Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00005701 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT IDA-H8420 AND IDA-60340 ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR66.1 MILLION (US$ 100 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR66.5 MILLION (US$ 90 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FOR THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FEBRUARY 17, 2022 Urban, Resilience And Land Global Practice Africa East Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Exchange Rate Effective January 14, 2022 Currency Unit = FCFA 1999.9 = US$ 1 US$1.4079 = SDR 1 FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Jean-Christophe Carret Acting Regional Director: Catherine Signe Tovey Practice Manager: Meskerem Brhane Task Team Leader(s): Christian Vang Eghoff, Jean Mabi Mulumba ICR Main Contributor: Muliro Mashauri ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APA Annual Performance Assessment AF Additional Financing CAS Country Assistance Strategy CPF Country Partnership Framework CERC Contingency Emergency Response Component PDO Project Development Objective DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ERR Economic Rate of Return ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework EVD10 10th Ebola Virus Disease outbreak FCBT Flying Capacity-Building Team FCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association LG Local Government N/A Not applicable M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MUH Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing (Ministère de l’Urbanisme et de l’Habitat) MINDEC Ministry of Decentralization (Ministère de la Décentralisation) MTR Midterm Review NEF National Equalization Fund NPV Net Present Value OP Operational Policy OVD Urban Road Agency (Office de Voirie et Drainage) PAD Project Appraisal Document PBFAS Performance-Based Fund Allocation System PDO Project Development Objective PDSS Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (Projet de développement du système de santé) PIU Project Implementation Unit PS Permanent Secretariat RAP Resettlement Action Plan RED Roads Economic Decision model RF Results Framework RPF Resettlement Policy Framework TTL Task Team Leader UDP Urban Development Project UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services WHO World Health Organization TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................................1 I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ...................................................................7 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................7 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................. 11 II. OUTCOME ................................................................................................................................ 14 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 14 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 15 C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 20 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 21 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ......................................................................................... 22 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME............................................. 23 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 23 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 24 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO THE DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ........ 26 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 26 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 27 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 30 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 31 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 32 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................................ 35 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ...................................... 47 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................................ 50 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 51 ANNEX 6. CLIENT’S COMMENTS........................................................................................................ 61 ANNEX 7. RESULTS ........................................................................................................................... 62 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name P129713 DRC Urban Development Project FY13 Country Financing Instrument Congo, Democratic Republic of Investment Project Financing Original EA Category Revised EA Category Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B) Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing, Health System Ministry of Finance Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project PDSS Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO To improve access to basic services and strengthen urban and municipal management of the targeted cities. Revised PDO To improve access to basic services and infrastructure, strengthen urban and municipal management of the Target Cities, and to provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency. Page 1 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing 100,000,000 82,320,696 75,916,658 IDA-H8420 90,000,000 29,672,146 32,242,557 IDA-60340 Total 190,000,000 111,992,842 108,159,215 Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0 Borrower/Recipient 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 Total Project Cost 190,000,000 111,992,841 108,159,215 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 09-May-2013 06-Sep-2013 27-Jan-2017 31-Jul-2019 30-Jul-2021 Page 2 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 08-Jun-2016 33.30 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 04-May-2017 39.70 Additional Financing Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Disbursements Arrangements Change in Legal Covenants Change in Institutional Arrangements Change in Financial Management Change in Procurement Change in Implementation Schedule 08-Jan-2020 72.46 Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 13-Aug-2020 77.83 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Disbursements Arrangements Change in Legal Covenants Change in Institutional Arrangements Change in Financial Management Change in Procurement 30-Jul-2021 104.28 Change in Components and Cost Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Modest Page 3 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 18-Sep-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.01 02 01-Apr-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.52 03 29-Oct-2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 14.62 04 08-May-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 23.17 05 17-Dec-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.97 06 17-Jun-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 34.81 07 27-Dec-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 38.04 08 24-Jun-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.80 09 21-Dec-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 49.02 10 23-May-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 52.64 11 20-Nov-2018 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 59.30 12 25-May-2019 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 64.45 13 05-Nov-2019 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 69.35 14 24-Jan-2020 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 72.46 15 24-Jul-2020 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 76.98 16 02-Dec-2020 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 93.74 17 08-Jun-2021 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 101.96 18 28-Jul-2021 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 104.20 SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Public Administration 16 Other Public Administration 16 Page 4 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Education 8 Other Education 8 Health 8 Health 8 Transportation 60 Urban Transport 60 Water, Sanitation and Waste Management 8 Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste 8 Management Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Public Sector Management 9 Public Administration 9 Administrative and Civil Service Reform 3 Municipal Institution Building 6 Urban and Rural Development 91 Urban Development 91 Services and Housing for the Poor 91 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Eustache Ouayoro Jean-Christophe Carret Director: Jamal Saghir Catherine Signe Tovey Practice Manager: Alexandre Edouard Bakalian Meskerem Brhane Christian Vang Eghoff, Jean Task Team Leader(s): Mahine Diop Mabi Mulumba Page 5 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ICR Contributing Author: Muliro Mashauri Page 6 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Country Context 1. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a resource-rich country, with considerable potential for development. Despite its rich endowment, the country remains one of the poorest globally. At the time of project preparation, the DRC’s per capita income was US$ 190 (2011). The country was emerging from a long period of conflict, which had a devastating impact on the population and the country’s economy. This includes a huge infrastructure deficit, limited public sector capacity to provide public goods and services, and weak governance systems and institutions, among others. 2. The newly elected government in 2011 began to address some of these issues, through economic policies and structural reforms. However, challenges to disseminating these gains to the decentralized entities across the country remained. To address the underlying imbalances, the government focused on the operationalization of the 2011 Poverty Reduction Strategy, with a strong emphasis on governance, closing the infrastructure gap, improving security, and public finance management, as well as promoting a modern public administration and human development, among others. 3. At the same time, the country was undergoing rapid urban growth, leading to the unplanned development of cities. This in turn undermined economic growth, posed additional constraints to urban poverty reduction and made the provision of adequate urban services more challenging. The 1957 urban planning legislation was outdated, and the only master plans in existence were over 30 years old. There was a need to invest in the DRC’s cities to fill the infrastructure deficits, and to improve connectivity so as to reap the benefits of urbanization. 4. The World Bank's DRC intervention from 2000 to 2013 was oriented towards addressing post-conflict emergencies with projects implemented by large stand-alone project implementation units. Hence, the government and the Bank decided to pilot the implementation of Bank-funded projects by sector ministries. This was in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in which countries and development donors agreed to undertake far-reaching reforms to improve governance and strengthen development performance. Hence, preparation of the Urban Development Project (UDP) paid particular attention to the need to use the country’s own institutions and systems with a view to strengthening the DRC’s capacity to develop and implement its policies. The project was set up to be implemented by civil servants in the Permanent Secretariat (PS) in the Planning Department of the Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing (MUH) and thus be fully integrated with government structures. 5. The UDP followed a series of emergency projects in the urban sector that had focused on infrastructure rehabilitation. It was expected to contribute to objective 1 of the 2013–2016 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which aimed at supporting the effectiveness of the state at the center and decentralized levels, and improving good governance. In line with the ‘growth pole’ approach envisaged in the CAS, the project focused on investments in a limited number of locations targeted through this approach (Bukavu, Kalemie, Kikwit, Kindu, Matadi, and Mbandaka) to harness economies of scale, scope, and agglomeration benefits in the selected cities, and to respond to the infrastructure investments that were deemed necessary to unleash the country’s growth potential. 6. The project design reflected the necessity to invest in structuring urban infrastructure to allow cities to catch up on historic under-investment, neglect, and lack of maintenance, while laying down the foundations for improved sector governance and performance of the local governments (LGs) in the longer term. Page 7 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Theory of Change (Results Chain) 7. The theory of change is illustrated in figure 1 and was implicit in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD). In fact, no theory of change was developed during project preparation since it was not a requirement at appraisal. Figure 1: Theory of Change. PROBLEM PRIMARY ACTIVITIES INTERMEDIATE RESULTS IMPACT Primary Infrastructure Upgrading of roads and No substantial drainage People provided with improved Component 1 investments, continuous Other investments in anti- urban living conditions degradation of the erosion, markets, solid waste People directly benefiting from urban infrastructure management, water supply investments result in low levels of and sanitation, and electricity access to services and Improved access to high levels of urban basic services and poverty strengthened urban and municipal Performance-based management of the Urban Governance investments in targeted cities Improved lines of accountability neighborhood infrastructure between local authorities and city Low capacity of city inhabitants administrations and Building capacity in local Component 2 other stakeholders to government administrations Performance-based fund improve access to and local civil society allocation system in project cities infrastructure and organizations ready to roll out services Building capacity of central Urban sector and LG database, government and other with annual reports produced relevant structures Targeted strategic studies 8. In line with the governance objectives of the CAS, the project was designed to support the establishment of improved lines of accountability between local authorities (nominated mayors) and city inhabitants; and was centered on a development program flowing from a local participatory process. The principle of performance was enshrined in city contracts signed between the mayors, governors, and the MUH. The contract specified performance criteria related to urban and municipal management responsibilities of the city authorities, that once met, would qualify the city for additional funding for basic infrastructure and facilities, to be determined through consultation with the local population. 9. The project concept was ambitious, combining innovative features and a new way of implementing project s in the DRC. The experience gained from the project was expected to be translated into a fiscal transfer and oversight architecture for the National Equalization Fund (NEF) and mainstreamed into the government’s fiscal and performance support and monitoring systems for LGs in the DRC. Recommendations were to be drawn from Page 8 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) the performance-based funding mechanism to orient the type of transfer and performance-assessment that could be applied broadly to LGs in the DRC. The DRC’s constitution requires the transfer of 10 percent of central government resources to subnational entities and although this level of transfer has not been attained, the project experience was intended to contribute to increasing the efficacy of the actual decentralized expenditure. It was also hoped that the project could demonstrate the feasibility of using government structures to implement projects funded by the World Bank. Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 10. The project development objective (PDO) at appraisal was ‘to improve access to basic services and strengthen urban and municipal management of the targeted cities’. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 11. The expected outcomes and PDO-level indicators from the project included the following: a. The number of local governments respecting base conditions and achieving at least 65 points out of 100 on the Annual Performance Assessment (APA), triggering performance-based investment funds. b. A performance-based fund allocation system for allocating investment funds to cities ready to roll out. c. Benchmarking cities through the establishment of the urban sector and LG database, with annual reports produced. d. The number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under the project. e. The number of direct project beneficiaries, including the percentage that are females. Components 12. Significant consideration was given to the selection of project cities (Bukavu, Kalemie, Kikwit, Kindu, Matadi, and Mbandaka), to avoid spreading the investments too thin, and to support the ‘growth pole’ approach of the CAS, outlined above. As objective selection criteria, cities would need to be the provincial capital or a principal city and have populations between 100,000 and 1 million. This was the typology of cities experiencing the most rapid population increases and a size of city where the project could be expected to have substantial impact given the level of financing available. The number of cities presented a compromise between the desire to make a positive impact and the need to invest equitably across the territory of the DRC, in support of the peace consolidation focus of the CAS. Equitable allocation of investments across provinces was considered as an important element of stabilizing peace. 13. The project had two components at appraisal: 14. Primary infrastructure (appraisal: US$ 50 million, AF: US$ 82 million, final cost: US$ 69.69 million): This component financed investments to rehabilitate or construct major socioeconomic infrastructure in project cities, in line with other central and provincial government investments aimed at strengthening cities’ role as centers of economic growth. It aimed to improve access to basic services and infrastructures in the targeted cities. 