GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 12566 FACILITY NOV. 1993 Economics and the Conservation of- Global -Biological Diversity Katrina Brown David Pearce Charles Perrings Timothy Swanson Working Paper Number 2 UNEP THE WORLD BANK GEF Documentation The Global Environment Facility (GEF) assists developing countries to protect the global environment in four areas: global warming, pollution of international waters, destruction o- biodiversity, and depletion of the ozone layer. The GEF is jointly implemenited bythe United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the World Bank. GEF Workiing Papers - identified by the burgundy band on their covers - provide general information on the Facility's workand more specific information on methodological approaches: scientific and technical issues; and policy and strategic matters. GEF Proje,ct Documents - identified by a green band - provide extended project- specific inforrnation. The implementing agency responsible for each project is identified by its logo on the cover of the document. Reports by the Chairman - identified by a blue band - are prepared by the Office of the GEF Administrator in collaboration with the three GEF implementing agencies for the biannual Participants' Meetings. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY Economics and the Conservation of Global Biological Diversity Katrina Brown David Pearce Charles Perrings Timothy Swanson Working Paper Number 2 UNEP THE WORLD BANK © 1993 The Global Environment Facility 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 USA All rights reservedl Manufactured in the United States of America First printing November 1993 The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Global Environment Facility or its associated agencies. ISBN 1-884122-01-9 ISSN 1020-0894 Economics and the Conservation of Global Biological Diversity This paper explores the relationship between economics and biodiversity conservation with minimal recourse to jargon, making the issue accessible even to the non-economist. It deals with the concepts of cost and benefit as they apply to biodiversity. Since biodiversity is an area where no clear measure of benefits exists, the process of project selection for a financial mechanism such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) becomes especially complex. The paperreviews concepts and measures of biodiversity, assesses what is currently known aboutextinction r ates and species loss, and looks at efforts to place a value on biodiversity. It also investigates the question of why biodiversity is being eroded, and argues that the main economic causes of biodiversity erosion are the pressures exerted by population growth to convert available land, and under-investment in biodiversity. it recommends policies that reduce the returns on land conversion by eliminating subsidies and other economic policy distortions; and policies that aim to increase the returns on biodiversity conservation, for e xample, by conferring and enforcing property rights on those who sustainably manage resources, and by instituting mechanisms to capture the global benefits of sustainable land use. Finally, the paper considers ways in which the GEF might alleviate the problem of under-investment in biodiversity. David Pearce is Professor of Environmental Economics and Director of the Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment (CSERGE), University College, London, and University of East Anglia, United Kingdom. Katrina Brown is Senior Research Associate at CSERGE. Charles Perrings is Plrofessor of Environmental Economics and Environmental Management, University of York, and Timothy Swanson is Lecturer in Economics at the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. iii Contents Introduction I Concepts and Measures of Biological Diversity 3 2 Placing a Value on Biological Diversity 10 3 The Economic Causes of Biodiversity Erosion 25 4 Reversing the Decline 36 5 SSummary and Conclusions 47 Tables in text 1.1 Estimates of species extinction 7 2.1 Total economic value and tropical forests 12 2.2 Summary of studies on the economic value of biodiversity 16 2.3 Preference valuations for endangered species and prized habitats 20 2.4 Implicit global willingness to pay in international transfers: debt-for-nature swaps 21 2.5 Carbon storage in different uses of tropical forests 23 2.6 Changes in carbon with land-use conversion 23 3.1 Rate of conversion of land 28 3.2 Econometric studies of deforestation 29 3,3 Producer subsidies as a percentage of producer prices in agriculture 33 3A4 Two sources of subsidy to agriculture 34 4. 1 Cost recovery in irrigation schemes 44 4.2 Economic subsidies to energy use in selected countries 45 5.1 Economic value classification 47 Figures in text 5.1 Schematic summary of factors affecting global biological diversity 50 Appendix I: A Survey of the Results of Econometric Studies on Deforestation 52 Appendix II: Resource Franchise Agreements 58 Appendix III: Incremental Costs 59 Bibliography 61 v Abbreviations CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna CVM Contingent valuation method DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid ERR Economic rate of return GNP Gross national product GWP Gross world product NPV Net present value PCR Polymerase chain reaction TDR Tradable development right TEV Total economic value WTP Willingness to pay Data notes: Dollars ($) are current US dollars unless otherwise indicated 1 hectare = 2.47 acres vi Introduction The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was estab- but which have ample rationale when considered in lished in 1990 for a Pilot Phase of three years. Its the context of global costs and benefits. Examples purpose is to channel investment and technical of the problems posed include: assistance funds to developing nations to assist them with their role in reducing four major global * How best to choose between projects that are environmental problems: the depletion of the ozone innovative but more costly compared with others layer, the threat of global warming, the degradation that may be more traditional but yield more of international waters, and the loss of biological immediate, sizable reductions in local pollution diversity. The GEF will continue into an operation- * How to measure the benefit of biodiversity con- al phase, GEF II, in which it will consolidate its servation, and hence how to choose between learning experience and disburse funds to the four competing conservation projects. focal areas, and toward solving problems of deser- tification and tropical deforestation insofar as they Because the GEF is charged in its operational phase relate to the original four areas of concern. The with assuring the "cost-effectiveness of its activities in modified GEF will be the interim funding instru- addressing the targeted global environmental issues" ment to achieve the goals of the two international (GEF 1992, Principle IV), the measurement of cost conventions-the Framework Convention on Cli- and effectiveness is a focal concern. Cost-effective- mate Change and the Convention on Biological ness has long been the concern of economics as a Diversity-agreed at the Earth Summit in Rio de discipline, and the time seems right for some reflec- Jane3iro in June 1992. tions on the way that economics can contribute to achieving the GEF's global objectives. The disciplines needed for the efficient working of the GEF embrace science and social science. The This paper is intended as a contribution to this process. need to think of global solutions and global costs It focuses very much on the perspective of the econo- and benefits has set a challenge for these disci- mist, but without (we hope) suggesting that econom- plines, and the Pilot Phase of the GEF has been ics is the only relevant discipline. It clearly is not. The characterized by a productive questioning of the paper also focuses only on biodiversity, for two rea- techniques and procedures whereby investments sons. First, the GEF has already commissioned work are usually appraised to see how they are best in the area of cost-effectiveness and greenhouse gas modified, if at all, in the global context. The reason reduction (Mintzer 1992). The second is that biodiver- for this reappraisal is that the GEF exists in the main sity represents a major challenge to cost-effectiveness to fund those investments which have limited or no thinking: it will take a good deal more collaborative rationale in terms of net gains to the host country, and interdisciplinary thinking to develop the kinds of evaluative tools that are needed for this purpose. Rath- Economists, like scientists, have a habit of using er, we have set out to say, broadly, what is known about jargon. We have tried to minimize its use to make the contribution of economics to biodiversity conser- the paper comprehensible to the largest possible vation, and to suggest some ways in which this "state audience. In so doing we are conscious that the of the art" impinges on GEF concerns. As such, we go professional economist may feel we have oversim- beyond the immediate issues of measuring costs and plified or failed to qualify statements sufficiently. effectiveness of conservation to investigate also why We feel that the increase in communicability is a biodiversity is being eroded, for only by analyzing price worth paying for this oversimplification. causes can we ultimately secure truly cost-effective policies. 2 Concepts and Measures of Biological Diversity The term biological diversity, often shortened to and micro-organisms. Each species is the reposito- biodiversity, is commonly used to describe the ry of an immense amount of genetic information. number, variety, and variability of living organ- The number of genes ranges from about 1,000 in isms. Biodiversity therefore embraces the whole of bacteria to more than 400,000 in many flowering "Life on Earth." Decline in biodiversity includes all plants. Each species consists of many organisms, those changes that have to do with reducing or and virtually no two members of the same species simplifying biological heterogeneity-from indi- are genetically identical. Thus, even if an endan- viduals members of a species to regional ecosys- gered species is saved from extinction, it probably tems. has lost much of its internal diversity. Consequent- ly, when populations expand again, they become This chapter explains some of the key concepts of more genetically uniform than their ancestors. For biodiversity, and approaches to the measurement of example, the bison herds of today do not have the biodiversity and its components. Some estimates of same genetic diversity as the bison herds of the rates of extinction are presented, and the problems early eighteenth century (McClenagham et al. in deriving such figures highlighted. The develop- 1990). merit of indicators to assess and monitor biodiversi- ty that aid in the formulation of effective conservation Population geneticists have developed mathemati- strategies, are briefly described. The chapter stress- cal formulas to express a genetically effective pop- es the range of measures of diversity from different ulation size. These explain the genetic effects on scientific perspectives. The different conceptual- populations that have passed through the bottleneck izatitons of biodiversity lead to different policy of a small population size, such as the North Amer- prescriptions, and require different indicators for ican bison or African cheetah (World Conservation monitoring and assessment. Monitoring Centre 1992). Subsequent inbreeding may result in reduced fertility, increased suscepti- The meaning of biological diversity bility to disease, and other negative effects that are Biodiversity may be described in terms of genes, termed "inbreeding depression." These effects de- species, and ecosystems, corresponding to three pend on the breeding system of the species and the fundamental and hierarchically related levels of duration of the bottleneck. If the bottleneck lasts for biological organization. many generations, or population recovery is ex- tremely slow, much variation can be lost. Converse- Genetic diversity ly, "outbreeding depression" occurs when species Genetic diversity is the sum of genetic information become genetically differentiated across their range, contained in the genes of individual plants, animals and individuals from different parts of the range 3 breed. Genetic differentiation within species oc- The exact number of species on earth is not known, curs as a result of either sexual reproduction, in not even to the nearest order ofmagnitude. Wilson which genetic differences from individuals may be (1988) estimates that the absolute number of spe- combined in their offs,pring to produce new combi- cies falls between 5 million to 30 million, although nations of genes, or ifrom mutations, which cause some scientists have put forward estimates of up to changes in the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 50 million. At present, approximately 1.4 million living species have been described. The best cata- The significance of genetic diversity is often high- logued groups are vertebrates and flowering plants. lighted with reference to global agriculture and Such groups as lichens, bacteria, fungi, and round- food security. This stresses the dependence of the worms are relatively under-researched. Likewise, majority of the world's human population on a few some habitats are better researched than others. staple food species. These staple species have been Coral reefs, the ocean floor, and tropical soils are improved by tapping genes from their wild relatives not well studied. As we shall see, this lack of to foster new characzteristics, for example, to im- knowledge has considerable implications for the prove resistance to pests and disease (Cooper et al. economics of biodiversity conservation. 1992). The most obvious pattern in the global distribution Species diversity of species is that overall species richness increases Species are populations within which gene flows with decreasing latitude. Not only does this apply as occur under natural conditions. Within a species, a general rule, it also holds within the great majority all normal individuals are capable of breeding with of higher taxa, at order level or higher. However, other individuals of tlhe opposite sex, or at least of this overall pattern masks several minor trends. being genetically linked with them through chains Species richness in particular taxonomic groups, or of other breeding individuals. By definition, mem- in particular habitats, may show no significant lat- bers of one species do not breed freely with mem- itudinal variation, or may actually decrease with bers of another species. Although this definition decreasing latitudes. In addition, in terrestrial eco- works well for many animal and plant species, it is systems, diversity generally decreases with increas- more difficult to delineate species in populations ing altitude. This phenomenon is most apparent at where hybridization, self-fertilization or partheno- extremes of altitude, with the highest regions at all genesis occur. Scientists often disagree about where latitudes having extremely low species diversity. the necessary arbitrary divisions must be made. However, these areas also tend to be relatively small, which may be a factor that results in lower New species may be established through polyp- species numbers. In marine systems, depth is the loidy, the multiplication of the number of gene- analogue of altitude in terrestrial systems, and biodi- bearing chromosomes. More commonly, new versity tends to be negatively correlated with depth. species result from geographic speciation, the pro- Gradients and changes in species richness are also cess by which isolated populations diverge through noticeably correlated to precipitation, nutrient lev- evolution by being subjected to different environ- els, and salinity, as well as other climatic variations mental conditions. Over a long period, differences and available energy. between populations may become great enough to reduce interbreeding. Eventually populations may Ecosystem diversity be able to co-exist as newly formed, separate Ecosystem diversity relates to the variety of habitats, species. biotic communities, and ecological processes in the biosphere, as well as to the diversity within ecosys- Within the hierarchical system used by scientists to tems. Diversity can be described at a number of classify organisms, species represent the lowest different levels and scales. Functional diversity is the level of classification. In ascending order, the main relative abundance of functionally different kinds of categories, or taxa, of living things are: species, organisms. Community diversity comprises the size, genus, family, order, class, phylum, and kingdom. number, and spatial distribution of communities, and 4 is sornetimes referred to as patchiness. Landscape include keystone species, whose loss would trans- diversity is the diversity of scales of patchiness. form or undermine the ecological processes, or fundamentally change the species composition No sirnple relationship exists between the diversity of the community. of an ecosystem and such ecological processes as productivity, hydrology, and soil generation. Nor Biodiversity is thus a complex and all embracing does (diversity neatly correlate with ecosystem sta- concept that can be analyzed and interpreted on bility, its resistance to disturbance, or its speed of many levels and scales. recovery. There is also no simple relationship with- in any ecosystem between a change in its diversity Measurement of biodiversity and the resulting change in its component process- Biodiversity can be better understood when we es. On the one hand, the loss of a species from a examine exactly what we measure to assess biolog- particular area or region (local extinction or extirpa- ical diversity. However, this also serves to highlight tion) may have little or no effect on net primary further the range of interpretations, and the impor- productivity if competitors take its place in the tance placed on different hierarchical levels of comrnunity. On the other hand, there can be cases biodiversity, by scholars of different disciplines where the converse is true. For example, if zebra and by policy-makers. Reid et al. (1992) have and wildebeest are removed from the African sa- commented on the continuing lack of a clear con- vannah, net primary productivity of the ecosystem sensus about how biodiversity should be measured. would decrease. Indeed, debates on measurement have comprised a substantial part of the ecological literature since the Despite these anomalies, Reid and Miller (1989) 1950s. This lack of consensus also has important suggest six general rules of ecosystem dynamics implications for the economics of biodiversity con- that link environmental changes, biodiversity, and servation. At its most basic level, any measure of ecosystem processes. These rules are: cost-effectiveness used to guide investments in conservation must have some index, or set of index- * The mix of species making up communities and es, of change in biodiversity. ecosystems changes continually. * Species diversity increases as environmental het- Measurement of genetic diversity erogeneity or the patchiness of a habitat does, but The analysis and conceptualization of differences increasing patchiness does not necessarily result within and among populations is in principle iden- in increased species richness. tical, regardless of whether one is considering a * Habitat patchiness influences not only the com- population to be a local collection of individuals, a position of species in an ecosystem, but also the geographical race, a subspecies, species, or higher inlteractions among species. taxonomic group. Genetic differences can be mea- * Periodic disturbances play an important role in sured in terms of phenotypic traits, allelic frequen- creating the patchy environments that foster high cies, or DNA sequence. species richness. They help to keep an array of Phenetic diversity. This is based on measures of habitat patches in various successional states. phenotypes, which are individuals that share the * Both size and isolation of habitat patches can same characteristics. The method avoids exami- influence species richness, as can the extent of nation of the underlying allelic structure. It is transition zones between habitats. These transi- usually concemed with measurement of the var- tional zones, or "ecotones," support species that ance of a particular trait, and often involves would not occur in continuous habitats. In tem- readily measurable morphological and physio- perate zones, ecotones are often more species logical characteristics. Phenetic traits can be rich than continuous habitats, although the re- easily measured, and their ecological or practical verse may be true in tropical forests. utility is either obvious or can be readily inferred. * Certain species have disproportionate influences H t g on the characteristics of an ecosystem. These sHowever, their genetic basis s often difficult to assess, and standardized comparisons are diffi- cult when populations or taxa are measured for In its ideal form, species richness would consist of a qualitatively different traits. complete catalogue of all species occurring in the * Allelic diversity. I'he same gene can exist in a area under consideration, but this is not usually number of variants and these variants are called possible unless it is a very small area. Species rich- alleles. Measures of allelic diversity require ness measures in practice therefore tend to be based knowledge of the allelic composition at individ- on samples. Such samples consist of a complete ual loci on a chrornosome. This information is catalogue of all organisms within a taxa found in a generally obtainedl using protein electrophore- particular area. Alternatively, species richness might ses, which analyzes the migration of enzymes be a measure of species density in a given sample under the influence of an electric field. Allelic plot, or a numerical species richness defined as the diversity may be measured at the individual number of species per specified number of individ- level or at the population level. In general, the uals, or as a unit of biomass. more alleles, the more equitable their frequen- cies; and the more loci that are polymorphic, the A more informative measure of diversity would also greater the genetic diversity. Average expected incorporate the "relatedness" of the species involved heterozygosity (the probability that two alleles (Reid et al. 1992). Using a measure of taxonomic sampled at randorn will be different) is com- richness would imply that a region containing many monly used as an overall measure. Several dif- closely related species would rank lower than one ferent indexes and coefficients can be applied to containing the equivalent number of distantly relat- the measurements to assess genetic distance ed species. However, as measures which could be (see Antonovic 1990). The advantage of the applied to a range of different organisms have yet to detection of allelic variation by electrophorese be developed (but see Weitzman 1991 a, 1991 b), the is that it can be precisely quantified to provide richness of genera or families may provide a more comparative measures of genetic variation. accurate assessment of species diversity than simple However, the disadvantages are that it may not measurements of species richness. be representative of variation in the genome as a whole, and does not take account of functional Measurement of community diversity significance or the selective importance of par- Many environmentalists and ecologists stress the ticular alleles. importance of conservation of biodiversity at the * Sequence variation. This involves sequencing a community level. However, several factors make portion of DNA using the polymerase chain measurement and assessment of diversity at this reaction (PCR) teclnique. This technique means level more nebulous and problematic. Many differ- that only a minute amount of material, perhaps ent "units" of diversity are involved at the supra- one cell, is required to obtain the DNA sequence species level, including: data, so that only a drop of blood or a single hair is required as a sarnple. Closely related species * Pattern of habitats in the community may share 95 percent or more of their nuclear * Relative abundance of species DNA sequences, implying a great similarity in * Age structure of populations the overall genetic information. * Patterns of communities on the landscape * Trophic structure Measurement of species diversity * Patch dynamics. Species diversity is a function of the distribution and abundance of species. Often, species richness- At these levels, unambiguous boundaries delineat- the number of species within a region or given ing units of biodiversity do not exist. By conserving area-is used almost synonymously with species biodiversity at the ecosystem level, not only are the diversity. Technically, however, species diversity constituent species preserved, but the ecosystem includes some consideration of evenness of species functions and services are also protected. These abundances. Let us first consider species richness as include pollutant cycling, nutrient cycling, climate a proxy measure of species diversity. control, as well as non-consumptive recreation, sci- 6 entific, and aesthetic values (see forexample, Norton pollution also contribute. Global warming is ex- and Ulanowicz 1992). pected to exacerbate the loss and degradation of biodiversity by increasing the rate of species extinc- Given the complexities of defining biodiversity at tion, by modifying the composition of habitats and community and at ecosystem levels, a range of ecosystems, and by altering their geographic areas measurement approaches exist. As Reid et al. (Peters and Lovejoy 1992). (1992) explain, many community attributes are components of biodiversity and might deserve Traditionally, from the Darwinian perspective, ex- monitoring for specific objectives. For example, tinction is the fate of species that lose the struggle generic measures of community-level diversity in- for survival. Taken to its logical conclusion, this clude biogeographical realms or provinces based on view implies that extinction is a constructive