Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: 25275
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
(IDA-24320)
ON A
LOAN/CREDIT/GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ MILLION
TO THE
MALI
FOR A
PRIVATE SECTOR ASSISTANCE
12/30/2002
Private Sector Group
Africa Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their
official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.



CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective November 2002)
Currency Unit = CFAF
US$ I = CFAF 700
FISCAL YEAR
January 1  December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
APEP         Agency for the Promotion of Private Initiative
(Agence pour la Promotion de I 'Entreprise Privee)
BEP          Office of Public Enterprises (Bureau des Entreprises Publiques)
DNAE         National Directorate of Economic Affairs
(Direction Nationale des Affaires Economiques)
DNCC         National Directorate of Commerce and Economic Affairs
(Direction Nationale du Commerce et de la Concurrence)
DNTCP        National Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting
(Direction Nationale du Tresor et de la Comptabilite Publique)
FIAS         Foreign Investment Advisory Service
OHADA        Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa
(Organnisation pour l'Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique)
PMU          Project Management Unit
PRSP         Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSD          Private Sector Development
SAR          Staff Appraisal Report
Vice President:  Callisto Madavo
Country Manager/Director:  A. David Craig
Sector Manager/Director:  Demba Ba
Task Team Leader/Task Manager:  Francois Nankobogo



MALI
PRIVATE SECTOR ASSISTANCE
CONTENTS
Page No.
1. Project Data                                                                     1
2. Principal Performance Ratings                                                    1
3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry          2
4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs                                             6
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome                              13
6. Sustainability                                                                  14
7. Bank and Borrower Performance                                                   15
8. Lessons Learned                                                                 17
9. Partner Comments                                                                18
10. Additional Information                                                         26
Annex I. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix                               3 1
Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing                                               33
Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits                                               35
Annex 4. Bank Inputs                                                               36
Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components               38
Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance                                  39
Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents                                              40






Project ID: P001747                                      Project Name: PRIVATE SECTOR ASSIS
Team Leader: Francois Nankobogo                          TL Unit: AFTPS
ICR Type: Core ICR                                       Report Date: December 30, 2002
1. Project Data
Name: PRIVATE SECTOR ASSIS                          L/C/TF Number: IDA-24320
Country/Department: MALI                                               Region: Africa Regional Office
Sector/subsector: General industry and trade sector (58%); Central
government administration (30%); Banking (6%);
General finance sector (5%); Housing finance and
real estate markets (1%)
KEY DATES
Original           Revised/Actual
PCD:   09/27/1989                            Effective:                    07/08/1993
Appraisal:  09/13/1991                               MTR:
Approval:  11/12/1992                             Closing:                     03/31/2002
Borrower/lImplementing Agency: GOVT OF MALI/MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Other Partners:
STAFF                Current                                  At Appraisal
Vice President:      Callisto E. Madavo                       Edward V. Jaycox
Country Manager:     A. David Craig                           Katherine Marshall
Sector Manager:      Demba Ba                                  Silvia Sagari
Team Leader at ICR:  Franqois Nankobogo
ICR Primary Author:  Diame Youssouf Thiam
2. Principal Performance Ratings
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly
Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)
Outcome: S
Sustainability: L
Institutional Development Impact: M
Bank Performance: S
Borrower Performance: S
QAG (if available)        ICR
Quality at Entry: S
Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes
Project outcome, and Bank and Borrower Performance are marginally satisfactory.



3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry
3.1 Original Objective:
The Private Sector Assistance Project (Credit 2432-MLI) for a credit amount of SDR 8.2 million
or US$ 12 million equivalent was approved by the Board on Novemberl2, 1992. The credit
became effective on July 8, 1993. The original closing date was December 31, 1999; it was
extended twice for a total of 27 months to March 31, 2002.
The principal objective of the Project, as described in the Staff Apraisal Report (No 10459-MLI),
was to help foster the development of private sector enterprises, so that they could lead the
growth of Mali's economy. The project aimed at putting in place mechanisms and measures to
support the Government's strategy of breaking from past reliance on the public sector. The
project proposed to achieve this by: (a) completing implementation of improvements to the
regulatory environment that had been introduced starting in the late eighties; (b) assisting a private
business support structure, APEP, the Agence pour la Promotion de l'Entreprise Privee, to
coordinate a program of institutional support to private non-financial enterprises; (c) improving
the functioning of economic chambers (principally the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
Mali), the Government's office charged with public enterprise reform, BEP, and departnents of
the administration responsible of administering regulations affecting private enterprises; and (d)
inducing the strengthening of the banking sector and the preparation of a coherent financial sector
strategy.
The project was prepared during a period of political unrest that resulted in the overthrow in 1991
of a government that had held power since the sixties, and which pursued centrally planned
economic policies until the late eighties. Preparation continued in 1991-92 during a transition
government and the election of a new government in 1992. The credit was approved after the
election of this new government.
The project, which was in line with Bank strategy for Mali at the time, aimed to support reforms
in economic policies. These had begun to be put in place in the late eighties and were designed to
liberalize the economy and reduce the role of the state. In the context of the project, the
Government prepared a Private Sector Development Strategy Statement in which it confirmed its'
commitment to policies, which ensured a stable macroeconomic environment while leaving
productive activities to the private sector. It was one of the first private sector support projects in
Africa, innovative for its time, and largely consistent with best practice at the time.
The project had complex implementation arrangements. Overall responsibility of the project was
assigned to a "Supervisor' in the Ministry for Promoting Private Initiative, which was under the
Prime Minister's Office. Implementation was assigned to a Project Management Unit in the same
ministry and to APEP, a professional association of private Malian organizations. The PMU was
charged with coordinating all project components. It was also charged with their execution,
except for the direct support to private enterprises and a communications program which were the
responsibility of APEP. In implementing the project, the PMU was to collaborate with the
following agencies: the National Directorate of Economic Affairs (DNAE) and the National
Directorate of Industry for the regulatory component; the Office of Public enterprises (BEP) on
matters relating to privatization; the National Directorate of Treasury and Public Accounting
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(DNTCP) on studies on the financial sector; and with the Central Bank of West Africa on support
to the commercial banks. The PMU was charged with maintaining project accounts, procurement,
disbursement, and audits for the project. Some key institutions were not involved in components
for which they had a leading role, such as the Ministry of Justice for the legal subcomponent.
There were also difficulties with the design of the support fund to private enterprises, a subject
discussed in the section dealing with revised components below.
The appraisal report identified key risks. These were related to the sustainability of the political
democratization underway in Mali, and the maintenance of a policy framework supportive of
private sector development. The appraisal spelled out the measures which were intended to
mitigate these risks. These measures included the formulation of the Government policy towards
the private sector embodied in its letter of policy mentioned above, and by the creation of a
ministerial level position in the Prime Minister's office to be charged with private sector issues
which would work closely with stakeholders. A second risk was that APEP would misuse its
independence. This risk was to be mitigated by the approval by the Bank of the procedures
manual, the fact that the performance of the Director General would have to be satisfactory to the
Bank at all times, and intense supervision by the Bank. In hindsight, the risks of supporting an
ambitious project in a country which was undergoing a transition in its political structures and
economic policies, as well as the weaknesses, of the institutions involved in the project might have
been underestimated. Actions taken such as the preparation of the APEP procedures manual,
proved insufficient. Lastly, the appraisal could not have anticipated regional initiatives such as that
relating to accounting which affected the project.
3.2 Revised Objective:
The project objective was not revised, although project components and implementation
arrangements were modified to reflect lessons learnt in similar operations elsewhere, rationalize
project management, and integrate regional initiatives. The changes introduced are discussed in
the section on Revised Components below.
3.3 Original Components:
The original four components of the project as described in the SAR and detailed in the
Development Credit Agreement are summarized below:
1. Regulatory Component. This component aimed to improve and help implement reforms of the
institutional and regulatory environment, and consisted of: (a) enlargement of the role of the
guichet unique (one-stop investment office) to include all key administrative formalities routinely
requested of businesses and physical location of offices of the guichets closer to businesses in the
regions; (b) revision and upgrading of the national accounting plan; and (c) modernization of legal
texts (laws, regulations and procedures) on corporate rights and bankrupcy.
2. Institutional Support Component. This component consisted of: (a) support to private
enterprises including (i) assistance to non financial private enterprises, including associations, to
upgrade, among other things, their management policies and procedures, accounting, production,
technology, marketing and training of staff, and (ii) commercial banks for audits and institutional
diagnoses, staff training and implementation of institutional development programs; and (b)
strengthening of business promotion and regulation agencies including the Office of Public
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Enterprises, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Directorates of Economic Affairs
and Industry of the Ministry of Industry.
3. Studies Component. This component was to finance two studies to explore options to deepen
the financial system in the areas of urban mutual saving credit schemes and housing finance, and
the preparation of an overall financial sector strategy.
4. Communication Component. This component consisted of a program  of information
dissemination to ensure that target groups became familiar with the project, and with government
reforms in the regulatory environment affecting businesses and the usefulness of quality technical
services in improving business.
The project components were related to the project objectives. However, the design of the
support program subcomponent to private enterprises had problems. The subcomponent was
defined as a pilot at appraisal, although the amount assigned to it in the credit agreement was
substantial (SDR 2.2 million out of a total credit of SDR 8.2 million). The program financed
approximately 75 percent of expenditures through interest free credits with a long grace period.
These arrangements were inappropriate for technical assistance to the expected beneficiaries,
which were small enterprises, and there were no clear mechanisms for recovery. In addition, key
activities to be supported related to increasing availability of term financing by preparing bankable
projects. In practice, in its early years, the support fund concentrated on feasibility studies which
did not result in increased access to long term financing. In addition to the problems with the
support fund to private enterprises, another difficulty of the project appears to have been the
emphasis given to support of public sector agencies.
3.4 Revised Components:
The problems with project design and the implementation arrangements were identified early on in
project implementation. In late 1995, an extensive consultation process involving the Government
and key stakeholders was started with a workshop by the World Bank Institute. The process
resulted in a revision of project components and implementation arrangements. The consultation
process coincided with a growing Government concern on the need to expedite reforms to
enhance private participation in the economy, and helped build ownership among key
stakeholders. The amendments to the project legal agreements were finalized in December 1997
and became effective in March 1998. The long period of project restructuring was required not
only because of the consultation process, but also because a number of institutional changes
needed to be introduced such as the modification of the statutes of the implementing agency,
APEP. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, project restructuring coincided with several
changes in task teams at the Bank, which probably did not contribute to a speedy completion of
the restructuring process.
The amendment sought to focus the project on priority activities -- reforms in the legal and
regulatory environment, the provision technical assistance to the private sector, and the
establishment of a public-private consultative process - which were also priorities in the
Government program and the Bank Country Assistance Strategy at the time. The principal
changes involved modifications in the project components and implementation arrangements. The
amendment did not require Board approval as the project objectives were very broad and
-4 -



