GLOBAL TRADE WATCH
GLOBAL TRADE
WATCH 2018*
Trade Amid Tensions
Cristina Constantinescu, Aaditya Mattoo, and Michele Ruta with
contributions from Maryla Maliszewska and Israel Osorio-Rodarte
May 29, 2019
* Global Trade Watch—a joint product of the Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment (MTI) Global
Practice of the World Bank and the Trade and International Integration Team of the Development
Research Group—provides up-to-date data from an array of sources, along with analysis of recent
trade developments. The report was produced under the guidance and supervision of Caroline
Freund, Director, MTI, and Antonio Nucifora, Practice Manager, MTI. We are grateful to Erik
Churchill, Csilla Lakatos, Gladys Lopez-Acevedo, Ambar Narayan, Franziska Ohnsorge, Martin
Raiser, Joseph Rebello, Carolina Sanchez-Paramo, and colleagues at the World Bank for their
insightful comments and suggestions.
Table of Contents
Overview: Trade Amid Tensions 1
Chapter 1: Trade developments in 2018 and early 2019 3
1.1. Trade flows and trade policy developments 3
1.2. Changes in trade patterns due to United States-China trade tensions 6
1.2.1. United States 7
1.2.2. China 13
1.2.3. Other countries 15
Chapter 2: Implications of U.S.-Chinese trade tensions 18
2.1. Short-term effects 18
2.2. Long-Term Effects 21
References 27
Annex A 28
i
Overview: Trade Amid Tensions
Global trade growth slowed in 2018 amid a weakening of economic growth in China and the Euro
Area and rising trade protectionism. The volume of trade grew by 3.8 percent, down from 5.4 percent
in 2017, but has shown signs of stabilizing in the first quarter of 2019. However, the U.S. tariff
increases implemented in early May and China’s response might change the outlook.
Trade policy developments are mixed. Restrictive trade measures imposed during 2018 affected
3.8 percent of world merchandise trade—nearly three times the share affected in any of the years
since the global financial crisis of 2009. Tit-for-tat tariffs between the United States and China alone
affected 2.0 percent of world merchandise trade in 2018. In May 2019, the United States increased the
tariffs implemented in September on imports from China of approximately $200 billion to the levels
originally threatened for January 2019, and China announced its plans to retaliate. Yet, 2018 also
saw positive trade policy developments, with the signing of a number of regional trade agreements
(e.g., African Continental Free Trade Area; Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership;
U.S., Mexico, Canada Agreement).
The tariffs have changed trade flows in affected goods. China’s imports from the United States of
goods targeted by tariffs dropped by 8 percent in 2018 compared with 2017, whereas U.S. imports
from China of goods affected by tariffs grew by 9 percent because of strong domestic demand and in
anticipation of tariff increases. In the first quarter of 2019, China’s imports from the United States of
goods affected by tariffs declined by 40 percent on a year-on-year basis while U.S. imports from China
of targeted products dropped by 24 percent.
Retaliatory tariffs by the United States and China diverted trade from each other to many develop-
ing countries, including Brazil, India, Malaysia, Mexico, and Vietnam. Soybean exports from Brazil
to China soared by $8 billion in 2018 (an increase of nearly 40 percent), offering one of the most
significant examples of trade diverted by U.S. and Chinese tariffs.
Tariffs did not affect all goods in the same way. For example, U.S. imports of products such as electri-
cal connectors from China—which a specific company tends to manufacture for a specific business in
the United States—increased by 1 percent year on year from August through December 2018. Trade
in such goods tends to be more resistant to tariff shocks because they cannot be easily substituted. In
contrast, U.S. imports from China of hard-disk-drive units, which are more easily substituted, declined
by as much as 85 percent, shifting in part to the Philippines. The evidence shows that the United States
targeted “stickier” products than China, resulting in smaller effects on trade volumes.
Ongoing trade tensions affected importers in United States and China significantly. While trade fell
in targeted products, prices at the border did not change as compared with non-targeted products.
For example, in the United States, roughly half of products targeted by tariffs saw an increase in the
price charged by Chinese exporters and half saw a price decrease, similar to the distribution of price
changes of non-targeted products. Results are similar for China. The evidence indicates a high pass-
through of tariffs to import prices for most products in both the United States and China, at least in the
short run. Going forward, if traders believe the tariffs will be in place for a long period, exporters may
reduce prices to stem import declines.
The effects on global poverty have been muted. But if trade tensions continue to intensify and cause
a slump in investor confidence, the effects could be significant—up to 30.7 million people could be
1
pushed into poverty measured as income levels below $5.50 a day, and global income could fall as
much as $1.4 trillion in a worst-case scenario. Developing countries other than China would bear
roughly half of the global income loss.
Even though trade in stickier inputs tends to be relatively resilient in the short term, if trade tensions
are not resolved, existing global value chains are likely to be disrupted in the longer term. Tariffs
applied by the United States on imports from China are biased so far against intermediate goods. As a
result, a Computable General Equilibrium model predicts that U.S. imports of intermediate goods from
China would decline in the longer term by over 40 percent, with the U.S. likely to reallocate its sourcing
of intermediate inputs to other trading partners in Asia and Europe, and to Canada and Mexico. These
switches could result in adjustment costs in the sectors and locations affected by trade diversion.
The early evidence for 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 points to some useful lessons: Trade
tensions and tariff increases hurt the countries directly involved the most, although they could
have long-term consequences for all countries because of the increase in uncertainty; other countries
would do well to stay out of the fight, and continue with trade deals that preserve and improve
open markets; and a managed trade deal between the two countries involved, especially one involv-
ing promises to increase bilateral purchases, is likely to divert trade away from other countries. It
is in the long-term interest of industrial and developing countries for trade tensions to be resolved
through a multilateral approach and World Trade Organization reforms.
2
Chapter 1: Trade Developments in 2018 and Early 2019
1.1. Trade Flows and Trade Policy Developments
Goods trade volumes slowed in most regions compared with 2017 because of softening eco-
nomic growth in Europe and Asia and the resurgence in protectionism. After growing at
5.4 percent in 2017, goods and services trade volumes grew at only 3.8 percent in 2018. Gross
domestic product (GDP) growth was only slightly lower, at 3 percent. The sluggish trade perfor-
mance in 2018 resembles that of the 2012–2016 period. The stronger performance in 2017 stands
out as an outlier (figure 1A).
Services trade values have been more resilient than goods trade values in recent years but grew
at a similar pace in 2018. Services trade values (excluding transportation services) fell less than
goods trade values during the Great Recession and have grown faster subsequently, although in 2018,
services and goods trade values grew at a similar pace (figure 1B).
Goods trade volume was particularly weak in the fourth quarter of 2018, reflecting weaker
industrial production in the European Union and China and the accumulation of trade-tension
effects. According to preliminary data, goods trade volumes grew at approximately 4 percent year on
year in the first three quarters, before slowing to less than 2 percent in the fourth quarter, a rate last
seen in 2016 (figure 1C). Goods trade volumes dropped by 0.5 percent year on year in the first two
months of 2019, but signs of stabilization emerged toward the end of the first quarter, reflecting in part
the stimulus-driven recovery in China (World Bank 2019a).
Advanced and emerging markets made similar contributions to demand for imported goods in
the last two years. In 2012 and 2013, global imports were supported mostly by the contribution of
emerging markets, while the opposite was true during 2014–2016. The years 2017 and 2018 saw more
balanced contributions (Figure 1D).