pro- the distribution of species, and eco-regions or eco- cess, eliminating obsolete species. It is now widely zones based on physical attributes such as soils and recognized, however, that this is not the case, since climate. These definitions may differ according to human intervention distorts the natural process. scale. For example, the world has been divided into Many extinctions are non-constructive, and a spe- biogeographical provinces, which are the more finely cies' ultimate demise is not a reflection of its "good- grained classifications that might be useful for ness" as a biological organism. policy-making. More policy-oriented measures in- clude the definition of hotspots (based on the num- No precise estimate of the number of species being ber of endemic species) and the delineation of lost can be made, because the present number is not megadiversity states. These concepts will be dis- known. The vast majority of species is not moni- cussed in the context of using indicators for assess- tored. However, there is no doubt that extinction is ing and monitoring biodiversity. proceeding faster than it did before 1800. It seems likely that major episodes of species extinction have Extinction occurred throughout the past 250 million years, at Speciation and extinction are natural processes, and average intervals of approximately 26 million years. Swanson (I 992a) has described biodiversity as the According to Wilson (1988), the current reduction net result of the processes of speciation and extinc- of diversity seems likely to approach that of the tion. Species may be lost for a variety of reasons. great natural catastrophes at the end of the Paleozoic Habitat loss and degradation are the most important and Mesozoic eras, the most extreme in the past 65 causes of the present extinction crisis, but over- million years. Myers (1986) links present rates of harvesting, the introduction of exotic species, and tropical deforestation to a megadiversity spasm. l'able 1.1 Estimates of species extinction % Global loss Estimate of species loss per decade Method of estimation Reference I million species 1975-2000 4 Extrapolation of past Myers (1979) exponentially increasing trend 15-20% of species 1980-2000 8-11 Species area curves Lovejoy (1980) 25% of species 1985-2015 9 Loss of half species in Raven (1988) area likely to be deforested by 2015 2-13% of species 1990-2015 1-5 Species area curves Reid (1992) Source: Reid (12992) 7 Table 1.1 shows some recent estimates of extinction argues that such a technique may be more appropri- rates. Many are based on estimates of habitat loss. ate for assessing conservation options than just a The procedure estimates potential losses of species conventional taxonomic approach. This alternative by extrapolation of rates of habitat destruction and approach focuses on the aspects of biodiversity that calculation of associated extinctions using species are critical for maintaining the resilience of ecosys- area curves. It is based on principles of island tems. Resilience is the capacity of an ecosystem to biogeography, and recognizes a relationship be- maintain its characteristic patterns and rates of tween the number of species present and the area of processes such as primary productivity and nutrient a given habitat (MacArthur and Wilson 1967). Due cycling in response to variable environmental con- to several problems alssociated with the use of this ditions. At the other extreme, Eiswerth and Haney rather over-simplified equation for the calculation (1992) argue that environmental economists and of extinction, figures calculated in this way might policy-makers tend to focus on the importance of underestimate the exjpected extinction rate. species in isolation to one another, and on the number of species (species richness) in natural Assessing and monitoring biodiversity areas, to the exclusion of genetic and ecosystem for conservation diversity. They propose the use of estimates of For the assessment and monitoring of biodiversity inter-species genetic distance (originating in DNA- as an aid to conservation policy, Noss et al. (1992) DNAhybridization)asameasureofgeneticdistinc- suggest a number of indicators. Useful indicators at tiveness which should be considered in deciding the species level include monitoring of keystone conservation policy. species-those speciles of pivotal importance in their ecosystems upon which the diversity of the In biodiversity, as in other areas, economic and community as a whole strongly depends; and um- political factors rather than biological expedients brella species (relatively wide-ranging species, such often dictate the policies that are enacted. Soberon as large carnivores, whose protection would assure (1992) highlights the gaps between conservation adequate amounts of habitat for many other spe- theory and practice. For example, reserve sites are cies). Five categories of species have been used to proposed for reasons of historical biogeography: justify special conservation efforts: ecological indi- richness of selected taxa, number and kinds of cator, keystone, umbrella, flagship (charismatic), endemism, and other indexes that can be quantified. and vulnerable species. However, in practice, the size and shape of reserves are chosen as a result of political and economic At a community level, taxonomic groups that are considerations. relatively easy to monitor or that are particularly sensitive to environmental stress (for example, Conclusions amphibians, fish, predatory birds, and butterflies) The design and implementation of conservation may be monitored for changes in abundance, spe- policies will depend on what we want to conserve, cies richness, or guild (a group of organisms that how we define biodiversity, and how we measure it shares a common food source) proportions. Bibby in practice. It is clear that what we measure and how et al. (1992) advocate the use of endemic bird we choose to measure it affects our judgement and species for identifying areas for conservation. At a our ability to formulate and enact effective policy. landscape level, environmental changes such as From a conservation standpoint, it must be remem- changes in land use (say deforestation), human bered that regions rich in some species are not populations, demography, and even gross national necessarily rich in others. For example, in terms of product (GNP), may be used as indicators. species per unit area, Central America is more species rich than northern South America, but north- Increasingly, scientists argue that a species focus is ern South America has more plant species. On the not the best approachi to the conservation of biodi- African continent, the species richness of butter- versity. For example, Walker (1992) presents a flies is greater in west Africa just north of the functional approach to analyzing biodiversity. He equator, while the diversity of passerine birds, pri- 8 mates, and ungulates is greatest in central and east scientists argue that this cannot be done effectively Africa, and plant diversity is greatest just north and without more accurate data on existing species. south of the equator in west Africa. Mares (1992) Wilson (1988) has drawn attention to the declining has recently drawn attention to the incongruity in number of taxonomists worldwide, the dwindling concentrating on Amazonia as the center of biodi- financial resources for their work, and the need to versity. The drylands in South America are habitat conserve this endangered species. to 53 percent more endemic mammalian species, and 440 percent more endemic genera than the Biodiversity can be interpreted and measured on Amazonian lowlands. On the basis of Mares' find- different levels of biological organization. Our ings, if a single macro-habitat were chosen in which knowledge is far from complete in many areas of to preserve the greatest mammalian diversity in genetics, in terms of total species and their distribu- South America, it would be the largely continuous tion, and an ecological functions and processes. deserts, scrublands and grasslands. This is exactly There is no scientific consensus on how best to the converse of the funding, research, and conserva- measure biodiversity, but a number of indicators tion strategies that have been employed to date. have been developed to inform conservation policy. Research is required on a number of fronts, includ- The gaps in our knowledge of global biodiversity ing inventory, classification, mapping distribution, are significant, and basic work on inventories and and monitoring. The implications for the econom- systernatics is still required. Noss et al. (1992) ics of biodiversity conservation are potentially for- highlight the need for biodiversity inventories, which midable. If we do not know what we are conserving they visualize as a series of filters designed to and no reasonable consensus exists on how to capture elements of biodiversity at various levels of measure biodiversity, how can effective policy be organization. At a national level, biodiversity in- designed? While conservation policy may thus ap- ventories are best focused on the species, commu- pear to be very much a hit-and-miss affair-and it nity (ecosystem), and landscape levels. While Erwin does tend to be so for many reasons in addition to (1991) also acknowledges these gaps in knowledge, scientific uncertainty, as we shall see-it is impor- he highlights the potential pitfalls in attempting to tant that policy goes in the right direction, even if an estimate all the species on earth. Knowledge of the optimal policy is not apparent. However, before precise number of species might not be as important investigating what that direction is, the importance as recognizing the present rate of extinction due to of biological diversity needs to be established. This human intervention, and devising policies to mini- may seem odd, but it is the failure to establish why mize it. This view implies that research efforts biodiversity is important that explains why so much should be channeled into conservation and preser- economics appears to proceed on the assumption vation of those species that we do have. Some that it is not important. 9 Placing a'Value 2 on Biological Diversity Ethics and econDmics life itself. It is commonplace to find references to Economists approach the issue of measuring impor- the value of life. Economists are apt to speak of the tance in a particular way. The essence of their environment as a commodity, which leaves them approach is that imrportance is measured by peo- open-perhaps justifiably-to charges that this is ple's preferences. In turn, preferences are measured all the environment is worth. All these terminolo- by looking at an individual's willingness to pay gies generate an unfortunate image of what eco- (WTP) for something. Economic value is then mea- nomic valuation involves. What is being valued is sured by the summation of many individuals' will- not the "environment" or "life," but people's pref- ingness-to-pay. So economic valuation in the erences for changes in the state of their environ- environment context is about measuring the prefer- ment, and their preferences for changes in the level ences of people for an environmental good (biodi- of risk to their lives. There is no dispute that people versity) or against an environmental "bad" (loss of have preferences for and against environmental biodiversity). Valuation is therefore of preferences change. There is no dispute that people are willing held by people. The valuation process is anthropo- to pay to prevent or secure change: donations to centric. The resulting valuations are in money terms conservation societies alone demonstrate this. The because preference revelation isdeterminedthrough problem arises when this WTP is taken as the value people's WTP, or by inferring their WTP through of the environmental change. Many people believe other means. Moreover, the use of money as the that there are intrinsic values in environmental measuring rod perrnits the comparison that is re- assets. They are of value in themselves and are not quired between enviironmental values and develop- "of' human beings, values that exist not just be- ment values. The latter are expressed in money cause individual human beings have preferences for terms, either in a dollar amount or an economic rate them. There is no reason to reject the idea of of return. Using other units to measure environmen- intrinsic values because the idea of measuring pref- tal values would not permit the comparison with erences is adopted. What is being assessed are two development values. different things: the value of preferences of people for or against environmental change (economic The language of economic valuation is often mis- values) and the value that intrinsically resides in leading. Studies speak of valuing or pricing the environmental assets (intrinsic values). environment. Similarly, changes in the environ- ment affect health so it is necessary to find some Economic valuation is essentially about discover- valuations of changes in health status, with the ing the demand curve for environmental goods and ultimate change, of course, being the cessation of services: the values of human beings for the envi- 10 ronment. This is another way of talking about find- discussion of rights and intrinsic values into the ing willingness to pay.' The use of money as the policy dialogue can be counterproductive in con- measuringrodisaconvenience: WTPhappenstobe texts where the conflict is between conservation one of the limited number of ways in which people and, say, converting land to food production for express preferences. Once it is accepted that both immediate needs. If, on the other hand, conservation forms of value exist, the issue becomes one of which and the sustainable use of resources can be shown to values should inform and guide the process of be of economic value, then the dialogue between making public choices. The answer is that since developer and conservationist may be viewed dif- both values are legitimate, both are relevant to ferently, not as one of necessary opposites, but of decision-making. Making decisions on the basis of potential complements or alternative land uses that economic values alone neither describes real world compete on an equal footing. The remaining stage decision-making, nor would be appropriate given rests on finding ways for the developing world to that governments and other agents involved in the capture or appropriate the conservation benefits. If development process have multiple goals. But one environmentalists in richcountries perceive value in dilfference between the economic and intrinsic val- conserving a rainforest in a poor country, this is of ue approach is that economic values can, in princi- little consequence to the poor country unless there is ple, be measured. Intrinsic values cannot. If a potential cash flow or technology transfer to be decision-makers do not feel the need for quantified obtained. Economic valuation is therefore a two- assessments of gains and losses, then lack of quan- part process in which it is necessary to: tification may not be an obstacle to decision-mak- ing. Otherwise it will often prove difficult to make * Demonstrate and measure the economic value of choices between competing projects or alternative environmental assets-what we will call the dem- policies with differing environmental impacts. onstration process Find ways to capture the value-the appropria- The practical problem with economic valuation is tion process. one of deriving credible estimates of that value in contexts where there are either no apparent markets Total economic value or very imperfect markets. If it is possible to derive The economic value of environmental assets can be such values, then it may well be that some measures broken down into a set of component parts. This can of individuals' preferences will, in any event, cap- be illustrated in the context of decisions about alter- ture at least part of what might be called intrinsic native land uses for a tropical forest, but the example value. This will be so if the people expressing values can be generalized. According to a benefit-cost rule, for the environmental change in question them- decisions to "convert" a tropical forest, for say selves possess some concept of the intrinsic value of agricultural development, would have to be justified things. They may then bepartly valuing"on behalf' by showing that the net benefits from agriculture of the environment as an entity in itself. exceed the net benefits from conservation. Conser- vation could have two dimensions: preservation, Many of the environmental assets that people gen- whichwouldbeformally equivalentto outrightnon- erally feel are very important are in the developing use of the resource; and conservation, which would world. Notable examples include the tropical rain- involve limited uses of the forest consistent with forests, ecologically precious wetlands and moun- retention of natural forest. The definitions are neces- tain regions, and many of the world's endangered sarily imprecise. Some people would argue, for species. Many people feel these environmental as- example, that ecotourism is not consistent with sets have intrinsic value. They may express that sustainable conservation, while others may say that view by speaking of the immorality of activities it could be. Accepting the lack of precise lines of which degrade these resources, and of the "rights" differentiation, the benefit-cost rule would be to to existence of trees and animal species. Bringing convert the forest land only if the development Strictly, the demand curve traces out the willingness to pay for extra (or marginal) amounts of something. So the demand curve is a marginal willingness to pay schedule. II benefits minus the development costs are greater clearance, cannot consume the non-marketed ben- than the benefits of conservation minus the costs of efits. This asymmetry of values imparts a consider- conservation. able bias in favor of the land-use conversion option. As we shall see, these non-market benefits also have Typically, the benefits and costs accruing to the two spatial dimensions: benefits within the nation converted land use can be fairly readily calculated that possesses the resource, and benefits to other because there are attendant cash flows. Timber nations. Thus, the benefits of the tropical forest in production, for example, tends to be for commercial nation A include such things as the watershed markets and market prices are observable. Conser- protection functions that the forest may have. The vation benefits, on the other hand, are a mix of benefits to country B of A's forest includes the associated cash flows and non-market benefits. contribution that the forest makes to global climate This fact imparts two biases. The first is that the stability, and the benefits reflected in B's willing- components with associated cash flows are made to ness to pay to conserve the forest habitat because of appear more "real" than those without such cash its biodiversity. We shall refer to these different flows. There is a certain misplaced concreteness: spatial benefits as domestic (or host country) bene- decisions are likely to be biased in favor of the fits, and global benefits respectively. development option because conservation benefits are not readily calculable. The second bias follows Conservation benefits are included in total econom- from the first. Unless incentives are devised where- ic value (TEV). Total economic value for a tropical by the non-market benefits are internalized into the forest is explained in Table 2. 1. This value compris- land-use choice mechanism, conservation benefits es use and non-use values. Conservation is consis- will automatically be downgraded. Those who stand tent with some sustainable uses of the forest, to gain from, say, timber extraction or agricultural including sustainable timber harvesting. Table 2.1 Total economic value and tropical forests Total Economic Value = Use value + Non-use value (1) (2) (3) (4) Direct + Indirect + Option + Existence value value value value Sustainable timber Non-timber Nutrient Future uses Forests as of products cycling as per intrinsic value, (1) + (2) as a gift to others, as responsibility and stewardship Recreation Watershed protection Medicine Air pollution reduction Plant genetics Microclimate Education Humanl habitat 12 Direct use values value, obtained through questionnaire approaches Such values are fairly straightforward in concept (the contingent valuation method), suggest that but are not necessarily easy to measure in economic existence value can be a substantial component of tenns. Thus minor forest products output (such as total economic value. This finding is even more nuts, rattan and latex) should be measurable from pronounced where the asset is unique, suggesting market and survey data, but the value of medicinal high potential existence values for unique ecosys- plants for the world at large is more difficult to tems. Some analysts like to add bequest value as a measure, although estimates exist (see Pearce and separate category of economic value. Others regard Puroshothaman, 1992). it as part of existence value. In empirical terms they would be hard to differentiate. Indirect use values These values correspond to the ecologist's concept Total economic value can be expressed as: of ecological functions. A tropical forest might help protect watersheds, for example, so that removing TEV = Direct use value + Indirect use value + forest cover may result in water pollution, siltation, Option value + Existence value floods and droughts, depending on the alternative use to which that forest land is put. Similarly, The usefulness of this classification is in practice tropical forests store carbon dioxide (CO2). When debatable. Most contingent valuation studies distin- they are burned for clearance much of the stored guish use values from "non-use" values, but do not CCO2 is released into the atmosphere, contributing to attempt to break down the component parts of non- greenhouse gas atmospheric warming. Tropical use value (or "passive use" value, as some recent forests also store many species which in turn may literature calls it-see Arrow et al. 1993). Others haave a wide range of ecological functions. deny that existence value is relevant to economic valuation since it may be representing counter- Option values preferential values based on moral concern, obliga- These relate to the amount that individuals would be tion, duty, altruism, and so on. But if we take the willing to pay to conserve a tropical forest for purpose of benefit measurement to be one of dem- possible future use. Option value is thus like an onstrating economic value, however it may be mo- insurance premium to ensure the supply of some- tivated, many of these problems disappear. thing the availability of which would otherwise be Nonetheless, it is as well to be aware that the uncertain. While there can be no presumption that underlying principles and procedures for economic option value is positive, it is likely to be so in a valuation are still debated. context where the resource is in demand for its environmental qualities and its supply is threatened Is Total Economic Value really total? by deforestation. It may be tempting to think that economists have captured all there is to know about economic value Existence value in the concept of TEV. But this is obviously incor- This relates to valuations of the environmental asset rect. First, recall that they are not claiming to have that are unrelated either to current or optional use. captured all values, merely economic values. Sec- Its intuitive basis is easy to understand because a ond, many ecologists say that total economic value great many people reveal their willingness to pay is still not the whole economic story. There are some for the existence of environmental assets through underlying functions of ecological systems which wildlife and other environmental charities despite are prior to the ecological functions that we have not taking part in the direct use of the wildlife been discussing (such as watershed protection). throughrecreation.Tosomeextent,thiswillingness Turner (1992) calls them "primary values." They to pay may represent "vicarious" consumption are essentially the system characteristics upon through wildlife videos and TV programs, but stud- which all ecological functions are contingent. There ies suggest that this is a weak explanation for cannot be a watershed protection function but exitstence value. Empirical measures of existence for the underlying value of the system as a whole. 