82096
The Global Integrated Pest Management Facility
Addressing Challenges of Globalization:
An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s
Approach to Global Programs
Case Study
Lauren Kelly
Director-General, Operations Evaluation: Vinod Thomas
Director: Ajay Chhibber
Task Team Leader: Uma Lele/Chris Gerrard
Date: October 25, 2005
ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXCELLENCE
AND INDEPENDENCE IN EVALUATION
The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) is an independent unit within the World Bank; it reports
directly to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. OED assesses what works, and what does not; how a
borrower plans to run and maintain a project; and the lasting contribution of the Bank to a country’s overall
development. The goals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing
the results of the Bank’s work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. It also
improves Bank work by identifying and disseminating the lessons learned from experience and by framing
recommendations drawn from evaluation findings.
OED Working Papers are an informal series to disseminate the findings of work in progress to encourage the
exchange of ideas about development effectiveness through evaluation.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
The World Bank cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors,
denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply on the part of the World
Bank any judgment of the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Contact:
Operations Evaluation Department
Partnerships & Knowledge Programs (OEDPK)
e-mail: eline@worldbank.org
Telephone: 202-458-4497
Facsimile: 202-522-3125
http:/www.worldbank.org/oed
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AKIS Agriculture Knowledge and Information Systems
BP Best practice
CABI CAB International
CAS Country Assistance Strategy (World Bank)
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CICP Consortium for International Crop Protection (CGIAR)
CODE Committee on Development Effectiveness
DEC World Bank Development Research Group
FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FFS Farmer field school
GIF Global IPM Facility
GP Good practice
GTZ Deutsch Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit GMbH
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ILO United Nations International Labor Organization
IOMC Inter-organization Program for the Sound Management of Chemicals
IPM Integrated pest management
IPPM Integrated production and pest management
MTR Mid-Term review
NGO Non-governmental organization
OD Operational Directive
OED Operations Evaluation Department
OP Operational Policy
OPN Operational Policy Note
PEEM Panel of Experts on Environmental Management for Vector Control
PAN Pesticide Action Network
PANNA Pesticide Action Network North America
PMP Pest Management Plan
POPs Persistent Organic Pollutants
QACU Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit
SP-IPM Systemwide Programme on Integrated Pest Management (CGIAR)
STAC Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
VPU Vice Presidential Unit
WHO United Nations World Health Organization
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Table of Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................... i
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................v
Preface.............................................................................................................................. vii
Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... ix
1. Introduction and Context: Global Challenges in the Sector....................................1
Linking Health, Environment, and Sustainable Livelihoods ...................................1
The Road to International Consensus......................................................................1
Defining Integrated Pest Management ....................................................................2
Global Health Concerns Impact Trade Policy Decisions........................................3
Lack of Uniform Assessment Indicators Impede Large Scale Adoption of IPM......4
2. Program Alignment with Global Challenges and Bank Priorities..........................4
Bank Support Catalyzed the Establishment of the Global IPM Facility .................4
Goals, Objectives, Strategies, and Priority Activities..............................................5
3. Outcomes, Results, and Sustainability .......................................................................7
Achievement of Stated Objectives ............................................................................7
Activity No. 1: Institutional Assistance to the World Bank ........................8
Activity No. 2: Production of Global Public Goods ....................................9
Activity No. 3: Creating Conditions for Effective National Investment ...10
Impact Evaluation of IPM......................................................................................12
World Bank Research ................................................................................12
Impact Evaluation of the Farmer Field School Approach .........................12
OED Assessments of Bank Projects in Indonesia and Vietnam.............................14
Global Program Monitoring and Evaluation ........................................................14
The Program’s Mid-Term Review.............................................................15
4. Governance and Financing .......................................................................................17
Program Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency..........................................19
Financing of the Program......................................................................................20
5. Fostering a Results-Based Partnership....................................................................21
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Overview of the Role of Partnership in Program Implementation ........................21
Partnership with Designated Collaborators..........................................................21
Partnership with the Private Sector.......................................................................22
Partnership With Global IPM Networks................................................................24
The Gender Dimension ..........................................................................................25
The Integral Role of Science ..................................................................................25
6. Bank Performance .....................................................................................................25
World Bank’s Catalytic Role .................................................................................25
Program Linkages to the Bank’s Agricultural Operations....................................25
Operational Policy 4.09 .............................................................................26
Exit Strategy...........................................................................................................27
Risks and Risk Management ..................................................................................27
Institutional Risk........................................................................................27
Associated Risk..........................................................................................28
7. Lessons ........................................................................................................................29
Bibliography .....................................................................................................................31
Annex A. Evaluation Framework for The World Bank’s Approach to Global
Programs: An Independent Evaluation – Phase 2 ..................................................37
Annex B. World Bank’s Disengagement from the Global IPM Facility.....................46
v
Acknowledgements
This report was prepared under the overall direction of Uma Lele by Lauren Kelly with
inputs from Chris Gerrard, Kavita Mathur, and Saeed Rana. The team wishes to thank Peter
Kenmore, Coordinator of the Global IPM Facility, for hosting OED’s visit to Rome in March
2003 and facilitating two very fruitful days of discussions with Masa Kato, Tulia Aiazzi,
Harry Van der Wulp, and Pieter Stemerding.
The team interviewed several individuals inside and outside the Bank who have played a role
in establishing the facility and its work program. The team wishes to thank Gershon Feder,
Gerd Fleischer, Doug Forno, Sushma Ganguly, Eija Pehu, Tjaart Schillhorn Van Veen, and
Hermann Waibel for their input. Telephone interviews were conducted with task managers
and key staff persons within the Bank. Special thanks to Osmane Badiane, Madhur Gautam,
M. Khokhar, Agi Kiss, Aziz Lagnaoui, Mathew McMahon, Tawhid Navarz, Ridley Nelson,
Malik Saifullah, Ethel Sennhauser, Susan Shen, and John S. Wilson for sharing their
experiences. Thanks also to Laurent Granier of GEF, as well as Bank Legal Counsel and
team member David Freestone and Charles de Leva. Several Bank staff interviewed also
provided written comments on the draft.
The team also interviewed members of the NGO and scientific communities and wishes to
thank Barbara Dinham and Marcia Ishii-Eiteman of the Pesticide Action Network (PAN) and
Janny Vos and Mark Holderness of CABI Bioscience. Special thanks are also extended to
Hiremagalur Gopalan and Jim Willis of UNEP.
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Preface
At the request of the World Bank’s Executive Board, the Bank’s Operations Evaluation
Department (OED) has been conducting an evaluation of the Bank’s involvement in global
programs. The Phase 1 Report titled The World Bank’s Approach to Global Programs
focused on the strategic and programmatic management of the Bank’s global portfolio of 70
programs in five Bank Networks (a cluster of closely related sectors) and was presented to
the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) on June 12, 2002. This case study is
one of 26 and derives additional lessons for the Bank’s strategic and programmatic
management of global programs as well as lessons for the design and management of
individual programs.
Each case study follows a common outline and address four major evaluation issues, which
correspond to the four major sections of each report:
• The overarching global relevance of the various global programs
• Outcomes and impacts of the programs and their sustainability
• Organization, management, and financing of the programs
• The World Bank’s performance as a partner in the programs
These four issues correspond to OED’s evaluation criteria of relevance, efficacy, efficiency,
and Bank performance, appropriately interpreted and expanded for the case of global programs.
Each case study also addresses 20 evaluation questions related to these four evaluation issues
(Annex A, Table A.1) that have been derived from OED’s standard evaluation criteria (Table
A.2), the 14 eligibility and approval criteria for global programs that have been endorsed by
the Development Committee and established by Bank Management (Table A.3), and the 8
eligibility criteria for grant support from the Bank’s Development Grant Facility (Table A.4).
Twenty out of the 26 case study programs and about two-thirds of the Bank’s total portfolio
of 70 global programs have received DGF grants.
Global programs are defined as “partnerships and related initiatives whose benefits are
intended to cut across more than one region of the world and in which the partners (1) reach
explicit agreements on objectives, (2) agree to establish a new (formal or informal)
organization, (3) generate new products or services, and (4) contribute dedicated resources to
the program.” (OED, The World Bank’s Approach to Global Programs: Phase 1 Report).
This case study assesses the value added by the Bank’s participation in the Global IPM
Facility with a view to learning lessons for the Bank’s future involvement in global
programs. This is not a programmatic evaluation of the Global IPM Facility, nor a substitute
for a thorough external independent evaluation. Several studies using new survey data
detailing the substantial health and ecological benefits of IPM have emerged that contend
that IPM does not result in a loss in production. Yet the debate continues about the most cost-
effective and fiscally sustainable approach to extending knowledge about IPM practices to
farmers. This study reviews some of this recent literature on IPM , but arrives at the same
conclusion as that arrived by the Review of the CGIAR Systemwide Program on Integrated
Pest Management (SP-IPM), that with regard to the question of the most cost-effective [IPM]
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extension approaches... “discussions have not always been carried out on scientific grounds
and have sometimes been used as a vehicle of controversy among different stakeholders for
their different views on development…Leaving such ‘internal conflicts’ unresolved will be at
the expense of farmers in developing countries and also consumers and the environment at
large” (Gutierrez & Waibel, 2001).
A draft of this case study was provided to World Bank and Global IPM Facility staff and
associated stakeholders for comment in spring 2004. The case study has considered and
incorporated comments received from the World Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development
Department, the Bank’s Development Economics Group, and the Global IPM Facility.
Selected findings of this case study were reported in the World Bank’s synthesis report
entitled Addressing the Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the
World Bank’s Approach to Global Programs (2004). These findings have contributed to
subsequent Bank actions, including a decision by the Bank not to renew its cosponsorship of
the Facility (Annex B).
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List of 26 Case Studies in Phase 2 of OED’s Evaluation of the Bank’s Involvement in
Global Programs
Acronym/ Operational Size (US$
Full Name
Short Form Start Date millions)1
Environnent & Agriculture
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
1. CGIAR 1972 395.0
Research
2. GEF Global Environment Facility 1991 387.53
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal
3. MLF 1991 158.6
Protocol
4. ProCarbFund Prototype Carbon Fund 2000 6.5
5. CEPF Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 2000 20.19
6. GWP Global Water Partnership 1997 10.25
7. GIF Global Integrated Pest Management Facility 1996 1.3
Health, Nutrition & Population
Special Programme for Research and Training in
8. TDR Dec 1975 47.5
Tropical Diseases
9. Global Forum Global Forum for Health Research Jan 1997 3.07
10. UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS Jan 1996 95.0
11. RBM Roll Back Malaria Nov 1998 11.4
12. Stop TB
Stop TB Partnership July 1999 20.8
Partnership
13. GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization Oct 1999 124.1
Infrastructure & Private Sector Development
14. WSP Water and Sanitation Program March 1978 12.4
15. ESMAP Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme Jan 1982 7.58
16. CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest August 1995 12.67
17. infoDev The Information for Development Program Sept 1995 8.90
18. PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility Dec 1999 15.61
19. CA Cities Alliance Dec 1999 13.25
Social Development & Protection
20. PostConFund Post-Conflict Fund 1998 10.60
21. UCW Understanding Children’s Work 2000 0.56
Trade & Finance
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical
22. IF 1997 2.71
Assistance
23. FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program May 1999 10.46
24. FIRST Financial Sector Reform & Strengthening Initiative July 2002 4.64
Information & Knowledge
25. GDN Global Development Network Dec 1999 8.67
26. World Links World Links for Development 1998 6.52
/1 FY04/CY03 expenditures. In the cases of the Global Integrated Pest Management Facility, the Water & Sanitation
Program, Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance, previous fiscal or calendar year expenditures are
used since updated, audited data were not readily available.
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Executive Summary
Genesis, Objectives, and Activities
1. Developing countries dependent on agriculture face a complex dilemma concerning
how best to promote “sustainable agricultural intensification” – natural resource management
that safeguards productivity of the natural resource base while meeting economic growth and
poverty alleviation objectives. National policy makers must weigh the need for food security
and competitiveness on international agricultural output markets against the negative
externalities of pesticides that can damage the sustainability of the country’s production base.
2. Although no consensus exists on its precise definition, the World Bank’s Operational
Policy 4.09 defines integrated pest
management as a mix of farmer-driven, Global Integrated Pest Management
Facility
ecologically based pest control practices that
seeks to reduce reliance on synthetic Established: June 30, 1995
chemical pesticides. It involves (a) managing Objectives: To assist interested
pests (keeping them below economically governments and NGOs in
initiating, developing, and
damaging levels) rather than seeking to expanding Integrated Pest
eradicate them; (b) relying, to the extent Management (IPM) programs
possible, on non-chemical measures to keep that aim to reduce pesticide use
and associated negative impact
pest populations low; and (c) selecting and on health and environment,
applying pesticides, when they have to be while increasing production and
used, in a way that minimizes adverse effects profits through improved crop
and pest management
on beneficial organisms, humans, and the
Key Activities: Provides TA in project or
environment program design, fundraising and
facilitation of collaboration
3. The World Bank, in part due to among IPM programs. Advises
increasing public concern that its agricultural governments, international
organizations, NGOs and
projects in support of intensification were donors on pest management
contributing to high pesticide use, co- programs and policies.
founded the Global Integrated Pest FY04 Not Available
Management Facility in June 1995. The Bank expenditures:
recognized the need to promote wider FY04 DGF Not Applicable
allocation:
implementation uptake and investment in
FY04 TF Not Available
farmer-led, participatory IPM. It also contributions:
recognized an opportunity to forge a stronger Governance Secretariat inside external
and more substantive partnership with FAO model: organization; external
in an area in which FAO had a strong core of organization is lead partner
expertise. It would therefore look toward the Location: FAO HQ/Rome, Italy
Facility to assist it achieve more effective Governing Cosponsors: FAO, WB, UNDP,
monitoring and supervision of Bank- partners: UNEP
supported agricultural projects to promote Core Donors: Netherlands,
Switzerland and Denmark
IPM.
Latest program- The Mid-Term Review of the
level evaluation: Global IPM Facility, April-June
2001
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4. The stated aim of the Global IPM Facility is to achieve “sustainable, cost effective
and environmentally sound crop production for food security through improved IPM.” This
goal is to be achieved through a three-pronged approach of (1) technical cooperation among
developing and emerging countries (human resource development), (2) better deployment of
information and development of standard documentation for good IPM practice, and (3)
effective mobilization of funds.
5. Key Activities: It was envisioned that the Global IPM Facility would act as a vehicle
to catalyze and facilitate collaboration among national policy makers, development agencies
(including the Bank), and NGOs in the planning and implementation of IPM activities. It
would advise and assist national programs in the design, implementation, and evaluation of
IPM field initiatives; identify and assemble projects for support by national, bilateral, and
multilateral sources; promote the implementation of a small set of pilot projects designed to
lead to larger national programs; and document, analyze, and evaluate IPM pilot projects to
provide standard documentation. These activities would be geared toward stimulating the
development of improved IPM concepts through scientific research (not included in the
program, but rather would rely on the CGIAR system, for example), to improve the
participation of farmers (including women), extensionists, and researchers.
Design and Implementation
6. The Global IPM Facility is housed in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Headquarters in Rome but was designed as an “independent institutional framework.” The
Facility was cosponsored by FAO, UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank and is overseen by a
Governing Group – comprised of cosponsors, core donors (contributing cosponsors plus the
Dutch Development Ministry, the Swiss Development Corporation and Norway), and
representatives of five geographical regions. Observers from NGOs, the CGIAR Systemwide
Program on IPM (SP-IPM), and the Ad-Hoc Technical Advisory Groups also attend
Governing Group meetings. The Facility is accountable to the Governing Group, which
reviews its activities and work plan. The Facility’s Secretariat (a skeleton staff of four
professional officers, supplemented by consultancy services), organizes, operates, and reports
on its activities at annual Governing Group meetings. However, only three Governing Group
Meetings have been convened in six years (in Rome, 4/1989; Kakamega, 10/2000; Rome,
12/2001) in spite of the requirement of annual Governing Group meetings as stated in the
Facility’s Program Document. The Bank has attended all three. Both the Facility and the
Secretariat were developed in close collaboration with CAB International-- although the role
of CABI has diminished over time.
7. The Facility was established in 1995, initially for a five-year period, and with
projected cumulative funding of US $13.5 million. The Netherlands has been the largest
sponsor of the Facility, and the Bank’s total financial contribution to the Facility over the
period 1996-2003 was US $2.7 million. The Bank last transferred funds to the Facility in
early 2001. Bank contributions to the Facility have been used mainly to support institutional
assistance to the Bank to help enhance compliance with its safeguard policy on pest
management.
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8. At the time of the Facility’s inception, a number of IPM programs were under way for
small scale rice-based farmers in Asia where excessive pesticide use on rice was a concern.