Goods trade volumes slowed in most regions compared with 2017:
• In the Euro Area, goods trade volumes were almost flat in 2018 for the first time since 2012
(figure 1E), as weaker internal and external demand dampened growth. Trade sluggishness in
the Euro Area was broad based across partners and goods, albeit with some differences; bilateral
trade values (in current euros) have been particularly weak between the Euro Area and the United
Kingdom in light of Brexit uncertainty, whereas the Euro Area’s exports to the United States grew
faster than in 2017.
• China’s export and import volumes declined throughout 2018, particularly toward the end of
the year. This weak performance reflects the country’s macroeconomic slowdown as well as
U.S.-Chinese trade tensions (figure 1F).
• Developing countries in Europe and central Asia experienced sluggish trade volume growth
throughout the year, whereas exports accelerated more rapidly in Latin America, Africa, and the
Middle East (A1).
• Fueled by supportive internal macroeconomic and fiscal conditions, U.S. trade growth remained
robust in 2018, with increased imports despite the implementation of restrictive trade policies
throughout the year (section 2.2 and figure A1).
3
FIGURE 1: Global trends in international trade flows and developments in trade policy
a. Trade volume and GDP b. Trade values: goods and services
7 265
Index of trade in current US dollars
6 5.4 240
5 215
(2005 = 100)
3.8
Percent
4 190
3.2 3.0
3 165
2 140
1
115
0
90
0
1
17
13
15
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
99
01
20
20
20
–1
–2
80
01
19
20
Goods Services
Goods and services trade volume Transport services Travel services
Real GDP (market prices) Other services
c. Quarterly goods trade volume d. Contributions to goods trade volume growth
8 130 5.0
120 4.0
Percentage points
6
110 3.0
4
100 2.0
2
90 1.0
0 80 0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Percent change (year-on-year)
Index (2012Q1 = 100, RHS) Advanced economies Emerging economies
e. Euro Area trade volume (Jan 2012–Feb 2019) f. China trade volume (Jan 2012–Feb 2019)
120 200
Trade in constant billion US dollars
Trade in constant US dollars
(3-month moving average,
(3-month moving average)
115 180
Jan. 2012 = 100)
110 160
105 140
100 120
95 100
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Exports Imports Exports Imports
4
FIGURE 1: (Continued ) Global trends in international trade flows and developments
in trade policy
g. Share of merchandise trade that new
policy measures cover
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
Percent
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
12 01
3
01
4
01
5
01
6
01
7
01
8
20 v2 t2 t2 t2 t2 t2
O ct N o O c O c O c O c Oc
1– 2– 2– 4– 5– 6– 7–
01 01 01 01 01 01 01
ct2 ct2 ov2 ct2 ct2 ct2 ct2
O O N O O O O
Trade remedy initiations
Restrictive trade measures excl. remedies
Sources: World Bank (WB) World Development Indicators, WB Global Economic Prospects, CPB World
Trade Monitor (April 2019), World Trade Organization (WTO) international trade statistics, WTO “Overview
of development in international trading environment”, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Trade volumes are based on constant U.S. dollars, and trade values are based on current U.S. dollars.
A-C: Trade (growth) is the average of (growth rates of) imports and exports. B. Services growth in 2018 is
WTO estimate based on quarterly data. F. Missing data for March and April. G. Restrictive trade measures
excluding remedies include import measures (e.g., tariffs, customs procedures, tax, quantitative restrictions),
export measures (e.g., duties, quantitative restrictions), and other measures (e.g., local content measures, other
than local content measures). Trade remedy measures include anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties,
and safeguard measures. GDP, gross domestic product.
Protectionism surged in 2018, with newly implemented restrictive trade measures covering
3.8 percent of world merchandise trade. This is more than three times the share in the post-crisis
years (figure 1G). More than 80 percent of the new measures were applied to imports (as opposed to
exports), and two-thirds of these came in the form of tariffs.
Trade tensions between the United States and China are the principal cause for the rise in pro-
tection. Tariffs that the two countries imposed on each other in 2018 covered more than half of their
bilateral trade (approximately 70 percent of U.S. exports to China and almost half of U.S. imports
from China). The United States imposed three rounds of tariffs on three lists of covered goods in July,
August and September 2018. China retaliated with almost simultaneous tariffs on three lists of its own
(figure 2). In May 2019, the United States increased the tariffs implemented in September to the levels
originally threatened for January 2019, and China announced plans to retaliate. The United States
also imposed tariffs on other countries covering solar panels, washing machines, steel, and aluminum,
sparking retaliation from affected trading partners. Table A1 lists the U.S. tariffs and other restrictive
measures, the retaliatory response that they triggered, and the approximate trade values affected.
5
FIGURE 2: United States-China trade tensions timeline
US tariffs on Chinese imports
U.S. list 3:
$3 bn U.S. list 1: U.S. list 2: $200 bn
$34 bn $16 bn
(10% - hiked to
(25% steel; 10% aluminum) (25%)
March 23, 2018
(25%) 25% in May 2019)
August 23, 2018
July 6, 2018
September 24, 2018
May 10, 2019: tariff hike
Chinese tariffs on US imports
$3 bn China list 1: China list 2: China list 3:
$34 bn $16 bn $60 bn
(15%; 25%)
(25%)
(25%) (up to 10%)
April 2, 2018
August 23, 2018
July 6, 2018
September 24, 2018
Several positive trade policy developments also occurred in 2018, especially involving developing
countries. Examples include:
• the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and the Comprehensive and Progres-
sive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in March 2018;
• the signing of the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement in November 2018;
• the renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences program of unilateral preferences for devel-
oping countries by the United States in April;
• China’s unilateral liberalization of more than 1,500 tariff lines starting November 2018.
1.2. Changes in Trade Patterns due to United States-China Trade Tensions
In 2018, the United States imposed tariffs on approximately 13 percent of its overall imports—
representing more than $300 billion—and other countries retaliated on more than $120 billion.1
U.S. tariffs applied mostly to imports from China, which saw almost half of its exports to the United
States targeted by tariffs. China retaliated by imposing tariffs on more than $100 billion in imports—
almost 70 percent of its imports from the United States. Other countries retaliated as well, applying
tariffs on close to 2 percent of U.S. exports—approximately $20 billion in goods.
The 2018 tariffs led to declines in affected trade. During 2018, the overall effect of tariffs was
stronger for U.S. exports of affected products but somewhat muted for U.S. imports (table 1) because
of sustained economic growth in the United States throughout the year and increased purchases of
some tariff-affected products in anticipation of threatened hikes in tariffs.2 This led to an increase in
1
All analysis from this point on is based on trade values in current U.S. dollars.
2
An additional factor is the different selection of products that the United States and China targeted, as explained
in Section 3.
6
TABLE 1: United States–China bilateral trade: percentage change 2017 to 2018
and 2018Q1 to 2019Q1
2018 vs. 2017 2019Q1 vs. 2018Q1
All Tariff- Not All Tariff- Not
goods affected affected goods affected affected
U.S. imports from China 6.9 9.4 4.5 -13.4 -23.9 -1.9
U.S. exports to China -7.4 -15.7 13 -18.8 -24.1 -6.6
China imports from United States 0.8 -8.3 17.3 -31.8 -39.8 -14.4
China exports to United States 11.3 14.4 9.1 -8.5 -11 -6.6
Sources: U.S. Census, China Customs, authors’ calculations
the U.S. trade deficit with China in 2018. In the first quarter of 2019, all tariff-affected flows between
the United States and China declined greatly, and the bilateral trade deficit was 12 percent lower than
in the same period in 2018.
1.2.1. United States
Tariffs that the United States imposed in 2018 affected more than $300 billion of its imports
(figure 3A). Most of these imports came from China, which saw almost half of its exports to the
United States affected.