13 There is, in some sense, a "glue" that holds every- Domestic costs (Cd) > Domestic benefits (Bd) thing together and that glue has economic value. If and this is true, then there is a total value to an ecosystem Global benefits (Bg) > Domestic costs (Cd) or ecological process which exceeds the sum of the values of the individual functions. The rationale for focusing on Type II projects as the prime focus for the GEF is straightforward. Type I The discussion suggests three reasons for the im- projects are essentially development projects. If coun- portance of biological diversity. The first reason is tries were not to achieve an excess of domestic benefits based on the concept of economic value. If biodi- over costs, then investment would be inefficient and versity is economically important we would expect would not contribute to the developmental process. this to show up in an expressed willingness to pay GEF is not part of official development assistance and for its conservation. Shoirtly, we will show that this is focused on global, not domestic, problems. Hence its is indeed the case. The second reason is that eco- concern is mainly with Type II, not Type I projects. nomic value measurement will understate "true" Nonetheless, there will be circumstances in which economic value because of the probable failure to some Type I projects will be eligible. This will be the measure primary life support functions. This kind case when global benefits (Bg) are judged to be large of economic value is difficult to observe because it and the beneficiary could legitimately be expected to is unlikely to be recognized until some disastrous pay; and when recipient countries are clearly con- event has happened: landslides consequent upon strained by capital shortages. deforestation, loss of fishing grounds due to pollu- tion, and so on. The third reason is that economic The magnitude (Cd - Bd) is one interpretation, at its value does not capture--nor is it designed to cap- simplest level, of the concept of incremental cost. ture-intrinsic value. Acceptance of Type II projects thus requires that global benefits exceed incremental cost, or: Global and domestic economic values in the GEF context Bg > (Cd - Bd) The distinction between domestic and global eco- nomic values is of fundarnental importance for two On rearrangement this rule is a simple cost-benefit reasons: rule, expressed as: - The rationale for intervention by the Global (Bg + Bd) > Cd Environment Facility is to capture the global valuesof conservingbiodiversity,reducinggreen- In general contexts, there are two ways in which the house gas, preventing the pollution of intema- cost-benefit rule can be derived. The first is to tional waters, and protecting the ozone layer estimate the monetary value of benefits. This means * Failure to appropriate global values of biodiver- finding the willingness to pay of the host nation for sity conservation distorts the relative rates of biodiversity conservation (Bd), as well as the will- return between conservation and "developmen- ingness to pay of the rest of the world for conserva- tal" land use. tion-theglobal values (Bg). The secondis tomeasure the effectiveness of the GEF intervention in terms of This section addresses the former issue, and the next some index of the change in biodiversity that comes section looks at the issue of the rate of return to about because of the investment, typically the differ- conservation. ence in some index of biodiversity with and without the project. The procedure then is to relate the cost of The GEF is primarily concerned with projects which, the project to the index to produce a cost-effective- while not likely to yield net economic gains to the ness measure. country in question, will yield net global benefits. These are termed Type II projects and are character- There are many problems with the cost-effectiveness ized by the following conditions: approach. Chapter I observed that there is no current 14 agreement on how to derive the relevant biodiversity Generalizing about these valuations is fraught with indicators. Even if indicators can be found, there are danger. We cannot, forexample, extrapolate values of problems in comparing different kinds of biodiversi- minor forest products to whole forests. Distance and ty, no matter what unit of account (such as ecosystem limits of the market for the products will preclude this. or species) is chosen. These are issues to be addressed The examples are illustrative rather than conclusive. by the GEF and others. But the evidence does suggest that local values are often higher than the price of land, or the net returns Is it possible to obtain monetary values for biodiver- from "developmental" uses such as forestry and agri- sity conservation? The science of monetization has culture.2 certainly advanced greatly and there is a significant body of work which bears on the issue (Pearce et al. Global economic values 1992; Pearce 1993). Typically, what is being valued in Investigations into global economic values are com- these monetization exercises is not biodiversity per se, paratively few. They can be expected to increase as the but usually some habitat such as a wetland or forest, or demand for such valuations increases. In turn, this a patticular species. The following sections consider demand will increase as it becomes necessary to examples of such economic values. In practice, some estimate the scale of international resource transfers combination of indicators and monetized benefits is under the various conventions agreed at the Earth likely to be relevant to the evaluation of biodiversity Summit in Rio in 1992. However, early evidence conservation measures. already suggests that such values could be substantial. Various approaches to estimating global values are Domestic economic values possible. Biodiversity will tend to be conserved through habitat conservation. If it is possible to measure the domestic Contingent valuation benefits of that conservation, then it is possible to The first is to use the "contingent valuation method" construe those benefits as reflecting the benefits of (CVM) to find out what people in any one country are biodiiversity. This relationship between habitat values willing to pay to conserve biodiversity in another and biodiversity values is not very precise: it may be country. The CVM functions through sophisticated possible for some biodiversity to be reduced in a given questionnaires which ask people their willingness to habitat without economic values being impaired. But pay. Global CVMs of this kind do not yet exist.3 Table the values that arise from conserved and sustainably- 2.3 assembles the results of some CVMs in several used habitats will to some extent reflect the biodiver- countries. These report WTP for species and habitat sity in the habitat, since it is that diversity which conservation in the respondents' own country. contributes the economic value by providing, for example, a range of medicinal plants, a variety of Debt-for-nature swaps minor products, or food. In a debt-for-nature swap an indebted country ex- changes foreign debt for a newly created obligation, Table 2.2, taken from Pearce et al. (1992), summarizes on which payments in domestic currency are used to many of the studies of economic value of biodiversity fund an agreed conservation ("nature") program. The as initerpreted above. These values can be significant. foreign debt is acquired at the substantial discount at Examples of market value of sustainable products are which the debt is traded. Debt-servicing payments on the estimate of some $6,800 per hectare (present the new domestic obligation are typically paid into a value) for forest products in the Peruvian Amazon, fund that finances the conservation activities. The and over $3,000 per hectare for local medicinal plants. price paid for the secondary debt can therefore be An example of the non-market value is the $1,250 per thought of as a willingness to pay to conserve the hectare ecotourist values for Costa Rican forest, a resource in question (Ruitenbeek 1992). Table 2.4 value which accrues in the form of inferred willing- assembles available data on debt-for-nature swaps to ness to pay over and above what is actually paid. see what the implicit price might be. 2 The price of land should be related to the benefits of developing the land. More formally, the price of land is the present value of the flow of profits from the land. In practice, however, land prices often have a significant and speculative element. A global CVM is being carried out by the World Bank with respect to Madagascar's rainforests. 15 Table 2.2 Summary of studies on the economic value of biodiveristy Non-use values option, quasi-option, Benefit (sustainable use) Value category: Direct use Indirect use bequest, existence Total economic value /opportunity cost ratio Ecosystem type: (1) Sustainable harvesting in I hectare (3) Arising from sustained use of the Lower bound option value may be (2)Brazilian Amazon: (1), Implicit ratios of 6.82, 2.14 of Peruvian Amazon, (timber, fruit and Korup forest: inferred from the current market ($1991) or 2.3 depending on alternative Tropical forest latex 1987$). NPV hectarel $6,820 Existence of Watershed functions value or foreign exchange earning Direct Use $15b use, but subject to qualifications (local market values) relative to a net affording protecton to Nigerian and potential of plant based pharma- Indirect $46b regarding local elasticity of Sources: revenue $1,000 h' from clear-felling Cameroonian fisheries: NPV ceuticals, (See Appendix I) Existence $30b demand for harvested forest which risks uncertain regeneration, (1989Ł) Ł3.8m (approx $6.8m) or Total $91b/year products. A similar exercise (12) (I) Peters, Gentry and $3,184hal plantations for timber and $54ha, assuming that the benefit Attempts to gauge existence values in another area of Peruvian Mendlesohn (1989) pulpwood or $2,960hal from cattle starts to accrue in 2010 and beyond in other contexts, rely on CVM to NPV (using Krutilla & Amazon contradicts these ranching. (2010 represents the time horizon by report WTP/willingness to accent Fisher) $1 j296b estimates with a ratio of about 3f (2) Gutierrez and which the continued use of the forest compensation (WTA). To date only in favour of logging and rotation Pearce (1992) (2) Estimated contribution of direct use resources (in the absence of one study relating directly to tropical (10) CVM survey of cropping. to Brazilian GNP-$15b protection) would start to exhaust forests is available (10), although villagers' WTA, to (3) Ruitenbeek resources. The imputed benefit this does not report any foreign forego use benefits in (2) Total present value $1296bn (I 989a) (3) Medicinalgenetic Net Present Value stream therefore represents the (explicitly non-use) WTP. However the newly created over 3.6b ha-$360/ha relative to $7/ha over 126,000 ha (park area) or continued existence of resources. (2) set the existence value for the Mantadia National Park a net revenue from clear felling (4) Mendelsohn and 426,000ha (with the additional buffer Brazilian Amazon at $30b, calcu- (Madagascar). of $1000/ha. The implied ratio Tobias (1991) zone) This represents a minimum An imputed value of the expected lated using an arbitrary WTP figure Implicitly their of 0.36 will not be strictly expected genetic value. Estimates loss from flooding resulting from (observed from various CVM valuation will reflect a representative since the (5) Pearce (199Id) depend on i) the probability of an area alternative land use from 2010 on- studies), aggregated across the total economic value of calculation of Total economic yielding a drug base ii) the method of wards: NPV of expected value of OECD adult population. the resource foregone. value is not necessarily based on (6) Schneider et al. valuation iii) an assumed extent of rent loss by 2040 is Ł1.6m ($2.84m) or The survey revealed a the assumption of sustainable (1991) capture by local authority. $23 ha Donations to charitable funds may per household sum of use. be one possibility to place CV $13.91 per annum, (7) Mendelsohn and Under certain assumptions the genetic/ Soil fertility maintenance. Benefit evaluations in context; however, which is aggregated (4) Implied for Costa Rica 12.5 Balick (1992) medicinal NPV of tropical forest could imputed based on crop productivity adichotomy exists between the over the affected which is the ratio of recreation be as high as $420 ha (See Appendix 1). decline from soil loss which would observed reason for giving and number of households value per hectare of protected (8) Pearce (1990) take effect from 2010 onwards (the actual use of funds. Problem of (347) to give $4,827 per area to the highest estimated (4) Travel cost valuation of tourist trips without project scenario) NPV identifying organizations involved annum PV (assuming price of land outside the park. (9) Watson (1988) to Costa Rica's Monteverde Cloud forest. Ł532,000 ($958,000) or $8ha. uniquely in forest protection. payments for 20 years Average visitor valuation $35 (1988), and discounted at 5%) (7) On the basis of local (10) Kramer et al. producing a present value for trips (5) (6) Valuing Carbon (3) Value of debt-for-nature swaps $60,141 or $6/ha over medicinal plant harvesting only, (1992) assuming constant flows of $2.5m or sequestration; crediting standing may provide an estimation of a 10,000 ha of park. the implied ratio of 1.04 extrapolating for foreign visitors, forest with damage avoided from WTP, reflecting a non-use value. (II) Guttierez and $12.5m. This gives a value per hectare adverse climate change: $1.2b- Varying implicit valuation of (9) Determination of market Pearce (1992) in the reserve of $1,250 relative to the $3.9b/year, depending on different sites is reflected in the prices in this study is uncertain market price of local non-reserve land assumptions of: i) Damage estimate price paid by conservation bodies (ie world or local) implied ratio (12) Pinedo-Vasquez of $30-$100/ha. per tonne carbon estimated range involved. Some swap transactions 11.3 et al. (1992) $5-13 tonne. ii) amount released, have aimed to preserve tropical (7) Sustainable harvesting of medicinal itself dependant on assumptions of forest ecosystems,(see Appendix 3). (3) 1.07 total project ratio or (13) Solorzano and plants in Belize (local market values per hectare sequestration and annual 1.94 from the perspective of Guerrero (1988) alone) NPV $3,327per ha compared to deforestation rates. (10) Foreign visitor's WTP for the Cameroon when indirect project $3,184 from plantation fo)restry with creation of the Mantadia National adjustments are included. These (14) Schneider (1992) rotation felling. (8)(14) Carbon storage $1,300- Park (1991). Bids ranged $75-$1 18 include figures for project 5,700/ha/year p.a., with sums being additional to related aid flows and value for (9) Forest production (Malaysia) existing prices paid. Multiplying uncaptured genetic and $2,455/ha compared with $217/ha from (11) Total carbon storage value these sums by the number of annual watershed values. intensive agriculture. Brazilian Amazon $46b foreign visitor s to a neighbouring park (3,900) resulted in an annual (13) Implied ratio of 2 (3) Tourism value from the Korup (13) Rio Macho Preserve, Costa WTP of $292,500-460,000, a PV of $19/ha Rica. Evaluates the replacement cost $3.64m-$5.73m (at 5% and 20 in terms of water services and ener- years) or $364-573/ha (10,00Oha). (10) Annual value of fuelwood to gy generation resulting from reserve These sums might represent use Malagasy households about $39 per conversion to agricultural use. values as tourists were actually in annum the area. | I Non-use values 1 option, quasi-option, Benefit (sustainable use) Value categorYv Direc!t ui-se Indirect use bequest, existence Total economic value /opportunity cost ratio Ecosystem Type: (1) NPV per acre ($1990) from the (1) Ground water recharge function Significant option values fom future (7) Bintuni Bay (I) Benefit/cost ratio expressed preservation of the Hadejia-Jama'are for surrounding areas, potentially tourism, educational and scientific mangrove ecosystem, in terms the relative benefits Wetlands floodplain, Nigeria measurable by either WTP or using uses. existence values of wetland Irian Jaya. accruing from alternative water (Floodplains, costs of ground water depletion on wildlife probably high although no NPV of whole system use: $45 per 1,000m3 of water Coastal wetlands, Agriculture $41 local agriculture-ie a production explicit studies exist. ($1991 discount rate maintained in the floodplain as Wet meadows, Fishing $15 function approach-as a minimum 7.5%) opposed to 4 cents per 1,000m3 Peatlands) Fuelwood $ 7 benefit approximation. (2) Some non-use values for wildlife $961-$1,495m, of from diverted water. Discounted at 8% (CVM estimates) which direct-use Sources: Other floodplain benefits: Other important functions: 1990$/annum/person: probably $152-534m. (4) From a similar analysis of the livestock and grazing This value does not Ichkeul National Park, Tunisia, (1) Barbier, Adams non-timber forest products Flood Control and Storm Protection brown bear, wolf, account for the high direct-use benefits amounted to and Kimmage (1991) tourism, recreation, (including hunting), can in theory be approximated wolverine (Norway) 15 cultural value placed on $134 per 1 ,00OM3 compared to educational and scientific benefits estimating altemative preventative bald eagle (US) 12.4 the bay by the Irarutu negative returns from (2) Semples et al. (genetic and information value) expenditure or replacement costs for emerald shiner 4.5 tribe (10). diversionary use. (1986) sea defences and dykes. In Malaysia grizzly bear 18.5 (3) Louisiana. WTP PV at 8% ($1990) the cost of rock escarpments to bighom sheep 8.6 Given the difficulty of (3) Costanza et al. per acre. replace eroded mangrove fringe is whooping crane 1.2 generalizing with respect to (1989) Commercial fishery $400 typically around $300,000/km blue whale 9.3 alternative uses for wetland Fur trapping $190 ($1990) (I1). The same study quotes bottlenose dolphin 7.0 areas, informative cost-benefit (4) Thomas et al. Recreation $ 57 a 1987 E.C. estimate of the califomia sea otter 8.1 ratios are difficult to provide. (1990) Storm protection $2,400 "inherent" value of mangrove Where non-use values have Total $3,047 protection to Guyana as $4bn, been inferred from costs of (5) Bergstrom et al. though there is no indication of how (9) Revealed WTP (CVM) for imposing or agreeing land use (1990) (5) Louisiana. WTP PV at 8% ($1990) the figure is derived. preservation benefits of blanket bog constraints (the cost of which per acre area in Scotland (1990) (once and- represent a discounted future (6) Thibodeau and Recreation $103 Nutrient cycling will normally have for-all payment) PV Ł164.68/ha benefit stream), the implicit Ostro (1981) a measurable effect on fishing and (approx. $296.50/ha) implicitly cost-benefit ratio will normally (6) Charles River, Massachusetts agricultural yields (in deltaic areas) representing the discounted future be at least 1, because the (7) Ruitenbeek (1991) PV (1990$) per acre at 8%. the value of which might also be stream of user and non-user compensatory payment from the Recreation $3400 approximated by replacement benefits. As such the value is recipient's perspective will have (8) Hamilton and Water supply $80,000 expenditures on nutrients and interpreted as an option value. (See to be at least equal to the Snedaker (eds.) compensating technologies. Smith [1987]) perceived opportunity cost. (1984) (8) Present Value per acre (at 8%) of Mangrove systems. Direct use from The value of wildlife habitats and (12) An average annual amount (9) Hanley and Craig fisheries, forestry and recreation. life support functions will be ($343/acre) paid (by the US Fish (1991) Trinidad $15,000 reflected in the value placed on the and Wildfowl Service in 1980) to Fiji $11,000 continued existence of dependant owners of wetlands in Massachusetts (10) Van Diepen and Puerto Rico $13,000 species, (see under Existence values for preservation easements, can be Fiselier (1990) for some estimates) taken to represent a minimum option Value for the ecosystem in an (11) Fiselier (1990a) (14) Sustainable charcoal production unaltered state. SimiIaLconclusions from mangrove (Thailand) could be inferred by looking at the (12) Danielson and generates an annual national income average value of management Leitch (1986) of approx. $22.4m Net profits are agreements negotiated between nearly $4,000/ha for forests with conservation bodies and land owners (13) Tumer and average productivity of 230m3/ha. in the UK. Such an alternative cost Brooke (1988) approach has revealed a value of Ł70/ha/per annum for coastal marsh (14) Mcneely and and. Dobias (1991) -J Non-use value option, quasi-option, Benefit (sustainable use) Value category: Direct use Indirect-use bequest, existence Total economic value /opportunity cost ratio 800 Ecosystem Type: (I) Wildlife tourism. Viewing value of Indirect benefits from sustainable (3) Beneficial use project for Kbao (2) Ratio of wildlife tourism Elephants in Kenya $25m/per annum. wildlife management: Yai National Park surveyed user revenue per ha ($40) to income Rangelands WTP for continued existence of from extensive pastoralism (semi-arid) and The same study gives an indication of Distribution of benejits to local elephants at approx $7. Under ($0.80) 50. This ratio has wilderness areas the extent of revenue forgone through communities as a result of certain assumptions of population probably increased significantly sub-optimal park entrance pricing. A sustainable wildlife management and park use, the option and due to increasing value added in Sources: rough WTP survey revealed a potential schemes. existence value of Khao Yai to Thai tourism. consumer surplus as high as $25m/per residents (for elephant preservation) (1) Brown and Henry annum (a sum almost 10 times the value (7) The Nyaminyami Wildlife may be as high as $4.7miyear . (4) Ratio of value of i!lif (1989) J of poachcd ivory exports and at least a Management Trust, Zimbabwe production (Z$4.20/ha) to Cattle 10% increase in actual expenditures). channeled approx Z$198,000 (1989) The extent of existence values might Ranching (Z$3.58/ha in (2) Westem and Since people were only asked their of wildlife revenues into local be approximated from the value of Zimbabwe 1 .17. Calculation Thresher (1973) WTP to preserve elephants, consumer projects for health, housing, vicarious tourisnthe consumption based on economic rates of surplus for all wildlife viewing is education and recreation. In addition of books, films and TV programmes return (as opposed to financial (3) Dobias (1988) presumably higher. the project was able to compensate -particularly in developed rates), and accounting for the local farmers for any damage countries, or from observed relative environmental costs (4) Child (4) Wildlift utilization: Non-consumptive incurred and offer cropped wildlife charitable donations to organizations would in certain areas of the (1984)(1990) game viewing, lightly consumptive products for sale locally at involved in wildlife preservation. country produce ratios of safari hunting and live animal trade, subsidiized prices. More crudely we might extrapolate between 2 and 5. (5) Coulson (1991) consumptive meat and hide production. on the basis of WTP information of Direct and indirect provision of visitors to wildlife sites in substitute (8) Provides PVs for retums (6) Dept. of National Zimbabwe: illustrative examples: employment. countries like Kenya. from game viewing combined Parks, Zimbabwe with some form of elephant (1991) Non-consumptive use: Direct and Improvements in local infrastructure In 1990 56% of ovemight visitors to cropping and for viewing alone indirect income accruing to the and potential increases in land and wildlife areas in Zimbabwe were in Botswana (1989). The ratio of (7) Jansen (1990) Matusadona National Park (1991) property values. foreign, of which 26% originated in the former to the latter range US$10.3m, 66% of which foreign Europe or North America (approx from 2.63 to 1.8 (depending on (8) Barnes (1990) currency (5). Significant saving in the hidden costs 151,000 visitors). Assuming 50% of whether a 5 or 15 year horizon is of land degradation and soil erosion these visitors reveal a similar WTP considered) demonstrating the (9) Imber (1991) Safari hunting: Value for foreign visitors arising from agricultural production in addition to entry fees (in much the earning potential of consumptive in 1990 was US$9m of which, trophies in marginal areas. same way as in (1) i.e. a $100 permit uses. Comparison with the accounted for US$4m (6). for elephant preservation), extra economic rate of return from The role of elephants as keystone revenue generated might amount to cattle production on a per Consumptive value Zimbabwe estimates species diversifying savannah and $7.5m per annum. hectare basis could show ratios it makes $4.7m/annum from the sale of forest ecosystems. similar to those in Zimbabwe. elephant goods and services, a return of (9) CV study preserve the Kakadu $75/km2 over approx 74,OOOkm2 of Value added retained in the host Conservation Zone (from mining elephant habitat. country consists of net revenues development) revealed that accruing to: local airlines, tour Australians were willing to pay The proportion attributed to sale of operators, hotels, transport and A$124/annum for ten years to avoid goods has fallen significantly since the cottage industries, a major impact scenario and A$53 to imposition of an intemational ban on avoid the minor scenario. ivory sales. Extrapolated to the whole population produced a total WTP range of A$650m-$1,520m, or a PV at 5% of between A$1 r/ha and A$2.3m/ha over 5,000 ha. Both cultural and bequest values are likely to be significant in wildlife valuation although as yet few WTP studies reveal specific motivations. l l | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~Non-use values ll option, quasi-option, Total economic value Benefit (sustainable use) Value Categu9'. Direct use Ir.direc; usc bequest, existence !opportunP.y cost ratio Ecosystem Type: (1) Estimating the socio-economic effect of the (2) Estimates provided for the (2) Option value for the (2) Total annual (3) Cahuita National Park ratio Crown of Thoms starfish on the Great Barrier Galapagos National Park, Galapagos National Park set monetary returns from 9.54* Marine/coastal Reef. A travel cost approach provided Ecuador: $/ha/year arbitrarily at $120/ha/year which direct and indirect use systems, heritage estimates of consumer surplus of A$117.5m is the approximate sum of direct approx $120/ha. In (4) Ratio of total (direct and sites /year for Australian visitors and A$26.7m/year Maintenance of and indirect use values from the present value terms this indirect) benefits to total cost for international visitors. The study showed that biodiversity 4.9 park. The uniqueness of the represents $2,400/ha (at 11.5* (1) Carter et al. tourism to the reef is valued (in NPV terms) Galapagos ecosystem suggests 5% discount rate) or (1987) over and above current expenditure levels by Value of fish breeding that existence values are likely to almost $2.8b for the Hundloe (1990) more than $Alb. (nursery function) 0.07 be significant. entire study area. * A conventionally assessed (applicable to 430,000 ha ratio rather than one based on (2) de Groot (1992) (2) Total direct use valued at $53/ha/year, of marine zone). (5) Describes a CV survey to opportunity cost. comprising ($/ha/year): value visibility improvements at (3) Marcondes (1981) Watershed and erosion the Grand Canyon (from Recreational use 45 prevention functions 0.3 reduced sulphur dioxide (4) Posner et al. food/nutrition 0.7 (applicable to terrestrial emissions). Mean bid (1981) Raw materials for construction 5.2 area of 720,000ha) ($1990/person/year) $27. A high Energy resources 1.5 level of familiarity may explain (5) Schulze et al. Ornamental resources 0.4 the high value respondents seem (1983) to have been willing to pay in this Biochemical and genetic resource values are study (compared to bids for (6) Hausman, also thought to be significant though no endangered species-see table Leonard, McFadden estimates are provided. Provision of employ- 5.3). Higher WTP bids in habitat (1992) ment directly or indirectly related to the valuation studies have generally National Park is a considerable benefit to the revealed a preference for Galapagos economy (60% of 2,500 work- protection of a perceived array force). Tourism is the most important activity, of benefits rather than for a contributing an estimated $26.8m to the local targeted species. As with other economy. CV studies the Grand Canyon case has been the subject of (3) A form of Travel cost appraisal of the much debate, particularly with recreational value of the Cahuita National Park, respect to the levels of Costa Rica. Consumer surplus estimates were information and framing derived from observed wage equivalent travel (hypothetical) bias (see Schulze time net of transport costs multiplied over a et al. [1981]). visitor population. The resulting benefit-cost ratio demonstrated that the park is economically beneficial. (4) Conventional benefit-cost analysis of the Virgin Islands National Park, St John, identified significant direct and indirect benefits associated with the park, particularly tourist expenditures and the positive effect on land values in proximity to the designated area. Little information is available on the environmental effects of altemative land uses or the extent of visitor's consumer surplus. Total benefit ($1980) approx. $8,295/ha over approx 2820ha of National Park on St. John. (6) Recreation demand study to value recreation use loss caused by the Valdez oil spill in Alaska; about $3.8m (1989) Source: Pearce, Moran and Fripp, 1992 Table 2.3 Preference valuations for endangered species and prized habitats (US 1990 $ p.a. per person) Species Norway: Brown bear, wolf and wolverine 15.0 USA: Bald eagle 12.4 Emerald shiner 4.5 Grizzly bear 18.5 Bighom sheep 8.6 Whooping crane 1.2 Blue whale 9.3 Bottlenose dolphin 7.0 Califonia sea otter 8.1 Northem elephant seal 8.1 Humpback whales' 40-48 (without information) 49-64 (with information) Other kabitat USA: Grand Canyon (visibility) 27.0 Colorado wilderness 9.3-21.2 Australia: Nadgee Nature Reserve NSW 28.1 Kakadu Conservation 40.0 (minor damage) Zone, NT2 93.0 (major damage) UK: Nature reserves3 40.0 ('experts' only) Norway: Conservation of 59.0-107.0 rivers against hydroelectric development Notes: (1) respondents divided into two groups one of which was given video information; (2) two scenarios of mining development damage were given to respondents; (3) survey of informed individuals only. Sources: Norway--Dahle et al. (1987) (in Norwegian), Hervik et al. (1986); USA-Boyle and Bishop (1985), Brookshire et al. (1983), Stoll and Johnson (1984), Hageman (1985), Samples et al. (1986), Schulze et al. (1983), Walsh et al. (1984); Australia-4mber et aL (1991), Bennett (1982); United Kingdom--Willis and J.Benson (1988). Implicit global willingness to pay in education and training as well. Moreover, each international transfers hectare of land does not secure the same degree of Numerous debt-for-nature swaps have been agreed. "protection" and the same area may be covered by The table below sets out the available information different swaps. We have also arbitrarily chosen a and computes the implicit prices. It is not possible ten-year horizon in order to compute present val- to be precise with respect to the implicit prices since ues, whereas the swaps in practice have variable the swaps tend to cover not just protected areas but levels of annual commitment. 