Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00003713 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H6820, IDA-H7850; IDA-H7850, IDA-H8300; IDA-53270, IDA- H8300, IDA-H8950; IDA-53270, IDA56090, IDA-D0440, IDA-H8950) ON CREDITS AND GRANTS IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF SDR 171.7 MILLION (US$260 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO BURKINA FASO FOR THE GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS CREDITS AND GRANTS SERIES April 17, 2017 Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice AFCF2 Country Management Unit Africa Region BURKINA FASO - GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate as of April 17, 2017) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1.00 = CFAF 615.81 ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS AICB Inter-professional Association of Cotton Farmers of Burkina Faso (Association Interprofessionnelle des Cotonculteurs du Burkina) ABG General Budget Support (Appui Budgétaire Général) ASCE High Authority for State Oversight (Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle de l’Etat) BGPP Bagré Growth Pole Project BTOR Back to Office Report CAMC-O Commercial Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation Center of Ouagadougou CAS Country Assistance Strategy CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment CFAF Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CSM Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature CSO Civil Society Organization DGCF General Directorate for Financial Control DG-CMEF Direction générale du contrôle des marchés publics et des engagements financiers DGMP Direction Générale des Marchés Publics DGPC Directorate General for Procurement Contracts DPO Development Policy Operation ECF Extended Credit Facility EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative FAARF Support Fund for Women’s Income-generating Activities (Fonds d’Appui aux Activités Rémunératrices des Femmes) FIAS Facility for Investment Climate Advisory Services GCC Growth and Competitiveness Credit GDP Gross Domestic Product GoBF Government of Burkina Faso ICR Implementation Completion Results Report IDA International Development Association IMF International Monetary Fund ISRR Implementation Status Results Report MATDS Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances) PDO Program Development Objective PFM Public Financial Management PRSCG Poverty Reduction Support Credit and Grant QAG Quality Assurance Group QAE Quality at Entry SCADD Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable) SDR/XDR Special Drawing Rights SONAGESS Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité Alimentaire WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine) VAT Value Added Tax Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte Senior Global Practice Director: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo Practice Manager: Lars Christian Moller Task Team Leader: Samba Ba, Mariam Diop ICR Task Team Leader: Julie Saty Lohi ICR Primary Authors: Julie Saty Lohi and Richard Carroll BURKINA FASO GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS CREDITS AND GRANT SERIES Contents A. Basic Information ..................................................................................................................................... v B. Key Dates .................................................................................................................................................. ii C. Ratings Summary .................................................................................................................................... iii D. Sector and Theme Codes ......................................................................................................................... v E. Bank Staff................................................................................................................................................ vii F. Results Framework Analysis ................................................................................................................. viii G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs ..............................................................................................xiv H. Restructuring (if any) .............................................................................................................................xiv 1. Program Context, Development Objectives, and Design ................................................................... 1 3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ....................................................................... 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes................................................................................................................... 15 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................................................................. 22 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ............................................................................. 22 6. Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................................. 25 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ................................. 26 8. Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes................................ 27 9. Annex 2. Beneficiary Survey Results ................................................................................................. 31 10. Annex 3. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results....................................................................... 32 11. Annex 4. Summary of Borrower’s draft ICRR .................................................................................... 33 12. Annex 5. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ......................................... 56 13. Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents ............................................................................................ 57 14. Annex 7. GCC 1, 2, 3 and 4 Prior Actions and Status......................................................................... 58 15. MAP .................................................................................................................................................... 70 A. Basic Information Program 1 BF- First Growth and Country Burkina Faso Program Name Competitiveness Credit (GCC-1) Program ID P126207 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-H6820, IDA-H7850 ICR Date 04/17/2017 ICR Type Core ICR THE GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument DPL Borrower BURKINA FASO Original Total XDR 58.10M Disbursed Amount XDR 58.10M Commitment Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy and Finance Cofinanciers and Other External Partners Program 2 Second Growth and Country Burkina Faso Program Name Competitiveness Grant Program ID P132210 L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-H7850, IDA-H8300 ICR Date 04/17/2017 ICR Type Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument DPL Borrower BURKINA FASO Original Total XDR 45.50M Disbursed Amount XDR 45.50M Commitment Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy and Finance Cofinanciers and Other External Partners Program 3 BF - DPO - Growth and Country Burkina Faso Program Name Competitiveness Credit 3 IDA-53270, IDA- Program ID P146640 L/C/TF Number(s) H8300,IDA-H8950 ICR Date 03/30/2017 ICR Type Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument DPL Borrower BURKINA FASO Original Total XDR 65.20M Disbursed Amount XDR 65.20M Commitment Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy and Finance Cofinanciers and Other External Partners Program 4 BF - DPO - Growth and Country Burkina Faso Program Name Competitiveness Credit 4 IDA-53270,IDA- Program ID P151275 L/C/TF Number(s) 56090,IDA-D0440,IDA- H8950 ICR Date 04/17/2017 ICR Type Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument DPL Borrower BURKINA FASO Original Total XDR 71.00M Disbursed Amount XDR 71.00M Commitment Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Economy and Finance Cofinanciers and Other External Partners B. Key Dates BF- First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-1) - P126207 Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 01/12/2012 Effectiveness: 09/12/2012 Appraisal: 04/13/2012 Restructuring(s): Approval: 06/26/2012 Mid-term Review: Closing: 12/31/2012 12/31/2012 Second Growth and Competitiveness Grant - P132210 Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 11/06/2012 Effectiveness: 09/11/2013 Appraisal: 01/25/2013 Restructuring(s): Approval: 03/21/2013 Mid-term Review: Closing: 12/31/2013 12/31/2013 ii BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness. Credit 3 - P146640 Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 09/10/2013 Effectiveness: 12/20/2013 Appraisal: 10/30/2013 Restructuring(s): Approval: 12/05/2013 Mid-term Review: Closing: 06/30/2014 06/30/2014 BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 4 - P151275 Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 09/30/2014 Effectiveness: 06/15/2015 06/30/2015 Appraisal: 02/09/2015 Restructuring(s): Approval: 04/02/2015 Mid-term Review: Closing: 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Overall Program Rating Outcomes Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome Moderate Bank Performance Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance Moderately Unsatisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Overall Program Rating Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Moderately Moderately Quality at Entry Government: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Moderately Overall Borrower Moderately Performance Unsatisfactory Performance Unsatisfactory iii C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators BF- First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-1) - P126207 Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating: Performance any) Potential Problem Program No Quality at Entry (QEA) None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Program at any Quality of Supervision No None time (Yes/No): (QSA) DO rating before Highly Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status Second Growth and Competitiveness Grant - P132210 Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating: Performance any) Potential Problem Program No Quality at Entry (QEA) None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Program at any Quality of Supervision No None time (Yes/No): (QSA) DO rating before Highly Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 3 - P146640 Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating: Performance any) Potential Problem Program No Quality at Entry (QEA) None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Program at any Quality of Supervision No None time (Yes/No): (QSA) DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 4 - P151275 Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating: Performance any) Potential Problem Program No Quality at Entry (QEA) None at any time (Yes/No): Problem Program at any Quality of Supervision No None time (Yes/No): (QSA) DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status Satisfactory iv D. Sector and Theme Codes BF- First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-1) - P126207 Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central Government (Central Agencies) 45 45 Microfinance 5 5 Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 35 35 Other social services 5 5 Sub-National Government 10 10 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Decentralization 10 10 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 10 10 Nutrition and food security 10 10 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 50 50 Rural policies and institutions 20 20 Second Growth and Competitiveness Grant - P132210 Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central Government (Central Agencies) 38 38 Microfinance 13 13 Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 12 12 Other Public Administration 25 25 Other social services 12 12 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 12 12 Nutrition and food security 12 12 Other public sector governance 25 25 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 38 38 Rural markets 13 13 v BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 3 - P146640 Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Microfinance 11 11 Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 11 11 Other Industry, Trade and Services 22 22 Other Public Administration 45 45 Other social services 11 11 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 11 11 Nutrition and food security 11 11 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 45 45 Rural markets 11 11 Trade facilitation and market access 22 22 BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 4 - P151275 Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central Government (Central Agencies) 33 33 Microfinance 11 11 Other Industry, Trade and Services 34 34 Other social services 11 11 Sub-National Government 11 11 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 11 11 Nutrition and food security 11 11 Public expenditure, financial management and procurement 45 45 Rural markets 11 11 Trade facilitation and market access 22 22 vi E. Bank Staff BF- First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-1) - P126207 Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte Madani M. Tall Practice Lars Christian Moller Miria A. Pigato Manager/Manager: Task Team Leader: Samba Ba Ali Zafar ICR Team Leader: Julie Saty Lohi ICR Primary Author: Julie Saty Lohi, Richard Carroll BF-Second Growth and Competitiveness Grant (GCC-2) - P132210 Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte Madani M. Tall Practice Lars Christian Moller Miria A. Pigato Manager/Manager: Task Team Leader: Samba Ba Ali Zafar ICR Team Leader: Julie Saty Lohi ICR Primary Author: Julie Saty Lohi, Richard Carroll BF – Third Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-3) - P146640 Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte Madani M. Tall Practice Lars Christian Moller Miria A. Pigato Manager/Manager: Task Team Leader: Samba Ba Samba Ba ICR Team Leader: Julie Saty Lohi ICR Primary Author: Julie Saty Lohi, Richard Carroll vii BF-Fourth Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-4) - P151275 Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Makhtar Diop Country Director: Pierre Frank Laporte Ousmane Diagana Practice Lars Christian Moller Blanca Moreno-Dodson Manager/Manager: Task Team Leader: Samba Ba Samba Ba ICR Team Leader: Julie Saty Lohi ICR Primary Author: Julie Saty Lohi, Richard Carroll F. Results Framework Analysis Program Development Objectives (from Program Document-PD) The program development objectives were: (a) catalyzing the private sector growth and employment; (b) improving governance and public resources management; and (c) building resilience to shocks and reducing the country's vulnerability. (PDO indicators are taken from the GCC4 PD. Data sources/ responsible agencies are in parentheses in the comments section.) Revised Program Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Not revised Indicator(s) BF- First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-1) - P126207 Original Target Actual Value Formally Baseline Values (from Achieved at Indicator Revised Target Value approval Completion or Target Values documents) Years Second Growth and Competitiveness Grant - P132210 Original Target Actual Value Formally Baseline Values (from Achieved at Indicator Revised Target Value approval Completion or Target Values documents) Years BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 3 - P146640 Original Target Actual Value Formally Baseline Values (from Achieved at Indicator Revised Target Value approval Completion or Target Values documents) Years viii BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness. Credit 4 - P151275 Original Target Actual Value Formally Baseline Values (from Achieved at Indicator Revised Target Value approval Completion or Target Values documents) Years I. Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment Indicator 1 : Capitalization of the stabilization fund is at least CFAF 6 billion Value CFAF 7 billion by the CFAF 5 billion. CFAF 6 billion. not revised (quantitative or target year Qualitative) Date achieved 04/12/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved (Inter-professional Association of Cotton Farmers of Burkina Faso- (incl. % AICB) achievement) Indicator 2 : Capitalization of the Input Fund is at least CFAF 10 billion Value Capitalization of Input CFAF 10 billion not revised CFAF10 billion (quantitative or Fund is 0 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/12/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved (AICB) (incl. % achievement) Indicator 3 : Improved fertilizer distribution to the private sector increased by 30,000 tons. Value 0 tons 30,000 tons. not revised 820 tons (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target not achieved--only 2.7 percent of target. (Ministry of Agriculture-MoA). (incl. % achievement) Indicator 4 : Average waiting time for customs clearance in Ouaga Inter reduced by 50 percent Value 50 percent (2 days) average of 4 days 1 day (quantitative or reduction Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved and exceeded. The reform related to the queuing at the “Ouaga- (incl. % inter” was moved to the regional DPO and monitored. (Ministry of Transport-MoT) achievement) ix Annual increase of 10 percent in the Number of certified professionals and Ratio Indicator 5 : between trucking companies / individuals Value Annual increase of N/A 0 (quantitative or 10 percent Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Target not achieved. This indicator was added for GCC4. It measures progress in Comments improving professionalism in the trucking industry by licensing truck drivers. Despite (incl. % the adoption of the decree by the Ministry of transport, the overall legal framework achievement) was not completed on time (decree on the amount of taxes (royalty fees) to be paid by truckers….) (MoT) II. Improve governance and public resource management Public revenues generated by the mining sector are increased to 4 percent of GDP. Indicator 6 : Value 1.8 percent 4 percent not revised 2.4 percent (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Target not achieved. The global downturn resulted in a sharp decline about 27 Comments percent of the gold price on the international market in 2014 and 2015. This has (incl. % impacted mining revenues for Burkina Faso. (MoF) achievement) The number of mining companies submitting validated data for Extractive Industries Indicator 7 : Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports is increased to 6. Value 0 6 not revised 18 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved and exceeded (300 percent of target). (Ministry of Mines-MoM) (incl. % achievement) Burkina Faso’s score in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Indicator 8 : is increased to 40 or higher. Value 38 out of 100 Increase to 40 not revised 38 (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target not achieved. The achievement remained at the level of 38 through the (incl. % program close (Ministry of Justice-MoJ). achievement) x Number of Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature (CSM) elected members per grade Indicator 9 : increased by 50 percent Three (3) CSM Value Two (2) CSM elected Increased by 50 not revised elected members per (quantitative or members per grade percent grade Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Target achieved. (MoJ la loi organique n°049-2015/CNT du 25 août 201. However, Comments there is a transition period to allow the current members to complete their terms (incl. % before the entering into force of the new Law - Source: DGESS Ministry of Justice achievement) and human rights). Indicator 10 : A 20 percent decrease in the time required to obtain a court ruling (to 584 days) Value 20 percent decrease 2 years (730 days). not revised 120 days (quantitative or to 584 days Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved and exceeded. (MoJ) (incl. % achievement) Indicator 11 : A 20 percent reduction in the time needed to enforce contracts (to 372 days) Value 446 days. 372 days not revised 446 days (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target not achieved. (Doing Business 2016) (MoJ) (incl. % achievement) Percent of judgments written down in commercial courts is at least 75 percent Indicator 12 : Value 111 out of 173, or 64 96.3 percent 75 percent. not revised (quantitative or percent. (December 2013) Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved and exceeded. (MoJ) (incl. % achievement) xi The average execution rate of the line ministries’ investment budgets is increased by Indicator 13 : more than 50 percent. Average is increased Value Average of 30 percent by more than 50 not revised 61.2 percent (quantitative or percent Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved. (incl. % achievement) Number of physical spot checks of contracts subject to competitive bidding Indicator 14 : increased by 50 percent. Value Increased by 50 200 spot checks not revised 350 (quantitative or percent. Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved. (MoF) (incl. % achievement) III. Reduce Vulnerability 5 percent of the national budget is transferred to local governments under the Indicator 15 : Budget Law Value 3.7 percent not revised 5.62 percent (2014) (quantitative or 5 percent 4.21 percent (2015) Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 This target not achieved. Transfers fell to 4.21 percent in 2015 due to the political Comments instability which led to dismiss of mayors in all of the 354 communes and the shortfalls (incl. % in public revenues following the decline in gold and cotton prices in 2015. (Ministry achievement) of Territorial Admin. and Decentral. & Security-MATDS) Number of active borrowers increased by at least 10 percent Indicator 16 : 10 percent Value At least 150,000 by 79,937 increase 119,416 in 2014 (quantitative or December, 2014 (87,931) Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2014 12/31/2015 Target achieved. The 2011 baseline was incorrectly reported at 120,000 on which Comments the original target was based. The target was revised to a percentage increase. (incl. % Note, the active borrowers are also referred to as ‘beneficiaries’ in the results achievement) matrix. (MoF) xii Indicator 17 : FAARF has a total loan portfolio of more than CFAF 5 billion Value (quantitative or N.A. CFAF 4.5 billion CFAF5 billion CFAF8.1 billion Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2014 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved and exceeded. Target increased at GCC4. (Ministry of Women’s (incl. % Promotion-MoWP) achievement) The Annual Financial Reporting Sheets of microfinance institutions are made Indicator 18 : available each year no later than July. Value (quantitative or N.A. Yes Yes Qualitative) Date achieved Comments Target achieved. Data on certified audits of microfinance institutions is available at (incl. % the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The information for this indicator was achievement) confirmed at the ICR stage. The national food reserve increase to at least 50,000 Indicator 19 : 59,000 tons at the end of 2013 for the Value Reserves-at least Reserves-35,000 tons not revised food reserves in (quantitative or 50,000 tons 2014 Qualitative) 31,400 in table in text Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Target achieved and exceeded based on the data provided by the government. (incl. % (SONAGESS) achievement) Emergency food stock increased to at least 25,000 tons Indicator 20 : Value 5,000 tons 10,000 tons 25,000 tons 10,972 tons (quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 12/31/2015 12/31/2015 Comments Revised target not achieved. By the end of 2012 the government had pulled out (incl. % reserves to intervene in favor of poorest households during the raining season. ICR achievement) cannot confirm whether the stock has been replenished. (SONAGESS) xiii G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs BF- First Growth and Competitiveness Credit (GCC-1) - P126207 Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 06/28/2014 Highly Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory 89.37 Second Growth and Competitiveness Grant - P132210 Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 06/29/2014 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory 70.48 BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 3 - P146640 Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 07/17/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 100.27 BF - DPO - Growth and Competitiveness Credit 4 - P151275 Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (USD millions) 1 12/26/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 99.02 H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable xiv 1. Program Context, Development Objectives, and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. Burkina Faso is a low-income, landlocked country in the Sahel, frequently exposed to shocks, and whose economy is heavily dependent on revenues from gold mining and cotton exports. The main sectors of the economy—subsistence agriculture, cotton, and mining—remained vulnerable to exogenous shocks. These shocks include (a) macroeconomic shocks from fluctuations in commodities’ prices and recession in the euro area given the peg of the country’s currency—the CFAF—to the euro; (b) the climatic risks characteristic of Burkina’s geographical location in the Sahel where extreme and variable climatic conditions often cause flooding and drought within a few months. These shocks made the country subject to weather-related shocks and threats of food security. Burkina Faso also faced political risks which heightened from the domestic protest and political unrest of 2011, motivated by structural disparities and lack of economic opportunities. Political risks were exacerbated by the large inflows of refugees from the conflict-ridden neighbor, Mali, which reduced the likelihood of political stability and the Government keeping its reforms commitments. 