The Facility’s original agenda was to expand IPM to other regions – to Africa and Latin
America, as well as to develop cotton and vegetable IPM in central Asia. Yet a central
feature of the Asian experience was pesticide misuse in a key smallholder food crop (rice).
Misuse in Latin America and Africa was in cash crops such as cotton, coffee, cocoa,
plantains, and export-oriented vegetable production. Because African programs necessitated
a comprehensive focus on both pest and agriculture production issues, the operational
mandate of the Facility evolved from “integrated pest management” to “integrated
production and pest management” or IPPM. IPPM focuses on soil fertility and production, in
addition to the traditional pest management aspects.
Findings
Relevance: Are the Program’s Objectives Right?
9. The mandate of the Global IPM Facility responds to an international consensus,
embodied in an array of international policy instruments: Agenda 21, the Code of Conduct on
the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, OECD DAC Guidelines on Aid and Environment –
Pest and Pesticide Management, and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The
instruments reflect an understanding that while pesticides have enhanced agricultural
production and suppressed many insect-transmitted human diseases, they have also produced
a host of negative side-effects on human health and the environment. High costs and
concerns about environment and public health have reduced the use of pesticides in
industrialized countries and have induced many farmers to adopt an IPM approach.
Meanwhile, the developing world, which uses less than 50 percent of all pesticides account
for more than 99 percent of the human poisonings world wide (FAO, 2002).
10. A wide volume of research conducted over the past two decades has demonstrated
that, despite the sometimes dramatic short-term effects of chemical pesticides, their heavy
use has not significantly reduced long-term pest problems and, in some cases, has even
aggravated them. Today, there is a broad consensus on the desirability of IPM as a core
component of sustainable agriculture. A decade after the World Bank co-founded the
Facility, IPM has become widely adopted by international development partners —FAO,
IFAD, EC, regional development banks, and major bilateral agencies -- as an
environmentally sustainable approach to crop protection. An impact assessment of IPM in
the CGIAR Centers found that the benefits of IPM were well recognized both within the
Centers and by the global scientific community (CGIAR 2000).
11. The World Bank’s corporate rural strategy, Reaching the Rural Poor (2003), commits
the Bank to promoting environmentally sustainable pest management systems by
encouraging more efficient use of farm inputs and reduction of post-harvest losses, partly
through demand-driven extension services. The strategy cites the successful Capacity
Building and Policy Reform Program in Mali, which was designed to tackle increasing
pesticide resistance and inappropriate uses – factors that were driving pesticide costs steadily
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up while yields stayed flat or declined. The Global IPM Facility played an integral role in
achieving results in Mali.
Efficacy: Has the Program Achieved Its Stated Objectives?
12. The Facility has contributed to an evolving body of norms and standards of conduct
surrounding the promotion of IPM and the reduction in pesticide overuse. Among other
activities, staff have contributed to the revision of the International Code of Conduct on the
Distribution and Use of Pesticides and to the alignment of pest management assistance under
emergency programs with FAO’s normative work on pesticide management. They have
assisted FAO with the implementation of the Stockholm Convention; led an inter-agency
working group on termite control, assisted with the reform process of the Japanese aid
program KR2; and helped prepare parts of the Africa Stockpiles Program. Through a staff
secondment, the Facility assisted the Bank in reviewing/appraising pesticide procurements
and project documents and in designing an Integrated Safeguard Policy Datasheet, a Pest
Management Guidebook, training materials, and a health department circular on using DDT
in malaria control projects. It co-funded an AFR Sector Review on safeguard compliance.
The Facility has been instrumental in assisting the Bank in identifying and addressing
partnership activities that in the past have been inconsistent with the Bank’s safeguard policy
on pest management and its guidelines for partnerships with the private sector. However,
given the sensitive nature of the compliance function that the staff secondee was asked to
perform, the Bank could have better performed these duties through the hiring and
institutionalization of a full-time IPM specialist within the Bank itself. The Bank only created
and staffed such a position in 2003 (eight years after the decision to cosponsor the Facility).
13. The Facility’s Program Document, drafted in 1996, provides no guidance on criteria
to assess expected impacts (beyond outputs and outcomes) of the program. Impact indicators
should include more than quantitative increases of IPM opportunities and participants. They
should also address the economic efficiency and environmental and health related
sustainability of the approach itself. Impact indicators related to the Bank’s mission should
include a measure of the reductions in pest management costs as a proportion of total crop
production costs and reduced incidence of rejection of produce (e.g., by EU markets) due to
pesticide residues.
14. The Facility’s Program Document was ambiguous as to how demand for Facility
services was expected to be generated, whether by its core donors or by need-based
assessments submitted by developing country governments. The Facility’s Mid-Term Review
found that it could not determine whether the Facility’s work program was meeting the basic
precondition of identifying areas experiencing significant pest problems and/or pesticide
abuse. The Program Document was also unclear as to how decisions about the program’s
priorities and activities were expected to be made. The Facility’s governing principles did not
indicate how developing countries could be legitimately represented or their views reflected
in the program’s strategic planning at the global level.
15. The Global IPM Facility excluded the pesticide industry from its formal governance
structure in order to establish a neutral forum for decision making, which was viewed as
essential for the credibility and independence of the Facility. This review concurs with the
xiii
need for a neutral forum; however, the Facility may have missed an opportunity to promote
an industry-wide dialogue on chemical standards and food safety regulations.
Efficiency
16. The Global IPM Facility has undergone one external evaluation – its Mid-Term
Review in 2000. The Bank did not accept the findings of the review due to the fact that the
review’s evaluation team was selected without first consulting the Bank and that joint
reporting by the evaluation team and the program being evaluated (in this case, the Facility)
violated good governance procedures. This case study concurs that the Mid-Term Review
team should have been chosen by consensus, in consultation with all program partners, and
that the review’s lack of an arm’s-length relationship to the Facility fell short of generally
accepted evaluation principles. This lack of clear communication reflected two different
evaluation histories and work cultures and represents a lesson in partnering for the Bank.
Expectations regarding monitoring and evaluation should be concisely defined in program
agreements at the global level. The Bank has requested and this case study supports the need
for an external, independent evaluation of the Facility (which goes beyond the scope of this
case study), as well as the need for impact studies, including studies on the level and quality
of farmer-to-farmer transmission and the extent of environmental externalities. Other donors
have requested that follow-up evaluation activities ensure a more focused examination of
gender equity. Ideally, the review, its team selection, terms of reference, and reporting
mechanism should be independent of the management of the Global IPM Facility.
17. The Global IPM Facility was initiated with strong shared objectives between the
World Bank and FAO. However, since the establishment of the Facility, the views of these
two Governing Group members have diverged on a number of key issues. Foremost among
the differences between the Bank and the Global IPM Facility is the Facility’s Farmer Field
School (FFS) approach. Project performance evaluations conducted by OED in 2002
question the sustainability of the system in those cases where IPM farmer networks have not
become strong enough to continue working effectively without technical and financial
support in the post-project period, or where the support of IPM in the government was found
to be only partial and fragile. Yet, while OED pointed out the limitations of the FFS approach
(in Vietnam), these assessments stopped short of exploring the wider environmental, health
and potential cost and/or yield benefits of IPM. A Special Report on the World Market for
Crop Products in Rice (AGROW, 2003) considered the case of the Vietnam IPM Program
and reported that farmers who were trained in IPM used only 1.7 pesticide applications on a
rice crop, compared to 4.5 applications by a control group. Pesticide costs were more than
halved, while crop yields rose. At the same time, the World Bank’s Infrastructure and
Environment Team of the Development Research Group attempted to ascertain (using new
survey data) whether IPM offered the prospect of lower production costs and higher
profitability for rice farmers in Bangladesh (Dasgupta et al., 2004). The study compared
outcomes for farming with IPM and conventional techniques, using input-use accounting,
conventional production functions and frontier production estimation. The results suggested
that the productivity of IPM rice farming was not significantly different from the productivity
of conventional farming. Since IPM reduces pesticide costs with no countervailing loss in
production however, it appears to be more profitable than conventional rice farming.
xiv
Interviews also suggested substantial health and ecological benefits. Yet, the study also found
that externality problems make it difficult for farmers to adopt IPM individually. Without
collective adoption, neighbors’ continued reliance on chemicals to kill pests would also kill
helpful parasites and predators, as well as expose IPM farmers and local ecosystems to
chemical spillovers from adjoining fields.
18. The Bank’s caution about a single “silver bullet” approach reflects an arduous
institutional learning process following the Bank’s $4 billion investment in the training and
visit system – a system that ultimately proved financially unsustainable and that, after many
years of support, resulted in limited development impact (Gautam, 2000).
19. Meanwhile, research on the impact of Farmer Field Schools in Indonesia and the
Philippines conducted by the Bank’s Development Economics Research (DEC) Group has
generated a debate amongst Facility cosponsors and IPM specialists with direct involvement
or experience in IPM field programs. While DEC research finds that farmer field schools do
not have significant impact on pesticide use and yields, the Global IPM Facility Program
Manager asserts that the research contains serious flaws that largely invalidate its findings
and conclusions, and that other predominantly positive study findings of the same project are
not being considered. On the other hand, the Global IPM Facility Program Manager does
consider the DEC research useful as a possible contribution towards the development of a
methodology for impact assessment. The Bank could benefit from a widened internal
discussion on the most appropriate methodology to be used in assessing the economic returns
and impacts of IPM.
Bank Performance
20. While World Bank cosponsorship of the Facility was instrumental in catalyzing initial
support, a recent review of the Bank’s rural project portfolio has revealed that there is a low
inclusion of IPM in Bank projects, even in projects dedicated to sustainable agricultural
intensification (Sorbey et al., 2002). This finding can in part be explained by the general
decline in the share of agricultural productivity enhancement in the Bank’s loan portfolio
over the past decade. Consequently, the Bank had not directed sufficient resources towards
building in-house capacity to advise its staff on IPM related matters – a situation which has
now been partly corrected with the hiring of a full time IPM specialist in Quality Assurance
and Compliant Unit (QACU).
21. Meanwhile, a Bank Review of IPM in Development (2002) found that the Bank’s
safeguard on pest management (OP 4.09) has had an “ambiguous role” in the Bank despite
the fact that IPM has a high profile as one of the Bank’s ten safeguards. This case study finds
that it is very much a matter of judgment as to what is sufficient in order to say that an “IPM
approach” is in place, because IPM is not a particular set of technologies or behaviors –
rather it is more like a philosophy and guiding framework. So while OP 4.09 requires that
any investment that is likely to increase pesticide use be made only “in the context of an IPM
program,” there are no clear set of rules for deciding what qualifies.
22. The Global IPM Facility was not established by a formal agreement. As a Governing
Group member, the Bank did not ensure that the five-year work program included a
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transparent and accountable framework for oversight and management of the Facility’s
Secretariat, with measurable indicators and time-bound objectives. The framework did not
include a clear communication and reporting strategy between the Facility, cosponsors,
donors and stakeholders, nor clarity on how recommendations made by the Governing Group
would be considered by the Secretariat. These prerequisites of good governance were not
delineated clearly in the program’s governing document.
23. The Bank’s cosponsorship of the Facility raised civil society expectations
surrounding the Bank’s configuration of its own operational policy guidelines on pest
management. Civil society followed closely the Bank’s policy formulation process in the
mid-nineties that produced OP4.09 on Integrated Pest Management. Due to mounting
concerns expressed by civil society that the Bank’s revision of its pest management policy
was in effect a weakening of binding standards, the Bank revised the 1996 draft and released
its present operational policy in December 1998.
24. In exchange for staff assistance in identifying IPM constraints and opportunities
within the Bank, the Global IPM Facility looked toward the Bank to supplement its catalytic
project activities with long-term policy guidance through its country level dialogue.
However, except in Mali, the Bank has not integrated key analytical work (i.e., the findings
of the Pesticide Policy Project studies) into its country assistance strategies, even though the
Bank requested and partly funded the country cases. Each case study identified the need for
further in-country, on-site data collection.
25. Prior to the publication of this case study, the World Bank announced its withdrawal
as a cosponsor and global governance partner from the Facility, in line with the envisioned
end date outlined in the original partnership agreement. Interviews with the Governing Group
members and stakeholders suggest that it is critical for the Bank to “stay involved” with
Facility activities. As announced, the Bank’s withdrawal at the global level does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of future cooperation between the Facility and the Bank’s
regional operations on a case-by-case basis under separate agreements (Annex B).
Lessons
26. Integrated Pest Management is an approach that requires an appreciation of its
multiple goals and a suitable methodology for the assessment of its impact. The assessments
currently underway for the FFS method of extending IPM practices are not sufficient to
achieve this goal, and should be considered a separate but complementary exercise. Several
development banks, international organizations and bilateral assistance agencies support
IPM, but there is little consensus on monitoring and assessment standards for the economic,
social and environmental impacts of farmer IPM training. The Global IPM Facility has
contributed to the establishment of assessment standards through its support of collaborative
efforts designed to increase the quality and usefulness of IPM research. Meanwhile, the Bank
needs to consider the best way that IPM lessons can not only enhance the Bank’s rural
strategy and its implementation, but also offer lessons across sectors: agriculture, health, and
the environment.
xvi
27. The Global IPM Facility’s decision to exclude the agro-chemical industry from its
governance structure could have been balanced with a separate long-term strategy to engage
the commercial private sector in discussions on national and global food safety regulations,
on trade, and on marketing and distribution of generic, less specific pesticides. While the
Facility has sought cooperation from the food processing industries, it has missed an
opportunity to benefit from a pipeline of private sector research and development aimed at
certain market segments and IPM-type issues.
28. The program’s governance principles, as designed through an informal agreement,
should have reached a consensus not only on the objectives, roles, and responsibilities of the
partnership but also on how to manage, treat or incorporate different points of view as these
arose. The lack of functional clarity in this program is not a unique phenomenon. The
challenge was perhaps more conspicuous in this program given the nature of the subject the
Facility was tackling. The experience with this program emphasizes the importance of clear
terms of reference for the Bank’s representative on the governing bodies of global programs.
Independent oversight should provide the kind of neutral guidance necessary to bring
problematic partnerships back on track or recommend exit for the Bank rather than have it
face undue institutional or reputational risk.
1. Introduction and Context: Global Challenges in the Sector
LINKING HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS
1.1 Experts acknowledge that the large-scale use of chemical pesticides has been a two-
edged sword: While significantly contributing to the enhancement of agricultural production
and the suppression of many insect-transmitted human diseases worldwide, chemical
pesticides have also produced a host of negative side-effects on human health and the natural
environment – side-effects which have been unevenly distributed. Despite the fact that the
lion’s share of chemical pesticides are applied in developed countries, 99 percent of all
pesticide poisoning cases occur in developing countries where regulatory, health and
education systems are weakest. Prolonged exposure to pesticides has been associated with
several chronic and acute health effects like non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, leukemia, as well as
cardiopulmonary disorders, neurological and hematological symptoms, and skin diseases
(Blair and White, 1985; Hoag et al., 1986; Wigle et al., 1990; Pingali et al., 1994; Crissman
et al., 1994; Antle and Capalbo, 1994).
THE ROAD TO INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS
1.2 The full expression “Integrated Pest Management” appeared in press for the first time
30 years ago (Kogan, 1998); it was not until the early nineties, however, that the international
community formally acknowledged its potential as an alternative technique for agricultural
production (Box 1). IPM
figured prominently in Box 1: Origin of Integrated Pest Management
the 1992 United Nations The scientific basis of “Integrated Pest Control” evolved over a period of
Conference on about 10 years, mainly among researchers at the University of California.
Environment and The concept was explicitly defined in 1965 at a symposium sponsored by
Development’s non- the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), of the United Nations, held
binding but globally in Rome, Italy (FAO 1966b). The concept of “Integrated Control,”
originally limited to the combination of chemical and biological control
advocated agreement, methods (Michelbacher & Bacon 1952), was greatly expanded in that
Agenda 21, which in part symposium to become synonymous with what we now consider IPM.
demanded the Concurrently, however, the concept of “Pest Management” that had been
implementation of IPM as proposed by Australian ecologists in 1961 (Geyer & Clark 1961), started
an alternative to receiving greater recognition. Publication of Geyer’s Annual Review of
Entomology article in 1966 (Geyer 1966), a report by the US National
dependence on the use of Academy of Sciences (NAS 1969), and the proceedings of a conference
chemicals. The concept held in North Carolina, which included participation by the original
stresses the use of local proponents of pest management from Australia (Rabb and Guthrie 1970),
knowledge and aims at provided the impetus for that recognition. The convergence of the
improving the decision concepts of integrated control and pest management, and the ultimate
synthesis into integrated pest management, opened a new era in the
making capacity of protection of agricultural crops, domestic animals, stored products, public
farmers and health, and the structure of human dwellings against the attack of
policymakers, instead of arthropod pests, plant and animal diseases, and weeds.
disseminating fixed
packages of external A more detailed account of the historical development of IPM is found in
technology. Kogan (1998).