20 Ignoring the outlier (Monteverde Cloud Forest, Costa costs of protected land, although if these implicit prices Rica) the range of implicit values is from around I cent mean anything, they are capturing only part of the rich per hectare to just over $4 per hectare. Ruitenbeek world's existence values for these assets. That is, the (1992) secures a range of some 18 cents to $11 per values reflect only part of the total economiic value. hectare (ignoring Monteverde), but he has several diflerent areas for some of the swaps, and also com- Finding a benchmark from such an analysis is haz- putes a present value of outlays for the swaps. But ardous, but something of the order of $5 per hectare either range is very small compared to the opportunity may be appropriate. Table 2.4 Implicit global willingness to pay (WTP) in international transfers: ,debt-for-nature swaps Payment Area WTPlha Notes Country Year (1990$) m.ha PV 1990$ Bolivia 8/87 112,000 12.00 0.01 I Ecuador 12/87 354,000 } 22.00 0.06 2 4/89 1,068,750)} Costa Rica 2/88 918,000 1.15 0.80 3 7/88 5,000,000 4 parks 1/89 784,000 4/89 3,500,000 0.81 4.32 4 La Amistad 3/90 1,953,473 1.40 1.40 5 Monteverde 1/91 360,000 0.014 25.70 6 Dominican Republic 3/90 116,400 Guatemala 10/91 75,000 Jamaica 11/91 300,000 Philippines 1/89 200,000 } 9.86 0.06 7 8/90 438,750 } 2/92 5,000,000 Madagascar 7/89 950,000 0.47 2.95 8 8/90 445,891 } 1/91 59,377 9 Mexico 2/91 180,000 Nigeria 7/91 64,788 Zambia 8/89 454,000 10 Poland 1/90 11,500 unrelated to area purchase Nigeria 1989 1,060,000 1.84 0.58 11 Notes: 1. A discount rate of 6% is used, together with a time horizon of 10 years. The sum of discountfactorsfor 10 years is then 7.36. 21 I. The Beni "parlc" is 334,000 acres and the storage. All forests store carbon so that, if cleared surrounding buffer zones are some 3.7 mil- for agriculture, there will be a release of CO2 which lion acres, making 1.63 million hectares (ha.) will contribute to the accelerated greenhouse effect in all (I hectare = 2.47 acres). 1.63 x 7.36 = 12 and therefore to global warming. In order to derive million hectares in present value (PV) terms. a value for the "carbon credit" that should be as- 2. Covers six areas: Cayembe Coca Reserve at cribed to a tropical forest, we need to know two 403,000 ha.; Cotacachi-Cayapas at 204,000 things: the net carbon released when forests are ha.; Sangay National Park at 370,000 ha.; converted to other uses, and the economic value of Podocarpus National Park at 146,280 ha.; one tonne of carbon released to the atmosphere. Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve at 254,760 ha.; Yasuni National Park-no area stated; Gal- Carbon will be released at different rates according apagos National Park at 691,2000 ha.; Paso- to the method of clearance and subsequent land use. choa near Quitci at 800 ha. The total without With burning there will be an immediate release of Yasuni is therefore 2.07 m.ha. Inspection of CO2into the atmosphere, and some of the remaining maps suggests that Yasuni is about three carbon will be locked in ash and charcoal which is times the area of Sangay, say 1 m.ha. This resistant to decay. The slash not converted by fire would make the grand total some 3 m.ha. The into CO2 or charcoal and ash decays over time, PV of this over ten years is then 22 m.ha. This releasing most of its carbon to the atmosphere is more than twice the comparable figure within ten to twenty years. Studies of tropical for- quoted in Ruitenbeek (1992). ests indicate that significant amounts of cleared 3. Covers Corvocado at 41,788 ha.; Guanacaste vegetation become lumber, slash, charcoal and ash. at 110,000 ha.; Monteverde Cloud Forest at The proportion differs for closed and open forests; 3,600 ha., to give 156,600 ha. in all, or a PV the smaller stature and drier climate of open forests of land area of 1.15 m.ha. Initially, $5.4 result in the combustion of a higher proportion of million at face value, purchased for $912,000, the vegetation. revalued here to 1990 prices. 4. Guanacaste at 110,000 ha., to give a PV of If tropical forested land is converted to pasture or 0.81 m.ha. permanent agriculture, then the amount of carbon 5. LaAmistadat 1'90,000ha.,togiveaPVof 1.4 stored in secondary vegetation is equivalent to the m.ha. carbon content of the biomass of crops planted, or 6. Monteverde Cloud Forest at 2023 ha. x 7.36 the grass grown on the pasture. If a secondary forest = 14,900 ha. is allowed to grow, then carbon will accumulate, 7. Area "protected" is 5,753 ha. of St. Paul andmaximumbiomassdensitywillbeattainedafter Subterranean River National Park, and 1.33 a relatively short time (forty-five years, according m. ha. of El Nido National Marine Park. This to German Bundestag, 1990). Table 2.5 summaries gives a PV of land of 9.86 m.ha. the carbon content of soils and biomass in the 8. Focus on Adringitra and Marojejy reserves at relevant land uses. 31,160 ha. and 60,150 ha. respectively. This gives a PV of 474,000 ha. These data can be used to calculate the total changes 9. Covers four reserve areas: Zahamena, Mi- in biomass and soil carbon as a result of land-use dongy-Sud, Manongarivo and Namoroko. changes, as shown in Table 2.6. This table illus- 10. CoversKafueFlatsandBangweuluwetlands. trates the net carbon storage effects of land-use 11. Oban Park, protecting 250,000 ha. or 1.84 m. conversion from tropical forests-closed primary, ha. in PV terms. See Ruitenbeek (1992). closed secondary, or open forests-to shifting cul- tivation, permanent agriculture, or pasture. The Carbon storage negative figures represent emissions of carbon, for Biodiversity conservatilon may often be an inciden- example, conversion from closed primary forest to tal effect, or "joint product" of some other environ- shifting agriculture results in a net loss of 194 tC/ha. mentally beneficial activity. An example is carbon The greatest loss of carbon involves change of land 22 Table 2.5 Carbon storage in different uses Table 2.6 Changes in carbon with land-use of tropical forests conversion Biomass Soils Total (tClha) (tClha) Original Shifting Pennanent Pasture Closed primary forest 167 116 283 C Agric. Agric. Closed secondary forest 85-135 67-102 152-237 Oniginal C 79 63 63 Open forest 68 47 115 Forest fallow (closed) 28-43 93 121-136 Closed primary 283 -204 -220 -220 Forest fallow (open) 12-18 38 50-56 Closed secondary 194 -106 -152 -122 Shifting cultivation Open forest 115 -36 -52 -52 (year 1) 10-16 31-76 41-92 Shifting cultivation Note: Where range was given in Table 7 a mid-point (year 2) 16-35 31-76 47-111 is used here. Permanent cultivation 5-10 51-60 56-70 . . Pasture 5 41-75 46-80 EShiftng agriculture represents carbon in biomass and soils in second year of shifting cultivation cycle. Source:compiledfrom German Bundestag (1990), and Houghton et al. (1987). Assumes carbon will reach minimum after 5 years in cropland, after 2 years in pasture. estimates relate to a "two times CO2 concentration" I scenario-to damage done around 2030 and dis- counted back to the present. Taking the estimates produced with consistent discount rates, and taking use from primary closed forest to permanent agri- 1 percent of Global World Product as the minimum culture. These figures represent the once and for all damage, global warming damage would seem to be change that will occur in carbon storage as a result of the order of $7 to $18 per tC. If zero discountrates of the various land-use conversions. are applicable, then the upper range could be as high as $80 per tC. We use a "central" value of $10 per The data in Table 2.6 then suggest that, allowing for tonne carbon as the shadow price of carbon. the carbon fixed by subsequent land uses, carbon released from deforestation of secondary and pri- From Table 2.6 we can conclude that converting an mary tropical forest is of the order of 100 tonnes to open forest to agriculture or pasture would result in 200 tonnes of carbon per hectare. global warming damage of, say $300 to $500 per hectare; conversion of closed secondary forest would We turn now to the value of this stored carbon. cause damage of $1,000 to $1,500 per hectare; and Nordhaus (199Ia, 1991b), Cline (1992) and conversion of primary forest to agriculture would Fankhauser (1992) have produced provisional esti- give rise to damage of about $2,000 per hectare. mates of global warming damage. In the case of Note that these estimates allow for carbon fixation Nordhaus and Cline, the estimates are for the United in the subsequent land use. States, and are extrapolated to the rest of the world. Fankhauser's analysis uses more worldwide infor- How do these estimates relate to the development mation. Nordhaus' estimate suggests damage equal benefits of land-use conversion? We can illustrate to some 0.25 percent of world GNP (GWP-gross with respect to the Amazon region of Brazil. world product), while Cline and Fankhauser sug- Schneider (1992) reports upper bound values of gest a figure of around 1.1 percent of GWP. Allow- $300 per hectare for land in Rondonia. Fearnside iTlg for omitted categories of damage, Nordhaus (1985, 1991) reports carbon loss rates of some 105 suggests that 1 percent of GWP might be a central tonnes to 125 tonnes per hectare for conversion of estimate, with 2 percent as an upper bound. Both primary forest to pasture, which are well below the 23 representative figures given in Table 2.6. But these host country) and global values may be very large apparently low emission figures suggest carbon relative to the conventional rates of return to land- credit values of $1,050 to $1,250 per hectare, three use conversion for agriculture and even forestry. The to four times the price of land in Rondonia. two problems are: the rate of return to conversion land use is itself exaggerated by the presence of The analysis strongly suggests that one of the cheap- economic distortions such as subsidies; and a large est options is to reduce tropical deforestation via part of the "rate of return" to biodiversity conserva- some form of international transfer based on incen- tion accrues in non-marketed form and not to the tives not to burn the forests for clearance. Exactly farmer who considers converting the land. Domestic how these incentives could be designed is a complex non-market values can be captured by suitable eco- and separate issue, but there is scope for the Global nomic policies in the host country. But global non- Environment Facility to encourage such reductions market values can only be captured through some in deforestation through its investment portfolio, form of international resource transfer. This latter and to experiment with tradeable burning rights. result is of course fundamental to the Global Envi- ronment Facility's purpose since the GEF can be Conclusions viewed as a means of raising the host country's rate Eliciting economic values for biodiversity is com- of return on conservation land uses. The importance plex, but not impossible. The available evidence of this will be underlined in chapter 3 where we suggests that both domestic values (values to the explore the reasons why biodiversity disappears. 24 The Economic Causes 3 Dof Biodiversity Erosion In this chapter we focus on the economic causes of Over-exploitation and extinction biodiversity loss. By economic cause we mean In all of these cases it was over-exploitation that was factors at work in the way that modem economies the cause of the species' decline, since fishing and are organized and, perhaps more fundamentally, hunting pressures were occurring, with regard to factors in the very evolution of modem economies. many oceanic species, at levels that were unsustain- The basic proposition is that it is in the workings of able. Therefore the initial focus of the economic the economy that we will find most of the factors study of extinctions concerned the deleterious im- explaining the decline not just in biodiversity, but in pacts of human hunting and fishing on various environmental capital generally, whether it is the resources (Gordon 1954). ozone layer, the carbon cycle, tropical forests or coastal waters. Looking at economic causes does The study of over-exploitation was the first attempt not mean we neglect more general factors such as at an economic analysis of the interface between population growth, for population growth is itself human society and the remainder of the biological ifrequently to be explained in economic terms. world. This resulted in the development of so-called bioeconomic models: models analyzing the interac- ]First it is necessary to look at the way economists tion between human harvesting pressures and bio- have traditionally tried to explain the extinction logical resource regeneration. The questions process, or what we will call biodiversity erosion. addressed in these models concerned the character- istics of a resource and resource management sys- lExtinction in the context of marine tem that rendered them incompatible, so that the resources resource was incapable of sustaining the systemic 'The economic analysis of extinction was initially pressures placed upon it by human society. developed in the context of marine resources. This was the case because many of the earliest examples Economic analysis gave a short and simple answer of modem species' endangerment occurred within to these questions. In the context of marine resourc- that context. The Pacific fur seals suffered near es, exploitation of a resource was likely to be extinction in the late nineteenth century due to over- unsustainable if: exploitation. The blue whale experienced a severe decline in the same period. During the twentieth (a) The ratio of the price of the harvested re- century the analysis focused on the decline of var- source to the cost of harvesting was "high;" ious fisheries, as the advance of technology made it and possible to overfish entire stocks of various oceanic (b) The natural growth rate of the resource was species. low" (Clark 1976, 1990). 25 These two conditions determined the ultimate im- system of incentives based solely upon first appro- pact of human harvesting pressures on a species. priation, and this implies that no individual harvest- The intuition behind these conditions is simple. er has any incentive to discontinue harvesting the Condition (a) determines the incentives for human resource, because any of the resource that one harvesting; a species with a high price relative to the harvester leaves behind will simply be captured by cost of harvest is potentially very profitable, and another. therefore attracts substantial harvesting pressure. Condition (b) determines the capability of a species In the context of an open access regime, extinction to sustain these pressures; a species with a low is a possibility if there are incentives to harvest the natural growth rate cannot regenerate itself at a rate resource which exceed its capacity to replace itself. sufficient to withstand substantial harvesting This is precisely what the bioeconomic models of pressure. extinction (in the context of marine resources) have demonstrated: open access regimes are a primary Therefore the economic analysis of extinction in contributing force to extinctions. the context of marine resources is quite straightfor- ward; the existence of financial incentives for Extinction in the context of terrestrial significant harvesting pressures applied to slow- resources growing resources implies unsustainability. This As the elephant and rhinoceros examples suggest- explains the decline of such species as the great ed, it is tempting to apply the same bioeconomic whale. Its high values as the provider of important models to land-based resources. But the economic oil products (in the nineteenth century) combined analysis of extinction in the context of terrestrial with its naturally slow growth rate meant that pop- resources is in fact very different from the analysis ulation declines were the likely result of the uncon- regarding marine resources. This is attributable to trolled harvest, and this is the pattern that was in fact two fundamental differences, one on the societal observed. Much the same could be thought to apply side and one on the biological side of the bioeco- to land-based resources such as the African ele- nomic model. These two features are: phant and the rhinoceros. Both are comparatively easy to hunt, especially with the advent of high * The existence of nation states in the terrestrial velocity rifles (low cost), and both have high value context products (ivory and rhinoceros horn). We will soon * Competition for land-based "niches." discuss how far this transfer of extinction econom- ics from sea to land is justified. "Optimal" open access regimes First, there is no reason why the assumption of open Open access as a cause of over-exploitation access management should be carried over from the In the marine context, however, the emphasis must marine context to be applied to terrestrial resources, be placed on the uncontrolled nature of all marine even to wildlife species. With regard to oceanic harvesting activity. Over-exploitation has often resources, the choice of the management system occurred in the context of the oceans precisely was not an option, because these resources lay in the because the harvesting activities in this environ- international domain. However, on land there is a ment have been so pooily controlled. Until very nation that has the designated responsibility for recently, the oceans have been non-sovereign terri- making management decisions with regard to the tory, and their resources have been subject to appro- resources associated with any piece of territory; this priation on a first-come-first-serve basis (Swanson is the economic meaning to be given to the legal 1991). concept of national territorial sovereignty, meaning that there are "owner-states." This form of resource management is known in economics as an open access regime. No one owns If a terrestrial resource is managed by an open the resource and no one can effectively be prevented access form of regime, this is because some owner- from making use of it. Such a regime installs a state has chosen to apply this manner of manage- 26 ment to this resource. An owner-state may in fact crucial difference between the different forms of choose to apply a management regime selected management regimes listed above is the aggregate from a wide range of different forms of institutions amount of societal investment (by the group of to terrestrial resource management. For example, harvesters) that results. For example, as described there are various forms of common resource man- above, an open access regime creates incentives not agement (such as communally managed pastures to invest in the resources subjected to it; the harvest- and forests), private property rights (exclusive to a ers of the resource will not view the resources as single individual), and national ownership (such as being worthy of investment because others will national parks and forests). Any one of these capture mostof thebenefits of theirinvestments. On resource management regimes may be the "best" in the other hand, if the state were to institute another a given context and locality. institution (such as a property rights regime), then the harvesters would see some individual benefit to Paradoxically, even an open access regime can be investing in the resources. In either case, the owner- an optimal choice (from an owner-state's perspec- state determines the ground-level investment in- tive), even though it will always result in the ineffi- centives by its choice of management institutions cient over-exploitation of the resources subjected to for a particular region or resource. it. This is because there are two potentially conflict- ing objectives at issue: the objective of maximizing Despite the fact that it has the power to choose the the efficiency of the management of a particular "efficient" management regime, it is sometimes resource (or group of resources), versus the objec- optimal (from the state's perspective) to allow open tive of maximizing the efficiency of the manage- access regimes to continue in place. This is because ment of the totality of a society's resources (natural, another important difference between these differ- human and man-made). The efficient pursuit of the ent management regimes (such as open access. latter objective will imply the necessity of some common property, private property and national trade-offs in regard to the pursuit of the former. property) is the differential amounts of state re- Then it may be the case that inefficient forms of sources that they require for their implementation. resource management are optimal from the owner- In general, the creation and implementation of state state's perspective. institutions for protecting rights and monitoring production are costly affairs. The one exception is In order to explain this concept clearly, it is neces- that the institution of an open access regime costs sary to understand that all state-level decisions the owner-state nothing (in the form of state spend- concerning the regulation of natural resources are ing requirements); other forms of state management investment decisions, and the state is deciding im- regimes will require more significant commitments plicitly whether the particular resource or region is of state funding. worthy of an allocation of scarce societal invest- ment funds. Efficient management of a given bio- A zero-level of state spending with regard to the logical resource will require the regulation of management of a particular resource or habitat may harvesting activities with regard to a biological be optimal from a state's more general perspective resource, in order to allow some amount of the because of the competing claims for national invest- existing stock of a species to remain for the purpose ments within a developing state. In short, it cannot of generating future growth. be assumed that full and effective institutions will be warranted for the protection and production of all This capacity for growth is the reason that econo- existing natural resources. The state must select its mists refer to a natural resource as natural capital. A investments carefully, and allocate its scarce funds natural resource is capable of generating a return to those resources and regions that it believes will just as with investments in any other form of asset. use them most productively. Investing in management regimes for a particular natural resource is the state's means for inducing Therefore, although an open access regime is the investments in that resource. In other words, the embodiment of an inefficient resource management 27 regime, it will be the optimal choice for many states ture includes both crops and livestock. Table 3.1 in the context of severe scarcity of investment funds illustrates