By the end of 2018, U.S. tariffs had led to significant declines in the affected imports.
• Tariffs imposed in January 2018 on solar panels and washing machines resulted in negative import
growth on a year-on-year basis in the last three quarters of 2018 (figure 3B).3 Affecting all trading
partners, these tariffs have diverted trade away from foreign producers to domestic ones, causing
a rise in U.S. prices of affected products. For example, the U.S. consumer price index aggregate
for major appliances—which includes washing machines—increased by approximately 10 percent
immediately after the implementation of tariffs on washing machines (Figure 2 in Amiti et al. 2019).
• Tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum imposed in March and June 2018 led to weak growth in
imports in the second quarter and declines in the third and fourth quarters and in the first quarter of
2019 (figure 3B). These tariffs too have diverted trade toward domestic producers and led to price
increases and differences from world prices (for steel, World Bank 2019b; for aluminum, World
Bank 2019c).
• Tariffs imposed on Chinese goods translated into negative growth in the third and fourth quarters
for tariffs on imports of products on U.S. list 1 imposed in July and negative growth in the fourth
quarter for tariffs on imports of products on U.S. list 2 imposed in August. Imports of products on
both lists declined further in the first quarter of 2019 (figure 3C, D). See section 3.1 for an analysis
of prices of products affected by U.S.-Chinese bilateral tariffs.
• Imports from China affected by tariffs on list 3 (implemented in September) continued to grow in
the fourth quarter of 2018 because of expectations of an increase in tariffs from 10 percent to
25 percent in 2019 but declined in the first months of 2019 (figure 3E).
3
See table A2 for details on measures, month in which they were implemented, tariff rate, and import coverage.
7
FIGURE 3: Effect of U.S. tariffs on U.S. imports
a. Tariff-affected U.S. imports b. Tariff-affected U.S. imports, year-on-year
quarterly growth
400
Year-on-year percent change
30
10
300
Billion US dollars
–10
200 –30
–50
100 –70
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
0
2017 2018 2018 2019
Safeguard (World) Steel/alum (World) No extra tariffs Safeguard (World)
US list 1 (China) US list 2 (China) Steel/alum (World) US list 1 (China)
US list 3 (China) US list 2 (China) US list 3 (China)
c. U.S. imports of Chinese products on U.S. list 1 d. U.S. imports of Chinese products on U.S. list 2
3.5 1.7
3.3 1.6
3.1 1.5
2017
2.9 1.4
Billion US dollars
Billion US dollars
2.7 1.3
2017
2.5 1.2
2.3 1.1
2019 2018
2.1 1.0
2018
1.9 0.9
1.7 0.8 2019
1.5 0.7
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
e. U.S. imports of Chinese products on U.S. list 3 f. U.S. imports of Chinese products not
affected by tariffs on U.S. lists 1, 2, and 3
24
35
2018
22 2018
30
20
Billion US dollars
Billion US dollars
18 25
2017
16
20
14
2019
15 2017
12 2019
10 10
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
8
FIGURE 3: (Continued ) Effect of U.S. tariffs on U.S. imports
g. Contribution of tariff-affected imports to year-on-year
quarterly growth in 2018 U.S. imports
14
10
Percentage points
6
2
–2
–6
–10
–14
–18
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2018 2019 2018 2019
World China
No extra tariffs Safeguard Steel/alum
US list 1 US list 2 US list 3
Sources: U.S. Census and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Based on goods CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) imports in current U.S. dollars. Vertical lines in C-E
denote month of tariff announcement and implementation. “Safeguard” refers to imports from all countries of
solar panels and certain washing machines affected by safeguard tariffs imposed in January 2019 after Section
201 investigation. “Steel/alum” refers to imports from all countries of steel and aluminum products affected
by tariffs imposed in the first half of 2018 after Section 232 investigation. U.S. lists 1, 2, and 3 refer to imports
from China affected by tariffs imposed in July, August, and September of 2018, respectively, after the Section
301 investigation. See Table A1 for details.
• With the exception of an acceleration in September and October, imports from China of products
not affected by any new tariffs grew in 2018 at a pace similar to that in the previous year, and this
dynamic continued in the first quarter of 2019 (figure 3F).
Strong U.S. demand meant that tariffs reduced U.S. import growth by less than 1 percentage
point in the fourth quarter, the most affected quarter of 2018, but this changed in 2019
(figure 3G). Despite the declines in tariff-affected imports, growth in overall U.S. imports remained
strong throughout the year, at 8.5 percent. In addition, the threat of even higher tariffs in 2019
sustained imports of tariff-affected products, particularly those on list 3. As a result, the negative
contribution to growth in total imports from China in 2018 was less than 1 percentage point over
the whole year and amounted to 2 percentage points in the fourth quarter. This changed in 2019
as Chinese imports dropped 13 percent, due mostly to the sharp drop in imports of products on
U.S. list 3.
Retaliatory tariffs resulted in a fall in U.S. exports for all affected products in 2018. U.S. tariffs
elicited retaliation from Canada, China, the European Union, India, Mexico, the Russian Federation,
and Turkey (table A1). The already-implemented retaliatory tariffs targeted 8 percent of total U.S. goods
9
exports totaling more than $120 billion in 2017. The value of exports subject to tariffs declined to
approximately $100 billion in 2018, accounting for 6.5 percent of total U.S. goods exports (Figure 4A).
More specifically:
• Retaliation for U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs resulted in year-on-year negative growth for
affected U.S. exports to tariff-imposing countries in the third and fourth quarters of 2018 and
the first quarter of 2019 (figure 4B).
FIGURE 4: Effect on U.S. exports of retaliatory tariffs against United States
a. Tariff-affected U.S. exports b. Tariff-affected U.S.exports, year-on-year
quarterly change
150
30
Year-on-year percent change
0
Billion US dollars
100
–30
–60
50
–90
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2018 2019
0
2017 2018
No extra tariffs (World)* Retaliation
CHN list 3 (China) CHN list 2 (China) CHN list 1 (China) (multiple countries)
CHN list 1 (China) Retaliation (multiple countries) CHN list 3 (China) CHN list 2 (China)
c. Contribution of tariff-affected exports to change
in U.S.exports
20
Percentage points
10
0
–10
–20
–30
–40
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2018 2019 2018 2019
World China
CHN list 3 (China) CHN list 2 (China)
CHN list 1 (China) Retaliation (multiple countries)
No extra tariffs (World)*
Sources: U.S. Census and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Based on FOB (Free On Board) exports of goods in current U.S. dollars. Lists 1, 2, and 3 refer to
imports of HS Nomenclature 2017 6-digit product codes that include products affected by tariffs imposed
by China in July, August, and September 2018, respectively, in retaliation for U.S. tariffs associated with the
Section 301 investigation. See table A1 for details.
*Includes products on China’s $3 billion retaliation list against the United States that are not on lists 1-3.
10
• U.S. exports to China of products on lists 1 and 2 dropped in all quarters of 2018 from the
same periods in 2017, but the declines were much larger in the third and fourth quarters of 2018
(after the months when tariffs were imposed: July for list 1, August for list 2) and continued to be
large in the first quarter of 2019 (figure 4B, figure 5C, D based on Chinese reporting).
• U.S. exports affected by Chinese tariffs on list 3 products imposed in September declined in the
fourth quarter and more sharply in the first quarter of 2019 (figure 4B, figure 5E based on Chinese
reporting).
• U.S. exports to China of products not on any of the three lists were sluggish toward the end of the
year, especially from September to November, pointing to generally reduced demand from China
(figure 5F based on Chinese reporting).