2
DEFINING INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT
1.3 Chapter 14, Section I of “Agenda 21” (adopted at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit) is
dedicated to IPM and control in agriculture. IPM was defined by signatories to the Agenda as
“a combination of biological control, host plant resistance, and appropriate farming practices
to minimize pesticide use.” According to Agenda 21, “IPM is the best option for the future,
as it guarantees yields, reduces costs, is environmentally friendly, and contributes to the
sustainability of agriculture.” Agenda 21 clearly states that IPM should go “hand in hand
with appropriate pesticide management to allow for pesticide regulation and control,
including trade, and for the safe handling and disposal of pesticides, particularly those that
are toxic and persistent” (Box 2).
1.4 As defined by the World Bank’s Operational Policy (4.09), Integrated Pest
Management refers to a mix of farmer-driven, ecologically based pest control practices that
seeks to reduce reliance on synthetic chemical pesticides. It involves (a) managing pests
(keeping them below
economically damaging
Box 2. Agenda 21 and Integrated Pest Management and levels) rather than seeking
Control in Agriculture.
to eradicate them;
The representative parties to the 1992 United Nations Conference (b) relying, to the extent
on Environment and Development (UNCED) did not directly possible, on non-chemical
conceive of the Global IPM Facility to administer the portions of measures to keep pest
Agenda 21 relating to integrated pest management. Yet, the populations low; and
Global IPM Facility has de facto assumed a role in facilitating the (c) selecting and applying
implementation of the agreement. The basis for international
pesticides, when they have
action to address trans-boundary pest management problems is
originally derived from Paragraphs 14.74-14.82 of Agenda 21. to be used, in a way that
However, the agreement remains non-binding. minimizes adverse effects
on beneficial organisms,
14.74: World food demand projections indicate an increase of 50 humans, and the
percent by the year 2000 which will more than double again by environment.
2050. Conservative estimates put pre-harvest and post-harvest
losses caused by pests between 25 and 50 percent. Pests affecting 1.5 It is commonly
animal health also cause heavy losses and in many areas prevent understood that applying an
livestock development. Chemical control of agricultural pests has IPM approach does not
dominated the scene, but its overuse has adverse effects on farm necessarily mean
budgets, human health and the environment, as well as on
eliminating pesticide use,
international trade. New pest problems continue to develop.
Integrated pest management, which combines biological control,
although this is often the
host plant resistance and appropriate farming practices and case because pesticides are
minimizes the use of pesticides, is the best option for the future, often over-used for a
as it guarantees yields, reduces costs, is environmentally friendly variety of reasons. There
and contributes to the sustainability of agriculture. Integrated are also cases where an
pest management should go hand in hand with appropriate increase in pesticide use
pesticide management to allow for pesticide regulation and could be justified, however
control, including trade, and for the safe handling and disposal pesticides should only be
of pesticides, particularly those that are toxic and persistent. used when it is
economically justified to do
Source: Author and Agenda 21
so (i.e., not on a calendar or
3
other routine basis, but based on a real-time assessment that a specific pest has reached the
control threshold). The IPM approach regards pesticides as mainly short-term corrective
measures when more ecologically based control measures are not working adequately
(sometimes referred to as using pesticides as the “last resort”). In those cases when pesticides
are used, they should be selected and applied in such a manner as to minimize the amount of
disruption that they cause to the agro-ecological system (i.e., to the extent possible, use
products that are non-persistent, with very selective action and apply them in the most
targeted possible way).
1.6 Scholars dedicated to IPM research agree that pesticides will remain an integral part
of IPM in the foreseeable future (Kogan and Bajwa, 2003). Despite the adoption of the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants in May 2001 (a binding international
agreement that works to reduce and/or eliminate releases of 12 POPs, 9 of which are
pesticides), the global chemicals industry has continued to expand. In fact, the global
chemistry industry is expected to experience an annual growth rate of about 3 percent over
the next three decades, with a considerable increase in trade (OECD, 2001).
GLOBAL HEALTH CONCERNS IMPACT TRADE POLICY DECISIONS
1.7 Today, growing concern over health risks associated with food products in OECD
countries is at the forefront of the trade policy debate. At the heart of this debate is the
“precautionary principle,” which holds that precautions should be taken against health,
safety, and environmental risks even when science has not established direct cause-and-effect
relationships (World Bank, 2003).
1.8 How governments regulate food safety and environmental protection, including
pesticide residue levels, has important implications for trade. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) Ministerial held in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001 included statements on standards
and their impact on market access for developing countries. These issues will continue to be
important in trade policy dialogues. Wilson and Otsuki of the Bank’s Development
Economics Research Group (DEC) examined regulatory data from 11 OECD importing
countries and trade data from 19 exporting countries to discover if regulations on pesticides
have an effect on trade. Their research found, for example, that a 10 percent increase in
regulatory stringency – tighter restrictions on the pesticide chlorpyrifos – leads to a decrease
in banana imports by 14.8 percent. This represents a significant impact on trade and affects
prospects of developing countries who continue to rely on exports of agricultural
commodities such as bananas.
1.9 Whereas food safety standards can affect the ability of agricultural producers to meet
regulatory standards set by importing countries, Wilson and Otsuki’s findings also suggest
that the lack of consensus on international standards and divergent national regulations on
pesticides is costly. For example, the authors estimate that there would be a US $5.3 billion
loss in world exports of bananas if the world were to adopt a standard at EU levels of
regulatory stringency in contrast to the world standard set by Codex (the body charged with
setting global standards in this area).
4
LACK OF UNIFORM ASSESSMENT INDICATORS IMPEDE LARGE SCALE ADOPTION OF IPM
1.10 While the adoption of Agenda 21 clearly reflects an international consensus to
recognize the global dimension of pest management problems, the perception of Integrated
Pest Management as an institutional framework is still in its infancy. Declining attention to
agriculture in development assistance and interagency competition are among the factors that
have prevented the implementation of the quasi-mandate of Agenda 21 on a larger scale
(Sorbey et al., 2003). A key constraint is the lack of standards for impact assessment of IPM
interventions.
1.11 The current trend among international organizations is a de facto broadening of
Agenda 21’s original definition of IPM, with today’s strategies designed to include more
comprehensive aspects such as research and extension, capacity building, and policy reform
(Sorbey et al., 2003). However, broadening the rationale for IPM beyond the technical and
economic dimensions has not been followed by the commonly agreed indicators for project
outcomes. In most cases where IPM adoption is measured, the indicators cited include
reduced costs of inputs, increased yields, and better incomes for farmers. Since in most cases,
this information relies on data from pilot activities, information is rare on the cost-
effectiveness of large-scale IPM programs (Sorbey et al., 2003).
2. Program Alignment with Global Challenges and Bank
Priorities
BANK SUPPORT CATALYZED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GLOBAL IPM FACILITY
2.1 In the mid-1990s, as part of a wider initiative involving FAO and UNDP, the World
Bank’s Agriculture and Natural Resource Department launched a study to analyze the causes
of excessive use of pesticides in developing countries that hindered the adoption of IPM
(Farah, 1994). The study concluded that a majority of developing countries were providing
financial incentives to farmers to use pesticides and were directly and indirectly subsidizing
pesticide imports, domestic manufacture, sales, and use with a combination of mechanisms.
It also concluded that a number of non-price policies were encouraging pesticide use in some
developing countries where relatively little emphasis was being placed on research, extension
and farmer training in IPM compared to the pronounced emphasis on chemical pesticides.1
2.2 The Bank decided to seek expert assistance in identifying and preparing investment
opportunities to expand the uptake of IPM by facilitating a cooperative agreement with FAO
and others. In 1995, the Bank participated in an Inter-Agency IPM Task Force that proposed
the establishment of a Facility to “assist in the identification, design, and implementation of
projects supporting the application of integrated pest management.”
1. Examples of non-price policies that have and continue to lead to excessive pesticide use include excessive
public investment in support services and knowledge base for chemical control, erroneous pest management
policies, lack of tools to identify pests and economic crop loss (leading to decision-making based on inaccurate
information), lack of adequate information of alternative pest management measures, and a historical pro-
chemical bias in training and extension.
5
2.3 The Global IPM Facility was established following the signing of a letter of
agreement between the World Bank and FAO on June 30th, 1995. However it was not until
December 1996 that a final Program Document (in lieu of a memorandum of understanding
or charter) was put in place by the partners. The Program Document set forth the structure of
the Facility, based on the agreement that there would be (i) an independent Secretariat
located at FAO, with a work-plan of activities; (ii) a five year initial term of work;
(iii) regional and global field activities; and (iv) a governing structure with regional
representation, cosponsors, donors, NGOs, and a representative of the CGIAR’s Systemwide
Program on IPM (SW_IPM), and (v) independent Technical Advisory Group observers (ad-
hoc). Selected bilateral donor partners made their support and participation conditional on
there being no representation of the pesticide industry within the Global IPM Facility; rather
the Facility should use other public forums to carry out dialogue with the industry.
2.4 The Facility was established initially for a five year period with a projected
cumulative funding level of U.S. $13.5 million. As reported by the Facility, actual
contributions have totaled US $11.84 million. First funded by a small grant from the SDC
and the Bank, by the time the Facility became fully operational in January 1997, bilateral
commitments from the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway made up the majority of Global
IPM Facility funds.2 The World Bank’s total financial contribution to the Global IPM Facility
over the period 1996-2003 was about U.S. $2.7 million, which were held in trust by FAO for
the World Bank.3
GOALS, OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES, AND PRIORITY ACTIVITIES
2.5 The Global Integrated Pest Management Facility was coined a “facility” because the
Bank and its partner cosponsors were insistent that the main task of the program would be to
draw upon local, national, and international expertise, knowledge and resources to facilitate
the process of identification, design and implementation. The Facility was faced with a great
demand for services from its very inception, and there was agreement that it should follow a
demand-driven approach. The Bank as a cosponsor has felt, however, that the Facility has
lacked a strategic approach and has allowed itself to be deflected from its principal task of
facilitating the wider-uptake of IPM and towards technical assistance and extension
activities. It has lacked policy expertise and focused on farmer level technical issues. The
Bank has perceived a disconnect between the Facility’s work program at the farm level and
the potential leverage that the Facility could have had at the country level on pest
management issues in relation to food safety and environmental protection.
2. Rounded off contributions in US$ are as follows: World Bank 2.70 M; Netherlands Trust Fund 6.25 M;
Netherlands FNPP 0.90 M; Swiss 1.56 M (including 0.35 for CABI); Norway 0.43 M.
3. Integrated Pest Management Facility – Project TEMP/INT/778/WBK/Trust Fund No. 050865. FAO
submitted
6
Box 3: The Role of NGOs in Shaping the World Bank’s Pesticide and Pest Management Policies
1984 200 NGOs sign petition asking the WB to address pesticide abuses in its projects
1985 WB releases first guidelines on pest management (OPN 11.01) which states that IPM should be the
objective of Bank strategy in agricultural development”; guidelines include “22 operational requirements
that must be observed by WB staff…”; WB also releases a list of chemicals (PTN1) that are not to be
used in WB financed projects, although this list is later withdrawn
1986 WB releases supplementary “step-by-step” guidelines (PTN2) to assist staff in appraising and
supervising pest management components; releases guidelines for the use of pesticides in public
health programs (OPN 11.01b).
1987 WB convenes an external panel of experts to comment on the revision of the 1985 guidelines
1988 Panel of experts finalizes report and recommends revisions of WB’s 1985 guidelines
1989 WB releases OD 4.03 on Agricultural Pest Management which replaces the 1984 guidelines; includes
some recommendations made by expert panel; NGOs voice concern that OD omits implementation
details; transmittal note attached to OD 4.03 announces two forthcoming documents: an Agricultural
Pest Management Handbook and a Policy on Pesticide Procurement.
1992 WB releases OD 4.03 on Agricultural Pest Management which replaces the 1984 guidelines; includes
some recommendations made by expert panel; NGOs voice concern that OD omits implementation
details; transmittal note attached to OD 4.03 announces two forthcoming documents: an Agricultural
Pest Management Handbook and a Policy on Pesticide Procurement.
1993 WB releases GP 4.03 (non-binding) which contains a description of recommended pest management
practices; WB releases new information disclosure policy which makes pest management information
contained in the appraisal processes available to the general public.
1994 WB Discussion Paper No. 238 reveals pesticide policies in developing client countries encourage
excessive use (Farah 1994). October 1994: Concept paper for IPM facility was released by FAO,
World Bank, UNDP and UNEP.
1995 March. The Global IPM Facility is announced at NGO-WB Meeting. FAO and World Bank sign
agreement to establish and initiate funding for the Global IPM Facility with its Secretariat housed at
FAO. World Bank commits $500,000. FAO commits staff time and office space/support. July 1995:
During International Plant Protection Congress, structured discussions held between Global IPM
Facility staff and NGOs. May to September 1995: UNDP and UNEP agree to cosponsor GIF.
1996 The Global IPM Facility is again announced and a presentation is made at the EU Commission - NGO
seminar on IPM; WB releases OP 4.09 as part of a wider policy conversion process. Over 105 NGOs
and more than 75 concerned individuals send a letter to the WB president with a view that OP 4.09
represents a “serious weakening of WB pest management policy.” May 1996: Global Expert
consultation on the IPM Facility, attended by governments, NGOs, and academic specialists. The
consultation expressed concerns about the slow operationalization of the Facility; it endorses a four
stage model of national IPM program development and recommends full time staffing for Facility
Secretariat. August - October 1996: agreements reached with CABI-IIBC and Institute of Horticultural
Economics, Hannover University for long term participation in the technical and policy work of the
Global IPM Facility. December 1996: Global IPM Facility Partners Meeting endorses draft program
document.
1996-1997 WB convenes a series of NGO consultations (including the Pesticide Action Network, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Consumer Policy Institute) on the converted OP to “seek
suggestions and support on ways to further enhance the uptake of IPM.”
1998 The Bank’s Operational Policy on Pest Management (OP 4.09) was revised in December 1998,
replacing the version dated June 1996. OP was revised reflecting principles the NGO community was
pushing for…NGOs were “satisfied with new language concerning the Policy’s farmer driven approach
specific adherence to reducing reliance and using pesticides a last resort”; WHO class I chemicals are
prohibited following FAO guide; PANNA launches its World Bank Accountability Project designed to
investigate WB project compliance with OP 4.09.
1999-2001 WB seconds expert staff from the Global IPM Facility to assist in monitoring compliance with OP 4.09
2003 The World Bank hires a pest management specialist who takes his position in the Bank’s Quality
Assurance and Compliance Unit (i.e., not in the Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development
Department).
Source: Author, PANNA, and Status Report on the Global IPM Facility March 1995 to January 1997.
7
2.7 The Bank’s decision to cosponsor the Global IPM Facility greatly raised civil society
expectations surrounding the Bank’s configuration of its internal operational policy
guidelines on pest management. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), led by the Pesticide Action Network of North America (PANNA),had
campaigned heavily to promote World Bank reform of its policies on pesticide financing and
promotion of alternatives. NGOs closely followed the Bank’s policy conversion process in
the mid-1990s. The attention of these groups focused particularly on the revision of the
Bank’s pest management policy, in which Operational Directive, OD 4.03 on Agricultural
Pest Management, was converted to Operational Policy, OP 4.09 on Integrated Pest
Management. NGOs saw the new policy, drafted in June 1996, as a weakening of binding
standards in the area of pest management in World-Bank supported projects.
2.8 In a 1996 joint letter to President Wolfensohn in 1996, more than 180 organizations
and individuals held the Bank accountable to the conceptual framework it agreed upon just
months prior as a co-founding member of the Global IPM Facility. Signatories indicated that
the Bank’s revised OP 4.09 (1996) diverged markedly from this commitment as well as from
the OECD Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Pest and Pesticide Management. Moreover,
proponents for a revised policy felt the conversion process severely detracted from the
Bank’s original 1985 Guidelines for the Selection and Use of Pesticides in Bank Financed
Projects and their Procurement (OPN 11.01), which contained an “articulate definition of
sound pest management.” They concluded, “Over the past 10 years, we have witnessed a
downgrading of this original policy.”
2.9 In response, Bank officials convened a series of NGO consultations (with the
Pesticide Action Network, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Consumer Policy
Institute) on the revised OP to “seek suggestions and support on ways to further enhance the
uptake of IPM.” The notable outcome of this series of meetings was the invitation by the
Bank to NGOs to submit suggested language to revise the new operational policy – an
invitation which was taken up on a point by point basis in the spring of 1997 – and which
subsequently contributed to the formulation of the revised OP 4.09 on pest management,
released by the Bank in December 1998 and currently in effect. According to PANNA, it was
the NGOs’ concentrated campaign that “ultimately resulted in the World Bank’s 1998
adoption of a policy on pest management.” (Box 3 overviews the significant role of the NGO
community in shaping both the Global IPM Facility and the Bank’s pesticide and pest
management policies).
