Document of The World Bank FOR OMFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 7255 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2025-SE) May 20, 1988 Western Africa Region Transportation Division This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICI4L US ONLY TO* WORtLD BANK wasw4ton. D.C. 20413 U.S.A. Olhce .d Duectn-CawW May 20, 1988 - MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Senegal SEFICS Rail Transport Project (Loan 2025-SE) Attached, for Information is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Senegal SEFICS Rail Transport Project (Loan 2025-SE)" prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office. Under the modified system for project performance auditing, further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department has not been made. Attachment This document has a restricted ditutbion wd may be used by rciplents only in the perfomance of their oMcial dutie Ib contents may not othwfie be discsed witbout Wold ank authofiaton. FOR OMCLIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PROJECT, LOAN 2025-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Table of Contents Page No. Preface ......... ...... ........ ...... 4 ..0... ............... Basic Data Sheet .... 0............... ....... *.*.................. i Evaluation Summary ......... ...... ................... . iv I. INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT IDENTIFICATION ............... 1 II. PROJECT PREPARATlON ANn APPRAISAL ..................... 2 III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST ................... ...... 3 IV. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS, ....................... ....... .... 6 A. Traffic ........... 0... * ............ 6 B. Operations ............................................. 6 V. FINANCIAL PERFORMQNCE ........................... ...... 7 VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ............. 10 VII. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION . ........ .... ....... ..*..... 11 VIII. ROLE OF THE BANK ..... .............. ......... . 11 IX. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................ 12 ANNEX I: Comments from Ministry of Equipment .......... 13 ANNEX II: Comments from SEFICS ......... ............. . 16 TABLES: 1 Actual and Appraisal Estimates of Project Costs 2 Actual Freight Traffic bv Commodity 3 Selected Operating Statistics, 1984-1986 4 Comptes de Resultats ?revisionnels et Realises, 1984-86 5 Bilans Pr6visionnels et Realises: 1982-85 1AP -- IBRD 13063R This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its cot-cnts may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PROJECT, LOAN 2025-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Preface 'his Project Completion Report (PCR) has been prepared for the SEFICS Rail Transport Project for which Loan 2025-SE in the amount of US$19.3 million was approved by the Board on June 23, 1981 and was signed on September 30, 1981. The original closing date of Decem- ber 31, 1984, was extended by one year to December 31, 1985, and the final disbursement was made on August 11, 1986. This PCR was prepared by the Western Africa Region on the basis of the information collected by the completion mission in May 1986 and the information available in the project files. In accordance with the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, this PCR was reviewed by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), but the project was not audited by OED staff. Tae draft report was sent to the Borrower for comments. The Comments of the Ministry of Equipment is placed as an annex to this report. The SEFICS management has replied that it has no comments to make. - Li - REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PROJECT. WLAN 2025-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BASIC DATA SHEE? KEY PROJECT DAIA Original Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (USS million) 23.4 15.4 /a Cost Underrun (M) -- (-34) /b Financing (USS million) ICS -- Equity in SEFICS 3.1 3.1 /c RCFS -- Equity in SEFICS 0.3 0.3 Ic Government -- Capital Grant to RCFS 0.5 0.5 /c Government -- Capitalized Guarantee Fees 0.2 0.2 /c Loan Amount 19.3 19.3 Disbursed 19.3 13.2 Cancelled -- 6.1 /d Outstanding -- 13.2 Completion of Physical Components (date) 06/30/84 12/31/85 Proportion Actually Completed by Original Completion Date (N) 100 85 Economic Rate of Return (%) Not assessed at appraisal -- CUMULATIWE ESTlMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (USS million) FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 Appraisal Estimate 3.5 11.6 19.3 Actual 0.0 0.89 11.7 12.93 12.985 13.2 Actual as % of Estimate 0 8 61 67 67 68 /a Includes equity and capital grants mobilized. /b Though the implementation cost was 34% less than appraisal cost in US dollar terms, it was 11S higher in FCFA terms, due to the consistently high dollar values during the peak disbursement phase. /c These are equity contributions and capital grants. /d Lower cost due to reduction in scope of work and high dollar values vis-&-vis CFA and French Francs during the project implementation period. - Uii - <> 0IHE~~TOR PROJECT DATA Actual or Item Original Current Estimate First Mention In Files -- 03/08/77 Negotiations 0W/81 05/81 Board Approval of the Loan 06/81 06/23/81 toan Agreement Date 09/30/81 Effactiven s Date 03/3C/82 03i08/83 Closing Date 12/31/84 12/31/85 Borrower and Executing Ag4ncy: SEFICS - Socidt6 d'Explottation Ferroviaire des Industries Chimiques du Senegal L Guarantor Government of Senegal Fiscal Year of the Borrower July 01 - June 30 Fiscal Year of the Gove% mmnt January 01 - December 31 MISSION DATA No. of Mission Date of Item Mo./Year Persons Composition /d Man Weeks Report Identification /e -- -- -- -- -- Preparation /e -- -- -- -- -- Appraisal 180 4 E, F, P, R 4.5 11/21/80 Supervision 1 12/81 2 F, R 0.6 01/18/82 Supervision 2 10/83 1 F 0.6 11/10/83 Supervision 3 03/84 1 R 0.4 05/01/84 Supervision 4 10/84 1 R 0.4 01/03/85 Supervision 5 05/85 1 R 0.4 CS/30/85 Name of Currency: CFA Franc (CFAF) Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average: 1980 . . ......t.iSl245 Intervening Years Average: 1981-86 ........... US1-370 Current Year Average (First quarter of 1987) .... ........ ... USS1-314 /a Due to sharp drop in the value of French Franc and CPA Franc in which most contracts were denominated. /b Undisbursed amount of USS6,100,044 was cancelled on 08/01/86. Ic A subsidiary of ICS: Industries Chimiques du Sdndgal. Id E - Economist; F - Financial Analyst; P - Programs Economist/Officer; R a Railway Engineer. Je Project identification and preparation were carried out by IFC. The Bank supported the IFC project with a Rail Transport Component which was developed into and financed as, a separate Bank Project, after about three years. - iv - REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PROJECT, LOAN 2025-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Evaluation Summary Obiectives 1. The Government of Senegal in 1978 decided to set up a fertilizer manufacturing plant called the "Industries Chimiques du Senegal (ICS), with the assistance of IFC and other aid agencies. The ICS factory needed reliable and economic transport facilities to carry the imported inputs for the factory (sulphur, fuel, etc.) from the Dakar Port and the phosphoric acid and the fertilizer to t'ie port for exp.rt (para 1.01). In order to fulfill this need, a rail transport operating entity called Societe d'Exploitation Ferroviaire des ICS, SEFI0, was created. The principal direct objective of the SEFICS project was to meet the trartsoort requirements of ICS in the most economical and efficient manner without causing interruptions of the plant production (para 2.05). This project objective was fulfilled when the transport services were made available to ICS within a period of 30 months from start-up, in time to transport the heavy industrial eq_-ent and the primary construction inputs needed for the plant from the Port of Dakar to tLe factory's inland site at M'Bao, located nearly 120 km from the Port. Moreover, transport costs of SEFICS were roughly 252 below those of the only logical alternative, the state-owned Regie du Chemin de Fer du Seneg.-l (RCFS). The main indirect objective in the creation of the private sector company SEFICS was to help streamline the state-owned railway into a more efficient organization. This objective was achieved to some degree, probably the best under the prevailing labor and political realities of Senegal. Implementation Experience 2. The creation of SEFICS broke new ground in Senegal by privatizing a significant segment of the rail transport industry and setting it up as a private sector operating entity in competition with the state-ownel monopolistic railway company, RCFS. This pioneering step demonstrated th&t the private sector could maintain higher technical and financial standards of operation and maintenance, higher staff discipline and accountability, and a better record of safety than the state-owned RCFS (para 6.01). It also opened up the possibility to extend this concept to other activities of RCFS's traffic and thereby restructure RCFS or induce it to become more efficient (para 8.02). 3. On the other hand, one lesson learned from the project is that, even in the private sector, certain management deficiencies cannot be easily eradicated. Such was the case of the tendency to overstaffing, which was controlled in time, the difficulty in shedding the traditional public-sector work attitude of insensitivity to productivity and in adjusting .:o a commercially-oriented environment where least-cost solutions were required (para 6.02). Results 4. No separate computation of the rate of return for this project was made at appraisal since it was considered as an integral element of the industrial project. The ICS project which included the SEFICS cost in its overall economic computation estimated a rate of return of 13.5% for the whole ICS project. The average cost of transport is 15.36 FCFA/t km in SEFICS compared to 20.46 FCFA/t km of RCFS. On this basis a.d making a conservative allowance for delays, accidents and other operating inefficiencies, the ERR for SEFICS is about 13% (para 7.01). 5. However, as ICS's production volumes are lagging behind forecasts, SEFICS is carrying less traffic than its design capacity. As a consequence, SEFICS's fixed costs are high. In order to spread the fixed costs of SEFICS over larger traffic volumes, Bank missions tried to persuade Government to throw open the national phosphate traffic to competitive bidding by SEFICS and RCFS which most likely would have led SEFICS to win this additional traffic or RCFS to improve operations and management substantially, or both. However, due to severe labor union pressure and political deference to railway labor, it was not possible to implement this proposal (paras 4.01 and 8.01). In hindsight, it appears that it would have been prudent to have some built-in safeguards against the contingency of a failure of the parent industrial venture. 6. SEFICS's investments were strictly controlled by ICS's senior management, in consultation with Bank missions, in ordex to keep investment costs well below estimates. These measures were successful, and the need for additional wagons, signalling, etc., was pruned down. Overall, there was a saving of US$6.1 m despite the procurement of one locomotive above the appraisal estimate (paras 3.08 and 3.09). 7. Despite lower than estimated traffic volumes and consequent underutilization of its equipment, SEFICS has maintained a satisfactory financial position because of its statutory right to recover full costs from I-S, admittedly, to the latter's disadvantage (Chapter V). SustainabilitX and Findinas 8. Overall, the project was successfuls (a) RCFS would not have been able to provide ICS the desired levels of reliability and regularity of service, at a significantly lower level of transport costs, as SEFICS has done, without which ICS's operations would have been seriously affected (para 1.02); (b) SEFICS's higher quality of technical management (despite some weaknesses) has vindicated the decision to privatize this segment of rail transport; and (c) the de-linking of the management of operations and maintenance from the ownership of the track has opened the door (at least, in principle, for the present) to private companies to operate container surnices between Dakar and Bamako. This idea, now being discussed among private sector interests, the Government of Senegal and the Bank, would, if implemented, also - vi - benefit land-locked Mali. This Project concept was probably ahead of its time in 1981, as further privatization and/or restructuring of the RCFS are radical changes which require a longer time-horizon to take root in Senegal and therefore were not feasible within the project period. 9. Postscript. The objective of raising RCFS's management efficiency and staff productivity has come closer to achievement than ever before because: (a) in December 1986, the Government agreed with the Bank to limit investments in RCFS to a mcdest program; and (b) RCFS is now more keen to: (i) control costs, and compete with SEFICS to recapture ICS traffic; (ii) control staff indiscipline and thus increase productivity; (iii) reorganize its international trarfic to Mali on the basis of closer cooperation with Mali Railways; and riv) examine the viability of the St. Louis branch line and close it, if proved to be uneconomical (paia 5.02). REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PROJECT, LOAN 2025-SE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT IDENTIFIC.TION 1.01 In 177, the Government of Senegal (GOS) approached the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to assist in setting up a phosphoric acid/fertilizer project. By 1978/79, the GOS, IFC and the design consultants agreed that efficient and reliable transport was crucial to the success of the fertilizer project and that the state-owned Senegal Railways (Regie des Chemins de Fer du Senegal -- RCFS) was too inefficient and risky for this purpose. The IFC requested the support of the Bank in designing and financing the transport infra- structure, in view of the Bank's long involvement with, and knowledge of, the rail sub-sector. 