FIGURE 5: Effect of Chinese tariffs on China’s imports from United States
a. Tariff-affected Chinese imports b. Tariff-affected Chinese imports, year-on-year
quarterly change
120
Year-on-year percent change
30
100
Billion US dollars
80 –20
60
–70
40
20 –120
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
0
2017 2018 2018 2019
CHN list 1 (US) CHN list 3 (US) No extra tariffs (World)* CHN list 1 (US)
CHN list 2 (US) CHN list 2 (US) CHN list 3 (US)
c. Chinese imports of U.S.products on d. Chinese imports of U.S.products on
China’s list 1 China’s list 2
5.0 1.6
4.5
2017 1.4
4.0 2017
1.2
3.5
Billion US dollars
Billion US dollars
3.0 1.0
2.5 0.8
2018
2.0
0.6
1.5
2019
0.4
1.0 2019
2018
0.5 0.2
0.0 0.0
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jul
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
(continues on next page)
11
FIGURE 5: (Continued ) Effect of Chinese tariffs on China’s imports from United States
e. Chinese imports of U.S.products on f. Chinese imports of U.S. products not affected
China’s list 3 by tariffs on China’s lists 1, 2, or 3
7.0 6
2017
6.0 5
2017 2018
5.0 5
Billion US dollars
Billion US dollars
4.0 4
2018 2019
2019
3.0 4
2.0 3
1.0 3
0.0 2
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
g. Contribution of tariff-affected imports to growth in
Chinese imports of products on lists 1 and 2
30
20
Percentage points
10
0
–10
–20
–30
–40
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2018 2019 2018 2019
World United States
No extra tariffs (World)* CHN list 1 (US)
CHN list 2 (US) CHN list 3 (US)
Sources: China Customs Statistics and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Based on goods CIF imports in current U.S. dollars. Vertical lines in C-E denote month of tariff
announcement and implementation. CHN lists 1, 2, and 3 refer to imports of HS 2017 8-digit product codes
affected by tariffs that China imposed in July, August, and September 2018, respectively, in retaliation for U.S.
tariffs associated with the Section 301 investigation. See table A1 for details.
12
Overall, the largest drag on U.S. export growth from retaliatory tariffs occurred in the fourth
quarter of 2018. Total U.S. goods exports in current U.S. dollars grew approximately 7.6 percent from
2017 to 2018, with tariff-affected goods reducing overall export growth by merely 1 percentage point
(and by 3 percentage points year on year in the fourth quarter, figure 4C). In contrast, U.S. exports to
China declined in 2018 by 7.4 percent and in the first quarter of 2019 by 19 percent, because of the
significant drag from tariff-affected imports from the third quarter of 2018 on.
1.2.2. China
In 2018, China imposed tariffs on almost 70 percent of its imports from the United States (more than
$100 billion (figure 5A), approximately 5 percent of China’s overall imports).
Chinese tariffs led to significant declines in affected imports. Specifically:
• Tariffs on imports of products on China’s list 1 imposed in July and on China’s list 2 declined on a
year-on-year basis in all quarters examined but at a sharper rate in the second half of 2018 and the
first quarter of 2019 (figure 5B-D).
• Imports from China affected by tariffs on goods on list 3 (implemented in September) declined in
the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 (figure 5E).
• Around the end of 2018, imports from the United States of products not affected by tariffs on any
of the three lists were weaker than in the previous period, mirroring China’s macroeconomic slow-
down (figure 5F).
Tariffs reduced China’s import growth by approximately 2 percentage points in the fourth quarter
of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 (figure 5G). China’s imports from all destinations grew by
almost 16 percent in 2018 but declined by close to 5 percent year on year in the first quarter of 2019
because of a drop in all imports, those affected and not affected by tariffs. China’s imports from the
United States declined by more than 30 percent year on year in the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first
quarter of 2019, mostly because of a decrease in imports of tariff-affected products.
The United States imposed tariffs on half of China’s exports to the United States (8 percent of
China’s exports to the world), and the value of exports to the United States subject to tariffs increased
by 10 percent, from approximately $180 billion to more than $200 billion in 2018 (figure 6A).
• China’s exports to the United States of products on lists 1 and 2 declined in the fourth quarter
of 2018 from the same period in 2017 and more sharply in the first quarter of 2019 (figure 6B;
Figure 3C, D, based on U.S. reporting).
• China’s exports to the United States affected by U.S. tariffs on list 3 products imposed in September
were resilient in the fourth quarter of 2018 but declined in the first quarter of 2019 (figure 6B;
Figure 3E based on U.S. reporting).
• China’s exports to the United States of products not included on U.S. lists 1, 2, and 3 have continued
to grow, albeit at a slower rate in the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 than in the
same periods in the previous years (figure 3F based on U.S. reporting).
Overall, China’s exports have been resilient to U.S. tariffs in 2018 but declined significantly
in the first quarter of 2019. China’s multilateral exports grew by 10 percent in 2018, and China’s
exports to the United States grew by 11 percent. In the first quarter of 2019, China’s exports to the
13
FIGURE 6: Effect of U.S. tariffs on chinese exports
a. Tariff-affected Chinese exports b. Tariff-affected Chinese exports, year-on-year
quarterly change
250
Year-on-year percent change
30
200
Billion US dollars
10
150
–10
100
50 –30
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
0 2018 2019
2017 2018
US list 1 (CHN) US list 3 (CHN) No extra tariffs (World)* US list 1 (CHN)
US list 2 (CHN) US list 2 (CHN) US list 3 (CHN)
c. Contribution of tariff-affected exports to
change in Chinese exports
20
10
Percentage points
0
–10
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2018 2019 2018 2019
World United States
US list 3 (CHN) US list 2 (CHN)
US list 1 (CHN) No extra tariffs (World)*
Sources: China Customs Statistics and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Based on goods FOB exports in current U.S. dollars. U.S. lists 1, 2, and 3 refer to imports of HS 2017
6-digit product codes that include products affected by tariffs imposed by the United States in July, August,
and September of 2018, respectively. See table A1 for details.
*Includes products targeted by safeguard tariffs and steel/aluminum tariffs that are not present on lists 1-3.
14
United States declined by 8.5 percent on a year-on-year basis because of the decrease in U.S. imports
of tariff-affected products and of products not affected by tariffs (Figure 6C).
1.2.3. Other Countries
U.S.-Chinese trade tensions have diverted trade, with developed and large developing countries
the biggest beneficiaries.4 We examined the 15 countries with the largest increases in exports to
China or the United States of products on U.S. and Chinese lists 1, 2, and 3.
• Exports of products on lists 1 and 2 accounting for a total of $100 billion in tariff-affected bilateral
U.S.-Chinese trade were examined by comparing the second half of 2018 and first quarter of 2019
with the same period a year before. Brazil stands out with its gains from exporting soybeans to
China. Other economies that benefited from trade diversion are the European Union, Canada,
Malaysia, India, and Mexico, among others (figure 7a).5
• Exports of products on list 3, covering $260 billion in tariff-affected bilateral U.S.-Chinese trade
were examined by comparing the first quarter of 2019 with the corresponding quarter of 2018.6
Countries with large increases in exports include South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Mexico, and
Vietnam (figure 7b).