15. The investments were expected to cover roads and transport, drainage, markets, water, solid waste, and electricity. The funds were split between cities, based on a formula whereby each city would receive a US$ 5 Page 9 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) million base allocation, with the rest allocated according to population size. This formula was determined to assure that each city would obtain sufficient funds to cater to some of its basic investment priorities, while recognizing that larger cities had substantial needs. The cities would receive between US$ 7 million and US$ 12 million for primary infrastructure investments. 16. Urban governance (appraisal: US$ 48 million, AF: US$ 108 million, final cost: US$32.3 million)1: This component aimed to improve urban governance at both the national and local levels, while also improving municipal and urban management as well as fiscal performance. It was divided into five sub-components: a. Performance-based investments (appraisal: US$ 30.0 million, AF: US$ 70 million, final cost: US$ 6.4 million) based on the performance criteria specified in the city contracts. They consisted of five minimum conditions to be achieved by LGs to trigger half of the annually allocated funds and 13 performance criteria to be achieved with a score of at least 65 percent to access the remainder of funds (see details in Annex 5). The implementation of the Performance-Based Fund Allocation System (PBFAS) and investments were included under the urban governance component because they were intended as much to be a lever for improved governance, in line with the accountability considerations presented in theory of change, as providing actual services to the direct beneficiaries. The indicative performance- based investment funds were allocated pro rata city population size. Allocations were US$ 16 per capita, and cities were allocated between US$ 2.6 million and US$10.5 million. b. Capacity support at the city level (appraisal: US$ 12.8 million, AF: US$ 21.2 million, final cost: US$ 12.2 million), aimed to strengthen critical aspects of municipal and urban management through a Flying Capacity Building Team (FCBT) charged with the responsibility of providing on-the-job guidance. The sub- component also included support for the cities in meeting performance criteria and other technical assistance for improved financial management, management of commercial infrastructure and other infrastructure assets, update of local development plans, elaboration of urban reference plans, and implementation of street addressing with a fiscal objective, training, and support to local civil society to provide enhanced oversight of LG activities, and additional on-demand technical assistance. c. Support to central and provincial government agencies (appraisal: US$ 2.5 million, AF: US$ 4.1 million, final cost: US$ 4.8 million) aimed to mitigate identified capacity shortcomings in the urban and decentralization sectors through capacity building and technical assistance to the project oversight ministry responsible for urban planning (Ministry of Urban Planning and Housing -MUH) and the Ministry of Decentralization (MINDEC), as well as specialized sector agencies. This included support for carrying out the APA of project cities, revising sector legislation, and implementing a sector database, as well as supporting the LGs in implementing the activities under subcomponent 2b. d. Strategic studies (appraisal: US$ 500,000, AF: US$ 1.5 million, final cost: US$ 0.7 million) included midterm and end of project evaluations, beneficiary satisfaction surveys, and a study to assess the PBFAS. e. Project operating costs (appraisal: US$ 2.2 million, AF: US$ 9.2 million, final cost: US$ 8.2 million) to cover operating expenditures (recruitment of fiduciary staff, mission travel to project cities, environmental monitoring, audits, and so on). The relatively low level of budgeted project operating cost was in large part due to the reliance on civil servants rather than consultant experts to implement the project. 1The disbursed portion of a Project Preparation Advance of US$ 2 million was refinanced on the project grant after the project became effective and the cost integrated in Component 2. Page 10 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 17. The project underwent significant changes during implementation. It was restructured five times (including one additional financing). However, only one restructuring (January 2020) triggered the revision of the PDOs to include a contingent emergency response component (CERC) in the project, as part of the response to the 2018 Ebola Outbreak in Eastern DRC. The PDO was revised as follows: ‘to improve access to basic services and infrastructure, strengthen urban and municipal management of the target cities, and to provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency’. Revised PDO Indicators 18. The PDO indicators and some target values were modified through the first three project restructurings. The fourth restructuring modified only the PDO indicator target values. The fifth restructuring did not affect the indicators or target values. Annex 1 provides the main aspects of the results framework (RF) at appraisal and project closing, with comments on each indicator, and Annex 7 provides the detailed overview of the indicators in effect throughout the project and the corresponding target values and final achievement. See also table 1 below for summary and extent of restructuring. The final PDOs indicators are as follows: Objective/Outcome 1: Improve access to basic services and infrastructure • People provided with improved urban living conditions (Number) • Direct project beneficiaries (Number), of which female beneficiaries (Percentage) Objective/Outcome 2: Strengthen urban and municipal management of the target cities • Cities qualifying for performance-based investment fund (Number) • Performance-based fund allocation system piloted and recommendations available (Percentage)2 • Cities with improved livability, sustainability, and/or management (Number) Objective/Outcome 3: Provide an immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency • Number of new Ebola cases confirmed (Number) Revised Components 19. The five project restructurings (including the AF) were carried out each time in response to requests from the government. The main aspects are presented below, with further details in Table 1. a. June 8, 2016 restructuring: This restructuring served to revise the RF in recognition of difficulties in establishing an urban sector database through government structures, and slower than expected advancement on the government’s decentralization agenda. The restructuring also served to make minor changes to the performance assessment instrument for cities (dropping two performance indicators and rephrasing five others) and to component activities: replacing the sector database with technical assistance to the MUH (monitoring and evaluation unit) and MINDEC, reducing the scope of financial management activities and street addressing, tasking the FCBT with support to local civil society, and including civil society representatives in training organized for LG staff. b. May 4, 2017 restructuring: Additional financing (AF) of US$ 90 million extended the project scope from 2 The indicator metrics in the project results framework is 0 or 1, but in keeping with how progress was reported during project implementation, this is interpreted as a percentage indicator for the ICR. Page 11 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) six to nine cities, with the inclusion of Goma, Kisangani, and Kolwezi, in line with the ‘growth pole’ approach and the initial city selection criteria. The rationale for the AF was to deepen the results of the project and support the government’s strategy to pave the way for a performance-based approach to funding investments in cities in the DRC and to meet investment needs in project cities. The AF triggered a change to the PDO with the inclusion of improved access to infrastructure as an objective, in addition to improved access to services. The RF was revised with the main modification being the inclusion of corporate results indicators to replace some sector indicators. Also, components were modified with the reintroduction of a separate activity to support community engagement and a study on the special investment and planning needs for Goma (given the multiple land management and service delivery challenges in terms of rapid urbanization, conflict, and exposure to natural hazards), as well as a study on land tenure. Finally, the component cost was revised in line with the above changes and the project closing date was extended from July 31, 2019 to November 30, 2022 to allow further strengthening and consolidation of city-level governance improvements and the institutionalization of the PBFAS in MINDEC. c. January 8, 2020 restructuring: Inclusion of a CERC as a new Component 3 (and related PDO indicator) to strengthen the Bank’s response to the 2018 Ebola outbreak. US$ 50 million was allocated to the CERC and the geographic scope of the project was reduced from nine cities to four cities (Bukavu, Goma, Kikwit, and Matadi) to facilitate field supervision in response to the poor project performance after the approval of the AF, as well as realign the project with the World Bank’s evolving strategy for the DRC. The city selection was in line with the Bank’s emerging strategy, at the time, to focus on provinces with some of the highest concentration of poverty, and hence, the highest potential for poverty reduction. The performance-evaluation matrix was substantially reduced to a total of five combined base conditions and performance criteria to focus the evaluation and accompanying measures on the basics of transparent and accountable financial management and to pave the way for MINDEC to take over the APA. In addition, several activities were dropped to simplify the project: (i) street addressing, (ii) elaboration of local development plans (part of the planning objective was to be met through the elaboration of urban reference plans), (iii) the specific study on the urban development needs of Goma, and (iv) the study on land tenure. d. August 13, 2020 restructuring: Continued poor project performance led to the cancellation of US$ 70 million and changes in the RF and component cost. With reduced need for funding of the Ebola response, US$ 30 million of the US$ 50 million CERC was canceled, while US$ 40 million was taken from Components 1 and 2. The restructuring was part of the effort to release funds from non-performing Bank-funded projects and to reallocate them to activities that were better suited to help counter the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19. The city of Kananga, capital of the Kasai-Central Province, was included to allow the project to fund activities to stop gully erosion that were threatening key infrastructure in the city, including the only provincial airport. The inclusion of Kananga investments under Component 1 was also in line with the emerging World Bank strategy to focus on provinces with a high concentration of poverty, Kasai-Central being one of those provinces. Given the reduced project funding and scope, and the cancellation of planned investments that were not already at the contracting stage, the project closing date was brought forward from November 30, 2022 to July 30, 2021. e. July 30, 2021 restructuring: Cancellation of US$ 8 million, the amount of the uncommitted project balance on the project’s closing date, which was returned to the DRC’s International Development Association (IDA) allocation. Page 12 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Other Changes 20. The inclusion of the CERC in January 2020 modified the implementation arrangements, with the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) of the Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (P147555) becoming the agency responsible for implementing the CERC and for reporting on fiduciary aspects and results. Whenever warranted, the relevant financing agreements were modified to include the changes to project components outlined above, and funds reallocated between the disbursement categories. Table 1 below summarizes all the significant changes that occurred during project implementation. Table 1. Significant Changes During Project Implementation. Key revisions Restructuring Dates June 2016 May 2017 Jan 2020 August 2020 July 2021 1st restructuring 2nd restructuring 3rd restructuring 4th restructuring 5th restructuring Main modifications to the project Reducing Additional CERC included, Cancellation of Cancellation of the project financing, number of cities US$ 70 million, US$ 8 million ambition addition of reduced from 9 Kananga three cities, to 4 included, extension of closing date project closing brought date forward Change in Project Development Objectives X Change in Results Framework X X X X Change in Components and Cost X X X X X Reallocation between Disbursement X X X X X Categories Change in Legal Covenants X X X Change in Institutional Arrangements X X Change in Financial Management X Change in Procurement X Change in Disbursements Arrangements X Change in Loan Closing Date(s) x X Cancellation of Financing X X Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 21. The changes described in table 1 above had an impact on the original theory of change. In particular, the level of ambition regarding the rolling out of the performance-based system was reduced, and the indicator on implementing a sector database was dropped, along with the underlying activity. These changes weakened the link between project activities and the PDO. The inclusion of additional cities and the subsequent reduction of scope (table 2) did not substantially affect the intervention logic of the project or the theory of change. However, the inclusion of the CERC component substantially modified the theory of change, with the introduction of an emergency response objective in parallel to, and not directly integrated with, the original theory of change. The inclusion of the city of Kananga, and the anti-erosion works implemented there, was aligned with the upper track of the original theory of change to provide improved access to services, while also introducing a more integrated emergency response to the theory of change. Page 13 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Table 2. Project Cities. Cities at appraisal Cities added in May 2017 Cities dropped in Jan 2020 Cities at Project (AF, 2nd restructuring) (3rd restructuring) Completion Bukavu, Kalemie, Kikwit, Goma, Kisangani, Kolwezi Kalemie, Kindu, Mbandaka, Bukavu*, Goma, Kikwit*, Kindu, Matadi, Kisangani, Kolwezi Matadi* + Kananga Mbandaka * Cities that were retained from appraisal to completion (3 of the initial 6 cities). II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs Assessment of the Relevance of PDOs and Rating 22. The relevance of the PDOs is rated Substantial. Several factors allowed the PDOs and project concept to remain relevant. Among these are the project restructurings to respond to changing circumstances and political priorities, the inclusion of Kananga in the project, the continued relevance to address urban and municipal governance, including through the NEF, and the addition of the CERC. The extension of the initial geographic scope of the project from six to nine cities underpinned the relevance of the project and the Bank’s responsiveness to the country’s decentralization agenda, as well as the deep imbalances between the national and decentralized levels. 23. An updated World Bank strategy for the DRC is finalized for approval to replace the 2013–2016 CAS. Territorial development analysis carried out by the World Bank in 2018–2020 underpins the guiding principle for the new Country Partnership Framework (CPF), which is to refocus World Bank investments in provinces with higher concentration of poverty. The project was restructured in January 2020 to focus investments on project cities in these provinces, a change that was made within the scope of the existing PDO. The incorporation of Kananga (in Kasai-Central Province, with higher concentration of poverty) was also accommodated within the original PDOs, demonstrating the PDOs’ continued relevance, despite implementation difficulties, as well as the sufficient agility to allow the project to finance activities to combat some of the gully erosions that threatened key infrastructures in the city (airport, railway, national roads, and main markets). 24. In addition, the CPF is likely to include objectives related to improved urban development, access to basic infrastructure services, and strengthened governance and transparency which are—if not verbatim—very well aligned with the UDP PDO. The Bank is very likely to finance investments to stop advancement of other gully erosion in Kananga within the existing portfolio, using the technical designs elaborated under the UDP. The strong dialogue between the government and the Bank centered on piloting the PBFAS under the UDP and the role of the NEF in decentralization has led to the possible inclusion of policy actions in pipeline World Bank strategies and operations. As part of the upcoming CPF, the DRC will have access to the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA), a mechanism to supplement IDA country allocations for countries at risk of escalation of violent conflict which have a credible strategy to address the underlying drivers of conflict. The PRA contains milestones related to the clarity of allocating financial resources to decentralized levels as part of its strong focus on governance. And the proposed series of Development Policy Operations is planning to support the effectiveness and efficiency of the NEF. Both are in extension of the UDP focus on improved management of sub-national entities, which remains relevant. Page 14 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 25. The inclusion of the CERC in the PDOs was relevant to increasing the government’s preparedness and response capacity to cope with the world’s-second largest recorded Ebola outbreak that killed more than 2,200 people. It is also aligned with the inclusion in the upcoming CPF of an objective to strengthen the resilience of targeted vulnerable populations. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome Outcome 1: Improve access to basic services and infrastructures 26. The project provided about 419,000 people with improved access to basic services and infrastructure, surpassing the final target of 391,000 beneficiaries. This is due to the project’s rehabilitation of urban roads in eight cities, the construction of school facilities in three cities and the investments to stop advancement of gully erosion in Kananga (see Annex 1). The beneficiary satisfaction survey conducted before the mid-term review (MTR) revealed that 86 percent of project beneficiaries in the six initial cities were satisfied with the project’s achievements. The beneficiary satisfaction increased to 94 percent according to the beneficiary survey carried out before project closing (Annex 7). 