intervention, and in close collaboration with the Country Management Unit (CMU), initiated the preparation of the project following condensed procedures and provided all fiduciary, social and environmental, and legal support to ensure that the project would be prepared in the shortest possible period of time. The project was prepared, appraised, negotiated, and approved by the Board in less than four months.

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<sup>1</sup> Letter No. 16-1/1344 of February 9, 2021 from the Deputy Ministry of Finance to the World Bank's Country Manager for the Kyrgyz Republic.



19. The project was designed to complement another IDA intervention, inter alia, focusing on providing support to small and medium enterprises to retain employment during the pandemic (Emergency Support for MSMEs Project - P174028). For this reason, both projects were prepared with the active participation and leadership of the Ministry of Finance, to ensure high complementarity and follow government priorities from both the line ministry and the ministry responsible for the fiscal issues the Government was dealing with.

20. In terms of the structure of the operation, three of the four interventions included in the project were initially designed and proposed by the GoK; namely, the temporary top-up to the social assistance (UBK) monthly payment (Subcomponent 1.1), the funding of the Social Fund deficit to ensure that pensioners receive their regular payments on time (Subcomponent 1.3), and the productive inclusion intervention to support the recovery stage (Component 2). The unemployment benefit (Subcomponent 1.2) and the investments to strengthen the social protection delivery system and the GoK's capacity to better respond to future shocks were identified during the short period of preparation. Furthermore, the structure of the project ensured that no long-term fiscal burden would be created, as about 90 percent of the funds would be allocated on interventions to support exposed groups during the pandemic while Component 3 would be a series of discrete activities with no recurrent costs attached. Finally, the operation design did not include conditions of effectiveness to ensure quick disbursements as soon as the project is declared effective by the Bank.

21. The Bank was aware of a forthcoming parliamentary election and the possibility that a new administration would be in office as a result of the election. However, given the very tight timetable, the Bank took the decision of responding to the urgent government request and ensure the relevance and political sustainability of the operation by involving during the entire process not only the line ministry (Ministry of Labor), but also the Ministry of Finance. The Bank made substantial efforts to reach effectiveness and start implementation of the project, beyond the technical collaboration. Ongoing dialogue at the management level was maintained with the interim government and two extensions of the effectiveness deadline were granted. Once the new administration was in office, the Bank made an adjusted proposal to restructure the project in a way that addressed the concerns expressed by the GoK to be discussed at the level of Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Finance. Finally, in March 2021, discussions led by the Bank Senior Management were taken up to the level of the Minister of Finance and the President's Office, including a meeting with the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.

22. In sum, Bank performance was satisfactory because of the following aspects: (a) responsiveness to the GoK's request, (b) ability to process a regular IDA operation in a very short period of time to ensure relevance of the funding, (c) following government priorities while ensuring that interventions would address the existing situation in terms of supporting groups particularly exposed to the negative impacts of the pandemic, (d) supporting the GoK to maintain fiscal disciplines; and (e) engaging the Ministry of Finance at the decision-making level during the entire preparation process; and (f) providing hands-on implementation support between the approval until the cancellation of the project.

#### **IV. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

23. In the context of political volatility and in a high-risk situation in the country, project preparation



may need to reach further up in the administration and ensure ongoing communication with the relevant office. In the case of the proposed project, despite full agreement during the preparation and negotiations, the eventual ratification at the Parliament level, and even the support and intervention of the Ministry of Finance when the initial objections came, further dialogue even during preparation with the President's Office would have help to identify potential issues at a later stage.

24. There is need to carry out extended consultations with counterparts and stakeholders beyond the Ministry of Finance and the line ministry to ensure awareness, ownership, and support of the proposed operations at different levels, given the timing of the project preparation (negotiations took place less than four months from the parliamentary elections). Nevertheless, given the extremely short period of time to prepare the project, carrying out further discussions would likely delay appraisal, negotiations, and approval of the operation.