1.02 The Bank considered this opportunity crucial to the success of its long-standing quest for higher efficiency in the management of the railways. By then, the Bank had financed three railway projects all intended to address the issues of management efficiency and close operational coorc.ination with Mali Railways. For nearly 15 years, during which these projects were under execution, the influence of the Bank failed to make an impact on RCFS's efficiency and on the GOS's awareness of the gravity of RCFS's inadequacies. Consequently, it was feared that if RCFS were to be given the responsibility for this impor- tant industrial traffic, its management would either allocate undue priority to this highlv visible operation with serious repercussions for the traffic to land-locked Mali or handle it with habitual inefficiency and thus affect seriously ICS's production. A just-then concluded study, which had revealed serious weaknesses in RCFS's management, supported this judgment. The study had taken the view that RCFS should gradually divest itself of its passenger services, hive off its phos- phate traffic to a separate operating unit and create a bi-national management to focus on the international traffic. RCFS and the GOS were not expected to accept such radical restructuring of the railway alL at onre, given the labor implications of these measures. The ICS project was an enclave operation, and therefore, it was considered to be a suitable vehicle to induce the GOS to take the first step towards the eventual restructuring of the RCFS -- bv accepting the concept of private ownership of. rolling stock and private operations on RCFS's track. Since the Bank had an institutional interest in RCFS, simultane- ously, it would provide an opportunity to protect and improve the financial interests of RCFS by insisting on an equitable tariff for ICS traffic. - 2 - II. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 2.01 The ICS project had engaged Entreprise Miniere et Chimique (EZC) of France as the project-design consultant. For purposes of conceptual homogeneity, it was decided to entrust the detailed engineer- ing of the transport component also to the same firm, who hired railway specialists for this purpose.. The Bank's intimate knowledge of RCFS's operations and track conditions was made full use of by the consultant in his design of the transport component of ICS during late 1979 and 1980. In the meantime, IFC prepared itself to finance a segment of the industrial elements of the ICS project. 2.02 The Project structuring with its implications for RCFS was the key issue. The hope that RCFS could be relied upon to provide full rail services to ICS was nullified by the Bank's documented evidence of RCFS's poor performance and the consultant's misgivings about its management capability. After considering various alternatives ranging from full ownership to leasing of equipment by ICS, it was decided that ICS sthould own and operate its own trains on RCFS's track, paying a track-user charge. This meant that ICS would have full responsibility for its own transport requirements and would be able to minimize sub- stantially the risks of serious accidents, as most of RCFS's accidents were attributable to weak discipline among locomo,tive drivers -- a problem which ICS would be better equipped to address through an effi- cient system of penalties and incentives without running into resistance from labor unions. ICS would also be responsible for the routine maintenance of its locomotives and wagons. In short, the transport operations would have all the benefits of relatively more efficient private management. 2.03 The Project was appraised in early 1981 and was approved by the Zoard in June 1981 on the basis of only a President's Report. 2.04 The Societe d'Exploitation Ferroviaire des ICS, (SEFICS) was created as a railway operating company, functioning as a majority-owned subsidiary of ICS. SEFICS was the borrower and beneficiary of the Bank lcan and was responsible for the project implementation and debt ser- vice. The loan was g-iaranceed by GOS. SEFICS was to conclude as conditions of effectiveness: (a) a Transport Agreement with RCFS covering charges for the use of its tracks; (b) a Tariff Agreement with ICS covering the tariffs for the transport services rendered; and (c) a Financing Agreement with RCFS in which RCFS would pay SEFICS the cost of repairing its siding tracks which SEFICS undertook to supervise under the project using RCFS's labor. Importantly and unlike the Rail agree- ment between Senegal and Mali, the Transport Agreement between SEFICS and RCFS laid down (a) operating guidelines for traffic coordination; (b) the conditions of service like number of trains, their punctuality, tonnages, etc., to be honored by both sides; and (c) the apportionment of damages in case of accidents and disruption of services. 2.05 Consultants EMC (para 2.01) prepared the statutes of SEFICS and defined its financial and organizational structure. It was, like ICS, placed under the tutelage of the Ministry of Industries. The principal shareholder in SEFICS was ICS; RCFS held a small minority participation to cover the cost of some existing siding tracks which - 3 - were taken over by SEFICS. The technical manager was recruited from PCFS and the financial manager was recruited from the private sector. she train operating staff were hand picked from RCFS. ICS nominated one of its senior managers as the General Manager of SEFICS. Except for a technical assistant for supervision in the workshop, financial and operating managements were entirely in Senegalese hands. Project Objectives 2.06 The major direct objective was to provide efficient, economi- cal and reliable transport for the raw materials, supplies and the finished products of the ICS Fertilizer Project with the requisite reliability and safety necessary to avoid disruption of the production schedules of the plant. As an indirect objective the project was intended by the Bank to be a first step towards the liberalization of the rail transport industry and eventual opening of the doors for restructuring of RCFS through possible privatization of certain opera- tions in order to upgrade the quality of the rail services to land-locked Mali. Project Description 2.07 To ach:leve these objectives, the Project included: (a) upgrad- ing and renewal of about 6 km of RCFS's siding track serving an existing fertilizer plant, whi:h was to be rebuilt as ICS's new fertilizer factory; (b) the-construction of rail terminals with loading and unload- ing facilities at the phosphate mine/phosphoric acid plant, at the fertilizer plant and at the Port; (c) procurement of locomotives, shunting locomotives, tank wagons, and hopper wagons, with adequate spare parts; (d) construction and equipping of a small workshop to maintain the locomotives and the wagons; and (e) signalling and telecom- munications at the junction between the siding tracks and RCFS's main- line. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST Effectiveness and Start-Up 3.01 The project was expected to be implemented between FY1982 and FY1984. The project became effective on 'larch 8, 1983. The delav in effectiveness was caused by the delay in the fulfillment of the condi- tions of cross-effectiveness of the IFC loan with the large number of co-lenders parrtcipating in the ICS project. However, this delay did not adversely affect SEFICS's start-up, as the procurement process progressed on schedule and the suppliers were initially paid out of the equity funds of ICS and later reimbursed from the project funds. Project Implementation 3.02 The project was implemented largely as conceived in the appraisal report, except for the procurement of one additional locomo- tive (para 3.05). The implementation schedule ran almost as planned at appraisal and the overall time over-run was no more than three to six months on some individual items. However, these small over-runs had no -4- adverse effect on the implementation of the ICS fertilizer project, which suffared bigger delays. SEFICS's capacity was thus ahead of ICS's demand on Lt. Project Costs 3.03 The project was implemented with a saving of US$8.1 m (Ta- ble 1). The savings are principally due to the favorable exchange rate of the French franc and the CFA franc, most of the contracts being payable in these two currencies (para 3.08). There was also a small reduction in the scope of the signalling and telecommunication compo- nent; the wagon maintenance facility was dropped in favor of using a private maintenance facility (para 3.09). Most of the pre-operating costs and the initial working capital provisions of the loan were not utilized, as ICS absorbed these relatively minor costs in its pre-operating and mobilization expenditures. Reporting I3. -v46 ICS's consultants provided satisfactory progress reports of the implementation of the whole ICS project, including SEFICS. However, this report covered general progress only. Detailed progress was monitored through supervisions and special reports gathered during supervision. Procurement 3.05 Procurement posed serious problems at the beginning, as the consultants were not familiar with the Bank's guidelines. Bid documents for critical items like locomotives and special wagons were prepared on the basis of known and preferred designs. However, they very soon fell in line with Bank's ICB procedures. During this process, the Senegalese managers were closely associated with the design criteria and bid evaluation, and there was an appreciable transfer of know-how. Revisions 3.06 The initial project design was based on the phosphoric acid storage being located at Dakar Port. The trains were scheduled to operate on a very tight schedule called the "circuit court." According- ly, SEFICS's traction requirement was estimated at 2.2 main line locomo- tives 1/ and three shunting locomotives. However, as ICS's factorv design evolved, the industrial consultant decided to shift the site of the main phosphoric acid storage from the Port of Dakar to M'bao, the site of the fertilizer plant, some 15 km west of Dakar. Besides, the number of weighbridges was reduced from two to one at M'bao. Both these design changes made it obligatory for all trains in both directions to pass through M'bao, adding some 26 km to a round trip of about 140 km. In addition, ICS decided to base all of its loco running staff at Taiba, on housing considerations and proximity to the maintenance facilities and not at both extremities, as initially planned. As a result of these 1/ At 75% availability, this was equivalent to three locomotives. - 5 - changes, the "circuit court" became unworkable and the train scheduling had to be recomputed. Consequently, the mainline traction needs rose from the original 2.2 locomotives to 2.6 locomotives. SEFICS could still have operated with three locomotives but should have maintained 85Z availability consistently, in order to have been able to do so. It was considered impractical to maintain such a high availability in Senegal, due to the long lead time needed for procurement of spare parts and the rather low quality of workmanship generally available locally. It was acided to take advantage of the ICB prices to increaie the number of main line locomotives from three to four but still expect SEFICS to maintain 70% availability throughout the service life of these locomotives (which, under West African conditions, wjuld be the highest consistent level on record). This additional locomotive was also justified on the the ultimate transfer of the phosphate traffic from RCFS to SEFICS, which is a GOS commitment. However, this transfer has still not taken place due to GOS's unwillingness to face labor unrest in RCFS. 3.01 Initially, three shunting locomotives were considered adequate for the three terminal points at 80% availability. This meant some time-sharing between Dakar Port and M'bao. However, with the new traffic planning requiring all trains to pass through M'bao, the time-sharing plan was -ot feasible and a fourth shunter was added to provide "on-demand" shunting at the three terminals. This additional equipment cost US$1.1 million equivalent, which was found from the savings in other categories. Disbursements 3.08 Disbursements lagged behind appraisal estimates because: (a) SEFICS financed initial payments to suppliers from ICS equity funds; (b) the dollars rose between appraisal (USS1 - CFAF 220) and the time the equipment was purchased (USSI - CFAF 370); and (c) except for the main line locomotives, all other equipment and works were performed by French contractors, and during this period, the French Franc (FF) reached record low levels vis-A-vis the US dollar. 3.09 The project had a net saving of US$8.0 million. The reasons for the savings were: (a) sharp rise of the dollar and fall of the French Franc; (b) non-utilization of the funds provided for signalling and telecommunications, as the SEFICS staff were actually found to be better disciplined and hence able to operate the three terminals at a high level of safety, thereby rendering additional safety devices redtnidant for the given level of traffic; (c) deletion of the wagon maintenance workshop; it was decided to contract with a private mainte- nance workshop in Dakar for wagon maintenance; (d) considerably lower cost of upgrading the siding tracks of RCFS due to use of some sec- ond-hand materials which were deemed to be satisfactory; and (e) non-utilization of a major portion of the loan allocated to pre-operat- ing costs and initial work'ng capital. - 6 - IV. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS A. Traffic 4.01 SEFICS's hauling capacity was initially intended to carry some 800,000 t of traffic, the ultimate transport capacity of ICS. However, considering the long growth. period of ICS and the depressed world fertilizer market, SEFICS was in the end designed to carry only 650,000 t. This level was expected to be reached after the first three years of operation of ICS. Actual traffic grew even more slowly than this forecast. In 1986, SEFICS carried 535,000 tons, which is about 82% of its design capacity (Table 2). B. Operations 4.02 SEFICS's locomotives were admittedly under-utilized as they ran only an average of 121 km/day (1986) as against 250 km/day for those of RCFS (1985) (Table 3), but they were much better maintained than RCFS'.s locomotives with an availability of 89% as opposed to 67% of RCFS and about 69% in Cameroon, which is a well-managed railway by West African standards. The workshops were adequate for all normal mainte- nance up to "annual visits." The staff were better disciplined than that of RCFS and used the spare parts and equipment prudently. The cost of maintenance of a locomotive was FCFA 10 million as compared to FCFA 56 million in RCES (para 6.01). Given that SEFICS's locomotives are relatively new at present, this maintenance cost could rise to FCFA 35 million in about five years but it would still be some 35% lower than in RCFS. These were the significant effects of the private owner- ship of the industry. 4.03 The availability of locotracteurs was 83% as against 65% of RCFS and 68% in Cameroon. The wagon availability was 92% as against 74% of RCFS and 85% in Cameroon (para 6.01). 4.04 The maintenance of wagons by a private contractor, Ateliers Ferroviaires de Dakar, was efficient. The conventional fears that maintenance of rolling stock by an external agency would result in operational constraints were not borne out in practice. The cost of maintenance of one wagon by this private company was FCFA 0.7 milLion while RCFS, which systematically under-maintains its wagons, cost FCFA 0.69 million per wagon (para 6.01). 4.05 Maintenance of the terminal tracks was also entrusted to a private contractor. The only other precedent is in Cameroon, and both experiences confirm the feasibility and efficiency of privatized track maintenance. The quality of maintenance is good, but precise cost comparisons are not available. Both wagon and track maintenance are instances of successful utilization of the private sector in railway maintenance, a powerful lesson for Senegal as well as for the developing countries. -7- V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE Income Statements 5.01 SEFICS's financial situation is intimately linked to the performance of ICS. Therefore, SEFICS's performance during the first two years of operation, 1984/85, essentially reflects the slow start-up of ICS, as the tonnages transported by SEFICS for ICS have been signifi- cantly lower than expected. The basic financial arrangements between SEPICS and ICS had been devised with the objective that SEFICS would neither incur book losses nor make profits, but still earn a reasonable return on fixed assets. ICS pays SEFICS exactly the full cost of transport, including all working expenses, depreciation and amortiza- tion, financial charges and provisions for renewal (set at 4% of the sum of all other expenses). Tariffs are set at the beginning of every year on the basis of SEFICS's budget; at the closing of the year, a comple- mentary payment by ICS, or conversely, a drawback payment from IS, is effected to balance exactly SEFICS's actual expense by income. 5.02 This formula, whereby SEFICS is guaranteed not to make any losses, does not provide much incentive for SEFICS to become on its own more efficient, or, conversely, does not impose any penalty for poor productivity. On the other hand, SEFICS is, at least at the beginning, much limited by its status of a quasi-operating department of ICS rather than of an independent sub-contractor. Recause of RCFS's dominating position with a monopoly for all other freight traffic, SEFICS has not until now been in any position to find other customers: SEFICS is thus limited to one unique customer, ICS, and is thus dependent on the fluctuations of ICS's demand, with little leverage for negotiations and little flexibility. Also, as an organization, SEFICS is very much integrated in ICS's structure (including buildings, financial manage- ment, administration, personnel management), which results in savings in overheads but, at the same time, makes SEFICS's administrative efficien- cy directly dependent on ICS's efficiency. Changing the financial arrangement between SEFICS and ICS would be justified only if SEFICS could expand its operations to other traffic than the sole transport for ICS. 5.03 SEFICS's income statements for 1984, 1985, and the first six months of 1986, are summarized in the table which follows. Detailed income statements, comparing actual results with appraisal forecasts are shown in Table 4. - 8 - CFAF Million te i 1984 1985 1986 (six months) Tonnage Handled (000) 306 461 261 Working Expenses 469 609 314 Depreciation and Amortization 429 433 220 Financial Charges and other Expenses. 580 544 350 Total Transport Revenues Equal to Total Exp,nses 1,478 1,586 856 Total Cost per Ton Handled (CFAF) 41830 3,440 3,280 /a Differs from total income which includes, in addition, minor non-operational income from force account works which are capitalized. Tonnage handled was 20% and 22% below forecast, respectively, for 1984 and 1985; total unit cost per ton was, respectively, 59% and 17% above appraisal forecast. Variable costs are more or less in line with forecasts, but fixed costs are higher in absolute terms and are spread over lower volumes of traffic. Because of the high fixed costs (which represented 77% of total costs in 1985), of which little can be cut in the short-term, SEFICS can hardly improve its results unless it trans- ports larger volumes (either for ICS or other customers). The results have been improving in 1986 as traffic for the first six months in- creased by 13%. As traffic is still 30% below SEFICS's capacity, the total cost per ton of transport is still about 26% above the forecast cost at full capacity. 5.04 Overall, the actual traffic between 1984 and 1986 has been 21% below forecasts. The gap between these actual and forecast figures reflects the gap between actual and forecast sales/production of ICS. The projections of ICS's industrial consultants were too optimistic bv underestimating starting difficulties of the industrial plant and market downturns. In addition, SEFICS is burdened by the fixed costs (depreci- ation and final charges) related to the acquisition of the fourth locomotive. As long as SEFICS cannot find additional traffic, this heavy burden will be supported by the ICS traffic only. Unfortunately, the willingness of the Government to allow SEFICS a share of the phos- phate traffic from RCFS has been overestimated. If no solution can be found to increase SEFICS's traffic, SEFICS will have to find alternative ways tc reduce its fixed costs, for example, by selling or leasing its. fourth locomotive to RCFS. Balance Sheets 5.05 SEFICS's actual balance sheets from 1982 to 1985, compared with appraisal forecasts, are shown in Table 5. On the basis of the long-term financial arrangements between SEFICS and ICS, whereby the financial burden is, in fact, borne by ICS, SEFICS has been from the onset financed with a high debt-equity ratio of about 85:15. While - 9 - total project cost was lower in US$ than forecast at appraisal, SEFICS's total fixed assets expressed in FCFA, are uipon project completion about 20% higher. than forecast, because of large variations in the FCFA/US$ exchange