3. Outcomes, Results, and Sustainability
ACHIEVEMENT OF STATED OBJECTIVES
3.1 The Bank’s declared interest in the Global IPM facility was two-fold: (i) a
recognition of the need for wider implementation, uptake, and investment in farmer-led,
participatory IPM and more effective monitoring and supervision of Bank-supported IPM
projects; and (ii) an institutional objective of stronger and more substantive partnership with
FAO in an area in which FAO has a strong core of expertise. This was based on an
assumption that sufficient technologies and know-how were available to implement IPM
8
programs. Research would be done by various institutions and universities, including the
International Agricultural Research Centers. The Bank’s rural sector management at the time
envisaged that the IPM facility would work directly with Bank task managers to identify
opportunities for IPM application in Bank projects and to help design such IPM components.
3.2 The World Bank’s total financial contribution to the Global IPM Facility over the
period 1996-2003 was about US $ 2.7 million.4 According to progress reports submitted by
the Global IPM Facility, World Bank contribution to the Facility was mainly used to support
activities in the following three areas, which this case study subsequently addresses in turn: 5
• Institutional assistance to the World Bank to help enhance compliance with its
safeguard policy on pest management
• Contribution to the Global IPM Facility’s generation of global public goods in the
form of specific studies in priority areas identified by the World Bank
• Creating conditions for effective national investment in IPM.
Activity No. 1: Institutional Assistance to the World Bank
3.3 At the request of the World Bank, the Facility seconded a pest and pesticide
management specialist to RDV from December 1998 to October 2000, and later to the ESSD
Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit (QACU) from October 2000 to July 2001. In
addition, the Facility partially funded the secondment of an IPM policy specialist from the
University of Hannover to RDV.
3.4 The Bank has modest in-house technical expertise in integrated pest management.
Due to budgetary constraints and the low priority that the Rural Sector Board has historically
awarded to IPM, the Bank utilized its connection with the Facility to procure the secondment
of an IPM expert to monitor the Bank’s safeguard policy and promote IPM awareness and
training throughout the Bank. The expert’s specific terms of reference included (1) training
Bank staff on pest and pesticide management, (2) reviewing pesticide procurement and use in
Bank-financed projects, and (3) providing assistance to staff in dealing with IPM and
pesticide issues in specific projects.6 It was intended that the Facility be the Bank’s eyes and
ears, both within the institution and in the field (Interview with Doug Forno, May 2003).
3.5 The seconded pest management specialist in QACU prepared a number of tools to
assist Bank staff in fulfilling requirements of OP 4.09 and BP 4.01, Annex C. This included
inter alia: (1) reviewing pesticide procurements and project documents; (2) participating in
QAG Reviews; (3) assisting with the development of the Integrated Safeguard Policy
Datasheet and a Safeguard Policy Matrix for OP 4.09; (4) providing inputs to the Pest
4. According to the Global IPM Facility, about a quarter of this amount flowed directly back to the World Bank
in the form of assistance to strengthen compliance with OP 4.09 and BP 4.01 Annex C.
5. Following the OED meetings in Rome in February 2003, The Global IPM Facility staff provided OED with a
document entitled “The World Bank contribution to the Global IPM Facility.”
6. Draft Minutes, Second Governing Group Meeting, Global IPM Facility, Kakamega, Western Kenya, 4-6
October 2000.
9
Management Guidebook, including technical review of a draft pest management guidebook
(an interactive, intranet based guidance document, training staff in understanding OP 4.09
and provided guidance and assistance to the preparation of Pest Management Plans and
(5) developing a circular on DDT use in malaria control projects.
3.6 The Bank’s Best Practice (BP 4.01) requires the preparation of a Pest Management
Plan as part of the preparation for projects that meet specified criteria. The Global IPM
Facility, through the assistance of its staff member seconded to the Bank, assisted task
managers in fulfilling this requirement (Table 1). According to the seconded staff, there were
only few efforts to actively promote IPM in World Bank financed projects as required by
article 1 of OP 4.09. The requirement of preparing Pest Management Plans (PMPs) for
specified groups of projects (BP 4.01, Annex C) was rarely fulfilled, and if PMPs were
prepared this was in most cases done with technical and financial assistance from the Facility
and the FAO Investment Centre (interview with H. Van der Wulp, February 2003). Facility
assistance varied from case to case and for each case involved one or more of the following
items: selection of consultant, preparation of program and TOR for consultant, travel
arrangements for consultant, briefing of consultant, and/or funding of consultant.
Table 1. Pest management plans prepared during the period: 1999 – 2000
Country Project Facility assistance
Benin Cotton Yes
Rwanda ARMD/RSSP Yes
Tanzania SOFRAIP Yes
Uganda Nat. Ag. Adv. Serv. Yes
Armenia Ag Reform Support Yes
China Sustainable Forestry Dev. No
3.7 While a comment reflected in the Rural Sector Board minutes of 20 July 2000 states
that the World Bank was “getting very good value from the Facility in regard to the support
from the Facility’s seconded Bank’s Pest Management Specialist on compliance and pest
management,” some task mangers interviewed for this study indicated that excessive
emphasis on compliance with the safeguard policy at an early stage led staff to avoid
implementing agricultural productivity projects in general.
Activity No. 2: Production of Global Public Goods
3.8 The Facility’s Program Document identified its ultimate target beneficiaries to be
farmers and rural communities – local and national level beneficiaries that would benefit
from the effective IPM training programs through an ability to produce crops in a more
sustainable and cost-effective manner, resulting in higher incomes and a healthier
environment.
3.9 The Facility’s program document also identified the program’s global beneficiaries as
including the general public interest (in that there would be less risk of pesticide residue in
drinking water or food and that crop production would become more stable) and international
10
organizations and development agencies that could potentially benefit from standard
documentation on good IPM practices and services to enhance their responses to developing
countries needs.
3.10 The Facility’s work program was designed in a manner that gave great attention to:
• Inputs -- such as the establishment of National IPM Programs, Farmer Field Schools,
Training of Trainers, and regional meetings etc.
• Outputs -- such as studies, case studies, and advisory documents
• Outcomes -- such as enhanced national capability, national and donor policy reform,
increased participation of farmers (with an emphasis on gender), new opportunities in
IPM supported by international development agencies, and increased national and
local investment in IPM.
However, the Facility’s guidelines, as agreed upon by the cosponsors, provided no guidance
on the criteria or methodologies that would be used to assess the expected poverty impacts of
the program vis-à-vis these main target beneficiaries, both local and global.
3.11 One significant global public good delivered by the Global IPM Facility has been its
assistance in guiding and molding the evolving body of international norms surrounding the
promotion of IPM and reduced reliance on pesticides. Facility staff have provided assistance
to FAO departments involved in pest management. Among other activities this included
contributions to the revision of the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and
Use of Pesticides and further internal scrutiny of the role of the FAO Emergency Program in
pesticide supply (1997-2002, continuing). Facility staff have also assisted in the formulation
of FAO’s role in the implementation of the Stockholm Convention; led an inter-agency
working group to develop IPM-based alternatives for use of POP pesticides in termite control
(1998-2002, continuing); assisted with the reform process of the Japanese aid program KR2; and
contributed to the preparation of the Africa Stockpiles Program regarding the component to
prevent accumulation of obsolete pesticide stocks (2000-2002, continuing).
Activity No. 3: Creating Conditions for Effective National Investment
3.12 The Facility has focused much of its efforts on strengthening national IPM programs
and promoting regional cooperation. Its West Africa program started with a pilot activity in
Ghana with inputs from the Asian IPM program (Box 4). Extension staff from Ivory Coast
and Burkina Faso were invited to participate. The pilot led to further (UNDP) funding of IPM
in Ghana and requests from Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast for similar pilot activities. The
pilot in Ivory Coast led to a request from the extension service to include a significant IPM
component in the Bank-funded PNASA II project. In Burkina Faso and in Mali, pilots led to
the development of a regional IPM Trust Fund program together with Senegal. This Trust
Fund program attracted requests from several other West African countries keen to get
involved. It also led to an additional program funded under GEF to focus on environmental
issues related to pesticide use.
3.13 World Bank funds were used to help support the development and coordination of
regional programs and national IPM initiatives in FAO’s Africa and the Near East regions.
11
Box 4. Integrated Pest Management in Ghana
IPM farmer field schools were introduced in Ghana through an FAO-funded pilot project from 1995 to
1996. Extension staff from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture were trained in participatory IPM, and
conducted three farmer field schools. Cost comparisons showed net returns from the IPM plots that were
32 percent higher than those treated with conventional agrochemicals, convincing government authorities to
scale up the IPM program. The government established a national IPM steering committee chaired by a
Deputy Minister of Food and Agriculture, and a National IPM Coordinator. Ghana obtained additional
funding from the UN Development Programme for a three-year project to train 1,400 farmers per year in
IPM for rice and to develop a farmer field school program for IPM in tomatoes and cabbage. High-level
support for the program and success in the field has led to a recent decision that farmer field school training
methodology should be adopted as the norm in the national extension system. To date, extension agents
have mobilized over 2,400 farmers in the ecologically sound production of rice, cassava, vegetables and
plantain, and there are IPM trainers in every region of the country. The services of these trainers are in
demand by countries such as Malawi, Tanzania, Benin and Senegal.
Source: http://www.fao.org/ag/Agp/agpp/IPM/Farmers.htm; http:www.pan-
uk.org/pestnews/pn38/pn38p4.HTM ; and comments submitted by the Global IPM Facility staff.
At a very early stage of implementation however, the Bank as a cosponsor informed the
Facility’s Secretariat of its concern that many of the activities and proposals of the Facility
were beginning to deviate from the concepts that had been developed during Facility’s
planning stages.7 At the heart of the Bank’s concern was the emphasis by the Facility on the
implementation of pilot projects as opposed to a wider effort to proactively stimulate IPM in
donor projects. The Bank has voiced concern that the Facility is running the risk of spreading
itself too thin due to insufficient selectivity criteria. While the Bank has acknowledged that
FAO’s support is provided to national IPM programs on a demand-driven basis, and this
drive is an important part of the Facility’s work, this has resulted in the Facility’s receiving
an increasing number of requests. The Bank has suggested that housing the Facility in FAO
may have deterred it from turning down requests from FAO’s member countries. The Bank
cautioned that the Facility should not allow itself to be dragged away from its principal task
of “facilitating” the wider-uptake of IPM or diluting its impact through the “holistic” thrust to
the extension/IPM advice that the Facility was pursuing.
3.14 The Terms of Reference for the Scientific and Policy Advisory Panel, as drafted in
May 1996, were strongly focused on the identification of “hot spots” – problem issues and
areas, or areas at risk from pest outbreaks and or areas with excessive pesticide use, with
potential for IPM to succeed in lowering these risks. This type of strategic evaluation and
prioritization signified a keen understanding of the need to establish selectivity criteria based
on strong scientific advice. However, seemingly, this “hot spot” approach was never used.
3.15 The Facility’s Mid-Term Review commissioned a study of institutional issues related
to the methodological approach (MTR, Annex 10). The study conducted a rapid assessment
of two national IPM programs facilitated by the Facility in West Africa and found that it was
questionable as to whether the basic precondition of identifying areas experiencing
significant pest problems and/or pesticide abuse was being met.8 In the case of irrigated rice,
7. Bank response to the “Interim Report of the FAO-World Bank IPM Program” February 1996
8. Lessons from successful experiences indeed suggest that government ownership of IPM as a national strategy
for crop and plant protection occurs when it can be convinced that outbreaks are related to an overuse/misuse of
12
vegetable and plantain FFSs held in Ghana, this question was answered in the affirmative.
Yet, in the case of irrigated rice production in Niger, there was no evidence that the farmers
had ever experienced significant pest problems or for that matter were “overusing chemical
inputs.” This finding led the study authors to suggest that the Global IPM Facility orient its
programs around target areas and crops for which there are noted production problems and
for which some basic improvements can be offered that are viable under average field
conditions.
IMPACT EVALUATION OF IPM
3.16 An impediment to the wider adoption of IPM is the lack of an adequate framework
for evaluating the true costs and benefits of crop protection measures. In particular, there is a
widespread perception in the IPM community that conventional loss assessment methods –
which focus narrowly on yields and productivity and cost-benefit analyses which are limited
to the costs of inputs and the value of products – tend to underestimate the costs of pesticide
use, and of the various benefits that can accrue from adoption of effective IPM strategies
(CGIAR Thematic Working Group on Crop Loss and IPM Impact Assessment).
World Bank Research
3.17 Using new survey data, the World Bank’s Infrastructure and Environment Team of
the Development Research Group attempted to ascertain whether IPM offered the prospect of
lower production costs and higher profitability for rice farmers in Bangladesh (Dasgupta et
al., 2004). The study compared outcomes for farming with IPM and with conventional
techniques, using input-use accounting, conventional production functions and frontier
production estimation. The results suggest that the productivity of IPM rice farming is not
significantly different from the productivity of conventional farming. Since IPM reduces
pesticide costs with no countervailing loss in production, however, it appears to be more
profitable than conventional rice farming. Interview results also suggested substantial health
and ecological benefits. Yet, the study also found that externality problems make it difficult
for farmers to adopt IPM individually. Without collective adoption, neighbors’ continued
reliance on chemicals to kill pests will also kill helpful parasites and predators, as well as
exposing IPM farmers and local ecosystems to chemical spillovers from adjoining fields. The
study therefore concluded that successful IPM adoption may depend on institutional support
for collective action.
Impact Evaluation of the Farmer Field School Approach
3.18 Various components of IPM continue to be debated – including the role of markets
and the private sector in promoting IPM and the integration of IPM into existing
environmental and policy frameworks. Yet the most debated of these issues is undoubtedly
the applicability of Farmer Field School approaches to IPM in various production systems.
pesticides. This was the case in 1986 when President Suharto was made aware that it was a pesticide-induced
resurgence of brown plant-hopper that threatened Indonesia’s rice production.
13
3.19 A synthesis of 25 IPM-FFS impact evaluations revealed that impact evaluation of the
IPM Farmer Field School approach has proven to be complex because of methodological
obstacles, because of the range of immediate and developmental impacts, and because of
different perspectives of stakeholders (van den Berg, 2004). Consequently, there is no agreed
conceptual framework for measuring the impact of the FFS approach. The majority of studies
reviewed measured the immediate impact of training through aggregated data, and reported
substantial and consistent reductions in pesticide use attributable to the effect of training. In a
number of cases, there was also a convincing increase in yield due to training. Most studies
focused on rice. Pesticide reduction and farm-level returns were higher in non-rice crops
(vegetables and cotton) than in rice. A number of studies reviewed described broader,
developmental impacts of training often using qualitative methods, and in some cases
involving farmers in identifying and describing the impacts. Results demonstrated reported
widespread and lasting developmental impacts, which have been best documented for
Indonesia. It was found that the FFS stimulated continued learning, and that it strengthened
social and political skills which apparently prompted a range of local activities, relationships
and policies related to improved agro-ecosystem management.
3.20 Staff from the World Bank’s Development Research Group (DEC) evaluated the
Farmer Field School approach in Indonesia and the Philippines to determine whether
participation in the program had improved yields and reduced pesticide use among graduates
and their neighbors who may have gained knowledge from graduates through informal
communications. The Philippines study suggests that graduates of FFS improve their
knowledge compared to others, but the knowledge does not diffuse significantly to other
farmers. The Indonesia study found that the program did not have significant impacts on the
performance of graduates and their neighbors. Moreover, because the study’s empirical
results do not indicate a program effect on pesticide use, there is no evidence to suggest any
measurable environmental and health benefits. The study further notes that it is risky to
extrapolate the results of small and early pilots programs given that the impact of the FFS
training can be much smaller than envisaged, so that when the program is applied on a large
scale, the effect is to render the economic, environmental, and health benefits much less
attractive than what decision makers were expecting. Whereas one of the key sources of
concern in regard to the FFS approach is its fiscal sustainability, the study recommended
cutting the cost of the program by “narrowing and prioritizing the curriculum” to shorten the
length of the training. The authors argue that a significant reduction of the per-farmer
training cost would enable a much larger number of farmers to be trained directly, allowing
for better prospects of collective action in pursuing coordinated pest management (so that
cross-farm infestations do not occur).9 The authors recommend exercising more caution in
the design of FFS programs in order to improve the likelihood of economic viability.
3.21 Staff of the Global IPM Facility have questioned the overall findings of this DEC
research, insisting that it contains serious flaws that largely invalidate its results and
conclusions and that ignores other predominantly positive study findings of the same project
in Indonesia.