2. Burkina Faso was characterized by high poverty and profound structural disparities between rural and urban areas and between rich and poor. This poverty existed despite the relatively strong economic growth and the high flows of international aid over the first decade of the 2000s. As of 2009, the poverty incidence in rural areas was 50.7 percent compared to 19.9 percent in urban areas and 46.7 percent at the national level. Poverty incidence widely varied across regions. In 2011, Burkina Faso’s score on the Human Development Index was 0.385 out of 1. 3. The national development objectives of the Government of Burkina Faso (GoBF) were formulated in the 2011–2015 Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable, SCADD). The SCADD is the successor to an earlier series of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which was the framework of the Government’s economic and social development policies from 2000 through 2010. The SCADD aimed at addressing vulnerability through transformation and diversification of the economy and a better sharing of the benefits of growth. It focused on private sector development, the investment climate, and rural transformation as the key pillars of its policy actions. Through the SCADD, an economic growth rate averaging more than 10 percent during 2011–2015 was envisioned. The Government also projected to reduce its fiscal deficit from 3.8 percent in 2012 to 3.1 percent in 2015, with the combination of increased revenues, shifting expenditure from current to investment, and through measures of the Public Finance Management (PFM). Under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, which supported the SCADD, revenues were expected to increase (from 16.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 to 17.5 percent of GDP in 2015), supported by higher tax revenue, increased revenue from mining, and improvement in administrative efficiency. Previous World Bank Support and Rationale for Continued Intervention 4. The programmatic series of Growth and Competitiveness Credit and grants (GCC) Development Policy Operation (DPO) to Burkina Faso over 2012–2015 was designed to support the GoBF in the implementation of its development program (SCADD). The Bank involvement was well-placed to contribute to mitigating the adverse effects of political, macroeconomic, and climate risks on the country’s 1 growth, thereby enhancing prospects for reducing poverty and increasing shared prosperity. A goal in the support of the SCADD was mitigating the adverse effects of the risks on sociopolitical and economic development. The reduced agricultural production in 2011 and the decrease in food grain production in 2012 required budget support to the Government and external food aid in 2012 for both the local population in deficit areas and for the Malian refugees. The series of four DPOs had a broad scope, addressing reforms in the cotton sector, mining, transit facilitation, judicial reform, stronger Public Financial Management (PFM), microfinance, improved decentralization, and food security. The development of the GCC series required strong collaboration with the GoBF, Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and Development Partners1. A donor conference to pledge funds for the Government’s new development strategy (SCADD) was also held in Paris in February 2012. The World Bank committed to further support to the Government through investment projects to achieve its SCADD objectives. 5. The World Bank had provided many years of similar budget support in Burkina Faso, including 11 Poverty Reduction Support Credits and Grants (PRSCGs). These PRSCG 2 operations helped improve economic management and deepen the reform agenda in Burkina by: (a) providing predictable financing for the country to manage terms of trade shocks and implement poverty reduction strategies; (b) supporting reforms in the cotton sector that resulted in greater efficiency and equity for farmers (as farmers get increased producer prices that are closer to international levels) as well as improved vertical integration of the chain through the privatization of the sector; (c) improvement in the investment climate for mining and thus, increasing foreign direct investment inflows; and (d) reforming public financial management (PFM), which has been critical in achieving greater fiscal stability through improved public finance control and accountability. 6. Although the PRSCGs accomplished investment climate reforms, there was mixed success in improving the overall competitiveness of the economy. There remained challenges to improve competitiveness by strengthening agricultural input markets, transportation infrastructure, and customs facilities. The judicial environment for private sector investment, and governance in general needed to be more conducive to private sector growth. There also needed to be a renewed focus on supporting decentralized social services. 7. The broader Bank portfolio built a strong foundation for the GCC under the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). For example, the Bagré Growth Pole Project (BGPP), approved in FY2011, 3 aimed at promoting private sector investment and improving the public-private partnership framework. The GCC complemented the existing operations in agriculture by specifically targeting promotion of timely access to cotton inputs and reduction of their costs by developing an input capitalization fund. To promote private sector development and agricultural growth, the program emphasized private sector involvement in the distribution of fertilizers for selected crops. On analytical advisory assistance, the Public 1 Development partners including the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Development Program, the European Union German Society for International Cooperation, Canadian International Development Agency, and the International Food Policy Research Institute. 2 The Implementation Completion Results Report (ICR) rated the outcomes of PRSC 7-11 as satisfactory, whereas the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) rated this series’ outcome as moderately unsatisfactory. 3 Burkina Faso - Bagré Growth Pole Project, Report No.: AC5131, May 31, 2011, Project ID: P119662. 2 Expenditure Review on transport and energy was a key analytical input for identifying private sector development bottlenecks. 8. The macroeconomic framework was adequate at the beginning of the program. As table 3 shows, during 2011-12, GDP growth was strong at over 6 percent annually. Inflation was moderate at 2.8- 3.8 percent. Government overall balance deficit was also at a moderate level at 1.4-3.1 percent of GDP. External performance was adequate with a current account deficit at only 1.5 percent of GDP. As the GCC series progressed, the macroeconomic framework deteriorated. Section 2.1 provides additional details of macroeconomic performance throughout the GCC series. 1.2 Original Program Development Objectives and Key Indicators 9. The program development objectives (PDOs) of the GCC series to Burkina Faso were to i) catalyze the private sector growth and employment; ii) improve the transparency and accountability in public resources mobilization and management; and iii) build resilience to shocks and reduce the country’s vulnerability. Annex 8 provides the full set of original key indicators for each of the four GCC operations. The four operations had a total of 30 distinct results indicators. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 10. The PDO was not revised, but the PDO indicators for each operation were revised, particularly for the final operation in the series, GCC4. Table 1 shows the key indicators that were dropped (10) before GCC4 and the indicators that were added at GCC4 (3). Each operation had a somewhat different composition of indicators in addition to some revisions of targets which is traced in Annex 8. In addition, the indicator “Burkina Faso’s score on Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International” in GCC4 was made more precise compared with the GCC3 version (“a general decline in corruption indicators is observed over time”), and was designed to capture the impacts of the reform in the justice sector related to the Anticorruption Law. The indicators were dropped for a variety of reasons which is explained in section 3.2 in the context of the impact on the rating for PDO achievement. 3 Table 1. Revisions to the Set of Key Indicators Indicator Monitoring Status Pillar 1: Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment 1. The government continues to refine the operational structure of the guarantee scheme. Dropped before GCC4 2. Private firms begin expressing interest in joining the new scheme. Dropped before GCC4 Dropped before GCC2- targeted trucks operate on the corridors connecting Burkina Faso to seaport countries requiring regional efforts-Indicator transferred to 3.Axle overloading goes down to 25 percent regional DPO New Annual increase of 10 percent in the Number of certified professionals and Ratio between trucking companies / individuals. Added to GCC4-Monitored at end of program Pillar 2: Improve Governance and Public resource management 4. Physical inspections of gold exports by customs Dropped before GCC4 officials increases. Dropped before GCC4-only 17 attained, not achieved. 5.50 mediation cases at CAMC-O in 2012 and 75 cases In addition, number of cases depends on demand not in 2013. on CAMC-O performance 6. Greater transparency and accountability in PFM is Dropped before GCC4-Superceded by score on achieved. indicator for anti-corruption index 7. Number of judges that will remain for at least a year Dropped before GCC4-no data available is 12. 8.At least 10 percent of the population is satisfied with Dropped before GCC4-no data available public services New Number of CSM elected members per grade increased by 50 percent. Added to GCC4-Monitored at end of program Pillar 3: Reduce Vulnerability 9. Number of women-owned businesses to increase Dropped before GCC4-no data available by 5 percent. 10. Stocking of food in 50 of the warehouses in food- Dropped before GCC3-target met in 2013, then no deficit parts of the country. longer monitored under program New The Annual Financial Reporting Sheets of microfinance institutions are made available each year no later than July Added to GCC4-Monitored at end of program Note: Only the dropped indicators are numbered (1 to 10). 1.4 Original Policy Areas Supported by the Program 11. The GCC series covered three strategic policy areas (pillars). The series supported the GoBF’s key priorities under its development program (SCADD). The implementation of the GCCs’ pillars and actions was expected to mitigate Burkina Faso’s macroeconomic, political, and social risks and reduce poverty while increasing shared prosperity. 4 Pillar I: Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment • Pillar I focused on two sectors: the agricultural and transport sectors and directly supported the Government’s strategy to empower the private sector to reduce poverty. The reform focus on the cotton sector development with the establishment of the cotton price stabilization fund and cotton input capitalization fund, as cotton represents the major export good and the source of revenues for farmers. The reform also required the involvement of the private sector in fertilizers distribution for other non- cotton agricultural food crops to increase food production. The second objective of this policy area focused on measures to cut transport costs, through customs audit, the adoption of reforms to reduce waiting time at Ouaga-inter (the formal customs-clearance yard in Ouagadougou, and the renewal of trucking fleet). In the agricultural sector, the main goal was to improve the functioning of the agricultural input market, including: • Capitalization of the cotton4 price Stabilization Fund • Capitalization of the cotton Input Fund • Involvement of the private sector in fertilizer distribution for other staple food crops. 12. The transport sector actions were designed to ensure the quality of transport logistics and reduce the waiting time at customs. The expected result was to increase trade flows by reducing the cost of cross- border trade and incentivizing private investment in the transport sector. Reforms in the transport sector included: • The renewal of the auto-park • Speeding the customs clearance process at the ‘Ouaga-inter’. • Increase the Number of certified professional truck drivers and the ratio between trucking companies and individuals. Pillar II: Improve the transparency and accountability in public resources mobilization and management 13. Pillar II covered reforms in three key sectors: Transparency and accountability in the mining sector, improve the justice sector and governance, and strengthen PFM. This pillar supported the Government’s priorities for justice sector reform and political, economic, and administrative governance. In the mining sector the reform objective was to build transparency and accountability. The reform measures in the justice sector aimed at enhancing judicial efficiency and openness. In PFM, the reforms objectives focus on strengthening the public financial management. Reforms in the mining sector included: • Revising the Mining Code, 4 Cotton directly sustains the lives of more than 3 million people in Burkina Faso and is the main source of monetary revenue in rural areas. As of 2012, the agriculture sector represented 30 percent of GDP, employing about 90 percent of Burkina’s workforce, with cotton being the most important production of the sector in terms of value. Until 2012 (before the boom in gold mining) cotton represented more than 50 percent of Burkina’s export revenues (see the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation Statistics (FAOSTAT) 2014 and World Integrated Trade Solutions, World Bank). 5 • Increasing the number of mining companies submitting validated data for Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports and publishing monthly reports of consolidated data on mining revenues. • Increasing public revenues generated by the mining sector. The goal for this action was to ensure better coordination between the recipient’s ministries responsible for finance and mining, to improve collection of public revenues generated by mining activities in the country. Justice sector and governance reforms included: • Improve Burkina Faso’s score in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (new indicator added in the fourth operation) • Increase the number of CSM elected members per grade • Decrease the time required to obtain a court ruling • Reduce the time needed to enforce contracts • Increase the percentage of judgments written down in commercial courts The Public Finance Management (PFM) included: • Increase the number of physical spot checks for contracts subject to competitive bidding • Increase the average execution rate of the line ministries’ investment budgets. • Compliance with measures for the transposition of the current WAEMU directives on PFM (six WAEMU directives related to PFM concerning: (a) budget laws, (b) transparency rules, (c) government accounting practices, (d) budget classifications, (e) the central government’s chart of accounts, and (f) the central government’s operations summary table) Pillar III: Build Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability 14. The third pillar aimed at building resilience and reducing vulnerability. This pillar responded to the Government’s strategy for reducing poverty and vulnerability through social service delivery. The main reforms included: • Enhance access to decentralized basic services by increasing fiscal transfers from the national budget to local governments. • Increase access to microfinance and promoting gender equality by ensuring an increase in the number of nationwide beneficiaries of the ‘Support Fund for Women’s Income-generating Activities (FAARF)’ and a raise in the support portfolio. • Strengthen food security by i) implementing a National Organization and Coordination of Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation Plan; ii) constituting an emergency and intervention food stocks; and iii) involving operators in the acquisition of cereal products. 1.5 Revised Pillars 15. No revisions. 1.6 Other Significant Changes 6 16. During the implementation period (after GCC3), President Blaise Compaore was ousted from power on October 31, 2014, following a popular uprising in violent protest against his plans to extend his rule. The collapse of the Compaore regime led to a transitional government and significant staff turnover throughout the administration, which caused implementation delays in some sectors in the latter part of the program as described below. 17. Implementation dates were delayed for each of the operations. Constraints related to reform implementation and political unrest in the country, led to changes in the starting dates of some operations relative to the dates planned at appraisal. The first operation was effective on September 12, 2012, and the second operation was slightly delayed to extend the implementation time for the cotton sector input fund capitalization and to address the flow of refugees from the Malian political crisis. The Cotton Fund was officially capitalized on February 2013 and served for the cotton season of 2014-2015 instead of the initially envisaged season of 2013-2014. The third operation was effective on December 20, 2013 cascading from the delay in starting the second operation. The fourth operation was delayed from the envisaged date of December 2014 until June, 2015 due to political events, as well as the difficulties in implementing reform triggers. The results indicators were expected to be achieved by program close, December 31, 2015. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Program Performance 18. The program consisted of four operations with total disbursements of SDR 239.8 million, US$359.14 million equivalent (table 2), equivalent to about 0.8 percent of the country’s GDP during the four-year period. Thus, the program provided a substantial amount of budget support over a sustained period of time. Table 2. Program Key Dates and Disbursed Amounts Effectiveness Disbursed Disbursed Operation Approval Date Date Amount- Amount- Closing Date million SDR million US$ GCC 1 06/26/2012 09/12/2012 58.1 89.37 12/31/2012 GCC 2 03/21/2013 09/11/2013 45.5 70.48 12/31/2013 GCC 3 12/05/2013 12/20/2013 65.2 100.27 06/30/2014 GCC4 04/02/2015 06/30/2015 71.0 99.02 12/31/2015 19. Macroeconomic performance in Burkina Faso has been mixed with a decline in the last two years of the GCC implementation. Growth was strong averaging 6 percent between 2011 and 2013 followed by slower growth in 2014 and 2015 (table 3). Growth was mainly driven by agriculture and extractives. The unfavorable international market for cotton and gold was exacerbated by a sharp drop in public investment, which combined with unfavorable rainfall have resulted in stagnant production in agriculture, and accompanied by political instability in 2014. These factors led to significant deceleration of growth in 2014 and 2015, averaging 4 percent. Inflation decelerated from 3.8 percent in 2012 to -0.3 percent in 2014 before slowly picking up to 0.9 percent in 2015 (the lowest among its peers in WAEMU in 7 that year) due to subsidies in cereals prices, lower demand and falling oil prices. The improvements in public sector management through implementation of key reforms in the first years of the GCC series helped the government respond adequately to the shocks and preserve fiscal sustainability. The government’s primary deficit deteriorated from 0.8 percent of GDP in 2011 to 3.3 percent in 2013, but improved to 1.6 percent in 2015 (table 3). Severe cuts in investment expenditures allowed maintaining public debt at a moderate level of risk of debt distress. Gross debt increased only slightly from 30 percent of GDP in 2011 to 33 percent in 2015. Due to the unfavorable international market and rainfalls, resulting in lower exports, external performance weakened, with the current account deficit widening from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2011 to 7.2 percent in 2012 and 11 percent in 2013, before narrowing to 6.5 percent in 2014 and 4.1 percent in 2015. Overall macroeconomic performance was somewhat weaker at the end of GCC series relative to the base line of 2011. Table. 3 Macroeconomic performance between 2011 and 2016 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 annual percent growth GDP 6.6 6.5 6.6 4 4 5.2 Inflation, average consumer prices 2.8 3.8 0.5 -0.3 0.9 1.7 Import of goods and Services 22.9 24.3 19.3 -7.7 4.5 7 Export of goods and services 26 4.2 17.6 2.1 5 3.3 Agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing -4 7.8 3.7 2.7 2.4 3.1 Industry, mining, energy, construction 19.4 -7.3 5 8.1 4.5 1.1 Services 5.3 11.7 6.1 3.1 4.2 7.5 percent of GDP Total investment 15.4 14.9 20.8 19.8 14.2 14.3 General government revenue 20.7 22.4 23.9 21.4 19.6 21.9 General government total expenditure 22.1 25.5 27.8 23.4 21.8 25.1 General government primary net -0.8 -2.4 -2.9 -1.1 -1.2 -1 lending/borrowing General government net lending/borrowing -1.4 -3.1 -3.9 -1.9 -2.3 -3.1 General government gross debt 29.8 28.3 28.1 29.8 28.6 29 Current account balance -1.5 -7.2 -11 -6.5 -4.1 1 th Source: World Bank Group, macro-poverty-outlook, 4 edition, November 2016. (Available at http://macropovertyoutlook.worldbank.org/mpo_files/mpo/mpo-am16-ssa.pdf 20. A total of 36 prior actions were implemented throughout the four operations to address key constraints, but, program PDO performance declined throughout the series. Annex 7 provides the list of the prior actions by operation and evidence of their implementation. According to the ISRRs, the first two operations rated PDO achievement as highly satisfactory, the third operation as satisfactory and the fourth as moderately satisfactory. The decreasing rate of performance across the four operations may be attributed to several factors. One factor was the deteriorating political environment exacerbated by political instability in neighboring countries (i.e., Côte d’Ivoire and Mali). Another factor was the weak institutional and financial capacity to handle the reforms, made worse by the political turmoil. The frequent exposure to exogenous shocks led to increasing the country vulnerability. Another factor was the shortage of budget resources to sustain implementation of the GCC series over its lengthy timespan and large number of actions. This led to a decline in the implementation incentives of the technical 8 departments of the line ministries over time. During the ICR mission several line ministries confirmed that they did not receive sufficient financial resources across the operations to carry out the tasks. The political crisis and uncertainties contributed to the slowing of momentum for reform implementation. Indeed, after the political crisis, staff in many sectors were replaced by new and often less experienced people which reduced implementation capacity from the third operation onward. 21. Table 4 summarizes the changes to Triggers throughout the GCC Series which had to be made because the original plan proved too ambitious for country conditions. In Pillar 1, the support to trucking was scaled down from a guarantee scheme to exemptions from taxes. This change was necessary because the government did not have the financial capacity to implement the guarantee fund that would have facilitated access to credit for transporters to import new trucks. In addition, the expected support in bilateral technical assistance did not materialize. The dismantling of ‘Tour de Role’ system also proved not to be feasible at the country level, because it required the approval of other countries’ governments (in Abidjan, Lome, Tema) in addition to Burkina Faso. This measure was scaled back to ‘improve professionalism in the trucking industry.’ In the mining sector, the major disputes were about taxes, such as VAT on the hydrocarbon, and the level of contribution to the local development fund. Owing to the dispute over the content of the new mining code and delays in its adoption, the original trigger for the fourth operation was changed as shown in Table 4. This action was originally expected to trigger GCC2. However, due to the lack of institutional capacity to implement the legal framework on time for GCC2, it became a trigger for GCC3. 9 Table 4. Changes to GCC Triggers Original Change to Trigger Pillar 1 Requirement of government support to the Instead of a guarantee scheme, the government revised and trucking fleet renewal through a guarantee stipulated support through exemptions of custom fees and VAT on scheme. imported trucks/vehicle with expanded deadline to December 31, 2013. Official dismantling of the queuing system New trigger for the GCC4 in the transport area became: “enhanced “tour de role”, originally defined as the Professionalism in the trucking industry through the adoption and trigger for the fourth operation (GCC4) implementation/enforcing of a legal framework for licensing road transport operators”. Mining sector: the trigger for the third The new requirement (GCC3) was the submission of the revised operation “the submission to the parliament mining code, because, the dispute over the first draft submitted to and adoption of Mining Code adhering to the parliament led the government of Blaise Compaore to withdraw international best practice for fiscal, it for revision. environmental, and social standards” “Resubmission to the National Assembly of a revised Draft of the “Development of special fund (in share of Mining Code; including the creation of a local development mining mining revenues) allocated to regions and fund financed by a share of mining revenues, and resources from communities where mining takes place” the fund are allocated to regions and communities where mining companies operate”. This revised measure included both the initially agreed prior action on the mining code and the trigger related to the local development fund. Pillar 2 The major change is related to the reform Became the trigger for GCC3. However, by GCC3, the action of establishing “the legal framework implementation of the reform did not occur and the requirement for public finance complying with selected had to be changed once again. The new trigger for GCC3 was WAEMU directives of June 2009…”, as defined as the “appointment of a financial controller for each defined in the first operation. Trigger for ministry and each national public administrative institution”. GCC2. The requirements of adopting of finance law, the regulations of the fiscal transparency, the rules of public accounting, and budget nomenclature by the parliament and by the government (as envisaged in the first operation document), were cancelled. Adoption of the medium-term Completion of procedure-based audit of the customs clearance recommendations to streamline customs procedures in Ouagadougou to improve customs administration administration from the procedural audit” and adoption of recommendations; and support to renewal of trucking fleet through a guarantee scheme. The original triggers for the GCC3 related to The triggers were reformulated as follow: (a) A Draft Anticorruption the adoption of measures to reduce Law designed to strengthen penalties for bribery, tighten commercial case backlog, were moved to regulations on gift-giving to public officials, and more precisely and GCC4 comprehensively define both the nature of corrupt practices and the sanctions against them is submitted to National Transition Council (CNT) and (b) Measures are adopted to improve the functioning of the Superior Council of the Magistracy, including an increase of its number of elected members. 10 22. In Pillar 2, the weakness of the institutional capacity in PFM and in other areas caused major program changes. The action to establish a legal framework for public finance complying with selected WAEMU directives was originally expected to trigger GCC2. However, due to the lack of institutional capacity to implement the legal framework on time for GCC2, it was moved to GCC3 and was replaced by a less ambitious action (“appointment of a financial controller for each ministry and each national public administrative institution”). The compliance with WAEMU law required significant institutional capacity, but the DG-CMEF at this point was still a new structure (created only in 2012) created from the merger of two directorates: General Directorate for Financial Control (DGCF) and Directorate General for Procurement Contracts (DGMP). It was important to build the institutional capacity through the appointment of directors of the control of public procurement and financial commitments (DCMEF) in ministries and institutions in order to advance toward the goal. Streamlining customs administration was related to the adoption of reforms of the customs-clearance procedures at “Ouaga-Inter” (the formal customs-clearance yard in Ouagadougou). This action also needed to be postponed (to GCC3) because the customs audit was not completed on time. 2.2. Major Factors Affecting Implementation Adequacy of Government commitment 22. The government of Burkina Faso (GoBF) has had some lapses in commitment to the implementation of key reforms required under the GCC series, though it has worked to overcome these lapses along with the additional challenges of program design flaws and weak capacity. For example, the first draft of the new mining taxation code submitted to the national assembly was not approved by end-2013 as planned because of investors’ concerns about fiscal aspects of the code. The Government, which had not properly vetted the code with stakeholders, withdrew the draft code from the parliament. The draft code was revised in consultation with the stakeholders (especially the Chamber of Mines, Civil Society Organization-CSO) and resubmitted to the parliament for approval. In the end, the new mining code was passed by Burkina Faso's transitional parliament and replaced 12-year-old mining regulations, abolished a 10 percent tax break on mining company profits and required firms to pay into a local development fund. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, (MEF) which carried out the coordination and oversight of the overall implementation and the technical departments of sector ministries, which were in charge of the reform implementation remained committed even during the political turmoil to ensure the program implementation. Another example is from the transport sector, where the government provided incentives to encourage the renewal of the trucking fleet. Given its financial resources constraints to establish a guaranteed fund for trucking fleet renewal, the government exempted customs fees and the VAT on imported new truck (through adoption of laws and decrees) as a way of encouraging the fleet renewal. Soundness of background analysis 23. Program preparation and technical design were based on a solid body of analytical work, but could have better taken into account capacity limitations in implementing such a broad program. An in-depth Country Economic Memorandum 5 completed in 2010 identified microeconomic constraints that 5 World Bank. 2010. Promoting Growth, Competitiveness and Diversification, Country Economic Memorandum. Report No. 51815-BF, September 10, 2010. 11 hamper growth and competitiveness, as well as reform needs for the investment climate, credit intermediation, and transport and telecommunication for access to global markets. The Public Expenditure Review on Transport and Energy carried out in 2011 has provided an analytical underpinning for the pillar 1. Surveys were conducted to assess constraints to private sector investment, including the Summary Review of Tax and the Investment Climate by the Facility for Investment Climate Advisory Services (FIAS) in 2009, which surveyed the fiscal and institutional landscape for foreign investors. The report of National Business Association (La Maison de l’Entreprise du Burkina Faso) analyzed the drivers of firm survival, which contributed to defining prior actions under Pillar 1. Regional studies on mineral tax administration, in particular, a political economy study of the mining sector (carried out during the preparation of the IDA-financed Mineral Development Support Project), highlighted the need to increase transparency and accountability in the management and oversight of the mining sector. The 2010 Public Expenditure and Financial Assessment procurement study and the 2010 PEFA results were useful in defining prior actions for Pillars 2 and 3 of the GCC series. 24. The PD for GCC-1 showed that preparation of the GCC series considered lessons learned from previous DPOs. The GCC-1 PD cited several lessons that guided program preparation. The main lesson from policy in Burkina Faso was that, without broad-based economic growth and job creation, policies promoting macro stability and social programs will not be sufficient to cause a significant lowering of poverty. GCC design included cross-cutting reforms targeting private-sector development (such as transport costs), build greater resilience to shocks in existing labor-intensive sectors (e.g., cotton), and ensure that the fiscal benefits of natural resource (e.g., mining) activities are well managed and widely shared. A lesson that was cited, but not incorporated into the design was the need to narrow the choice and number of policy reforms to support. It also referred to the need to be ambitious in depth of reforms and their significance for economic growth, employment, and poverty reduction. The broad nature of the series, however, over taxed limited implementation capacity. A third lesson cited was to avoid the negative effects of providing finance out of sync with the government’s own budget cycle. Unfortunately, given the unforeseen political events and other factors, it was not possible to keep the GCC series fully in sync with the government’s budget cycle. Assessment of the operation’s design 25. The project design was rooted in the World Bank’s Africa strategy 6 on employment, resilience, and governance, and reflected Burkina Faso’s specific country conditions and challenges, but needed to take greater consideration of the country’s limited implementation capacity. The GCC series encompassed a wide range of policy areas from a new mining code to cotton guarantee funds, judicial reforms, fertilizer distribution, budget execution, emergency food reserves, procurement reforms, etc. While each of these areas is justified individually as a national priority, it is not clear that the operation’s design was sufficiently cohesive to generate synergies that would promote implementation. The broad design is mitigated to some extent because the series was complemented by the IDA investment lending program by supporting policy reforms needed for an enabling environment for investments in agricultural diversification and social services delivery. There was also a benefit to design of the simultaneous preparation of the FY2013–2016 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). 6 See World Bank. 2011. Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s support to it: AFRICA REGIONAL STRATEGY, Report No. 59761, Washington, DC. http://imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/02/23/000356161_20110223004028/Re ndered/PDF/597610BR0SecM21OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY191.pdf . 12 Risks identified at appraisal and their mitigation 26. The political risk assessment anticipated a return to domestic protest and political unrest similar to that of 2011 and that it could hinder reforms. The October 2014 popular protest against President Blaise Compaore’s extension of his rule led to the collapse of his regime, the dissolution of the parliament, and an installation of a transition government followed by simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and a new government. These political events led to staff turnover within the sector ministries and agencies and further weakened already inadequate institutional capacity and caused delays in the implementation of some reforms. The GCC4 became effective in June 2015 rather than in December 2014 as planned. In addition, the impacts of the Malian 7 crisis that led to the flow of refugees to Burkina Faso have been taken into account in the GCC series, especially on increased needs for food. This was mitigated by the GCC through the revision of the food security mechanism in Burkina Faso. 27. The GCC series was implemented under three different governments due to political turmoil. In particular, (a) under the Government of Blaise Compaore (from 2012 to 2014) for GCC1-2 and halfway through GCC3; (b) under the transition government (from October 31, 2014—Compaore’s resignation— to December 28, 2015) for the completion of GCC3 and start of GCC4 (there was also an unsuccessful military coup in September 2015) against the transition government, which hampered implementation and led to popular protests to free the transition government); and (c) under the new government, from December 29, 2015, when Roch Marc Christian Kabore was sworn in as the new president, at the very end of GCC4. Despite the political disruptions, the transition government and the new government have been committed to the implementation of the GCC program. The Bank worked with the government to help with the increased challenges by agreeing to extensions to complete prior actions and, in some cases, modifying the actions to increase feasibility of implementation. 28. For the macroeconomic risks, the mitigation measures through the stabilization fund, cotton input capitalization fund, and access to fertilizers for selected staple food crops worked well. There were sharp declines in mining and cotton prices, by 27 percent and 8 percent, respectively, during 2014 and 2015. However, the cotton stabilization fund and the cotton guarantee fund (which allowed access to credit for cotton companies at lower interest) insulated farmers from large fluctuations in input prices. The external factor of the decrease in oil prices helped lower farmer’s income risk by lowering costs of production. The program’s pillar on reducing vulnerability also recognized household and farm risks by empowering women through microcredits which helped reduce household risk of income shortfall. Involving the private sector in the distribution of fertilizers is potentially important to lowering risks to farmers. However, this activity has not yet taken off because of logistical limitations in the country. 29. Climate risk mitigation measures have not been tested in the absence of severe weather-related conditions in recent years. However, increased farmers’ productivity has meant there is a need to have less area under cultivation and less reliance on food stocks. This is a particularly good development for food deficit areas. The weather-related risk combined with the flow of Malian refugees has been mitigated 7 The Malian crisis has been another political risk factor in Burkina Faso due to its resulting flows of refugees that exacerbated the food security risks. Migrants in Côte d’Ivoire from neighboring countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo have established strong economic links with their native countries through trade, investment, and remittances. The drying up of remittances, trade links, and investments could have negative impacts on recipients. 13 by the GCC through a revision of the food security mechanism and the targeting of higher food reserves in Burkina. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 30. Though generally relevant to the PDOs, there were some weaknesses in the design of the results framework. The results framework had five indicators for Pillar I (catalyze private sector growth and employment), and these indicators were of varying degrees of relevance to the PDO. The PDO of pillar I (catalyze private sector growth and employment) was of a relatively high order requiring likewise higher level indicators to assess. For example, the results framework would have been more relevant to the PDO if it had included actual employment and growth data attributable to the prior actions. The nine indicators covering Pillar II (increasing resource mobilization and transparency) were relevant to the PDO. However, in terms of measuring the final outcomes, there were shortcomings. For example, one intent of the program was to improve basic social services, and that was to be achieved by meeting a target of 5 percent of central government budget to be transferred to decentralized communities. The target was met only in 2014, but more importantly, it was necessary to collect additional data outside the results framework to have any indication of whether there was effective utilization of the resources (see Section 3.2). For Pillar III, reducing vulnerability, the six indicators were somewhat relevant for assessing the PDO on vulnerability, though the micro-finance activities could have included some indication of improvements in household income for a sampling of the beneficiaries. Data on the use of emergency food reserves would also have improved measurement of achievement of reducing vulnerability and building resistance to shocks. Annex 9 provides a summary of results indicators targets and actuals. 31. Implementation was conducted basically as laid out in the PD, although some of the results indicators were left out of regular monitoring and available only at the end of the program. The MEF carried out overall coordination and oversight of M&E through the Directorate General for Cooperation. Technical departments in the sector ministries were in charge of implementing sector reforms: Ministries Agriculture, Mines and Energy, Transport, Commerce, Justice, and the MEF (for PFM reforms). The distribution of tasks across line ministries helped ensure continued implementation in spite of the political crisis that led to the collapse of the central Government. Technical departments across sector ministries were committed to monitoring implementation progress and providing data for internal and external analysis with in their limited capabilities. There were difficulties in collecting data for a number of key indicators, many of which were not provided until the ICR stage, including: increase in certified professionals in the trucking sector (Pillar 1), public revenues from the mining sector (Pillar 2), increase in the number of CSM members elected (Pillar 2), and annual reporting of microfinance institutions (Pillar 3). Absence of this data made it difficult to fully monitor results from a number of prior actions during the program. There were also cases where the indicators were not always well understood, which led to late provision of data in some cases (e.g., indicator on contract enforcement). A workshop to assess effectiveness of the program implementation was held with the participation of all relevant line ministries in March 2016. Section 3.5 provides findings from this workshop. 31. Utilization. The GCC program benefited from good analytical work and a generally relevant results framework, which helped in the decisions concerning appropriate adjustments to the program. However, unavailability of data hampered sometimes the utilization of the framework as mentioned above. The nine of the 10 indicators that had been approved, but were later dropped did not appear to have a role in decision-making in the program. The one exception was the stocking of food in 50 warehouses in food deficit areas, but that indicator was monitored for only one year. 14 2.4 Expected Next Phase/Follow-up Operation 32. The follow up policy operation focuses on improving the performance of energy sector, but also contains a pillar in improving the public procurement process and tax collection. This pillar will help sustain GCC series reforms in procurement. There are a number of other areas where follow up is needed. Food security requires purchase of food at different points of time, and so there needs to be an indication that financial resources that are available to purchase food stocks when needed. The government should also ensure continued implementation reforms that were not completed by the end of the GCC series, including establishing monitoring compliance with rules established through the reforms, which will require defining new measures for monitoring and evaluating. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation Overall Relevance Rating: Substantial 33. Relevance of Objectives: Substantial. The objectives to improve growth and employment by reducing costs in the agriculture and transport sectors, to improve transparency and accountability in public resources mobilization and management, and to increase resilience to shocks continue to be relevant to national priorities. The GCC program objectives mirrored the strategic objectives of the most recent CPS (FY2013-2016), which were to: i) Accelerate inclusive and sustained economic growth; ii) Enhance Governance to Deliver Social Services More efficiently and iii) Reduce social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities. Each of these strategic objectives remained relevant through the end of the GCC series as Burkina Faso continues to face challenges in these areas. 34. Relevance of Design: Modest. On the positive side, the prior actions required for each operation were in line with the Government’s poverty reduction program (SCADD) as well as the CPS FY 13-16, and were relevant to creating a business-friendly environment, reducing costs of investment, and boosting the private sector development. The reforms in key policy areas were important in empowering the different sectors to reduce Burkina’s socio-economic vulnerabilities. To manage the multi-sectorial nature of the GCC, the series design distributed reform responsibilities to the technical departments of the line ministry in each sector, while the MEF coordinated the overall implementation process. Improving food security through emergency food stocks was also an appropriate measure and helped reduced the risk of famine. However, there were also significant shortcomings in design, in particular that a number of prior actions were not well-aligned with the country capacity and context. For example, the axle over loading trigger required multi-country agreement which was not secured. The solution to the issue was not within the power of Burkina Faso alone, and the measure was moved to the regional DPO. The guarantee fund for trucking also proved not to be feasible, as well as a number of other triggers (such as the trigger related to the WAEMU requirements) which required significant changes because they had not fully taken into account the country context. Weaknesses in the results framework also contribute to a modest rating for design relevance. 35. Relevance of Implementation: Substantial. The distribution of tasks across the sector ministries and the commitment of the technical departments facilitated program M&E and the provision of data for 15 internal and external analysis. It also kept the series relevant to the changing conditions in the country caused by the change in governments. These implementation arrangements increased the sector ministries’ ownership of the program and strengthened their capacity to sustain implementation despite the political crisis. Program relevance was maintained through timely revision of some prior actions to reflect reform progress and other changing circumstances. Adjustments of prior actions and time- extensions helped ensure implementation in the post-crisis environment. 3.2 Achievement of Program Development Objectives Overall achievement of objectives rating: Modest 36. This section individually assesses each of the three PDO components: (a) catalyzing the private sector growth and employment; (b) improving governance and public resources management; and (c) building resilience to shocks and reducing the country's vulnerability. Table 5 provides a record of achievement of key indicators relative to targets for the three PDOs. In total, 13 out of 20 GCC4 indicator targets could be verified as achieved, with 10 indicators that were dropped, which is consistent with a modest rating overall. Missing data for six indicators at the end of the series was remedied at the ICR stage. One limitation in measuring program impacts is that the latest data for many indicators is for 2014, which allows measurement of only earlier impacts of the GCC program. Table 5: Achievement of Key Indicator Targets by PDO PDO Achieved Not Achieved Dropped Total Catalyze Private Sector Growth and 3 2 3 8 Employment Improve governance and public resource 6 3 5 14 management Building resilience to shocks and reducing 4 2 2 8 the country's vulnerability Total 13 7 10 30 Note: The dropped indicators are identified in Table 1. a. Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment: Substantial 37. The results framework indicators support a substantial rating for this part of the PDO. The results framework had eight indicators for this PDO component, of which three were met, two not met and three were dropped. Substantial accomplishments were recorded in the cotton sector with the implementation of prior actions designed to stabilize cotton prices and capitalize cotton input prices. Both funds were capitalized at or above target levels which helped ensure higher production and lower risk to farmers, both of which contribute to higher private sector growth. The cotton price stabilization fund helped improve the sector’s organization and accountability, and prepared for the establishment of the input capitalization fund. If managed well, the stabilization fund and the input capitalization fund could continue to serve as an effective guarantee fund to allow documented credit for cotton companies. This structural reform has been beneficial to cotton farmers and the cotton companies and has eased a constraint to private sector growth. According to the report provided by the Inter-professional Association of Cotton Farmers of Burkina Faso (Association Inter-professionnelle des Cultivateurs de Coton du Burkina, AICB), the reforms in the cotton sector, had positive growth impacts, and achieved better resilience, higher productivity, and higher employment in the sector. Box 1 complements the results framework with 16 additional evidence on the impacts of the reforms on the cotton sector on private sector growth and employment. Though the effects are not fully attributable to the cotton sector reforms, they are consistent with a substantial rating of achievement. Box 1. Impacts of Cotton Sector Reform Output and productivity in cotton fields improved due to several factors. According to the 2014 IMF Article IV, cotton production increased from 400,000 to 800,000 tons during 2011-13 and yield increase from 965 kg/ha to 1,002 kg/ha during 2011–2014). The main factors that contributed to this result were: i) an increased ownership of the method of determining the purchase price of seed cotton in Burkina Faso (price smoothing mechanism) by producers; ii) the use of greater amounts of organic fertilizer in cotton farms in addition to chemical fertilizers; iii) a rigorous application of technical procedures in the production of both conventional and raw cotton; iv) strict management of producer bodies, including the input credit of Cotton Producer Groups; improved ‘margin after reimbursement of inputs’ of producer; continuous improvement of the living conditions of cotton farmers; v) improved crop production associated with cotton and maize in particular; vi) a positive improvement in business results of the cotton companies; and stimulation of increasingly strong leadership to remain in cotton production in Africa. GCC1-GCC3 reform actions, with their timing, could have contributed to these gains. The number of cotton producers increased from 179,037 in 2010-11 to 239,713 producers in 2013–2014, contributing to increases in agricultural employment. In addition, there was an increase in staff of agents of the cotton companies (permanent and nonpermanent or seasonal workers), an increase in employment in the transport sector and of cotton from the private sector, in view of the growth of seed cotton production and cotton fiber, and an increase of jobs in the crushing of cottonseed sector, given the growing number of crushing units created in recent years. Private sector growth and employment and resilience have been catalyzed through: the enhancement of dialogue between cotton producers and companies; increased transparency in the management of the sector (through the inputs fund); and the strengthening of responsibilities among the actors to achieve better agricultural and economic performance. 38. Though there were delays in implementing transport sector reforms, the indicator target for the reduction of time for customs clearance, a major transport cost, was met and exceeded (from 4 days to only 1 day), which improves transportation efficiency. One shortcoming in this PDO was that, although the private sector began to be more involved in fertilizer distribution, the quantity distributed was well below target (820 tons vs. 30,000 tons), due to low capacity in transport logistics and the lack of adequate storage in localities where the fertilizers were expected to be delivered. The private sector participated in the distribution of fertilizer only in 2012. The ICR assesses that the achievements in the cotton sector outweigh the weaker achievements in other areas such that achievement of this part of the PDO is substantial. 39. The three dropped indicators for this PDO component were dropped because the underlying prior actions were dropped or changed. Two of the indicators related to the guarantee scheme in trucking. This guarantee scheme could not be implemented. The other was the requirement to prevent 17 axel overloading. While it was originally planned in the program, dropping the triggers reflected adjustment realities on the ground in the country, and is more a reflection of weak design than of failure to achieve objectives. b. Improve governance and public resource management: Modest 40. The results framework indicators support a modest rating for this PDO. The political disruptions of multiple governments hampered the implementation of reforms under this PDO, and the resulting achievement of results targets was limited. The results framework included 14 indicators to measure the achievement of this PDO, of which six targets were met, three not met and five were dropped. The prior actions under this PDO were focused on enhancing transparency and accountability in mining, justice, and PFM. Because of the economic importance of the mining sector, it was critical to good governance that this sector be more transparent and that effort was partially successful with mining companies exceeding the target for EITI reports which provide validated data on their operations. The achievement in the amount of public revenues generated from the mining sector, which was a key to achieving the PDO, fell short of the target (2.4 vs. 4.0 percent). The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TICPI) did not improve and remained at a level of 38 out of 100. The adoption of the anticorruption law, it is expected, will contribute to positive results and an improvement in the score in the future. 41. The results related to judicial prior actions were mostly positive. There was a significant reduction in the time to obtain a court ruling, which was important to confidence in the justice system and therefore, improved governance. The targeted improvement in the time required to enforce contracts was not achieved. The reform for elected CSM met the targeted improvement (increasing from 2 to 3 members). However, the impact of the CSM reform is muted because CSM compensation is quite low, necessitating that CSM members take time from their responsibilities to earn additional money to support their families. Substantial improvement in the percentage of judgements written down in commercial courts was achieved and this achievement also promotes an improved environment for private sector growth (Pillar 1). The ranking of Burkina Faso on the ease of doing business index 8 improved from 149 in 2006–2011 to 143 in 2011–2015. Factors such as the democratic change in government, reforms in the mining sector, transport, and PFM might have contributed to this improvement (see Doing Business, 2016). 42. There was mixed performance for public resource management. The execution rate of line ministries’ investment budgets met its target (baseline of 30 percent, a targeted improvement of 50 percent and an actual of 61.2 percent, indicating some progress in the management of public resources. The indicator for procurement that spot checking competitively bid contracts increased by 50 percent was achieved showing that the government was doing a better job of verifying public resource use. 43. Three of the five dropped indicators under this PDO component were still relevant to the implemented prior actions, which has a somewhat negative impact on the achievement of PDO rating. The indicator “physical inspections of gold exports by customs officials increases” would have been an important contribution to governance and transparency, given that gold sales account for about 20 percent of the country’s GDP. However, this indicator was not linked to any prior action. The indicator “50 mediation cases by CAM-CO for 2012 and 75 for 2013”, attained only 17 cases before being dropped. 8 Ease of doing business index (1 = most business-friendly regulations). A high ranking (a low numerical rank) means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation. 18 This indicator would have been useful in measuring the demand for CAM-CO mediation services, an indicator of governance. The indicator “Greater transparency and accountability in PFM” was replaced by a more precise indicator, the TICPI, whose target was met. “The number of judges that will remain for at least a year is 12” was not measured, though it was relevant to improving governance. Although judicial reforms were generally positive, the failure to follow through on several indicators does raise questions about the achievement of the PDO. The other dropped indicator was “at least 10 percent of the population is satisfied with public services.” This indicator would have helped assess whether the 5 percent allocation to the local governments had led to improved service delivery as intended. The ICR presented some additional evidence on social outcomes, but attribution of these outcomes is rather indirect. The fact that four of these indicators were still relevant, but not measured, further supports a modest rating for this part of the PDO. c. Building resilience to shocks and reducing the country's vulnerability: Modest 44. The results framework indicators for this PDO also support a modest rating. The results framework included eight indicators to measure the achievement of this PDO, of which four targets were met, two were not met, and two were dropped. 45. The requirement that 5 percent of the national budget be transferred to localities was achieved in 2014, and may have contributed to some improvements in the delivery of basic social services, though the 5 percent level was not met for 2015 owing to a difficult economic context. Though attribution is difficult to establish, the higher level of resources transferred to localities has likely supported positive impacts on vulnerability through better access to primary education, health, and access to clean water. Increased fiscal transfers to decentralized localities has provided additional resources for the construction of new schools and a significant reduction of in-hut classes. Gross primary enrollment increased from 79.6 percent (of children in the age of schooling) in 2011 to 83 percent in 2014 and school supplies are being provided free to children. Health care centers are available at an average distance of 6.5 kilometers since 2014, compared to the average distance of 7.2 kilometers in 2011. Clean drinking water sources are available in all villages; the share of population with access to clean drinking water increased from 60 percent in 2011 to 66 percent in 2015 in rural areas and in urban areas, from 80 percent in 2011 to 89 percent in 2015. It was also reported to the ICR mission that there has been a significant reduction in diseases caused by unclean water (as also reported by the SCD). The dropped indicator “At least 10 percent of the population is satisfied with public services” might have helped measure this effect, assuming it was more properly specified as an increase in satisfaction with public services. 46. The access to credit intended to reduce vulnerability by helping to diversify sources of household income, but it is difficult to prove with the available information. The realization of the reform increased FAARF credit funds, amounting to CFAF 500 million (to a total of CFAF 5 billion), which helped increase the number of active borrowers from 75,000 in 2010 to 119,416 in 2014, according to the FAARF authorities. The microfinance reform was aimed at a large target population, especially female entrepreneurs, with loans averaging CFAF 100,000 (US$ 200) for individuals. It was also possible to confirm the availability of Annual Financial Reporting sheets of microfinance institutions, which was an important measure to verify their performance and therefore their contribution in improving resilience and lowering vulnerability of households. These are rather low level indicators for this PDO. The dropped indicator of the increase in the number of women-owned businesses of 5 percent would have provided a 19 higher order. Information on improved income would also have been useful to assessing whether vulnerability was reduced. 47. Achievements in building the national food reserve and emergency food reserve were mixed, but generally positive. The target for the national food reserve was met (59,000 tons achieved vs. a target of 50,000 tons), but not the target for the emergency food stock (15,500 tons vs. a target of 25,000 tons). The target for the emergency food stock was originally 10,000 tons, but was revised upward during GCC4 preparation. The emergency food stock was exhausted during the 2012 drought and was supposed to be replenished at the higher level. However, at the end of the year the government pulled out the stock to intervene in favor of poorest households during the raining season. While the program was only partially successful in maintaining food reserve levels, the measures encouraged by the GCC series did help mitigate the risk of famine, in particular by pushing the government to stock Sonagess (the agency responsible) with food reserves. 3.3 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 48. The relevance of objectives, and implementation were substantial, though the design was modest. The achievements have been modest on average across the three program pillars, and, therefore, the overall outcome rating is moderately unsatisfactory. The ICR outcome rating is a downgrade relative to the final implementation status result report (GCC4), where outcome was rated as moderately satisfactory. This disconnect may be the result of the final ISRR not sufficiently weighing unmet targets and dropped indicators which accounted for more than half of the total number of indicators. Those indicators that did not meet their targets, as well as those that were dropped, were not included in the final ISRR. Finally, given the large amount of resources provided under this four-operation series, US$359.14 million, it would be reasonable to expect significantly more substantial outcomes. However, achievements under the program were relatively limited. 3.4 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 49. In recent years, poverty incidence has fallen in Burkina Faso, although the level remains relatively high. The multi-sectoral survey on households’ living conditions, conducted by the National Institute for Statistics and Demography in 2014 in collaboration with the National Statistical System, revealed a national 9 poverty incidence of 40.1 percent in 2014 compared to 46.7 percent in 2009. The GCC program might have contributed to part of this reduction in poverty, but it is difficult to separate its effect from that of other factors. The key achievements in the cotton sector, which is the main source of revenue for farmers, and the access to fertilizers for staple agricultural crops suggest that the GCC could 9 Despite the relative drop in the national poverty incidence, rural poverty remains widespread and regional disparities are large. Rural poverty incidence fell somewhat less, 2.6 percentage points in 2014 from 50.1 percent in 2009. Disparities across regions remain also wide. Based on the 2014 survey, among the regions, the Central East has fewer poor people (9.3 percent). The Central-East Region is followed by the Sahel (21 percent), then Cascades (22 percent), and Hauts-Bassins (34 percent). The regions with more poor people are the North (70.4 percent), the Mouhoun (59.7 percent), and Central-West (51.7 percent). 20 have had an important positive effect on poverty reduction through improved productivity and certainty in input prices and planning. The strengthening of emergency food stocks has benefited vulnerable populations by providing assistance during cyclical food shortages during the program. Promotion of female entrepreneurship through microcredit was designed to improve gender equality. This might also have some positive impacts on poverty reduction, as women entrepreneurship increased their household revenue and their purchasing power. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 50. The GCC series has helped strengthen institutional processes in some areas. Through the publication of sectoral data, the GCC series has contributed to a foundation for transparency and accountability in Burkina’s key institutions of justice, and mining. The design of the GCC series allowed greater participation of line ministries and improved budget execution (except for investment budgeting, which did not improve). In other targeted areas, such as the agricultural sector, the GCC program has eased the timely access to inputs at less volatile prices. The number of microfinance borrowers has increased and food deficit areas have reduced risk through improved food security. 51. However, governance and public sector management capacities remain weak. According to the World Bank’s country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) 10, though Burkina Faso was classified among strong performers, scoring 3.8 (out of a scale of 0 to 6) in both 2012 and 2013, its performance fell slightly during 2014 and 2015 to a score of 3.6. The country’s score on public sector management and institutions dropped from 3.7 in 2011 to 3.5 in 2014 and 2015 (out of a scale of 0 to 6). Although the unprecedented political crises and the following transition might have contributed to the drop in CPIA performance in 2014 and 2015, these scores indicate that public sector management including PFM remains weak and at risk. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) N.A. 3.5 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops 52. The Government held a workshop in March 2016 for line ministries to discuss GCC implementation findings, which revealed mixed results in implementation across the sectors. While targeted results indicators were attained in some cases such as decentralized transfers, the cotton sector, others were not fully attained. The lowest achievement has been in the transport sector. According to the administration of the transport sector, constraints to achieving the goals include the lack of transporters’ incentives and the lack of access to credit. Results were also mixed in PFM as a result of weak institutional capacity that led to a failure to implement a few originally planned reforms (for example, the reform to 10 The CPIA assesses the quality of a country’s policy and institutional framework to foster sustainable growth, poverty reduction, and the effective use of development assistance. It consists of 16 criteria grouped into four equally weighted clusters: (1) Economic management, (2) Structural policies, (3) Policies for social inclusion and equity, and (4) Public sector management and institutions. 21 establish a legal framework for public finance compliance with selected WAEMU directives). The goal for decentralized transfers was achieved in 2014, by 2015 the share dropped below the expected rate. Budget constraints, political instability that slowed investments, and the coupled elections that required mobilization of funds and thus, the contraction of some budget lines, have been pointed to as the main reasons for the decline. Still, the GCC has been a participatory program involving major sectors and ministries of the country to achieve its targeted key objectives. 53. While the implementation process was smooth and successful for some activities, the achievement of others was constrained by the lack of financial resources, adequate logistics, clarity in the measure’s definition, and human resources capacity. These problems were compounded by the 2014 sociopolitical unrest that led to a transition government and mobility of staff across implementing agencies and ministries and the long period of time to implement the series, which resulted in some implementation fatigue. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate 54. This moderate rating is based to a significant extent on the improved stability of the political and social environment in Burkina Faso. Indeed, after the political and social unrest of October, 2014, which led to the ousting of President Blaise Compaore from power, and the failed military coup against the transition government in September 2015, the political and social environment appears to have stabilized. This relatively stable environment is conducive to sustaining the outcomes of the GCC series. In addition, the drop in global oil prices since 2014 played a role in moderating inflation and the prices of imported goods, including fuel, 11 at a low level. Each of these factors contributes to a more stable macroeconomic environment and improved food security, and hence, reduction of some of the main risks to the development outcomes. The risk that new political instabilities that might jeopardize the current achievements of GCC in Burkina Faso is moderate for now. 55. Still there are some sustainability concerns. For instance, replenishing food stocks to ensure food security at all times requires financial resources. Continuous transparency in judicial, mining, PFM, and data publication areas will require close monitoring of the application of the related laws and decrees and ensuring the different reforms remain operational. The government elected at the end of 2015 continues to build on achievements of the GCC series. Decrees, reform laws, and the new mining code initiated under the GCC continue to be in force. 56. Important to managing risk is the need to monitor the compliance to rules established through the reforms and ensure their sustainability and continuous impact in improving governance and increasing resilience to macroeconomic, sociopolitical, and climate shocks. This will require defining new measures for monitoring and strengthening those impacts. The Bank will continue to work with the government to improve monitoring capacity and compliance. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance 11 Note that Burkina Faso is a net fuel importer. Thus, the lowering of international oil prices can result in saving and investment in social projects. 22 (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 57. The Bank team was experienced and helped design a program that responded to the country’s specific needs and conditions, but there were significant shortcomings. The objectives of the program were based on strong analytical work where the country’s constraints to developments were identified. In addition, aligning the GCC with the CPS, which was prepared at the same time, also helped align the program with the Government’s SCADD. However, the design of the program did not sufficiently take into account the country’s institutional and financial capacity issues. Such awareness would have led to a less ambitious program and avoided some failures in the PFM and transport sectors, including the requirement to establish the finance law (legal framework for public finance complying with selected WAEMU directives) and the renewal of the trucking fleet through an established guarantee fund by the government. The inclusion of reform actions which do not fall within the competence of Burkina Faso alone, also contributed to complicating the implementation process. This is the case for the axle overloading requirement, which was transferred to another project. Finally, the Bank might have offered a better technical review of the mining code to catch the lack of inputs from stakeholders, which could have avoided the need to re-submit the code to parliament after proper vetting. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 58. The World Bank office in Burkina provided day-to-day supervision of the program and consistent supervision during the series. The dialogue between the World Bank team and the community of donors (Multi-Donor Budget Support Group – CGAB) helped coordinate support to meet the country’s needs. The team provided appropriate and well-targeted advice and observations and monitored progress reports that tracked the PDOs. The Aide Memoires and back-to-office reports provided evidence of regular supervision and professional advice given by the World Bank’s experts throughout the program implementation (see related documents on the operation portal for the codes P126207, P132210, P146640, and P151275). One significant shortcoming was the weak monitoring of the results framework as reflected in ISRRs. ISRRs did not report on the majority of results indicators. Even the ISRR for GCC4 included only the 10 indicators that had achieved their targets. 59. The World Bank adequately responded to the political crisis by allowing an extension of the program and working well with the transition government, which supported the GCC program process. The fiduciary and safeguards policies were well managed and reported. The ICR mission took place during April 2016, covered meetings with relevant agencies, and its BTOR summarized feedback from the post- program workshop. On balance, the rating for supervision is moderately satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 60. With quality at entry rated moderately unsatisfactory, supervision rated moderately satisfactory, and outcome rated moderately unsatisfactory, the overall rating for the Bank performance, is moderately unsatisfactory. 