remained unchanged.
The main changes in project components were: (i) support for the establishment of a unit in the
Ministry of Justice to coordinate reforms of the legal and regulatory framework, and (ii) a
reformulation of the arrangements for the private sector support component to make the
assistance demand-driven; the program was converted into a matching grant fund, which is in line
with best practice. The communications component in the original description was dropped as
communications and information activities were included in all remaining components. Activities
dealing with support to the financial sector institutions included in Component 2 in the original
description were dropped as these were to be included in a Financial Sector Project under
preparation at the time. Project activities in the financial sector were thus limited on studies and
the preparation of a financial sector strategy. The revised project description has two components
as follows:
-     Improvements of the business, institutional and regulatory framework component,
consisting of: (1) consolidation of legal and administrative procedures for business start up into a
single office (Guichet Unique); (2) establishment and implementation of a new national
accounting scheme for private firms accounting; (3) establishment and operation of a unit in the
Ministry of Justice to initiate and coordinate reforms of the legal business environment; and (4)
strengthening of legislative and regulatory business environment to promote private sector
development.
-     An institutional support component, consisting of: (1) support to non-financial private
enterprises; (2) strengthening of institutions involved in private sector activities including support
to (a) private sector advocacy organizations, (b) the Office of Public Enterprises (BEP) which
dealt with privatization, (c) other public agencies dealing with private sector, and (d) the Ministiy
of Finance to improve its capacity to promote the dialogue and prevent/resolve disputes between
the Government and the private sector; and (3) preparation of a financial sector strategy.
As part of the restructuring of the project, a public-private consultation mechanism was put in
place. In addition, project management arrangements were simplified. The project management
unit which had not performed well was merged into APEP, and the functions in procurement,
disbursements accounting and financial management for the project transferred to APEP. The
statutes of APEP were revised to make the Board more representative. The revisions of the
Statutes also improved APEP's accountability in the use of public funds, and provided the
Government with safeguards in the use of public funds. At restructuring, the function of providing
overall supervision to project was formally transferred to the Ministry of Industry. The
restructuring team noted that the project was still ambitious, and that a major concern was the
capacity of APEP to manage the project, an assessment which turned out to be correct. The
project was amended a second time in 1999 to provide for support to the construction of a
building for the Private Sector Center, to house the one stop investment office and other public
and private offices providing services to the private sector, including APEP. The Govermment
requested this support very early in the project, but the Bank agreed to it only when progress had
been achieved in the one-stop investment office operations and in other regulatory reforms, as
well as issues of design, cost and financing had been resolved.
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3.5 Quality at Entry:
The project was one of the first generation PSD projects prepared in the early 1 990s. Quality at
entry is rated satisfactory. The rating takes into account that there was limited experience with
this type of project in Africa. The project predates the establishment of the Quality Assurance
Group, and therefore no assessment was done by the group of quality at entry. The project also
predates the introduction of the logical fiamework approach, and a logical framework was thus
not included in the SAR. Performance indicators were defined at project restructuring.
The SAR contains a good review of the private sector and the problems that it faced, and an
attempt to assess benefits and risks. The appraisal reflects considerable preparation work, and
includes details on the procedures manual for the project and the intemal procedures of APEP. It
also contains draft terms of reference for studies relating to the financial sector. As indicated
above, the project design had a number of shortcomings. It covered a wide range of activities, and
had a complex implementation arrangement which does not seem to have taken fully into account
the difficulties of using a public sector agencies with limited project implementation capacity and
young private sector institutions. Furthermore, implementation arrangements did not involve the
Ministry of Justice, a key agency. The technical assistance to private enterprises, which was
viewed as a pilot program, was not demand driven and had a complex recovery mechanism;
however, the project predates successful experiences with matching grant funds. The problems of
design were addressed at restructuring.
4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs
4.1 Outcome/achievement ofobjective:
The project's outcome is rated marginally satisfactory. Despite a difficult start, in the end, the
project partly achieved its objective of helping to foster the development of private sector
enterprises, and putting in place mechanishms and measures to support the Government's strategy
of breaking from past reliance on the public sector. The project was restructured, and the main
project activities after restructuring --the legal and regulatory reform and the matching grant
program -- yielded important resuts. The project contributed to improvements in the policy and
regulatory framework, and there is evidence that the changes brought about have contributed to
business creation and investment. The project also supported the preparation of a comprehensive
financial sector strategy that led to the definition of a Government sector reform program. There
is also evidence that the matching grant program has contributed to enterprise development,
although the impact of the program cannot be fully assessed. The work on financial sector reform
followed a consultative process of the public and private sectors, but activities under the project
did not promote a public-private dialogue, as expected at restructuring. The secretariat of the
Public-Private Consultative Group carried out a number of studies and it is hoped that these will
be used as the basis for an expanded consultation process. The project established the practice of
government support to the nascent private sector. However, the institutions and mechanisms that
provide support such as APEP and the matching grant program, have not been institutionalized
and the future of APEP is uncertain.
4.2 Outputs by components:
Outputs by components are summarized below. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the
appraisal did not contain perfonnance indicators. These were developed at restructuring and are
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summarized in Annex 1 to this report.
Improvement of Business, Institutional and Regulatory Framework Component
One-Stop Investment Office (Guichet Unique)
Performance under this subcomponent is satisfactory. Under the project, procedures for business
start up were consolidated and a one-stop investment office, the "Guichet Unique," was
established. The office began operations in 1995, and now includes all agencies that provide
approvals for business startup. In addition, in 1997, to make the operations of the office more
effective, the Government simplified the business approval process by introducing automatic
authorization for most enterprises. With the 1997 reforms, enterprises can be formed and start
operations unless they receive explicit objections from government to their application within 15
days. Only enterprises associated with polluting and hazardous materials or products for the
education and health sectors are exempted from the general rule. Experience with the revised
approval process and one-stop window has been positive. The time for approvals has been
reduced from 24 months prior to the reforms to a maximum of 15 days for most enterprises.
Available data on business creation suggests that elimination of red tape and other legal and
regulatory improvements have had a positive effect on business creation and investment in Mali.
During 1995-2001 period, some 4000 businesses were authorized (around 560 per year). This is a
tenfold increase over the yearly figures for the 1991-94 period. During that period, 196 businesses
were authorized (around 50 per year).
To further strengthen the support to enterprises, all existing activities related to investment
promotion, including the offices of the one-stop investment office are now concentrated in an
Investment Promotion Center, ("Centre National de Promotion des Investissements). The project
supported the construction of a building to house the Center and the private sector, through
APEP, contributed to its financing.
Revision and upgrading of the national accounting plan.
Early during project implementation a consultant was recruited to revise and upgrade the national
accounting plan. However, the study was not carried out. Mali, as the other members of the West
African Monetary Community, decided in 1994 to adopt a uniform accounting system (SYSCOA)
for the region, which became effective in Mali in 1998.
Strengthening of the Legal and Regulatory Environment
This subcomponent, which was one of the main subcomponents after restructuring, is rated
satisfactory. The subcomponent as restructured called for the establishment and operation of a
unit in the Ministry of Justice to initiate and coordinate legal and regulatory reforms and the
strengthening of legal institutions. Reforms introduced after restructuring followed actions taken
in the early nineties. The project supported the establishment of three commercial courts and three
administrative tribunals in 1995 which were provided for under a new Commercial Code
approved in 1992. The project also provided support for the training of staff of the new tribunals
-7 -



as well as the required equipment and legal materials.
After project restructuring, the Unit established in the Ministry of Justice coordinated (i) the
harmonization of Malian legislation to the West African legal norms; (ii) the dissemination of the
new legislation; and (iii) the strengthening of legal institutions and training of legal professionals.
The project supported the adoption by Mali of the business law agreed by the members of
Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). The new legislation
became effective in January 1998. As part of the program, the Government reviewed national
legislation and abrogated obsolete legislation, and changed others to conform to OHADA norms.
Changes were completed in 2001. OHADA legislation includes the (i) Commercial Code,
corporate law; (ii) laws governing joint ventures; (iii) secured transactions (guarantees and
collateral); (iv) debt recovery and enforcement; (v) bankruptcy; and (vi) arbitration and company
accounting. OHADA corporate rights and bankruptcy procedures were largely based on the
Malian Commercial Code of 1992.
With support from the project, business legislation was distributed to all judges, court officials
and enterprises. In addition, the business legislation was translated into the principal local
languages and is readily available to users; a compendium of civil legislation since independence
was prepared and made available to legal professionals; a periodic joumal on business law was
created; and a commercial registry was established in line with modem practices and OHADA
requirements, and has started operations.
The project also supported an intensive training programn for legal professionals. Fifty judges
presiding over the largest courts in Mali as well as all court clerks were trained in matters relating
to business law and its application. The program provided basic equipment and legal publications
to all courts. In addition, four commercial tribunals with heavy workloads received management
assistance to improve their performance. The Government also established an inspection agency
for the judiciary in the Ministry of Justice, and in 1999 organized a national forum on justice
administration which led to the preparation and adoption by the Government of a ten-year legal
reform program.
Support was also provided to the set up of an Arbitration Center at the Chamber of Commerce.
The arbitration center began operations in March 1998, and is seen by the business community as
an important development which is facilitating business transactions. The center has helped
resolve some twenty disputes since its creation.
In addition to reforming the legal framework and legal institutions, the Government recognized
the need to reduce transaction costs by eliminating practical obstacles confronting potential
investors, and requested an assessment of the business environment by the Foreign Investment
Advisory Service (FIAS) of the World Bank, which identified key bottlenecks. A steering
committee, with private sector participation, was created in July 1999 to assist in defining
constraints. Following the consultation process, the Government (i) improved the access of
commercial, economic and technological information to enterprises; (ii) simplified the procedures
for obtaining operating licenses; and (iii) reduced fees for registering companies.
There is evidence that improvements in the legal frmework and judicial system as a result of the
- 8 -