27. The result was achieved by the rehabilitation of 31.8 kilometers of roads and 6.2 kilometers of drainage to the benefit of about 392,000 people. According to the impact assessment and beneficiary satisfaction survey, these project investments reduced transport time by between 50 and 75 percent along rehabilitated roads. In relation with the selection and design of road investments, the OVD benefited from capacity building to carry out economic analysis of road projects and has developed expertise in this area. Such capacity is likely to be used in other government-led investments. 28. The project’s objectives regarding erosion control in Kananga were met. The project as restructured in August 2020 aimed to carry out studies and stop advancement of at least one gully erosion and this indicator was surpassed as works were completed to stop advancement of two gully erosions that threatened access to Kananga’s airport, the airport runway, as well as the provincial university. The works were carried out on force account by the OVD and their finalization on the very last day of the project explains part of the difference between the target number of beneficiaries and the achievement. The anti-erosion works are estimated to have benefited about 15,000 persons. In addition, technical designs elaborated by UNOPS (with UDP funding) are available to stop the advancement of seven other gully erosions in Kananga, which could not be done under the project. The project’s objective to stabilize some of the gully erosions that threatened key infrastructure in the city was achieved. The technical designs are expected to be used for long-term erosion control solutions since the work was only finalized just before project closing. While the project objective in this area was met, the city of Kananga still faces serious problems of gully erosion that threatens other infrastructure and the lives of the inhabitants. For that reason, discussions are ongoing between the government and the World Bank on the potential inclusion in the Bank’s DRC portfolio of further investments to control other major gully erosion in the city. 29. Additionally, about 12,000 pupils and their teachers benefited from the rehabilitation or construction of 120 new classrooms in 10 schools. The beneficiary satisfaction survey established that more than 90 percent of school officials, teachers, and students in ten schools supported by the project were very satisfied with the Page 15 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) rehabilitation and modernization efforts, and the acquisition of equipment. The attractiveness of the schools after rehabilitation and modernization may also have led to high saturation. In some cases, the number of students doubled, going beyond the national standards. 30. The number of people provided with improved urban living conditions, and the project’s total number of beneficiaries, were reduced by almost half from 2nd restructuring target estimates. This is partly explained by the downscaling during implementation as a result of the cancellation of funds. Consequently, the third and fourth restructurings increased the rating of this outcome from negligible rating in the mid-phase of project implementation, to a high rating at the project’s closing date (see Table 3). 31. An important intermediate results indicator for this component measured the number of person-days of employment generated on construction sites, with the objective of monitoring the provision of meaningful work and the redistribution of income in project cities. At appraisal, the objective was to generate 3.5 million person-days of employment, an objective that was regularly revisited for each project restructuring (See Annex 7). Only the final revised indicator value was achieved. The initial sub-indicator on the percentage of employment generated for women (10 percent) was not met, but the revised target of 3 percent was surpassed, with 6 percent of female beneficiaries of work. Table 1. Rating of Outcome 1 ‘Improve Access to Basic Services and Infrastructure’. # PDO Indicators Original Target 1st Target 2nd Target 3rd Target 4th Actual achiev. target restructuring restructuring restructuring restructuring (June2016) (May 2017 ) (Jan. 2020) (Aug. 2020) Objective/Outcome: Improve access to basic services and infrastructure 1 People provided with 76,000 123,000 1,036,000 457,000 391,000 406,911 improved urban living conditions (Number)a Achievement rate of 535% 331% 39% 89% 104% indicator (H) (H) (N) (S) (H) 2 Direct project 104,230 1,073,000 1,358,000 742,000 394,000 419,240 beneficiaries (Number) Achievement rate of 402% (H) 39% (N) 31% (N) 57% (M) 106% (H) indicator Female beneficiaries 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 52% (Percentage) Achievement rate of 102% (H) 102% (H) 102%(H) 102% (H) 102% (H) indicator Outcome Rating: Outcome 1 H » Mb M N S H The indicators rating is based on the following scale: High ≥100, Substantial ≥75, Modest ≥ 50, Negligible < 50. a Indicator modified in May 2017. It partially corresponds to the appraisal indicator ‘The number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under the project.’ The final value also includes beneficiaries of anti- erosion works in Kananga, corresponding with the standard indicator definition. b Rated M instead of H (H » M) because, in addition to minimum estimated beneficiaries of other infrastructures and training, the original targets only considered beneficiaries of infrastructure investments identified at appraisal. Hence original target values do not fully reflect the aspirations of the project. This assessment is also supported by the underachievement of the initial IRI on employment generation, with a target of 3.5 million person-days against 737,070 person-days of employment generated. Outcome 2: Strengthen the urban and municipal management of the targeted cities Page 16 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 32. One of the most important achievements of the project is the piloting of the performance-based approach and the results obtained through the accompanying technical assistance to local government administrations. As illustrated in the project’s initial theory of change, the dual component approach (infrastructure and local governance) allowed the project’s infrastructure investments to not only provide benefits in terms of access to services and infrastructure, but also support the establishment of a more inclusive and equitable local governance mechanism. The initial ambitious objective of operationalizing the piloted PBFAS after the project, through the NEF, was not realized. However, substantial progress was made towards the objective, as revised in 2016, to generate relevant experience and resulting recommendations on how the PBFAS can be mainstreamed. The recommendation, sanctioned by the project closing workshop, is to develop a performance window in the NEF inspired by the UDP model. The reason why the revised indicator is not fully achieved is that a national workshop to further discuss and refine the recommendations was not held before the project closing, although the project experience and recommendations are feeding further strengthening of the decentralization agenda (as described in the relevance and risk sections of this ICR). 33. At the end of the project, the four remaining cities all lived up to the conditions and performance criteria to trigger project investment funds. As described in Annex 5, this assured that project cities live up to basic criteria of budget preparation and transparency and also elaborate and implement municipal management tools such as investment planning and revenue-enhancement plans in a transparent manner and in consultation with the urban population. For the first time, cities had their accounts audited through the support provided by the project to the supreme audit institution (Cour de Comptes). At the outset of the project, the auditor issued a disclaimer of opinion on audited budgets on all project cities (meaning that their accounts were not in a condition to be audited). Along with the project’s technical assistance to implement financial management manuals developed with project support, this assured that at project closing, five of the project cities were able to obtain at least a qualified audit opinion. Just as importantly, the auditor’s opinion and summaries of the external audit were made public, providing for improved civil society oversight of local government financial management. At the end of the project, LG authorities in three of the four cities were also providing timely budget reports and presenting and debating them publicly in a timely manner. 34. The FCBT spent about three to five days in each city per month to support municipal administrations to improve performance and provide on-the-job guidance. With the support of the FCBT, four cities out of four qualified for performance-based investment funds, an outcome that was strongly dependent on a solid strengthening of the capacity of the cities’ governance. This impact is expected to have long-term effects on the municipalities’ capacity and overall development paths. Each project city now has a procurement unit staffed with trained personnel, carry out procurement planning and can carry out multi-year capital investment planning and develop plans to improve own source revenue. Three of the four cities retained after January 2020 are able to set realistic targets for infrastructure maintenance and implement the plan. All four cities dispose of detailed studies to allow them to substantially increase own source revenues (with the potential estimated at over US$3 million per year); had the studies been finalized earlier, the project could have provided technical assistance to implement the recommendations. 35. All project cities benefited from improved livability, sustainability and/or management through project investments and technical assistance. In addition to the nine cities at one time or another included in the PBFAS, Kalemie can be counted as an additional city where the project successfully intervened to provide better living conditions. Page 17 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 36. The urban sector benefited hugely from the project-funded technical assistance to national institutions to design and implement urban reference plans (URPs) and update the urban code. The timely completion of the Goma URP that included a strong component on risk assessment and management became a central planning tool following the May 2021 eruption of the Nyiragongo Volcano to guide the response and reconstruction phases. The use of national institutions (Kinshasa University Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning and the para-statal Office for Studies in Urbanism and Architecture) for the elaboration of the URPs for four cities also contributed to building of institutional capacity (including through provision of equipment) and retainment of knowledge. Although the update of the urban sector legislation and regulation was not finalized as expected, a draft law is available and the project provided support to review the document, based on international standards and best sector practices. The projet also supported improved dialogue and working relationships between the national institutions and paved the way for an extensive consultation process and leaves behind a substantial analytical foundation and training material to serve the future process of updating the urban sector legislation. Support for this activity will continue in the context of the Bank-funded Kin Elenda Project (P171141), with the continuation of UN-Habitat as technical advisor to the government. As described above, the activity to establish an urban sector database was canceled from the project and no progress was made towards the achievement of the indicator that was deleted from the project through the 2016 restructuring. Table 2. Rating of Outcome 2 “Strengthen Urban and Municipal Management of the Target Cities” # PDO Indicators Original Target 1st Target 2nd Target 3rd Target 4th Actual target restructuring restructuring restructuring restructuring achiev. (June 2016) (May 2017 ) (Jan. 2020) (Aug. 2020) Objective/Outcome: Strengthen urban and municipal management of the targeted cities 4 Cities qualifying for 5 out of 6 5 out of 6 7 out of 9 3 out of 4 3 out of 4 4 out of 4 performance-based (0.83) (0.83) (0.78) (0.75) (0.75) (1) investment fund (Number)a Achievement and achievement rate 1/0.83 =120% 1/0.83 =120% 1/0.78= 128% 1/0.75=133% 1/0.75=133% of indicator b (H) (H) (H) (H) (H) 5 Performance-based fund 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% allocation system piloted and recommendations available (percentage)b Achievement rate of 20% (N)c 80% (S) 80% (S) 80% (S) 80% (S) indicator 6 Cities with improved N.A. N.A. 9 out of 9 4 out of 4 3 out of 4 4 out of 4 livability, sustainability (1) (1) (0.75) (1) and/or management (Number) Achievement rate of N/A N/A 100% 100% 1/0.75=133% indicator (H) (H) (H) 7 Cities benchmarked through 4 annual Indicator N.A. N.A. N.A. 0 establishment of an urban reports dropped sector and LG database, with annual reports produced Achievement rate of 0% 0% N.A. N.A. N.A. indicator Page 18 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Outcome Rating: Outcome 2 M S S S S The achievement rate of indicator is based on the following scale: High ≥100, Substantial ≥75, Modest ≥ 50, Negligible < 50. a Corresponds to the original key indicator ‘ The number of local governments respecting base conditions and achieving at least 65 points out of 100 on the APA, triggering performance-based investment funds.’ The number of targeted cities qualifying for performance-based investment funds repeatedly changed depending on whether the project was scaled up or down. For that reason, the evaluation uses the data for the last conducted evaluation for each city, see Annex 5, Table 5-2: 2020 for Bukavu, Goma, Kikwit and Matadi, 2018 for Kalemie, Kindu, Kisangani, Kolwezi and Mbandaka. b The indicator as revised after the first restructuring in June 2016. Prior to that it was ‘A performance-based fund allocation system for allocating investment funds to cities ready to roll out.’ The indicator was numerical (0/1) in project documents but interpreted as percentage. c The indicator was more ambitious in the initial project and hence achievement is rated N. Outcome 3: Provide an immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency 37. The achievement of the outcome is rated Negligible. When the CERC was included in the project in January 2020, the 10th Ebola Virus Disease outbreak (EVD10) that started in 2018 still caused 24 Ebola cases per week. The activation of the CERC, on June 23, 2020, intervened 40 days after the latest confirmed case and only two days before the official declaration of the end of the epidemic. Hence, the objective of providing an immediate and effective response was not met. The funds disbursed through the CERC enabled the project to fund the maintenance of a continued EVD10 response capacity by disbursing US$ 10 million to allow UNICEF to maintain their 90 days enhanced surveillance program following the declaration of the end of the epidemic on June 25, 2020. The objectives for disbursing the CERC are discussed in the “Key factors during implementation” section of this report Table 3. Rating of Outcome 3 “Provide Immediate and Effective Response to an Eligible Crisis or Emergency” # PDO Indicator Baseline Target 1st Target 2nd Target 3rd Target 4th Actual Dec. restructuring restructuring restructuring restructuring achiev. 2019 (June 2016) (May 2017 ) (Jan. 2020) (Aug. 2020) Objective/Outcome: Provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency 7 Number of new Ebola cases 24 N.A. N.A. 0 0 0 confirmed Achievement rate of indicatora N.A. N.A. N.A. 100% 100% Outcome Rating: Outcome 3b (H » N) (H » N) a The achievement rate of this indicator is based on the following scale: High ≥100, Substantial ≥75, Modest ≥ 50, Negligible < 50. b Despite an achievement rate of 100 percent, this outcome is rated Negligible (H » N) since the CERC component was activated toward the end of the outbreak and thus did not provide an immediate response. Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 38. The overall efficacy is Modest. 39. The project struggled to deliver outcome 1 ‘Improve access to basic services and infrastructure’. Though the road sections selected for rehabilitation at appraisal were constructed as planned and works finalized in 2015– 2016, the first works under subcomponent 2A were not launched until after the MTR. Additional works were implemented in all project cities except Goma. The later project restructurings improved the achievement of this outcome, from a negligible rating (2nd restructuring) to a high rating at project closing (See outcome 1 rating, Table 3). Page 19 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 40. The project was able to strengthen, to a certain extent, the urban and municipal management of the targeted cities (outcome 2). Within the context of a highly centralized country, the project effectively laid a foundation for dialogue on good local governance and emphasized the need to involve the population in the selection and implementation of activities at the municipal level, a practice which is not common in the DRC. The results are very encouraging from a systems perspective. 41. While the indicator for outcome 3 “Provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency” was achieved at 100 percent, it is difficult to establish a causal link between this outcome and the end of the Ebola outbreak, since the CERC was activated towards the end of the Ebola outbreak. Therefore, the achievement of this outcome is negligible on the basis that the CERC activation did not provide the intended immediate and effective response. 