23 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 61. The GoBF supported the GCC by pushing the implementation of most of the key reforms, but fell short in a few areas. The Government was involved in the implementation process through the MEF which carried out the coordination and oversight of overall implementation. The Government generally avoided political intervention that could delay reforms, although some actions of the government contributed to delays or failure in the implementation. For example, the attempt of the government to submit to the parliament a draft mining code before obtaining the sector stakeholder’s consensus led to implementation delays. The Government remedied the mistake, but there were significant delays as a result. The Government attempted, but has not yet been successful in ensuring that the private sector was effectively involved in the distribution of the required agricultural fertilizers. The involvement of the private sector occurred in 2012 only. The government’s decision to change the reform for the renewal of the trucking fleet, after agreeing at entry on the establishment of a guarantee fund also caused delay. The government was unable to establish a guarantee fund that would have eased access to credit for truck and taxi drivers as had been agreed at the start. Given its constraints in financial resources to establish a guarantee fund for trucking fleet renewal, the Government exempted customs fees and the value-added tax (VAT) on imported new trucks (through adoption of laws 12 and decrees) as a way of encouraging the fleet renewal, which helped mitigate the inability to establish the guarantee fund. With respect to M&E, while the government did monitor the program, it provided data late and was not able to provide a report from the stakeholder workshop. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 62. The implementing agencies and ministries of Burkina Faso were committed and motivated in achieving the goals of the GCC series, despite capacity constraints. The technical departments of sector ministries carried out the day-to-day process required to implement most reforms. In cases where the implementation of the original reforms faced difficulties, the sectors were cooperative in revising the actions and implementing the revised versions to move the program forward. Where resubmission to the parliament was required, IAs were effective in ensuring follow through and resubmission. A significant shortcoming is the limited success in achieving result indicators, and in some cases, collecting the necessary data. This failure can be attributed to a large extent to the effects of the political upheaval that led to staff turnover and further weakened institutional capacity and financial constraints. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 12 No. 010-2011/AN of Mai 24, 2011 of custom fees and VAT exemption on import of new trucks. Decree No. 2011-755 PRES/PM/MTPEN/MEF/MICA and Decree No. 2012-190/PRES/PM/MTPEN/MEF/MICA, respectively, on import of new vehicles for taxi and for imports of new trucks for hydrocarbon and other merchandises. 24 63. With government performance rated moderately unsatisfactory, implementing agency performance is moderately satisfactory, and outcome is moderately unsatisfactory, the overall performance of the borrower over the GCC is moderately unsatisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 64. Lesson 1: In countries such as Burkina Faso, it can be advantageous to distribute operational tasks across various ministries instead of concentrating daily decision-making under the responsibility of one ministry/agency or the central Government. This design feature proved valuable in allowing continuation of the program implementation through periods of political upheaval. The involved line ministries were able to continue the implementation process despite the disruption of the central government. 65. Lesson 2: The Bank should be cautious in supporting the establishment of a guarantee fund in vulnerable countries where capacities are low and financing scarce. The renewal of the trucking fleet would have been successful if the guarantee fund system had been applied as in the cotton sector. However, the government did not have the means to follow through on this fund, but rather supported fleet renewal by exempting customs fees and the VAT on imported new truck (through adoption of laws and decrees). 66. Lesson 3: In a low capacity states, allowing additional time and flexibility on prior action formulation and revision leads to a more successful outcome. Some actions would require adjustments and additional time for their implementation particularly in the context of a volatile political environment. Under the GCC, the World Bank team has been flexible, in light of the country’s vulnerability, allowing adjustments of some actions to facilitate their implementation. This flexibility is reflected through the provision of additional time for revision or implementation, or in moving an action to another, more appropriate operation. 67. Lesson 4: For prior actions involving a law submitted to parliament, the borrower and the Bank teams should ensure that all key stakeholders have been considered before submission. During the GCC series, for example, the GoBF submitted to the parliament a mining code that had not been adequately vetted by the mining sector. The protest of the sector against the new code forced the government to withdraw the code and engage in negotiation with the sector. Although the code was revised and submitted successfully to Parliament, the lack of appropriate vetting led to unnecessary delays, loss of staff time and required changes in the trigger for the next operation. The Bank could have taken greater care in reviewing the mining code. There is also a risk that countries, like Burkina Faso, that have a thorough understanding of Bank processes, may be able to take short-cuts with respect to some prior actions. 68. Lesson 5: Results indicators should be fully understood by clients so that they can carry out effective M&E of the program. In the GCC program, some indicators were not well understood by the client. For instance, the indicator on enforcing contracts was unclear and misunderstood. The MoJ viewed “contract enforcing” as contract execution and argued that execution of the contracts did not fall under his power, and could not be responsible for achieve the target. Another indicator that was unclear to the client (and was later dropped) is the mediation by CAMC-O. As the number of mediations of arbitrage depends on how many cases are presented, but not on CAMC-O, it was not clear to the agency, how it would achieve a given number of mediations. 25 69. Lesson 6: Bank supervision should take into account both negative and positive results in rating the program. As pointed out in the text, the Bank’s final (GCC4) included only indicators for which the targets had been met (10 of the 20 results indicators). This led to an overly generous outcome rating (moderately satisfactory) for the program. 70. Lesson 7: Targeted capacity building activities should be arranged in countries like Burkina Faso where low capacity can be a constraint in achieving ambitious program objectives. The GCC series would have benefited from capacity building in a number of program areas and in M&E of results. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners 71. The Burkinabe institutions and agencies have expressed their gratitude to the World Bank team for its collaboration, wholehearted support, and professionalism in designing and closely supervising the implementation process of the GCC operations. Although there have been mixed results, the results accomplished in a low-capacity environment and under unprecedented political instability have been possible owing to the World Bank team’s professionalism that allowed making timely adjustments in the objectives, increasing feasibility, and making implementation possible in some difficult areas such as mining. 72. The ICR concurs with the Borrowers’ report conclusions that reform implementation was satisfactory in some sectors, but that the achievement of some outcomes was constrained by factors including the lack of: financial resources, adequate logistics, clarity in the definition of a measure, and human resources capacity problems, compounded with the 2014 sociopolitical unrest that led to a transition government and mobility of staffs across implementing sectors and ministries. The Bank is pleased that implementing agencies expressed their satisfaction in regard to the World Bank intervention and collaboration throughout the GCC program. The Bank will take into consideration some of the suggestions in the report to improve future operations: For example, the training by l'Association 13 des grossistes et détaillants d'intrants agricoles du Burkina staff would have fostered their knowledge and enhance success in the fertilizers distribution. The Bank also agrees that capacity building in other areas of the program would have helped implementation. 13 The private sector organization involved in the fertilizer distribution. 26 6. Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team Members P126207 - First Growth and Competitiveness Credit Names Job Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Ali Zafar Sr. Economist GMF08 Team Leader Mariam Diop Sr. Economist GMF09 Sr. Economist Kolie Ousmane Maurice Sr. Financial management Megnan Sr. Financial management Specialist GGO26 Specialist Jean Gaspard Ayi Consultant GHN07 Consultant Valerie Nussenblatt Celestin Bado Koffi Nouve Sr. Agriculture Economist Sr. Agriculture Economist Djibrilla Adamou Issa Senior Financial Specialist AFMCG Senior Financial Specialist Aguiratou Savadogo Tinto Sr. Transport Specialist GTI08 Sr. Transport Specialist Adja Dahourou Sr. Private Sector Specialist GTC07 Sr. Private Sector Specialist Magueye Dia Sr. Private Sector Specialist GTC07 Sr. Private Sector Specialist Setareh Razmara Boubacar Bocoum Lead Mining Specialist GEEX2 Lead Mining Specialist Lead Public Sector Management Lead Public Sector Management Serdar Yilmaz Specialist GGO27 Specialist Sr. Public Sector Management Sr. Public Sector Management Bronwyn Grieve Specialist GGO27 Specialist Adama Ouedraogo Sr. Education specialist GED07 Sr. Education specialist Ousmane Haidara Senior Health Specialist GHN13 Senior Health Specialist Andrew Dabalen Lead Poverty Specialist GPV07 Lead Poverty Specialist Nicolette DeWitt Aissatou Diallo Sr. Finance Officer WFALN Sr. Finance Officer Elisee Ouedraogo Sr. Agriculture Specialist GFA01 Sr. Agriculture Specialist Corinne Ilgun Catherine Marie Z. Compaore Team Assistant AFMBF Team Assistant Michel Valois Consultant GFM01 Consultant Judite Fernandes Language Program Assistant Language Program Assistant Elianne Tchapda Program Assistant ITSNI Program Assistant 27 P132210 -Second Growth and Competitiveness Credit Names Job Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Adja Mansora Dahourou Sr. private sector Specialist GTC07 Sr. private sector Specialist Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto Sr. Transport Specialist GTI08 Sr. Transport Specialist Ali Zafar Sr. Economist GMF08 Sr. Economist Sr. Public Sector Management Sr. Public Sector Management Bronwyn Grieve Specialist GGO27 Specialist Catherine Marie Z. Compaore Team Assistant AFMBF Team Assistant Elisee Ouedraogo Sr. Agriculture Economist GFA01 Sr. Agriculture Economist Jean Gaspard Ntoutoume Ayi Consultant GHN07 Consultant Koffi Nouve Sr. Agriculture Economist Sr. Agriculture Economist Mariam Diop Sr. Economist GMF08 Sr. Economist Serdar Yilmaz Lead Public Sector Specialist GGO27 Lead Public Sector Specialist P146640: Third Growth and Competitiveness Credit Names Job Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Ali Zafar Sr. Economist GMF08 Sr. Economist Johannes G. Hoogeveen Lead Economist GPV07 Lead Economist Samba Ba Sr. Economist GMF08 Sr. Economist Abdoulaye Gadiere Sr. Environmental Specialist GEN07 Sr. Environmental Specialist Adja Mansora Dahourou Sr. private sector Specialist GTC07 Sr. private sector Specialist Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto Sr. Transport Specialist GTI08 Sr. Transport Specialist Boubacar Bocoum Lead Mining Specialist GEEX2 Lead Mining Specialist Catherine Marie Z. Compaore Team Assistant AFMBF Team Assistant Elisee Ouedraogo Sr. Agriculture Economist GFA01 Sr. Agriculture Economist Jeremy Robert Strauss Sr. private sector Specialist GTC07 Sr. private sector Specialist Judite Fernandes Language Program Assistant Language Program Assistant Koffi Nouve Sr. Agriculture Economist Sr. Agriculture Economist Mamata Tiendrebeogo Sr. Procurement Specialist GGO01 Sr. Procurement Specialist Mariam Diop Sr. Economist GMF08 Sr. Economist Serdar Yilmaz Lead Public Sector Specialist GGO27 Lead Public Sector Specialist Yele Maweki Batana Sr. Economist GPV07 Sr. Economist Mamata Tiendrebeogo Sr. Procurement Specialist GGO01 Sr. Procurement Specialist Sr. Financial management Sr. Financial management Kolie Ousmane maurice Megnan Specialist GGO26 Specialist Roch Levesque Sr. Counsel Sr. Counsel 28 P151275: Fourth Growth and Competitiveness Credit Names Job Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Samba Ba Sr. Economist GMF08 Team Leader Michael G. Nelson Operation Officer OPSPQ Operation Officer Mariam Diop Sr. Economist GMF09 Sr. Economist Mamata Tiendrebeogo Sr. Procurement Specialist GGO01 Sr. Procurement Specialist Ngor Sene Sr. Financial Management specialist GGO26 Sr. Financial Management specialist Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto Sr. Transport Specialist GTI08 Sr. Transport Specialist Boubacar Bocoum Lead Mining Specialist GEEX2 Lead Mining Specialist Elisee Ouedraogo Sr. Agriculture Economist GFA01 Sr. Agriculture Economist Nicolas Ahouissoussi Sr. Agriculture Economist GFA01 Sr. Agriculture Economist Serdar Yilmaz Lead Public Sector Specialist GGO27 Lead Public Sector Specialist (b) Staff Time and Cost GCC1-P126207 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle Number of staff weeks US$, Thousands (including Travel and Consultant Costs) Lending FY12 64.63 333,364 Total: 64.63 333,364 Supervision/ICR FY13 0 0 Total: 0 0 Total lending &Supervision 64.63 333,364 GCC2-P132210 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle Number of staff weeks US$, Thousands (including Travel and Consultant Costs) Lending FY13 52.91 374,411 Total: 52,91 374,411 Supervision/ICR FY14 0 0 Total: 0 0 Total lending & supervision 52.91 374,411 29 GCC3-P146640 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle Number of staff weeks US$, Thousands (including Travel and Consultant Costs) Lending FY14 36.39 199,535 FY15 12.35 37,929 Total: 48.74 237,464 Supervision/ICR FY15 1.06 17,480 Total: 1.06 17,480 Total lending & supervision 49.80 254,944 GCC4-P151275 Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle Number of staff US$, Thousands (including Travel and Consultant Costs) weeks Lending FY15 30.51 177,180 FY16 0 0 Total: 30.51 177,180 Supervision/ICR FY16 10.41 78,445 FY17 1.22 4,271 Total: 11.63 82,716 Total lending & supervision 42.14 259,896 30 7. Annex 2. Beneficiary Survey Results Not Applicable 31 8. Annex 3. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Report not available 32 9. Annex 4. Summary of Borrower’s draft ICRR Rapport d’achèvement de la série de Crédit d’appui à la Croissance et à la Compétitivité (CCC) La série programmatique « Crédit d’appui à la croissance et à la compétitivité(CCC) est une aide financière qui a pour objectif de soutenir le gouvernement burkinabé dans ses efforts de lutte contre la pauvreté à travers la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable(SCADD). Il est bâti autour de trois piliers qui comportent chacun des résultats intermédiaires. Ces piliers ont Impulsé une dynamique au secteur privé en vue de créer plus d’emplois; améliorer la gouvernance et la gestion des ressources publiques ; renforcer la résilience de l’économie et réduire sa vulnérabilité. I : RAPPEL DES OBJECTIFS DE LA REFORME Les objectifs de la réforme sont variés et touchent plusieurs secteurs. A- Le secteur de la décentralisation Pour permettre aux collectivités territoriales d’exécuter leurs missions, le Gouvernement à travers le Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de la Décentralisation(MATD) et le Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances (MEF) se doit de les accompagner avec des subventions, des dotations spéciales, des ressources humaines et/ou matérielles et d’appuis techniques et financiers. L’objectif global visé est d’augmenter l’accès aux services de base au niveau décentralisé. De façon spécifique, la réforme vise à : o Etendre les domaines de compétences transférées ; o Accroitre le volume des appuis financiers de l’Etat aux collectivités territoriales ; o Adopter un cadre de réglementation. B- Le secteur renforcement de la gestion financière publique L’objectif de la réforme dans ce domaine est de renforcer la gestion financière publique avec comme base le contrôle physique a priori de 200 contrats d’appel d’offres international de plus de 20 000 000 de francs CFA. 33 C- Dans le secteur de la micro finance/genre, L’objectif de la reforme consistait à renforcer l’approche genre en favorisant l’accès d’un plus grand nombre de femmes aux produits financiers distribués dans ce secteur. D- Dans le secteur minier L’objectif visé par la réforme dans ce secteur est de renforcer la transparence et l’obligation de rendre compte. E- Dans le secteur de la justice, La réforme avait pour objectif à moyen terme d’améliorer l’efficacité et l’ouverture du système judiciaire et ce à travers le renforcement de l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, la contribution à l’amélioration du climat des affaires, le renforcement du dispositif national de lutte contre la corruption et le renforcement du processus de collecte et de publication des statistiques de la justice. F- Dans le secteur agricole a) Dans le domaine du renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire A ce niveau, l’objectif de la reforme couvre notamment la mise en œuvre du Plan national d'organisation et de coordination des secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation (PNOCSUR), la constitution des stocks de sécurité et d’intervention ainsi que l’implication des opérateurs dans l’acquisition des produits céréaliers. b) Dans le domaine de la production du coton L’objectif de la réforme pour la filière coton, «d’accroitre la résilience, la productivité et les emplois dans le secteur agricole». G- Dans secteur des transports la réforme vise à terme la professionnalisation du secteur des transports. Elle a deux(2) dimensions : - la règlementation de l’accès à la profession de transporteur ; - l’appui aux transporteurs pour le renouvellement des flottes. o La mesure de renouvellement des flottes vise à contribuer : • au rajeunissement graduel des parcs de taxis et de véhicules de transport de marchandises et d’hydrocarbures ; • à la mise aux normes des véhicules transport de marchandises et d’hydrocarbures au Burkina Faso conformément au Règlement N°14/2005/CM/UEMOA sur le contrôle des gabarits, du poids et de la charge à l’essieu ; • à l’accroissement de la compétitivité des acteurs du transport burkinabè dans le cadre d'un marché de plus en plus ouvert. 34 o Sous l’angle de la règlementation de l’accès à la profession de transporteur, le décret portant fixation des catégories de transports et des conditions d’exercice de la profession de transporteur routier apporte des innovations portant sur les mesures de réformes ci-après :  l’affinement de la catégorisation des transports routiers et des conditions d’exercice de l’activité ;  la distinction nette entre le transport pour compte propre et le transport pour compte d’autrui et les conditions d’exercice ;  l’introduction de mesures qui à terme devront contribuer à assainir le parc automobile de transport ;  le libre choix du transporteur par le chargeur ;  un régime de sanctions. II- Les évolutions constatées dans les différents secteurs Pour l’atteinte les objectifs de la réforme, des mesures et des indicateurs ont été prévus. Il s’agit ici de faire le point sur ces mesures et indicateurs afin de voir si les objectifs ont été effectivement atteints. H- Dans le domaine de la décentralisation Mesures et indicateurs prévues Mesures et indicateurs réalisées − Les textes sont élaborés (décrets, arrêtés, protocoles d’opération, circulaire 2012 : Adoption d’un cadre de réglementation budgétaire, calendrier budgétaire adopté en définissant l’organigramme type des communes et 2013, ….) des régions collectivités visant à améliorer la − Institutionnalisation en 2013 des cadres de prévisibilité des transferts intergouvernementaux et promotion pour le développement local tel accorder plus de compétences aux CT que les Agences Régionales de Développement (ARD) 2013 : Accroitre les transferts de ressources aux collectivités locales pour les porter à au moins 4% du Effectivité du transfert de ressources en budget national afin d’assurer que ces collectivités accompagnement des compétences transférées. disposent de moyens suffisants pour réaliser leurs Montant transféré : 46 551 440 844 FCFA soit 4,44% missions respectives, telles que prévues par le Code du budget de l’Etat, gestion 2013 général des collectivités territoriales Extension des domaines des transferts de 3 à 5 : ce 2014 : Porter le taux de transfert aux collectivités qui a contribué à l’augmentation du volume de locales à 5% du budget national l’allocation budgétaire aux CT à 69 578 153 402 FCFA, soit 5,62% du budget de l’Etat, gestion 2014 35 I- Dans le domaine de la gestion des Finances Publiques Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées Dévolution à titre expérimentale de la gestion du Les unités de vérification (UV) de l’ensemble de ces budget et des dépenses par la mise en place des ministères sont fonctionnelles : agriculture (avril unités de supervision et de vérification des 2012), santé (avril 2012), infrastructures (avril dépenses dans les ministères en charge de 2012), enseignement secondaire et supérieur (avril l’agriculture, de la santé des infrastructures, de 2012), justice (juillet 2012) ; l’enseignement secondaire et supérieur et de la justice. Nomination d’un contrôleur financier auprès de Chaque ministère et les institutions pour lesquelles chaque ministère et institution nous avons pris des engagements disposent d’un contrôleur financier ; Relecture du décret portant règlementation Un arrêté a été pris pour le relèvement des seuils générale des marchés publics et des délégations de d’approbation. services publics au Burkina Faso, en vue du relèvement des seuils d’approbation. Indicateurs prévus Indicateurs atteints Contrôle physique de 300 contrats de plus de 20 plus de 300 contrats de plus de 20 millions ont été millions contrôlés à fin 2013 J- Dans le domaine de la justice Sur la période 2012-2014, il était prévu après actualisation six (06) mesures et actions politiques au titre du Ministère de la Justice dont deux (02) en 2012, trois (03) en 2013 et une (01) en 2014. De manière spécifique les mesures et actions politiques suivantes étaient prévues : Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées / Etat d’avancement Soumission à l’Assemblée Nationale d’une loi La loi n°052-2012/AN du 17 décembre 2012 portant conçue en vue de mettre en place un cadre médiation civile et commerciale a été adoptée le 17 légal et règlementaire adéquat pour la décembre 2012 par l'Assemblée Nationale, promotion de la médiation comme promulguée le 07 février 2013 et publiée au Journal Au titre de mécanisme alternatif de gestion des conflits » Officielle du 13 juin 2013. l’année 2012 Publication des statistiques couvrant la Les statistiques couvrant la période des années 2010 période des années 2010 et 2011 sur les et 2011 sur les activités des tribunaux de grande activités des tribunaux de grande instance du instance du Bénéficiaire, y compris le temps moyen Bénéficiaire, y compris le temps moyen nécessaire pour le règlement final d’un cas, le nécessaire pour le règlement final d’un cas, le budget annuel alloué, et le pourcentage des budget annuel alloué, et le pourcentage des jugements rendus par écrit » ont été publiées dans jugements rendus par écrit ». un journal national et publiées sur plusieurs sites dont celui du ministère de la justice. Adoption d’un arrêté ministériel pour • Circulaire invitant les juges au siège à formaliser le processus de collecte et de transmettre au Greffe de la juridiction dans les 36 Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées / Etat d’avancement publication des statistiques des tribunaux du meilleurs délais les décisions rédigées signée le 21 bénéficiaire et du manuel de procédures de novembre 2012 ; collecte des statistiques sur le temps moyen • Arrêté portant organisation de la nécessaire pour la liquidation d’un cas, le production des statistiques judiciaires signé le 20 nombre de cas en attente, le temps moyen décembre 2012. pour rendre des jugements écrits et le délais moyen pour l’application formelle des jugements. Adoption d’un mécanisme national pour Cette mesure qui relève de l’ASCE a été exécutée. Le Au titre de suivre l’état de la corruption et pour évaluer Ministère de la justice participe en tant que membre l’année 2013 les initiatives des réformes anti-corruption de au mécanisme de suivi de la corruption mis en place l’agence semi-autonome ASCE à travers au niveau de l’ASCE. l’exploitation et l’analyse annuelles des données sectorielles, l’information d’audit (de l’ASCE et de la Cour des compte) et des requêtes conduites par l’Etat et la société civile. Soumission à l’Assemblée nationale du projet Une première version a été élaborée et soumis à la de loi anti-corruption pour renforcer le session de mars 2014 de l’Assemblée Nationale. Elle système de déclaration des biens, appliquer a été retirée avec comme orientations : les dispositions relatives à la criminalité aux • définir mieux la notion de corruption ; corrupteurs, réglementer les dons de Revoir la liste des personnes soumise à l’obligation cadeaux aux fonctionnaires et fixer des de déclaration des biens ; pénalités et des sanctions, conçu par des • faire une étude comparée avec les conventions agents publics et soumis à l’Assemblée internationales ratifiées par le Burkina Faso ; • voir si certains aspects de cette loi ne sont pas pris en compte par la législation déjà en vigueur. Pour prendre en compte ses observations, une réunion des Secrétaires généraux du MEF et du MJ s’est tenue le 21 juillet 2014. Il est envisagé de soumettre le texte révisé au conseil de cabinet du Premier ministère Adoption des mesures pour renforcer le Le CSM s’est-il réuni le 15 avril 2014 et donné son fonctionnement institutionnel du Conseil avis sur l’avant-projet de lois. Cet avant- projet de loi Supérieur de la Magistrature (CSM) sur le CSM a été adopté en Conseil des Ministres le 18 juin 2014 et transmis à l’Assemblée Nationale le 20 juin 2014. Le texte sur le CSM prévoit comme innovations, la création d'un secrétariat permanent avec une autonomie de gestion; l’augmentation du nombre des membres élus qui passe de 02 à 03 par grade; l’élargissement des membres de droit aux commissaires du gouvernement du Conseil d'Etat et de la Cour des comptes. 