program are yielding results. The business community has responded positively to the adoption of
the regional legal framework. Cases are being brought to the arbitration center.
Institutional Support Component
Non-financial private enterprises through APEP (matching grant fund)
The matching grant subcomponent, the largest subcomponent of the project in terms of financing,
effectively started operations in 1998 after the project was restructured. Despite some important
achievements after restructuring, the program is rated marginally satisfactory, as there is
insufficient information to confirm its impact. The technical assistance program defined at
appraisal had a weak design. Overall, some US$440 thousand were disbursed before project
restructuring; recovery of the loans that had not been fully repaid at restructuring have been
transferred to the Directorate of Internal Debt of the Ministry of Finance.
Support to private enterprises after project restructuring appears to have contributed to business
development, and figures available indicate that it met the objective set at the time of restructuring
in terms of employment generation. Quantitative information on the impact of the program is
partial. In a survey conducted at the end of the project, 87 beneficiaries (grants of CFA 340
million or about 15 percent of the total value of grants) noted the contribution of the
project-supported marketing activities and business strengthening technical assistance to the
development of their business. A sample survey of 25 enterprises carried out in 1999 noted that
the expected increases in sales in the beneficiary firms of about 15 percent. Estimates at the
completion of the project were that sales of beneficiary enterprises had increased approximately 5
percent. The lack of information on expected output and investment is in part due to the fact that
activities associated with the program are only starting to show results now, but also because
APEP did not commission a comprehensive impact study as part of the completion report.
Commitments in the matching grant as of March 2001 totaled CFA 2.3 billion (US$3.3 million)
which financed services totaling some CFA 4.5 billion (US$6.6 million). It is estimated that some
600 enterprises, associations and individuals benefitted from the program. The program made 1004
grants; some 47 percent of the grants (468) were made to enterprises; 30 percent to associations
(303) and 23 percent (233) to individuals. Grants were used to finance studies (202), training
(361), business promotion including participation in business fairs (353), management support
(69) and technical support (17). Grants were given to enterprises in all sectors, although there
was a concentration in the service sector, which received 48 percent of the grants. Also important
were grants to micro enterprises producing handicrafts (21 percent) and industrial enterprises (14
percent). Commercial and agricultural enterprises received 8 percent of the total number of
grants, respectively. As expected, given the distribution of economic activity in the country, most
of the enterprises benefiting from the program (92 percent of the value and 86 percent of number
of grants) are located in Mali's capital, Bamako.
The grants are estimated to have generated over 2000 new jobs in the beneficiary enterprises, in
line with the estimates at the time of restructuring. This figure excludes the employment generated
in the consulting firms which provided the assistance or its indirect effects (which are always
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difficult to measure). It is estimated that half the value of the services provided under the program
were carried out by Malian consulting firms, and there is evidence that the program made an
important contribution to developing and strengthening the consulting industry in Mali since most
of the services were provided locally.
Other Institutional Support
Office of Public Entreprises (BEP-Bureau des Enterprises Publiques)
The subcomponent aimed at improving the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for
privatization and consisted of strengthening the capacity of the Office of Public Enterprises (BEP)
to prepare draft regulations on implementation modalities for privatizing public enterprises,
prepare terms of reference for restructuring public enterprises to be privatized, and train staff in
enterprise valuation and in implementing privatization operations. The subcomponent is rated
unsatisfactory because of the limited progress achieved on improving the legal and regulatory
framework for privatization.
The project supported the preparation of a privatization law which required a more transparent
process based on competition and which represented a substantial imnprovement over the approach
that had been used in the first government privatizations of the early nineties, although the law
was subsequently suspended, and remains suspended to date. The project also supported the
strengthening of BEP, principally through staff training and provision of some basic equipment.
The impact of project support to BEP will become clearer now that the Government intends to
accelerate the privatization process. In 2001, the govemnment decided to give a higher priority to
privatization and plans to update the privatization framework. Unfortunately, this decision came
towards the end of the project and the updating of the legal framework could not be financed
under the credit.
Private Sector Advocacy Organizations.
The subcomponent is rated unsatisfactory. The chamber of commerce remains a government
institution, a development that was foreseen at the time of restructuring. Progress in strengthening
APEP as a representative of private sector organization able to cover its costs has been slower
than anticipated at the time of restructuring.
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Limited progress was made in converting the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Mali into a representative organization of the private sector as was
expected at appraisal. The process of regional economic integration and pressure from external
competition created a new breed of entrepreneurs whose needs were not anticipated when the
project was designed. As a result, a number of organizations representing private sector interests
have been created which broke the monopoly of the Chamber of Commerce in the provision of
support services to private enterprises. These organizations are members of APEP, discussed
below, which provided technical support to them. As mentioned in the legal component, in 1998
an arbitration office was set up in the Chamber to help settle disputes among businesses.
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APEP. The project supported the operations of the Agency for the Promotion of Private
Initiative, APEP, established in the early nineties as an APEX institution to represent private
sector interests. An important function of the institution when it was established was to manage
the pilot program of support to enterprises financed under the IDA credit. The creation of the
institution was a condition of Board presentation. Its founding members included representatives
of key private sector associations. As a new institution with limited competencies, it had
difficulties implementing the tasks initially assigned to it under the project. In the mid-nineties,
during the restructuring of the project, the statutes of APEP were revised to increase the role of
the private sector and its accountability. Over the years, the institution's membership and
credibility has increased, and it now includes the majority of private sector associations. APEP
performed better than the original project unit in carrying out the functions of project
administration, although its performance could have been stronger (as discussed in the section on
project implementation agencies in part 5 of this report). Furthermore, APEP's Board and
management did not make much progress in developing a plan and programs to ensure the
institution's sustainability or address problems associated with project implementation as they
arose. The Government will provide support to APEP this coming year, and has asked APEP to
assist in managing the facilities of the Private Sector Center. APEP is developing a business plan
which will spell out its activities and means to ensure its sustainability.
Other Government Agencies Dealing with the Private Sector
This subcomponent is rated unsatisfactory as the main activity supported, the technical secretariat
of the Committee charged with public-private dialogue, i.e. the "Bureau du Moderateur du
dialogue Etat-Secteur Prive", had lmited impact.
Public-Private Dialogue Mechanism. Under the project, a mechanism to ensure dialogue between
the public and private sectors was established (Committee on Private Sector Development) and
the project financed the establishment and work of the a technical secretariat for the Committee
on Private Sector Development. The technical secretariat was headed by a moderator, who was
also vice president of the Committee. The consultative process was piloted in the preparation of
the financial sector strategy (discussed below), although it made limited progress in other areas.
The technical secretariat was not as effective as would have been expected, partly because it
began its work late, but also because it did not engage the private and public stakeholders as
much as would have been needed. A number of studies were completed close to the end of the
project, and the government intends to initiate a consultation process with stakeholders on the
recommendations of the studies. The government is considering how best to support the work of
the Committee in the future. It is likely that the interface will be in the Ministry of Finance, as
discussed in the section on sustainability below.
In the process of the preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the project
provided assistance to the Government to carry out a small and medium enterprises (SME)
survey, which served as a basis for a SME map and policy note. The outcome of this work was
discussed at a national workshop on SME development and was used for the formulation of the
private sector development agenda in the PRSP.
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National Directorate of Economic Affairs. The project supported the establishment of the
National Directorate of Commerce and Competition (DNCC), whose primary task is to
strengthen the rules of competition and which monitors the new system of mostly liberalized
prices and marketing channels. The DNCC replaced National Directorate of Economic Affairs
(DNAE), which played an important role during the centrally planned economy period.
Ministry of Finance. The project also supported the strengthening of a Department in the
National Directorate of Treasury and Accounting (DNTCP) in charge of supervision of financial
institutions. This department participated actively in the formulation of the financial sector
strategy discussed under studies below.
Financial Sector Strategy
This subcomponent is rated satisfactory. Under the project, a review of the banking system, the
non-bank financial sector, and the micro finance sector was carried out and a strategy for the
financial sector prepared. Work was carried out by a committee, the Consultative Group on the
Financial System  (Groupe de Reflexion sur le Systeme Financier-GRSF), consisting of
representatives of banks, insurance companies, social security institutions, the Central Bank,
micro finance institutions, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and
private sector companies and associations. The studies and strategy prepared by the Group were
the basis for a project prepared by the government which aims to improve the soundness,
performance and competitiveness of the financial sector and enable it to support broad-based
private sector growth. The project supports (i) restructuring and privatizing viable state-owned
banks; (ii) strengthening non-bank financial institutions, including social security and retirement
funds; and (iii) strengthening micro finance institutions. It also includes support to the
Government micro finance supervision agency, improvements to the legal and regulatory
environment affecting the financial sector, strengthening the capacity of the departments of the
Ministry of Finance in charge of banking, insurance, pension funds and micro finance. This project
is mainly financed by Credit 3394-MLI.
4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:
Not applicable
4.4 Financial rate of return:
Not applicable
4.5 Institutional developnment impact:
The impact of the project was modest. The project contributed to improvements in the
administrative procedures and formalities for the establishment of new enterprises, and the
improvements in the operations of the one-stop investment office are viewed by investors as a
significant improvement over past arrangements. Improvements in legal institutions are expected
to have a lasting impact. The matching grant program set up after project restructuring in 1998
contributed to business development and employment generation, and to strengthening the Malian
consulting industry, although information to substantiate this conclusion is only partial. A key
government agency in charge of monitoring the existing system of mostly liberalized prices and
marketing channels, the National Directorate of Commerce and Competition (DNCC) was
- 12 -