42. Only one of the five original PDO-level indicators stayed unchanged, but with modified target values. The other four indicators were either deleted or replaced to accommodate the project’s implementation performance , evolving lessons learned, or to include updated indicator language. Despite the revision of the results framework, and the successes of various project sub-components, the project did not fully deliver on key activities. Based on the above, it is concluded that the operation partly achieved its objectives, and this justifies the Modest rating of the overall efficacy. C. EFFICIENCY 43. The cost-benefit analysis prepared for the ICR shows a level of return on investments substantially above the opportunity cost of capital. At closing, the net present value (NPV) is estimated at US$ 48.4 million for the main road and drainage infrastructure investments of the project that covered 56 percent of the total cost or US$ 62.3 million. The economic rates of return (ERRs) range from 8 to 80 for individual investments, with a weighted average of 25.1 percent. The cost-benefit analysis was in each case carried out using the Roads Economic Decision (RED) model, applying ex-ante and ex-post traffic counting. The discount rate used for the ICR is 12 percent, the same that was used at appraisal. With application of a social discount rate for road investments, currently assessed at 6 percent, the NPV would have been higher, though the respective ERRs would remain unchanged. The methodology and assumptions are presented in Annex 4. 44. The overall results for the project are consistent with generally recognized sector norms and align with appraisal estimates, but substantial variations are noted in the returns of individual subprojects. The results correspond to the appraisal estimates of the respective ERRs (between 14 and 74 percent), and their weighted average of 29 percent, and the NPV of US$ 18.6 million for a range of investments, identified at appraisal, of US $18.7 million. Ex-ante traffic counting (carried out each time prior to commencing the upgrading of specific roads) demonstrated a total flow of 100,000 vehicles per day in comparison to ex-post traffic counting that showed an increase to 135,000 vehicles per day on rehabilitated roads. However, the analysis for the ICR reveals that rehabilitation of two segments with combined length of 2.17 kilometers generated a negative NPV when applying a discount rate of 12 percent (but a positive NPV, if applying a discount rate of 6 percent percent), which detracts from an otherwise positive evaluation of efficiency based on average costs and benefits. The assessment is also supported by unit cost comparison for road rehabilitation, detailed in Annex 4, which shows that the average unit cost of US$1.9 million per kilometer is likely at the higher end of benchmarks. Page 20 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 45. Even with the sizeable NPV and mostly significant sub-project ERRs, operational efficiency was encumbered by lengthy project implementation and delays to launch investments, in large part explained by limited capacity in the PS responsible for project implementation and multiple changes to project management. Despite the AF, the final project cost (US$ 112 million) was only slightly higher than the appraisal amount (US$ 100 million) but included two additional years of implementation. This limited ability of the project to disburse the approved project financing for productive uses resulted in a comparably higher project operating cost, at 7.3 percent of disbursed funds compared to 2.2 percent estimated at appraisal of the original project and 4.8 percent estimated at the appraisal of the AF. Also, the increase in actual cost compared to appraisal is mostly explained by the disbursement of US$ 10 million for the CERC. Moreover, the frequent change of project coordinators contributed to uneven project implementation. 46. Considering the issues pertaining to the operational efficiency discussed above, along with the evidence provided by the economic analyses for the individual road segments, overall efficiency is rated Modest. D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 47. The overall outcome of the project is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, based on the combined evaluation of relevance, efficacy, and efficiency, as shown below. The methodology is based on the ICR guidelines.3 Relevance and efficiency are rated for the entire project. Efficacy is rated based on the ratings for each objective and each implementation period between project restructurings (the ‘split rating periods’), as presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5 above. Based on sub-ratings, the outcome rating is automatically derived for each period based on the methodology in the ICR guidelines. Each rating is then assigned a numerical value to attribute a relative weight to the outcome rating of each ‘split rating period’ based on its share of total disbursements over the period. These values are then added up and rounded to derive the project’s final overall outcome rating. Table 4. Overall Outcome Rating Original target Between 1st Between 2nd Between 3rd After 4th (approval and 2nd and 3rd and 4th restructuring until 1st restructuring restructuring restructuring (Aug. 2020 restructuring) (Jun 2016– (May 2017– (Jan 2020– until closing) May 2017 ) Jan 2020) Aug 2020) 1. Relevance Substantial 2. Efficacy (PDO) M M M M S 1 Access to infrastructure and services M M N S H 2 Strengthen urban and municipal M S S S S management 3 CERC - - - N N 3. Efficiency of PDO Achievement Modest Outcome 1 Outcome Ratings MU MU MU MU MS 2 Numeric value of the outcome rating 3 3 3 3 4 3 Disbursement (US$) 33.30 million 5.77 million 33.39 million 4.52 million 31.21 million 3Bank Guidance - Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for Investment Project Financing (IPF) Operations, dated March 2, 2020. Appendix H ‘Deriving the Overall Outcome Rating’ provides the overall outcome rating based on sub-ratings of relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. Numerical values attributed to outcome ratings are: 1 for Highly Unsatisfactory, 2 for Unsatisfactory, 3 for Moderately Unsatisfactory, 4 for Moderately Satisfactory, 5 for Satisfactory, and 6 for Highly Satisfactory. Page 21 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 108.19 million4 4 Share of disbursement (%) 30.77% 5.33% 30.86% 4.18% 28.93% 5 Weighed value of the outcome rating (Row 2 X Row 4) 0.92 0.16 0.93 0.13 1.16 6 Final Outcome Rating 3.30 => 3 => Moderately Unsatisfactory 48. There were significant shortcomings in the achievement of the project’s overall outcome, partly explained by the modest ratings on efficiency and efficacy, and the low disbursement rates. The restructuring processes were able to address some of the shortcomings. Consequently, the outcome ratings improved after the fourth project restructuring. E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS Gender Institutional Strengthening 49. The project’s principal impact on institutional strengthening is treated in the outcome section above. A consequence of the project restructuring in August 2020 that dropped cities from the project and canceled planned investments in these cities (which had otherwise been triggered by the same cities living up to performance criteria) was that the central government lost its credibility to engage with local authorities on the elaboration and implementation of local development programs. Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 50. The project was designed as a stand-alone operation. It did not consider any co-financing or private sector financing arrangement. Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 51. The main impact on poverty reduction and shared prosperity derives from the modified project approach to focus on the DRC provinces with the highest concentration of poverty, in line with the World Bank’s prospective CPF. The construction works also contributed to redistributing income to the poorest part of the population. Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 52. According to the beneficiaries interviewed for the socioeconomic impact assessment, the market values of land and real estate along the rehabilitated roads has increased by 30 to 60 percent. However, this result should not be taken as indicative, as no rigorous price survey was carried out. Data from the urban road agency (OVD) reported in the impact assessment indicates that the rehabilitation of roads in some cities increased the number of road accidents by 30 percent. The explanation put forward is the increased speed along rehabilitated roads. 4The split rating uses the historic disbursed amount, US$ 108.19 million. The final disbursement in the currency of the financing of the Grant H8420-ZR and Credit 6034-ZR is SDR 76,119,851.78. This represents 99.8 percent of the project amount at closing, SDR 76,300,886.00. The revised project amount according to the AF and amounts canceled in through restructurings is US$ 112 million. The difference between the two is explained by fluctuations in the SDR-US$ exchange rate. Page 22 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 53. Several factors contributed to positive outcomes, one of them being project readiness. The project was quite ready for implementation at effectiveness, with about 20 percent of the project amount prepared for contracting shortly after effectiveness, the TOR for the FCBT approved, and the shortlisting done before effectiveness. This performance was largely due to project preparation having been assured by an experienced PIU before being transferred to the PS for implementation. However, another key preparatory activity related to analysis of the institutional organization of the urban sector was not finalized, since the PIU for preparation had not been able to contract the activity. 54. Institutional arrangements and high level of ambition of the project. The project was designed with ambitious targets that did not sufficiently consider the fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) context of the country. The government and the World Bank agreed on an implementation arrangement that relied on the government’s permanent structure composed of civil servants, rather than on a large project unit composed of consultant experts. The PS was staffed with civil servants dedicated to the project, who were expected to learn on the job. The design of the project opted to support the PS with two consultants (procurement and financial management) who were expected to be gradually phased out and replaced by the civil servants. While this approach was laudable, it was also very risky without having a strategy for attracting staff with the right motivation and skillsets through adequate training, compensation packages, and career perspectives. It was also too ambitious to propose very substantial activities at the institutional level, for a project in a sector that had been focused almost entirely on infrastructure rehabilitation and construction since the end of the conflict. 55. Reliance on decentralized entities. Furthermore, the project design’s reliance on the capacity of the decentralized entities to select viable neighborhood investments and elaborate investment planning documents was also ambitious. The project design addressed the low capacity of the city administrations through the establishment of the FCBT that would provide them with additional training. Although this project feature did go some way towards improving capacity, it did not fully address the capacity constraints, as described elsewhere in this report. 56. Broad geographic scope. The project’s selection of numerous cities throughout the country was not rooted in a deep assessment of the challenges inherent in implementing such an ambitious project in a country as large as the DRC, and one with limited infrastructure, deteriorated by decades-long cycle of conflicts. This affected the overall performance of the project as both the PS and Bank teams suffered logistical challenges to carry out supervision in the field. 57. Lessons learned integrated into the project. Several lessons were integrated into the project to improve the design, the most noteworthy of which are: (i) Drawing on experience from previous emergency projects in the DRC and the region, and given the very limited capacity of LG administrations, cities delegated implementation responsibility to the PS through delegated contract management arrangements. This assured clear allocation of roles for infrastructure investments, with LG representatives participating to bid evaluation committees to assure their implication, but with the PS retaining fiduciary responsibility. (ii) The project preparatory study on local participatory development demonstrated that relying overly on the Page 23 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) advancement of the decentralization process could undermine project results. Another fact that came out from preparatory studies was the low level of LG resources and the limited capacity to fund the maintenance of infrastructure. Hence, the project also focused on increasing the LGs own source revenues, independently of the decentralization process and any potential increases in intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The limited success of activities to increase local government resources was more a function of the PS capacity to prepare and implement those activities. (iii) The FCBT was developed as a response to the need for TA to LGs, but with a history in the DRC and elsewhere of LGs overly relying on such support if it was imbedded within the LG administration. In the end, this solution was also not ideal, as reflected upon in the Lessons and Recommendations section of this ICR. 58. Employment generation and targeting female beneficiaries. The PAD specified that the creation of temporary work using labor-intensive construction techniques was to be an integral part of the project, to be specified in bidding documents whenever feasible. The type of construction work foreseen under the project was expected to generate a high share of employment (especially drainage works in connection with road rehabilitation). However, there was no project mechanism to increase the labor content of public works, with contractors left to hire workers as in classic construction projects. Nor was there a strategy to increase the percentage of women on the construction sites. While the supervision engineers recorded and reported on the daily employment on construction sites, including the share of women, the overall M&E setup was not designed to monitor and evaluate the percentage of female beneficiaries. This was estimated at appraisal as the percentage of women in the total population, and at project closing by the administrative data provided by LG authorities. B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 59. Difficulty selecting bankable investments. The first performance-based investments were triggered by the good performance of Kikwit and Matadi during the first APA finalized in August 2014. Construction based on the performance-based grant allocations were very substantially delayed due to several factors, among which are the time taken to select investments, prepare technical designs of acceptable quality, agree on operating arrangements, verify land ownership, and elaborate safeguards studies. Tendering of the first lot construction works supervision was launched in June 2017. The delay was a contributing factor to selecting only school rehabilitation as investments under sub-component 2A, as the safeguards and land issues relating to these investments were quite limited. It also explains why performance-based investments could only be funded in Kikwit, Kindu and Matadi, as these were the cities with investments preparation sufficiently advanced at the time of the project restructuring in August 2020. 60. Implementation support efforts. The preparation of the AF and the MTR revealed that the level of ambition reflected in the PDO indicators, combined with the PS’s lack of experience managing similar projects, led to delays in implementation. Consultants and the World Bank project team provided significant ad hoc technical assistance, but they were unable to reduce these delays. 61. Lack of incentives for the PS. The project performance was seriously affected by the inability of the government to adequately renumerate the civil servants attached to the PS. The PS staff attached to the project repeatedly cited a lack of incentives resulting from inadequate salaries and bonuses. At one point, eight of the 17 civil servants assigned to the PS resigned and were not replaced. Mission aide-memoires Page 24 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) continuously highlighted the lack of incentives and the resulting negative impact on the performance of the project. The issue was addressed in the later stages of implementation (in 2019) when an agreement was reached between the government and the Bank to abandon the approach in favor of a traditional PIU, while retaining a counterpart system whereby civil servants would continue to learn on the job from working with more experienced consultants. 62. The AF rationale, funds cancellation, and advanced project closing date. The AF was intended to expand the geographic reach of the project and to strengthen the programmatic aspects of the project’s performance-based approach, by providing urban management tools developed under the project to additional cities. The design of the AF added a layer of complexity to an already ambitious project, and the intended outcomes were short-lived, as less than two years later, a decision was made to reduce the geographical scope of the project to four cities (Goma, Bukavu, Kikwit, and Matadi) and to advance the closing date of the project. 63. Ebola outbreak: The 2018 Ebola outbreak and the surrounding events directly and indirectly affected the project. When the January 2020 project restructuring was approved, US$ 50 million was reallocated to the CERC for Ebola response. At that time, the evolution of the outbreak, ongoing for more than a year, was still uncertain, but during February-March there was hope that the epidemic could be over and therefore the CERC was put on hold. A new case recorded on April 10, 2020 provided a renewed need for the Bank’s support to the response. It took time to trigger the CERC (approval of the CERC manual, development of contractual arrangements between the UDP, Health Project PIU, and UN agencies). The end of the epidemic again seemed within reach, since the epidemic seemed contained. Therefore, it was decided to only honor the Bank’s engagement to finance the work of UN agencies (UNICEF and WHO) with US$ 10 million each, to help maintain a minimum response capacity in case of the resurgence of the epidemic. Therefore, on June 4, 2020, the government requested the triggering of the CERC for US$ 10 million each to UNICEF and WHO. The agreement on funding amounts (US$ 20 million total) was reflected in the project restructuring in August of 2020. The UNICEF part of the CERC was disbursed on August 14, 2020. Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against WHO employees in connection with the Ebola response led the Bank management to place a hold on funding going to WHO, and the second contract for an amount of $10 million with WHO was not signed. 64. Emergency works in Kananga. A project agreement was signed between the UDP and UNOPS in December 2020 with the objective of carrying out emergency works on the most important gully erosions in Kananga and develop technical design studies to address the remainder of the nine most urgent gully erosions. When UNOPS were not able to implement the emergency works based on the funding put at their disposal, it was agreed to confide the works to OVD on force account and with the UDP stationing an engineer permanently in Kananga to assure supervision of the works. This arrangement allowed the project to complete works to stabilize to a greater extent the advancement of two gully erosions, just before the project closing although there remains a need to fund long-terms solutions based on the technical designs prepared under the project. 65. COVID-19. The latter stages of implementation were negatively impacted by COVID-19. Lockdown measures delayed the delivery of building materials. Field missions from Kinshasa to the project area were Page 25 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) hampered and the PS had to rely more on the supervision engineers, that did not always report timely on project issues. 66. Quality of studies and investment selection. Similar to appraisal, the client experienced great difficulty in selecting capable consultants, managing contracts and assuring the quality of consultant outputs. The PS often largely relied on the World Bank to provide quality control of consultant reports, including inputs to ESIAs and RAPs and strategic sector studies. This delayed project implementation. In some cases, studies had to be canceled because the PS did not impose early remedies to correct for shortcomings in consultant team composition and quality control. 67. Political environment. During implementation, the political landscape was volatile. The organization of the 2018 elections (including for local government) and government reshuffles led to tensions in the country and delays in the delivery of project activities. For instance, the reshuffle of mayors and governors seriously affected the implementation of the performance-based contract, while the changes of ministers at the central level often led to changes in leadership within the PS, with ministers opting to nominate a confidant to lead the PS. This partly explains the three changes of project coordinators prior to the competitive recruitment of a coordinator in August of 2019 and the return to a more traditional PIU arrangement. The fact that local government elections were not held, and the mayors continued to be nominated and several times reshuffled, somewhat undermined the strengthened accountability built into the performance-based funding mechanism, as the mayors continued to be upwards accountable, to assure their position, rather than downwards to the electorate, who to a great extent did not have a direct say in their reelection. IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO THE DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 68. The M&E design is rated Modest. Although there was no specific section on theory of change in the PAD, the intervention logic was well developed with a clearly articulated PDO and adequate indicators. Given that the geographic intervention areas were well defined, achievements against these indicators would be attributable to the project. Furthermore, the project’s results framework established clear links between the PDO and the project interventions. Where applicable, the results framework was disaggregated by gender. The baselines were established for all indicators. However, the target for the total number of beneficiaries was based on the infrastructure investments identified at appraisal, which accounted for about 20 percent of the total project cost. A more concerted effort could have been made to estimate the total number of beneficiaries of the project. Also, a main shortcoming in the M&E arrangements was that the unit in the MUH that was to assure the project’s M&E function was not sufficiently versed in rigorous project monitoring and reporting, and the PS staff was also not used to consolidating and reporting on results. M&E Implementation 69. M&E implementation is rated Modest. During the first years of project implementation, the availability of output data and other indicator data was not timely, and analysis was not conducted methodologically, by the PS. The field presence of the PS was not adequate to monitor construction works and to build working relationships with the local governments and administrations. The FCBT filled some of the reporting gap, but Page 26 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) with limitations, as the team did not have a mandate of third-party monitor to really be the eyes and ears of the PS on the ground. 70. The situation improved starting in 2015, when PS staff started to increase the frequency of field missions, and later when the Bank staff based in the field were able to carry out regular field visits. Around the same time the M&E function was de facto removed from the MUH M&E unit and the PS was reinforced with more capable M&E staff, as well as later a technical assistant who assured regular updates to results data. The M&E function was further strengthened during implementation by the introduction of the Geo-Enabled Monitoring System (GEMS) to collect data with the help of local focal points. In addition, OVD staff routinely carried out ex-post and ex-ante traffic counting and were trained during implementation to conduct economic analysis. For the MTR, and before project closing, technical audits, impact assessments, and beneficiary surveys were carried out. However, the impact assessments and beneficiary surveys were not conducted based on a rigorous methodology, and the quality control by the PS was not adequate.5 Throughout project implementation, available indicator values were reported in the project Implementation Status and Results Reports. M&E Utilization 71. The M&E utilization is rated Substantial. The gradually improving quality of data served to inform the project restructurings and enhance the estimation of indicator targets. The APA of project cities guided decisions on which aspects of technical assistance to retain, modify, or drop from the project (as described elsewhere). The economic analysis carried out during implementation by the OVD, under the Bank’s guidance, served to justify the project investments and support the efficiency rating in the ICR. Despite their shortcomings, the impact assessments also served to substantiate some of the auxiliary outcomes of the project in support of the outcome rating. Monitoring of the outcomes of the CERC was entirely under the responsibility of the Health Project PIU, relying on weekly WHO reporting of the evolution of the Ebola epidemic. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 72. Based on the above assessments of significant shortcomings, the quality of M&E is rated Modest. B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE 73. Environmental and social compliance: The project was classified category B and three safeguard policies, namely Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). Implementation of environmental and social safeguards was based on the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF, which included ‘chance find’ procedures related to physical cultural resources) and the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) approved by the World Bank and published in-country and in the World Bank’s InfoShop before appraisal. These instruments were complemented by Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) for specific infrastructure investments, as determined by the environmental screening carried out by the PS. The ESMF and RPF were updated and republished before appraisal of the AF in 2017. 5 Only the well-documented conclusions of these activities are reported in the present ICR without reserves. Page 27 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 74. Implementation of safeguards instruments was monitored through quarterly safeguards reports prepared by the PS and regular field visits by the World Bank. A total of 1,078 persons affected by the project (PAPs) were identified through RAPs, of which 1,041 were compensated for a total amount of US$ 155,918. The remaining PAPs identified through RAPs did not present themselves to receive compensation. In each case, the PS and local authorities attempted to locate and contact the PAPs and the compensation funds (US$ 18,984) have been reserved with the local governments, should these efforts succeed. The Grievance Redress Mechanism established in each project city was in place and functional. In total, 41 complaints were registered and addressed, and all were considered closed. Seventy-nine occupational health and safety incidents were recorded. Of these, 75 were indicative (minor accidents etc.) while three were serious and one (a fall from height with resulting serious injury) was considered severe and reported to World Bank management through the Environment and Social Incident Response Toolkit - ESIRT. For the serious and severe accidents, root cause analysis was carried out and corrective measures developed. All cases were addressed and considered closed before the end of the project, including the severe incident for which documentation concerning the treatment and full recovery of the injured person was provided by the PS. One potential incident of sexual exploitation and abuse or sexual harassment was reported in relation to work on the project Grievance Redress Mechanism. The Bank’s survivor-centered approach (outlined in the ‘World Bank Gender-Based Violence Good Practice Note Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Harassment in Investment Project Financing Involving Major Civil Works’) was followed to investigate the matter; no link to project activities was established. 75. Three cases of noncompliance were documented. Two related to the start of construction works before the implementation of the RAP (and one of these even before the contract had been signed) and were revealed through field visits by the World Bank. In one case, subsequent field visits justified that corrective measures (update of the RAP) could be taken to allow the continuation of the works. In the other case, the World Bank notified the client that the investment would not be eligible for project financing, and no project funds were used for the construction works.6 As a corrective measure, it was agreed that the World Bank should provide its ‘no objection’ in each case before launching subsequent works, based on the PS’ documentation of the implementation of the safeguard instruments. The third case of noncompliance concerned a person who had notified the World Bank of a potential lack of compliance on a construction site in Mbandaka and who was allegedly subsequently threatened by provincial authorities. In this case, an immediate field mission was undertaken to ascertain the safety of the complainant. This mission was able to confirm both safeguards compliance on the construction site as well as the safety of the complainant. As a result of the event, a safeguards compliance audit was carried out, which did not reveal any other cases of noncompliance. It provided operational recommendations that were regularly monitored (notably concerning the training of project and local government staff, improved occupational health and safety, and the functioning of local complaints treatment committees). The World Bank further maintained regular communications with the complainant. The safeguards audit was updated before project closing and did not reveal any other cases of noncompliance. 76. Financial management: Based on assessment of the PS’s financial management capacity during appraisal, financial management arrangements and mitigation measures were put in place to meet the World Bank’s minimum fiduciary requirements under OP/BP 10.02. Among them were the recruitment of a financial 6 Which is the reason that no infrastructure was financed by the PDU in Goma. Page 28 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) management consultant with adequate experience in World Bank financial management procedures and the installation of project accounting software in the PS. The Financial management rating during the life of the project varied from satisfactory to moderately satisfactory for the last three years of project execution. Quarterly Interim Financial Management Reports were provided to the World Bank on time, with comments provided to the PS. Annual audits of financial statements were submitted on time to the World Bank and were unqualified. The financial management rating during the life of the project was consistently in the satisfactory range. 77. The World Bank carried out regular financial management supervision as part of implementation support missions and provided comments and guidance to the PS to strengthen the financial management system. The Health Project PIU reported on implementation of the CERC, and a financial report was provided by UNICEF, as the implementer of the CERC-financed activities. Two UN agencies, UN-Habitat and UNOPS, implemented activities for the PDU under the World Bank-UN framework agreement. UN-Habitat provided a full justification of incurred expenditure and financial report. Some of the outputs (spare parts to recondition OVD construction engines in Kananga) under the PDU-UNOPS agreement were delivered after the project closing date. The expenditure corresponding to outputs delivered before the project closing date has been recorded in the World Bank disbursement systems. At the loan disbursement deadline of January 31, 2022, the undocumented balance of the advance paid to UNOPS remained to be reimbursed. 78. Procurement: The project was appraised and implemented under the procurement and consultant guidelines of January 2011, and the AF was implemented under the same guidelines, as updated in July 2014. Assessment of the PS procurement capacity during appraisal revealed substantial weaknesses. In consequence, several mitigation measures were put in place, among which were the recruitment of a consultant with adequate experience in World Bank procurement procedures, training to the PS, and the strengthening of procurement systems and processes. At appraisal, it was foreseen that project cities could be tasked with the implementation of some procurement activities under the project after the MTR. However, it took too long to put into place functional procurement units in the project cities (although progress was made, mainly supported by the FCBT), so this shift in implementation responsibility did not happen. 79. Post procurement reviews were regularly carried out as part of implementation support missions. They highlighted repeated shortcomings in updating the procurement plan and in contract management, with instances of payments made against expired contracts, or with advance payment guarantees expired while reimbursements were not effective. The project continuously suffered from delays to procurement processes, and procurement was mostly rated moderately unsatisfactory or unsatisfactory during project implementation. To help improve performance, the World Bank provided substantial hands-on support through technical reviews of contracts and contract modifications. 80. Despite substantial shortcomings and delays, post procurement reviews and the technical audits carried out twice during implementation did not reveal cases of mis-procurement. The main conclusions of the technical audits were that the quality of the technical design of the infrastructure was modest, but that the quality of the infrastructure financed by the project was generally good. Regular World Bank field visits served to develop solutions to design shortcomings and, in particular, to propose changes to improve the management of surface water on rehabilitated roads, which was a recurrent design shortcoming. One case of a tender launched without the contract having been included in the approved procurement plan was revealed due to Page 29 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) complaints from a bidder. This did not lead to a declaration of mis-procurement, as the contract had not been signed, and the PS was able to relaunch the tender based on an updated and approved procurement plan. C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry 81. The quality at entry is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. This rating is mostly driven by the World Bank’s limited realism when appraising a highly ambitious project in a very difficult context and confiding implementation to a client that did not have project implementation experience. 82. The PAD demonstrates the Bank’s awareness of the difficult FCV context and the weak institutional capacity. The preparation of the first investments, done by an experienced PIU during appraisal, was advanced enough to assure commencement of road rehabilitation works in each of the six initial cities shortly after effectiveness. The government and Bank’s joint decision to implement the UDP (and two other projects around the same time, in health and statistics) without a traditional PIU, and to rely principally on civil servants, was based on the objective to build client capacity and acceptance of the related risk. However, while the Bank’s assessment of the PS capacity at appraisal revealed a lack of experience in managing donor- funded projects and fiduciary weaknesses, whereas the proposed mitigation measures to overcome these capacity constraints turned out to be insufficient. Measures to mitigate the implementation capacity risk in the PS focused on providing a minimal fiduciary capacity through the recruitment of two consultants responsible for financial management and procurement. In addition, the FCBT was to provide technical assistance to the local governments to overcome the capacity constraints at the local level that were identified by the project preparatory studies. 