9. The Global IPM Facility notes that concerns about fiscal sustainability largely stem from Bank calculations of
the cost of FFS. The manner in which these costs were calculated has attracted controversy.
14
OED ASSESSMENTS OF BANK PROJECTS IN INDONESIA AND VIETNAM
3.22 OED’s project performance assessment of the Bank’s Agricultural Rehabilitation
Project in Vietnam submitted to the Bank’s Board in June 2002 focused primarily on just one
of the project’s subcomponents – its integrated pest management component (which
represented only 3 percent of the project’s costs). The assessment concentrated on the
project’s extension approach only, the Farmer Field School, the efficiency and fiscal
sustainability of which it found to be questionable. Yet, this OED assessment missed an
opportunity to explore the wider policy implications of IPM as opposed to the limitations of
the FFS approach in Vietnam. A further assessment of the project’s actual impact in terms of
yield increases, stability, environmental and health benefits was warranted here.
3.23 A Special Report on the World Market for Crop Products in Rice (AGROW, 2003)
considered the case of the Vietnam IPM Program and highlighted research findings which
showed that farmers who were trained in IPM used only 1.7 pesticide applications on a rice
crop, compared to 4.5 applications. Pesticide costs were more than halved, while crop yields
rose. Predators and parasites help to limit pest attack in the absence of extensive use of
broad-spectrum insecticides. This reduction in pesticides under IPM schemes led the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to impose restrictions on the most hazardous
compounds. Several Class I pesticides (parathion-methyl, methamidophos, monocrotophos)
were banned as a result.
3.24 In an Implementation Completion Report Review of the Bank’s Integrated Pest
Management Project in Indonesia, OED also assigned only a “modest” rating to the project’s
institutional development component because the actual numbers of farmers and others
trained were substantially less than the project’s appraisal targets. Similarly, OED questioned
the sustainability of the project and rated it “uncertain” because funding was not assured for
the post-project period, because IPM messages had not been fully integrated into the national
extension system, and because national, provincial, and district governments were facing
difficulties due to the project’s establishment of parallel extension structures that had yet to
be integrated into the existing structure. Given that this project had generated such substantial
interest as the first project of this kind to be administered on a such a scale, OED concluded
that there was a need to further assess the project’s actual impact in terms of yield increases,
stability and environmental benefits, as well as to ascertain further information on cost-
effectiveness and value added of the FFS approach in order to draw lessons about its
applicability in diverse country circumstances.
GLOBAL PROGRAM MONITORING AND EVALUATION
3.25 The Facility’s guidelines, approved by the cosponsors, provide no criteria or
methodologies to assess the expected impacts of the program in relation to its main target
beneficiaries. Here the Facility finds itself in the midst of an ongoing debate about how to
measure the economic returns of sustainable farming practices. Several major issues are
involved, including the type of tools most appropriate for measuring program impact and the
methodology to be used in calculating economic returns and impacts of IPM, including the
beneficial spin-offs related to human health and well-being and the environment, or creation
(or loss) of jobs (Schillhorn Van Veen, 2003).
15
3.26 The Facility has contributed to ongoing efforts to establish impact assessment
schemes. It has contributed to workshops on impact assessment methodology, provided
consultancy services to the West Africa IPM Program, provided assistance for the
finalization of two long-term impact assessment studies in Asia, and has prepared a synthesis
report of 25 impact evaluations (that reviews the strengths and weaknesses of different
impact assessment approaches). Moreover, it has advocated for the development of
approaches for environmental and health impact assessment (e.g., and through CGIAR SP
IPM; the Signs and Symptoms approach for health impact assessment; the Environmental
Impact Quotient for environmental impact assessment).
The Program’s Mid-Term Review
3.27 At the second Governing Group Meeting October 2000, the Bank strongly supported
the need for an independent, external evaluation, to include both the Facility’s modus
operandi and the impact of the IPM programs that have been implemented. The Bank
forewarned that the upcoming evaluation would be a determinant of the future of the Bank’s
role as a cosponsor of the Facility, and requested that the terms of reference and the
Evaluation Team be broadly endorsed by the cosponsors. The Bank envisioned the external
evaluation as providing an opportunity for shaping the development of a higher-level
strategic vision for the program.
3.28 The conduct and focus of the resulting Midterm Review, though, was viewed as
unacceptable by the Bank. Specifically, the Bank expressed serious concern that the selection
of the evaluation team leader was in violation of the agreed procedure as recorded in the
Minutes of the second Governing Group Meeting and that joint reporting by the evaluated
unit and the evaluation team violated good governance procedures. This case study agrees
with the Bank’s concerns to the extent that the Bank should have been consulted prior to the
selection of the evaluation team; it should have been given more time to review the TOR; and
the evaluation conducted did not adhere to what the Bank considers to be an appropriate
arm’s length from the program team being evaluated.10 However, it is unclear why the Bank
did not ask for more time. Even with little time and a short response, the Bank’s input into
the terms of reference would have influenced the review, alerted its UN partners to problem
areas, or at the very least, imparted the kind of good governance behavior which the Bank
itself was seeking.
3.29 The Bank did however draft a very detailed response to the Mid-Term Review.
UNEP and UNDP did not submit comments on the terms of reference nor did they provide a
written response to the MTR. An interview with UNEP revealed that since UNEP and UNDP
were not contributing funds for the Facility, there was “less at stake” for these agencies than
for the Bank, although UNEP suggested that the MTR could have added more value by
projecting how the Facility could have helped further the Bank’s integration of IPM into its
development agenda.
10.The terms of reference for the Global IPM Facility’s mid-term review were submitted to the Bank on March
31, 2001, by which time the evaluation team had already been appointed.
16
3.30 Other stakeholders interviewed for this case study, both inside and outside of the
Bank, felt that the Facility’s Mid-Term Review was “overly positive.” Many pointed to the
difference between the original governing document’s reference to an external review versus
the nature of the mid-term review actually conducted.11
3.31 However, as was agreed by the Cosponsors, the Facility is housed in FAO and
according to the Program Document, “the Facility will be administered in the same manner
as FAO’s field projects are administered” (p. 2). This debate has pointed to a clear difference
in views between the Bank’s and partner organizations about best practice in evaluation. The
GIF program offers a wider lesson for other programs as well of the importance of quality
and independence of monitoring and evaluation in the Bank’s partnerships.
3.32 According to Bank staff, the Mid-Term Review should have given greater emphasis
on the need for impact studies, including studies on enhancing understanding of the level and
quality of farmer-to-farmer transmission and the extent of environmental externalities. The
Mid-term Review pointed to several undeveloped components of the Global IPM Facility’s
work program that warrant further investigation. These include:
• Project quality. The program’s quality is affected by a poor link to research and
technical backstopping. The MTR found that there is a poor link between the Facility
and national agricultural universities and research institutions and noted that it would
be important for IPM projects to link with existing national research
projects/programs, to improve researcher-advisor linkage and the feedback from
farmers to research institutions.
• Lack of leadership by cosponsors. To whom should the Global IPM Facility be
accountable – FAO or the Governing Body? It seems the latter does not have a
strategic governing and advisory function. It was envisaged that the Facility would be
responsible to the cosponsors; and would be attached to FAO mainly for
administrative purposes. The MTR recommended the appointment of an independent
facilitator for the meetings. While this suggestion was welcome and would serve to
enhance the flow of discussion as well as the independence of the reporting of
cosponsors’ concerns, the strategic governance and advisory function of the
Governing Group could only be augmented if the cosponsors were committed to a
leadership role. One of the reasons, for example, that the Bank has had very little
influence in steering the course of the Facility (agreed to both by FAO and the Bank)
is that there is no person or persons in the Bank’s anchor to champion global IPM
issues (Kenmore and Pehu, February 2003).
11. The Facility’s Program Document (May 1997), as agreed upon by the cosponsors, called for an external
evaluation to be conducted at the end of the 3rd year in order for recommendations to be provided concerning
the future of the facility beyond its initial five-year framework. The review is referred to as external but never
‘independent’ in the Program Document. A discussion with FAO’s evaluation unit revealed that according to
FAO’s administrative guidelines, it is not mandatory for FAO’s Evaluation Service to be involved in a review.
In the case of the GIF Mid-Term Review, the Evaluation Service was involved in so far as it reviewed the draft
Terms of Reference, suggested a consultant for the review team (in lieu of its staff), participated in debriefing,
and commented on the review report.
17
• Need for evaluation of farm-level impact of IPM. The MTR noted that the information
needed to establish an authoritative picture of farm-level impacts of IPM-FFS is not
available (p. 66). There was a timely need for cosponsors to debate the FFS approach
– with a focus on why it has been the only medium for conveying IPM knowledge.
Such a debate could be strengthened by empirical evidence, such as the type that has
been provided by the Bank’s Development Economics Research Group. As the
economic incentive for IPM adoption in Africa derives less from cash savings on
pesticide use than from the need to improve the stability of yields and the
sustainability of farming systems (Orr 2003), the Bank consensus, and one with
which this review team concurs, is that the Facility not instruct poor countries to
engage in an extension approach that has not yet proven to be economically
justifiable at the farm level.
• An outdated design. The MTR pointed to several items included in the initial design
of the Global IPM Facility that were no longer relevant. It also noted that there has
been a significant change in emphasis, an expansion of the Facility’s scope, and the
emergence of a new strategic focus. There is a clear need for the Program Document
to be revised/or updated at this stage of implementation (six years after inception).
Such a revision should reflect a collective agreement between cosponsors on how to
collect and document cost-benefit data, which would include difficult-to-quantify,
long-term benefits of IPM related to health, environment, and empowerment. The
MTR notes that a reorientation of the Facility may require some adjustment in design,
staffing, or resources. The Governing Group should specifically address these needs
vis-à-vis the Facility’s evolving mandate.
3.33 Because the Bank rejected the MTR, due to the fact that it was prepared by a team of
evaluators selected by the evaluated unit prior to consultation with the full Governing Group,
and because the report was written in part jointly with the evaluated unit, the Bank has not
accepted the report as a basis for recommendations to consider. The subsequent Bank
comments highlighted various substantive points of objection to the analysis and conclusions
of the MTR.
3.34 The absence of a technical response to the MTR by the Global IPM Facility’s ad-hoc
Science and Policy Advisory Committee points to the need for a more defining role of this
committee in the overall governance structure so that future policy direction can be based on
up-to-date scientific input.
4. Governance and Financing
4.1 In reviewing issues surrounding the governance and management of the Global IPM
Facility, there is a particular need to consider the evolution of the Facility’s operational
mandate vis-à-vis the Facility’s formal mandate, which was originally conceived and agreed
upon by the Facility’s cosponsors in 1996. A formal mandate is defined here to be the agreed
statement of an organizations’ overall purpose or raison d’être, usually encapsulated in a
constitution, charter, or articles of agreement. The Global IPM Facility’s Formal Mandate is
encapsulated in the Facility’s Program Document. By contrast, operational mandates
18
represent the accumulation of activities and decisions of an organization as its formal
mandate has been interpreted and operationalized over time.
4.2 The Global IPM Facility was not established by a formal agreement. As reported in
the minutes of the first steering committee, “in keeping with the desire to minimize
bureaucratic procedures and to maintain the simplicity and flexibility of the Facility, it was
decided to utilize the exchange of letters between the sectoral Vice President of the Bank and
the heads of FAO, UNDP and UNEP as the rationale for the establishment of the Facility and
of its cosponsorship by the four international organizations.”12
4.3 The Global IPM Facility is governed by the Facility’s Program Document –the
principles agreed upon by FAO, the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP. The Program
Document outlines the Facility’s strategy and institutional framework. However, the Program
Document’s treatment of the governance structure of the Facility is descriptive in nature; it
does not spell out in clear terms the specific roles and responsibilities of the different
Governing Group Members. There is no indication of how decisions will be taken or what
mechanism will be applied in the absence of consensus.
4.4 Even more fundamentally, it does not appear that the four original cosponsors ever
agreed on the strategies that should be pursued to achieve the stated objectives. The
cosponsors bring different vantage points to bear: whereby a sheer reduction in pesticide use
may be a priority for UNEP, the mandates of FAO and the World Bank would tend towards a
more poverty-focused approach, putting more emphasis on increased productivity and
increased incomes of small farmers, in addition to the health and environmental benefits
generated from a reduction in pesticide use.
4.5 The Governing Group is “the Body that oversees the functioning of the Facility.” It is
comprised of (1) members, (2) observers, and (3) the Secretariat. Members include
representatives of the cosponsors (FAO, WB, UNDP, UNEP), core donors (the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and Norway), and the five geographical regions covered by the Facility.
4.6 Observers include representatives of the ad-hoc Technical Advisory Groups, NGOs,
and the CGIAR Systemwide Program on IPM (SP-IPM). The question as to whether or not
NGOs should have a formal role in the Facility’s governing structure arose in the initial
steering committee consultations. A compromise was reached between Governing Group
Members of the Global IPM Facility and nongovernmental organizations, led by the
Pesticide Action Network (PAN): if the Facility agreed to exclude agro-chemical companies
from its advisory board, then the Facility would also exclude the advocacy-oriented
nongovernmental organizations from formal representation. However, NGOs have been
awarded the status of observers which entitles them to be present at panel discussions,
whereas the commercial private sector has not.
12. According to interviews with the Bank’s General Counsel, legal oversight occurs on a more routine basis
today compared to the past when partnership agreements, such as the Global IPM Facility, were conceived and
negotiated (when there were no agreed procedures for global programs).
19
4.7 The Facility Secretariat is housed in FAO and is based at FAO Headquarters in
Rome. This arrangement was agreed upon by the cosponsors so that the Facility could
optimize its professional links with FAO’s capacity in IPM. The Secretariat would be
administered in the same manner as FAO’s field projects were administered, in which all
financial administration was handled by FAO. Yet, it was intended that the Facility would be
an independent entity that would benefit from working closely with FAO without being
integrated into FAO’s regular programs.
4.8 The Secretariat is headed by a Coordinator who carries full responsibility for the
management of the Facility, including the implementation of the Facility’s work program and
the recruitment of staff. It was understood that the Coordinator would report to the
Governing Group and the donors. The Secretariat would be responsible for submitting
progress reports, work plans, and budgets to the Governing Group for review and approval
while financial plans would be submitted to the donors in the same manner as was done for
FAO’s trust-funded projects.
4.9 The Governing Group was designed to meet annually to review the activities and
progress of the Facility’s Secretariat and, if necessary, to make recommendations for
adjustments to the Facility’s program of activities. The location and schedule of Governing
Group meetings were intended to follow regional IPM meetings (anticipated in the Program
Document) to provide an opportunity for the Governing Group to take up recommendations
posed by regional IPM meetings. In spite of the recorded requirement for annual meetings of
the Governing Group, however, the Secretariat has only convened three meetings in six years
(Rome, 4/1989; Kakamega, 10/2000; Rome, 12/2001). The Bank has attended all three.
PROGRAM FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY
4.10 Accountability. There is a consensus among all stakeholders interviewed for this case
study that there was a clear comparative advantage in housing the Global IPM Facility at
FAO Headquarters, considering FAO’s technical capacity and ability to mobilize global
expertise in the area of IPM. FAO also houses the secretariats for the international treaty on
plant genetic resources, the International Plant Protection Convention, and the Rotterdam
Convention. FAO staff members have strong and up-to-date expertise concerning the
evolving body of international instruments that guide and regulate the entire life-cycle of
pesticide use. However, this arrangement was beset by the equally important need for the
Facility to be an independent entity that would not be integrated into FAO’s regular programs
while benefiting from working closely with it. The Facility’s coordinator and staff are FAO
staff, like the staff of global programs housed in the World Bank are Bank staff.
4.11 Absence of transparent criteria for selecting regional representatives. This case study
was not able to ascertain a set of transparent selection criteria by which the regional
representatives in the Facility’s Governing Group are chosen. It is not clear whether
representatives are nominated in their own right for their expertise, as representatives of
governments or regions, and hence to whom they are accountable. Whose voices are
reflected by the regional representatives? At what level do country governments back the
opinions of individual participants and own the results of decision-making carried out
through this global body.
20
4.12 An inadequate communication strategy: A key aspect of transparency is proactive
communication – concerted, organized efforts to gather and disseminate information to
donors, host country officials, NGOs, and on-the-ground-stakeholders. In this area, the
program fell short. Apart from noting that the Global IPM Facility’s Secretariat would be
headed by a Coordinator, who would carry full responsibility for the management of the
Facility, the topic of management and oversight was not touched upon in the Facility’s
Program Document.13 As a Governing Group member and core donor, the Bank should have
ensured that a five-year work program included a transparent and accountable framework for
strategic direction and oversight of the Facility’s Secretariat.
4.13 The Global IPM Facility has not produced a steady stream of annual reports which it
committed to producing in its Program Document. Its website was under construction
(content kept shifting) the entire length of this review, making retrieval of project
information problematic. The website does not post summaries of meetings or its annual
reports, financial information, or specific project information.