The market for soybeans illustrates the extent of trade diversion resulting from U.S.-Chinese
trade tensions. China’s share of U.S. soybean exports dropped from 63 percent in the second
half of 2017 to 3 percent in the second half of 2018 (figure 8A), and the U.S. share of Chinese
imports of soybeans dropped from 28 percent in the second half of 2017 to 2 percent in the
second half of 2018 (figure 8B). The significant drop in demand from China, the world’s largest
soybean importer, caused the price of soybeans in the United States to decline sharply during 2018,
with the drop from April to September 2018 falling short of the 25 percent tariff rate by merely
5 percentage points (figure 8C). The United States increased soybean exports to other countries,
including the European Union, Argentina, and Mexico, but still experienced a $4 billion loss. China
imported more soybeans from Brazil than from the U.S. but fell short of the previous period’s pur-
chases by approximately $2 billion. In the fall of 2018, EU soybean imports from the United States
replaced imports from Brazil, tilting the balance of the formerly equal annual import shares of the
two countries (∼30 percent each) in favor of the United States (figure 8D). Brazilian soybean producers
gained from the price increase that the increased demand from China triggered but did so at the
expense of Brazilian soybean consumers.
4
Greater scrutiny is required to establish causality with certainty.
5
See also http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/how-are-trade-tensions-affecting-developing-countries.
6
The last quarter of 2018 was excluded from the analysis to avoid the confounding effect due to the rise in U.S.-
Chinese bilateral trade affected by the 10 percent tariffs imposed in September that were expected to be raised
in January 2019.
15
FIGURE 7: Changes in exports of tariff-affected products to the United States and China:
China, United States, and the 15 countries with the largest gains
a. Change in exports of products on U.S. and Chinese b. Change in exports of products on U.S. and
lists 1 and 2 (Aug 2018–Mar 2019 vs Aug 2017–Mar 2018) Chinese lists 3 (Jan–Mar 2019 vs Jan–Mar 2018)
billion US dollars billion US dollars
–20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 –14 –12 –10 –8 –6 –4 –2 0 2
Brazil South Korea
Canada Australia
Malaysia Mexico
India Taiwan
Mexico Vietnam
Russia European Union
Taiwan Singapore
Saudi Arabia Hong Kong
Kuwait Rest of the World*
Peru India
Turkmenistan Indonesia
European Union Canada
Ecuador Thailand
Kazakhstan Papua New Guinea
Switzerland Nigeria
Rest of the World Philippines
China –7.9 United States –3.1
United States –18.8 China –12.0
Subject to US tariffs Subject to Chinese tariffs Subject to US tariffs Subject to Chinese tariffs
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, China Customs Statistics, UN Comtrade, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Blue (red) bars refer to products on the U.S. (Chinese) lists of goods affected by new tariffs. Products
for which Chinese (U.S.) shares in U.S. (Chinese) imports are less than 5 percent were excluded.
* Chinese imports of gold (HS 710812) from Switzerland removed because of large decline (∼$5 billion).
16
FIGURE 8: Changing soybean trading patterns
a. U.S. soybean exports according to b. China’s soybean imports according to origin
destination
25
15 13 21
19
20
13
billion US dollars
billion US dollars
10 9 15
8 10
5
5
3
0
0 Jul–Dec 2017 Jul–Dec 2018
Jul–Dec 2017 Jul–Dec 2018
United States Brazil
China European Union Argentina Rest of the world
Argentina Mexico World
Rest of the world World
c. Drop in U.S. soybean price d. EU soybean imports from United States and
Brazil
11.0
10.5 0.5
10.0
0.4
US$/bushel
9.5
billion euros
9.0 0.3
8.5
0.2
8.0
7.5 0.1
7.0
0.0
Jan-17
Apr-17
Jul-17
Oct-17
Feb-18
May-18
Aug-18
Dec-18
Jan
Mar
May
Jul
Sep
Nov
Jan
Mar
May
Jul
Sep
Nov
2017 2018
United States Brazil
United States Brazil
Sources: U.S. Census, China Customs Statistics, and authors’ calculations. World Bank (2019a) based on
Bloomberg, U.S. Department of Agriculture and World Bank.
Notes: C. Last observation: Dec 19, 2018.
17
Chapter 2: Implications of U.S.-Chinese Trade Tensions
2.1. Short-Term Effects
The response to tariff shocks varies according to product. The relationship stickiness indicator
identifies products where trade between firms tends to be persistent.7 Higher degrees of relationship
stickiness correspond to lower probabilities of switching suppliers and longer firm-to-firm trade rela-
tionships. This inertia may be associated with technological reasons (e.g., inter-firm trade relations
dictated by the specifics of a product, such as in the case of Foxconn – Apple) or economic reasons
(e.g., because of search costs incurred when looking for alternative suppliers). The implication in the
context of U.S.-Chinese trade tensions is that trade in products that are relationship sticky take more
time to respond to a tariff shock than trade in products that are not.8
Tariffs affected bilateral trade in 2018, but this effect was smaller on relationship-sticky
products such as vehicle parts and components and concentrated in non-relationship-
sticky products such as soybeans. The United States imposed tariffs on sticky products more than
China. Products with less relationship stickiness experienced on average faster and larger declines
in import values due to the U.S.-Chinese trade tensions than products with greater relationship
stickiness. The inertia of sticky products is apparent in the case of U.S. imports from China affected
by the tariffs (figure 8A, C, E) and China’s tariff-affected imports from the United States (Figure 8B,
D, F). For example, U.S. imports from China of products on U.S. list 1 declined on average by
23 percent from August to December 2017 to August to December 2018; imports of nonsticky prod-
ucts dropped by 31 percent, whereas those of sticky products fell by 15 percent. Declines in imports
exceeded 50 percent in one-fourth of nonsticky products, but only in one-tenth of sticky products.9
The United States imposed tariffs on products that were stickier and for which China’s
share of U.S. imports was not large, whereas China targeted less-sticky products for which
the U.S. share of Chinese imports was large. Differences between the selection of tariff-affected
products in the United States and China depend on various factors. First, because of the nature
of bilateral trade relations, China imports mostly agricultural, homogeneous, less-sticky products
from the United States, whereas the United States imports more manufactured, differentiated,
stickier products from China. In some sense, the menu is very different between the two, as is
apparent in figure 9A-F. Second, in the case of U.S. tariffs set on earlier tranches of products, the
share of imports from China is not large (figure 9G). In contrast, China first targeted products
with a large U.S. import share but that were non-sticky and hence more substitutable and were
important exports for the United States (figure 9H). These differences help explain the changes
in trade quantities and prices.
The declines in U.S. and Chinese import values in tariff-affected products were mostly due to
declines in quantities and to a lesser extent to declines in the prices that exporters charged.
7
Relationship stickiness is a newly introduced indicator of stickiness in business relationships (Martin et al. 2018).
8
Multiple sets of trade elasticities have been used in the literature to assess heterogeneous response of products
to tariffs. UNCTAD (2018) used substitution elasticities, import demand elasticities, and export supply elasticities
to estimate the effect on international trade of the 2018 tariffs that the United States and China implemented.
9
Not all products behave as expected. Some that are not relationship sticky, such as vehicles, have not seen large
declines in imports, probably because of legal reasons, for example in the form of binding contract clauses that
the indicator of relationship stickiness does not capture (figure 9A).