rate. Current assets and current liabilities are substantially higher than forecast. In particular, while cash was very low, accounts receivables were very high, about 10 months of revenues as of Decem- ber 31, 1985 due to ICS's difficult financial situation. Because of its very tight cash situation, ICS delays as much as possible in payments to SEFICS, and the latter makes short-term loans back to its parent company using available cash by delaying its payments to suppliers. As a result, the financial covenant whereby SEFICS's cash should amount to at least 25% of current assets was not fully complied with in 1985. Improvement of SEFICS's working capital can be expected only after an overall improvement of ICS's financial position. ICS's Financial Situation 5.06 ICS's performance has been poor, leading to a critical situa- tion after two years of operations, as cumulated losses reached FCFA-23 billion (US$61 m) against a capital of FCFA 25 billion. Total sales in 1985 reached only FCFA 25 billion, about 20% below forecast, mainly because of much lower than projected sales price of phosphoric acid due to the depressed world market. With little improvement in the world market situation in 1986 and ICS's results 2/, a drastic financial restructuring plan had to be proposed to ICS's shareholders and lenders,- with a package of about US$100 m of additional equity, rescheduling of existing loans, new loans, and reduction in energy charges for ICS. Continuation of ICS's activities, which is critical for the Senegalese economy, will be assured when this financial restructuring plan will be accepted and implemented by the parties involved, hopefully in 1987. Financial Targets and Covenants 5.07 Except for the covenant requiring SEFICS to maintain its cash at not less than 25% of its current assets as explained above, SEFICS has generally complied with the various financial covenants, i.e., current ratio of not less than 2.0, and debt-equity ratio of maximum 84:16, and minimum debt-service coverage ratio of 1.25. The special reserve for renewals is being built up at an annual rate of 4% of total operating expenses, and working ratio remained in 1984-85 well below the limit of 60%. Audits and Financial Management 5.08 Audits were carried out regularly and generally within the agreed time limits, and were satisfactory with the auditors providing an unqualified opinion. SEFICS's accounts are well kept in close collabo- ration with ICS's accounting department; SEFICS's financial management is de facto, controlled by ICS's staff. 2/ Net losses are estimated at FCFA 16 billion on sales of FCFA 23 billion in 1986. - 10 - VI. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6.01 The institutional performance of SEFICS, as noted under Sections IV and V above, was better than that of the publicly-owned and operated RCFS. Though some comparative figures have been provided earlier the following table provides a quick comparison of SEFICS and RCFS in operational efficiency in 1985-86. SEFXCS RCFS (1986) (1985-86) (i) Freight Traffic in Traffic Units (millions) 58 442 (ii) Mainline Locomotive Availability (S) 89 67 (iii) Shunting Locomotive Availability (') 82 39 (iv) Wagon Availability (%) 92 80 (v) Annual Cost of Maintenance of a Locomotive (millions FCFA) 10 56 (vi) Annual Cost of Maintenance of a Wagon (millions FCFA) 0.7 0.69 /a (vii)- Net ton-kI/staff ('000) 1,487 3,745 (viii) Average Cost of Transport (FCFA/t km) 15.36 20.46 /a RCFS's costs are lower because of insufficient maintenance. 6.02 The managers of SEFICS, as soon as they were exposed to the work ethic in a competitive situation, adapted quickly to.the challenges of the new situation and became more result-oriented than before. The reasons were: (a) better incentives; (b) higher accountability in the private sector environment; (c) higher staff discipline down the line; (d) more effective authority of the manager over the subordinates; (e) clearer definition of results expected; and (f) no union interfer- ence. All these motivations were lacking in RCFS. 6.03 However, even with experienced and sensitive management of this type, two weaknesses were apparent: (a) tendency to recruit more staff than necessary; and (b) inability to de-link past loyalties from current responsibilities. However, through repeated discussions, management began gradually to appreciate the need for stricter control on staff recruitment both in quality and quantity, and the need for a watchful attitude towards the quality of operational coordination obtained from RCFS. But such a sensitization in respect of (b) above was slow to take root. It was clearly seen in the manner in which the rights of SEFICS, in day-to-day train operations, train punctuality and priorities, accident enquiries, etc., were subordinated to the pressures of RCFS. SEFICS managers are continuously learning on the job and their exposure to commercial practices, management training in institutional structure, flows of authority, negotiating techniques and personnel management would help them to be better equipped to handle the problems in a private sector company. 6.04 The workshop staff and train drivers benefitted from the expatriate workshop supervisor who has established regular preventive maintenance routines and trouble shooting practices. - 11 - VII. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION 7.01 Economic evaluation was not carried out at the time of ap- praisal as this project was part of a larger program. However, a brief economic evaluation has been carried out by comparing SEFICS's transport costs with those which would have been incurred by RCFS if the latter had been chosen to transport ICS's products. Admittedly, RCFS's costs are not well documented and are therefore not susceptible to precise breakdown. On the premise that either SEFICS or RCFS would have had to incur the same investment costs and the same interest charges, the economic evaluation would consist in comparing the variable costs per t.km incurred by SEFICS with the incremental costs per t.km to RCFS had the latter been asked to undertake this operation. On the standard assumption that RCFS's variable costs are 75% of total costs, the average variable costs per t.km is approximately 15.36 FCFA/t.km (in 1985) of SEFICS as opposed to 20.46 FCFA/t.km of RCFS. After making allowances for RCFS's costs being understated due to inadequate mainte- nance, high accident costs (one locomotive and about five wagons per year) and frequent traffic interruptions (about 30 days/yr), RCFS's costs could increase to 26.6 FCFA/t.km. Comparison with the adjusted cost gives an ERR of about 13%. VIII. ROLE OF THE BANK 8.01 It was envisaged that the precedent set up by the establish- ment of SEFICS would lead to progressive privatization of other streams of RCFS's traffic. When SEFICS was well established and its operating efficiency was no more in doubt, several attempts were made to open a dialogue with the GOS to discuss the transfer of the 1.2 million t.p.a. (average) phosphate traffic from RCFS to SEFICS, but the Ministry of Equipment and the Senior Management of RCFS, in their anxiety to avoid labor unrest in RCFS, have not responded positively. These inhibitions entertained at the highest political level effectively prevented SEFICS's management from bidding to the Phosphate Company for the phosphate traffic in competition with RCFS, even though the Phosphate Company was willing to evaluate the bids purely on a commercial basis. 