established to replace the National Directorate of Economic Affairs (DNAE). The Office of Public
Enterprises has been strengthened, although its effectiveness can only be assessed when the
Government accelerates its privatization program.
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome
5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implenmenting agency:
In the early nineties, Mali embarked in a process of political liberalization which affected public
administration and the government's ability to focus its attention on policy and project issues. By
the time of project restructuring, the government was in a better position to address policy and
project issues. Government programs, including the agencies managing the project, were shut
down temporarily following student unrest in 1993-94 which led to a cabinet change, and after
aborted legislative elections in 1997, resulted in a protracted political crisis.
5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:
The Government had committed to the liberalization of the economy and improvements in the
business environment, which were the policy foundations for the project. However, it have not
been able to assign teams that could provide the needed leadership during project implementation.
The project, in general, did not receive follow up by senior officials conversant with the project
content and able to resolve project issues. The absence of senior government officials familiar
with the project in the supervising ministry (the Ministry of Commerce and Industry after project
restructuring) was complicated by the changes in ministers which oversaw the project. This
situation could be explained in the early years of the project when Mali faced internal political
issues which diverted government attention, but less understandable after project restructuring.
The Public-Private Sector Consultation mechanism established in the context of project
restructuring was a step in building stakeholder support and in ensuring implementation of sector
policies. However, arrangements to assess and follow up the implementation of the private sector
development policy and to facilitate the involvement of the private sector in the formulation of
economic policies and the management of the economy, agreed to in 1997, were not
implemented.
5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:
The original Project Management Unit and APEP management had difficulty appropriating the
project and seemed to have viewed the project as a World Bank activity. APEP initially improved
its performance when its structure and personnel were changed after restructuring, although the
performance both in terms of overall project management and in implementing the matching grant
could have been stronger. There were difficulties between APEP management and the Unit
dealing with legal reform, the other large component of the project, because of a perceived
slowness of APEP in procurement matters. APEP could have been more proactive in developing
business activities which ensured its sustainability, and could have done better in assessing the
impact of the matching grant. This would have helped demonstrate APEP's accomplishments.
APEP Board did not become actively involved in resolving project issues even though this was
part of its mandate.
5.4 Costs andfinancing:
Total project cost at appraisal was estimated at US$14.18 million with a beneficiary contribution
(government and private sector) of US$2 or 14 percent of total project costs and about one third
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of the program of support to private enterprises. IDA contribution was estimated at US$12
million. Total project cost at completion is estimated at US$15.30 million, with a beneficiary
contribution of US$3.26 million, or 21 percent of project costs and 42 percent of the matching
grant program. IDA financing amounted to US$12.04 million. The Government's contribution
supported regulatory reforms, the investment center and project management. The private sector
financed its share of the matching grant scheme, and the APEP made a small contribution of some
US$12 thousand towards the operating costs of the institution. The increase in the contribution of
the beneficiaries reflects the revised arrangements under the matching grant program introduced
at restructuring which is in line with the practice in matching grants. There was a significant
increase in project management costs, which reflects the ten year duration of the project.
6. Sustainability
6.1 Rationalefor sustainability rating:
Despite implementation problems, the sustainability of the project as a whole is rated likely. It is
likely that the changes that have come about in the legal and regulatory framework will be
sustained. These reforms have helped improve the business environment and the changes are
largely irreversible. The application of legal reforms will depend on the courts. As part of the work
carried out in the project, the Government has prepared a ten year legal investment program which
requires support from donors which will extend the reforms introduced to date. An active dialogue
between the public and private sector is a government priority and is likely to be continued.
However, existing arrangements for private-public dialogue are not likely to be sustainable, and it
is likely that the government will introduce new arrangements in the future. A number of donors have
expressed willingness to support consultation mechanisms, and more effective technical support
arrangements will need to be worked out. The Financial Sector Reform Strategy developed under
the project could lead to improvements of the financial system.
Information on the impact of the matching grant on beneficiaries is partial, although surveys point
to substantial benefits to enterprises. Progress on the institutional front is less encouraging. APEP
has not developed an institutional plan to provide services to its members and begin to attain
sustainability. The outlook is uncertain. As part of this problem, APEP did not develop
competencies in the institution to manage matching grant programs in the future. The Bank and
IFC are supporting APEP in the preparation of a business plan which has a principal objective of
ensuring the sustainability of the institution. To assist APEP, and because APEP includes the
majority of business associations, the Government has asked it to manage the Private Sector
Center building which will house support service institutions.
6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:
The Govermnent continues its commitment to the promotion of the private sector, a policy which
is reflected in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PRSP confirms that the
Government will pursue measures that will result in a favorable business climate, good physical
infrastructure, and a legal and regulatory framework that includes respect for property rights and
a sound financial system. The Government intends to prepare a ten-year private sector
development plan, and has requested Bank support for its program. Future programs of support will
draw from experience with the project under review. To ensure that there is an appropriate and
high level involvement of the Government in the implementation of sector policy, the Government
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has transferred responsibility for private sector issues to the Ministry of Economy and Finance. A
Minister for Investment Promotion and Private Sector Development has been appointed and will
report to the Ministry of Finance; these developments augur well for a more dynamic role of the
government in the future. The Ministry of Justice will continue the reform program initiated under
the project, and the Government will continue the financial sector reform program identified in the
context of this project. As noted above, APEP is preparing a business plan with technical support
from the Bank and IFC to define activities that ensure its sustainability.
7. Bank and Borrower Performance
Rank
7.1 Lending:
Bank performance in project identification, preparation and appraisal was satisfactory. The SAR
contains a good overview of the private sector in Mali and of the problems it faced. The project
was timely and a priority, as it prepared and approved following the initial phases of the program
of economic liberalization which began in the late eighties. The project was one of the first of its
kind in Africa and had design problems; particularly problematic were the implementation
arrangements and the design of a pilot program of support to enterprises. Given the innovative
features of the project and the political and economic policy changes that were taking place in
Mali at the beginning of the project, it is possible that there was no effective way to avoid the
initial implementation problems faced. After two years of implementation, the borrower and the
Bank began a process of consultation that led to the restructuring of the project.
7.2 Supervision:
Supervision of the project was uneven and is rated marginally satisfactory. From the start, the
project was followed by regular supervision missions, and a mid-term review was conducted in
1995. Teams carrying out the early missions identified implementation and design problems very
early in implementation, although they were not particularly proactive in proposing actions to
revamp the project. In the mid-nineties, during the process leading to project restructuring, there
was a rapid changeover of task team leaders. The need to build stakeholder ownership and the
institutional changes required were important causes of the delays in completing the restructuring,
although the changes of Bank teams and the changes in ministers during the period probably
contributed to the delays in completing the process. As a result, restructuring was only completed
18 months prior to the original closing date.
After restructuring in 1998, the project was supervised by two teams whose work was highly
satisfactory. The first of these teams completed the restructuring process started in 1995. It
refocused the project on the components with the greatest probability of success. In doing so, the
task team revisited the project experience, established new targets and performance benchmarks
and set a timetable that would allow the major project outputs to be delivered in the 18 months
remaining in the project.
The task teams were proactive, and made a concerted effort to build the constituency for the
reforms envisaged under the project. There were regular supervision missions consisting of both
headquarters and field office staff. The work of these teams contributed to the success of the
project in the area of business environment improvement. The supervision effort was reviewed by
the Quality Assurance Group in October 2000 and was rated highly satisfactory.
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7.3 Overall Bankperformance:
Overall, the Bank performance is rated marginally satisfactory. There was a particularly strong
supervision effort since 1998 which contributed to the ultimate achievements of the project.
Borrower
7.4 Preparation:
The borrower's performance during project preparation was satisfactory. A team composed of
future project beneficiaries was set up to work with the Bank team. The Government also
prepared a letter of private sector development policy that was extensively discussed with the
Bank.
7.5 Government implementation performance:
Performance of the Government during implementation was uneven and is rated marginally
satisfactory. On the policy front, the government introduced important reforms in the areas of
business creation and in the legal and regulatory front, and developed a solid financial sector
reform program. However, there was a high turnover of ministers charged with overall
coordination of the project throughout the project implementation period, partly reflecting the
frequent changes in cabinets during the period, which affected project implementation. There was
no high level personnel in the ministry in charge with sufficient authority or knowledge of the
project and subject matter to provide continuity during ministerial changes. This problem was
evident throughout the project implementation period, but was particularly troublesome after
restructuring. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry took an administrative approach to following
up the project, rather than as an opportunity to provide substantive input on policies affecting the
private sector. The project had six supervisory ministers. Ministers were often not informed of
project issues, and learned about problems with the project from Bank supervision missions.
7.6 Implementing Agency:
APEP had difficulties in carrying out project procurement and other project management
functions. Procurement actions were often slow which created frictions with other institutions
involved in project implementation. Administrative problems were partly linked to the assignment
of the Administrative Director of APEP to the management of the matching grant, which was not
his function. Project accounting was adequate. Audits were carried out, and auditors reported
relatively minor problems from an accounting point of view; the audits were generally available
some three months after they were due. The Board of Directors of APEP did not seek to resolve
project administration problems. For instance, despite suggestions, the administrative team in
APEP was not expanded, and the Administrative Director of the project continued working on the
matching grant until project completion. The team working on the matching grant seems to have
done limited follow-up. For instance, despite a comprehensive data base, the team did not extract
basic information such as the number of beneficiaries. The lack of understanding and interest of
the Board of APEP in the administrative aspects of the project is reflected on the closing. Despite
repeated requests by Bank teams, analytical data on project costs was made available only seven
months after project closing and it was incomplete, and limited work was done to present
information to reflect the accomplishments of the project or the matching grant. APEP did not
prepare, nor commission the preparation of a closing report containing basic information on
beneficiaries (such as number of firms assisted) and expected outcomes. Perhaps a longer lasting
problem was the Board's inability to lead work on the institutionalization of APEP by making it
- 16-



self sustaining.
7.7 Overall Borrower performance:
The borrower performance is uneven but on balance was marginally satisfactory. This rating reflects
the important reforms introduced in the legal and regulatory framework, a key element of the project, and
the work done on financial sector reform. The govemment work in these areas outweighs the problems of
APEP as an implementing agency.
8. Lessons Learned
Lessons that can be drawn from the experience with the project are summarized below:
In countries which have relatively new reform programs with fragile sector institutions,
projects should have limited scope. Initially, the project covered a number of activities. The
project was streamlined after restructuring to focus on legal reform and the matching grant and
the public-private dialogue. These changes, along with the simplification of implementation
arrangements, contributed to the successes of the project in its final years.
Project implementation arrangements are critical to the success of a project, and should
involve institutions with a knowledgeable and committed team. Private sector advocacy
institutions which have a variety of functions are not necessarily well suited to implement
private sector support projects where management and coordinating skills are of
paramount importance. The original implementation arrangements were complex, relied on
weak government institutions and a young private institution. After restructuring, the
implementation arrangements were simplified, but APEP does not appear to have given priority to
project management, and APEP staff assigned to project management worked on the matching
grant instead. APEP management and Board did not address project management issues that
would have enabled it to perform better. The APEP team should have included a procurement
specialist.
Stakeholders should be actively involved in the reform programs that affect them to ensure
ownership. Serious efforts were made both at appraisal and at the time of restructuring to involve
all stakeholders. The project performed better when the private sector increased its involvement
following restructuring. The moderator charged with carrying out the technical work for the
Private-Public Commission did not engage the stakeholders, and the technical work carried out
has not had as much impact as would have been expected.
Active participation of the government through representatives that have both the
authority and capacity to provide guidance facilitates the success of private sector support
projects. The work of the Financial Sector Commission and of the Unit charged with the legal
component demonstrate that the appointment of experienced, and dynamic persons helps ensure
that a project meets its objectives. There were a number of ministers charged with the overall
follow up of the project, and no senior staff with the appropriate profile was appointed to provide
overall guidance to the program embodied in the project, which resulted in limited involvement
from the government in project follow-up. Symptomatic of the problems in the Ministry of
Industry was the commission in the ministry set up towards the end of the project to prepare a
ten-year private sector development project which consisted of ten civil servants and only five
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private sector representatives.
The impact on beneficiaries should be assessed, preferably annually. Impact assessments
were to have been carried out at completion of the project, but it would have been preferable to
have conducted annual reviews.
9. Partner Comments
(a) Borrower/implementing agency:
Rapport d'Achevement du Projet d'Assistance au Secteur Prive'
Financement Credit IDA n° 2432/MLI du 11 janvier 1993
PRESENTATION SIGNALITIQUE DU P.A.S.P
Organisme de tutelle                    Ministere de l'Industrie, du Commerce et des
Transports (M.I.C.T)
Organisme d'execution                  Agence pour la Promotion des Entreprises
Privees (APEP)
Adresse                                 ACI 2000 BP 912 Bamako (Mali)
Association pour la Promotion du Secteui 21 associations et groupements professionnels
Prive (APEP)
Numero de l'accord de credit            2432-MI
Date d'approbation du credit            12 Novembre 92
Date de signature du credit             11 Janvier 93
Date de Demarrage du projet             08 Juillet 93
Cofit Total du projet                   14 Millions de $US dont:
- IDA = 12 millions $
-   Budget National = 2 millions $
Amendement a l'accord de Credit        25 mars 98
(Restructuration)
Fin juridique du projet                 30 juin 2001
Prorogation (nouvelle date de cl6ture)  31 mars 02
Composantes du Projet                   -   Coordination APEP
-   Fonds de soutien
-   Composante juridique
-   Bureau du Moderateur
-   Privatisation
-   Administration publique (MICT)
RAPPEL
Le projet d'appui au secteur prive est un projet initie par le gouvemement malien evalue a 14 000
000 $ US en 1993. il a ete finance par l'IDA a hauteur de 12 000 000 $US et par le Budget
- 18 -