18
FIGURE 9: U.S.-Chinese bilateral import values according to product
a. U.S. imports from China of products on U.S. b. Chinese imports from United States of products
list 1 ($34 billion – July 2018) on China’s list 1 ($34 billion – July 2018)
100 50
US imports from China, percent change
pis
pistachios
(Aug–Dec 2018 vs Aug–Dec 2017)
80
China imports from US, percent change
parts of
parts o
25
(Aug–Dec 2018 vs Aug–Dec 2018)
machinery
machin
60 handling
dli
hand lin
minerals
m nera
mi
40 0
20 veh
vehicles
les
hicl pumps
pum
pu m for vehicles a
almonds
liquids
liq –25
0 car part
parts
–20 –50
light-
lig
–40 emitting
emi
–60 diodes
dioo –75
storage
orag
sto ge units
s
–80 for data –100
transmission
ransmi
tr m ssion
–100 processing
processing
apparatus
apparat
tus soybeans
machines
–120 –125
–1.50 –1.00 –0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 –2 –1.5 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1
Relationship stickiness Relationship stickiness
c. U.S. imports from China of products on U.S. d. China’s imports from United States of products
list 2 ($16 billion – August 2018) on China’s list 2 ($16 billion – August 2018)
100 100
US imports from China, percent change
China imports from US, percent change
electrical
(Sep–Dec 2018 vs Sep–Dec 2017)
80 75
(Sep–Dec 2018 vs Sep–Dec 2018)
machines
hines
60 and
nd
apparatus
ratus
s 50 paper or
40 paperboard
20 onic
electronic 25
integrated
ated
0 circuits
uits 0
vehicles
–20 aluminium 1500–3000cc
–25 scrap
–40
–60 –50
–80 light- –75 copper scrap
–100 emitting
e g
diodes
di d –100
–120 liquefied
–1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 –125 propane
–2 –1.5 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1
Relationship stickiness
Relationship stickiness
(continues on next page)
19
FIGURE 9: (Continued ) U.S.-Chinese bilateral import values according to product
e. U.S. imports from China of products on U.S. f. China’s imports from United States of products
list 3 ($200 billion – September 2018) on China’s list 3 ($200 billion –
60 September 2018)
US imports from China, percent change
150
China imports from US, percent change
(Jan–Mar 2019 vs Jan–Mar 2018)
40
(Jan–Mar 2019 vs Jan–Mar 2018)
100
20 internal
ternal
int
combustion
commbustion
piston
piston
0 50 engines
engines
–20
0
–40
communication –50
appaara
atus (excl.
apparatus
–60 telephone sets)
machinery
ery
machiner y
parts and
and
–80
accessories
c esso
acc ories
s –100 pet
troleum
petroleum
gold gases
–100 –150
–1.50 –0.50 0.50 1.50 –1.5 –1 –0.5 0 0.5 1
Relationship stickiness Relationship stickiness
g. Share of China in U.S. imports according to h. Share of United States in China’s imports
product, 2017 according to product, 2018Q1
40 40
Share of US in China's imports (percent)
Share of China in US imports (percent)
35 35
35
30 34 30
25 25
20 20
21
15 15
10 13 10
5 8 7 5 8
7 7 7
0 0
Solar Steel and US list 1 US list 2 US list 3 Not CHN list 1 CHN list 2 CHN list 3 Not
panels; aluminum products products products affected affected
washing products products
mashines
Sources: U.S. Census, China Customs Statistics. and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Data points represent tariff-affected products aggregated to 6-digit HS 2017 level. Dot sizes are
proportional to import values in the initial period. Dot sizes may not be comparable across charts. Based on
CIF U.S. imports in current U.S. dollars. Linear fitted lines are depicted in all charts. In A and C, several
outliers and dots with U.S. imports in the initial period of less than $5 million were removed. In B and D,
dots with Chinese imports in the initial period of less than $1 million were removed.
20
Although quantities and prices declined for some products that the United States and China imported,
on average there is no evidence of a significant reduction in unit values (net of tariffs). Moreover,
although products that are affected by tariffs behave differently from others when value and quantity
imported are examined, they do not show a dissimilar pattern in terms of export prices. This suggests
that, in general, U.S. and Chinese exporters did not reduce their markups significantly in response
to tariffs, indicating that U.S. and Chinese importers have mostly paid the price of tariffs. Figure 10
illustrates these points. For example, approximately 70 percent of the products on U.S. lists 1 and 2
have declined in value and quantities, compared with just half of the products not included on any of
the three U.S. lists (figure 10A and 10E). In contrast, unit values excluding tariffs displayed a very
similar pattern for products that were targeted and those that were not, declining by about half for both
types of products.10 Similar conclusions emerge from inspecting products imported into the United
States from China and included on U.S. list 3 (figure 10C) and products imported into China from
the United States and included on Chinese lists 1, 2, and 3 (figure 10B, D, F).11 Going forward, if the
tariffs are viewed as permanent, exporters may be more inclined to lower prices.
2.2. Long-Term Effects
Continuing trade tensions pose significant economic risks, primarily through a possible loss of
investor confidence. Estimates from a global trade computable general equilibrium model (Freund
et al. 2018) show a range of likely effects of trade tensions on global exports and income according to
three different scenarios: (Scenario 1) Chinese-U.S. tariff increases on bilateral trade as of September
2018 covering $250 billion of U.S. imports from China and $110 billion of Chinese imports from the
United States; (Scenario 2) a 25 percent surcharge on all products traded between the United States
and China12; and (Scenario 3) a 25 percent tariff on all products traded between the United States and
China plus a decline in investor confidence, resulting in a 0.5-percentage-point drop in the investment-
to-GDP ratio at a global level.
Under the most pessimistic scenario, trade tensions would reduce global income by 1.7 percent.
Under Scenarios 1 and 2, several developing countries would be expected to achieve some net gains
in terms of total exports and income in line with the effects observed to date. The early evidence
based on U.S. import data (figure 6) appears to be broadly consistent with the expected outcomes of
Scenario 1, under which several developing countries (Mexico, Malaysia, Vietnam) would be expected
to achieve net gains (figure 11), but if tensions continue and result in a slowdown in investment and
economic activity, the consequences would be severely negative for all countries. Estimates under this
scenario suggest that, by shaking investor confidence, the escalation in trade tensions could reduce
global exports by up to 3 percent (at a cost of $674 billion) and global income by up to 1.7 percent
($1.4 trillion)—with losses in all regions. Roughly half of the global income loss of 1.7 percent would
10
This observation is consistent with the findings on “pass through” in Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) and Amiti et al.
(2019).
11
Comparison of the first quarters of 2019 and 2018 allows the behavior of products on list 3 to be examined as
well, given that imports of these products increased toward the end of 2018 because of anticipated tariff hikes.
Figure A2 shows the same information as figure 9 but comparing the fourth quarter of 2018 with that of 2017.
12
The imposition of 25 percent surcharges on all goods on lists 1, 2, and 3 on May 10, 2019, brings the current
level of restrictions closer to Scenario 2, which represents an upper bound estimate of effects of higher tariffs
because it extends surcharges to all U.S. imports from China and assumes full retaliation by China.
21
FIGURE 10: Count of products with increases or declines in import value, quantity, and price
from January to March 2018 from January to March 2019, percentage of total
a. U.S. imports from China of products on b. Chinese imports from United States of
U.S. lists 1 and 2 products on Chinese lists 1 and 2
Percent Percent
100 100
17 18 13 13
80 80 48
52
60 60
40 40
28 40
20 20
20 12
0 0
Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price
Decline over 25% Decline Increase Decline over 25% Decline Increase
c. U.S. imports from China of products on d. Chinese imports from United States of
U.S. list 3 products on U.S. list 3
Percent Percent
100 100
26 27 32 31
80 49 80
57
60 60
40 40
39 25
20 20
12 18
0 0
Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price
Decline over 25% Decline Increase Decline over 25% Decline Increase
e. U.S. imports from China of products not f. Chinese imports from United States of products
included on U.S. lists 1, 2, and 3 not included on Chinese lists 1, 2, and 3
Percent Percent
100 100
80 80 42 36
51 48 53 57
60 60
40 40
21
39
20 20
23
8
0 0
Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price
Decline over 25% Decline Increase Decline over 25% Decline Increase
Sources: U.S. Census, China Customs Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Data points being counted represent tariff line HS 2017 product codes with U.S. import in the initial
period exceeding $5 million in the case of U.S. imports and $1 million in the case of Chinese imports. D. Unit
values do not include the tariff.