the changes in land area in selected coun- for institutional development. This implies that the tries. The table shows clearly that major increases fundamental cause of many land-based extinctions, have occurred in the areas of cropland in South especially those resulting from over-exploitation, is America, Oceania and Africa, and significant in- not the existence of open access institutions. In- creases in pasture-land have occurred in Central and stead, the fundamental cause is the existence of South America. These broad aggregates conceal incentives in these developing states not to invest in some major changes which are shown for selected the necessary management institutions in some re- separate countries. gions of the country or in regard to some resources. With regard to these various forms of competition Niche competition for land use, the danger to species is that they will be The second important difference between oceanic undercut rather than over-exploited. That is, these and terrestrial resources is the extent of the niche are resources that will lose their capacity to survive available to the species. With regard to oceanic not because humans place too much pressure on species, the size of the niche is exogenously deter- their stocks but because humans convert their hab- mined; that is, the niche available to a species is itats to other uses. Part of the reason that such determined by the carrying capacity of its natural conversions take place is because the economic environment. The species will be able to expand to value of biodiversity is nottransparent in the market the limits of its niche, as determined by its capacity place. This may be because there is insufficient to compete with other species (other fish, sea mam- mals, and so on) for the reSDurces within that envi- 0 ronment. Table 3.1 Rate of conversion of land (late 1970s to late 1980s) For terrestrial species, the arnount of basic resources (percentage rate of increase) available to sustain a given species is no longer determined by a natural equilibrium of this sort, but Region Cropland Pasture Forest by human choice. That is, the important difference Africa 4.4 -0.5 -3.6 between marine and terrestrial resources is the num- N and C America 1.1 3.1 1.0 ber of competing uses that humans have for their S America 10.9 4.1 -4.6 respective habitats. The main avenue by which hu- Asia 0.8 -0.3 -5.3 mans interact with oceanic species is through har- Europe -1.3 -4.0 1.1 vesting and pollution; however, with regard to ex-USSR -0.2 -0.6 1.7 terrestrial species, the nature of the interaction is Oceania 11.6 -3.1 -0.6 much more multi-faceted. Country A terrestrial species will compete with humans (for B-Faso 27.5 0.0 -8.2 the use of its habitat) in a multitude of different CBte d'lvoire 20.8 0.0 24,1 ways. Humans may consi(der making use of the Uganda 20.0 0.0 -8.1 habitat for purposes of agricultural production, and Brazil 17.1 6.3 -4.2 therefore the naturally-occurring species will have Paraguay 46.7 32.6 -27.7 to be competitive with these in order to retain their Suriname 53.4 11.1 -0.3 lands. Alternatively, humans may consider using the land for purposes completely unrelated to the bio- Bangladesh 1.5 0.0 -10.4 sphere (such as residences or factories), and then the Malaysia 2.5 0.0 -11.0 species must compete with these land uses as well. Pakistan 3.3 0.0 17.3 The main habitat-displacing activity in the develop- Source: World Resources Institute (1992) ing world is agricultural expansion, where agricul- 28 information about the benefits of biodiversity con- Niche competition: statistical tests servation (see chapter 2) or because there has been If niche competition contributes to biodiversity loss under-investment in conservation (see above). we would expect this to be a testable proposition. Table 3.2 Econometric studies of deforestation A minus sign means that an increase in the variable leads to a decrease in deforestation. A plus sign means an increase leads to an increase in deforestation. Blank entries mean either not statistically significant or not testedfor. Deforestation Rate of significantly population Population Agricultural International related to growth density Income productivity indebtedness Allen and + Barnes 1985 Burgess 1992 + Burgess 1991 a) - + + b) + Capistrano a) + and Kiker b) + 1990 c) + + Constantino and + Ingram 1991 Kahn and McDonald 1990 + Katila 1992 + + Kummer and Sham 1991 + Lugo, Schmidt and Braun 1981 + Panayotou and + Sungsuwan 1989 Palo, Mery + and Salmi 1987 Perrings 1992 a) + + + + b) + Reis and + Guzman 1992 Rudel 1989 + + Strafik 1992 Southgate 1991 + Southgate, Sierra + and Brown 1989 29 Table 3.2 reports the results of various analyses of disinvestment, management resources diversion, the statistical relationship between the destruction and base resource conversion. of habitat (a proxy for biodiversity loss), and demo- graphic and economic variables such as population Stock disinvestment growth, population density, per capita GNP and As in the bioeconomic model applied to marine international indebtedness. Appendix I shows the species, these are resources with high price/cost results in more detail. ratios but low growth. In that case, there are incen- tives to harvest the entirety of the resource (for its The studies surveyed in Table 3.2 suggest, first, high value) and invest the funds in other assets (for that there is no absolutely conclusive link between their greater growth rates) (Clark 1973). any of the selected variables and deforestation. However, cautious conclusions might be: An example of this force in action is the deforesta- tion of the tropical hardwood forests. These trees (a) The balance of evidence favors the niche represent substantial amounts of standing value, but competition hypothesis if that is expressed they have very low growth potential. It is econom- in terms of the influence of population growth ically rational to "cash in" the hardwoods and invest on deforestation. the returns in other, more productive assets so long (b) Population density is clearly linked to de- as the economic value of conservation is either not forestation rates. known (the information problem) or is not appropri- (c) Income growth is fairly clearly linked to able (the "global benefit capture" problem of chap- rates of deforestation, suggesting that defor- ter 2). estation has more to do with growth of incomes than with poverty-a result that Management resources diversion runs counter to the popular interpreta- These are resources of "medium" value but relative- tions of the causes of environmental degra- ly low growth. Since they are slow-growing re- dation. sources, they make little sense as assets; society has (d) The evidence on the role of agricultural no incentive to invest in their growth capacity. In productivity change is finely balanced. One addition, on account of their relatively low value, would expect growth in productivity to less- they do not justify a commitment of substantial en the pressure on colonization of forests amounts of national resources for the management (the coefficient of association should be of the exploitation process. Then, the nation will negative). The two studies finding this asso- allow these resources to be depleted through un- ciation are for South America and Indone- managed exploitation. sia. The two studies finding the opposite association are for Thailand (Katila) and the Examples of this process include the depletion of Brazilian Amazon (Reis). many of the large land mammals, such as the Afri- (e) The link between indlebtedness and defores- can elephant. During the 1 980s, sub-Saharan Africa tation is also fairly clear. Perrings finds a lost half of its elephantpopulation (from 1.3 million positive link for tropical moist forests but to 0.6 million). However, on closer inspection of not for other forests. Kahn finds a positive the national population statistics, it appears that link, but Capistranci's models do not find four countries alone (Sudan, the Central African such a link. Again, this ambivalence is at Republic, Tanzania and Zambia) lost 600,000 thou- odds with the popular interpretations of the sand elephants between them. It is clear how these causes of environmental degradation. elephants were lost. These four countries fell at the bottom of the tables of African park and protection Three routes to extinction spending (averaging about $15 per square kilome- To summarize, there are three alternative routes to ter) (Swanson 1993). The decline of the African extinction for terrestrial species (as opposed to the elephant in the 1 980s was the result of these tacit single route for marine species). These are stock open access regimes. 30 Base resource conversion a management institution (for example, private prop- These are resources that are of little or no known erty rights with some state enforcement) are put into individual value to humans. These biological re- place when the land is deforested, enclosed and sources are not over-exploited but undercut. They converted to agriculture. This indicates the unwill- are lost because humans find alternative uses for the ingness of the state to invest in management regimes lands on which they rely. Those alternative uses for the slate of diverse resources that naturally exist reflect simple human need for food (the growing there (and the willingness to introduce these regimes population problem) or the failure to appropriate the with the introduction of different assets in those "true" economic value of conservation, or the exist- regions). Therefore the fundamental basis for any ence of perverse economic incentives to convert land-based species' decline is a state's determina- land for biodiversity-friendly uses to uses inconsis- tion, implicit or explicit, not to invest in that partic- tent with biodiversity maintenance. ular species (or, equally, its habitat). In order to regulate extinction, it will be necessary to operate An example of this process is the depletion of many through the perceptions of these states, affecting the types of virtually unknown life forms when land is determination of which resources are investment- deforested and converted to other forms of use, such worthy. Information about the economic value of as cattle ranching. This branch of the force for biodiversity will help. It will also help to demon- extinction is generally termed the ibiodiversity strate that the relative economic rates of return to problem." land conversion are distorted, for example, by subsi- dies, the removal of which would confer net benefits Regulating extinction: correcting to the state in general. Procedures for capturing investment incentives global economic value would also help restore a The framework that these three forces imply focus- level playing field between conservation uses and es on the investment-worthiness of the resource. In land conversion uses. But the underlying force for essence, in the context of owner-states, all questions making the conversions in the first place remains the of extinction and species decline are based in the need to produce food to meet growing human popu- incentives for under-investment. The fundamental lations and, to some extent, the political requirement problem is that the owner-states do not invest in of establishing nationally loyal communities in bor- their diverse species (in terms of stocks, manage- der areas. ment and habitat). It is the failure of a state to provide for these requirements for a terrestrial spe- Niche appropriation and the specialized species cies that inevitably results in its decline. One very important reason for the continuing under- investment in diverse resources and diverse habitats The decision to withhold these investments in re- is the bias towards investment in the specialized gard to a given area of habitat implicitly derives species. These are the domesticated (animal) and from a determination that the naturally existing cultivated (plant) species that have been selected by resources do not warrant the required investments. humans to receive the vast majority of investment In regard to the developing tropical countries (where for purposes of meeting human consumption needs. most diversity now exists), these are usually deci- They represent a minute proportion of the world's sions not to invest in managing the forested frontier, diversity, but they constitute the vast majority of the thereby allowing wholesale over-exploitation of food consumed by humans. Only twenty species the diverse resources and encouraging widespread produce the vast majority of the world's food. The conversion to the traditional agricultural commod- four carbohydrate crops (wheat, rice, maize and ities (which are perceived as more productive). potatoes) feed more people than the next twenty-six crops combined (Wilson 1988). For example, in the Amazon region, it is often the case that the owner-state refuses to engage in re- The specialized species are of special importance source management on the frontier region before because their mere existence indicates the nature of the conversions occur. Usually, the first vestiges of the underlying problem. These species are so prev- 31 alent because they are monopolizing the invest- It is estimated that the human population on earth ments of human societies in biological production. ten thousand years ago (before specialized agricul- In a world where human investments are now nec- ture) was approximately 10 million individuals. essary for species survival, these natural monopo- The advance of this particular technological fron- lies in a handful of species imply non-investment in tier left much greater human population densities in literally millions of others, and non-investment its wake, first in the developed countries and now equates with extinction. increasingly (with the Green Revolution) in the developing world. The extent to which this process of conversion underlies the process of extinction is indicated by The human population will reach 10 billion in the the rates and locations of recent land-use conver- coming century. The movement to this much higher sions. During the twenty years 1960-1980, the whole population level necessarily implies the capture of of the developing world saw the proportion of its many other species' niches; the human species (one land area dedicated to the specialized species in- of five or ten million) now appropriates about 40 crease by 37.5 percent, while that same proportion percent of all available photosynthetic product on the remained constant in the developed world (where planet (Vitousek et al. 1984). This expansion has been the conversion process is complete; see Repetto and occasioned largely through the instrument of conver- Gillis 1988). At the "forest frontier"-countries sions of land area to the use of the human-selected where colonization of forest land is significant- specialized species. It is the substitution of the special- these rates of conversion are even greater than the ized for the diverse on a global scale that is the most average, and continue to be so. For example, during fundamental force for extinction. the 1 980s, Paraguay (72 percent), Niger (32 per- cent), Mongolia (32 percent) and Brazil (23 per- Investment distortions cent) have all experienced significant rates of Nations under-invest in biodiversity because its rate conversion of lands to specialized crops; while of return appears to be less than that from alterna- Ecuador (62 percent), Costa Rica (34 percent), tive, competing uses of the land. But these rates of Thailand (32 percent) and the Philippines (26 per- return to alternative land uses are themselves dis- cent) have all experienced significant conversions torted: biodiversity uses have to be compared with of lands to specialized livestock (World Resources two alternatives: (a) land uses in which inputs and Institute 1990). outputs are "correctly" valued; and (b) the actual situation in which the value of inputs and outputs Finally, it is important to note that the motivation for are distorted. These might be referred to as the level expanding the ranges of these few, specialized playing field comparison and the "unlevel" playing species is one of human niche expansion. These field comparison. Of course, this assumes that biodi- specialized species are mere instruments for the versity uses are not themselves subject to subsidies capture of photosynthetic product by human societ- and distortions. Typically, however, the bias is very ies. The diverse biological communities are cleared, much towards distortions in conventional land use. and these homogeneous ones installed, in order to convert the land to more beneficial production from Such distortions are widespread. Table 3.3 shows the human perspective. The conversion of lands one set of subsidies to agriculture in selected coun- between biological assets (firom diverse to special- tries for 1987. While some countries tax their ized) is simply another manner in which humans agricultural sectors (these show up as negative benefit from adjusting their societal asset portfolio numbers in Table 3.3) most subsidize agriculture. (Solow 1974). The subsidies shown, however, are recorded as sums received by farmers in addition to the produc- An indicator that this has been a successful strategy er price. What has to be remembered is that the for the human species is the phenomenal expansion producer price may itself be artificial in that it is of the human niche (as measured by the population controlled by government. As an example, rice and of this species) sincethe introduction of agriculture. cereal prices paid to farmers in Japan were six to 32 seven times the border price. In addition, farmers rudimentary but instructive. In Bangladesh, for exam- received subsidies in excess of 100 percent of the ple, the subsidy structure to wheat makes little differ- producer price. Table 3.3 shows that the countries ence to what producers would get if border prices which subsidize over and above producer prices ruled. The same is true for Indonesian rice. In China, tend to be the developed economies of Canada, the the effect of the subsidy structure is in fact to tax European Community, Japan and the United States, farmers so that Chinese producer incomes per hectare together with the newly industrializing countries of are actually below borderprices. But in Japan (wheat) South Korea and Taiwan. But subsidies are perva- and South Korea (rice) it can be seen that not only is sive, as the table shows. the producer price well above the border price (seven and four times respectively, but further subsidies of Table 3.4 shows the magnitude of distortion arising around 100 percent are paid in addition to the border from the level of producer prices as well as the price. The effect is to make the returns to a hectare of subsidies granted (shown in Table 3.3). Only a few wheat production in Japan around fourteen times what selected countries are shown. Once again, the data are it would be without subsidies and without adminis- Table 3.3 Producer subsidies as a percentage of producer prices in agriculture 1987: selected countries (%) Rice Corn Sorgh. Soya Wheat Beef Sugar Other Argentina -23 -42 -10 6 Australia 4 4 16 Bangladesh 35 -1 Brazil 95 5 -9 59 1 Canada 37 22 51 10 54 Chile 20 44 50 Colombia 63 21 coffee -35 Egypt -126 15 4 45 EC 56 56 46 50 40 41 India 4 4 -10 I1 7 Indonesia 8 Japan 97 59 108 72 70 Kenya -7 13 coffee -31 tea -41 Mexico 75 59 52 20 18 cotton 60 Nigeria 49 6 64 cotton 83 Pakistan -1 and -128* -18 -17 11 Poland 54 36 29 South Korea 84 77 85 47 Taiwan 46 82 83 72 79 22 28 Thailand 5 Turkey 19 42 4 USA 49 46 43 8 63 10 60 Source: Adaptedfrom Webb, Lopez and Penn (1990). Note that these subsidies are in addition to producer prices which may themselves be higher than border prices - see Table 3.4. * Different types of rice. 33 Table 3.4 Two sources of subsidy to agriculture: selected countries 1987 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Producer Revenuel Yield Border Producer Subsidy price PP+Sub Border price tiha price $It price $It % of PP $1ha (1)x(3) $1ha (6)1(1)x(2) Wheat Bangladesh 2.5 164 172 -1 426 421 1.03 China 4.1 151 130 -17 527 458 0.74 Japan 5.7 184 1201 108 6801 14147 13.6 Nigeria 1.1 143 323 64 362 594 3.7 USA 4.3 70 96 63 416 679 2.2 Rice Indonesia 3.7 192 190 8 706 763 1.1 S. Korea 5.9 257 1095 84 6499 11958 7.8 Source: Authors' calculations. tered producer prices, and around eight times in South In the language of chapter 2, if host countries could Korea. Clearly, with distortions at this level, there is capture the total economic value of habitat conser- nothing remotely like a level playing field for biodiver- vation, and if the resulting cash flows could be sity uses. directed towards those who make decisions about land use, then, clearly, the relative rates of return to The failure to capture global economic conservation and conversion would change in favor value of conservation. Nation states would then have less The rate of return to biodiversity conservation is incentive to under-invest in biodiversity. further distorted by what economists call "missing markets." Chapter 2 indicated two such markets that Conclusions on the fundamental forces are highly relevant to biodiversity: carbon storage in underlying extinction tropical forests and the existence value possessed by Extinction in the marine context may readily be individuals in one country for wildlife and habitat in explained by the existence of open access regimes, other countries. The carbon storage values are po- and by the relative profitability of harvesting sea tentially very large, assuming the science of global species relative to the alternative uses of capital. But warming is fulfilled. Tropical forest "carbon cred- open access in the marine environment arises be- its" could be of the order of $1,000 to $2,500 per cause nations have not, until recently (but still hectare, dwarfing the investment returns from con- incompletely) exercised national property rights ventional land-use options such as agriculture. Com- over the oceans. parisons with forestry values also suggest high conservation values, where conservation is taken to Extinction in the terrestrial context cannot be ex- mean sustainable utilization. Rates of return to un- plained in the same way. It is necessary to ask why sustainable forestry could be as high as $2,000 per nations allow natural resources to be depleted to the hectare (Pearce et al. 1992), but figures in the range point of extinction. Since they are the "owners" of of $1 ,000 to $2,000 are more likely. Rates of return the land, the process must reflect some choice not to to sustainable forestry are perhaps $230 to $850 for invest in those resources. This process of under- Malaysia (Vincent 1990) depending on assump- investment has to be seen against the backdrop of tions about yield, and the discount rate. theneedtofeedgrowingpopulationsand,occasion- 34 ally, political objectives with respect to the settle- resolve the problem of biodiversity loss, but to ment of land. But the rate of land conversion is contribute to a slowing down process. If one main accelerated further by (a) lack of information about force explaining the losses is population growth, the economic value of conservation; (b) deliberate then GEF can expect to have a limited role to play policies which encourage land conversion-such in conservation since it has no powers nor any remit as subsidies; and (c) "missing markets"-the in- to change that fundamental process. But GEF does ability of nation states to capture the global eco- address the second issue of under-investment. Es- nomic benefits of conservation. It is arguable then sentially, GEF' s funding of the incremental cost of that, while niche competition remains a fundamen- projects (see chapter 2) raises the rate of return to tal cause of biodiversity loss, the rate of conversion conservation projects in the host country. And it would be slowed if the information, distortionary does this by focusing on one of the "failures" in the policy, and missing marketproblems were resolved. way the competition between conservation and land Moreover, as the statistical analysis showed, there conversion works-the failure to appropriate glo- are other forces at work as well. bal benefit. Nor should the low level of funding of GEF be too disadvantageous provided it can use its What relevance has such a view for the Global limited funds to lever private sector capital, an issue Environment Facility? First, it helps to put the GEF discussed briefly in chapter 5. activity in context. GEF was not established to 35 Reversing 4 the Decline From the discussion of the nature of the extinction sions of the world. It was also the initial rationale problem in chapter three, it is apparent that there are underlying the International Whaling Convention. two different spheres to be considered, marine and Most of these international treaties functioned through terrestrial. These spheres are distinct biologically, the creation of a commission whose task it was to economically and (most important) institutionally. develop a scheme similar to that outlined in (a) - (d). Regulation of oceanic resources In practice none of these commissions has been a In the oceanic context there is no owner-state with success in terms of the management of its resources. the designated responsibility for management of a This result has been occasioned not by a failure to given marine resource. The regulation problem appreciate the nature of the management solution to concerns the construction of an owner-manager the problem, but rather by a failure of the parties to regime with regard to the resources which are, in accept and implement the managed solution. fact, international resources, falling outside any one state's territorial jurisdictiori. The role of regulation Instead, the various states have over-depleted oceanic is to develop a management regime that would resources by failing to agree how to distribute the mirror that constructed by an owner-state, if one gains from implementing the managed solution; these existed. are multilateral bargaining problems. When each state argues that it should receive a larger share of that The development of an international resource man- gain, pressure is created to revise the aggregate off- agement regime is, in theory, a simple task. It take in order to accommodate all the demands. These concerns the performance