National pour 2 000 000 $US. L'objectif fondamental de ce projet est de favoriser la promotion
du Secteur Prive au Mali.
Ce rapport d'achevement s'articulera autour des points suivants:
(i) objectifs initiaux du projet,
(ii) changement d'objectifs en cours d'execution,
(iii) objectifs initiaux et nouveaux atteints,
(iv) objectifs non atteints et pourquoi ?,
(v) notre jugement du comportement de la Banque Mondiale,
(vi) en cas de reprise du projet,
(vii)     que doit-on faire ?
(viii) que faut-il eviter ?
Les documents annexes seront partie integrante du present rapport.
I. OBJECTIFS INITIAUX DU PROJET
L'Accord de Credit 2432/MLI a defini les objectifs initiaux du projet comme suit:
(i)    Aider l'Emprunteur A promouvoir et a favoriser le developpement du secteur prive en tant
que moteur de croissance economique;
(ii)   Renforcer les organisations locales privees afin que les entreprises privees operant sur les
territoires de l'Emprunteur beneficient de services commnerciaux satisfaisants.
Pour la realisation de ces objectifs, le projet se composait de deux parties:
1.    Amelioration du Cadre Institutionnel et Rlglementaire des Affaires (confiee A l'Agence
pour la Promotion des Entreprises Privees (APEP))
-  regroupement de toutes les demarches juridiques et administratives pour la creation
d'entreprises au sein d'un Guichet Unique, situe en un lieu facilement accessible aux interesses
- elaboration et mise en oeuvre d'un nouveau Plan Comptable General pour les entreprises
privees;
-  creation et exploitation au Ministere de la Justice d'un service charg6 d'initier et de
coordonner les reformes du cadre juridique des activites commerciales par la fourniture de
services de consultants et l'acquisition de materiel;
-  renforcement du cadre legislatif et reglementaire des activites commerciales (formation du
personnel juridique et parajuridique et d'operateurs prives, collecte et diffusion de
documentations juridique);
-  renforcement de la competitivite des entreprises privees non financieres, y compris les
cabinets d'audit et de consultants, par l'amelioration de leurs methodes de gestion,
comptabilite, technique commerciale et de la formation du personnel.
2.     Appui Institutionnel (confie A l'Unite de Gestion du Projet -UGP-)
-  renforcement des capacites des directions, organismes et entites de l'Emprunteur qui
traitent avec le secteur prive;



- renforcement des capacites du BEP afin qu'il soit a mame d'elaborer des projets de regles
sur la privatisation des entreprises publiques, d'etablir les termes de reference relatifs a la
restructuration des entreprises publiques a privatiser, former son personnel a l'evaluation des
entreprises publiques dont la privatisation a e  decidee, ainsi qu'a la realisation d'operation de
privatisation;
- renforcement des organismes de promotion du secteur prive (CCIM et APEP) par des
services de conseil technique;
-  renforcement des capacites du Ministere des Finances pour lui permettre de mieux
prevenir et de resoudre eventuellement les differends entre l'administration de l'Emprunteur
et les operateurs;
- preparation d'une strategie du secteur financier, d'une strategie relative aux mutuelles de
credit urbaines et au financement du logement.
II. CHANGEMENT D'OBJECTIFS EN COURS D'EXECUTION
Une evaluation a mi-parcours du projet a fait apparaitre un bilan mitige en 1998. Celle-ci a conduit
a une restructuration du projet le 25 mars 1998. L'UGP a disparu et ses attributions ont e
confiees a l'APEP qui doit desormais assurer la coordination des activites de six (6) composantes
avec des objectifs nouveaux:
(i) Direction APEP (Fonctionnement),
(ii) Fonds de Soutien
(iii) Bureau du Moderateur
(iv) Reformes Juridiques
(v) Privatisation
(vi) Administration (MICT)
Le changement d'objectifs s'est accompagne par la formulation de deux nouveaux objectifs
confies a l'APEP:
(i)   fournir l'assistance technique aux entreprises et aux organisations professionnelles pour
faciliter l'acces a l'expertise necessaire a leur developpement;
(ii)  jouer le role d'agence financiere de l'ensemble du projet notamment en ce qui conceme la
passation des marches, la tenue des comptes, le decaissement des fonds ainsi que
centralisation/coordination des informations, budgets, plans d'actions et rapport d'activites .
En plus de ceux initialement definis pour le projet:
- renforcer la competitivite internationale des entreprises et de l'economie nationale;
-  ameliorer le cadre judiciaire et juridique des entreprises;
- simplifier les formalites administratives de creation d'entreprises;
-  ameliorer le climat des affaires;
- renforcer l'organisation professionnelle et les ressources humaines du secteur prive dans le
but d'ameliorer son efficacite.
Dans la realisation de ces objectifs, chaque composante se voit assigner des objectifs specifiques.
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Direction APEP
Veiller A 1'execution des activites du projet dans les delais prescrits,
Construire et 6quiper le Centre du Secteur Prive pour l'Association,
kelever le niveau de performance des agents,
Veiller A une meilleure utilisation des ressources du projet,
Perenniser les activites du projet pour promouvoir l'initiative privee,
Cloturer dans les meilleures conditions les activites du projet.
2.     Fonds de Soutien
Assister et appuyer les entreprises privees (etudes, formation, conseils etc...).
3.     Bureau du Moderateur
Prevenir les conflits entre l'Etat et le Secteur Prive et intervenir, eventuellement, en
proposant des solutions pour concilier les positions des deux parties;
- Faciliter la mise en cuvre des reformes en faveur du Secteur Prive;
-  Instaurer un dialogue efficace entre le Secteur Prive et le Secteur Public pour faciliter
l'emergence d'un environnement propice aux affaires.
4.     Cellule Juridique
-  Appuyer les reformes judiciaires en cours:
*      etablissement et mise A jour des banques de donnees judiciaires, notamment le
commentaire des Arrets de la Cour Supreme pour la periode 1990-2000 (Volet
jurisprudentielle),
*      etablissement des donn6es 1lgislatives et reglementaires,
*      harmonisation des textes maliens avec OHADA, (etude realisee mais non valid6e
sur le code de procedure civile, commerciale et sociale, ainsi que sur le code du
commerce),
*      creation d'un site web de la Justice,
*      formation des greffiers aux formulaires du Registre du Commerce et du Credit
Mobilier ainsi qu'a l'informatique (etude de comparaison realisee sur les plans comptables
de l'OHADA et du Mali);
-  Rehabiliter le cadre de travail des juridictions,
-  Appuyer les institutions:
* Tribunaux pilotes (Tribunal administratif, Tribunal de Conmmerce et Tribunal de
Segou),
* Tribunal administratif de Bamako;
*  Toilettage et les travaux de refection des juridictions et de la Cour d'Appel de
Bamako;
* Documentation et equipement des tribunaux
* Financement de l'informatisation du Casier, Judiciaire (equipement acquis et
formation effectuee);
* Creation du Centre d'Arbitrage de Bamako loge A la Chambre de Commerce et
d'Industrie du Mali (non operationnel encore);
-  Realiser des etudes sur:
*  I'audit du Registre du Credit et du Mobilier;
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* les modes alternatifs de reglements des litiges.
5.     Privatisation
- Equiper la Cellule de privatisation et former son personnel pour faciliter et favoriser le
retrait de l'Etat des domaines productifs au profit du secteur priv.
6.     Centre du Secteur Prive'
- creer la synergie entre les differentes composantes du secteur prive afin de promouvoir le
secteur;
- offrir des prestations pour catalyser le developpement du secteur;
- servir de lieu d'hebergement pour certaines associations ou entreprises privees et de cadre
ideal de rencontre, d'information, d'orientation et d'echange entre operateurs prives nationaux
et etrangers.
7.    Administration publique
-  Appuyer les services techniques de l'administration publique impliques dans la fornulation
et la mise en ceuvre des reformes en faveur du secteur prive (equipement, formation,
renforcement des capacites techniques et humaines, construction de cinq << Bureaux d'Accueil
et d'Information >> a Bamako);
- Realisation d'etudes dans le cadre de l'elaboration du Programme decennal de
Developpement du Secteur Prive (PDSP).
III. OBJECTIFS INITIAUX ET NOUVEAUX ATTEINTS
Dans l'ensemble, les resultats sont mitiges meme s'il est difficile de les comparer a ceux de la
premiere phase d'avant restructuration du 25 mars 1998. On peut noter pour chaque composante
la realisation des objectifs comme suit:
1.     Objectifs initiaux atteints:
Les ressources du projet ont permis d'atteindre des objectifs concrets tels:
(i) Amelioration du cadre institutionnel, juridique et judiciaire (renforcement des capacites
materielles et humaines):
-  equipement: 904 mobiliers de bureau repartis entre 35 juridictions;
- confection de depliants et brochures sur les actes uniformes de l'OHADA en 500
exemplaires par acte (21 actes au total);
- recrutement de 10 operateurs de saisie des jugements;
- redaction de 25 000 jugements en retard au niveau des juridictions du pays par 6
magistrats;
- formation de 60 greffiers aux formulaires du registre du commerce et du credit mobilier;
- participation de 160 avocats au colloque des avocats de l'espace UEMOA;
-  archivage de 3 Cours d'Appel (Bamako, Kayes et Mopti);
- etude realisee sur I'archivage et informatisation du registre du commerce et du credit
mobilier;
- revue du Droit des Affaires;
- elaboration du Code de Commerce Harmonise (rapport definitif non valide de 1'etude
- 22 -