25. In the context of an emergency, like the COVID-19 pandemic, and a tight fiscal situation, it is necessary to very clearly discuss with the government on how a temporary operation not only will not create an additional recurrent fiscal burden, but also how to scale down the proposed temporary interventions. For future interventions, and learning from the COVID-19 pandemic experience, it would be useful to have ready an evidence base of how such programs in similar contexts were scaled back (to guide the government) and the need to actively support them with crafting a communications strategy to deal with this issue.

26. The need to strengthen the social protection delivery systems in the country is quite clear not only to better support poor and vulnerable groups in general but also to facilitate the design and implementation of key reforms, such as the Energy Subsidy Reforms that currently are being discussed (and partially delayed because the potential negative impact on underserved groups). To facilitate such engagement and have adequate discussions and consultations even under limited mission travel, there is a need to have a SPJ staff based in the Kyrgyz Republic. That will ensure that adequate consultations and ongoing day-to-day dialogue are possible.



**ANNEX 1. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION**

**TASK TEAM MEMBERS**

Name	Role
<b>Preparation</b>	
Manuel Salazar, Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy	Task Team Leader(s)
Irina Goncharova	Procurement Specialist(s)
Nazgul Albanova	Financial Management Specialist
Nodar Mosashvili	Financial Management Specialist
Nodar Mosashvili	Financial Management Specialist
Adis Medetov	Procurement Team
Olamide Oluwaseyi Bisi-Amosun	Environmental Specialist
Florentin Philipp Kerschbaumer	Team Member
Odil Akbarov	Social Specialist
Odil Akbarov	Safeguards Advisor/ESSA
Siddharth Hari	Team Member
Aidai Bayalieva	Environmental Specialist
Marina Novikova	Team Member
Andrianirina Michel Eric Ranjeva	Team Member
Ngoc Dung Thi Tran	Team Member
Ruxandra Costache	Counsel
Sujani Eli	Team Member
Suryanarayana Satish	Social Specialist
Eva K. Ngegba	Team Member
Karla J. McEvoy	Team Member
<b>Supervision/NCO</b>	
Manuel Salazar, Oleksiy A. Sluchynskyy	Task Team Leader(s)
Irina Goncharova	Procurement Specialist(s)
Nazgul Albanova	Financial Management Specialist





Nodar Mosashvili	Financial Management Specialist
Adis Medetov	Procurement Team
Olamide Oluwaseyi Bisi-Amosun	Environmental Specialist
Florentin Philipp Kerschbaumer	Team Member
Odil Akbarov	Social Specialist
Siddharth Hari	Team Member
Laurent Loic Yves Bossavie	Team Member
Aidai Bayalieva	Environmental Specialist
Marina Novikova	Team Member
Andrianirina Michel Eric Ranjeva	Team Member
Ngoc Dung Thi Tran	Team Member
Ruxandra Costache	Counsel
Suryanarayana Satish	Social Specialist
Eva K. Ngegba	Team Member
Karla J. McEvoy	Team Member

**STAFF TIME AND COST**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Preparation</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
<b>Supervision/NCO</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>

*Note:* The preparation cost (around \$150,000 or 30 staff weeks) was subsidized by the HECSF because the GoK's project request came late in the FY (April 13, 2020) on an emergency basis, thus there was no budget allocation from the CMU. For supervision, 15.73 staff weeks and \$75,255 inclusive of labor, travel, and consultant costs were charged against P174072 in FY21.





## ANNEX 2. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. *Project Appraisal Document*, Report No. PAD3938, July 15, 2020
2. *Financing Agreement*, September 2, 2020
3. *Implementation Status and Results Report*, November 13, 2020
4. *Government Request to Extend the Effectiveness Deadline*, November 20, 2020
5. *Notice to the Recipient on Extension of the Effectiveness Deadline*, December 1, 2020
6. *Government Request to Cancel the Project*, February 9, 2021
7. *Notice to the Recipient on Extension of the Effectiveness Deadline*, February 26, 2021
8. *World Bank Invitation Letter to a Discussion on Possible Project Restructuring*, March 10, 2021
9. *Notice to the Recipient on Termination of Financing Agreement and Cancellation of the IDA Credit and Grant*, March 31, 2021