83. The implementation experience and the gradual addition of additional consultant staff to the PS points out the limitations in the capacity of the central administration to implement the project. While the pilot approach generated valuable lessons (see section V) the project scoping did not sufficiently capture the combined impact of the required technical and operational capacity to implement a project in a difficult environment like DRC, and the complexity and innovative approach of the project (including the skills and level of effort required to build a substantial dialogue with local authorities and manage the FCBT). Also, the delayed launch of the performance-based investments after the MTR demonstrates that the investment identification and preparation mechanisms of sub-component 2A were not strong enough. Although they did draw upon experiences elsewhere and build on local development plans developed during preparation and the establishment of local consultative fora they were not sufficiently adapted to the DRC context (see Annex 5 for additional information on the PBFAS). Quality of Supervision 84. The Bank's performance in ensuring the quality of supervision is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The most salient aspect of implementation were frequent project restructurings, which to some extent reflect the World Bank’s proactivity to adapt the project to the complex operating environment and the evolving Bank and client priorities, but they also reveal a lack of strategic direction. The first restructuring used the initial project implementation experience to improve the realism of the city performance metrics and the RF indicators and target values, as well as to drop establishment of a sector database. Scaling up the project with the inclusion of additional cities through additional financing was a way to respond to the government’s priorities, which didn’t realistically access the feasibility of expanding the scope of the project, given the Page 30 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) aforementioned implementation challenges. Also, it was not based on sufficiently realistic ratings given the emerging difficulties to the implementation of sub-component 2A. 85. The MTR in 2017 was used to take stock of the implementation experience. It highlighted again the lack of motivation of civil servants in the PS and the limited absorptive capacity at the local level, with proposals to overcome these shortcomings. However, the Bank should have used the conclusions of the MTR as an opportunity to propose more fundamental changes to the project concept. 86. The reduction of the geographic scope of the project in January 2020 was driven by a realignment of the Bank’s portfolio to focus on a limited number of provinces and bring underperforming projects in the portfolio to a close. Together with the restructuring in August 2020, it included the cancellation of planned works and the reduction of the level of ambition of the project, with the intention to improve the ratings. However, it was a late reaction to the overambitious additional financing. 87. Throughout implementation, the Bank engaged actively with the client on the technical and management level to resolve operational and project management problems. The Bank was actively engaged in the dialogue with the government on reforms to the PS, which eventually resulted in the replacement of a nonperforming project coordinator and the return to a more traditional PIU format. In addition to this, the Bank continuously engaged the client to provide more adequate salaries and motivation for civil servants working on the pilot projects implemented by civil servants. The Bank also increased supervision frequency and missions to the project cities, in addition to relying on other Bank project teams to support supervision in the field, as well as deploying significant resources to bring the project back on track. The frequent supervision allowed the Bank to strengthen working relationships with the local government authorities and administrations. From a fiduciary and safeguards perspective, the frequent field presence also assured that a stop was put to project funding for works in Goma that had been launched before the signing of the contract, and also allowed the Bank to request the client to suspend works in Bukavu that had been launched before implementation of the resettlement action plan. Other means of strengthening project monitoring included the introduction of GEMS, which provided information on the level of advancement of the works. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 88. Based on the above considerations, the Bank’s overall performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory due to the significant shortcomings in quality at entry and moderate shortcomings in quality of supervision. D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 89. Risk to Development Outcome is rated High. 90. Progress was made under the project to increase the likelihood of the sustainability of improved access to services and infrastructure. The project supported improved planning practices and the allocation of local government funds for maintenance, as well as the mobilization of communities for infrastructure maintenance. However, these improvements were not sufficiently systemic to substantially increase the likelihood of infrastructure maintenance from a very low starting point. In addition, the substantial involvement of the communities intervened too late in the project to support the sustainability of the established community-level infrastructure maintenance organization. Hence, it is doubtful that the good practices will be maintained. Without external follow-up, it is also uncertain that good budgeting, planning, and infrastructure maintenance practices will be maintained in the current governance context and hence the risk to the project development outcomes in the areas of improved access to basic services and infrastructure and strengthened urban and municipal management is rated high. Page 31 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 91. The performance-based fund allocation system feeds into the ongoing dialogue on decentralization between the government and the World Bank. The strong dialogue between the government and the Bank centered on piloting the PBFAS under the UDP and the role of the NEF in decentralization has led to the possible inclusion of policy actions in pipeline strategy documents and operations. As part of the upcoming CPF, the DRC will have access to the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA), a mechanism to supplement IDA country allocations for countries at risk of escalation of violent conflict which have a credible strategy to address the underlying drivers of conflict. The PRA contains milestones related to the clarity of allocating financial resources to decentralized levels as part of its strong focus on Governance. And the proposed series of Development Policy Operations is planning to support the effectiveness and efficiency of the CNP. V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 92. Piloting project implementation by civil servants revealed that there remains a substantial gap to be filled for the success of such an approach. Future efforts to build client project implementation capacity in an FCV context should be based on a diagnosis of underlying constraints, an agreed-upon strategy, and realistic expectations. As shown by the project experience (and reinforced by comparable experience in the Bank- funded health and statistics projects in the DRC that followed the same approach), the civil servants who took over project implementation after effectiveness were not able to substantially advance several aspects of the project due to limited project implementation experience and skills mismatch. Their low salaries also resulted in a lack of motivation. Even after consultant experts filled all positions in the PS, with civil servants retained as direct counterparts in the project unit as part of the effort to build client capacity, there is no evidence that substantial knowledge transfer took place, as this continued to be hampered by the same limiting factors. The pilot experience also established that civil servants are closer to the political leadership, compared to consultants who are objectively recruited under clear contractual arrangements and expected to be evaluated based on performance criteria. Civil servants are more prone to pressure resulting from short-term political priorities and inefficient governance. As the Bank deepens the ongoing efforts with the government of the DRC to make the remuneration of the project consultants more equitable and uniform, and incentivizes and encourages government employees to take on project management responsibility, the Banks’ approach should be based on an analysis of the gaps in skills and other constraints, such as salaries and bonuses, prior experience, and reporting structures. As the central administration is not yet ready to take on full project implementation responsibility, it is proposed to use a more incremental approach to capacity strengthening and the concomitant transfer of responsibility. 93. Technical assistance for capacity building can complement identified gaps, but the modalities and incentives need to be designed to avoid substituting for lack of performance. The FCBT was an innovative part of the performance-based financing system and contributed to the enhanced scoring of local governments in the APA. However, this came at the price of excessive reliance by the local government administrations on the technical assistance, reflecting capacity constraints and the limited capacity of the project unit to supervise and direct the work of the FCBT. Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the municipal authorities and the FCBT, or other technical assistance at the design phase, and allocating each party’s time and resources accordingly, will likely enhance outcomes. A specific consideration for the DRC context is also the geographic spread of activities which can stretch support structures. Page 32 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 94. Performance-based financing systems should reflect accountability mechanisms at the national and local levels. As part of project design and throughout the project, performance parameters such as public consultations on budget planning and implementation, and external audits of local government accounts, helped strengthen the downwards accountability of the local authorities. The very strong resistance from mayors to see their city removed from the project following the restructuring in August 2020 showed the need to demonstrate results for the citizens. However, as mayors in the DRC are nominated rather than elected, they also retained strong upwards accountability to the higher-level authorities that had nominated them, which somewhat undermined the success of the performance-based approach. These aspects should be considered as the government, the World Bank, and other partners continue to support decentralization efforts in the DRC in other operational contexts. 95. Citizen engagement can strengthen outcomes of local government service delivery even on a limited budget, but they need to be an integral part of project design, as they take a long time to operationalize. The FCBT was tasked with supporting the community development aspects of the project, but it was not until after the MTR in 2017 that discussions on a structured citizen engagement approach started. And then it took until March 2021 to recruit NGOs to support this approach in each city. In the short time before project closing, the NGOs were able to facilitate the creation of community structures to maintain upgraded infrastructures in a constructive collaboration with local governments, who provided technical support and minor equipment. However, the processes need more time to fully stabilize. 96. Selection and preparation of neighborhood-level investments, in urban project contexts without prior planning experience, should consider institutional arrangements and land and resettlement issues. The first UDP performance-based investments were delayed several years because of difficulties in settling on management arrangements (of a local park in Matadi) and assuring land availability (for commercial facilities in Kikwit). In the end, these investments were abandoned; a situation that might have been avoided if the local development plans carried out during project preparation had included operational considerations. In fact, the experience in large part explains the selection of school rehabilitation under sub-component 2A due to their relative technical simplicity, known operating arrangements, and absence of issues of land ownership. 97. Project design should recognize shortcomings in the local M&E capacity and incorporate commensurate capacity building and technical assistance. As part of project design, and in keeping with the reliance on civil servants for project implementation, the line ministry’s M&E unit was made responsible for data collection, analysis, and reporting, and staff from the Ministry of Decentralization participated in the APA. However, the M&E staff did not have the experience required to conduct systematic M&E informed by basic sector standards and was, like the PS, not sufficiently incentivized to take on the task. The M&E function was somewhat strengthened during implementation by the introduction of GEMS, but with limitations imposed by the lack of IT skills in the PS. On the other side, civil servants trained through immersion in the consultant performance assessment team were able to gradually take over the task, albeit only for the four cities in the restructured project 98. Project design should have built-in flexible mechanisms to return to normalcy whenever proposed innovations or pilots do not have the expected results. This flexibility would allow adjustments to institutional arrangement and a more fluid transition from civil servants to project consultants. The lack of Page 33 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) well-defined institutional arrangements for this pilot aspect of the project significantly contributed to the low performance of the project. Page 34 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improve access to basic services and infrastructure. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion People provided with Number 0.00 76,000.00 391,000.00 406,911.00 improved urban living conditions 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator as revised during implementation substantially covers the same beneficiaries as those to be counted through the PAD indicator "Number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500 meter range under the project." At appraisal, only beneficiaries of identified road investments were considered and the original target underestimates the number of beneficiaries at the end of the project. It was expected to be updated to include investments determined during implementation. The final value includes 391,711 beneficiaries of upgraded roads and 15,200 beneficiaries of anti-erosion works in Kananga. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 104,230.00 394,000.00 419,240.00 Page 35 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 51.00 51.00 52.00 Comments (achievements against targets): At appraisal, beneficiaries of identified road investments and a small number of minimum estimated beneficiaries from other infrastructures and training were considered. Hence the original target underestimates the number of beneficiaries at the end of the project. It was expected to be updated to incorporate beneficiaries from demand-driven investments and training. The final value includes 12,000 beneficiaries of school rehabilitation and 329 beneficiaries of training, in addition to the beneficiaries of improved urban living conditions. The percentage of female beneficiaries was estimated at appraisal based on the female part of the general population and the actual achievement based on the administrative census data reported by authorities of project cities. Objective/Outcome: Strengthen urban and municipal management of the targeted cities. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Cities qualifying for Number 0.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 performance-based investment fund 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): Page 36 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) The indicator was rephrased during implementation and corresponds to the PAD indicator "Number of LGs respecting base conditions and achieving at least 65 points out of 100 on the annual PA, triggering performance-based investment funds." The indicator was modified several times. As the number of beneficiary cities evolved, so did the indicator. The results of the APA carried out in 2019 prior to project restructuring in January 2020 showed that five cities (Bukavu, Kalemie, Goma, Kisangani and Kolwezi) respected the minimum conditions and passed the performance criteria. For the final performance evaluation carried out in 2020, all four cities (Bukavu, Goma, Kikwit and Matadi) met the minimum conditions and passed the performance criteria. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Performance-based fund Number 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 allocation system piloted and recommendations available 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 08-Jun-2016 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): The original indicator was "Performance-based fund allocation system (PBFAS) for allocating investment funds to cities ready to roll out." The level of ambition was reduced in the 2016 restructuring (from system being ready to roll out to piloting the system). The indicator was introduced as a 0/1 indicator but in practice treated as a percentage indicator and therefore it is presented in the main text as a percentage indicator (the metrics cannot be modified in the annex). The indicator was substantially achieved, with the PBFAS piloted and recommendations available and sanctioned by the project closing workshop. The indicator would have been fully achieved had the national workshop dedicated to discussing the outcomes of the UDP and the related recommendations been held. It was not organized due to a combination of time constraints before project closing and Covid-related restrictions. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Page 37 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Cities with improved Number 6.00 9.00 3.00 9.00 livability, sustainability and/or management 31-Jan-2017 30-Nov-2022 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator was added through the 2017 Additional Financing. When the number of cities was reduced, the final indicator target was also reduced to target three of the four cities retained in the project. The final achieved value of nine cities includes Bukavu, Kalemie, Kananga, Kikwit, Kindu, Kisangani, Kolwezi, Matadi, and Mbandaka. Only Goma did not benefit substantially from the project to be counted as a city with either improved livability, sustainability and/or management. Objective/Outcome: Provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Number of new Ebola cases Number 24.