disponible);
- rehabilitation des locaux de la Cour d'Appel de Bamako;
- logiciel informatisation des greffes et du casier judiciaire finance (non operationnel);
- traduction des actes uniformes de l'OHADA en 4 langues nationales (Bamanan, Peuhl,
Sonrhai et Sarakole).
(ii) Appui aux entreprises privees dans les domaines de la formation, de la restructuration, des
etudes et des echanges: 203 contrats signes avec les entreprises privees ont et executes.
2. Objectifs nouveaux atteints:
La reorientation du projet intervenue en 1998 a conduit aux resultats suivants:
(i) Creation d'une structure unique chargee de la gestion administrative et financiere, du suivi
et de la coordination des activites de 1'ensemble des composantes du projet;
(ii) regroupement de 22 associations de differentes entreprises du secteur prive dans une
meme structure denommee << Association pour la Promotion des Entreprises Privees >>
(APEP). Cette nouvelle association est devenue le porte-parole du secteur prive et la
partenaire exclusive de l'Etat dans la gestion du projet. Les contrats signes et execut6s se
repartissent entre les beneficiaires ainsi:
- 450 entreprises,
- 300 associations et regroupements, et
- 260 individus.
(iii) Mise en place d'un Fonds de Soutien qui a assure des services de consultation
(renforcement des capacites manageriales entre autres) au benefice des societes et entreprises
privees evalues a 1 856 459 904 FCFA (pour une prevision de 1 500 000 000 FCFA);
(iv) Appui au demarrage du Bureau du Moderateur du cadre de concertation Etat/Secteur
Prive qui a debute ses activites par la mise en place d'un fond documentaire et la conduite des
6tudes realisees dans le cadre de son plan d'actions approuve par le Cornite de D6veloppement
du Secteur Priv6. En plus de celle relative au plan de communication du moderateur, ces
etudes ont egalement concernm les themes proposes par le Comite interministeriel de pilotage
de la simplification des procedures administratives tels:
-  Delegation de signature;
- Cofit des actes notariaux;
- Couit des facteurs de production et leur impact sur la productivite des entreprises;
- Elaboration d'un identifiant unique;
-  TVA, ADIT;
- Passation des marches publics;
(v) La Cellule de Reflexion et de Suivi des Reformes du Droit des Affaires (CRSRDA) est
creee aupres du Ministere de la Justice et prise en charge par le PASP. Les objectifs de cette
composante n'ont pas varie depuis sa creation;
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(vi) L'assistance au Bureau des Entreprises Publiques (BEP) s'est traduite par:
-  Appui A la privatisation des entreprises publiques,
-  Formation des cadres du BEP au SYSCOA,
-  Fourniture de materiels de bureau et equipements informatiques,
-  Informatisation des donnees,
-  Publication du repertoire et des statistiques economiques et financieres des entreprises
publiques;
(vii) En appui a la composante Administration Publique (differents ministeres et structures en
rapport avec le secteur prive), le projet a permis la realisation de 4 Bureaux d'Accueil et
d'Information A Bamako, ainsi que la formation de 15 agents de la Direction Nationale du
Commerce et de la Concurrence (DNCC) A l'amelioration des techniques de controle des
activites des operateurs economiques prives;
(viii) La construction d'un Centre du Secteur Prive (CSP) dedie a la promotion de ce secteur
est incontestablement l'acte le plus significatif vers la perennisation des associations.
Remarque:
Suite a la prolongation de la date de cl6ture au 31 Mars 2002, de nouveaux contrats ont ete signes
par le personnel, avec une reduction de 1'effectif et du salaire de 1'ensemble du personnel. La
composante cellule juridique fut supprimee .
Aspect comptable etfinancier
La comptabilite : elle est A jour et I'audit des comptes et etats Financiers au 31 Decembre 2001
est fait.
La tresorerie:
Encaissements: 6 732 063 452
D6caissements:     6 732 063 452
IV. OBJECTIFS NON ATTEINTS ET POURQUOI ?
L'arret des activites de la CRSRDA pendant la periode de prorogation (Juillet 2001 - Mars 2002),
notamment pour l'informatisation du registre du commerce et le classement des archives ainsi que
le non fonctionnement de la cour d'arbitrage sont imputables A l'insuffisance des ressources du
fonds pour cette periode.
Le fonds de soutien a debourse beaucoup mais l'expertise attendue n'est pas encore bien lisible.
Les appuis octroyes aux entreprises ont donne des resultats mitiges.
Etat/Banque Mondiale : La fonction de tutelle a e  peu usitee. Ce qui a e  prejudiciable a la
realisation de nombre d'objectifs.
La perennisation de 1'APEP n'est pas assuree et le demarrage tres lent des activit6s du Centre du
-24 -



Secteur Prive connaIt des difficultes enormes.
La non realisation des etudes du PDSP sur les ressources du PASP est imputable A la fois A la
lenteur dans la prise de d6cision de I'Administration et dans les delais trop prolong6s pour la
reaction de la Banque. Pour les memes raisons, le renforcement du secretariat general et
l'equipement du departement n'ont pu etre effectues.
Le cinquieme Bureau d'Accueil et d'Information qui etait prevu A la Direction Nationale des
Imp6ts n'a pu etre realise. Ce bureau est deja prevu dans le plan de la nouvelle direction en
chantier actuellement.
Faute de ressources disponibles, le projet n'a pas reussi A prendre en charge l'equipement du CSP.
L'Etat a deploye des efforts budgetaires en assurant l'acquisition d'un minimum d'equipement en
2001 dans le souci de rendre le CSP operationnel. Le budget national 2002 prevoit egalement une
ligne de credit pour renforcer l'equipement du CSP.
V. NOTRE JUGEMENT DU COMPORTEMENT DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE
Dans le cadre du partenariat, autant l'appui financier de la Banque est appreciable, autant la
procedure de gestion est parficulierement lourde pour la realisation des objectifs du projet. Ce qui
reduit fortement l'efficacite des actes poses, compromettant ainsi les chances d'une pleine reussite
du projet.
I1 est particulierement important d'observer strictement la regle partenariale dans la conduite d'un
projet: la confiance mutuelle et le respect reciproque des parties contractantes.
Le non respect de la volonte de l'emprunteur est deplorable : cas de la Cellule juridique dont la
prise en charge du fonctionnement a e  autorisee par la Banque malgre la suspension de ses
activites par le departement tutelle du projet pendant la periode de prorogation.
Le projet gagnerait beaucoup dans la clerite de la banque dans le traitement des correspondances
qui lui sont adressees.
VI. EN CAS DE REPRISE DU PROJET:
Que doit-on faire ?
-      S'assurer du bon choix des hommes dans la constitution de l'equipe dirigeante du projet
sur la base de la competence, de l'experience et de l'integrite morale;
-     Inscrire le projet dans le cadre du renforcement des capacites des structures de
l'administration conformmeent A la strategie de bonne gouvemance publique et prive A laquelle le
Mali a souscrit dans le CSLP, cela, en vue d'assurer la perennite des actions entreprises en faveur
du secteur prive.
Quefaut-il eviter ?
-     La preponderance du r6le de depensier de la Direction de l'APEP au detriment de celui de
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la coordination censee susciter l'emulation entre les composantes et la synergie indispensable a
1'6mergence d'un secteur prive dynamique et comp6titif;
-      La lenteur du partenaire financier dans les procedures d'approbation des requetes.
Bamako, le 23 avril 200
(b) Cofinanciers:
N.A.
(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):
Private sector views were sought and integrated in the ICR mission aide-memoire.
10. Additional Information
Rapport d'Achevement du Projet d'Assistance au Secteur Prive du Mali:
Aide-Memoire de la Mission du 16 -26 dctcembre 2002
1.    Une mission de la Banque Mondiale, conduite par Diame Youssouf Thiam, Economiste au
Bureau de Bamako, s'est deroul6e du 16 au 26 D6cembre 2002.  La mission tient a remercier
ses interlocuteurs notanimnent leurs Excellences Monsieur le Ministre de l'Economie et des
Finances, Monsieur le Ministre de l'Industrie et du Commerce, Monsieur le Ministre de la Justice
et Monsieur le Ministre D6legue aupres du Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances, charge de la
promotion des Investissements et du Secteur Prive pour les audiences qu'ils lui ont accordees. La
mission remercie egalement Monsieur le Directeur National des Industries, Monsieur le Directeur
de l'Administration des Biens de l'Etat, Monsieur le Vice President du Conseil d'Administration
de l'APEP, le Moderateur, I'Animatrice de la Cellule de Reflexion et de Suivi de Droit des
Affaires, les cadres de I'APEP et des autres composantes du projet, et les responsables de
I'Administration pour leur disponibilite et la qualite des echanges de vue.
2.    L'objectif de la mission etait de discuter les realisations du projet d'assistance au secteur
prive et de recueillir les observations des  differents interlocuteurs sur le contenu de la
contribution de la Banque mondiale au rapport d'achevement du projet.
3.    La mission a rappele que selon ses regles, la Banque Mondiale redige un rapport
d'achevement apres 1'execution d'un projet. Le rapport a pour but entre autres de: a) fournir des
informations sur l'experience acquise en vue d'ameliorer les strategies de pret aux membres de la
Banque et de la conception des operations futures, b) aider a assurer un meilleur impact sur le
developpement par la Banque et l'Emprunteur, c) tirer les lecons utiles pour les operations futures
pour assurer un meilleur impact sur le d6veloppement.
4.    Les observations et appreciations suivantes ont e  formulees sur les realisations du projet
et sur le projet de rapport par les differents interlocuteurs. De fa9on generale, le projet de rapport
redige par la Banque est critique et objectif. Le contenu du rapport est appreci6 avec quelques
-26 -



petites reserves ; et les appreciations d'ensemble sur les performances des differentes composantes
et des acteurs respectifs dans la mise en ceuvre du projet sont jugees adequates.
5.    Realisations. Les interlocuteurs ont reconnu et valide les progres realises par les
differentes composantes du projet. Vu la situation du Secteur Prive au moment de l'evaluation du
projet, les interlocuteurs estiment que le projet par ses realisations a contribue A ameliorer
1'environnement dans lequel evolue le secteur prive et sa capacite de gestion. Cependant, il reste
beaucoup A faire comme en temoigne le r6le accorde au secteur prive dans le cadre strategie de
lutte contre la pauvrete.
6.   Avec l'avenement du guichet unique, le delai de creation d'une entreprise a et
drastiquement reduit de 24 mois A 15 jours. Cet allegement des procedures et F'amelioration de
l'environnement juridique et reglementaire ont certainement contribue A l'octroi de l'autorisation
A 4000 entreprises de 1995 A 2001 contre 196 entreprises de 1991 A 1994.
7.    La composante juridique   a atteint presque tous ses objectifs. Le projet a appuye la
creation des tribunaux de commerce et des tribunaux administratifs. En reponse au principe selon
lequel nul n'est sense ignorer la loi, les actes uniformes de l'OHADA ont et distribues A tous les
magistrats, greffiers et secretaires de greffe, ainsi qu'aux structures d'appui au secteur priv. Ces
actes ont aussi ete traduits dans les principales langues locales. Les differents cadres de l'6chelon
judiciaire ont recu des formations appropriees leur permettant de mieux jouer leur r6les. Les
operateurs economiques se sont felicite du soutien apporte A la creation du centre d'arbitrage A
la chambre du commerce qui a permis de regler certains conflits sans aller devant les tribunaux.
De facon generale, le monde des affaires malien apprecie l'effort d'amelioration de
1'environnementjuridique et reglementaire afin de le rendre plus incitatif.
8.    Les resultats de la composante fonds de soutien sont appreciables, etant donne 1'effort de
reponse aux besoins des petites entreprises et des associations, y compris celles de l'interieur du
pays, ainsi que la contribution au renforcement de la capacite d'offre de services de consultants.
Plusieurs entreprises, associations et individus ont beneficie de ce fonds de soutien pour financer
des etudes, la formation, la promotion commerciale, des soutiens A la gestion et des soutiens
techniques. Et ceci dans les domaines aussi varies que le commerce, I'agriculture et meme la
creation d'entreprise. Le fonds de soutien aurait aussi permis de creer plus de 2000 emplois
permanents. Un tel soutien accorde aux entreprises par le Gouvemement atteste de sa volonte, de
faire du secteur prive, le moteur de la croissance et de la lutte contre la pauvrete. Une evaluation
approfondie de l'impact du fonds de soutien sur le secteur prive malien apporterait des lecons
utiles pour les actions futures dans ce domaine.
9.    La composante appui a la privatisation a beneficie de soutien de projet pour la
formation des cadres du bureau des entreprises publiques et pour l'elaboration d'une loi sur la
privatisation qui n'existait pas auparavant.
10.   Dans le cadre du dialogue entre I'Etat et le secteur prive, le Bureau du Moderateur a
commence a jouer un r6le important dans le traitement de questions ayant un impact sur le
fonctionnement des affaires. A cet effet, il notamment beneficie du fmancement du projet pour la
-27 -