8.02 While the privatization initiative has admittedly not proceed- ed further, the transport sector dialogue has gained from this project, as it has succeeded in demonstrating the large efficiency gains that can be attained in the state-owned railway company if it were better run, as well as in sensitizing the Government and the management of RCFS to the stark reality that unless the RCFS's staff productivity and institution- al efficiency are substantially increased in the short-term, financial bankruptcv would be imminent even in spite of new investments to attract - 12 - traffic 3/. In the light of this new awareness, the dialogue took on an urgency in 1986 in the context of the Structural Adjustment Loan and Transport Sector Project under preparation. As a result, the GOS reached certain "landmark" agreements with the Bank in December 1986, on (a) reduction of investments on track rehabilitation from US$88.0 m to US$36.0 m; (b) abandonment of all new investments other than those contained in an agreed investment plan; and (c) willingress to close down branch lines, if pre-determined trials prove them to be uneconomic. These are major changes in the GOS's rail policy, the like of which had not been seen in two decades, and the origins of these far-reaching reforms can be traced to RCFS's awareness of the gravity of its finan- cial situation partly induced by the success of SEFICS as a competitor. IX. CONCLUSIONS 9.01 Overall, this project was a success to the extent of provoking the above-mentioned shifts in railway policy. Possibly, in the future, the lessons learned from SEFICS may find a wider application in the reorganization of international containe- traffic to Mali. 1Kowever, that would require not only more time but much greater effort to bring about a consensus in both railways for such innovative solutions like a commercially mandated international transport company either wholly private or with a significant private participation. 3/ On this crucial issue of privatization, the Ministry of Equipment has made the following observation on this report: "The authors have sought to demonstrate the advantages of privatizing the railroads... However, it should be noted that comparison of results cannot provide a convincing argument in favor of privatization... These two enterprises (SEFICS and RCFS) are not of the same size, do not have the same institutional framework and what is more, they operate in totally different economic and social environments... RCFS has to compete with the highway, despite personnel and infrastructure costs, which are hard to reduce..." This comment reflects the concerns and the position of the Government stated in para. 8.01 above. - 13 - ANNEX I (English translation of Min. of Equipment's Observations) Page 1 of 3 88E0442 February 2, 1988 French (Senegal) 17S/10 JCB:mec Republic of Senegal Ministry of Equipment Confidential Coordination of Transport Sector Project The Coordinator Resident Representative Dakar, January 21, 1988 Senegal: PCR SEFICS Railroad Project (Loan 2025-SE) Dear Sir: Following the letter dated December 28, 1987 from Mr. Graham Donaldson, Chief, Agriculture and Infrastructure Division, OED, concerning the SEFICS project, I now have pleasure in sending you the comments of the Director of Overland Transport on the PCR. Please forward these comments to Mr. Donaldson. Very truly yours, Is/ Amadou Lamine Ba - 14 - ANNEX I Page 2 of 3 Republic of Senegal Ministry of Infrastructure Directorate of Transport Department of Overland Transport Dakar, January 20, 1988 Comments on PCR SEFICS Railroad Project (Loan 2C25-SE) The SEFICS Railroad Project PCR traceG the origins of the project and describes its progress up to the present time. The authors have sought to demonstrate the advantages of privatizing the railroads, to make the authorities more aware of those advantages, and to encourage them to orient their efforts to rehabilitate Regie des Chemins de Fer du Senegal (RCFS) in that direction. However, it should be noted that comparisons of the results of SEFICS with those of RCFS cannot provide a convincing argument in favor of privatizing, even less completely dismantling RCFS. These two enterprises are not the same size, do not have the same institutional framework, and, what is more, they operete in totally different economic and social environments. SEFICS is a small subsidiary of ICS, with new equipment, and, moreover, the monopoly of an assured and profitable market, while RCFS has to compete with the highway, despite high personnel and infrastructure costs, which are hard to reduce. - 15 - ANNEX I Page 3 of 3 The profitability of SEFICS is closely linked to that of ICS; a slump in the world fertilizer market could seriously endanger the life of this entity, regardless of the competence of its managers. Ho1aver, it is gratifying to note that the Senegalese authorities are reluctant to transfer phosphate haulage from RCFS to SEFICS, and that they have signed an agreement with the World Bank to redefine the railroad's future role, based on a study whose findings should lead to a compromise on the social and commercial concerns of the different parties. /s/ Babacar Diop - 16 - English translation of cable from SEFICS) ANNEX II ZCZC DIST6078 JWS0121 OED01 REF: TCP SD OEDD1 JWS0121 2KR436 IN 08/11137 OUT 08/11143 31434 ICSMBAO SG TELEX .; 0 004 of 08/02/1988 THE WORLD BANK WASHINGTON OBJECT: LOAN 2025 SE - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ATT'N MR. GRAHAM DONALDSON DIVISION CHIEF OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPART1MENT WE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF OUR PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TO WHICH YOU ASSIGNED LOAN 2025 SE. AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF THE REPORT, WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR CONMENTS TO MAKE. SINCERELY, MR. JOSE PEIX DEPUTY OFFICER, SEFICS 31434 ICSMBAO SC 31434 ICSMBAO SG =02081403 NNNN _ | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'911-lUI satii 141 bvlsmW Oil .13 T IM SIR abuf0l}a v,l 4its abt#lt* aq; 'Ise) Ifnw} j,j 't p , ji,* Cn s-o iplstrid i pas5nh ztetql $0 1fir - t *4t- 't t S9' 111 LE 021 5) 3601 %II US 7 *t I' t ) 1 9 agg3 s It't 0if wiIt 21,)1 * sttS Ct" * .mf Si... ti s tu titti. :. R - ,,, ,,-,-,,, t.?...... t f t ti ei ot-e Ot euw Oo~ e ii ttre es~ i~ti ~ OQ; ti&3 ~u 'si.tt 9 o9 _.__ .__ts. .__,e ,ase _,. tis ._ ttl . . ..... u. *~. .. ................ ...... Sl t ,S*1 US eo-o e0o- onO itt tti Uc ,s es -* ;Isbubuow 1 tm-i ire wel "Ite w0oe Set 1't 3s i s ;0t1 S00t)t0z &IJ4 Ct-O ire OI tl Oe - v t n, lt n s nsind *sut4 *g,oit 3Set;dr 3Utaox ellultU3 1. RSt- ri i U 5 25 n-o n-e u-e 00e 2- 0'9 95 31 tIC fit e 1s;O;i5 a's w50 all 051 0010 0010 It 0 of 0 as isw,lns buwisp "i "ju9piit .j til t til US nI-o Uie 001e 9t 99 0 it? .5 mxhlots;soa bulimp tsanimlt I7 t is ' til t e " eI oo oI t 011 9t O lueistOi nt,Aot saipajs) usu es ds pru 'I lii- &SII WIt U*S ZVII lilt WI S911 OWl~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~|s0 03 IOV lICK- *3 1 103 9s*5 3e-s see-o t sUtX o1 -ez ISi 11 91 n3 11 III' N9 tSW jl'tt 9iU §C __ _ _~~~~~~ ... . ... .. -- - -- - -- - . -- -- - - - -- - - -- ~t SQ-I 05 31 33 0 01t 111 (i 0S lP 13 0g 95 1003nWi l.Id (t t'L 1 I JU 1 - 1 I 31 Iole oAlt 16 0 7t04 1t49 & i5 1K00369 Io3I ' "It ",I Oe it 1 tOi re eo- bt i at nC asC 0 sind sz, ds g ntm uso4o0 0l t)tjvunIS t toll toll Iti it, al l 1 e3 00 3t It Sil Lol 99d9;jS *213013510 5At)OS0OlOl *t PVIt iii t e tntl t e- 0017 e09 109 0 t1lUl 119'1 0 sl5d ands Vtn UoeilcumOal - ju ldombi 11 Ut- 'tS ILS U' l illt K 8 K0 1t- 9011 Mt'PI t81 Kl'l Ott 311 31Ko0rin __~~~~~~~~ -- ---__.- -- ..... ..... .... --- "It itI til lilt 11e * or 11 101 (Si Olt 5tt St 3m4 fil 911 p79 'DV# V *9°S5I9 I t 113 1010Sill "It WIti 44UINPl ttt' Q IN tP t 31963 ilaSi IUT lti tIfl SIUOW N )03 ubtamj i9e 19301 ti 111131W - - - ------- - 19301 UlII-SIW1W34IIIJ9OSIUNIrnW~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---------- JIMlI JMV PII VIfiAti P I P ltl ,d1111A) 1#301 31ItIIS3 lFSIn 111161 'tsJOIe 1#301 1f1°l vtsliti Itiel f iWI 1113 J 31M UinAl5 l SS3 mitl3 m fltlS I t110 3Is" 3 1is) WSM4.V IS3103 M19 51603 NlxtA1d 0 111)1) 1113 MM* Ow9 1i5329 * 1-1 la0 131O IUI3 1 351 3 3s-uet wooal 1139tO3 i l llQ'I uf 1113ii3 A 81M1F*l - 18 - Table 2 REPUILIC OF SENE£AL- SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PRCJECT, LOAN 2025-SE PROJECT CONPI.ETION REPORT ctual Freight Traffic by Comodity 1984 1985 1986 Comondity --_-_- Tons Tao-km Tons Tom-km Tons Tan-km Sulphur 117,054 14,405,894 121,822 14,996,914 165,015 20,791,890 Phosphoric cid 165,722 17,566,532 293,521 31,113,226 336.033 35,619,498 Phosphbwic Sulphur 0 0 6,450 683,700 8.9f 952,940 Fertilizer 12,912 258,240 17,130 342,600 7,995 159,900 Phosphate 184 19,080 8,621 913,826 6,093 645,858 Fuel 9,990 1,258,740 13.860 1,536,480 10,852 85,900 TOTAL 305.858 33,519.486 461,404 49,596,742 534,978 58,255,886 Source: Sefics WAPTR !trl-a7 - 19 - Fibi. 3 REPIJLIC OF SENEGAL SEFICS Rl'!L TRRT PROJECT, LOAN 2025-SE PROJECT COIUlETION REPORT Selected Operating Statistics, 1984-1986 aorresponding tStatistics of RCFS 1984 1985 1986 1 t995 TRAFFIC Freight tons '000 306 461 35 1 1,953 Freight tan-ke (million) 33 50 58 1 442 Average haul (kgl too 108 108 1 226 OPERATIONS I Trains-wk ('000) 77 125 1421 - Locomotive-km ('000) 89 131 143 Number of locootives in fleett Hainline (large) 4 4 4 26 Shunting 4 4 4 23 Nueber of freight cars 76 76 76 691 Percentage availability: Mainline locomotives (larqe) 922 87% 892 92 Shunting 76Z a3% 8321 65% Freight cars 95% 93% 92A7: 7 OPERATING EFFICIENCY Locomotive-kmiaainline locoeotive avail. (I000I 27 38 40 1 Naoon-kmiyear t0Ot) 1.551 2,270 2,908 Loaded wagon-kmlyear ('0001 782 1,164 1,472 1 Freight net ton-keifreiqht car avail.iyear ('000) 457 707 830 864 Net ton-ke per train 50,512 50,088 52,769 Gross ton-km per train 83,939 82,09& 87.351 1 Freight net ton per train 468 462 487 1 0 Staff strenqth 35 40 39 i 3.6 k Net ton kulStaff ('00' 943 1.250 1.487 116 …-…-- ---------------------… ----------------------- Source: Sefics WAPTR I i~~~NTaye - 20 - Table 4 KSULIC OF SENE6AL iEFICi RAIL TRliWPOIf PRJECT, LOAN 2025-SE PJECT cRPLTloU R RT COlMPES OE RESULTATS FREYisIhilEJS T REALISES 191441 (NIiliacns Fancs CFA) 194 198:5 1981 PROJc E REALISE PF0JETE REALISE PROJETE REALISE TONMASE TRASPORTE (12 los) (6 lots) (000 TOINIESI ;84 506 *88 Ul 112 261 PROCUITS PRODUIT DU TRANSP3RT PAIEIENTS PROGRESSIFS n.a 960.00 n.j 1978.00 115.00 851.00 PAIEIENTS DE RE6ULARISATION n.a '18.00 n.j 292.00 TOTAL 1169.00 1478.00 1(99.00 1586.00 1165.00 856.00 Z2Z3s* sU2U m:3*2S 28in _ -C~ AUTRES PRODUITS - t01.00 - 61.00 - 2.00 TOTAL PRODUltS 1169.00 1579.00 :1i3.00 1647.00 1685.00 884.00 _ ~~~s33s2 ~322 81S8 CHARSES FERSONDEL 180.00 1-.30 2:0. iD 156.00 240.00 72.00 CAIRURAIT I 4ATIeES :76.CO S.QO 2-a.D0 1:8.00 312.00 59.00 AUTRE-3 C EHS 3ElPLAITDi T 77..; , ii.D 179.00 104.00 M3.00 FEASEi RF:M i9.i0 1.0 .:.Oi 146.00 174.00 '6.00 TOTAL CHARMSE O EXlFITATIGN 1.0:. 'tOO -5:.00 609.00 830.00 314.00 AMORTt:-:EMENTS' * ib. 4; 9.00 :;.OD 435.00 357.00 2X0.00 INTE9-S i .3 c4^43.00 t;:.) ! 01.O0 PR.SiCN 4: 61.00 : .uO o *9.0 :RFCTS w 3: :" F.tTR; . - 1.iO ; 1.00 i4-T :HARES F!lA i.3;E-; :: .: ::'.Oo 44.0 543.00 4S43.00 * .3.00 RCT;S ' TS :McSIL. (TIMENS i .;.b ::;.00 34i:4.66 4415.00 321S.00 :i-.u KEDEtMENT SUR ACT:S SETS (1) I:.t ;4.9 1i.7 12.3 13.5 14.7 .^E.':ICIENT 3'EIFLGI AT ON ! * ;0 47 37 49 :6 iJ.VES: ETATS MONA0CIERS SEF::; 4LZIE- S;i4--.. ETAS FINANCIERS SEFClt :0 AOiN IM6 - 21 - Table 5 REPUIC O SE1ESAL SEFICS RAIL TRANSPORT PRIJECI, LOAN 2025-SE PROJECT COIIETIOM REPOlT BILQAS PMEVISIINU I REULISES: M2-8 I2bilioBi Fracs CFAI t912 19s 1n. 1985 PROJETE EALISE PRt4ETE REALISE MBETE REALISE PROJETE REALISE ACTIF ACTIFS CtRCULtIS TRESOtIRIE 153.00 1.00 B0.00 2069.00 113.00 IB5.00 420.00 13.OO EFFETS A RECEVOI -- - 6.00 145.00 705.00 196.00 135e.00 ; STOW S - - 1.00 158.00 19.00 215.00 125.00 TOTAL 5S3.00 I.CO 80.00 2095.00 416.00 909.00 83l.00 1O03.00 I2OIOIILISATIONS CORPORELLES TALEUMS BRUTES - - 3671.00 i710.00 5055.00 3710.00 48e9.00 tOINS AMORT1SS00E1TS - - 56.00 I69.00 376.00 380.00 679.00 190O8. RETTES EN SERVICE - - .621.00 .541.00 4679.00 1iSO.00 4150.00 INNOB. EN COLRS 12X5.00 1:t.00 ;599.00 1239.00 - - - AUTRES 1P9 BILISATMICS ZL6.)9 : 04.00 664.0 110C.00 16t3.00 1030.00 1054.00 TOTVL ACTiF .:2.. :1.: 4 .;0 tO9.00 5:17.a0 7451.00 5191.JO t:)30ou ' WSYSSS: $:SS:S5:3~~~~~~a tts$S:SXI tfltfl*fl c::SI ***:SSSSZ 3-lZflfl =::::S::: E7lIGBLE A C:..T TEFtE - - - 4643.00 35.00 493.00 57.30 *4. .o ECHEANCE :ETTE L! - 163.00 A iOINS C1 ANl ----- TOTAL - - - 4643.00 35.00 4e2.00 i20.00 1). :0 CETTES A LEAS TEFAE 149.00 !4.-0 4013.00 2975.00 4287.00 4148.00 4115.00 51 . CAPITAUI FRCfOES CAPITAL SOCIA . '. 1.00 750.00 1.00 T50.00 750.00 750.00 RESERVES - 45.00 60.00 l06.00 TOTAL 75.C0 a. 7.0.00 1.00 795.00 810.00 856-.0 TOTAL PASSIF 17:4.00 473.00 7619.00 5117.00 7451.00 5191.30 ---- -_----___. ...... .S..S.l S3h±h t.S.....t ........S .::ZttS S:2S..:::: PATIO DE LIQUIOITE -- 1.9 1.8 *.I RATIO C'E6METTEKEN1T 9:22 P1 84:1. 99:1 84:16 83:17 3:1 9:1S SOURCE: ETATS FtNAICIEPS SZF!CS AUDITES i9eves IBRD 1306i- ~~~~ 10> ~~~~~~~~~~~RASBTOXp C, f 0 T<-'¢1i F P R N'' E AS N 5 E A vsv ° . .- $ ) J ~~~~~~~~~~~~~WST AFRICA Fi. AL^UmI~~_ G E I SENEGAL tF F t+t X } t z s~~~~~~~~~~~LI Y A THIRD RAIllWAY PROJECT 0o \ Railways \9C) RQ* du Ch Rom>in de F rdu n-egal r - _.| s ! .\ , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ ~~~~~~E.rthro-ds St Lou 1J' \, i- .gjj IIUTR DAKAPorb "r2. _ =4 t N I G E R . C H A D . ,, e AMBAU* B>Af URKINA FASiO < X Lh GU5NeA- /- < ef ' KS't OFELESIS ,. / \ J t ' G~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ E A \< O^UD '- ~~_¢ ebwru**|Bs*th|,*Sa¢Z~~~~a tQU^tORtAt GUINEo,1 _. A} ,- RzVEfi - *7 Sb~~~~~41 _CX_w_dEd_i___,, w-+- - e_ ; { -Ai5n- - r s t~~~. ."',fd ,,,,>w_d AXA l< !. . __O\|E r 1 .;,> 1> G 8 'Nt tOPtE' flE, t 2 X JNEU1