22
FIGURE 11: Trade and poverty
a. Simulated effect of trade tensions on income b. Poverty at purchasing power parity
over medium term (% deviations from the baseline) $5.50 a day, change from base
Mexico Millions
Laos 20
Korea 17.43
Canada
Southeast Asia 15
Malaysia
Viet Nam 10.71
Brazil 10
New Zealand
Thailand
Philippines 5
Australia 2.00
Japan 0.58
Chile 0
Lower Upper High Low
Singapore
middle middle income income
Indonesia income income
South Africa
Russia
Ethiopia
EU28
Egypt
Kenya
Colombia
Turkey
USA
China
–4 –3 –2 –1 0 1
Scenario 3 Scenario 2 Scenario 1
Sources:
a: Freund et al. (2018)
b: World Bank staff simulation results based on Freund et al. (2019), PovcalNet, and Global Micro Database.
Notes: Scenario 1: tariff surcharges imposed on bilateral Chinese-U.S. trade under lists 1, 2, and 3 up to
September 2018; Scenario 2: 25 percent tariff surcharge imposed on all bilateral U.S.-Chinese trade; Scenario 3:
Scenario 2 with decline in investor confidence.
be due to loss of income by developing countries (excluding China), and one-third of the global export
decline of 2.7 percent would be due to loss of exports from developing countries (excluding China).
The global supply chains would likely be disrupted as well, with much bigger reallocation of sourcing
of intermediate inputs expected across value chains in the United States than in China (box 1).
Although effects would vary according to country, income losses under the most-pessimistic
scenario would risk pushing several million more people into poverty than under the baseline
scenario.13 There will be winners and losers in the short to medium term, but with the loss of investment
confidence, poor people in all countries would face negative consequences. Developing countries with
23
Box 1: Effects of current trade tensions on global value chains over
the long term
If trade tensions are not resolved, global value chains are likely to see significant
disruption in the coming years. Under the lists 1, 2 and 3 implemented in September
2018, tariffs applied by the United States on imports from China are biased heavily against
intermediate goods, compared to China’s retaliatory tariffs against the US, which apply
broadly to all product categories (final, intermediate and investment goods). The impact
is therefore likely to lead to a reallocation of sourcing of intermediate inputs across value
chains between the US and China (see Figure B1), causing potential adjustment costs in the
sectors and locations affected by trade diversion.
s a result of higher tariffs, US imports of intermediate goods from China are likely to
• A
decline by over 41 percent with much smaller declines in consumption goods at 9 percent
and investment goods at 26 percent. If trade tensions continue, the US is likely to reallocate
its intermediate inputs sourcing from China to other trading partners in Asia, Europe as well
as Canada and Mexico.
Our results indicate that the decline in Chinese imports from the US would likely affect all
•
product categories at around 30 percent, with the highest absolute impact on intermediate
inputs due to the relative size of trade flows. China would likely divert its intermediate
inputs imports away from the US and towards South America and Europe.
FIGURE B1: Effects of current trade tensions on U.S. and Chinese imports
(persentage deviations from baseline)
USA (total imports) China (total imports)
0.1 0.1
0.05 0.05
0 0
–0.05 –0.05
–0.1 –0.1
–0.15 –0.15
–0.2 –0.2
–0.25 –0.25
–0.3 –0.3
–0.35 –0.35
CHN
xea
IND
xsa
eca
mna
ssa
BRA
xlc
MEX
CAN
weu
xhy
USA
xea
IND
xsa
eca
mna
ssa
BRA
xlc
MEX
CAN
weu
xhy
24
Box 1: (Continued ) Effects of current trade tensions on global value
chains over the long term
FIGURE B1: (Continued ) Effects of current trade tensions on U.S. and Chinese imports
(persentage deviations from baseline)
USA (intermediate imports) China (intermediate imports)
0.15 0.15
0.05 0.05
–0.05 –0.05
–0.15 –0.15
–0.25 –0.25
–0.35 –0.35
–0.45 –0.45
CHN
xea
IND
xsa
eca
mna
ssa
BRA
xlc
MEX
CAN
weu
xhy
USA
xea
IND
xsa
eca
mna
ssa
BRA
xlc
MEX
CAN
weu
xhy
Source: Corong et al. (2019).
Notes: CHN – China; USA – United States; xea – other East Asia and Pacific; IND – India;
xsa – other South Asia; eca – Europe and Central Asia; mna – Middle East and North Africa;
ssa – Sub-Saharan Africa; BRA – Brazil; xlc – rest of Latin America and Caribbean;
MEX – Mexico; CAN – Canada; weu – Western Europe; xhy – other high-income countries
strong trade links to the United States and China will experience larger welfare losses. To evaluate
the effect on poverty14,15 in countries that are likely to be the most affected (middle-income coun-
tries), the use of a higher international poverty line (purchasing power parity (PPP)$5.50 a day) is
preferred.16 Our analysis indicates that, around the world, the median country would face an increase
of one-third of a percentage point in poverty headcount (at PPP$5.50 a day), but some countries, such
13
In 2015, the World Bank estimated that 53.7 percent of the population of developing countries (3.4 billion
people) lived on less than PPP$5.50 a day. The baseline scenario, which contemplates a continuation of current
demographic and economic trends, projects a reduction of 5.9 percentage points in the poverty headcount at
PPP$5.50 a day by 2019 and an additional reduction of 12.6 percentage points by 2030.
14
Poverty estimates were obtained by linking results of a computable general equilibrium model with those of
a simple global microeconomic model. The initial global distribution of per capita consumption or income was
constructed with household-based data. Country-specific growth rates in real per capita household consumption
from the macro computable general equilibrium model are fully transmitted to households, assuming distribu-
tion neutrality. To calculate the number of poor people, the total population in each country is adjusted using
World Bank population projections.
15
One hundred sixty-three countries are represented in the microeconomic model, with 146 harmonized,
nationally representative household surveys obtained from the World Bank Global Micro Database. Additional
per capita consumption and income distributions for 17 countries were obtained from the PovcalNet website.
25
as Mexico and the Philippines, which are heavily integrated in global value chains with the United
States and China, would experience 1.4- and 1.2-percentage-point increases, respectively. Globally,
30.7 million additional people would be living in poverty at PPP$5.50 a day than under baseline con-
ditions; 17.4 million would come from lower-income countries and 10.8 million from upper-middle-
income countries (figure 11B).
The World Bank now reports international poverty lines that are more closely related to national poverty stan-
16
dards. These poverty lines are set at $1.90, $3.20, $5.50, and PPP$21.70 for low-, lower-middle-, upper-middle-,
and high-income countries, respectively.
26
References
Amiti, Mary, Stephen J. Redding, and David Weinstein. 2019. “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on
U.S. Prices and Welfare.” NBER Working Paper NO. 25672.
Bown, Chad, and Melina Kolb. 2019. “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide.” Peterson
Institute for International Economics.
Corong, Erwin, Maryla Maliszewska, Maria Pereira, Dominique van der Mensbrugghe. 2019. “Global
and Regional Impacts of Trade Tensions on Global Value Chains.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
Fajgelbaum, Pablo D., Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Patrick J. Kennedy, and Amit K. Khandelwal. 2019.
“The Return to Protectionism.” University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA.