realisation de certaines etudes renforcant le contenu et la finalite du dialogue entre l'Etat et le
Secteur Prive. Toutefois, l'efficacite du Bureau du Moderateur aurait pu etre plus substantielle si
les differents comites de pilotage du partenariat Etat-Secteur Prive avaient regulierement
fonctionne.
11.   Les travaux realises par le Groupe de reflexion sur le secteur financier ont pernis au
Gouvernement d'elaborer une strategie pour le developpement du secteur bancaire, du secteur
financier non bancaire et du secteur du micro-credit afin d'aider a un meilleur financement de
l'economie. Cette strategie du Gouvemement est aujourd'hui appuyee par un credit de l'IDA.
12.   Conception du proiet : Les interlocuteurs ont reconnu que ce projet etait une premniere
au Mali. De ce fait, les difficultes d'execution etaient inherentes au caractere novateur du projet
et a I'absence d' experience en matiere de developpement de secteur prive. Les objectifs ont e
clairement definis et correspondaient effectivement a la volonte du Gouvernement de faire du
secteur prive le moteur de la croissance. Et cette volonte demeure encore aujourd'hui. En effet,
dans son cadre strategie de lutte contre la pauvrete adopte le 29 mai 2002, le Gouvemement a
clairement affiche sa volonte de mettre une politique active de developpement du secteur prive
afin que celui-ci soit le moteur de la croissance et de la lutte contre la pauvrete. II s'agira d'une
part de prendre des mesures visant a lever les principales contraintes qui touchent le secteur et,
d'autre part de mettre en place les conditions indispensables a une croissance tiree par le secteur
prive a savoir l'existence d'un climat 6conomique favorable aux affaires, une infrastructure
physique en bon etat, une bonne capacite a developper les affaires, un developpement
institutionnel garantissant les droits de proprietes et un systeme financier solide et performant.
13.   Afin d'appuyer davantage le developpement du secteur prive, le Gouvemement entend
organiser son action sur la base des orientations ci-apres: i) renforcer le dispositif de partenariat
et de concertation entre l'Etat et le secteur prive, ii) consolider et developper les infrastructures et
services d'appui aux entreprises, iii) renforcer les fondements institutionnels et reglementaires des
marches notamment par la reduction et le recentrage du r6le de l'Etat a travers la poursuite des
privatisations, iv) batir un systeme financier solide et performant, v) developper l'esprit
d'entreprise, vi) promouvoir la petite et moyenne entreprise et creer les facilites et la base de
competence necessaire a la competitivite, vii) coordonner et harmoniser les programmes appuy6s
par les partenaires au developpement en matiere de promotion de secteur prive pour eviter des
duplications et favoriser la synergie. Certains interlocuteurs ont vivement regrette l'absence de
cadre logique au depart qui aurait pu permettre de faire le point de facon r6guliere entre les
objectifs et les realisations.
14.   Montage institutionnel : Des reserves ont e  formulees quant au montage institutionnel
du projet a savoir la tutelle confiee au Ministere de l'Industrie, la gestion confiee a une Agence
d'Execution qui relevait d'un Conseil d'Administration. Cette Agence d'Execution n'avait pas
d'encrage juridique ce qui a laisse croire au Directeur de l'Agence qu'il a les mains libres pour
agir comme il le voulait. Le Directeur General de I'APEP aurait joue le Conseil d'Administration
et le Ministere l'un contre l'autre suivant ses interets. C'est l'un des rares projets oil un
departement ministeriel ne s'est pas implique dans la gestion quotidienne du projet, laissant entiere
liberte aux representants du secteur prive pour gerer le projet. Lors de la restructuration du
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projet, le poste d'observateur que le Ministere avait dans le Conseil d'Administration a et
supprime. Aussi, il n'etait pas surprenant que le Ministere n'etait pas au courant des problemes au
jour le jour. II avait e  convenu avec la Banque que le droit de regard du Ministere devait
s'exercer A travers: i) le budget du projet qu'il devait approuver avant de les transmettre A la
Banque pour non objection, ii) les differents rapports d'activites que l'Agence d'Execution devait
rediger pour soumettre A l'appreciation de la Banque et du Ministere, iii) les rapports d'audit.
Aussi, les insuffisances constatees dans la conduite du projet relevent beaucoup plus de l'absence
de statut juridique de l'Agence d'execution que de l'absence de responsables dans l'administration
publique capables de superviser le projet.
15.   Les relations fonctionnelles entre le Ministere de l'Industrie, le Conseil d'Administration
de l'APEP et la Banque Mondiale n'ont pas correctement fonctionne. Le Conseil
d'Administration avait theoriquement un grand rOle A jouer mais en fait n'avait aucun pouvoir
reel. Ce qui aurait cree une certaine frustration chez les membres du Conseil d'Administration qui
ne se sentaient pas entierement concemes dans la gestion du projet. Le Conseil d'Administration
avait l'impression d'etre une boite A lettre. Par exemple, c'est le Ministere de l'Industrie et la
Banque Mondiale qui ont selectionne le Directeur General ; mais son contrat a ete signe par le
President du Conseil d'Administration. Le changement frequent de Ministres et de Charg6s de
projet au niveau de la Banque Mondiale n'a pas e non plus un facteur de stabilite ; ceci a affaibli
la capacite d'action du projet.
16.   Ressources humaines: Le projet a souffert de problemes d'hommes. En effet, certains
acteurs qui repondaient aux criteres definis et qui avaient le profil necessaire sur papier ne se sont
pas montres A la hauteur des taches qui leurs ont ete confiees. Au cours de 1'execution du projet,
il s'est avere que certains acteurs n'avaient pas l'experience necessaire pour gerer un si jeune
projet avec plusieurs intervenants et deux organismes de tutelle dont les roles n'avaient pas ete
clairement compris par certains. Vu les moyens octroyes et la responsabilite qui lui avaient e
confies, I'Agence d'Execution aurait pu realiser de meilleures performances.
17.   Ex6cution du uroiet: Les corrections apportees dans le montage institutionnel lors de la
restructuration du projet ont enleve certains goulots d'etranglement pour la bonne marche du
projet. Ainsi, l'implication du Ministere de la Justice dans l'execution de la composante juridique
du projet a ete salutaire. L'examen du systeme bancaire, du secteur financier non bancaire et du
secteur du micro-credit, confie A un groupe de reflexion sur le secteur financier a conduit A la
definition d'une strategie de developpement du secteur financier qui beneficie aujourd'hui d'un
soutien de la Banque Mondiale A travers un credit. Le soutien du projet aux differentes
administrations a e  apprecie car ayant permis d'atteindre certains objectifs. II s'agit notamment
du guichet unique, de l'environnement juridique et reglementaire, du bureau des entreprises
publiques. De meme, la construction du centre du secteur prive est hautement appreciee et peut A
elle seule attenuer toutes les faiblesses constatees. Le Centre du Secteur Prive est une realisation
concrete, visible, palpable. Il est le fruit d'un veritable partenariat entre le Gouvemement, la
Banque Mondiale et le Secteur Priv6. Ce centre concretise la volonte du Gouvemement d'appuyer
le secteur prive afin qu'il puisse convenablement jouer son role de moteur de la croissance.
18.   Conclusion: 11 n'y avait pas de doute quant A l'opportunite de ce projet dont les objectifs
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ont et bien identifies. Ces objectifs demeurent valables aujourd'hui. Les objectifs n'ont pas et
entierement atteints pour plusieurs raisons dont notamment la capacit6 des ressources humaines,
le montage institutionnel et les liens fonctionnels entre les differents acteurs. L'execution de ce
projet montre que tout ce qui est public n'est pas forcement mauvais et tout ce qui ait priv n'est
pas forcement bon. Confier l'ex6cution d'un tel projet a une structure 6phemere sans base
juridique pose le probleme meme de la perennite des actions entamees. La perennite est fonction
de la structure: une structure perenne augmente les chances de p6rennisation des actions
realisees. L'administration aurait pu atteindre de meilleurs r6sultats avec peu de moyens et ses
capacites auraient ete renforcees. A d6faut de l'administration, 1'execution du projet aurait pu etre
confi6e a un cabinet prive choisi par appel d'offires international avec des objectifs precis,
mesurables et obligations de resultats. Le fonds de soutien devrait etre evalue de fa9on
approfondie pour mesurer son impact sur les beneficiaires et sur l'economie. En termes de
perspectives, il serait souhaitable et necessaire de mettre en place un mecanisme approprie
pouvant creer la synergie necessaire pour faciliter la collaboration entre tous les acteurs concemrs
- Etat, Secteur Prive et autres bailleurs de fonds- pour atteindre les objectifs de developpement
du secteur prive malien.
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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
Outcome / Impact Indicators:
'   IndWeatgrlM   - -t - r;    ' i  Projecbdte    kwd .1st                ActuaUteiErsiMate
Strengthened private sector through    Private sector center operational and  Business environment improved
improved business environment (of which  framework for further divestiture from public  substantially. Procedures for business
legal reform and public-private dialogue),  enterprises strengthened.        creation simplifed which resulted in
support with a matching grant and a private                                 increased business creation. A Center for the
sector center, and financial sector strategy.                                Private Sector created and facilities
constructed to house institutions providing
support to private sector. Legal and
regulatory reform carried out and Malian
legislaton was harmonized with West African
norms. Legislation on privatizaton improved
and govemment privatizaton unit
strengthened. APEP has expanded its role
as a representative organization of the private
sector, and is now designing a program to
ensure self-sufficiency. The matching grant
program supported establishment and
Improvement of beneficiary insttutions.
Output Indicators:
- ndicator/Matrix  -                Prctj In istJR        -;   -    .     Actual/Latest Estimate
I. Legal and Regulatory
(a) One stop investment window reduced                                       Business approvals consolidated in one
red tape                                                                     office, the guichet unique, and procedures
for business creation simplified by
Introducing ex-post declaraton for most
enterprises, reducing processing Ume from
an average of 24 months to a maximum of
15 days.
Private Sector Center, to group all private
sector support institutons, completed.
(b) Legal Reform: consistency with OHADA  Five jurisdions refurbished; results attained All uniform acts of OHADA adopted in 1998.
law established and access to legal   in the 3 pilot tribunals assessed; commercial Consistency of national laws with OHADA
information improved; arbitraton center  registry computerized               established and obsolete legislation
established.                                                                 abrogated.
Business law diseminated to all judges and
court officials.
Business laws translated into local languages
and made available to legal porfessionals.
Peiodic joumal on business law established
and being published regularly.
Commercial registry established In line with
modem practices.
Fifty judges presiding over the largest courts
in Mall and all auxiliaries of jusfice trained in
matters relating to business law and its
application.
Courts modemized through the provision of
basic equipment and legal materials.
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Inspection agency for the Judiciary and Unit
monitoring business law established in the
Ministry of Justice.
Arbitration center established in the Chamber
of Commerce; 20 cases resolved since the
creation of the center in 1998.
IL. Institutional Support             Higher than expected quantitative    Contributed to business development and