of a straightforward four- individual demands are then met through: increased step process in regard to the resource: aggregate quotas; state withdrawal from the interna- tional commission (reservations and non-accession); (a) Assessment of stock level and growth capac- and/or state non-enforcement of its individual quota. ity of the resource; The ultimate effect is the inefficient international (b) Determination of the aggregate optimal off- management of the resource. The existence of these take (quota) for the resource; international bargaining problems has resulted in the (c) Allocation of the overall quota to individual over-depletion of many important oceanic resources. states; and (d) Enforcement of the individual state quotas. Regulation of land resources Although the problem of extinction on land is very Precisely this approach has been attempted for about different in character from that in the context of half of this century by the various fisheries commis- oceanic resources, the policy approach applied on 36 land derives directly from the analysis of the prob- only three avenues to extinction for terrestrial re- lem developed for the sea. This has led to a largely sources. The other two, the competition for land and ineffective and necessarily inefficient set of endan- management resources, are equally, or more com- gered species policies, as traditionally defined. monly, the incentives leading to extinction. There- fore a system of bans would be an apt policy for The leading piece of legislation regarding endangered over-exploited oceanic species and the slowest grow- species is the Convention on International Trade in ing (and highly valuable) terrestrial species, but the Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna. Its policy is policy would have no positive impact on the incen- to focus on the identification of endangered species tives resulting in the extinction of other terrestrial and the withdrawal of the demand for these species or resources. Species that are in decline on account of their products, and the criminalization of their supply. competition for lands (general biodiversity), or com- Endangered species policies developing out of this petition for state investments in management (such convention therefore operate through a system of as elephants), will not be assisted by the prevailing bans. An importing state is required to ban all imports set of endangered species policies. of products derived from a listed endangered species, and an exporting state is required to ban all exports of In fact, there is an argument to be made that the products derived from such a species. existing policies entirely misapprehend the core of the extinction problem-the creation of incentives This system of bans is required of all parties to for owner-states to invest in (rather than convert) CITES (now more than 125 nations). In addition, their remaining diverse resources. A system of there is the requirement that the member states bans, and the resulting reductions in the profitabil- adopt internal legislation implementing the terms of ity of all diverse resources, is the antithesis of a the convention. Many states, particularly develop- constructive approach to the fundamental problem ing countries, have implemented absolute bans on of extinction. all wildlife exploitation. In many developing coun- tries it is illegal to hunt, capture, trade or export any International regulation of extinction- part of the wildlife resource. This is true for most of creating incentives for owner-states the states of South and Central America. For exam- The objective of international extinction policies ple, Brazil and Boliviahave total bans on all wildlife should be the inducement of investments by owner- exports, as does Mexico. Many of their neighbors states in their diverse resources. This solution is have partial or full bans in place. In sub-Saharan suggested by the nature of the problem, as devel- Africa, there are a half dozen states with complete oped in chapter 3. In essence, if an owner-state does wildlife exploitation bans in place, while many not view its diverse resources as worthy of signifi- others have severe use restrictions. cant investments, then it will be optimal (from that state's perspective) to allow a continuation of the This approach to endangered species policy is based conversion of its lands to more specialized uses. on the over-exploitation theory of extinction de- Such conversions can occur through the managed scribed in chapter 3. It operates indirectly through ,mining" of existing resources (as with hardwood the economic system, by lowering the unit price of forests), via the unmanaged over-exploitation of a species' products (through the destruction of existing natural resources (as with the African ele- demand) and by increasing the cost of supply phant), or by the removal and replacement of the (throughcriminalizing theproduction process). The diverse with the specialized (as with land-use con- narrowing of the price-cost ratio would have the versions to cattle and crops). All three routes to effect of reducing the pressures on a resource within extinction have the same ultimate result (changed an open access regulatory framework, if the funda- land use) and the same underlying cause (perceived mental cause of its decline is over-exploitation. investment worth). The objective of international extinction policy, within this framework, must then However, as discussed in chapter 3, the incentive to be to alter the perceived relative investment worth over-exploit stocks of biological resources is one of of diverse resources within individual owner-states. 37 Global versus local optimum effects of their decisions. In economic terms, the The global problem of extinction comes down to a objective is the internalization of the global stock basic divergence between what investment in di- effect of diverse resources in the owner-state's deci- verse resources is desirable from a global point of sion-making framework. The rationale is that if an view and what is desirable from a local point of owner-state considers the global benefits rendered by view. The owner-state responds only to the per- diverse resources when making its conversion deci- ceived national (internal) relative advantages of sion, it will only decide in favor of conversion when diverse versus specialized resources. These are the that is globally optimal. This internalization of global same incentives that are found in every state, and externalities has the effect of making the perceived that have resulted in the almost complete conver- local optimum coincide with the global optimum. sion of the lands of most of the developed states in the world. For example, the amount of unaltered Such a policy implies that international regulation habitat of at least 400 square kilometers is zero in needs to be directed to the creation and maintenance Europe against a global average of 30 percent of a global premium to investments in diverse (World Resources Institute 1990). resources. This is an additional return, created through funding by the international community, The difference between the previously and currently that will flow to owner-states investing in their convertingstatesisnotsomuchamatterofdifferences diverse resources. There are two logically distinct between what is locally desirable, butratherthe change approaches to the creation of such premiums: inter- in what is optimal globally given the state of the global national subsidy agreements and market regulation stocks of diverse resources. In essence, the cost of agreements. However, there are a number of differ- each land conversion (from diverse to specialized) is ent forms (international parks, international man- not the same from the global lperspective because there agement subsidies, intellectual property rights, is a global stock effect. As stocks of diverse resources producer cooperative agreements, consumer pur- are replaced from the sanne roster of specialized chasing agreements and resource exchanges) that resources across the globe, the range of global diver- either of these approaches may take. sity continues to narrow. The initial narrowing of this roster probably had little consequence for global International subsidy agreements biological production; however, the final conversions Although it is under-investment thatgenerally drives will have a very substantial imnpact. A world constitut- extinction, it is the specific costliness of particular ed of none other than the relative handful of cultivated resource requirements that is the proximate cause of and domesticated species would not support a sustain- extinction. Extinction is caused most directly by the ableproductionsystemforhumanconsumptionneeds. refusal to allocate scarce societal resources to the lands or the management that diverse resources It is this uninternalized increasing costliness of con- require. It is the refusal to purchase these life- version that is the core of the global biodiversity sustaining factors for certain forms of biological problem. The individual state considering land-use resources that is the direct cause of species decline. conversions does not consider the effects of its actions on the global stocks of diverse resources, because These sources of decline can be remedied through a there are no benefits from doing so. Therefore the system of strategic international payments. This unregulated global conversion process may continue system of payments would necessarily be condi- well past the global optimum as individual states tional upon the owner-state's application of them to implement only locally optimal conversion policies. the purchase of the required factors for specified diverse resources. The payments would thus be International extinction policy-investing in restricted to use for the purchase of land and man- the internalization of the global stock effect agement for a particular resource or region. The best policy for regulating the conversion deci- sions of individual owner-states is the creation of Such a system of payments is constructed in a systemsthatcausethesestatestoconsidertheexternal manner that constitutes a self-enforcing interna- 38 tional agreement. The voluntary cooperation of ing. The permanent redirection of development countries in an international agreement means that paths will require the creation of institutions for that national sovereignty is respected rather than in- purpose. The suggested reforms outlined in this fringed. So the first principle for constructing an paper should be interpreted as potential directions effective system for regulating biological diversity for institution building of this nature. is to recognize terrestrial biological resources as national resources. Once this point is recognized, An example of such an international factor-subsidy the approach to registering global preferences in the scheme might be an internationalparks agreement. regulation of national resources is clear; it requires Such a program would in effect buy the use of the the inducement of changed national policies via land for the diverse resources that exist there. The strategic payments. In this way, host-states are role of the international community would be to pay induced to exercise their national sovereignty rights the rental price of the land each year that the national in globally-preferred ways, but only because it is in park remained unconverted. In order to manage the their own perceived best interests to do so. park, it would probably be necessary for the interna- tional community to provide a subsidy for manage- A crucial feature of any international scheme of ment services as well. If the international community payments based on conditionality (here, payment wished to maintain diverse resources at the lowest conditional on specific application) is its necessar- levels of exploitation (for non-consumptive activi- ily dynamic nature. It is only possible to restructure ties such as tourism and filming), then it would be the owner-state's decision-making process if the necessary to provide almost complete subsidies for payment is offered at the end of each period in the foregone land development opportunities and which the state takes the specified action. The management services required. payment is the globalpremium, supplementing the state's return, received for pursuing the global rath- However, the maintenance of a stock of diverse er than the local optimum. resources will often be compatible with a wide range of forms of resource utilization, other than A second important feature of this system of pay- those that are of the lowest intensity. In that case the ments is assurance. As emphasized in the previous international subsidies may be reduced in accor- sections, investments in diverse resources represent dance with the extent to which development oppor- investments in specific forms of assets. It is the tunities are allowed in the region. This, in essence, expectation of a future flow of benefits from these is the development rights approach to diverse re- investments that will ultimately induce them. There- source conservation; to the extent that the interna- fore the global community must, in order to alter tional community wishes to reduce the development host-state investment patterns, itself invest in two intensity away from the local optimum (of high distinct ways: (a) the creation of a stream of en- intensity conversion and use), it must be willing to hanced benefits for host-states investing in diverse provide a stream of ex postpayments to compensate resources; and (b) the creation of assurance that this for the foregone development. stream of payments will flow to investing states in perpetuity. Another example of an international subsidy scheme would be a resource franchise agreement. This This latter object is equally important because, would be a three-way agreement (between owner- without assurance, the enhanced benefits are mean- state, international community and franchisee) in ingless; states will not alter their long-term invest- which the international community would provide ment behavior without assurance that these benefits a stream of rental payments to the owner-state in are non-discretionary. The choice of an investment return for its agreement to restrict use of a given path for a given state's development is not redirect- piece of land to uses specified within the franchise ed by means of one-off impermanent injections of agreement. The land would thus be designated for funds. This is the reason that global investments in use, but only for limited uses amounting to much biodiversity must take the form of institution build- less than complete conversion (for example, for 39 extractive industries such as rubber-tapping, and cutting),apolicyofrentmaximizationandappropri- plant and wildlife harvesting). The land would then ation is available. be franchised to an entity that could use it only for purposes compatible with the franchise. If the state Rent appropriation is a policy based on assuring that failed to enforce the franchise agreement, it would the owner-state receives the full value from its di- forfeit its annual rental fee. verse resources. At present, this is the opposite of what is occurring with respect to a wide range of The benefit of a franchise agreement over an inter- these resources. African countries were capturing national parks scheme is that it provides a stream of about 5 percent of the value of their raw ivory exports benefits to fund the management of the operation. during the height of the ivory trade (Barbier et al. Under the franchise agreement, it is the responsibil- 1990). Tropical bird harvesters around the world ity of the franchisee to provide management servic- acquire between I percent and 5 percent of the es from the returns it generates in its operation of the wholesale value of the animals (Swanson 1992). franchise. In this fashion, the international commu- This is true even with regard to many exports of nity is able to "contract out" the provision of man- tropical forest products (Repetto 1990). The owners agement services, while (through the rental fee and of diverse resources under :hese circumstances are restricted use clauses in the franchise agreement) it holding only the legal, and not the beneficial, rights retains the possibility of moving the local optimum of ownership. Combining the two sets of rights closer to the global one. Therefore, a franchise within the same entity will greatly enhance the per- agreement is simply a more generalized form of the ceived benefits from diverse resource management. international park agreement required for the acqui- sition of all development rights in a region. A At present, international policies regarding diverse franchise agreement could be used to specify the resourcetradearetheoppositeofarentappropriation precise range of activities allowed and disallowed system. International policy regarding poorly man- in the region, and it would require the international aged resources (for example, where the beneficial community to provide the "global premium" that is interest is separated from the legal resulting in over- necessary to make up the difference between what exploitation) is to attempt to destroy the value of the an entity would bid for the franchise and what the resource (as discussed above with regard to CITES) value of the land would be in sustainable use. or to bring the resource into domestication (as with the relocation of the livestock for the tropical bird Market regulation agreements industry to developed countries). Both approaches The alternative to the direct purchase of develop- are geared equally to the destruction of incentives for ment rights is the subsidization of diverse resource investments in diverse resource habitats. production, in order to alter the perceived benefits of conversion. The owner-s,tate considering conver- An international policy regarding diverse resource sion will balance the comparative benefits from the trade must instead be based upon a constructive land in its various uses. One means by which the approach by being used for the maximization of the decision-making process rnight be biased towards rental value of the resource combined with the tar- the naturally occurring slate of resources is the geted return of that value to those states investing in enhancement of the returns from these resources. theirdiverse resources. This approach provides com- pensation for those states already investing in the This approach obviously wvill not address all three management of their diverse resources, and it pro- of the potential routes to extinction (discussed in vides incentives to those states not so investing. chapter 3), but it will address two of them. The third route-the mining of high value, slow-growth re- Forexample,theCITESbanontheivorytradecanbe sources such as hardwood forests-must be ad- seen as a misconceived policy. Although the conti- dressedviathesubsidiesapjproachdevelopedabove. nental populations of the elephant had declined by For all other resources threatened with extinction half, these populations had fallen precisely in those (those suffering from over-exploitation and under- states that had not invested. In other states that had 40 invested heavily in the species, such as Zimbabwe received from the exchange are re-channelled to the (with per kilometer investments ten or twenty times habitat, because sustainable management requires as great as those in the non-investing states), the substantial investments of resources (which is why it elephant population had vastly increased over the so seldom exists). It would only be those states that same period (by 100 percent in Zimbabwe). A are willing to invest in this manner of development, blanket ban on the ivory trade provides the wrong and able to demonstrate their capabilities to do so, incentive structure for the African states. The impo- that would be listed on the exchange. In this way the sition of a ban proved that the states engaged in exchange system generates the funding required for elephant over-exploitation were right; there was no enhancing diverse resource benefits, and also gener- future to be had from investments in this diverse ates the incentives for channelling these enhanced resource. benefits back into the diverse resources. The correct international incentive structure would Another example of such a scheme would be a do the opposite; it would provide premiums to the genetic (intellectual property) right regime. This states investing in their diverse resources and pen- regime would also allot specific markets in consum- alties to those who do not. This could be achieved er states to compensate for diverse resource invest- through a sustainable wildlife trade exchange. As ments, but the connection between the market and with any exchange, it would be developed to dis- the investment would be less direct (as compared criminate between good (investing) and bad (non- with stock investments that directly generate tangi- investing) suppliers and allow only the former to ble flows). sell on the exchange; then any consumer of the product would know that in purchasing from the The role of any form of intellectual property rights exchange, the funding would flow to an owner-state regime is to provide a basis for compensating invest- that invests in the resource. In addition, to the extent ments in stocks that do not generate directly com- that the consumer states agreed and enforced pur- pensatory flows. Specifically, intellectual property chases solely from the exchange, the result would regimes generally reward inappropriable investments be greatly enhanced prices for the supplier states in information with rights in discrete markets. A listed on the exchange. This exchange-based price concrete example is the innovation of the optimal differential would then constitute the premium for sized racquet head, developed from a program to investing owner-states and the penalty for the non- determine the optimal trade-off between wind resis- investing. tance (too large a head) and required accuracy (too small a head). The inventor of the oversized tennis The crucial element in this approach is the creation racquet determined that a racquet of 117.5 square of a price differential for investing owner-states centimeters was optimal for tennis. In fact, this through market regulation in the consumer-states. represented an investment in the creation of pure Restrictions on the country from which consumers information that would not have been appropriable are allowed to make their purchases will always through the marketing of tennis racquets (because create a premium for the favored countries. A glo- other sellers would immediately have entered the bal premium for the sustainable producers of flows market with the same head). Therefore the intellec- of diverse resources may be created through any tual property rights regime awarded this inventor scheme generally directed to this purpose. with aprotected marketrightin all racquethead sizes between 100 square centimeters (the original size of The method of certifying suppliers in a wildlife a tennis racquet head) and 135 square centimeters. trade exchange is the manner in which investments This protected market then acted as compensation in diverse resources are assured. A host-state would for the investment in the information created by this only be "listed" on the exchange if it were able to inventor. demonstrate that its supplies to the exchange were derived from "sustainably managed habitats." It is It is equally possible to link protected markets to the latter requirement that ensures that the proceeds investments in diverse resource stocks, because these 41 stocks also feed into various industries in an indirect creating global premiums by changing the rate of and usually inappropriable fashion. For example, return to conservation in the host country. As exper- many pharmaceutical innovations are developed tise is gathered in these ventures, the GEF might from a starting point of knowledge derived from the readily become an intermediary for private sector biological activities of natural organisms. Howev- investments-a natural development of current co- er, after the long process of product development financing agreements. For example, the GEF might and introduction, there is no compensation for the monitor and "authenticate" investments by the pri- role played by the diverse resource in initiating the vate sector in country A to reduce CO2 emissions in process. country B, an investment that would be justified for the industry concerned if (a) CO2 quotas are im- A genetic resource right system could be construct- posed in the developed world; and (b) the costs of ed that would be analogous to an intellectual prop- abatement are lower in the developing world. Ex- erty rights system. This would require a royalty tending this brokerage function still further, the payment to the owner-state investing in the mainte- GEF might ultimately involve itself in franchise and nance of diverse resources that are made available tradable development rights (TDR) agreements. for prospecting by various industrial concerns. This This is a scenario for the future, not a prescription. royalty would be based on a protected market right But the kind of economic analysis in this section for the return of some share of the revenues from the does suggest that biodiversity conservation will marketed product to the investors in the resource require more imaginative use of the limited resourc- that led to the creation of the product. es available under the Rio conventions. In summary, the idea of consumer market agreements Domestic policies is to allocate these markets only to those owner-states Chapter 3 argued that land-based biodiversity ero- investing in their diverse resources. The owner-states sion arises from under-investment and niche com- that choose to mine their diverse resources will other- petition. Under-investment reflects the wise drive down the prices, and rents, available to all unappropriated global externality from biodiversi- states providing diverse resource flows. An agree- ty loss, which is the failure to capture global values, ment to restrict consumer nmarkets to those owner- or the global premium. Chapter 2 showed that these states that invest in their diverse resources creates a premiums could be very large, as illustrated by the price differential: a price premium target to all sus- carbon storage values of tropical forests. tainable producers and a price penalty target to all non- sustainable producers. Such a mechanism might be Butchapter 3 also showed thateven the apparentrates used in a wide variety of circumstances, where the of return to land-use conversion are distorted by stock-related investments are directly linked to the domestic policies. Correcting those policies thus be- final product (for example, an ivory exchange), and comes an integral part of the measures needed to where the stock-related investments are less directly reverse the decline in the world's stock of biodiversi- linked to the final product (for example, a genetic ty. The general theme, then, of the policy measures resource right regime). emerging from the economic analysis of biodiversity loss is to: How are these considerations relevant to the Global Environment Facility? Since the GEF operates via * Establish a domestically level playing field be- projects,theconceptoftradabledevelopmentrights, tween alternative land uses by removing market whereby nation states capture what we have termed distortions in the form of subsidies and poorly the global premium, does not seem appropriate for defined property rights its remit. But over the long run the nature of the GEF * Capture the global premium to ensure that there is likely to change. One scenario is that it becomes is a globally level playing field as much a "broker" of some or many of the different . Invest more in population control policies and in ways in which international transfers take place. technologies to meet the needs of expanding The GEF does deal directly in one mechanism for populations currently met by land conversion. 