4.14 An inadequate reporting strategy. Governing Group decisions are not recorded.
Proceedings, which are drafted by the Facility following the conclusion of meetings, have
been released as late as six months after the end of a meeting, making follow-up and fact
correction extremely difficult for cosponsor representatives. Bank staff have also voiced in
interviews for this study that the minutes have neglected at times to include strategic
suggestions pertaining to the work plan and future direction of the Facility.
FINANCING OF THE PROGRAM
4.15 The Global IPM Facility is funded through a combination of sources including
contributions by the cosponsors, core funding for the Secretariat from donors and the
cosponsors, and funding for pilot activities from bilateral and multilateral sources and private
foundations. The core funding budget was set at approximately U.S. $13.5 million for the
original five-year work plan of the facility. The World Bank’s core contribution over this
five-year period has been U.S. $2.7 million. The other core donors – the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and Denmark – have contributed the balance.
4.16 The original seed money used to operationalize the Facility was derived from funds
kept in reserve by the Bank’s Planning and Budget Department, an amount which
represented the difference between the Bank’s FY94 FAO-CP Budget (US$ 10,742,380) and
the FY95 FAO budget allocation (US$ 10,214,600). The funds were kept in reserve pending
the Bank’s decision on whether to sponsor and contribute to the Facility. Since 1998, the
Bank’s financial contribution has been derived from the normal budgetary resources
allocated through its Agriculture and Rural Development Department. However, the last time
funds were transferred by the Bank was 2001. No application has ever been made to the
Development Grant Facility.
13. The Steering Committee envisioned the management of the Facility to occur at 4 levels, depending on the
scope of activity involved: at the level of the Secretariat, FAO’s Plant Protection Service, FAO Field Services
and CABI-IIBC. These directions were not translated to the management plan as established by the Facility’s
Program Document.
21
4.17 The World Bank’s contribution is deposited into an account that has been established
by FAO and is operated by FAO’s Agriculture Department.14 According to FAO’s Financial
Rules and Regulations, the account is subject to an external audit at the end of each
biennium, at which time FAO provides donors with a copy of the audited and certified
accounts. However, more complete financial statements have only been available at the
donors’ requests.
5. Fostering a Results-Based Partnership
OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF PARTNERSHIP IN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 There is growing consensus within the Bank and among international development
partners that national and global poverty reduction targets will not be met unless poverty in
rural areas is reduced. The Bank has adopted three new strategies – the rural development
strategy, Reaching the Rural Poor; Water Resources Sector Strategy, Strategic Directions for
World Bank Engagement; and A Revised Forest Strategy for the World Bank Group – that
collectively reaffirm the Bank’s commitment to rural development. All three strategies
recognize the need for enhanced partnership arrangements and linkages with the
development community.
5.2 Through its implementation experience and its cooperation with the FAO IPM
program, the Facility has not only learned that effective attention must be paid to the lowest
levels of the systems within which it works, but also that advocacy must systematically be
undertaken at the highest levels of government to provide the context for IPM field activities.
In Indonesia, FAO established an inter-ministerial coalition to oversee the development of
IPM activities. Such a coalition was able to prevail on the President of Indonesia to issue a
policy calling for the banning of certain pesticides in rice, the elimination of subsidies for
pesticides, and the implementation of IPM training for government agricultural field workers
and for farmers.
PARTNERSHIP WITH DESIGNATED COLLABORATORS
5.3 The Global IPM Facility “is a proto-organization, helping an IPM system to emerge,
make linkages, and achieve leverage” (MTR, p. 7). Its small staff has relied on “designated
collaborators” to augment its limited physical capacity. These collaborators include national
programs, NGOs, FAO, CABI, the CGIAR Centers (especially SP-IPM), EUROIPM, and the
Consortium for International Crop Protection. This study finds that the Global IPM Facility
has underexploited these vital research and implementation links. For example, its
relationship with CABI has failed to develop in a synergistic manner.
5.4 CABI Bioscience. CABI was a driving force behind the establishment of the Global
IPM Facility. However, as a nonprofit organization (supported by the CABI Trust, a
registered UK charity), it was considered inappropriate to list CABI among the founding
14. The World Bank’s contributions are identified by FAO as Project TEMP/INT/778/WBK/Trust Fund No.
050865.
22
sponsors (i.e., UNEP, WB, FAO and UNDP). Some effort was made to define a role for
CABI while being transparent and even handed. The suggested solution was that: “FAO will
invite CABI to enter into a partnership agreement to cooperate in the operation/ management
of the Facility. CABI will respond indicating what it is prepared to contribute to the Facility
on which basis discussions will be held to finalize FAO and CABI roles. CABI’s
contribution can be expected to include support to secretariat functions and to field
operations through CABI offices around the world. It is understood that a CABI
representative would participate in the Steering Committee”.
5.5 Interviews with CABI have revealed that CABI perceived this agreement to be
literally “a partnership” agreement. It was understood that they would do the technical
backstopping for the Facility as they had done for FAO’s IPM-related work in Asia. They
would assist with alternative options, with the design of farmer participatory activities, and
with training and research. CABI was also particularly interested in the follow-up with
farmers after the end of a Farmer Field School training. However, according to CABI, such
requests for assistance and true partnership rarely came. The Global IPM Facility has
indicated that due to CABI’s reorientation since 1995, its partnering potential diminished.
5.6 The CGIAR’s SP-IPM. The Bank, through its substantial support for the CGIAR’s
international agricultural research centers (IARCs), stimulates research on sustainable
agricultural development and IPM in the various IARC institutions. These institutions have
initiated the Systemwide Program on Integrated Pest Management, which aims to improve
communication and activities on IPM among the institutions, as well as between IARCs and
national research and extension programs.
5.7 The Bank has recently become a member of the SP-IPM Steering Committee and is
building on the technical capacity of the IARCs and is exploring ways to strengthen that
partnership by piloting a few projects (in Africa, Latin America, and Asia). Prior to the
Bank’s recent engagement, the Bank was represented by the Global IPM Facility, which has
traditionally sent two representatives to the SP-IPM. The Working Group is made up of
representatives of the members, and in addition to the Global IPM Facility, other active
partners include the IPM Forum, PAN-Africa, and a private sector representative from the
Global Crop Protection Federation, or CropLife (which joined in 2001).
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR
5.8 The Global IPM Facility was designed to look at the quality of IPM and how it was
being implemented at national program levels. There was indeed evidence at the time the
facility was conceptualized that business as usual in many developing countries meant that
countries’ plant protection sectors were heavily influenced by government policies that were
likewise influenced by research funding that was being supplied by the pesticide industry.
So, the focus of the Facility in trying to correct some of the bias in implementation is clearly
understood. By excluding industry formally from its governance structure, the Global IPM
Facility represented the first effort by the donor/development community to develop a
platform of influence as a counterweight to the pesticide industry and to assert a technical
authority in policy discussions (MTR, p. 3).
23
5.9 However, there is some sentiment among stakeholders that the Facility has missed the
opportunity to engage in a real industry-wide discourse about standards concerning different
methods of cost assessment. For example, CropLife International endorses the FAO
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides; membership is
contingent on strict adherence to the code. The industry has issued stewardship programs to
promote best practice in manufacture, marketing, use and disposal of waste.
5.10 What was missed was a chance for science to play a key role in developing global
standards that could transgress interest group politics. With the onset of liberalization
policies across developing countries, global standard setting must be considered an integral
component to successful implementation of an IPM agenda to address the impact of
increasing sales of generic, less specific pesticides worldwide.
5.11 This case study concurs with the Bank’s decision to agree to a compromised
governance arrangement – a compromise that excluded the commercial private sector from
formal representation on the Facility’s Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee
(STAC). However, the Bank has argued (and this case study again concurs) that the Facility,
through the appropriate fora, should intensify collaboration with the private sector to
stimulate the pesticide industry toward rationalizing agro-chemical use (with a focus on the
highly specific products that Box 5. Engaging the Private Sector to Promote
are in the pipeline that could be Sustainable Forest Management
useful in IPM type approaches)
“Participation of the international private sector is especially
as well as to push for an
important to produce favorable forest outcomes….For forest
adherence to global standards management to improve, private investors that are willing to support
(i.e., FAO’s Code of Conduct). sustainable forest management need to be brought into the sector and
logging enterprises that currently participate in destructive and
5.12 The Bank has taken a sometimes rogue and illegal forest operations shut down. If
proactive stance in the forest governments, the Bank and its partners work together to develop a
positive enabling environment for long term and sustainable private
sector, for example, directly sector investments in natural resources, responsible and
challenging logging enterprises environmentally conscious investors can be brought into the sector
to engage in sustainable forest who are interested in supporting sustainable forest management and
management (Box 5).15 OED conservation.”
pointed out in its review of the
At the present time, the Bank’s main interaction with the private
implementation of the World sector on a multilateral basis is the CEOs Forum, where private
Bank’s 1991 Forest Strategy enterprises meet alongside leading NGOs. “This not only ensured
(Lele et al., 2000) that the the exchange of diverse viewpoints….it also enabled the Bank to
prohibition on financing use its convening power to air differences on controversial issues in
commercial logging in primary a transparent manner as perhaps a first step toward possible
solutions to reconciling global and national objectives.”
moist tropical forests contained
in the original version of the
Source: Lele, Uma. Managing a Global Resource: Challenges of
Bank’s Forest Policy has had Forest Conservation and Development. New Brunswick, November,
no discernible impact on the 2002.
rate forest loss and
15. It should be noted that the Bank was far better equipped to deal with forest policy issues (with its sizeable
forestry staff) than with IPM policy where only a few agricultural specialists were involved. The then
Agriculture and Rural Development Department had at least two foresters employed compared to none in IPM
(Comment submitted by Tjaart Schillhorn Van Veen, April 2004).
24
degradation, which continued unabated through the 1990s. Given that the global chemical
industry is expected to experience an annual growth rate of about 3 percent over the next
three decades, with a considerable increase in trade (OECD, 2001), effective operation of the
Global IPM Facility will require a proactive agenda to influence the actions of the private
sector.
5.13 A strong incentive already exists for major multinational corporations to seek
consensus on global standards, given the upsurge in generic pesticides recently entering the
market. About 30 percent or more of pesticides marketed in developing countries do not meet
internationally accepted quality standards (WHO, 2001). Innovation in standard setting at the
global level could promote much more selective and environmentally sensitive compounds.
5.14 CABI has pointed out that the aggressive marketing of a broad range of chemical
products and the widespread and inappropriate use of these products have been the major
obstacles for IPM implementation as well as the cause of pest outbreaks worldwide.
Therefore, CABI would have liked the STAC to have had access to resource persons from
the commercial private sector on an as-needed basis in its meetings – for example, in
discussing plant protection issues related to BT-engineered crops. NGOs, including the
Pesticide Action Network (PAN), have offered constructive suggestions concerning the
possible inclusion of consumer-oriented private sector representatives such as Unilever and
Kellogg, which could sit side-by-side with NGOs to discuss and debate agricultural
production and purchasing strategies, and pest management products and approaches (in an
approach similar to the CEO Forum, as described in Box 5).
PARTNERSHIP WITH GLOBAL IPM NETWORKS
5.15 As Agenda 21 has demonstrated, the urgency of implementing IPM strategies for the
enhancement of sustainable agricultural production is a broadly accepted principle. However,
a major challenge in this effort is the dissemination of an ever-increasing volume of IPM
information, which must be processed in a manner that is accessible and usable by the rural
majority. “The current status of electronic communication of IPM knowledge-initiatives,
while rapidly exploring the benefits of Internet, remain rudimentary and disjointed, lack a
multidisciplinary balance, are not optimally responsive to the needs of potential users, and
lack necessary long term funding….it is critical that global cooperation move ahead. This
means the development of partnerships among diverse systems…The key goal of these
partnerships is effective cooperation leading to more effective use of donor resources”
(Global IPMnet, 1995).
5.16 There is an obvious supportive function that an established networking tool, such as
the IPM Forum, could lend to the work program of the Global IPM Facility. It is not clear to
this case study why the Global IPM Facility has not fostered an interactive relationship with
the IPM networks. For example, while it is the perception of networks such as the CGIAR’s
SP- IPM that the Facility is a “natural partner” in efforts to achieve an international policy
environment that is more favorable to IPM implementation, there is little evidence of this
natural partnership having been fostered by the Facility.
25
THE GENDER DIMENSION
5.17 The Global IPM Facility has begun to collect data and document the processes and
impact of selected IPM training and implementation in relation to livelihood implications
from a gender dimension. It recognizes, though, that more analysis is required to document
the interaction of gender and poverty in local strategies for coping with poverty, such as
selecting early maturing varieties to reduce total labor inputs.
THE INTEGRAL ROLE OF SCIENCE
5.18 This case study repeatedly argues that integrated pest management must be
considered in a site-specific context. In some isolated cases, participation may not be a
prerequisite for successful IPM at all. For example, “the most successful IPM program for
resource-poor farmers in Africa (biological control of the cassava mealy bug) involved no
farmer participation whatsoever. Accidentally introduced into Africa in the 1970s, this pest
caused extensive damage to a major food crop. By 1995, farmers were completely unaware
of the release of the parasitoid, ascribing the mysterious reduction in yield losses from mealy
bug to divine intervention or a change in the weather” (Neuenschwander, 1993, as quoted by
Orr, 2003). The benefits have been valued at U.S. $9.4 billion, and the economic rate of
return (valuing cassava at world market prices) estimated at 199 percent (Zeddies et al.,
2001).
6. Bank Performance
WORLD BANK’S CATALYTIC ROLE
6.1 The World Bank’s initial contribution to FAO in 1995 was instrumental in leveraging
support for the Global IPM Facility. The Bank-FAO partnership, by establishing an initial
joint program, demonstrated a foundational commitment to the institutionalization of an IPM
agenda and built the momentum needed to catalyze the support of other cosponsors like
UNDP and UNEP. While these agencies contributed no core financial support to the Facility,
their presence lent international recognition and legitimacy to the Facility, which in turn
generated bilateral support. Therefore, while bilateral contributions, especially from the
Netherlands, soon surpassed that of the Bank’s, the value of the Bank’s convening power in
this program has been important.
PROGRAM LINKAGES TO THE BANK’S AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS
6.2 Lending for agriculture and rural development has declined from approximately 31
percent of total Bank lending in 1978-1981 to less than 10 percent in 2000-2001 (World
Bank, 2003). The 1990s witnessed a particularly dramatic decline in overall Bank lending for
agriculture – from US$ 3.3 billion in 1990 to US$ 1.4 billion in 2000 – triggered by low
commodity prices and a perceived need to change investment priorities and avoid risks
associated with agricultural projects (Sorby et al., 2003). Interviews with task managers
conducted for this review revealed that there is a level of risk aversion occurring due to the
manner by which integrated pest management related issues are handled within the Bank. A
26
preliminary analysis has suggested that task managers may be wary of projects that invest in
productivity enhancing agriculture due to the fact that such projects immediately attract
attention from the Bank’s compliance units, generate controversy in the field, and complicate
negotiations at the country level.
6.3 A review of the World Bank’s FY01 rural project portfolio was conducted as part of
the Rural Development Department’s recent Review of IPM Trends and Implementation
Strategies (Sorbey et al., 2003). The Review concluded that there is a low inclusion of IPM
in Bank projects, even in projects dedicated to sustainable agricultural intensification.16 The
analysis found that among projects that did include IPM, the majority have focused on
extension and capacity building, while approximately 33 percent involved research and only
19 percent included policy reform. The analysis further suggested that IPM is more often
found to be included in projects in which investment in agricultural research is structured in a
demand-driven way – for example, through a competitive grants system – rather than in other
project types. Even in these cases, provisions to make research results available to farmers
have remained limited.
Operational Policy 4.09
6.4 The above review also found that the Bank’s safeguard on pest management
(OP 4.09) has an “ambiguous role” in the Bank despite the fact that IPM has a high profile as
one of the Bank’s ten safeguards. Safeguard policies aim at putting in place mitigation
measures to prevent direct environmental or social harm that could arise from Bank
intervention. A part of OP 4.09 is a “safeguard” policy in the sense that it requires improved
pesticide use/management practices, but much of it is actually a “how-to” guideline on
improving pest management for better, more sustainable production. This review has learned
that it is very much a matter of judgment as to what is sufficient in order to say that an “IPM
approach” is in place, because IPM is not a particular set of technologies or behaviors –
rather it is more like a philosophy and guiding framework. Therefore, although OP 4.09
requires that any investment that is likely to increase pesticide use be made only “in the
context of an IPM program,” there are no clear set of rules for deciding what qualifies.