37 Quant aux indicateurs, ils étaient au nombre de quatre sur la période, avec un très bon niveau réalisation. Résultats Résultats escomptés Base décembre atteints fin Indicateurs prévus fin Ecart et commentaires 2011 programme programme 2014 2012 Nombre de cas de 28 cas de 50 cas de 17 cas de L'écart entre les résultats escomptés médiation médiation en médiation en médiation en en fin de programme et les résultats 2011 au centre 2012 et 75 cas août 2014 atteints au cours des années 2012- d’arbitrage, de en 2013 2013 s'explique par le fait que les médiation et prévisions en termes de nombre de conciliation de dossiers n'ont pas été fournies par le Ouagadougou CAMC-O. (CAMC-O) Le Centre fait preuve de prudence dans la définition de ses prévisions en matière de saisine. Nombre de jours 2 ans Une La durée nécessaires au (temps moyen diminution moyenne de traitement d’un cas nécessaire pour le des retards de traitement traitement d’un 20% soit un des affaires cas du dépôt du temps moyen dans les dossier jusqu'à nécessaire tribunaux de sa liquidation) pour le commerce traitement est de 4 mois d’un cas du en 2013 dépôt du dossier jusqu'à sa liquidation d’environ 1an 7 mois Nombre de jours 466 jours Une réduction ND nécessaires pour de 20% des l’exécution d’un délais contrat d’exécution des contrats soit environ 372 jours pourcentage de 64% (pourcentage Le Les L’amélioration du pourcentage de jugements écrits de jugements pourcentage statistiques jugements rédigés peut être attribuée écrits dans les de jugements de 2013 à la circulaire invitant les juges au tribunaux écrits est montrent siège à transmettre au Greffe de la commerciaux) augmenté à que 96,3% juridiction dans les meilleurs délais les 85% des décisions rédigées signée le 21 jugements novembre 2012 ; sont écrits 38 K- Dans le secteur agricole 1- Dans le domaine du renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire Le secteur de l’organisation de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle des populations fait partie des missions régaliennes de l’ETAT. Il est confié le sujet de politique à certaines structures et les questions opérationnelles à d’autres. La SONAGESS s’inscrit dans les structures en charge des activités opérationnelles. En effet, « le dispositif national de sécurité alimentaire en place a été créé avec l’adoption par le Gouvernement du « Cadre général de coopération État-partenaires en matière de sécurité alimentaire ». Ce « Cadre général de coopération État-partenaires » a consacré la constitution du Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA) défini comme cadre de concertation et de suivi de la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire (SNSA). Le CNSA, instance de réflexion et d’orientation donc, assure la supervision de la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire ; il œuvre à l’implication effective de tous les acteurs et responsabilise les collectivités locales et la société civile dans la gestion de la sécurité alimentaire au plan structurel et conjoncturel. Le CNSA a pour principales missions : (i) d’offrir un cadre permanent de concertation sur la stratégie nationale de sécurité alimentaire ; (ii) de donner des orientations en vue d’éclairer toutes les décisions en matière de sécurité alimentaire ; (iii) de valider les rapports et bulletins présentés par les organes du dispositif ; (iv) de coordonner l’information sur toutes les aides alimentaires programmées et mises en œuvre au Burkina Faso ; (v) d’approuver les évaluations portant sur le fonctionnement du dispositif ; et (vi) de coordonner la mobilisation des ressources du dispositif de sécurité alimentaire. Le CNSA comprend une instance de décision l’Assemblée Générale (AG), un organe de réflexion et de concertation, le Comité Technique (CT), un organe d’exécution, le Secrétariat Exécutif (SE), des structures spécialisées (DGPER, SONAGESS, CONASUR), et des structures déconcentrées ». 2-1 Mesures prévues Les mesures prévues sont détaillées comme suit : - En 2012 : elle consistait en l’adoption d’un cadre réglementaire pour renforcer et rationnaliser les cadres institutionnels du Bénéficiaire en matière de sécurité alimentaire afin que celui-ci puisse disposer de réserves alimentaires suffisantes et réagir efficacement à la crise alimentaire. - En 2013 : mettre en œuvre le Plan national d'organisation et de coordination des secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation (PNOCSUR) approuvé par le Conseil des ministres visant à doter les dépôts en quantité suffisante de vivres dans les zones déficitaires du pays et répondre aux besoins alimentaires des populations vulnérables et réagir efficacement à la crise alimentaire. - En 2014 : Mettre en œuvre des mesures pour permettre une plus grande implication des commerçants dans les systèmes d’importation et de distribution des vivres Cette a été transformée pour tenir compte du fait que la SONAGESS n’effectue pas d’importation commerciale pour la constitution / reconstitution du stock national de sécurité (SNS) et le stock d’intervention (SI).Les achats de ces stocks sont sur la production nationale. Le nouveau libellé de la mesure est le suivant : « 2-2 Mesures réalisées. En 2012 et 2013, la mesure a été réalisée sans incidence majeure ; les ressources conséquentes ont été affectées l’acquisition des stocks de céréales. Le PNOCSUR relu et adopté en 2012 sert de référentiel dans la gestion des situations d’urgence en matière de sécurité alimentaire 39 En 2012 la preuve de la mesure a été la mise à disposition des stocks de vivres dans les zones déficitaires à travers plus de 200 boutiques sur les 50 souhaitées. De même les opérateurs privés ont été sont bien impliqués dans l’acquisition et la distribution des produits alimentaires ; ainsi qu’il ressort du tableau 1 présenté en annexe, le montant total des conventions et contrats d’achats passés en 2013 pour l’acquisition du SNS et du SI est de 8°794°885°960 (huit milliards sept cent quatre-vingt-quatorze millions huit cent quatre-vingt-cinq mille neuf cent soixante) francs CFA, Ainsi en 2013, les niveaux conventionnels du Stock National de Sécurité (SNS) et du Stock d’Intervention (SI), respectivement de 35 000 tonnes et de 10 000 tonnes, seraient parfaitement atteints, n’eut été quelques défaillances enregistrées par quelques fournisseurs pour des reliquats de marchés antérieurs; les niveaux atteints sont de 31 287,21 tonnes pour le SNS et 7 000 tonnes pour le SI. 2-3 Indicateurs prévus Les résultats escomptés en fin 2014 sont : 1°) les réserves alimentaires dans le pays augmentent à au moins 50 000 tonnes pour le stock principal et 10 000 tonnes pour le stock d’urgence ; et 2°) stockage de vivres dans 50 des dépôts existants dans les zones déficitaires du pays. Les indicateurs identifiés sont respectivement les « tonnes de réserves alimentaires » et « le nombre de dépôt fournissant des vivres dans les zones déficitaires » 2-4 Indicateurs réalisés Dès 2012, la preuve de la mesure a été la mise à disposition des stocks de vivres dans les zones déficitaires à travers plus de 200 boutiques sur les 50 souhaitées. Compte tenu de la crise alimentaire suite à la mauvaise campagne agricole 2011-2012, le Comité Technique du Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire (CT-CNSA) en sa séance du 20 mars 2012, a marqué son accord pour le déstockage intégral du Stock National de Sécurité (SNS) dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du plan opérationnel de soutien aux populations vulnérables aux crises alimentaires. Ainsi en fin 2012, le Stock National de Sécurité (SNS) et le Stock d’Intervention (SI) sont à un niveau 0 (zéro). Les stocks doivent être reconstitués en vue d’assurer une disponibilité alimentaire au niveau du dispositif de sécurité alimentaire. En conséquence les opérations d’achat de vivres en 2013 visaient donc la reconstitution à leurs niveaux conventionnels du Stock National de Sécurité (SNS) et du Stock d’Intervention (SI), respectivement de 35 000 tonnes et de 10 000 tonnes. Des contrats ont été passés avec les opérateurs privés pour les quantités sus indiquées ; Les niveaux atteints sont de 31 287,21 tonnes pour le SNS et 7 000 tonnes pour le SI (soit un taux de réalisation de 85,08%). Des défaillances enregistrées au niveau de certains fournisseurs expliquent ce taux qui aurait atteint les 100% du fait de la disponibilité des crédits. En 2014, des mesures de réformes de la 4ème opération d’appui budgétaire tenue du 20 au 24 janvier 2014, il est attendu la reconstitution du Stock national de sécurité (SNS) et du Stock d’intervention(SI) à respectivement à 50 000 tonnes et 10 000 tonnes ! Au cours de cette année, la mise en œuvre des mesures sociales commencée en septembre 2013 avec l’achat de 59 000 tonnes de céréales (maïs, sorgho, mil, riz local) en fin 2013 et 15 500 tonnes en 2014 pour une valeur estimée à 23 milliards, ont largement dépassé les prévisions du stock d’intervention, dont le plan de constitution prévoyait l’acquisition de 18 000 tonnes. En effet, le plan prévoyait le SI à 25 000 tonnes. 40 Ces mesures ont permis d’approvisionner sans discontinuer les boutiques de vente et de stabiliser les prix des céréales. Il reste que le stock d’intervention dans son acception originelle mérite d’être constitué. Concernant le Stock National de Sécurité, le plan de financement en début d’année (voir annexe 2) prévoyait l’acquisition de 18 629 tonnes pour atteindre le niveau de 50 000 tonnes. L’accroissement de ces stocks, notamment le SNS, prévu pour un stockage de longue durée (3 ans environ), exigeait l’accroissement des stocks de capacités de stockage adaptés ; c’est qu’un programme de construction de magasins adaptés avait été également soumis à financer. Ce programme n’ayant pas été financé, il n y a pas eu d’inscription budgétaire pour l’acquisition des stocks. 2- Filière coton Au cours de la période de mise en œuvre du programme CCC de la Banque Mondiale, la filière cotonnière du Burkina Faso qui traversait à l’instar des autres filières de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre des difficultés, a connu une amélioration de ses performances et ce, en partie dues à la mise en œuvre des reformes insufflées par la Banque. Les tableaux ci-dessous font ressortir d’une part, l’atteinte des résultats enregistrés par la filière dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des mesures arrêtées par le programme, et d’autre part, l’atteinte des indicateurs retenus. 1.1. Tableau résumant les mesures prévues et les mesures réalisées de la filière coton N0 Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées 1. Application pour les campagnes Il a été appliqué pour les campagnes cotonnières 2011-2012 et 2012-2013, cotonnières 2011-2012 et 2012-2013, une formule de prix au producteur, à travers le mécanisme de fixation du prix d’une formule de prix au producteur, d’achat du coton graine au producteur ou mécanisme de lissage. Il convient fondée sur les cours internationaux du de souligner que les résultats issus du fonctionnement de ce mécanisme coton, conçue pour permettre aux économétrique sont basés principalement, sur le comportement des cours producteurs de coton de recevoir un prix internationaux du coton et du dollar suivant une période bien définie. adéquat, et capitalisation du fonds de stabilisation des prix du coton d’un Les prix d’achat du coton graine de ces deux campagnes étaient montant d’au moins sept milliards de respectivement de : francs CFA. - 2011-2012 : 245 F CFA/Kg (prix plancher) et 274 F CFA/Kg (prix final) ; - 2012-2013 : 245 F CFA/Kg (prix plancher) et 253 F CFA/Kg (prix final). Il convient de souligner que le fonds de stabilisation des prix du coton ou Fonds de Lissage a connu un niveau de capitalisation de 8 082 908 477 FCFA au 31 mars 2012. La preuve de ce niveau de capitalisation a été faite à la Banque comme convenu avec les acteurs de la filière. 2. Création, Opérationnalisation et mise en Un Fonds Intrants Coton a été crée et son opérationnalisation a été effective. place du Fonds Intrants sur la base du Pour ce faire, les actions suivantes ont été menées : manuel rédigé par l’association des producteurs (AICB) et de documents - la réalisation d’une étude de faisabilité par l’AICB relative à la mise en place d’un Fonds Intrants Coton. Les résultats de ladite étude ont été validés au 41 N0 Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées juridiques connexes. Capitalisation du cours d’un atelier ayant regroupé les acteurs de la filière (sociétés fonds d’au moins 10 milliards de FCFA cotonnières et producteurs), les banques commerciales, les structures de l’Etat et des PTF. Il a été retenu que le Fonds Intrants agisse comme garant des crédits documentaires pour l’acquisition des intrants coton par les sociétés cotonnières ; - la création de l’Association Fonds Intrants Coton du Burkina (AFICB), qui a pour objet la gestion du Fonds Intrants ; - le recrutement d’une banque mandataire (Ecobank) où les ressources du fonds seraient logées et qui veillerait également à l’application du règlement technique dudit fonds, en rapport avec, d’une part, les sociétés cotonnières et d’autre part, avec les banques commerciales devant intervenir dans le processus d’acquisition des intrants par crédits documentaires ; - la signature d’un protocole cadre entre les sociétés cotonnières, la banque mandataire ainsi que les banques commerciales afin d’encadrer l’utilisation de la garantie du FIC, en vue des acquisitions des intrants ; - la signature de protocoles bilatéraux entre les sociétés cotonnières, leurs banques commerciales afin d’encadrer spécifiquement l’utilisation de la garantie du FIC, en vue des acquisitions des intrants. En ce qui concerne la capitalisation dudit fonds, l’Etat burkinabè ayant constaté la création et l’opérationnalisation de celui-ci a, en concertation avec les Partenaires Techniques et Financiers (la Banque Mondiale), mobilisé et versé dans le compte du Fonds Intrants Coton, une dotation initiale de 10 milliards de F CFA en février 2013. La preuve de cette capitalisation a été faite à la Banque Mondiale par la communication du relevé de compte du Fonds (ouvert au niveau de la Banque mandataire) crédité de 10 milliards de F CFA. 3. Utilisation du Fonds Intrants pour Cette mesure avait pour preuve de réalisation, la communication d’« une l’acquisition des intrants au titre de la lettre de la banque mandataire indiquant la quote-part de garantie de campagne agricole 2014-15 chaque société cotonnière pour l’acquisition des intrants au titre de la campagne 2014/15 » avec pour échéance le15 septembre 2013. Aussi, par lettre en date du 11 septembre 2013, la banque mandataire (ECOBANK) notifiait la répartition de la quote-part de garantie revenant à chaque société. Cette répartition de la quote-part de garantie du fonds devait permettre à chaque société cotonnière d’acquérir les intrants de la campagne 2014/15, à travers l’ouverture des Lettres de Crédits Irrévocables ou Crédits Documentaires au niveau de sa banque commerciale intervenant dans le financement des intrants. Malheureusement, dans le cadre du suivi de la mise en œuvre de la mesure, il a été constaté que les sociétés cotonnières ont acquis les intrants de la campagne 2014/15 sans recourir à la garantie du Fonds Intrants Coton. Un rapport sur cette situation a été communiqué aux autorités le 17 mars 2014. 42 N0 Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées Faisant suite à ce rapport, les autorités ont instruit la tenue d’une concertation entre les parties prenantes au fonctionnement du mécanisme du Fonds Intrants Coton afin de : - tirer les grands enseignements de la non-utilisation constatée de la garantie du Fonds Intrants Coton, au titre des acquisitions de la campagne 2014/15 ; - dégager des perspectives consensuelles au regard des difficultés rencontrées par les sociétés cotonnières dans l’utilisation de la garantie du fonds pour les achats d’intrants de la campagne 2014/15. Dans ce sens, un atelier d’échanges sur l’utilisation du FIC a été organisé le 11 août 2014 et a réuni les représentants des producteurs, des sociétés cotonnières, des banques et de l’Etat. Au cours de cette concertation, il a été examiné les difficultés invoquées par les sociétés cotonnières, lesquelles ont conduit à la non-utilisation de la garantie du FIC. De nouvelles propositions techniques ont été faites par les sociétés cotonnières et les banques et il a été consensuellement retenu que pour les acquisitions des intrants de la campagne 2015/16 et suivantes, deux (02) modes de paiement adossés à la garantie du FIC, en plus de la Lettre de Crédits Irrévocables, seront utilisés. Il s’agit de : - la traite avalisée ; - la garantie de paiement. Ces deux (02) modes additionnels de paiement ci-dessus, permettent à la fois le recours à l’utilisation de la garantie du FIC et la réalisation de transactions d’intrants avec les fournisseurs locaux participant aux appels d’offres intrants. Les sociétés cotonnières se sont engagés à œuvrer afin d’utiliser la garantie du FIC pour les acquisitions des intrants de la campagne 2015/16 et suivantes. Les représentants des producteurs à cette concertation ont insisté sur la nécessité de l’utilisation du FIC par les sociétés cotonnières pour les campagnes 2015/16 et suivantes, pour l’acquisition des intrants de qualité et moins coûteux, en vue de permettre leur cession à des prix accessibles aux producteurs, comme motivé auprès du Gouvernement et des Partenaires Techniques et Financiers, dans le cadre du processus de mise en place de ce fonds. Un rapport des conclusions de cette concertation a été fait aux autorités. 43 1.2. Tableau résumant les indicateurs prévus et les indicateurs atteints pour ce qui concerne la filière coton au terme de ce programme CCC N0 Indicateurs prévus Indicateurs atteints 1. Montant du capital dans le Fonds de En septembre 2014, le montant du capital dans le fonds de Stabilisation stabilisation ou Fonds de Lissage est au moins 5 milliards de F CFA. 2. Montant de la capitalisation du Fonds Le Fonds Intrant a un capital de 10 milliards de FCFA (non Intrants compris les intérêts produits par le fonds). L- Dans le domaine minier L’ITIE a mis en œuvre l’ensemble des mesures et indicateurs prévus Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées la publication et la diffusion du deuxième rapport la publication et la diffusion du deuxième rapport ITIE qui donne des relevés complets des recettes ITIE qui donne des relevés complets des recettes minières collectées en 2010 (y compris droits de minières collectées en 2010 de même que du licence, redevance, impôt sur le revenu, etc ) de troisième rapport ITIE qui se rapporte à 2011. toutes les mines en exploitation. Indicateurs prévus Indicateurs réalisés Rapport ITIE présentant les données de 06 sociétés le rapport ITIE 2010 a concerné 09 sociétés minières minières, en termes de réalisation et le rapport 2011 a fourni les données concernant 18 sociétés minières.  Dans le domaine des transports Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées le soutien au renouvellement du parc • Adoption de deux lois - la loi n° 041-2010/AN du 02 décembre 2010 portant loi de finances pour l’exécution du budget de l’Etat gestion 2011 (article 42) ; - la loi n°010-2011/AN du 24 mai 2011 portant institution d’une exonération à titre exceptionnel du Droit de Douane (DD) et de la Taxe sur la Valeur Ajoutée(TVA) pour l’importation de véhicules de transport de marchandises y compris les véhicules de transport d’hydrocarbures. • Adoption de deux décrets - le décret n°2011-755 PRES/PM/MTPEN/MEF/MICA du 18 octobre 2011 portant autorisation d’importation en exonération du droit de douane et de la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée de véhicules neufs à usage de taxis; - le décret n° 2012- 44 Mesures prévues Mesures réalisées 190/PRES/PM/MTPEN/MEF/MICA du 20 mars 2012 portant mise en œuvre de l’importation, à titre exceptionnel, en exonération du droit de douane et de la valeur ajoutée de véhicules de transport de marchandises et d’hydrocarbure. la mise en place d’une nouvelle règlementation • Adoption de deux décrets de l’accès à la profession de transporteur - le décret portant fixation des catégories de transports et des conditions d’exercice de la profession de transporteur routier ; - le décret portant composition, organisation et fonctionnement des instances consultatives des transports terrestres. la lutte contre la surcharge des poids lourds responsables de la dégradation du réseau routier ; la libéralisation du fret par la suppression du tour de rôle favorable aux véhicules vétustes. Indicateurs prévus Indicateurs réalisés Niveau de rajeunissement du parc o Deux cents (200) camions de transport d’hydrocarbure - 300 véhicules neufs à usage de ont été importés sur les deux prévus par le décret, soit taxis sont importés et mis en un taux de réalisation de 100% au 31 décembre 2013. circulation ; o Cinquante-deux (52) camions de transport de - quatre cent (400) ensembles articulés marchandises sur quatre cents (400) prévus par le pour le transport de marchandises décret soit un taux de réalisation de 12,75% au 31 - deux cents (200) véhicules pour le décembre 2013. transport d’’hydrocarbures. o Vingt (20) taxis ont été importés et mis-en sur les 300 accordés par le décret, soit un taux de réalisation de 6.67%. Sur rapport du ministre en charge des transports, le ministre de l’économie et des finances a accordé une ultime prorogation du délai d’accomplissement des formalités de mise à la consommation et de mise à la circulation de 290 ensembles articulés de transport de marchandises jusqu’au 31 décembre 2014. Cadre juridique et règlementaire Le décret portant conditions d’accès à la profession de Les textes d’application de la loi d’orientation transporteur routier et le décret portant composition des transports au Burkina Faso sont élaborés et organisation des organes consultatifs sont signés. adoptés ainsi que leurs arrêtés d’application Les arrêtés d’application sont en cours d’élaboration. 