42 To be sure, the final result will not be total conser- of supply, and often leads to a lack of incentives to vation of biodiversity. If we knew all of the relevant conserve water (for example, charges are often set information there might still be an "optimal" level on the basis of irrigated acreage regardless of water of biodiversity loss. But it will be a marked change quantity consumed). One of the effects of such low of emphasis compared to the current situation. charges is over-watering, with the result that the irrigated land becomes waterlogged. Applications What kinds of domestic policy changes are re- of irrigation water often exceed design levels by quired? We illustrate this briefly since extensive factors of three. In India, 10 million hectares of land analysis already exists (Pearce and Warford 1993; have been lost to cultivation through waterlogging, Repetto 1986; Kosmo 1989; and Panayotou and and 25 million hectares are threatened by saliniza- Ashton 1992, among others). Essentially, removal tion. In Pakistan, some 12 million hectares of the or reduction of economic distortions would be ben- Indus Basin canal system is waterlogged and 40 eficial to the economies of the country in question percent is saline. Worldwide, some 40 percent of and simultaneously benefit the environment, and the world's irrigation capacity is affected by salin- hence biodiversity in general. ization. Irrigation from river impoundments has resulted in other environmental effects. Large dams In the developing and developed world alike, free produce downstream pollution and upstream silt- markets are often not allowed to function. Govern- ation as the land around the reservoir is deforested. ments intervene and control prices. In the European Indigenous peoples are moved from their tradition- Community, agricultural prices are kept above their al homelands when the dammed area is flooded. market equilibrium, with resulting over-production Clearly, not all damage done by irrigation is due to and damage to the environment through hedgerow low pricing, nor, by any means, can the environ- removal and over-intensive agriculture. In the de- mental costs of large dams be attributed entirely to veloping world the tendency is to keep prices down, inefficient pricing. But there is an association be- below their market equilibrium. These interven- tween wrong pricing and environmental damage. tions often cause environmental problems through By adopting prices that are too low, more irrigation the following negative effects: water than is needed is demanded, exaggerating the requirement for major irrigation schemes such as * Governments use up substantial tax revenues and dams, as well as for other schemes. Even if the other income in subsidies for price control, even scheme is justified, the amounts of water that are though government revenues are at a premium used are likely to be excessive because of the failure because of the need to use them to develop the to price the resource closer to its true cost of supply. economy. * Subsidies encourage over-use of the resources Table 4.1 shows the actual revenues obtained from that are subsidized. The effect of keeping prices selected irrigation schemes as a percentage of oper- down is to encourage wasteful use. ating and maintenance costs (O+M) and of total * S ubsidies make the economic activity in question costs (capital conservatively estimated plus O+M). appear artificially attractive. This tends to attract While some countries succeed in recovering most more people into that industry or sector because or all of the O+M costs, the highest recovery rate of profits, or "rents," are high. This is termed rent- total costs is only around 20 percent. seeking, and diverts resources away from more productive activities in the economy. The under-pricing encourages a wasteful attitude so that systems are kept in a poor state of repair. The impact on the environment can be illustrated in the Inefficient irrigation negatively affects agricultural context of the pricing of irrigation water and energy. output. Low charges lead to excess demand, giving a premium to those who can secure water rights, for Irrigation water example, by being the first in line to receive water. In many countries the price charged for water that is This is brought about because the system irrigates used for irrigating crops is generally below the cost particular parcels of land first, leaving the poorer 43 farmer to secure whatever remains after wasteful sure reflects the direct financial cost to the nation of prior uses. Moreover, water tends to be allocated subsidizing energy, but the economic measure is according to acreage, not by crop requirements. more appropriate as an indicator of the true cost of This results in rent-seeking: the interest is in secur- subsidies since it measures what the country could ing control of the allocation system. The high rents secure if it adopted a full shadow pricing approach. get capitalized in higher land values, making the incentive to compete for the allocation more in- Table 4.2 shows the size of the economic subsidy tense. But the competition does not occur in the for selected oil-exporting countries. Here the subsi- marketplace. It manifests itself as bribery, corrup- dies have an additional distortion in that they divert tion, expenditures on lobbying, political contribu- potentially exportable energy to the home market, tions, and so on. The allocators of rights similarly thus adding to balance-of-payments difficulties and expand their own bureaucracies and secure benefits hence to international indebtedness. The scale of for themselves. Rent-seeking obviously favors the the distortion can be gauged by looking at the already rich and powerful and discriminates against subsidies as a percentage of energy exports and as the poor and unorganized. And because it encourag- a percentage of all exports. In Egypt, for example, es wasteful use of resources, rent-seeking harms the the subsidies are equal to 88 percent of all exports environment, adding to the social costs of policy and twice the value of oil exports. failures in the price-setting sphere. Governments are very often themselves the cause of Energy environmental degradation. While we are all used Commercial energy forms such as coal, oil, gas and to the idea that governments should put things right, electricity are widely subsidized in developing coun- we are less familiar with the idea that certain gov- tries. As with irrigation water, the effects of the ernment policies, even those that ostensibly have subsidy are to encourage wasteful uses of energy, nothing to do with the environment, can, and often and therefore to add to air pollution and problems of do, damage the environment. This is "government waste disposal. The economic impacts of the subsi- failure." Clearly, since markets fail too, the issue for dies tend to be more dramatic, since they are a drain policy is to find the proper balance between the role on government revenues and divert valuable re- of markets and government intervention. sources away from productive sectors; they also tend to reduce exports of indigenous energy, there- by adding to external debt, and encouraging energy- intensive industries at the expense of more efficient industries. Table 4.1 Cost recovery in irrigation schemes There are two measures of subsidy. The financial (percent) measure indicates the difference between prices Actual revenues charged and the costs of production. An economic Actual revenues Capital + measure indicates the difference between the value Country O+M Costs O+M costs of the energy source in its most productive use (the "opportunity cost value") and its actual price. A Indonesia 78 14 convenient measure of the opportunity cost value, Korea 91 18 or "shadow price," is either (a) the price the fuel Nepal 57 7 would fetch if it were exported, or the price that Philippines 120 22 would have to be paid if it were imported (the Thailand 28 5 "world" price), or (b) if the fuel is not tradable (as Bangladesh 18 neg with most electricity, for example) the long-run Notes: neg = negligible. Capital costs are "moderate" marginal cost of supply. This long-run marginal estimates only. cost of supply is the cost of providing an additional Source: Repetto (1986) unit of supply in the long-term. The financial mea- 44 count for the state of the local economy. For exam- Table 4.2 Economic subsidies to energy ple, merely providing an alternative, sustainable use in selected countries land use such as agroforestry may not result in reduced deforestation if the local economy is char- subsidy of alu As energy acterizedbysurpluslabor.Theeffectmaysimplybe $m exports exports that the new land use is absorbed by the surplus labor, leading to earlier levels of land use (as with Bolivia 5400 20 82 some coca "replacing" projects; see Southgate and Egypt 4000 88 200 Clark (1992)). Demonstrating and marketing Ecuador 370 12 19 the value of a sustainable product could even back- Indonesia 600 5 7 fire when property rights are weak, as with the over- Mexico 5000 23 33 exploitation of the fruit aquaje round Iquitos in Nigeria 5000 21 23 Peru. Previously sustainable picking of this Peru 301 15 73 fruit gave way, through market development, to Tunisia 70 4 10 rent-seeking and felling of the trees containing the Venezuela 1900 14 15 fruit. Source. Kosmo (1989) How are such pitfalls in well-meaning investments to be avoided? Careful design of the context of the investment is critical. The likely reactions of the local community to such investments need to be Community involvement carefully gauged, including the very real potential Whatever the national or global value of biodiver- for rejection of the project as an invasion of existing sity conservation, its size will be generally irrele- rights. Local communities must be able to identify vant if those values are not appropriable by the increased rents from the conservation activity com- individuals making land-use decisions, whether they pared to the existing returns from the mining of be loggers or squatters, permanent agriculturists or renewable resources. As Southgate and Clark (1992) ranchers. Wells (1992) notes that the benefits of pointout,rentsformanyagriculturalcolonistsatthe biodiversity protection through national parks tend forest edge are zero, since the colonists cannot to be lowest at the local level and highest at the influence price (they are "price takers"). What they national and global levels (see chapter 2 as well). receive for, say, timber is an amount approximating But when analyzing costs, they are highest at the what they can earn by applying their labor else- local level and lowest at the national and interna- where (the "opportunity cost" of labor), and this tional levels. As such, the net benefits of conserva- will be considerably less than the market price of the tion are lowest for the local community and highest timber. This accounts for the divergence between for the national and global community. Indeed, at actual land prices in such areas and the land price the local level, net benefits may be negative, indi- that would result if owners could capture all of the cating that there is no local incentive to undertake market value. All this suggests that investments in land conservation. conservation must ensure that the rents from con- servation accrue, in significant part, to the local This suggests that not only must the local commu- community that will be involved in implementing nity be involved in conservation efforts (now a the conservation activities. If Wells (1992) is right, standard policy prescription) but that they should conservation projects may sometimes yield nega- also be able to appropriate a fair share of the wider tive rents for local people, making the project even values of conservation. But even where these two less attractive than the meagre zero rent activity conditions of involvement and net local gain are they usually engage in. met, it cannot be assumed that conservation will be undertaken. Wells and Brandon (1992) note some But there is an additional policy measure, namely, additional requirements, especially the need to ac- investing in the activity that gives rise to the biodi- 45 versity loss. While this may seem contradictory, raising agricultural productivity to reduce the moti- what is involved is raising the productivity of lands vation for land conversion. outside the areas where biodiversity is to be con- served through sustainable use activity or outright This approach also avoids or mitigates the difficult protection. As chapter 3 showed, one of the funda- problem of choosing between biodiversity invest- mental forces at work in explaining land conver- ment projects-a basic concern for the GEF-for it sion is population growth and density. But the suggests that more will be achieved by agricultural demand for "new" land could be reduced by raising development, and fuelwood substitution technolo- the productivity of existing land through measures gies, than by protected areas. If the GEF is to such as agricultural investment, extension and irri- succeed in biodiversity conservation, conventional gation. Instead of focusing solely on investment in development assistance needs to be strengthened the protected area, the focus should also be on with respect to the agricultural sector. 46 Summary and 5 Conclusions The economic value of biodiversity sible. This paper is primarily concerned with mo- Why conserve biodiversity? There are three poten- tives (b) and (c), motives for what we term econom- tial answers: ic valuation. (a) The constituent parts of biological diversity The concept of economic value have some intrinsic right to exist, a value in Total economic value (TEV) can be broken down themselves, independent of human valua- into use and non-use values, the latter being mea- tion. sured by a willingness to pay for conservation (b) The erosion of biodiversity threatens the unrelated to any use, now or later, of the resource. well-being of the human race, regardless of Use values comprise direct uses (such as harvesting any intrinsic concept of value. and tourism), indirect use values (for example, (c) Humans wish to conserve biodiversity, a habitats as carbon stores and watershed protection wish they express through lobbying, a will- assets), and option values (an insurance premium to ingness to pay, and so on. This valuation may ensure future use). be independent of any belief about intrinsic value or any risk assessment of biodiversity Of fundamental importance to GEF is the broad erosion. division of TEV into "domestic" and "global" val- ues. The former accrue to individuals within the In reality, human valuations of biodiversity are host-state, the latter to the rest of the world. Thus, at likely to reflect all three motivations. Distinguish- any stage there is a potential eight-fold categoriza- ing between them can be complex, or even impos- tion of economic value, as in Table 5.1. GEF is Table 5.1 Economic value classification Use value Non-use value Direct Indirect Option Existence Domestic Harvesting Watershed WTP for protection conservation in own country, unrelated to use Global Ecotourism Carbon WTP for conservation store in other countries as revealed in debt-for-nature swaps, etc. 47 concerned with (a) deterrnining global value; and (b) Land conversion is often subsidized through (b) seeking means whereby host countries can ben- direct grants for land clearance, subsidies for efit from global value. credit, agricultural inputs, and land purchase, or through the maintenance of exaggerated Preliminary investigations suggest that global val- prices for agricultural output. Land tenure ue, particularly global indirect use value, and per- and resource rights are often ill-defined for haps existence value, are large relative to the the sustainable uses of land, and may be domestic returns from land conversion. Thus, car- made secure by the conversion process. The bon storage values in tropical forests may be as high excess amount of land conversion that oc- as $500 to $2,000 per hectlare. curs because of these factors reflects govern- mentfailure-inefficient interventions in the Why are we losing biodiversity? marketplace by governments. Land-based biodiversity is being lost due to two (c) Some of the external benefits of sustainable fundamental forces: land use are global and are not captured by the "owners" of land, whether this is the immedi- (a) Under-investment; and ate landowner or the government. Since these (b) Niche competition. global benefits (such as carbon storage) are not under the control of the nation-state, they are These forces are different for land and water. Many not appropriated, and hence do not appear as a water resources are open access resources, not be- domestic benefit to land conservation. ing owned by anyone. The traditional "tragedy of the commons" argument does much to explain the These domestic market, global market, and govern- loss of international water--based biodiversity. ment failures help to explain why the rate of return to sustainable uses of land is below the rate of return But land-based resources share the open access to land conversion. There is no level playing field features of water only because nation states choose between conservation and conversion. not to invest in those resources. All land-based resources have state "owners." International waters Niche competition do not always have owners. To explain land-based The sheer expansion of human numbers has and biodiversity loss, then, we need to explain under- will place pressure on the available unconverted investment in biodiversity. land. Combined with under-investment in conserved habitats, and hence in biodiversity, niche competi- Under-investment tion produces a fairly relentless demand for land This arises because the "rate of return" to conserva- conversion. Statistical analysis tends to support the tion and sustainable use is less than the rate of return significant role of population density as a factor to land conversion. This is so for three reasons: explaining conversion and, to a lesser extent, pop- ulation growth. But other factors are also at work, (a) Even where there are no deliberate attempts including national indebtedness to some extent, and to distort the functioning of markets, and certainly income growth. where there is no global value, some land conversion beyond the socially desirable Towards a biodiversity policy amount will occur. This is due to market Once the causal factors giving rise to biodiversity failure-thefailureofmarketstoaccountfor loss are put together in this overall picture, the the side effects of the land conversion, such directions for policy to slow the rate of biodiversity as downstream sedimentation and loss of loss become clear, though complex to implement: biodiversity. The true rate of return to land conversion is less than the perceived rate of (a) Continued efforts to slow population growth return (in economics jargon, externalities need to be emphasized so as to reduce the have been ignored). competition for available niche space. 48 (b) A major focus needs to be on measures which play with respect to niche competition due to pop- change the rates of return to land use, upwards ulation growth. Policies to control population growth in the case of biodiversity and downwards in are of the utmost importance but lie within the remit the case of conversion. There are many mea- of existing national government policies assisted by sures which can be employed: international agencies. The focus of GEF activity therefore has to be on under-investment in land uses * Continued pressure on domestic governments to to conserve biodiversity, and that focus has to be reduce and remove economic distortions such as within the context of nation-state priorities and conversion and input subsidies, and guaranteed conservation strategies. output prices. While some subsidies reflect delib- erate policy to meet the needs of the poor, many All nations-states attenuate the use of land in one are not targeted in this way and accrue to the way or another. As far as its biodiversity activities wealthier classes of society. are concerned, the GEF has so far operated mainly * Land registration, titling and resource rights for by raising the rate of return to protected areas. It those practising sustainable land use. conserves existing protected areas by reinforcing * Mechanisms to capture the global benefits of sus- existing zoning policies, which in turn attenuate the tainable land uses. Various candidates here are: development uses of land. For a totally protected area, the development uses are totally or near- (i) Global Environment Facility: the return to totally attenuated. In order partly to compensate for conservation investment projects is inflated foregone development values, the rate of return to to reflect the global benefits they generate. protection is raised through global transfers of re- (ii) Franchising agreements: land use is restricted sources to pay for the costs of protection. The in return for payments from some internation- payment is not a subsidy, but a transfer in return for ally agreed fund. Various forms of franchis- which the rest of the world secures a benefit in the ing agreements are possible. form of conserved globally important biodiversity. (iii) Debt-for-nature swaps. In this mode, GEF is, in terms of Figure 5. 1, in fact (iv) Tradable Development Rights (TDRs): do- executing an internationalfranchise agreement. mestic or international purchasers might buy development rights to zoned land in a given One issue that arises, then, is the extent to which country. In exchange for payment, land users GEF should extend its activities to preventing fu- in conservation zones forego the right to de- ture land conversions that would not be justified velop the land in a manner inimical to biodi- through a full global cost-benefit appraisal. As an versity conservation. The price of the TDRs example, consider the forces giving rise to future thus reflect the foregone value of converting deforestation, or future drainage of wetlands, or the the land-the "opportunity cost" of conserva- ranching of wildlands. The rationale for this kind of tion. As discussed in chapter 4, purchasers intervention is two-fold: may be governments, but could more interest- ingly be environmental organizations and the (a) GEF is currently the only international fund private sector. that seeks to capture global benefit;4 and (b) It may be a very cost-effective way to con- A schematic summary serve biodiversity. Figure 5.1 summarizes the essential features of this report, and shows the links between valuation, cau- Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that, in South sation of biodiversity loss, and remedial measures. America at least, significantly less land conversion would occur if investments were targeted not at pro- The role of the Global Environment Facility tected areas, but at the areas outside protected areas. Figure 5.1 shows the context in which the GEF Southgate (1991) has shown that raising agricultural operates. Clearly, the GEF has a very limited role to productivity could significantly reduce the drive by 4 Debt-for-nature swaps do this but are piecemeal and financially very small compared to the GEF. 49 Figure 5.1 Schematic summary of factors affecting global biological diversity ; CAUSES OF BIODIVERSITY LOSS NICHE UNDER-INVESTMENT IN SUSTAINABLE LAND USE COMPETITION i i i MARKET GOVERNMENT GLOBAL FAILURE FAILURE BENEFITS FAILURE r-----------------------------_-____ POPULATIO I ECONOMIC VALUATION (TEV) POPULATION -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - --- _____________ GROWTH 4 4 _ _ _ ESTIMATE ESTIMATE ESTIMATE DOMESTIC BENEFITS OF GLOBAL "EXTERNALITY" REMOVING EXTERNALITY DISTORTIONS "CARBON "EXISTENCE STORE VALUE" VALUE" ; ,_ ____ ____ ____ ___.