6.5 Task Managers in the Bank have various views on what is actually required to satisfy
this safeguard; it is more likely that a TM will focus simply on limiting the use of certain
particularly hazardous products, or include some small element of IPM-related research in
the project, as opposed to ensuring that an IPM approach is in place as a pre-condition of
project financing.
16. The lack of attention to IPM has been pointed out in a number of Bank papers. See ESSD monograph 17
(1997). Others have noted the absence of adequate attention for IPM in Bank-financed work (Guiterrez and
Waibel, 2003). A survey conducted by the Pesticide Action Network of Bank agriculture projects approved
between 1997 and 2000 found that “few mention integrated pest management” but “there are signs of
improvement in LAC and ECA, but SSA and South and East Asia remain problematic” (Tozun, 2001).
27
EXIT STRATEGY
6.6 The Global IPM Facility was originally conceived as a five-year pilot program, with a
sunset clause agreed upon by the cosponsors. The Governing Group agreed in 2001 to extend
the first phase of the Facility by one year, until the end of 2003, along with a focused
evaluation to supplement the MTR to be conducted as part of the extension of Phase 1. This
focused evaluation was specifically requested by the World Bank, but was not untaken.
6.7 The World Bank officially withdrew as a cosponsor from the Facility in March 2005,
in part due to dissatisfaction with the governance procedures and the inadequate evaluation
process at the Global IPM Facility (Annex B). While the Bank clearly recognized the
contribution of the Facility in promoting the issue of IPM in agricultural development, the
Bank’s decision not to renew its engagement was in line with its perception that Bank
partnerships are time-bound and require an exit strategy. Citing concerns raised by OED in its
Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Approach to Global Programs regarding aspects
of the governance of the partnership, the Bank’s decision was delivered more than two years
after the envisioned end date for the partnership (2002) as stated in the original program
document, although actual funding contributions from the Bank ceased before 2002.
6.8 Meanwhile, the Bank’s decision not to renew its engagement with the Facility does
not exclude the possibility for future cooperation between the Facility and the Bank's
regional operations on a case-by-case basis under separate agreements.
RISKS AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Institutional Risk
6.9 There has been much debate concerning the World Bank’s proclivity to manage risks
by simply adhering to policies guided by a “do no harm” principle, as opposed to adopting a
more proactive role in promoting and supporting environmentally safe and sustainable
practices. This debate has been broadly enhanced in the Bank and was highlighted in OED’s
recent review of the World Bank’s 1991 Forest Strategy (2002). The Bank has adhered to the
“do no harm” principle with regard to its pest management activities by developing its Pest
Management Policy (OP 4.09) and by increasing its access to technical expertise via its
cosponsorship and support of the Global IPM Facility. Indeed, after several damaging reports
by the mid-nineties involving the Bank and its lack of an effective pesticide policy, both
measures were critical for the Bank to manage its reputational risk.17
17. “In the early eighties, the Bank managed a project for IFAD in the Middle East. Implementation of a
farming component, on a farm previously operated by a Soviet project was contracted out to a U.S. company.
The contractor found some unused (and undefined pesticides) and buried them on the farm, using more or less
standard practices at that time. In the late 90s, the Bank was notified by the borrower (and FAO) about these
buried pesticides which showed some visible changes in the vegetation (or the lack thereof) around the site…No
significant leakage had occurred, but the site remained a liability. The Bank contacted the borrower on how to
resolve this sensitive issue. In part to address the reputational risk, the Bank decided to help arrange funding to
remove these obsolete stocks, at about U.S. $1 million” (K. M. Maredia, K.M., D. Dakouo and D. Mota-
Sanchez, editors, 2003).
28
6.10 However, as the link between environmental and economic sustainability is
increasingly acknowledged as a central tenet of any sustainable development agenda,
practitioners now must focus on policies that incorporate the “do-good” principle – a
principle that calls for improving awareness, enhancing policy reform and strengthening the
regulatory framework and institutional capacity for the implementation of IPM and the
control of pesticide use and handling” (Schillhorn van Veen, 2003).
6.11 The Bank has established the Quality Assessment Compliance Unit (QACU), which
provides operational support on critical corporate risk projects. The unit now houses one full-
time IPM specialist.18 Given that the Bank revised its operational policy on pesticides in
December 1998, it is overdue that the Bank only hired one professional full-time IPM
specialist in 2003 to oversee its implementation, act as a liaison with the NGO community
and the private sector, and represent the Bank at international fora. Currently, the QACU
IPM specialist conducts training for the Regional Safeguard Management and Review
Teams,19 as well as for Task Managers, Operations staff and field staff for Bank and Client
countries. At present, the IPM specialist provides training and gives support to projects
across sectors (rural development, environment, health and energy).
6.12 Yet, a training-of-trainers approach should be complemented with direct expert input
during a project’s design stage and thereafter. If the ultimate objective is to improve project
performance on the ground, then national pest management plans have to be above all owned
by the clients. The preparation of the plans would be more informed if Bank teams had ready
access to IPM specialists in the way in which it was envisioned the Facility would make
available. Today, in lieu of relying on the Facility for such services, the Bank instead looks to
a variety of sources for this expertise – sources that include the CGIAR centers, NGOs,
bilaterals with field experience involving IPM techniques, and consultants with expertise.
Associated Risk
6.13 Whereas the reputational and financial risks of liabilities associated with state
supported procurement of farmer inputs have been clearly realized by the Bank, the decision
to cosponsor the Global IPM Facility carried with it its own set of risks in terms of increased
expectations at the global and national levels. These risks were fully realized when the NGO
community took the Bank to task for its “poor choice of development partners…evident in its
18. One contribution of the Global IPM Facility’s seconded staff was the demonstration that a conflict of
interest existed between RDV’s advisory role (now ARD) and its administrative involvement in compliance
monitoring. As a result of this, the new pest management specialist post was placed directly under
ESSD/QACU.
19. In FY02, a comprehensive safeguards training program was implemented by QACU for both Bank staff and
clients/partners. Over the year, 94 safeguards training sessions of various durations were delivered. More than
600 Bank staff were trained through 63 sessions on safeguard policies. For clients and partners, 28 training
sessions on safeguards learning and outreach activities were organized in Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia,
Canada, China, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Lao PDR,
Lebanon, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and at the headquarters in
Washington, D.C. The 1,104 participants in these sessions represented a variety of stakeholders, including
government officials, academicians, private sector, and civil society groups. It should be noted that the section
on pest management in this training program had been prepared by staff seconded from the Global IPM facility.
29
Staff Exchange Program” (Letter to the World Bank signed by multiple NGOs, 2001). NGOs
have referred repeatedly to the Bank’s staff exchanges with such companies as Rhône
Poulenc (now Aventis), AgrEvo (now Aventis), Novartis (now Syngenta) and Dow
AgroSciences) as defying the spirit of the Bank’s policy on integrated pest management.
6.14 The NGO community has also voiced dissatisfaction with the Bank for inviting CEOs
of major pesticide and biotechnology companies to a roundtable discussion in December
2000 to identify possible areas of collaboration. However, for reasons outlined earlier,
dialogue with the commercial private sector is just as vital as dialogue with the international
nongovernmental community.
6.15 The Global IPM Facility has been instrumental in assisting the Bank in identifying
and addressing partnership activities that in the past have been inconsistent with the Bank’s
safeguard policy on pest management and its guidelines for partnerships with the commercial
private sector. With the assistance of the seconded pest management specialist, a handful of
cases were documented and directed to the attention of the Director of the Bank’s Ethics
Department, who then reviewed the potential conflict of interest and compliance issues. This
assistance from the Facility has contributed to the sharpening of the Bank’s risk assessment
and approval process for new private sector partners.
7. Lessons
7.1 Integrated Pest Management is an approach that requires an appreciation of its
multiple goals and a suitable methodology for the assessment of its impact. The assessments
currently underway for the FFS method of extending IPM practices are not sufficient to
achieve this goal, and should be considered a separate but complementary exercise. Several
development banks, international organizations and bilateral assistance agencies support
IPM, but there is little consensus on monitoring and assessment standards for the economic,
social and environmental impacts of farmer IPM training. The Global IPM Facility has
contributed to the establishment of assessment standards through its support of collaborative
efforts designed to increase the quality and usefulness of IPM research. Meanwhile, the Bank
needs to consider the best way that IPM lessons can not only enhance the Bank’s rural
strategy and its implementation, but also offer lessons across sectors: agriculture, health, and
the environment.
7.2 The Global IPM Facility’s decision to exclude the agro-chemical industry from its
governance structure could have been balanced with a separate long-term strategy to engage
the commercial private sector in discussions on national and global food safety regulations,
on trade, and on marketing and distribution of generic, less specific pesticides. While the
Facility has sought cooperation from the food processing industries, it has missed an
opportunity to benefit from a pipeline of private sector research and development aimed at
certain market segments and IPM-type issues.
7.3 The program’s governance principles, as designed through an informal agreement,
should have reached a consensus not only on the objectives, roles, and responsibilities of the
partnership but also on how to manage, treat or incorporate different points of view as these
arose. The lack of functional clarity in this program is not a unique phenomenon. The
30
challenge was perhaps more conspicuous in this program given the nature of the subject the
Facility was tackling. The experience with this program emphasizes the importance of clear
terms of reference for the Bank’s representative on the governing bodies of global programs.
Independent oversight should provide the kind of neutral guidance necessary to bring
problematic partnerships back on track or recommend exit for the Bank rather than have it
face undue institutional or reputational risk.
31
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Annex A. Evaluation Framework for The World Bank’s
Approach to Global Programs: An Independent Evaluation –
Phase 2
The Phase 2 Report and each case study follows a common outline and addresses 20 evaluation
questions (Table A.1) that have been derived from OED’s standard evaluation criteria (Table A.2),
the 14 eligibility and approval criteria for global programs (Table A.3), and the 8 eligibility criteria
for grant support from the Development Grant Facility (Table A.4).
The sheer number of these criteria, some of which overlap and others which are mutually exclusive,
can be daunting even to an evaluator. Hence the OED evaluation team has reorganized these criteria
into four major evaluation issues, which correspond to the four major sections of each report (Table
A.1):
I. The overarching global relevance of the program
II. Outcomes and impacts of the program and their sustainability
III. Organization, management, and financing of the program
IV. The World Bank’s performance as a partner in the program
These four issues correspond roughly to OED’s evaluation criteria of relevance, efficacy, efficiency,
and Bank performance, appropriately interpreted and expanded for the case of global programs. In
the case of global programs, relevance must be measured not only against individual borrowing
countries’ priorities and Bank priorities, but also in terms of the interplay between global challenges and
concerns on the one hand and country needs and priorities on the other. The former are typically
articulated by the “global community” by a variety of different stakeholders and are reflected in a
variety of ways such as formal international conventions to which developing countries are signatories;
less formal international agreements reached at major international meetings and conferences; formal
and informal international standards and protocols promoted by international organizations, NGOs, etc.;
the Millennium Development Goals; and the Bank’s and the Development Committee’ eligibility
criteria for global programs. While sponsorship of a program by significant international organizations
may enhance “legitimacy” of a global program in the Bank’s client countries, it is by no means a
sufficient condition for developing country ownership, nor for ensuring its development effectiveness.
“Relevance” and ownership by the Bank’s client countries is more assured if they demand the program.
On other hand some “supply-led” programs may also acquire ownership over time by demonstrating
substantial impacts, as in the case of the Internet. Assessing relevance is by far the most challenging
task in global programs since global and country resources, comparative advantages, benefit, costs, and
priorities do not always coincide. Indeed the divergence of benefits and costs between the global level
and the country level is often a fundamental reason for the provision of global public goods. Evaluating
the relevance of global action to the Bank’s client countries is however important because the global
development agenda is becoming highly crowded and resources to finance it have remained relatively
stagnant, therefore highlighting issues of selectivity.
For the global programs that have been operating for some time, efficacy can be assessed not only in
terms of program outcomes but more crucially in terms of impacts on the ground in developing
countries. Outcomes and impacts in turn depend on the clarity and evaluability of each program’s
objectives, the quality of the monitoring and evaluation of results and, where appropriate, the
effectiveness of the links of global program activities to the country level.
Since global programs are partnerships, efficiency must include an assessment of the extent to which
the benefit-cost calculus in collective organizational, management and financing arrangements is
superior to achieving the same results by the individual partners acting alone. The institutional
38
development impact and the sustainability of the program itself (as opposed to that of the outcomes
and impacts of the program’s activities) are also addressed in this section of each report.
Finally, this being an OED evaluation, it focuses primarily on the Bank’s strategic role and
performance in playing up to its comparative advantage relative to other partners in each program.
The Bank plays varied roles in global programs as a convener, trustee, donor to global programs, and
lender to developing countries. The Bank’s financial support to global programs — including
oversight and liaison activities and linkages to the Bank’s regional operations — comes from a
combination of the Bank’s net income (for DGF grants), the Bank’s administrative budget, and Bank-
administered trust funds. In the case of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) the Bank is a trustee
and in the case of the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), a
“limited” trustee. In the case of GEF and MLF the Bank is also an implementing agency. Thus, the
assessment of Bank performance includes the use of the Bank’s convening power, the Bank’s
trusteeship, Bank financing and implementation of global programs, and, where appropriate and
necessary, linkages to the Bank’s country operations. Bank oversight of this entire set of activities is
an important aspect of the Bank’s strategic and programmatic management of its portfolio of global
programs.
The first column in Table A.1 indicates how the four sections and 20 evaluation questions addressed in
the Phase 2 Report and case studies relates to the eight evaluation issues that were raised by the Bank’s
Executive Board in the various Board discussions of global programs during the design phase of OED’s
global evaluation and identified in the OED’s Evaluation Strategy paper:20
1. Selectivity
2. Monitoring and evaluation
3. Governance and management
4. Partnerships and participation
5. Financing
6. Risks and risk management
7. Linkages to country operations
The third column in Table A.1 indicates how the four sections and 20 evaluation questions relate to
OED’s standard evaluation criteria for investment projects (Table A.2), the 14 criteria endorsed by
the Development Committee and established by Bank Management for approving the Bank’s
involvement in global programs (Table A.3), and the 8 criteria for grant support from the
Development Grant Facility (Table A.4).
The 14 eligibility and approval criteria for the Bank’s involvement in global programs have evolved
since April 2000 when Bank Management first proposed a strategy to the Bank’s Executive Board for
the Bank’s involvement in global programs and include the four overarching criteria endorsed by the
Development Committee, and the four eligibility criteria and six approval criteria presented by Bank
Management to the Bank’s Executive Board. Each global program must meet at least one of the four
relatively more substantive eligibility criteria and all six of the relatively more process-oriented
approval criteria. The first two eligibility criteria relate directly to the Bank’s global public goods (GPG)
and corporate advocacy priorities (Table A.3). Although the six approval criteria resemble the topics
20. OED, The World Bank and Global Public Policies and Programs: An Evaluation Strategy, July 16, 2001,
page 21. “Partnerships and participation” were originally listed as two separate evaluation issues in the
evaluation strategy document. “Monitoring and evaluation” is now interpreted more broadly to include not only
an assessment of the monitoring and evaluation procedures of each program but also the findings of previous
evaluations with respect to the outcomes and impacts of each program, and their sustainability.
39
covered in a project concept or appraisal document for Bank lending operations, unlike for Bank
lending operations, there is currently only a one-step approval process for new global programs — at the
concept stage and not at the appraisal stage. And new global programs only have to be approved by the
Bank Managing Director responsible for the Network proposing a new program, not by the Bank’s
Executive Board.
While the approval of new global programs is logically separate from and prior to their financing
(whether from the DGF, trust funds, or other sources), the eight DGF eligibility criteria for grant
support from the DGF (Table A.4) were actually established in 1998. Twenty out of the 26 case study
programs and about two-thirds of the Bank’s total portfolio of 70 global programs have received DGF
grants.
Table A.1. Key Evaluation Issues and Questions
Evaluation Evaluation Questions Reference
Issues
Section I. Overarching Global Relevance of the Program
1. International consensus. To what extent did the Development Committee
programs arise out of an international consensus, formal (DC) criterion #4 (Table
or informal: A.3).
• Concerning the main global challenges and
concerns in the sector
• That global collective action is required to address
these challenges and concerns?
2. Relevance. To what extent are the programs: A modification of OED’s
• Addressing global challenges and concerns in the relevance criterion (Table
sector A.2) for the purpose of
global programs.
• Consistent with client countries’ current development
priorities The third bullet also relates
• Consistent with the Bank’s mission, corporate to Managing Director (MD)
priorities, and sectoral and country assistance approval criterion #1
1. Selectivity strategies? regarding a “clear linkage
to the Bank’s core
institutional objectives”
(Table A.3).
3. MD eligibility criteria. To what extent are the The four bullets
programs: correspond to the four MD
• Providing global and regional public goods eligibility criteria (Table
A.3).