Freund, C., M. Ferrantino, M. Maliszewska, M. Ruta. 2018. “Impact on Global Trade and Income of
Current Trade Disputes.” MTI Practice Note No. 2. World Bank, Washington, DC.
Freund, C., M. Maliszewska, Israel Osorio-Rodarte, and Cristina Constantinescu. 2019. “Impacts of
Current Trade Tensions on Developing Countries.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
Martin, Julien, Isabelle Mejean, and Mathieu Parenti. 2018. “Relationship Stickiness: Measurement
and Applications to International Economics.”
World Bank. 2019a. Global Economic Prospects. World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2019b. Global Economic Prospects. World Bank, Washington, DC.
———. 2019c. Commodity Markets Outlook. World Bank, Washington, DC.
27
Annex A
FIGURE A1: Merchandise trade volume (3-month moving average, January 2012 = 100)
Exports Imports
130 130
125 125
120 120
115 115
110 110
105 105
100 100
95 95
90 90
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
World World
Advanced economies (47%) Advanced economies (51%)
Emerging market and developing economies (53%) Emerging market and developing economies (49%)
130 130
125 125
120 120
115 115
110 110
105 105
100 100
95 95
90 90
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
United States (9%) United States (13%)
Japan (4%) Japan (4%)
Euro area (25%) Euro area (23%)
Other advanced economies (11%) Other advanced economies (11%)
150 150
140
140 130
120
130
110
120 100
90
110 80
100 70
60
90 50
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Latin America (5%) Latin America (6%)
Europe and Central Asia (8%) Europe and Central Asia (7%)
Africa and Middle East (9%) Africa and Middle East (7%)
Emerging Asia (27%) Emerging Asia (26%)
Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, World Trade Organization, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Seasonally adjusted data. In parentheses: share in world trade values in 2014. See CPB World Trade
Monitor for group composition.
28
FIGURE A2: Changes in import values, quantity, and price from October to December 2017
to October to December 2018, percentage of total
a. U.S. imports from China of products on b. Chinese imports from United States of
U.S. lists 1 and 2 products on Chinese lists 1 and 2
Percent Percent
100 100
29 29 20 20
80 80
54 51
60 60
40 40
28 37
20 20
18 11
0 0
Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price
Decline over 25% Decline Increase Decline over 25% Decline Increase
c. U.S. imports from China of products on d. Chinese imports from United States of
U.S. list 3 products on U.S. list 3
Percent Percent
100 100
80 80 41 37
50 57
70 70
60 60
40 40
40 26
20 20
10 17
0 0
Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price
Decline over 25% Decline Increase Decline over 25% Decline Increase
e. U.S. imports from China of products not f. Chinese imports from United States of products
included on U.S. lists 1, 2, and 3 not included on Chinese lists 1, 2, and 3
Percent Percent
100 100
80 80 42 42
60 58 53 58
60 60
40 40
41 22
20 20
20
0 7 0
Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price
Decline over 25% Decline Increase Decline over 25% Decline Increase
Sources: U.S. Census, China Customs Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Data points being counted represent tariff-line HS 2017 product codes with U.S. imports in the initial
period exceeding $5 million and Chinese imports in the initial period exceeding $1 million. D. Unit values do
not include the tariff.
29
TABLE A1: Timeline of U.S. and trading partner trade policy measures
Affected
Section 232 national security investigations imports
Section 301 investigation of China (billion U.S.
Date Other investigations dollars)
• 2017 Apr United States announces two Section 232 national security investigations,
one into steel and one into aluminum imports
United States announces Section 301 investigation of Chinese
activities that may be harming U.S. intellectual property rights,
innovation, or technology.
• 2017 Two U.S. industries petition U.S. International Trade
Oct/Nov Commission to investigate solar panel and washing
machine imports (Section 201 of Trade Act in 1974).
• 2018 Feb U.S. safeguard tariffs on imported solar cells and 10.3
certain washing machines go into effect after being
announced in Jan 2018.
• 2018 Mar United States announces forthcoming tariffs on steel 48
and aluminum covering $48 billion (25 percent for steel;
10 percent for aluminum).
United States announces measures to be implemented in
relation to Section 301 investigation: tariffs on $50 billion
imports from China, filing World Trade Organization dispute,
new rules on investment.
U.S. steel (25 percent) and aluminum (10 percent) tariffs go into effect
with temporary exemptions for Canada, Mexico, European Union,
South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico. South
Korea receives permanent exception for steel but agrees to quota.
• 2018 Apr China imposes tariffs against United States in retaliation for U.S. steel 3
and aluminum tariffs.
United States releases $50 billion preliminary lists of tariff-
affected products.
China releases $50 billion preliminary retaliatory lists of tariff-
affected products.
U.S. aluminum tariffs go into effect for South Korea.
• 2018 May United States announces Section 232 national security investigation into
imported autos and parts.
India announces tariffs on selected U.S. products in retaliation against
U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs.
• 2018 Jun U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs go into effect for European Union,
Canada, and Mexico. U.S. quotas for steel and aluminum go into effect
for Argentina. U.S. quota for steel goes into effect for Brazil. Australia is
permanently exempted. Rates are 25 percent for steel and 10 percent
for aluminum.
30
TABLE A1: (Continued ) Timeline of U.S. and trading partner trade policy measures
Affected
Section 232 national security investigations imports
Section 301 investigation of China (billion U.S.
Date Other investigations dollars)
Turkey’s retaliatory tariffs against U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs go
into effect.
EU retaliatory tariffs against U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs announced 3.4
in March 2018 go into effect (Annex A).
• 2018 Jul Canadian and Mexican retaliatory tariffs against U.S. aluminum and 12.8
steel tariffs go into effect.
U.S. tariffs of 25 percent on $34 billion of Chinese imports go 34
into effect (first tranche of $50 billion in imports – U.S. list 1).
Chinese tariffs of 25 percent on $34 billion of U.S. imports go 34
into effect (first tranche of $50 billion in imports – Chinese list 1).
United States releases $200 billion list of tariff-affected products.
• 2018 Aug Russian Federation retaliatory tariffs against U.S. aluminum and steel
tariffs go into effect.
United States increases steel tariff rate against Turkey from 25 percent 4.5
to 50 percent.
Turkey imposes additional tariffs on imports from United States.
China releases $60 billion list of tariff-affected products. 16
U.S. tariffs of 25 percent on $16 billion of imports from China go
into effect (second tranche of $50 billion of imports – U.S. list 1).
Chinese tariffs of 25 percent on $16 billion of U.S. imports 16
go into effect (second tranche of $50 billion in imports –
Chinese list 1).
• 2018 Sep U.S. tariffs of 10 percent on $200 billion of Chinese imports 200
go into effect (U.S. list 3). Threat of rise in rate to 25 percent
on January 1, 2019.
Chinese tariffs on $60 billion of U.S. imports go into effect 60
(Chinese list 3). Rates range from 5 percent to 10 percent.
• 2018 Oct South Africa receives exemption from United States on 161 aluminum
and 36 steel products.
• 2018 Dec U.S. tariff hikes on U.S. list 3 delayed.
• 2019 May U.S. hikes tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese imports, already 200
imposed in September 2018, from 10 percent to 25 percent.
China threatens to raise tariffs on $60 billion of U.S. imports on
June 1, already imposed in September 2018, from 5 percent to
10 percent to 10 percent to 25 percent.
Sources: Bown and Kolb (2019); https://www.cmtradelaw.com/2018/10/latest-u-s-trade-actions-tariffs-and-other-
countries-retaliatory-measures/.
Notes: Implemented measures are in bold.
31