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 confirmed. 15-Dec-2019 30-Jul-2021 30-Jul-2021 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Primary Infrastructure Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Page 38 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Roads rehabilitated, Non- Kilometers 0.00 11.90 31.80 31.81 rural 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): At appraisal, only beneficiaries of identified road investments were considered and the original target underestimates the number of beneficiaries at the end of the project. It was expected to be updated to include investments determined during implementation. The indicator target was gradually increased (21.8 km in 2016, 34.5 km for the AF, 51.5 km in January 2020) before being reduced to the final formally revised target in August 2020, which also corresponds to the actual achieved value at completion. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Person-days of employment Number 0.00 3,500,000.00 730,000.00 737,070.00 created (number) of which female (percentage) 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 Of which Female Percentage 0.00 10.00 3.00 6.39 Comments (achievements against targets): At appraisal, the objective was to generate 3.5 million person-days of employment, an objective that was regularly revisited for each project restructuring (1.3 million in 2016, 2.2 million in 2017, 1.2 million in January 2020 and 730,000 in August 2020). Only the final revised indicator value was achieved. The initial sub-indicator on the percentage of employment generated for women (10 percent) was not met, but the revised target of 3 percent was surpassed, with 6 percent of female beneficiaries of works. The value-setting and achievement for this sub-indicator is discussed in Section III of the main text. Page 39 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Drainage constructed Kilometers 0.00 2.00 8.70 6.20 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator was dropped from the project through the 2017 AF and reintroduced again through the project restructuring in August 2020. The final value measures drainage constructed in relation to road rehabilitation to improve runoff of surface water. The difference between the target value and actual achievement is due to investments in Goma being canceled. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Bidding documents for works Yes/No No Yes Yes to stop main erosions in Kananga available and 13-Aug-2020 30-Jul-2021 30-Jul-2021 emergency works done on at least one erosion Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator was introduced through the project restructuring in August 2020. The project elaborated bidding documents for the nine main identified gully erosions in Kananga and completed emergency works on two of these gully erosions. Page 40 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Component: Urban Governance (including PPA) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Beneficiaries that feel project Percentage 0.00 75.00 80.00 75.00 investments reflected their needs (percentage) 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 04-May-2017 30-Jul-2021 Beneficiaries that feel Number 0.00 39,868.00 163,548.00 163,504.00 project inv. reflected their needs - female (number) Total beneficiaries - female Number 0.00 53,157.00 204,435.00 218,005.00 (number) Total beneficiaries - male Number 0.00 51,073.00 190,407.00 201,235.00 (number) Beneficiaries that feel Number 0.00 38,305.00 152,325.00 150,927.00 project inv. reflected their needs - male (number) Comments (achievements against targets): The original target was revised upwards with the 2017 AF since the first beneficiary survey showed a very high level of satisfaction with the project (86.6 percent). The beneficiary satisfaction survey carried out before project closing likewise showed a relatively high level of satisfaction, with 75 percent of beneficiaries in surveyed responding that their expectations have been met and 90 percent reporting that they are overall satisfied with the project. Page 41 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) The sub-indicators are a function of the level of expression expressed, the total number of beneficiaries and the estimated percentage of female beneficiaries. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion City budget and narrative Percentage 0.00 95.00 70.00 75.00 reports generated, disclosed, and debated timely each 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 08-Jun-2016 30-Jul-2021 semester. Comments (achievements against targets): The original target aimed for timely publication of almost all quarterly city budget reports. The indicator was revised in 2016, from quarterly to semester publication and maintained in subsequent project restructurings, throughout measuring the percentage of timely publication of budget reports of the cities actively benefiting from the project. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Cities meeting targets for Number 0.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 infrastructure maintenance 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 08-Jan-2020 30-Jul-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): The target value was revised downwards to three in 2016 and upwards to six with the addition of three new cities through the AF in 2017. It was revised down to three again with the reduction of geographic scope through the January 2020 project restructuring. Page 42 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion New urban sector legislation Number 0.00 1.00 0.50 and regulation prepared. 09-May-2013 31-Jul-2019 30-Jun-2021 Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator remained unchanged throughout the project. The indicator was introduced as a 0/1 indicator but in practice treated as a percentage indicator. The project supported preparation of a new urban code and related application decrees. The work was begun with some preparatory diagnostic work and a draft law was available by project closing. However, a planned substantial national consultation process and related updates to the draft law had not been finalized and the application decrees are not available. The indicator is considered achieved at 50 percent. Page 43 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective/Outcome 1: Improve access to basic services and infrastructure 1. People provided with improved urban living conditions Outcome Indicators 2. Direct project beneficiaries, of which female (%) 1. Roads rehabilitated, nonrural 2. Person-days of employment created (number) of which female (percentage Intermediate Results Indicators 3. Drainage constructed 4. Bidding documents for works to stop main erosions in Kananga available and emergency works done on at least one erosion 1. 31.81 kilometers of roads rehabilitated in the cities of Bukavu (4.1 km), Kalemie (2.2 km), Kikwit (5.4 km), Kindu (3.1 km), Kisangani (2.9 km), Kolwezi (4.5 km), Matadi (3.9 km), and Mbandaka (5.7 km) 2. 6.2 kilometers of drainage constructed in the cities of Kikwit (0.4 km), Kindu (0.2 km), Kisangani (1.3 km), Kolwezi (2.0 km), Matadi (0.4 km), and Mbandaka (2.1 km) Key Outputs by Component 3. Two heads of erosion stabilized in Kananga (‘MONUSCO’ erosion near (linked to the achievement of Objective/Outcome 1) the airport and ‘SNCC2’ erosion) 4. Provision of construction material for treatment of two further erosion gullies (completed after the project on government own funds) 5. Technical designs, bidding documents, ESIAs and RAPs for stabilization works on seven erosion gullies 6. 737,070 Person-days of employment created of which 6% for women Objective/Outcome 2 : Strengthen urban and municipal management of the targeted cities 1. Cities qualifying for performance-based investment fund Outcome Indicators 2. Performance-based fund allocation system piloted and recommendations available Page 44 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 3. Cities with improved livability, sustainability and/or management 1. Beneficiaries that feel project investments reflected their needs (percentage) 2. City budget and narrative reports generated, disclosed, and debated Intermediate Results Indicators timely each semester 3. Cities meeting targets for infrastructure maintenance 4. New urban sector legislation and regulation prepared 1. Rehabilitation or reconstruction of 10 schools with 120 classrooms total in Kindu, Matadi and Kikwit 2. Technical assistance to nine project cities through the FCBT 3. Study on LG revenue mobilization 4. Study on management of revenue-generating LG assets 5. Operation of an independent performance-evaluation team 6. External audits of LG accounts 7. Elaboration of local development plans for project cities 8. Development and implementation of an asset inventory and maintenance planning tool Key Outputs by Component 9. Development and implementation of financial management manuals (linked to the achievement of Objective/Outcome 2) for project cities 10.Development and implementation of training plans for LG staff 11.MINDEC study tour to Senegal 12.Elaboration of URPs for Bukavu, Goma, Kikwit and Matadi 13.Delivery of urban planning software and equipment to the Kinshasa University Institute of Architecture and Urban Planning and the para- statal Office for Studies in Urbanism and Architecture 14. Technical assistance to updating the urban code 15. Beneficiary satisfaction surveys (MTR and project closing) 16. Impact assessment (MTR and project closing) 17. Project technical audits (MTR and project closing) Page 45 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Objective/Outcome 3: Provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency Outcome Indicators Number of new Ebola cases confirmed Intermediate Results Indicators - 1. Infection prevention and control activities (US$ 5.4 million) (maintenance of water supply systems in health facilities and community hand washing facilities, training in virus detection, etc.) 2. Communication and community engagement activities (US$ 1.8 million) (operation of community engagement units, risk Key Outputs by Component communication campaigns, etc.) (linked to the achievement of Objective/Outcome 3) 3. Operational cost for UNICEF (US$ 1.3 million) (overall coordination and maintenance of local-level response capacity) 4. Maintenance of psycho-social response capacity (US$ 0.8 million) (salaries for psycho-social teams and nutritional guidance) 5. Medical treatment (US$ 0.2 million) (pediatric treatment and support) 6. UNICEF indirect cost (US$ 0.5 million) (5% overhead) Page 46 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Mahine Diop Sr. Municipal Engineer, TTL Aissata Zerbo Procuremetn Specialist Angelo Donou Financial Management Specialist Antoine V. Lema Social Development Specialist Bella Diallo Senior Financial Management Specialist Christian Vang Eghoff Seniro Urban Development Specialist Deo Mulikuza Mirindi Water and Sanitation Specialist Ernestina Attafuah Team Member Hocine Chalal Social Development Specialist Jean Mabi Mumumba Sr. Public Sector Specialist Louise Mekonda Communications Specialist Nicole Kazadi Team Assistant Nneoma Nwogu Counsel Paul Jonathan Martin Social Development Specialist Philippe Mahele Liwoke Procurement Specialist Supervision/ICR Mahine Diop Sr. Municipal Engineer, TTL (ADM) Christian Vang Eghoff Sr. Urban Development Specialist, TTL (ADM) Jean Mabi Mulumba Sr. Public Sector Specialist, TTL Patrice Joachim Nirina Rakotoniaina Municipal Engineer, TTL Muliro Mashauri Disaster Risk Management Specialist, ICR TTL Aissata Zerbo Procurement Specialist Antoine Lema Senior Social Development Specialist Barbry R. Keller Senior Operations Specialist Bourama Diaite Senior Procurement Specialist Christelle Epuza Team Assistant Christian Katumba Kapena Financial Management Consultant Christophe Ngongo Muzyumba Environmental Specialist Claude Lobo Environmental Specialist Clément Tukeba Senior Procurement Specialist Cyrille Valence Ngouana Kengne Senior Environmental Specialist Dina Ranarifidy Senior Urban Development Specialist Donat Tunamau Social Development Specialist Franck Sidney Chrysantheme Bitemo Communications Specialist Grace Muhimpundu Social Development Specialist Gratien Boni Safeguards Consultant Page 47 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Guy Kindoki Kiaku Senior Procurement Specialist Jean-Claude Azonfack Procurement Specialist Julie Luvisa Bazolana Procurement Team Koho Francine Takoy Team Assistant Lansina Traore Procurement Specialist Leila Chennoufi OHS Expert Léonce Kazumba Team Assistant Louise Engulu Senior Communications Specialist Luc Kakumba Team Assistant Lydia Kanyembo Safeguards Consultant Lydie Madjou Financial Management Specialist Mamadou Deme Senior Financial Management Specialist Michael Macnamara Winter Local Governance Consultant Nicole Kazadi Team Assistant Paul Martin Senior Environmental Specialist Peter Lafere Senior Social Development Specialist Philippe Mahele Liwoke Senior Procurement Specialist Ramatou Diallo Urban Development Consultant Seraphine Nsabimana Team Assistant Sung Heng C. Kok Shun Team Assistant B. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY12 7.825 81,131.26 FY13 25.450 271,208.93 FY14 0 0.00 Total 33.28 352,340.19 Supervision/ICR FY13 0 0.00 FY14 14.686 114,886.80 FY15 14.262 120,946.16 FY16 18.895 144,248.47 FY17 17.985 146,213.23 Page 48 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) FY18 39.057 318,131.30 FY19 38.294 258,847.19 FY20 32.225 187,439.81 Total 175.40 1,290,712.96 Page 49 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Amount at Approval Approved Financing Actual at Project Percentage of Components (US$M) incl. AF (US$M) Closing (US$M) Approved Financing Primary Infrastructure 50.0 82.0 69.7 85.0 Contingent Emergency - 10.0 - Response Urban Governance (incl. PPA) 50.0 108.0 32.3 29.9 Total 100.0 190.0 112.0 58.9 Note: The difference between the revised amount (US$ 112 million) and the amount in the Datasheet (US$ 108.19 million) recorded as historic disbursements is due to fluctuations in the SDR/US$ exchange rate. The PS recorded expenditure in US$ while the Bank disbursement system used SDR as base currency for the UDP. The final disbursement in the currency of the financing of the Grant H8420-ZR and Credit 6034-ZR is SDR 76,119,851.78. This represents 99.8 percent of the project amount at closing, SDR 76,300,886.00 after cancellation of SDR 56,299,114.00. Page 50 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 1. The investments analyzed under this project pertain to road investments that account for 82% of the total investments under the project (the rest being investments in classrooms and other educational infrastructure) and for 56 percent of the total project cost. During appraisal a defined pipeline of road investments was used to conduct the economic analysis, using the Roads Economic Decision Model (RED), developed by the Bank, and applying a discount rate of 12 percent, as is common practice for economic infrastructure investments such as roads, and assuming a longevity of assets of 15 years. The appraisal analysis yielded subproject ERRs ranging from 14 to 74 percent. The same approach was applied to screen sub-project investments (roads) for their economic viability during implementation. In this ICR economic analysis, the same approach and assumptions are adopted as during project appraisal, yielding comparable subproject ERRs ranging from 8 to 80 percent, as detailed below. Since project appraisal, some projects apply a social discount rate of 6 percent for road investments. While the respective ERRs of the subprojects evaluated here would not change, the NPV would be significantly higher. 2. RED is based on the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM) but adapted for more accurate analysis of low-volume and unpaved roads and to require fewer inputs, which can be impractical to collect, such as surface layers material properties and refined traffic data. The RED model performs an economic evaluation of road investments options using the consumer surplus approach. It computes benefits for normal, generated, induced, and diverted traffic, and considers changes in road length, conditions in the dry and wet seasons, geometry, and surface type. 3. Costs that enter the RED computation include actual construction costs (design studies, cost of works, supervision engineer, and environmental and social measures), operation and maintenance, and vehicle fleet economic unit costs and utilization (new vehicle cost, fuel and oil, tires, labor, passenger composition and time, usage patterns, and so on), the latter being listed in table A4-1 below. 4. Road user benefits valued are reduced vehicle operating costs and passenger time costs, with the main input variables in RED being traffic counting on each road section (see table A4-2 for an example) and the speed of a reference vehicle. The latter was in most cases 15 to 20 km per hour before rehabilitation and 35 to 50 km per hour after rehabilitation for wet or dry conditions, respectively. The cost of congestion on existing roads that might be reduced after road rehabilitation was not considered, nor were the benefits from improved drainage (which in some cases was an investment selection criterion in addition to transport connectivity). The annual traffic growth rate was defined based on recent trends and was in most cases set to 3 percent, except in cases where a more substantial increase was expected due to UDP funding of the rehabilitation of linked road segments that would lead to higher traffic flows (in particular Avenues Tsasaditumba and its direct extension Terrasse in Matadi, and the crossing Avenues Eveché and de la Paix in Kindu, for which initial traffic growth was set to between 10 and 30 percent). Page 51 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Table 4-1. Vehicle Fleet Characteristics Four- Motor Car Wheel Bus Bus Goods Truck Truck Bicycle cycle Medium Drive Light Heavy Vehicle Heavy Articulated Economic Unit Costs New Vehicle Cost ($/vehicle) 400 750 29,580 43,000 32,480 76,560 30,160 150,800 168,200 Fuel Cost ($/liter for MT, $/MJ for NMT) 0.10 1.60 1.60 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 Lubricant Cost ($/liter) 2.40 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 New Tire Cost ($/tire) 45.00 75.00 130.00 290.00 290.00 290.00 670.00 670.00 720.00 Maintenance Labor Cost ($/hour) 2.