___-------- ,--- - -- -- - POLICY I_ + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 ' - - - - - POPULATION _____ POLICY LOCAL ENVIR. CORRECT TAXES; DISTORTIONS; THE ZONING and REMOVE GEF LOCAL TDRs SUBSIDIES, ETC INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS DEBT-FOR-NATURE INTERNATIONAL SWAPS TRADABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS so agricultural colonizers to expand into forested areas. (b) GEF projects are designed to capture global Such a policy fits the under-investment hypothesis benefits, so the idea of seeking conditions for since it addresses the fundamental disparity between resource transfers to benefit the donors seems the rate of return to colonizers from land conversion contradictory. and existing land intensification. But such projects are more typically the province of conventional develop- Finally, there is the important question of other ment aid. They may also generate a "magnet" effect by roles for the GEF. It seems clear that the most attracting inward migration which would then threaten effective way forward for the GEF is to evolve away the forest areas. from being only a project focused agency. GEF funding is unlikely to be at levels where major How far such a suggestion would change the remit of contributions to biodiversity conservation can be the GEF is not clear. Raising agricultural productiv- made. But the GEF can leverage other funds, and it ity in buffer zones would fit into a general conserva- can act as a broker for other forms of transfer such tion strategy, but more generally raising agricultural as international tradable development rights and productivity on degraded lands as a focus of a project international franchising agreements. is less likely to figure in the GEF portfolio. In the Pilot Phase, few projects have appeared to empha- As noted in chapter 4, there are several reasons why size the preventive approach. In GEF II, the fully purely private sector transfers could take place to operational phase, with its greater emphasis on cost- conserve biodiversity. In these transfers, the GEF effectiveness, it is arguable thatthis imbalance should could act as a monitoring, brokerage and authenti- change. At the very least, the relative cost-effective- cation agency, thereby widening its role and be- ness of the existing-areas focus versus the projected- coming more central and more effective in land-conversion focus needs to be explored. international efforts to conserve biodiversity. But any new role, for example, in relation to franchise The role of GEF in seeking to change economic agreements, could involve conditionality. The pay- distortions also raises difficult questions. By and ment of the "global premium," say annually, by the large, "conditionality" clauses in conventional aid franchisee, would be conditional on evidence that programs cover the more obvious examples, and the agreed attenuation of land use had been hon- the:ir controversial nature must be acknowledged. ored. The conditionality would thus be between the There are at least two reasons why the GEF need not recipient of the premium, the nation-state and the consider conditionality as part of its project evalua- agent to whom the franchise is let. The GEF could tioii procedure: act as the authenticating agent to ensure that the agreement is being honored (on both sides). (a) GEF projects tend to complement existing aid projects, so that they have limited "stand alone" features; and 51 CO, CD Independent Variables O CD (P Dependent Population Agricultural Extemal ____ Study Type of Analysis Variable Population Density Income Productivity Indebtedness Other Significant Variables . a _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CD X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~D U) X I. Shafik, the causes of annual rate of def. investment rate- C 1992b deforestation for a 1962-86 positive c) sample of 66 electricity tariff- O countries negative trade shares in GDP- m negative 0 political rights- f positive l civil rights- 3D positive CD 2. Burgess, def. in 53 tropical five-year change, negative (real GNP per roundwood production per capita, 1992 countries using 1980-85, in closed 0.01 capita in 1980) 1980- C cross-sectional forest area. negative, 0.05. C analysis. positive the log of closed forest area as a 0.05 percentage of total forest arca inon 1980- positive, 0.05 3. Burgess, sdes.in4 of the rmodel i. (hea pop. growth)(GDPper (debt-service totalgrculdwood porroduction- 1991C major tropical negative capita) ratio as a % of positive, 0.05 C forest countries level of def. 0.05 positive exports) using cross- 0.05 positive p sectional data. 0.05 0 model 2. negative positive food production per capita- 0.01 0.10 positive, 0.10 level of def. total roundwood production- positive, 0.05. 4. causes of growth in the area pop. growth negative agricultural export growth- Southgate, agricultural used to produce positive 0.01 positive, 0.05 1991d colonization in 23 crops and livestock. 0.01 latin American countries. 5. Kahn & develop model to def. area (1000 ha) negative positive forested land area- McDonald, show economic 0.017 0.01 positive, 0.01 1 990C mechanisms by (significant annual change in public extemnal which debt may alpha level), debt- lead to def.pp sda positive, 0.05 proxy for the labour force _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~lindepen-dernt Variables Dependent Population Agricultural External Study Type of Analysis Variable Population Density Income Productivity Indebtedness Other Significant Variables 6. global economic model 1: (per capita) (debt-service log export value- Capistrano influences on def. (the area of positive ratio) positive, 0.01, P. 1. & Kiker, tropical closed closed broad- 0.01 real devaluation rate-- 1990f broad-leaved leaved forest positive, 0.05, P.3&4. forest depletion, depleted by P.(perioe) 2 cereal self-sufficiency ratio- 1967-85. commercial positive, 0.01, P. 2. logging). model 2. positive negative log export value- 0.05 0.05 positive, 0.0 1, P. 1. P.3 P. 2 agri. export price index - positive, 0.05, P.2. real devaluation rate - positive, 0.01, P.3 /0.05 PA4 cereal self-sufficiency ratio- positive, 0.01, P.2 / 0.05 P.3. arable land per agricultural capital-positive, 0.01, PA4. model 3. positive positive negative 0.05 log export value- 0.05 0.01 P.2 positive, 0.01, P. 1. P.2 P.2 agricultural export price index- positive, 0.05, P.2. real devaluation rate- positive, 0.05, P. 3. cereal self-sufficiency ratio- positive, 0.01, P.2 / 0.05, P.3. arable land per agricultural capita-positive, 0.01, P. 4. 7. Rudel, decline in closed average annual pop. growth GDP per forest land area- 1989e tropical forests for decline in hectares positive, 0.001 capita. positive, 0.001. 36 countries of a country's across Africa, tropical forests (rural pop. positive Asia and Latin during the period growth, positive, 0.01 America. 1976-80 0.01) 8. Paulo, cross-sectional absolute forest negative. food production per capita- Mery & test of factors cover in 1980. 0.01 negative, 0.01 Salmi, 1987 influencing share of forest fallow- deforestation in 72 positive, 0.1 countries. agri. area coverage- negative, 0.1 Independent Variables Dependent Population Agricultural External Study Type of Analysis Variable Population Density Income Productivity Indebtedness Other Significant Variables 9. Allen & def. between model 1: annual pop. growth Bames. 1968-78 in 39 change in forest negative 1985h countries in areas. 0.10 f-i:ca, Latii America and Asia. model 2: the logarithm of % of forest cover decade change 1986- in forest area, positive, 0.10. 1968-78. the % area under plantation crops in 1968- negative, 0.05 per capita wood fuels consumption and wood exports in 1968- negative, 0.05 10. Lugo, def. in all greater % forest cover negative energy use per unit area- Schmidt & Caribbean 0.001 positive, 0.001 Brown, countries. 1981 11. Reis & Brazilian Amazon def. density. positive cattle herd- Guzman, deforestation and 0.001 positive, 0.05 1992i its contribution to logging- C02 emissions. negative, 0.01. 12. Katila, def. in Thailand relative forest negative negative wholesale price of construction 1992i cover by country 0.01 0.05 timber- negative, 0.01. 13. def. rates in relative forest negative GDP per capita positive time- Constantino Indonesia. cover. 0.01 positive 0.01 negative, 0.01 & Ingram, 0.05 (rice production 1991K used as a proxy) Independent Variables Dependent Population Agricultural External Study Type of Analysis Variable Population Density Income Productivity Indebtedness Other Significant Variables 14. def. in post-war 1. cross-sectional negative road density- Kummer & Philippines. analysis for the 0.05 negative, 0.05, Sham, years 1957, 1970 1970 and 1980. 1957, 1970 & 1980 19911 and 1980. absolute amount of forest kilometers of road- cover per province positive, 0.05 1980. in hectares. 2. panel analysis. forest area- absolute loss of positive, 0.05 forest cover, 1970- distance from Manila- 80 per province in positive, 0.05 hectares logging in 1970- positive, 0.05. 15. def. in N-E forest cover negative positive wood prices- Panayotou Thailand. 0.01 0.01 negative, 0.01 & (provincial distance from Bangkok- Sungsuwan income) positive, 0.01 1989m rural roads- negative, 0.10O rice yields- positive, 0.10O model 2: price of kerosene- negative, 0.01. 16. def. in 20 cantons def. (agri. tenure security- Southgate, in Eastern population) negative, 0.06. Sierra & Ecuador in early positive Brown, 1980s. 0.05 1989n LA Notes repeated with deforestation; debt and forest land area are defined in per capita terms a Presentation: studies explaining deforestation (results not shown in the table). In the scaled globally are listed first (entries 1-9), followed by regression, the public debt variable is the country and regional studies (entries 10-15). The most significant behavioural variable. sign, i.e., positive or negative, and significance level, where available, is indicated for each signif- f 1. Three linear models are estimated: icant independent variable. * Model 1: OLS * Model 2: a fixed effect model with the b Panel regressions are used to test three models- same explanatory variables as model 1, log linear, quadratic and cubic. Shafik estimates but with an intercept term allowed to vary both the annual and total measures of deforestation by regions, income class and intemation- (only annual deforestation results are presented). al credit standing He concludes that per capita income has virtually no * Model 3: intercept is constrained to be explanatory power, staLtistically speaking, in both equal for all subgroups. cases regardless of the functional form. (Per capita income is defined as real per capita gross domestic 2. The period 1967-85 is divided into four production in terms of purchasing power parity.) subperiods: * Period 1: 1967-71 -the waning years of c 1.Model 2 includes two dummy variables to the system of fixed exchange capture possible regional differences between * Period 2: 1972-75-started with grain African, Asian and Latin American coun- shortages, saw oil price increases and tries. credit expansion, and ended with reces- 2. Food production is used as a proxy for sion food demand. * Period 3:1976-80-booming commodi- ty prices led to slow economic recovery, d Explores the possibility that deforestation in conditional lending and the second round Latin America is symptomatic of agricultural un- of oil price increases derdevelopment. Southgate argues that since prop- * Period 4: 1981 -85---deep recession and erty arrangements oblige agricultural colonists to painful adjustments as developing coun- pay scant attention to the value of tree covered land, tries staggered under the burden of debt. the option of using the ratio of cleared area to remaining forest makes little sense. The growth in 3. Period 1: tropical wood was the most the area used to produce crops and livestock is significant variable, explaining more than 85 therefore chosen as the appropriate dependent vari- percent of forest depletion. able for causal analysis of frontier expansion. Period 2: cereal self-sufficiency ratio and the e 1. Results shown are for 1981-85 data. debt service ratio were the most significant 2. The negative coefficient for population, variables. used as a proxy for labour input, stems from Period 3: real devaluation rates had the stron- the authors' definition for GNP. A greater gest statistical relationship to forest deple- labour force leads to a higher GNP, thus tion. reducing the need to deforest to meet current Period 4: expansion of arable land had the consumption needs. strongest influence on forest. 3. The regression results show a strong relationship between debt and deforestation. Results suggest that population has had a less direct To eliminate the possibility that this mightbe impact on deforestation than macroeconomic vari- a function of country size and not a real ablesc behavioural relationship, the regression is 56 g The results shown are weighted by the size of a deforestation. Kummer argues that forest cover can- country's closed forest area. This procedure makes not be used as a dependent variable when analyzing equal units offorest area, belonging in varying propor- ongoing deforestation because it cannot capture the tions to different nations, the unit of analysis. GNP dynamic nature of tropical forest removal. The cross- explains a substantial amount of the variation in the sectional analysis is therefore not concerned with weighted analysis, but fails to show much variation in deforestation per se, but with the relative absolute the unweighted analysis (results not shown). Rudel forest cover at one point in time with the hypothesized argues that the results demonstrate the importance of independent variables. The panel analysis is, howev- capital availability, GDP, on the deforestation of large er, directly concerned with deforestation since the forests throughthefunding ofcapital intensiveprojects. dependent variable is the absolute change in forest In countries with small scattered rainforests, encroach- cover. Results for the Philippines are said to support ment by growing rural population is more relevant to this by the fact that the cross-sectional and panel the deforestation process. analyses yield such different results, with none of the independent variables in the panel analysis appearing hi 1. In model I the coefficient for change in in the cross-sectional equation. arable land is not significant. However, the The panel analysis cannot support the contention that authors observe that the bivariate correlation ghscroathis population growth is one of the leading causes of coefficients show that population growth IS deforestation. related to agricultural expansion, which is in tun related to deforestation. This relation m Two models are estimated to account for the high does not show up in the multivariate analysis multi-collinearity between kerosene price, crop price since controlling for population suppresses and the price of wood. Model 1 includes the price of the negative correlation between arable land wood and crops, and model 2, the price of kerosene. and forest loss; they therefore conclude that The difference in the explanatory power of the models both population growth and change in arable was found to be minimal. While the results for model land are associated with deforestation. 1 are presented in the table, the significance of the price of kerosene coefficient is noted. In model 1, 2. Model 2 IS specified im order t capture the population density emerges as the single most impor- possibledelayed impact of harvesting forests tant cause of deforestation, followed by the price of for fuelwood and wood exports on the rate of logs and the distance from Bangkok. deforestation. While the coefficient per cap- ita wood is not significant in the first model, n Under the hypothesis that settlement in tree cov- it is in the second, suggesting that deforesta- ered hinterland is stimulated by the prospect of captur- tion is significantly related to population ing agricultural rent, the authors first examine the growth and agricultural expansion in the relationship between rural population pressure (agri- short term, and with wood use (fuelwood and cultural population) and the factors affecting agricul- wood exports) in the long term. tural rent, the scale of the urban population as a proxy Population was found to be insignificant. for the local demand of agricultural commodities, soil quality, and road accessibility. Deforestation is then Study concludes that population density is the regressed against agricultural population and an index of relative tenure security among cantons. most important cause of deforestation in Thailand. k The time trend is used to capture the effects not accounted for, more specifically the cumulative roads built. The panel analysis does not support the contention that population growth is one of the leading causes of 57 Appendix 11 Resource Franchise Agreements Chapter 4 notes various forms of international re- the logs but also the value of the successive uses of the source franchise agreements. In each case, the general land for crops and ranching, since the logger can "on- principle is that land use is reduced in a given zoned sell" the land to the agriculturist, and so on. If markets area in return for the payment of a premium. If all land do not work well, the premium may be difficult to uses other than protective ones are forbidden, the assess. premium is equal to a rental on the land, and the donor effectively pays the rent on the land. In tum, this rent Who would buy such development rights? Panayotou would be approximately equal to the rental that the (1992) indicates that the international markets would land would command in some developmental use- be local and international environmental organiza- technically the "highest" sustainable use value. If only tions, govemments, corporations and the scientific some land uses are forbidden, then the premium will community (who would effectively buy the informa- tend to converge towards the differential returns that tion value of the site). The motives for such purchases land could have earned in the absence of reduced use. would vary: Several franchise-type agreements have been dis- (a) Environmental groups would be expressing cussed in the literature (Sedjo 1988, 1991; Panayotou their non-use ("existence") value for the sites; 1992; Katzman and Cale 1990). The importance of (b) Governments might be expressing some exist- intemational trading in such land-use rights ("devel- ence value on behalf of their populations, but opment rights") is that it offers a means of capturing would certainly be the likely agents for express- the global premium, the willingness to pay of the rest ing the global indirect use values such as carbon of the world foranation's conservation. If all develop- storage in forests; and ment is restricted, the minimum supply price should (c) Corporations might be motivated in several approximate the development value of the land since ways: this is what is surrendered with the franchise agree- ment. If only some uses are restricted, the minimum * Pursuing the tropical forest example, they might supply price should be the difference between the purchase conservation rights to forests in order to overall development value and the returns obtained by secure offsets to increased CO2 emissions else- operating the restricted uses. The demandprice will be where, the offset being required because of some determined by the global willingness to pay for the national CO2 control target under the Climate Con- global benefits. Chapter 2 suggested that for carbon, vention ("joint implementation").5 this demand price might be several times the total * They might wish to buy "exotic capital" to further a development value. This picture will, however, be green image domestically or internationally. influenced by discount rates. The global premium will * Some might wish to buy use rights to, say, pharma- be a regular payment, say annually, since it has to be ceutical material. conditional on performance. But the developmental * As Panayotou (1992) notes, they might also wish to land use value could be based on, say, clear felling the speculate on the growth in the value of the tradable site in a single year. It is therefore the resource owner's development rights (TDR) as the "demand for con- discount rate that will be relevant when making this servation" grows, that is, simply hold TDR for their comparison between a stream ofannual premiums and asset value. The "carbon credit" value of a forest the development value of the land. The issue is com- should also grow if carbon taxes in the developed plicated by the potential for successive uses of the world rise over time. land. Consider the "nutrient mining" sequence in a The incentives to sell therights would be straightfor- tropical forest (Schneider 1 992). If markets work well, ward. It would pay the owner-state to sell any a logger seeking a few trees on a given hectare should development right for a price higher than the fore- pay for the land a price reflecting notjust the rental on tn ~~~~~gone development value. There is a complication here. An offset could involve a growing forest to fix Co2 released in the original country. Purchase of existing forests in carbon equilibrium begs the question of what wouldhave happened if the developmentrights had not been purchased. Unless there is some certainty that the area would have been deforested there is no effective offset. One approach to this problem would be for an agency, such as the GEF, to determine the likelihood of "development." The potential for gains from threats should not, however, be overlooked. 58 Appendix III Incremental Costs This appendix outlines the basic elements of the This means the GEF may intervene to finance the measurement of incremental cost. It is important to project provided the global benefits exceed the net understand that, in practice, estimating incremental cost to the nation if the nation had funded the cost is complex and must be adapted to the context project. The amount Cd - Bd is the incremental of the institution and country in question. cost. We distinguish two contexts: a simple one in which What flows of funds are associated with this case? the country in question has only one choice of technology, and a more complex one in which there (i) The country pays some of the cost since it is a choice of technologies. "Technology" here gets abenefitBd, butit does notpay all of the needs to be interpreted broadly. In the context of cost (otherwise it would have no interest in greenhouse gas control, it can refer to an energy the project). The limit to the country's con- source or to a carbon sink. In the context of the tribution is given by Cd less GEF's contribu- ozone layer, it refers to substitutes for chlorofluoro- tion which is Cd - Bd. So the country's carbons (CFCs). In the international waters context, contribution is less than Cd - (Cd - Bd) = Bd. it may refer to different options for controlling (ii) GEF pays, in the limit, Cd - Bd, which is the waste; and in the biodiversity context it will refer to incremental cost. different ways of meeting a given protection objec- tive. This context is likely to define many of the biodiver- sity projects for GEF. Essentially, they will be Notation projects where the country finds that the benefits to In what follows we use C for cost; B for benefit; d itself from conservation are not sufficient to justify for domestic or national; and g for global, where conservation. Hence it will not proceed without global means the rest of the world. IC is incremental GEF intervention. GEF must be satisfied that: cost, and 8 means "difference in." (a) Domestic benefits are not greater than do- Simple case: single technology mestic costs; and In the simple case there are two possibilities: (b) Global benefits exceed the incremental cost. (a) Bd > Cd Multiple technologies Cases where a country has several choices of tech- In this case, the domestic benefits exceed domestic nology may be less relevant to biodiversity, but the costs-prima facie, therefore, the GEF would not analysis of incremental cost is not complete without be: involved in financing the project. The country an assessment of this issue. Economic rationality secures net gains by investing in the project itself or from the country's standpoint dictates that it will through conventional development aid sources. choose the least-cost technology. But this may not However, if there are major global benefits associ- be the most beneficial technology in terms of the ated with this investment, it might qualify for GEF global environment. For example, in the global intervention as a Type I project. warming context, the country may be able to bum coal or import gas. The coal is cheaper than the gas (b) Cd > Bd but emits higher amounts of CO . When should GEF intervene? In this case, the country in question will not invest in the project since it secures net losses to the Let Cdo be the cost of the technology 0, and let this country. But if there are significant global benefits, be the "cheap" technology. Let Cdl be the cost of the GEF may wish to intervene. The requirement for its more expensive but more globally beneficial tech- intervention is then: nology. Now the condition for GEF intervention is: Bg > (Cd - Bd) ... [I] Bg > (Cd, - Bd) ... [2] 59 This means that the global benefits must now ex- the two technologies (C) but that difference less the ceed the net costs to the nation of adopting the more net benefits the country would have got from pro- expensive technology. ceeding with the less clean technology. The intuition here is that the GEF should not be paying anyway for Let Cd, - Cdo = oC, which is the difference between the net benefits the country would have got. the costs of the two technologies. Then the require- ment for intervention can be expressed as: What now are the resource flows? Bg > (Cdo + oC - Bd) ... [3] (a) The total cost of the project is Cd, and the GEF would pay, in the limit, the amount this or Bg > ([Cdo - Bd] + 6C ... [4] cost less an estimate of the benefits accruing to the nation; and This is the same requirement as for the simple technology case, but the term oC is added. (b) The country would pay up to Cd, - (Cd, - Bd) = Bd, the benefits that it would obtain. The whole expression on the right hand side is the incremental cost, IC. The results are thus similar in form to the simple case. If Cdo exceeds Bd the country will not proceed anyway, and since Cd, > Cdo, it will not be interest- Of course, the preceding analysis assumes that ben- ed in the globally cleaner technology either. So the efits and costs are measured in the same units (such only context of interest is the one where Bd > Cdo, as money) and this will not always be possible. In but Bd < Cd,. That is, in its own interests, the some contexts, especially biodiversity and intema- country will proceed with the less globally benefi- tional waters, monetary assessment of benefits will cial technology and will not choose the more bene- be very limited. Hence a significant judgmental ficial technology. 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