45 M- Dans le domaine de la micro finance/genre L’une des mesures principales était le « Soutien de l’accès des femmes à la micro finance par l’augmentation du fonds d’appui aux activités rémunératrices des femmes (FAARF) pour inclure le financement de création d’entreprise et du fonds de roulement ». Cette mesure qui correspond intégralement à la raison d’être du FAARF a néanmoins été ajustée pour tenir compte de la situation actuelle et réelle du FAARF. C’est ainsi qu’au lieu de : Base décembre Mesures et actions Mesures et actions Résultats escomptés (fin du 2010 politiques pour CCC/G- politiques pour programme) 2(février 2013) CCC/G-3(2013) Le nombre Appui à la micro finance Elargissement du Le nombre d’emprunteurs d’emprunteurs par l’augmentation du fonds d’appui aux actifs augmente à 120 000. actif est de 75 fonds d’appui aux activités activités Le montant moyen par 000 rémunératrices des rémunératrices des emprunteur a augmenté. femmes(FAARF) pour femmes (FAARF) pour accroitre le nombre de augmenter les bénéficiaires montants octroyés La réalisation de cette mesure a conduit au renforcement du fonds de crédit du FAARF à hauteur de 500 000 000 F CFA et a été matérialisée par l’évolution du nombre d’emprunteurs actifs et également l’évolution du montant moyen par bénéficiaires. Ainsi pour cet indicateur qui était de 75 000 en 2010, l’objectif à atteindre en fin de programme en 2014 est fixé à 120 000 emprunteurs actifs. La mise en œuvre de cette réforme s’est soldée par une évolution des résultats comme suit : Année Base 2010 2013 2014(juin) Nombre de bénéficiaires 75 000 111 596 119 416 Montant moyen de 49 560 57 390 58 475 crédit par bénéficiaires 46 III- LES CHANGEMENTS CONSTATES N- Dans le domaine de la décentralisation Le processus de décentralisation a connu des avancées notables avec le début de la mise en œuvre du programme d’appui budgétaire. Domaines Impacts − Réduction du rayon moyen d’action de 5km à 2,5km en moyenne; − Accès gratuit aux fournitures scolaires Enseignement primaire, − Augmentation du taux brut de scolarisation de 79,6 en 2012 à 83,0% en 2014; − Réduction notable des classes sous paillotte − Réduction du rayon moyen d’action de 7,2km en 2011 Santé à 6,5km en 2014; − Fréquentation des centres de santé − Réduction de la distance d’accès à l’eau potable (un village, un forage) ; Approvisionnement en eau potable − Accessibilité à l’eau potable : de 2011 (60%) à 2012 et assainissement. (63%) en milieu rural et de 2011 (80%) à 2012 (84%) en milieu urbain − Réduction des maladies liées à l’eau − Disponibilité des textes sur les sites web des ministères sectoriels ; − Mise à disposition des arrêtés portant répartition des Cadre réglementaire ressources financières aux communes ; − Adoption en 2014 des 21 décrets consacrant le transfert des ressources et des compétences dans les domaines cités par le CGCT O- En matière de renforcement de la gestion financière publique o La mesure concernant l’internalisation des directives de l’UEMOA a été remplacée par celle relative à la nomination des contrôleurs financiers. Cela s’explique par le fait que la DG-CMEF est une nouvelle structure née en 2012 avec la fusion des deux directions : la DGCF et la DGMP. Le respect de cette réorganisation du ministère nécessitait la nomination des directeurs du contrôle des marchés publics et des engagements financiers (DCMEF) dans les ministères et institutions d’où la prise en compte de cette mesure ; o La mesure relative à l’audit des marchés publics a été remplacée par celle relative à la relecture du décret portant règlementation générale des marchés publics en vue du relèvement des seuils d’approbation. A ce niveau un arrêté a été signé dans ce sens en lieu et place de la relecture du décret. En effet, les seuils d’approbation relève du régime des arrêtés ; 47 o La création des Unités de Vérifications, ainsi que la délégation de service faite aux DCMEF des ministères et institutions ont favorisé la réduction du délai de traitement des dossiers et la redondance des points de contrôle ; o La mise en œuvre de ces différentes mesures a permis de rationaliser la gestion des finances publiques en améliorant le dispositif global de contrôle de la chaîne d’exécution de la dépense publique. P- Dans le domaine de la micro finance/genre Le FAARF faisait face depuis quelques années à des tensions de trésorerie surtout au dernier trimestre de chaque année ce qui ne lui permettait pas de satisfaire les demandes dans les délais requis. L’apport de ces fonds supplémentaires a permis de résoudre momentanément ce problème. C’est ainsi qu’au cours de ces deux ans les clientes n’ont pas subi de désagréments relatifs au non-respect des périodes de déblocage de fonds. Q- Dans le domaine minier Les sociétés minières sensibilisées sur les principes et exigences de l’ITIE sont de plus en plus disposées à communiquer les informations. R- Dans le secteur de la justice Les principaux changements constatés concernent l’amélioration des délais de production et de publication des annuaires et tableaux de bord des statistiques de la justice. En effet, depuis l’intervention du CCC en 2011, d’importants efforts ont été fournis afin que les délais habituels de production des statistiques portant sur l’activité judiciaires de l’année N qui étaient au plus tôt en juin de l’année N+1 soient ramenés au plus tard en fin mars de l’année N+1. Cette performance est en partie due aux ressources supplémentaires accordées en 2012 et 2013 au Ministère de la Justice pour la formation de la cellule statistique, la collecte et le traitement des données. Cependant, ces délais pourraient se rallongés en raison notamment de l’affaiblissement de cet effort financier constaté en 2014. A cela s’ajoute l’amélioration des délais moyens de traitement des affaires dans les tribunaux de commerce qui sont passés de 9 mois en 2011 à environ 4 mois en 2013 et du pourcentage de jugements rédigés dans les tribunaux commerciaux qui est passé de 64% en 2011 à 96,3% en 2013. Cette amélioration pourrait être attribuée à la circulaire du Ministre de la justice, Garde des sceaux invitant les juges au siège à transmettre au Greffe de la juridiction dans les meilleurs délais les décisions rédigées signée le 21 novembre 2012 ; Ces améliorations des délais de traitements des affaires commerciales et du pourcentage de décisions rédigées sont des indicateurs qui associés à l’adoption de la loi n°052-2012/AN du 17 décembre 2012 portant médiation civile et commerciale sont des résultats concrets qui attestent de l’amélioration de la justice commerciale au Burkina Faso et donc de l’amélioration du climat des affaires. Enfin, on note avec satisfécit que l’adoption d’un projet de Loi sur le CSM par le Gouvernement et sa transmission à l’Assemblé Nationale pourrait contribuer au renforcement de l’indépendance du juge et par voie de conséquence la crédibilité de la justice. Ce projet de loi prévoit comme innovations, la création d'un secrétariat permanent avec une autonomie de gestion; l’augmentation du nombre des membres élus qui passe de 02 à 03 par grade; l’élargissement des membres de droit aux commissaires du gouvernement du Conseil d'Etat et de la Cour des comptes. 48 S- Dans le domaine agricole 1- Dans le domaine du renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire Une priorité est donnée à la reconstitution du stock national de sécurité alimentaire. En effet depuis que la gestion du SNS a été confiée à la Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité Alimentaire (SONAGESS), il n’a jamais été mis autant de moyens qu’en 2013 pour sa reconstitution; le tableau qui suit présente sur les cinq dernières années (de 2009 à 2013) l’accroissement variation du Stock National de Sécurité Exercice 2009 2010 2011 2012 (*) 2013 Quantité totale au 31 20 915,460 23 617,320 28 226,210 0 31 287,250 décembre (en tonnes) Ecart avec la cible de -14 085 -11 383 - 6 774 -35 000 31 287,270 35000 tonnes Solde accroissement SNS - 2 701,860 4 608,890 NA 31 287,270 par an (*) Tout le SNS a été mobilisé en 2012 pour juguler la crise alimentaire, et un effort de reconstitution a fait en 2013. L’examen des accroissements par an montre bien cet effort. 2- Filière coton Au cours de la période de mise en œuvre du programme CCC, la filière coton du Burkina Faso a connu des améliorations tant sur le plan institutionnel et organisationnel que sur le plans des performances agricoles et économiques. En matière d’accroissement de la résilience, les améliorations constatées sont les suivantes : - Un renforcement du dialogue et de la concertation entre les acteurs de la filière (sociétés cotonnières et producteurs) ; - La transparence dans la gestion des outils de la filière (Fonds de Lissage et Fonds Intrants) des actions de la filière ; - Le dialogue renforcé entre les acteurs de la filière avec l’Etat et les PTF pour palier aux difficultés que rencontre par la filière d’une part, et anticiper sur les solutions relatives aux éventuelles difficultés qui pourraient survenir dans le futur d’autre part ; - Le renforcement des responsabilités au niveau des acteurs en vue de l’atteinte de meilleures performances agricoles et économiques ; 49 - Le développement des capacités d’adaptation des acteurs de la filière à travers l’environnement très évolutif de ce secteur d’activité fortement influencé par des facteurs exogènes tels que le climat, les cours internationaux du coton et du dollar, les crises économiques, sociales et politiques etc. - En matière d’accroissement de la productivité, les améliorations constatées sont les suivantes : - Une meilleure appropriation du mode de détermination du prix d’achat du coton graine au Burkina Faso (mécanisme de lissage des prix) par les producteurs ; - Une utilisation de plus en plus accrue de la fumure organique dans les exploitations cotonnières en plus des engrais chimiques ; - Une tendance à une application rigoureuse des itinéraires techniques de production, tant sur le coton conventionnel que sur le coton Bt. - Une amélioration de la productivité dans les champs de coton (le rendement moyen de la filière est de 1002 Kg/Ha en 2013/14 contre 965 Kg/Ha en 2010/11) ; - Une gestion rigoureuse des organes des producteurs, notamment les crédits intrants des Groupements de Producteur du Coton (GPC) ; - Une amélioration de la Marge Après Remboursement des Intrants (MARI) du producteur ; - Une amélioration continue des conditions de vie des producteurs de coton ; - Une amélioration de la production des cultures associées au coton, le maïs notamment ; - Une amélioration positive des résultats d’activité des sociétés cotonnières ; - Une stimulation de plus en plus forte pour demeurer leadership dans la production cotonnière en Afrique. En matière d’accroissement des emplois agricoles, les améliorations constatées sont les suivantes : - Une augmentation du nombre de producteurs de coton (239 713 producteurs en 2013/14 contre 179 037 producteurs en 2010/11) ; - Un accroissement des effectifs d’agents des sociétés cotonnières (agents permanents et agents non permanents ou saisonniers) ; - Un accroissement des emplois dans le secteur du transport du coton assuré par le secteur privé, au regard de la croissance des productions de coton graine et de coton fibre ; - Un accroissement d’emplois dans le secteur de la trituration de la graine de coton, au regard du nombre croissant d’unités de trituration crées ces dernières années. 50 T- Dans secteur des transports 1- La mise à la consommation et à la circulation des véhicules neufs de transport de marchandises et d’hydrocarbures a contribué à : - la réduction de la surcharge routière pour la protection du patrimoine routier ; - la création de nouveaux emplois ; - la réduction du nombre et de la gravité des accidents de la circulation routière dus à l’état technique des véhicules ; - la création de nouvelles entreprises de transport ce qui devrait renforcer la concurrence ; - l’amélioration des conditions d’approvisionnement du pays et l’accroissement de la compétitivité des transporteurs burkinabè. 2- L’adoption des deux (02) décrets assortis d’un moratoire de deux (02) ans a permis de préciser les conditions propices à la promotion de l’industrie des transports routiers burkinabé, en adaptant au mieux, la réglementation actuelle aux exigences d’amélioration du climat des affaires, de modernisation et de professionnalisation de l’industrie des transports et de renforcer l’implication des régions et des communes dans la gestion des transports terrestres. 51 IV- LES LECONS APPRISES U- Dans le domaine de la décentralisation Des difficultés ont émaillé ce processus de transfert. Ces difficultés ainsi que quelques pistes de solutions sont synthétisées dans le tableau ci-dessous : N° Difficultés rencontrées Solutions apportées transmission aux collectivités territoriales, des informations sur les montants à transférer inscrits dans la mise à disposition tardive des ressources aux 01 les avant-projets de budget en septembre afin de communes permettre leur prise en compte dans les budgets primitifs Sensibilisation à la mise en place d’un processus l’inadéquation entre les compétences transférées d’allocation conséquente de ressources financières 02 et les moyens mis à la disposition des collectivités destinées aux transferts par l’implication des territoriales collectivités territoriales à l’étape d’évaluation Sensibilisation à la prévision et la codification de l’insuffisance de moyens financiers pour le suivi l’utilisation des ressources financières réservées au suivi 03 des travaux des travaux d’investissement liés aux compétences transférées la non maîtrise des procédures d’exécution des le renforcement des capacités des acteurs des CT marchés publics spécifiquement liés aux intervenant dans le processus d’exécution des marchés 04 compétences transférées au niveau des publics spécifiquement liés au transfert des compétences communes et des ressources par les ministères sectoriels et le MEF. l’absence d’un cadre de dialogue entre les la création de cadres de concertation entre les différents 05 ministères sectoriels et les collectivités acteurs intervenant dans les CT sur les transferts des territoriales compétences et des ressources financières. dans le souci d’apporter un appui conséquent aux CT, un la déconcentration incomplète de certains projet de « plan national de déconcentration » est en 06 ministères finalisation au Ministère de la fonction publique, du travail et de la sécurité sociale. 21 autres décrets consacrant le transfert des ressources la non effectivité des transferts de ressources 07 et des compétences dans les domaines cités par le CGCT financières dans certains domaines transférés sont adoptés. l’implication du comité provincial de suivi des investissements dans les processus de suivi des chantiers la faible capacité technique au niveau local pour le 08 d’investissements et de réhabilitation dont le rapport suivi contrôle des chantiers d’exécution physique et financière des ressources transférées est à transmettre au MEF. la prévision des départements ministériels des l’insuffisance de moyens matériels et financiers ressources supplémentaires chaque année aux profits 09 alloués aux services déconcentrés pour appuyer des services déconcentrés pour l’appui technique, le suivi les communes de l’exécution des compétences transférées et de l’évaluation des besoins des communes. la mise en place d’une commission interministérielle de 10 l’absence d’un mécanisme de suivi-évaluation suivi évaluation de l’exécution physique et financière des ressources transférées. 52 V- En matière de renforcement de la gestion financière publique o La diminution du nombre de dossiers à transmettre au Ministre de l’Economie et des Finances pour approbation induit la responsabilisation accrue des ministères et institutions autres que celui des Finances, ainsi que la réduction du délai de passation des marchés; o La multiplication du nombre de DCMEF entraîne des problèmes de ressources humaines, matérielles et financières ; o Le regroupement des acteurs de la chaîne des dépenses réduit considérablement le risque de pertes des pièces justificatives lors des transmissions d’un acteur à l’autre ; o La mutualisation des ressources et des bonnes pratiques ; o Un meilleur alignement des objectifs, ce qui est source de plus d’efficacité. W- Dans le domaine de la micro finance/genre En terme de leçons apprises on note que c’est une première pour le FAARF de participer au programme d’appui budgétaire de la banque mondiale. Le déroulement tout entier du programme constitue une nouveauté, surtout le niveau de rigueur dans le suivi des reformes. L’accompagnement de la DGCOOP a permis de réussir cette première X- Dans le domaine minier Il s’avère important de : - associer la cour des comptes pour la certification des données fournies par l’administration des finances ; - sensibiliser et d’associer d’avantage les transitaires pour permettre aux sociétés minières de fournir toutes les informations liées à leur paiements douaniers nécessaires pour le rapport ITIE; - améliorer d’avantage la coordination entre les services du Ministère des finances et ceux du ministère des mines concernés pour faciliter la disponibilité des informations nécessaires pour le rapport ITIE. Y- Dans le secteur de la justice Le programme d’appui budgétaire dénommé Crédit d’appui à la Croissance et à la Compétitivité (CCC) dont le Burkina a bénéficié au titre de la période 2012-2014 est incontestablement d’une contribution substantielle au financement des options prioritaires de développement arrêtées en toute souveraineté par le Gouvernement du Burkina en général et au renforcement de la Gouvernance en particulier. Parce que le décaissement des CCC est conditionné par des mesures à mettre en œuvre, ce programme peut permettre d’accélérer la conduite de certaines réformes. Egalement le canevas de suivi des mesures et des indicateurs constitue un référentiel pertinent au regard des informations qui y sont contenues et qui permette une appréciation qualitative et quantitative des activités effectuées par les structures impliquées dans le processus ; toute chose qui interpelle la responsabilité de chacun des acteurs de la chaine. Nonobstant ces acquis, on peut noter l’existence d’insuffisances portant sur la définition des mesures, l’implication de tous les acteurs concernés et le suivi de la mise en œuvre de ces mesures. En effet, on a pu par exemple relever que certaines mesures retenues se sont révélées relativement plus difficiles que prévues à réaliser. En outre, des structures ont regretté ne pas avoir été associées à la définition des indicateurs et à la fixation des cibles. 53 En vue d’améliorer le processus CCC les suggestions suivantes peuvent être formulées : • Impliquer toutes les structures concernées par les mesures et indicateurs lors de leurs adoption et validation ; • Renforcer le suivi de la mise en œuvre des mesures par les DGESS en les impliquant dans toutes les discutions entre la Banque mondiale et les structures relevant de leur ministère ; • Prévoir des appuis budgétaires directs aux structures concernées en vue de facilité la mise en œuvre des mesures. Z- Dans le domaine agricole 1- Dans le domaine du renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire L’exécution de programme sur quatre ans a permis à plusieurs instructions de l’Etat de connaitre les procédures d’appuis budgétaires programmatiques de la Banque mondiale. Par ailleurs, il a développé une synergie d’actions entre ces différentes institutions, notamment dans le processus de recherche de l’atteinte des résultats escomptés ! De façon spécifique, le besoin d’accroissement des stocks de sécurité alimentaire existe ; il doit cependant être mis en lien avec l’accroissement des infrastructures de stockage ! 2- Filière coton Les leçons apprises par la filière coton au cours de la mise en œuvre du programme CCC de la Banque Mondiale sont nombreuses et diverses. La capitalisation de ces leçons apprises par les acteurs de la filière dans le cadre de ce programme demeure un challenge à relever. Il s’agit de : - le développement par les acteurs du secteur coton, de capacités propres pour résister par anticipation, aux chocs extérieurs à la filière ; - le développement de la concertation entre les acteurs pour une harmonie dans la gestion des défis de la filière ; - la recherche du bien être des producteurs et des populations du milieu rural (croissance inclusive) ; - l’intérêt prononcé des PTF pour le développement du secteur rural à travers le secteur coton ; - l’implication et l’accompagnement du secteur privé dans le monde rural, les banques notamment ; - La capacité des acteurs de la filière à prendre des engagements et à les respecter ; - la disponibilité et flexibilité de la Banque Mondiale dans la conduite du programme CCC avec les acteurs de la filière et de l’Etat. AA- Dans le secteur des transports 1- La mise en œuvre de la première mesure a laissé apparaitre : 54 - une réticence des banques et établissements financiers à accorder du crédit aux opérateurs de transport : en effet, le secteur des transports routiers de marchandises du Burkina Faso représente pour les banques un secteur de grands risques, aggravé par le manque de garanties solides en cas de défaut de remboursement ; - les transporteurs ont été confrontés à des problèmes de financement qui sont de deux ordres : • des taux d’intérêts élevés (en 2012 entre 9 et 12%) ; • des garanties importantes exigées par les banques. - la faible capacité des transporteurs à mobiliser des fonds (difficultés de constituer un fonds de roulement et d’investir dans le renouvellement de la flotte). 2. Pour l’élaboration de la règlementation sur l’accès à la profession de transporteur Le ministère en charge des transports a opté pour une approche participative afin de conférer une plus large base consensuelle à ces projets de texte avant leur soumission au Conseil des Ministres. L’implication dans ce processus, de l’ensemble des parties prenantes (secteur public/secteur privé) a constitué un facteur essentiel pour atteindre les résultats visés. Au regard de ce qui précède, il se pose : - la nécessité de mettre en place des mesures d’accompagnement et d’incitation à la professionnalisation :  organisation des séminaires régionaux de vulgarisation et d’appropriation du décret ;  organisation de sessions de renforcement des capacités des acteurs ;  la formation des gestionnaires de transport ; - la nécessité de rééditer l’opération de renouvellement des véhicules de transport de marchandises et de l’étendre aux véhicules de transport en commun ; la nécessité d’augmenter la durée de l’opération de renouvellement de la flotte. 55 10. Annex 5. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Not Applicable 56 11. Annex 6. List of Supporting Documents “Bagré” Growth Pole Project (BGPP) Report No.: AC5131, May 31, 2011, Project ID: P119662. Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Burkina Faso, for the period of 2010-2012, (Report No. 49588- BF of August 10, 2009). Doing Business 2016, Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency, World Bank Group Flagship Report, 13th edition. Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index, 2015. Available at www.transparency.org/cpi Financial Agreement for the first Growth and Competitiveness Credit, between the Government of Burkina Faso and the International Development Association, dated June 26, 2012. Financial Agreement for the second Growth and Competitiveness Credit, between the Government of Burkina Faso and the International Development Association, dated March 21, 2013. Financial Agreement for the third Growth and Competitiveness Credit, between the Government of Burkina Faso and the International Development Association, dated December 5, 2013. Financial Agreement for the fourth Growth and Competitiveness Credit, between the Government of Burkina Faso and the International Development Association, dated April 2, 2015. Program document for a proposed Grant in the amount of SDR 58.1 million (US$90 million equivalent) to Burkina Faso for a first growth and competitiveness grant, May 25, 2012 Program document for a proposed Grant in the amount of SDR xx million (US$70 million equivalent) to Burkina Faso for a second Growth and Competitiveness Operation, January 8, 2013. Program document for a proposed Development Policy Credit in the amount of SDR 32.6 million (US$50 million equivalent) and a proposed Development Policy Grant in the amount of SDR 32.6 million (US$50 million equivalent) to Burkina Faso for the Third Growth and Competitiveness Operation, November 7, 2013. Program document for a proposed Development Policy Credit in the amount of SDR 35.5 million (US$50 million equivalent) and a proposed Development Policy Grant in the amount of SDR 35.5 million (US$50 million equivalent) to Burkina Faso for the Third Growth and Competitiveness Operation, March 6, 2015. World Bank’s Africa Strategy Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s support to it: AFRICA REGIONAL STRATEGY, Report No. 59761. 57 12. Annex 7. GCC 1, 2, 3 and 4 Prior Actions and Status GCG -1 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence 1. Application, for the Cotton Seasons 2011-2012 and Implemented 2012-2013, of a producer price formula, based on Evidence: AIC Decision fixing the floor price for cotton international cotton prices, designed to ensure that (April 12, 2011); newspaper announcement of the cotton farmers are paid an appropriate price; and producer price (April 16, 2012); bank statement capitalization of the Cotton Price Stabilization Fund in confirming the amount on deposit in the stabilization an amount of at least seven billion CFA Francs (CFAF fund (April 17, 2012) 7,000,000,000). 