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Crew Cost ($/hour) 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Interest Rate (%) 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 Utilization and Loading Kilometers Driven per Year (km) 18,000 35,000 17,000 50,000 70,000 70,000 25,000 65,000 97,920 Hours Driven per Year (hr) 1,500 1,100 540 1,440 1,440 2,160 1,248 1,600 1,200 Service Life (years) 5 6 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 Percent of Time for Private Use (%) 100.00 20.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Gross Vehicle Weight (tons) 0.15 0.30 1.20 3.00 3.00 11.00 3.00 20.00 30.00 Table 4-2. Example of Traffic Counting, Ex-ante and Ex-post on Six First Road Investments BUKAVU KALEMIE KIKWIT KINDU MATADI MBANDAKA ex ex ex ante ex post ex ante ex post ex ante ex post ex ante ex post ex ante ex ante post post 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2013 Trafics des projets 2016 2016 Bicycle 0 38 671 319 186 48 353 187 6 2 0 6,546 Motorcycle 741 6567 5537 8196 6635 6738 5285 11835 62 905 323 9695 Car Medium 209 1732 237 320 4156 1,719 28 65 1088 504 195 86 Four-Wheel Drive 308 2045 346 273 291 481 160 259 303 149 0 85 Bus Light 63 1034 396 351 32 31 14 24 46 11 0 32 Bus Heavy 1 189 126 32 32 51 1 29 17 3 75 60 Goods Vehicle 0 697 43 106 49 17 40 7 207 16 80 102 Truck Heavy 26 207 18 57 43 51 29 6 94 36 81 44 Truck Articulated 0 17 7 19 2 11 4 0 111 43 0 1 Total 1348 12526 7381 9673 11426 9147 5914 12412 1934 1669 754 16651 5. The results of the cost-benefit analysis show, on average, a high return of financed investments, though there is variation among the individual sub-projects. At closing, the NPV is estimated at US$ 48.4 million against road investments carried out under the project, corresponding to a weighted average ERR of 25.1 percent. The ERRs for respective sub-project investments range from 8 to 80 percent, as detailed in table 4-3 below. These results are supported by a much larger usage of road segments after rehabilitation that increased in total from 100,000 to 135,000 vehicles per day after road rehabilitation. 6. There are, however, some notable variations between the ex-ante and ex post results, as shown in table A4-3 below. Deviations are in most cases explained by cost overruns (that is, in Kalemie, line #3) and in variations in traffic volumes. Cases of large increases in traffic volumes can be seen in subprojects #2, 4, 5, and 7, whereas traffic volumes decreased for investments #1, 6, 12, and 15. Some of the decreases can be explained by the fact that the ex-ante analysis was carried out shortly after the commissioning of the rehabilitated roads, and hence, traffic had not substantially returned from alternative routes, and economic activity along the roads was still to rebound. In each case, a more detailed analysis of traffic composition and changes to this (such as a switch from motorcycle to car or inversely) could support a more granular analysis. Page 52 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 7. This ICR economic analysis did not include investments made in educational infrastructure. The investments were in most cases finalized close to project completion, needed statistics on attendance and passing and dropout rates were difficult to garner and attribute to project investments, and they counted only for a small proportion (18 percent) of total investments made. In fact, the dominance of road investments among the various choices for investments from which local governments could select, may suggest limited stakeholder consultations by local governments. Investment decisions by local governments are expected to maximize the allocative efficiency—that is, the idea of investing in local goods and services that are the most needed and wanted by local residents—and needs typically vary across different constituencies. However, it may also just be that roads are a universally desired commodity, where they are lacking in quantity or quality. Table 4-3: Results of Ex-ante and Ex-post Cost-benefit Analysis Using RED First six road investments Ex Ante Ex Post Eval 2013 Ex post Eval 2013 Ex post 2016 Length ex NPV # VEH/ NPV # VEH/ Final length Appraisal cost estimate $/km Actual cost $/km ERR ERR ante ($m) DAY ($m) DAY 1. Matadi (Tsasaditumba) 2.10 2.10 4,001,713 1,905,578 3,787,968 1,803,794 20% 1.63 1,934 16% 1.04 1,669 2. Bukavu (Hippodrome) 2.30 1.90 1,614,820 702,096 1,836,884 967,800 18% 0.47 1,348 80% 7.08 12,526 3. Kalemie (kalemie) 2.00 2.20 1,892,509 946,254 6,950,967 3,159,530 74% 7.18 7,381 30% 6.11 9,673 4. Kindu (Eveché) 0.80 1.24 2,177,506 2,721,882 4,097,018 3,312,060 18% 0.69 5,914 12% -0.06 12,412 5. Mbandaka (Yassanyama) 3.10 3.14 6,349,737 2,048,302 6,690,595 2,128,729 14% 0.68 754 32% 7.36 16,651 6. Kikwit (université) 1.60 1.80 2,706,549 1,691,593 2,943,022 1,635,012 61% 7.93 11,426 46% 5.81 9,147 Total 11.90 12.38 18,742,834 1,514,205 26,306,454 2,125,259 18.58 28,757 27.34 62,078 Weighted average: 29.03% 30.96% Additional road investments, Exsix Ante initial cities Ex Post Ex ante Ex post Ex ante Ex post Length ex NPV # VEH/ NPV # VEH/ Final length Ex ante cost estimate $/km Actual cost $/km ERR ERR ante ($m) DAY ($m) DAY 7. Matadi (Terrasse) 1.83 1.83 2,104,225 1,153,000 2,550,932 1,397,771 16% 0.13 1,120 21% 3.06 7,190 8. Bukavu (Irambo) 1.23 1.23 2,095,890 1,699,830 3,373,995 2,754,281 35% 7.11 7,082 16% 0.65 8,918 9. Bukavu (Fizi-Mimosa) 0.94 0.94 1,406,808 1,503,000 2,077,557 2,219,612 15% -0.03 2,652 8% -0.39 3,398 10. Kalemie No additional investments 11. Kindu (De la Paix) 1.86 1.86 3,999,380 2,156,000 4,798,816 2,586,963 30% 3.31 8,224 13% 0.31 13,846 12. Mbandaka (Itéla) 2.56 2.56 5,780,480 2,258,000 6,618,018 2,585,163 27% 4.11 11,012 13% 0.43 5,836 13. Kikwit (Wazabanga) 3.60 3.60 4,362,022 1,211,000 5,022,367 1,394,327 18% 0.78 4,627 25% 3.39 8,596 Total 12.01 12.00 19,748,805 1,645,322 24,441,684 2,036,298 15.41 34,717 7.46 47,784 Weighted average: 22.74% 14.17% Three AF cities Ex Ante Ex Post Ex ante Ex post Appraisal of AF Ex post Length ex NPV # VEH/ NPV # VEH/ Final length AF appraisal cost estimate $/km Actual cost $/km ERR ERR ante ($m) DAY ($m) DAY 14. Goma (CCLK) 3.29 4,801,170 1,457,550 Not financed 12% 0.06 5,931 Not financed 15. Kisangani (Blvd 30 juin) 2.90 2.90 4,850,163 1,672,470 5,880,156 2,027,640 28% 4.24 21,122 23% 3.37 12,971 16. Kolwezi (Gazumbu) 2.24 2.56 3,899,907 1,741,030 3,256,176 1,271,944 12% 0.09 3,951 39% 5.24 6,402 17. Kolwezi (LDK) 1.25 1.97 2,299,098 1,836,340 2,367,164 1,204,663 20% 3.52 5,614 37% 4.98 6,204 Total 9.69 7.43 15,850,338 2,134,726 11,503,496 1,549,292 7.90 36,618 13.60 25,577 Weighted average: 18.31% 30.40% Grand total Ex Ante Ex Post Ex ante Ex post Ex ante Ex post Length ex NPV # VEH/ NPV # VEH/ Final length Ex ante cost estimate $/km Actual cost $/km ERR ERR ante ($m) DAY ($m) DAY Total 33.60 31.81 54,341,976.57 1,617,465.15 62,251,633.33 1,957,229 -- 41.90 100,092 -- 48.40 135,439 Weighted average 23.15% 25.14% 8. A comparison of unit cost for road rehabilitation shows that the cost here was at the higher end, but in line with average levels when accounting for factors such as type of work, region, conflict, and corruption. Even though comparisons of unit costs for road rehabilitation are complex, as few road contracts are the same, the average unit cost is US$ 1.8 million per km, which is at the higher end of road rehabilitation estimates analyzed by Collier et al (2015). Using a database of implemented road contracts, the average cost per km for road upgrading was assessed at US$ 250,000 and for widening and reconstruction US$ 874,000, both expressed in 2000 prices and both with Page 53 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) significant standard deviations. The authors estimated that road costs for an average African country in conflict, with corruption levels above, and a business environment below, the medians of their sample, is likely to yield twice the unit cost for road investments. This would yield an average of US$ 750,000 for upgrading and US$ 2.6 million for widening and reconstruction in 2020 prices (a 50 percent increase from 2000 based on the US consumer price index [CPI]). Page 54 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ANNEX 5. THE PERFORMANCE-BASED FUND ALLOCATION SYSTEM (PBFAS) 1. The PBFAS placed cities at the heart of the project. The approach aimed at improving urban governance at both the national and local levels, while improving municipal and urban management and fiscal performance. In so doing, the PBFAS was expected to support the establishment of improved lines of accountability between the local authorities (nominated mayors) and the city inhabitants, centered on a development program flowing from a local participatory process. This was envisaged to be achieved through the establishment of the principle of performance, enshrined in a city contract signed between the mayors and governors. 2. Contracts were designed to contain a number of performance criteria covering urban and municipal management, that focus on activities under the responsibility of the city authorities. Achieving these criteria, triggered funding for basic infrastructure and facilities at the neighborhood level, determined by the priorities of the population. The publication of information relating to urban and municipal management was a basic principle of the PBFAS, and civil society organizations were supported by the project in order to enable them to fully play their governance role in city affairs. 3. Increased attention was paid to strengthening the institutions and organizations charged with providing basic services, and to ensuring the sustainability of investments. For this reason, a performance-based approach was envisaged to link results obtained in municipal and urban management to financing of neighborhood infrastructure— thus establishing a link between the nominated mayors and the city populations that was missing. This approach was coupled with more substantial unconditional investments in structuring urban infrastructure (under Component 1), given the need to catch up on the investment deficit accumulated over the past decades. 4. The reason for linking performance only to funding of neighborhood infrastructure was to assure investments, in continuation of reconstruction efforts, and concurrently starting up a planning and participatory process which the city authorities could manage, as well as to establish a link between participation and meeting some of the most urgently felt local needs. 5. The mechanism was designed to create incentives for cities to perform well. No investments were planned to take place the first years, as a start-up period was allocated for the development of the LDPs, the training of personnel and time to carry out environmental and social studies for investments, once they were identified and agreed upon in consultation with the public. 6. The project design ensured that the capacity of the local government is strengthened through the support provided by the Flying Capacity Building Team (FCBT) made up of experts recruited by the project (a senior municipal administrator, a community development specialist, a procurement specialist, and an engineer with experience in urban planning), expected to travel to beneficiary cities to provide on-the-job training to municipal staff in meeting performance criteria and responding on a timely basis to special request raised. 7. The performance component underwent several readjustments during the implementation caused by the delay as cities were finding it difficult to attain the set criteria that could activate the performance-based allocation and to simplify the evaluation to make it more manageable to handle in-house by the MINDEC (rather than through the recruited team of independent performance evaluators). Readjustments (first restructuring) were intended to realign Page 55 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) the approach to the prevailing context and tone down the criteria to what was achievable and subsequent adjustments were done following the same logic. 8. Annual Performance Assessments (APAs) were regularly conducted in the target cities by an international firm from 2014 to 2019. Three out of four cities met the performance criteria in the 2018 APA. The 2019 APA was piloted by the General Secretariat of the MINDEC. Four (4) Flagship Cities achieved satisfactory scores and were rated as Performing Cities, whereas the four flagship cities retained after the scaling down (Bukavu, Goma, Kikwit and Matadi) achieved the performance criteria (that is, 100 percent achievement rate) as of April 31, 2021. 9. The transfer of the steering of the Annual Performance Assessment Scheme of Cities to the MINDEC was ensured thanks to the strategy defined by the SG/Decentralization during the Workshop in August 2020. The consolidation and sustainability of the APA remains a concern due to the lack of a sustainability approach from the government beyond the closing of the project. A suggestion was drawn during the August 2020 to establish a mechanism through the National Equalization Fund to motivate Good Municipal Governance through the Performance-based approach promoted by the project, and to solicit funding for the mechanism from development partners. This is unlikely to be achieved. 10. Table 5-2 below summarizes the cities’ progress towards achieving the performance-based conditions and criteria (Table 5-1), and the respective amount allocated throughout the project life cycle. Page 56 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Table 5-1: Base conditions and performance criteria in the original project Page 57 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Page 58 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Page 59 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) Table 5-2: Summary of cities’ progress towards achieving performance-based conditions and performance criteria. Page 60 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ANNEX 6. CLIENT’S COMMENTS UDP Permanent Secretariat's Comments on the World Bank's Draft Completion Report of February 7, 2022 (translation from French) 1. The table of contents reflects well all the points we would like to see in such a report. 2. The final values of the outcome indicators are consistent with those noted in the government report. 3. The factors identified as having affected the project at the time of its design and at the time of its execution are similar to those identified in the government report; the added factor that escaped the attention of the Permanent Secretariat of the UDP, specifically the inflation due to the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Special Drawing Rights. 4. We consider the World Bank's ICR to be sincere and reflective of our judgement. 5. The lessons learned and the recommendations are accurate and are close to those noted and formulated in the government's report. Evaluation of beneficiaries of rehabilitated or constructed infrastructure: 6. The evaluation of the beneficiaries of the rehabilitated or constructed infrastructure was based on estimation, because the approach for their quantification was not detailed in the PAD, while the target values kept on changing due to the many restructurings, making the evaluation difficult. Therefore, for the beneficiaries of the rehabilitated roads, it was necessary to count the people living along these roads up to a maximum of 500 meters on either side. For the schools, the standard capacity of 50 students per classroom was considered (translator’s note: and two classes per day). For the training beneficiaries, the figures were taken from the reports of the various workshops held. Page 61 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) ANNEX 7. RESULTS # PDO Indicators Original Revised Revided Revised Revised Actual Achiev. Target Target Target Target Target Achiev. Rate 1st Restr. 2nd Restr. 3rd Restr. 4th Rest June 2016 May 2017 Jan 2020 August 2020 Objective/Outcome: Improve access to basic services and infrastructure 1 People provided with improved urban 76,000 123,000 1,036,000 457,000 391,000 406,911 104.1% living conditions (Number) 2 Direct project beneficiaries (Number) 104,230 1,073,000 1,358,000 742,000 394,000 419,240 106.4% Female beneficiaries (Percentage) 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 52% 102% Objective/Outcome: Strengthen urban and municipal management of the targeted cities 4 Cities qualifying for performance-based 5/6 5/6 7/9 3/4 3/4 4/4 133.3% investment fund (Number) 5 Performance-based fund allocation 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 80% system piloted and recommendations available (Percentage) 6 Cities with improved livability, N/A N/A 9/9 4/4 3/4 4/4 133.3% sustainability and/or management (Number) Objective/Outcome: Provide immediate and effective response to an eligible crisis or emergency 7 Number of new Ebola cases confirmed N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 100% (Number) # Intermediate Result Indicators Original Revised Revided Revised Revised Actual Achiev. Target Target Target Target Target Achiev. Rate 1st Restr. 2nd Restr. 3rd Restr. 4th Restr. Component: Primary infrastructure 1 Roads rehabilitated, nonrural (Km) 11.9 21.8 34.8 51.5 31.80 31.81 100% 2 Person-days of employment created 3.5 M 1.3M 2.2M 1.2M 730,000 737,070 100.9% (Number) of which female (Percentage) 10% 10% 10% 10% 3% 6.39% 213% Page 62 of 63 The World Bank DRC Urban Development Project FY13 (P129713) 3 Drainage constructed (Km) 2 2 N/A N/A 8.70 8.70 100% 4 Bidding documents for works to stop N/A N/A N/A N/A Yes Yes 100% main erosions in Kananga available and emergency works done on at least one erosion (Yes/No) Component: Urban governance (including PPA) 1 Beneficiaries that feel project N/A 80% 75% 75% 80% 75% 93.75% investments reflected their needs (Percentage) 2 Beneficiaries that feel project inv. N/A 554,064 163,548 39,868 278,772 163,504 58.7% reflected their needs - female (Number) 3 Total beneficiaries - female (Number) N/A N/A 692,580 53,157 204,435 218,005 106.6% 4 Total beneficiaries - male (Number) N.A 665,420 665,420 51,073 190,407 201,235 105.7% 5 Beneficiaries that feel project inv. N/A 532,336 532,336 38,305 152,325 150,927 99.1% reflected their needs - male (Number) 6 City budget and narrative reports N/A 70% 95% 70% 70% 75% 107.1% generated, disclosed, and debated timely each semester (Percentage) 7 Cities meeting targets for infrastructure N/A 6 5 3 3 3 100% maintenance 8 New urban sector legislation and N/A N/A N/A 1 1 0.5 50% regulation prepared Page 63 of 63