• Supporting international advocacy to improve
policies at the national level
• Producing and delivering cross-country lessons of
relevance to client countries
• Mobilizing substantial incremental resources?
4. Subsidiarity. To what extent do the activities of the DGF eligibility criterion #1
programs complement, substitute for, or compete with (Table A.4).
regular Bank instruments?
40
Evaluation Evaluation Questions Reference
Issues
Section II. Outcomes, Impacts, and their Sustainability
5. Efficacy. To what extent have the programs achieved, OED’s efficacy criterion
or are expected to achieve, their stated objectives, (Table A.2).
taking into account their relative importance?
6. Value added. To what extent are the programs adding The first bullet corresponds
value to: to DC criterion #1 (Table
A.3).
• What the Bank is doing in the sector to achieve its
core mission of poverty alleviation and sustainable
development
• What developing and transition countries are doing
in the sector in accordance with their own priorities?
7. Monitoring and evaluation. To what extent do the MD approval criterion #6
programs have effective monitoring and evaluation: (Table A.3), since effective
communications with key
• Clear program and component objectives verifiable
2. Monitoring by indicators
stakeholders, including the
and Bank’s Executive
evaluation • A structured set of quantitative or qualitative Directors, requires good
indicators monitoring and evaluation
• Systematic and regular processes for data collection practices.
and management
• Independence of program-level evaluations
• Effective feedback from monitoring and evaluation to
program objectives, governance, management, and
financing?
8. Sustainability of outcomes and impacts. To what OED’s sustainability
extent are the outcomes and impacts of the programs criterion (Table A.2).
resilient to risk over time?
Section III. Organization, Management, and Financing of the Program
9. Efficiency. To what extent have the programs A modification of OED’s
achieved, or are expected to achieve: efficacy criterion for the
purpose of global
• Benefits more cost-effectively than providing the
3. Governance same service on a country-by-country basis
programs (Table A.2).
and The first bullet also relates
management • Benefits more cost-effectively than if the individual
to MD eligibility criterion #3
contributors to the program acted alone?
(Table A.3) and DGF
eligibility criterion #3
(Table A.4).
10. Legitimacy. To what extent is the authority exercised A modification of OED’s
by the programs effectively derived from those with a evaluation criteria (Table
legitimate interest in the program (including donors, A.2) for the purpose of
developing and transition countries, clients, and other global programs.
stakeholders), taking into account their relative
importance?
41
Evaluation Evaluation Questions Reference
Issues
11. Governance and management. To what extent are the MD approval criterion #5
governance and management of the programs: (Tables A.3) and DGF
• Transparent in providing information about the eligibility criterion #5
programs (Table A.4).
• Clear with respect to roles & responsibilities
• Fair to immediate clients
• Accountable to donors, developing and transition
countries, scientists/professionals, and other
stakeholders?
12. Partnerships and participation. To what extent do DGF eligibility criterion #8
developing and transition country partners, clients, and (Table A.4).
beneficiaries participate and exercise effective voice in
4. Partnerships the various aspects of the programs:
and • Design
participation • Governance
• Implementation
• Monitoring and evaluation?
13. Financing. To what extent are the sources of funding MD approval criterion #4.
for the programs affecting, positively or negatively: (Table A.3).
• The strategic focus of the program The third bullet also relates
• The governance and management of the program to OED’s sustainability
• The sustainability of the program? criterion (Table A.2).
5. Financing
14. Institutional development impact. To what extent has A modification of OED’s
the program established effective institutional institutional development
arrangements to make efficient, equitable, and impact criterion (Table A.2)
sustainable use of the collective financial, human, and for the purpose of global
other resources contributed to the program. programs.
15. Risks and risk management. To what extent have the MD approval criterion #3
6. Risks and risk
risks associated with the programs been identified and (Table A.3).
management are being effectively managed?
Section IV. World Bank’s Performance
16. Comparative advantage. To what extent is the Bank DC criterion #3 (Table
playing up to its comparative advantages in relation to A.3), MD approval criterion
7. Linkages to other partners in the programs: #2 (Table A.3), and DGF
eligibility criterion #2
country • At the global level (global mandate and reach,
(Table A.4).
operations convening power, mobilizing resources)
• At the country level (multi-sector capacity, analytical
expertise, country-level knowledge)?
17. Bank action to catalyze. To what extent has the DC criterion #2 (Table A.3)
Bank’s presence as a partner in the programs and DGF eligibility criterion
catalyzed, or is catalyzing non-Bank resources for the #4 (Table A.4).
programs?
42
Evaluation Evaluation Questions Reference
Issues
18. Linkages to country operations. To what extent are MD approval criterion #1
there effective and complementary linkages, where (Table A.3) regarding
needed, between global program activities and the “linkages to the Bank’s
Bank’s country operations, to the mutual benefit of country operational work.”
each?
19. Oversight. To what extent is the Bank exercising This relates to DGF
effective and independent oversight of its involvement in eligibility criterion #6 on
the programs, as appropriate, for in-house and “arm’s length relationship”
externally managed programs, respectively. (Table A.4).
Both questions 17 and 18
together relate to OED’s
Bank performance criterion
(Table A.2).
20. Disengagement strategy. To what extent is the Bank DGF eligibility criterion #7
facilitating effective, flexible, and transparent (Table A.4).
disengagement strategies, as appropriate?
43
Table A.2. Standard OED Evaluation Criteria
Criterion Standard Definitions for Lending Operations Possible Ratings
The extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent (1) with High, substantial, modest,
the country’s current development priorities and (2) with current negligible.
Relevance
Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate
goals (expressed in PRSPs, CASs, SSPs, OPs).
The extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or High, substantial, modest,
Efficacy expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative negligible.
importance.
The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to High, substantial, modest,
Efficiency achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and negligible.
benefits at least cost compared to alternatives.
The extent to which the authority exercised by the program is High, substantial, modest,
effectively derived from those with a legitimate interest in the negligible.
Legitimacy /1 program (including donors, developing and transition countries,
clients, and other stakeholders), taking into account their relative
importance.
The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or High, substantial,
region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its negligible, modest.
human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better
Institutional
definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability
development
of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the
impact
mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which
derives from these institutional arrangements. IDI includes both
intended and unintended effects of a project.
Highly likely, likely,
Sustainability The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time.
unlikely, highly unlikely.
Highly satisfactory,
satisfactory, moderately
The extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were
Outcome satisfactory, moderately
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently.
unsatisfactory, satisfactory,
highly unsatisfactory
The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality Highly satisfactory,
Bank at entry and supported implementation through appropriate satisfactory, unsatisfactory,
performance supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements highly unsatisfactory.
for regular operation of the project).
The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and Highly satisfactory,
Borrower responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, satisfactory, unsatisfactory,
performance and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the highly unsatisfactory.
achievement of development objectives and sustainability.
/1 This represents an addition to OED’s standard evaluation criteria in the case of global programs, since
effective governance of global programs is concerned with legitimacy in the exercise of authority in addition to
efficiency in the use of resources.
44
Table A.3. Eligibility and Approval Criteria for Global Programs
Overarching Criteria: Endorsed by Development Committee (Sept. 2000) /1
1. An emerging international consensus that global action is required
2. A clear value added to the Bank’s development objectives
3. The need for Bank action to catalyze other resources and partnerships
4. A significant comparative advantage for the Bank.
Global Public Goods Priorities /3 Corporate Advocacy Priorities /3
Eligibility Criteria:
Communicable diseases Established by Bank Empowerment, security, and
• HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria Management
social inclusion
and childhood communicable • Gender mainstreaming
(March 2003) /2
diseases, including the relevant • Civic engagement and
link to education participation
• Vaccines and drug development a. Provide global public • Social risk management
for major communicable diseases (including disaster mitigation)
goods
in developing countries Investment climate
Environmental commons • Support to both urban and rural
• Climate change development
• Water b. Support international • Infrastructure services to support
• Forests advocacy for reform private sector development
• Biodiversity, ozone depletion and agendas which in a • Regulatory reform and
land degradation significant way competition policy
• Promoting agricultural research address policy • Financial sector reform
Information and knowledge framework conditions Public sector governance
• Redressing the Digital Divide and relevant for developing • Rule of law (including anti-
equipping countries with the countries corruption)
capacity to access knowledge • Public administration and civil
• Understanding development and service reform (incl. public
c. Are multi-country
poverty reduction expenditure accountability)
Trade and integration programs which • Access to and administration of
• Market access crucially depend on justice (judicial reform)
• Intellectual property rights and highly coordinated Education
standards approaches • Education for all, with emphasis
International financial architecture on girls’ education
• Development of international d. Mobilize substantial • Building human capacity for the
standards incremental resources knowledge economy
• Financial stability (incl. sound that can be effectively Health
public debt management) used for development. • Access to potable water, clean air
• International accounting and legal and sanitation
framework • Maternal and child health
Approval Criteria: Established by Bank Management (April 2000) /4
1. A clear linkage to the Bank’s core institutional objectives and, above all, to the Bank’s country operational work
2. A strong case for Bank participation based on comparative advantage
3. A clear assessment of the financial and reputational risks to the Bank and how these will be managed
4. A thorough analysis of the expected level of Bank resources required, both money and time, as well as the
contribution of other partners
5. A clear delineation of how the new commitment will be implemented, managed, and assessed
6. A clear plan for communicating with and involving key stakeholders, and for informing and consulting the
Executive Directors.
45
Notes to Table A.3.
/1 From the Development Committee Communiqué issued on September 25, 2000. This represents the overall
authorizing environment for the Bank’s involvement in global programs.
/2 From the “Update on Management of Global Programs and Partnerships,” memorandum to the Executive
Directors, March 5, 2003. Each global program is only expected to satisfy one of these criteria, although a
particular global program may satisfy more than one.
/3 These are the five corporate advocacy priorities and the five global public goods priorities (and bulleted sub-
categories) from the Strategic Directions Paper for FY02-04, March 28, 2001.
/4 From the Board paper, “Partnership Oversight and Selectivity,” April 28, 2000, and an internal memorandum
from Sven Sandstrom to all Vice-Presidents, dated November 6, 2000. Global programs are expected to meet all
six approval criteria. The Initiating Concept Memorandum in the Partnership Approval and Tracking System
(PATS) was initially organized according to these six criteria.
Table A.4. Eligibility Criteria for Grant Support from the DGF
1. Subsidiarity The program contributes to furthering the Bank’s development and resource mobilization objectives in
fields basic to its operations, but it does not compete with or substitute for regular Bank instruments.
Grants should address new or critical development problems, and should be clearly distinguishable
from the Bank’s regular programs.
2. Comparative The Bank has a distinct comparative advantage in being associated with the program; it does not
advantage replicate the role of other donors. The relevant operational strengths of the Bank are in economic,
policy, sector and project analysis, and management of development activities. In administering
grants, the Bank has expertise in donor coordination, fund raising, and fund management.
3. Multi- The program encompasses multi-country benefits or activities that it would not be efficient, practical
country or appropriate to undertake at the country level. For example, informational economies of scale are
benefits important for research and technology work, and operations to control diseases or address
environmental concerns (such as protect fragile ecosystems) might require a regional or global scope
to be effective. In the case of grants directed to a single country, the program will encompass
capacity-building activities where this is a significant part of the Country Assistance Strategy and
cannot be supported by other Bank instruments or by other donors. This will include, in particular,
programs funded under the IDF, and programs related to initial post-conflict reconstruction efforts
(e.g., in countries or territories emerging from internal strife or instability).
4. Leverage The Bank’s presence provides significant leverage for generating financial support from other donors.
Bank involvement should provide assurance to other donors of program effectiveness, as well as
sound financial management and administration. Grants should generally not exceed 15 percent of
expected funding over the life of Bank funding to a given program, or over the rolling 3-year plan
period, whichever is shorter. Where grant programs belong to new areas of activities (involving, e.g.,
innovations, pilot projects, or seed-capital) some flexibility is allowed for the Bank’s financial leverage
to build over time, and the target for the Bank grant not to exceed 15 percent of total expected
funding will be pursued after allowing for an initial start-up phase (maximum 3 years).
5. Managerial The grant is normally given to an institution with a record of achievement in the program area and
competence financial probity. A new institution may have to be created where no suitable institution exists. The
quality of the activities implemented by the recipient institution (existing or new) and the competence
of its management are important considerations.
6. Arm’s length The management of the recipient institution is independent of the Bank Group. While quality an arm’s
relationship length relationship with the Bank’s regular programs is essential, the Bank may have a role in the
governance of the institution through membership in its governing board or oversight committee. In
cases of highly innovative or experimental programs, Bank involvement in supporting the recipient to
execute the program will be allowed. This will provide the Bank with an opportunity to benefit from the
learning experience, and to build operational links to increase its capacity to deliver more efficient
services to client countries.
7. Disengage- Programs are expected to have an explicit disengagement strategy. In the proposal, monitorable
ment action steps should be outlined indicating milestones and targets for disengagement. The Bank’s
strategy withdrawal should cause minimal disruption to an ongoing program or activity.
8. Promoting Programs and activities should promote and reinforce partnerships with key players in the
partnerships development arena, e.g., multilateral development banks, UN agencies, foundations, bilateral donors,
professional associations, research institutions, private sector corporations, NGOs, and civil society
organizations.
Source: World Bank, The Development Grant Facility: FY98 Annual Review and Proposed FY99 DGF Budgets, Oct. 28, 1998.
Annex B. World Bank’s Disengagement from the Global IPM
Facility
The World Bank formally notified the Global IPM Facility in March 2005 that its partnership
with the facility had lapsed and that the Bank did not intend to renew its partnership at the
present time. This did not preclude the possibility for future cooperation between the Facility
and the Bank’s regional operations on a case-by-case basis.
The formal letter announcing this decision follows immediately below.
The World Bank 1818 H Street N.W. (202) 473-1000
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT Washington, D.C. 20433 Cable Address: INTBAFRAD
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION U.S.A. Cable Address: INDEVAS
March 2, 2005
Dr. Peter Kenmore
Coordinator
Global EPM Facility
Plant Production and Protection Division
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00100 Roma
ITALY
World Bank's Partnership with the Global IPM Facility
Dear Dr. Kenmore,
With this letter I am responding to your inquiries on the Bank's involvement in
the Global IPM Facility, which were raised in discussions during a recent visit by an
FAO team to the Bank led by Mr. Carsalade.
As you know the World Bank is one of the founders and co-sponsors of the
Global IPM Facility. This association has been a significant input to the development of
the Bank's IPM program and also kept the Bank in touch with the international
development agencies interested in sustainable pest and pesticide management issues.
The main principle for the Bank's engagement in international partnerships is to
promote an issue, which is emerging in the development agenda and to get access to
cutting edge expertise in a particular area as well as to extend the Bank's experience to a
wider development community. By nature most of these partnerships are time-bound,
and need to have an exit strategy.
Recently the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department, OED, conducted a
review of a set of international partnerships in which the Bank is involved, including the
Global IPM Facility. That report recognized the benefits that arose from the partnership,
but it also flagged a few concerns. The review stated that "the Bank's involvement in GIF
calls for an independent assessment and redefinition of the objectives, governance, and
management" (p. 81). It also rated two critical governance attributes, namely,
transparency1 and clarity of roles and responsibilities2 as "Negligible". In order to rectify
1. Transparency: “provision of information to shareholders and stakeholders in an open and transparent manner, such as
accounting, audit, and non-financial but material issues”
2. Clarity of roles and responsibilities: “of the various offices and bodies that govern and manage the program, as well
as clear mechanisms to modify and amend the governance and management of program in a dynamic context”
RCA 248423. (2 WUI 64145 £□ FAX (202) 477-6391
Dr. Peter Kenmore -2- March 2, 2005
the deficiencies in the governance of the partnership and to support the Bank's decision-
making for possible continuation in and support for the partnership, the Agriculture and
Rural Development Department of the Bank requested an independent evaluation of the
Global DPM Facility in the Governing Group meeting in December, 2001. Such an
evaluation has not been carried out. Furthermore, the Governing Group of the GIF has
not convened since 2001 and we have not received any progress reports from GIF since
May 31, 2002.
The Bank recognizes the contribution of the GIF in promoting the issue of IPM in
agricultural development. However, given the governance standards required in the Bank
partnerships, and the fact that the Facility has not undergone an independent evaluation,
which could have guided the Bank's decision making for continued participation, and the
concerns raised regarding the governance of the partnership by the OED report, the Bank
finds it difficult to justify continued partnership with the GIF. In line with the envisioned
end date for the partnership in 2002 as stated in the original program document, the Bank
considers that the World Bank's partnership with the GIF has already lapsed and does not
wish to renew it. The Bank would like to stress that this decision does not exclude the
possibility for future cooperation between the Facility and the Bank's regional operations
on a case by case basis under separate agreements.
Sincerely,
Kevin Cleaver
Director
Agriculture and Rural Development Department