2. Continued involvement of the private sector in the Implemented fertilizer distribution process, by the issuance of In January, 2012 the procurement was launched, and invitations to private suppliers to bid on at least 6,900 the fertilizer has been imported metric tons of fertilizer to be purchased by the Evidence: Ministry bidding documents; results of the Recipient for distribution to rice and maize producers. procurement authority evaluation proposing award of contracts (March 15, 2012) 3. Adoption by the Recipient of a mechanism of Implemented monthly reporting of consolidated data on mining Consolidated revenue reports prepared for last revenues designed to ensure better coordination quarter 2011 between the Recipient’s Ministries responsible for Evidence: MF reports on mining sector revenues for finance and for mining, so as to improve collection of the months of December 2011 (January 20, 2012); public revenues generated by mining activities in the November 2011 (December 12, 2011); and October country; and issuance of said data for the last quarter 2011 (November 11, 2011); Minutes of MEF meeting of FY 2011. on monitoring of the sector (March 2012) 4. Submission to Parliament of a law designed to Implemented establish a suitable regulatory and legal framework for The bill has been submitted to Parliament in May, the promotion of mediation as an alternative dispute 2012. resolution mechanism. Evidence: Draft law and cover letter from Minister of Justice transmitting the draft law to the Parliament (May 9, 2012) 5 Publication of statistics covering the period FY 2010 Implemented and FY 2011 on the activities of the Recipient’s courts The Ministry of Justice has validated and uploaded the of first instance (tribunaux de grande instance), core statistics on its website. including average time required for a final disposition, Evidence: www.cns.bf; rate of case disposition, annual budget allocation, and 2011 and 2010 statistics and budgetary allocations percentage of judgments rendered in writing. 6. Devolution, on a pilot basis, of budget and Implemented expenditure management to the Recipient’s line The five units have all been established. ministries, through the establishment and Evidence: Decree establishing budget verification units operationalization of budget oversight and verification (October 7, 2011); MEF order (arrêté) on organization units in the Recipient’s ministries responsible for and functioning of these units (October 25, 2011); 5 agriculture, health, infrastructure, secondary and joint MEF/line ministry orders higher education, and justice. (arrêté conjoint) (March 15, 19, 23, 29, 2012) 58 GCG -1 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence 7. Approval by the Recipient’s high judicial council Implemented (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) of the The CSM has approved MEF’s nominations. nomination of qualified and experienced members Evidence: Signed minutes of the CSM meeting on May to the Recipient’s court of accounts (Cour des 17, 2012 stating that 4 persons were Comptes) so as to enable the full staffing of said court. retained as “presidents de chambres" of the Court of Accounts, and 11 persons were “retained to be nominated” as counselors at the Court of Accounts 8. Adoption of a regulatory framework for the Implemented organization of municipalities (l’organigramme type Government has adopted the framework. des communes) designed to further the predictability Evidence: 4 joint MEF/MATD orders (arrêté conjoint) of intergovernmental transfers and afford enhanced on the organization of rural municipalities; urban capacity of local governments. municipalities; special status urban municipalities; and regional administrations (April 6, 2012) 9. Adoption of a national strategy for the period FY Implemented 2012 through FY 2016, designed to promote the Government has adopted the strategy. economic and financially sound development of Evidence: Decree adopting the strategy and its action microfinance throughout the Recipient’s territory, plan (January 24, 2012), copy of the strategy and targeted to groups underserved by financial action plan intermediaries. 10. Adoption of an action plan to strengthen and Implemented rationalize the Recipient’s institutional arrangements Council of Ministers has adopted the action plan. for food security so as to ensure adequate food Evidence: Publication of minutes of CM meeting May reserves and an efficient and effective response in the 16 in newspaper; Letter from Minister of Finance event of food shortages. confirming CM adoption of the Food Security Plan (May 22, 2012). GCG -2 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence Implemented by December, 2012 1. Creation, operationalization and capitalization of the input fund based on the manual prepared by the producer association AICB and associated Evidence: Manual; supplemental legal documents (capitalization of at least 10 billion CFA). budget showing budget line Moved to GCG 3 December, 2013 2. Completion of procedure-based audit of the customs clearance procedures in Ouagadougou to improve customs administration. Evidence: Validated audit 3. Public dissemination of the second EITI report, that provides Implemented by November, 2012 comprehensive statements on mining revenues collected in 2010 (licenses, royalties, income tax, etc.) from all operating mines (materiality Evidence: EITI Report published decided by the EITI multi-stakeholder group) 59 GCG -2 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence 4. Adoption of a ministerial order to formalize both the process for the Implemented by December, 2012 collection and publication of statistics of the Recipient’s courts and the procedural manual for collecting statistics, including statistics on average Evidence: Decree (arête) time required for a final disposition, backlog rates, average time for approved by Ministry of Justice written judgments and average time for formal enforcement of judgments. 5 Adoption of a national mechanism to monitor corruption trends and Implemented by December 30, evaluate anti-corruption reform efforts by the semi-autonomous agency 2012 ASCE through the annual collation and analysis of sectoral data, audit information (from the ASCE and the Cour des Comptes) and surveys Decree (arête) validating anti- produced by the state and civil society. corruption tool Implemented by Jan 15, 2012 6. Submission to Parliament of a law relating to fiscal transparency to ensure that the legal framework for public finance complies with selected Evidence: Decree establishing WAEMU Directives on Code of Transparency code submitted to Parliament Moved to CGC-4 December, 2014 7. Completion of institutional and financial audit of the Recipient’s court Evidence: Finalization of audit of accounts (Cour des Comptes) so as to enable its adequate functioning. report of Cours de Comptes by Ministry of Justice Implemented by December, 2012 8. Increase resource transfers to local collectivities to 4% of national budget to ensure local governments have sufficient funds to fulfill Evidence: Budgetary line (loi de mandates as established per the Code General des Collectivites finance) allocating resources to Territoriales local communities Implemented by December, 2012 9. Support to female microfinance by scaling up the women’s fund Evidence: Capitalization of FAARF (FAARF) to include financing of business creation and working capital by CFAF 500 million Implemented by December, 2012 10. Implementation of PNOCSUR plan approved by CM to adequately stock warehouses in food-deficit parts of the country and feed vulnerable Evidence: Stockage of boutiques populations to ensure effective response to food crisis. in deficit areas GCC -3 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence Implemented 1. The agricultural input fund becomes operational in time for the 2014-15 agricultural season. Evidence: A letter from the commercial bank contracted to operate the input fund (ECOBANK) indicating the share guarantees of each cotton company for the acquisition of 60 GCC -3 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence inputs has been submitted to the World Bank (Sept 20, 2013). Implemented 2. An audit of customs-clearance procedures in Evidence: A Ministerial Decree validating the audit and Ouagadougou is completed and recommendations to authorizing the adoption of the audit-recommendation improve customs administration are adopted. action plan has been signed (Ministerial Decree 2013- 0264/MEF/SG/DGD, July 23, 2013). Implemented 3. Support the renewal of the trucking fleet through an extension of effectiveness deadline of the 2012 Decree for Evidence: A Ministerial Decree authorizing until December exemption of imports of trucks to December 31, 2013. 2013 the tax-free import of tanker trucks, freight trucks and taxis. Tax-exemption certificates are issued for import of vehicles (September 2013). Implemented 4. A revised Mining Code reflecting international best practices for managing the fiscal, environmental, and social Evidence: A letter acknowledging the submission of the impacts of the natural resource sector is submitted to draft Mining Code to National Assembly has been received National Assembly. (October 7, 2013). 5. A draft Anticorruption Law designed to strengthen Implemented penalties for bribery, tighten regulations on gift-giving to public officials, and more precisely and comprehensively Evidence: A letter acknowledging the submission of the define both the nature of corrupt practices and the draft Anticorruption Law to National Assembly has been sanctions against them is submitted to National Assembly. received (October 7, 2013). Implemented 6. A financial controller is appointed for each ministry and each national public administrative institution. Evidence: A decree appointing financial controllers for each ministry and national public administrative agency has been signed (October 2, 2013). Implemented 7. Transfers to local communities are increased to 4 percent of the national budget; local governments have sufficient Evidence: 2013 Financial Management Law, which funds to fulfill mandates established by the General Code for allocates 4.4 percent of the budgeted expenditure to local Local Communities. communities, has been signed (September 20, 2013). Implemented 8. Improve access to finance for women by expanding the Evidence: The FAARF exceeded these targets during the first Support Fund for Women’s Income-Generating Activities 9 months of 2013, when it reported more than 83,500 (FAARF). beneficiaries and a loan portfolio exceeding CFAF 4.6 billion (September 20, 2013). 61 GCC -3 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence Implemented 9. The PNOCSUR plan is implemented, ensuring that government warehouses are adequately stocked and that Evidence: Contracts to acquire 35,000 tons of cereals were national agencies have sufficient capacity to address the approved by the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of needs of vulnerable populations and respond effectively to the Budget, and these expenditures were included in the future food crises. national budget (October, 2013). GCC- 4 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence Implemented 1. Multiple private sector-operated open markets for Evidence: Contracts signed with cotton firms to acquire the sale of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs to fertilizer and other inputs have been approved by the farmers are piloted. Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of the Budget (June 2014). Implemented 2. Formalization in the trucking industry is enhanced Evidence: A decree defining qualitative criteria for access through the adoption of a legal framework for licensing to the profession has been signed (July 2, 2014), and has overland transport operators. been amended on January 27, 2015 to comply with the WAEMU legislation. Implemented 3. A revised draft of the mining code is resubmitted to the National Transition Council (CNT); including the Evidence: The Bank has provided comments and feedback creation of a local development mining fund financed by on the draft mining code, which was adopted by the a share of mining revenues, and resources from the fund Cabinet on October 15, 2014 and submitted to the are allocated to regions and communities where mining National Assembly. A revised draft was adopted by the companies operate. Council of Ministers on February 18, 2015 and submitted to the CNT on February 23, 2015. 4. A draft anticorruption law designed to strengthen Implemented penalties for bribery, tighten regulations on gift-giving to public officials, and more precisely and comprehensively Evidence: The Bank has provided comments and define both the nature of corrupt practices and the suggestions on the draft anticorruption law, which was sanctions against them is submitted to National adopted by the Council of Ministers on January 7, 2015 Transition Council (CNT). and was submitted to the CNT on January 20, 2015. Implemented 5. Measures are adopted to improve the functioning of the Superior Council of the Magistracy, including an Evidence: A letter acknowledging the submission of the increase in its number of elected members. draft law related to the Superior Council of the Magistracy to National Assembly has been received (June 28, 2014). 62 GCC- 4 Prior Actions Implementation Status/Evidence Implemented 6. A revised legal framework for procurement is adopted, and prior-review thresholds are increased at Evidence: A ministerial decree reforming procurement least by 25 percent. methods and increasing prior-reviews thresholds has been signed (July 2, 2014). Implemented 7. Transfers to local communities are increased to 5 percent of the national budget; local governments have Evidence: The 2014 Financial Management Law allocates 5 sufficient funds to fulfill the mandates established under percent of total budgeted expenditures to local the General Code for Local Communities. communities. Implemented 8. All microfinance institutions, including the Support Fund for Women’s Income-Generating Activities Evidence: The consolidated certified financial reports of (FAARF), perform annual audits and provide accurate FAARF-affiliated microfinance institutions have been sent statements to the relevant authorities. to the government (July 2014). Implemented 9. Measures are implemented to promote greater Evidence: Contracts have been signed with five private involvement by private firms in strategic food-import operators for 30 000 tons cereals to complete the national and distribution systems. food reserve (50,000 tons) and for the emergency food stocks (25,000 tons). Copies of these contracts have been submitted to the Bank on December 31, 2014. 63 Annex 8: GCC1-4 Results Framework Indicators GCC 1 GCC 2 GCC 3 GCC 4 Catalyze private sector growth and employment 1 Capitalization of the Capitalization of the Capitalization of the Capitalization of the stabilization fund is at least stabilization fund is at least stabilization fund is at stabilization fund is at 6 billion CFA. 6 billion CFA. least 6 billion CFA. least CFAF 6 billion. 2 Capitalization of the input Capitalization of the input Capitalization of the input Capitalization of the Input fund is at least 10 billion fund is at least 10 billion fund is at least 10 billion Fund is at least CFAF 10 CFA. CFA. CFA. billion 3 Improved fertilizer Improved fertilizer Improved fertilizer Improved fertilizer distribution to the private distribution to the private distribution to the private distribution to the private sector increased by 30,000 sector increased by 30,000 sector increased by 30,000 sector increased by 30,000 tons. tons. tons. tons. 4 Change: Waiting time for customs Waiting time for customs Average waiting time for Average waiting time for clearance in Ouaga Inter clearance in Ouaga Inter customs clearance in customs clearance in reduced by 2 days. reduced by 2 days. Ouaga Inter reduced by 50 Ouaga Inter reduced by 50 percent. percent. 5 New: Annual increase of 10 percent in the Number of certified professionals and Ratio between trucking companies / individuals 6 New: Dropped The government continues to refine the operational structure of the guarantee scheme. 7 New: Dropped Private firms begin expressing interest in joining the new scheme. 8 Axle overloading goes down Dropped to 25 percent Improve governance and public resource management 9 Mining revenue/ GDP is 4% Mining revenue/ GDP is 4% Public revenue generated Public revenues generated by the mining sector is by the mining sector are increased to 4 percent of increased to 4 percent of GDP. GDP. 10 Revised: Physical inspections of gold Physical inspections of gold The number of physical Dropped exports by customs officials exports by customs officials inspections of gold exports increases. increases. by customs officials increased by 15 percent, 64 GCC 1 GCC 2 GCC 3 GCC 4 enhancing the accuracy of export data; 11 New: Number of CSM elected members per grade increased by 50 percent. 12 Number of mining Number of mining The number of companies The number of mining companies submitting companies submitting submitting validated data companies submitting validated data for EITI validated data for EITI for EITI reports is validated data for EITI reports increased to 6. reports increased to 6. increased from 0 to 6. reports is increased from 0 to 6. 13 50 mediation cases at 50 mediation cases at Revised: Dropped CAMC-O in 2012 and 75 CAMC-O in 2012 and 75 At least an increase of 50 cases in 2013. cases in 2013. percent of mediation cases at CAMC-O in 2012 and 25 percent in 2013. 14 Percent of judgments Percent of judgments Revised: written down increased to written down increased to Percent of judgments Percent of judgments 85 %. 85 %. written down in written down in commercial courts is at list commercial courts is at list (sic) 75%. (sic) 75 percent. 15 A 20 percent decrease in A 20 percent decrease in A 20 percent decrease in A 20 percent decrease in the time required to the time required to delays in judgment times. delays in judgment times. obtain a court ruling. obtain a court ruling (to 584 days). 16 A 20 percent reduction in A 20 percent reduction in A 20 percent reduction in A 20 percent reduction in the time needed to the time needed to contract enforcement days contract enforcement days enforce contracts. enforce contracts (to 372 days). 17 New: Revised: A general decline in Burkina Faso’s score in the corruption indicators is Transparency International observed over time. Corruption Perceptions Index is increased to 40 or higher. 18 Average execution rate of Average execution rate of The average execution The average execution the line ministries the line ministries rate of the line ministries’ rate of the line ministries’ investment budgets investment budgets investment budgets is investment budgets is increased to more than 50 increased to more than 50 increased by more than 50 increased by more than 50 percent. percent. percent. percent. 19 Number of physical spot Number of physical spot Revised: checks of contracts subject checks of contracts subject Number of physical spot Number of physical spot to competitive bidding to competitive bidding checks of contracts subject checks of contracts subject increases to 300. increases to 300. to competitive bidding to competitive bidding increased by 50 percent. increased by 50 percent. 20 New: Dropped 65 GCC 1 GCC 2 GCC 3 GCC 4 Greater transparency and accountability in PFM is achieved. 21 Number of judges that will Number of judges that will Number of judges that will Dropped-no data yet remain for at least a year is remain for at least a year is remain in office for at least 12. 12. a year is 12. Reduce Vulnerability 22 Transfer to decentralized Transfer to decentralized Revised: Revised back to original: units is 5.0 percent of units is 5.0 percent of Sufficient funds are 5 percent of the national budget. budget. allocated from the budget is transferred to national budget to local local governments under governments to fulfill the the Budget Law. mandates established by the Budget Law. 23 Revised: The population’s general Dropped At least 10 percent of the At least 10 percent of the satisfaction with the population is satisfied with population is satisfied with quality of public services public services. public services. delivered by local governments improves. 24 Number of active borrowers Number of active Revised: increases to 150,000 borrowers increases to Number of active Number of active 150,000 borrowers increased by at borrowers increased by at least 10 percent. least 10 percent. 25 New: The Support Fund for The Support Fund for Women’s Income- Women’s Income- Generating Activities Generating Activities (FAARF) reaches over (FAARF) reaches more 80,000 beneficiaries than 80,000 beneficiaries nationwide, nationwide, 26 New: ...with a total loan …with a total loan portfolio of more than portfolio of more than CFAF 4.5 billion. CFAF 5 billion. 27 Number of women-owned Number of women-owned Number of women-owned Dropped businesses to increase by 5 businesses to increase by 5 businesses to increase by 5 percent. percent. percent. 28 New: The Annual Financial Reporting Sheets of microfinance institutions are made available each year no later than July. 29 The food stocks in the The food stocks in the The national food reserve Revised: country increase to at least country increase to at least and emergency food 66 GCC 1 GCC 2 GCC 3 GCC 4 50,000 tons for main stock 50,000 tons for main stock stocks are increase to at The national food reserve and 10,000 for emergency and 10,000 for emergency least 50,000 and 10,000 and emergency food stock. stock. tons, respectively. stocks are increase to at least 50,000 and 25,000 tons, respectively. 30 Stocking of food in 50 of the Stocking of food in 50 of Dropped warehouses in food-deficit the warehouses in food- parts of the country. deficit parts of the country. Number of women-owned businesses to increase by 5 percent. Stocking of food in 50 of the warehouses in food-deficit parts of the country. 67 Annex 9: Summary of Results Indicators Targets and Achievements Baseline Expected Achieved Achievement across Results Indicators Sector (2011) (in 2015) Realized at Pillar I: Catalyze Private Sector Growth and Employment 7 billion 8 billion 1. Cotton Stabilization Fund Agriculture 5 billion FCFA CFAF CFAF 100% 10 billion 10 billion 2. Cotton input Capitalization Fund Agriculture 0 FCFA CFAF CFAF 100% 3. Fertilizer distributed by the private sector (in 1000 tons) Agriculture 0 tons 30 0.82 3% 4. Average waiting time for customs more than clearance at Ouaga-Inter Transport 4 days 2 days 1 days 100 % 5. The number of certified professionals in the trucking industry and the ratio between trucking companies and Transport n/a n/a n/a n/a individuals are both increased by 10 percent by 2015 Pillar II: Improve the transparency and accountability in public resource mobilization and management 6. Public revenues generated by the mining sector Mining sector 3 % of GDP 4% of GDP n/a n/a 7. Mining companies reporting to EITI (in more than number) Mining sector 0 6 18 100 % 8. Burkina Faso’s score in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index Justice Sector 38 40 38 0% 9. Number of CSM elected members per grade Justice Sector 2 3 n/a n/a 10. Average time for case processing at the 19.2 more than court (in months) Justice Sector 24 months months 4 100% 11. Average time to enforce a contract (in days)1 Justice Sector 446 356.8 446 0% 12. Written judgments in commercial courts 111 out of more than (in %) Justice Sector 173 (64%) 85% 96% 100 % 13. Average execution2 rates of investment more than budgets by line ministries PFM 30% 50% 29.8% 59% 14. Number of physical spot checks PFM 200 300 300 100% Pillar III: Build Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability 15. Transfer to decentralized localities (% more than central gov. budget) Decentralization 3.7 5 5.62 100 % 16. Number of Micro-finance active more than borrowers (in 1000 of borrowers)3 Microfinance 70 77 119,416 100 % 17. FAARF Portfolio 18. Minimum food stocks in reserves in deficit areas (in thousands of tons) Food Security 35 50 31.4 63% 19. Minimum intervention food stocks (emergency food stock) (in thousands of tons) Food Security 5 25 15.5 62% 20. Indicators from the three first operations Baseline Expected Achieved (dropped in the fourth operation) Sector (2011) (2014) Realized at 68 Baseline Expected Achieved Achievement across Results Indicators Sector (2011) (in 2015) Realized at Number of Mediation at CAMC-O Justice Sector 28 50 17 34% Number of judges in the court of accounts that will remain for at least a year PFM 4 12 n/a n/a Transport Reduce the percent of axle overloading sector 35% 25% n/a n/a Indicators not listed in GCC, but appearing on Baseline Expected Achieved counterpart's list Sector (2011) (2015) Realized at New Hydrocarbon truck (in number) Transport 0 200 200 100% New Merchandise truck (in number) Transport 0 400 52 13% New Taxi (in number) Transport 0 300 20 7% Source: Information from the Government. 1 While the GCC program documents estimate the number of days to enforce contracts in 2011 at 466 days, according to doing business this number is 446 days. 2 The government could not provide performance data on this indicator as it does not appear on its list of indicators. 3 There is a mismatch between the program documents and the government data on the number of microfinance borrowers. According to the three first program documents, there were 120,000 active borrowers in 2011 and the target was to reach 150,000 active borrowers in 2015. In the fourth operation, the 2011 numbers of borrower was 70,000 and the expected number in 2015 is 77,000 - that is 10 percent increase). The government numbers suggest document 75,000 in 2010 and 150,000 expected by 2015). 69 13. MAP 70