-Support to non-financial private enterprises: performance; addRional spill-over effects in  employment generation, although information
Matching grant Employment generation and the eronomy.                      parlial.
increased output                                                           Program provided 303 grants to private
sector associations, 468 grants to
enterprises and 233 grants to individuals.
15 percent increase in sales in sample of 25
enterprises supported under the program
shows 2000 jobs created in beneficiary
institutions. Figures do not reflect effect on
development of the consulting industry.
-Private Sector Advocacy Orgainzations                                      Remains a govemment controlled instiuion.
Chamber of Commrce Reorganization                                        Arbitration center established in chamber
which is an effective. Remains in public
APEP Strenthened                                                         sector
Membership has expanded and is
increasingly representing private sector
interests. Delayed in developing a plan and
taking actions to ensure its susteinability and
relies entirely on govemment to fund its
-BEP Strenghened                                                            operations.
New law passed but application suspended
-Other Govemment Agencies                                                   BEP received technical assistance but
effectiveness not tested.
Public-Private Sector Committee
Secretarlat                                                                 Studies carried out by technical secretariat
(office of the Moderator) but not effective due
to inadequate consultation with the private
and public sectors.
National Directorate of Commerce and                                      Created to replace the National Directorate of
Competion                                                                   Economic Affairs. Charged with monioring
system of liberalized prices and marketing
channels.
-Financial SeCtor Strategy                                                  Comprehehsive strategy prepared which
provided basis for govemment preparation of
a reform program and project supported by
the Bank.
End of project
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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Appraisal   ActuallLatest  Percentage of
Estimate      Estimate      Appraisal
Project Cost By Component            US$ million   US$ million  ._;-_.
Regulatory Component                                1.40           3.01             10
Institutional Support Component                     8.89           9.05             63
Information and Communication                       0.70           0.68              5
Studies Component                                   0.62                            4
Project Management                                  1.13           1.81              8
Refund of PPF Advance                               0.75           0.75              5
Price & Physical Contingencies
Total Baseline Cost                                13.49          15.30
Price Contingencies                                0.69                             5
Total Project Costs            14.18          15.30
Total Financing Required             14.18          15.30
Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Procurement Method'
Expenditure Category     ICB           NCB         Othe         N.B.F.     Total Cost
1. Works                     0.70         0.00         0.00         0.00         0.70
(0.60)       (0.00)       (0.00)        (0.00)      (0.60)
2. Goods                     3.60         0.00          1.80        0.00         5.40
(3.25)       (0.00)       (1.30)        (0.00)      (4.55)
3. Servoces                  2.90         2.50          1.80         0.00        7.20
(2.40)       (2.20)       (1.50)        (0.00)      (6.10)
4. Miscellaneous             0.00         0.00         0.85         0.00         0.85
(0.00)       (0.00)       (0.75)        (0.00)      (0.75)
5. Miscellaneous             0.00         0.00         0.00         0.00         0.00
(0.00)       (0.00)       (0.00)        (0.00)      (0.00)
6. Miscellaneous             0.00         0.00         0.00          0.00        0.00
(0.00)       (0.00)        (0.00)       (0.00)      (0.00)
Total                     7.20          2.50         4.45         0.00        14.15
(6.25)       (2.20)       (3.55)        (0.00)      (12.00)
Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)
Procurement Method
Expenditure Category     ICB           NCB         Other        N.B.F.    Total Cost
1. Works                     0.64         0.00         0.12         0.00        0.76
(0.54)       (0.00)       (0.11)       (0.00)       (0.65)
2. Goods                     2.34         0.00         1.23         0.00        3.57
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(2.12)         (0.00)         (0.97)        (0.00)         (3.09)
3. Services                      2.67           2.35           3.93           0.00          8.95
(2.31)         (2.10)         (2.51)        (0.00)         (6.92)
4. Miscellaneous                 0.00           0.00           0.75           0.00          0.75
(0.00)         (0.00)         (0.73)        (0.00)        (0.73)
5. Miscellaneous                 0.00           0.00           1.17           0.00          1.17
(0.00)         (0.00)         (1.01)        (0.00)        (1.01)
6. Miscellaneous                 0.00           0.00           0.00           0.00          0.00
(0.00)         (0.00)         (0.00)        (0.00)         (0.00)
Total                         5.65           2.35           7.20           0.00          15.20
(4.97)         (2.10)         (5.33)         (0.00)       (12.40)
'Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.
vIncludes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff
of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i)
managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.
Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)
Percentage of Appraisal
CifhponenAt            Appraisal Estimate            Actuat/Latest Estimate
* Bank   -   t. '    CoF.-     Baik       Govt.     CoF:,    Bank   Go-( L  CoF.
1. Regulatory             1.40      0.20      0.00       1.97      0.10      0.00     140.7   50.0   0.0
11. Institutional Support  5.69     0.16       1.34      5.72      0.09      2.86     100.5   56.3  213.4
111. Studies              2.48                           2.34                         94.4
IV. Communication         1.50      0.10                 0.50      0.06               33.3    60.0
V. Project Management     0.93      0.20      0.00       1.51      0.25      0.00     162.4  125.0   0.0
Total                     12.00     0.66       1.34     12.04      0.40      2.86     100.3   60.6  213.4
Cofinancing in this case reflects matching grant beneficiaries' contribution.
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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits
Not applicable
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Annex 4. Bank Inputs
(a) Missions:
Stage of Project Cycle            No. of Persons and Specialty       Performance Rating
(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.)  Implementation Development
Month/Year   Count        Specialty                  Progress    Objective
Identification/Preparation
2/22/1991                3   PRIVATE SECTOR
SPECIALIST; FINANCIAL
SECTOR SPECIALIST;
ECONOMIST
Appraisal/Negotiation
5/27/1992                5   PRIVATE SECTOR
SPECIALIST; FINANCLAL
SECTOR SPECIALIST;
LAWYER;
PROCUREMENT
SPECIALIST;
ECONOMIST
Supervision
07/22/1994               2   PRIVATE SECTOR                S            U
SPECIALIST (1);
FINANCIAL SPECIALIST
(1)
11/13/1994               2   PRIVATE SECTOR DPTSP (1);     S            S
FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1)
04/13/1995               2   PRIVATE SECTOR DPTSP (1);      S           S
FINANCIAL ANALYST (1)
11/17/1995               5   SR. ECONOMIST (1);            U            S
TRAINING SPECIALIST (1);
PRIVTE SECTOR DPTSP (1);
FINANCIAL ANALYST (2)
02/13/1996               S   TRAINER (CONSULTANT) (1);     U            S
SR. ECONOMIST (1);
PRIVATE SECTOR DPTSP (1);
FINANCIAL ANALYST (1);
LEGAL ADV (CONSULTANT)
(1)
08/02/1997               3   TASK TEAM LEADER (1); SR      U            U
COUNSEL (1); FINANCIAL
ANALYST (1)
09/15/1998               6   MISSION LEADER (1);            S           U
PE/INSTITUTIONAL (1);
LAWYER (I); ECONOMIST
(1); PSD SPECIALIST (1);
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
(1)
03/10/1999               4   TEAM LEADER (1);               S           U
PE/INSTITUTIONAL (1);
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
(1); MATCHING GRANT (1)
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11/20/1999                4   TEAM LEADER (1);                S            S
PRIVATIZATION/INST. (1);
PROJECT MGMT (1);
LAWYER (1)
06/26/2000                4   MISSION LEADER (1);             S            S
PROJECT MANAGMENT (1);
FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1);
SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS
(1)
09/30/2000                6   MISSION LEADER (1);             S            S
SUPPLY CHAIN (1);
FINANCIAL ANALYST (1);
PROCUREMENT ANALYST
(1); LAWYER (1);
ECONOMIST (1)
03/02/2001                5   TEAM LEADER (1); SR.            S            S
ECONOMIST (1); SME PGM
MANAGER (1); SR.PRIV.
SECT. SPECIAL (1);
OPERATIONS ANALYST (1)
10/20/2001                4   TEAM LEADER (1); SR.            S            S
ECONOMIST (1); FINANCIAL
MGT SPEC. (1);
PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST
(1)
ICR
16/12/2002                1    SR. ECONOMIST                  S            S
(b) Staff
Stage of Project Cycle                Actual/Latest Estimate
No. Staff weeks            US$ ('000)
Identification/Preparation             13                        33
Appraisal/Negotiation                 121                       317
Supervision                           324                       982
ICR                                    14                        37
Total                                 472                     1,369
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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components
(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)
Rating
0 Macro policies                     O H OSU*M O N O NA
Li Sector Policies                   O H *SUOM ON O NA
O Physical                           O H *SUOM O N O NA
El Financial                         O H *SUOM O N O NA
Li Institutional Development         0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NA
L Environmental                      O H OSUOM O N * NA
Social
O Poverty Reduction            O H OSU*M O N O NA
Oi Gender                      O H OSUOM O N * NA
Li Other (Please specify)      O H OSUOM O N * NA
Li Private sector development        0 H * SU O M 0 N 0 NA
Ol Public sector management          0 H O SU *M 0 N 0 NA
O Other (Please specify)             O H OSUOM O N * NA
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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance
(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6.1 Bankperformance                                 Rating
OII Lending                                         OHS OS       OLu    OHU
O Supervision                                       OHS OS       O  U   O HU
OI Overall                                          OHS OS       Ou     O HU
6.2 Borrowerperformance                             Rating
LI Preparation                                      OHS OS       0 u    O HU
O Government implementation performance             O HS OS      0 U    0 HU
LO Implementation agencyperformance                 O HS O S     0 U    0 HU
LI Overall                                          OHS * s      0 u    0 HU
Performance of both the Bank and the Borrower was marginally satisfactory.
-39-



Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents
1. Staff Appraisal Report
2. Aide-memoires
3. Audit Reports
4. Appui a la gestion du fonds de soutien: rapports d'activite
5. SME Survey; SME Map and Policy Note
6. Le parcours de l'investisseur: Analyse des formalites administratives
7. Government letter and comments on the Bank's contribution to the ICR.
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Repol No.:       25275
7vm :    ;OR